
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THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE:

WHEREIN

ALL THE REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM IS CONFUTED, AND ITS IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED,

WITH A TREATISE CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BY

RALPH CUDWORTH, D D.

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TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

THE NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS OF DR. J. L. MOSHEIM,

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN HARRISON, M.A.

WITH A COPIOUS GENERAL INDEX TO THE WHOLE WORK.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION I.—Continued.

We come now to the second head proposed, of miracles and effects supernatural. That there hath been something miraculous or above nature, sometimes done even among the Pagans (whether by good or evil spirits), appears not only from their own records, but also from the scripture itself. And it is well known, that they pretended (besides oracles) to miracles also, even after the times of Christianity; and that not only in Apollonius Tyanæus and Apuleius, but also in the Roman emperors themselves, as Vespasian and Adrian, but especially in the temple of Æsculapius; thus much appearing from that Greek table therein hung up at Rome,[1] in which, amongst other things, this is recorded: "That a blind man being commanded by the oracle to kneel before the altar, and then passing from the right side thereof to the left, to lay five fingers upon the altar, and afterwards lifting up his hand, to touch his eyes therewith; all this being done accordingly, he recovered his sight, the people all applauding; that great miracles were done under the emperor Antoninus," &c. But we have in the scripture an account of miracles, both greater in number, and of a higher nature; done especially by Moses, and our Saviour Christ and his apostles.[2]

[1] Vide Gruteri Inscription. tom. 1. p. 71. This marble tablet, or rather fragment of a tablet, is supposed to have been suspended in the temple of Æsculapius in an island in the Tiber at Rome, where instances were recorded of cures effected by Æsculapius. This tablet has been copiously treated of by Daniel Le Clerc, Histoire de la Medicine, pt. 1. lib. 1. cap. 20.

[2] Our author here follows the early fathers, almost all of whom unhesitatingly be-

Wherefore it seems, that there are two sorts of miracles or effects supernatural. First, such as though they could not be done by any ordinary and natural causes here amongst us, and in

lieved that many miracles and prodigies were anciently done among heathen nations by the power and influence of evil spirits. See Athenagoras, Apology, cap. 20. p. 89; Tertullian's Apology, cap. 22. p. 222; Clement's Recognitions, lib. 4; cap. 21. &c. p. 542. &c. of the first volume of the Patres Apostolici, and several others. But I think our author would have done better to have considered all the miracles reported to have anciently taken place among the Pagans, either as false or uncertain, or to have happened from natural causes, or to have proceeded from the frauds and tricks of the priests. [On this point consult Van Dalen, De Oraculis, who throughout that work enumerates and explains many false miracles.] This has been well demonstrated by Father Anselm, in a remarkable Dissertation in the Histoire de l'Academie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres, tom. 8. p. 59; by Freret, in another Dissertation in the same work, tom. 8. p. 76; and previously by Jacques Serces, Traité des Miracles, p. 258. &c. And this view appears to me much more consistent with the divine glory than the one adopted by Dr. Cudworth. For if God allowed such a number of miracles as are on record to be performed among the heathen for the purpose of establishing the pagan religion and worship, he would in some sense himself have caused them to persevere in their ancestral superstitions and ceremonies. Nor is the opinion that I have mentioned altogether destitute of authority from the fathers, some of whom were certainly quicksighted enough in distinguishing miracles and exposing the frauds of the priests. The instances of miracles mentioned in the text rather serve to confirm my view than to oppose it.

I. Respecting the supposed miracles of Apollonius Tyanæus I have already made some observations. They are scarcely worthy of mention, and show their author to have been an ambitious man, somewhat skilled in deceiving the people. Nor do the prodigies of Apuleius deserve a better character; besides which, in his Apology, still extant, he himself expressly disclaims all suspicion of his being a magician.

II. The miracles ascribed to Vespasian and Adrian bear internal marks of falsehood, as has been fully shown by C. A. Heumann, in a remarkable Dissertation, De Miraculis Vespasiani Pœciles, tom. 2. lib. 2. p. 427; J. Le Clerc, Historia Ecclesiæ Primorum Duorum Sæculorum, cent. 2. year 138. pp. 610. 611; and J. Serces, Traité Des Miracles, p. 276. &c.

III. There remain then only the miracles of Æsculapius, the most celebrated of any, and most relied on by the heathen opponents of Christianity. But it will appear, I think, from the following observations, that no rational credit is due to them. (1.) First, then, I observe, that all the priests of Æsculapius, as I have proved in another place, were skilled in medicine, and having first minutely examined the diseases and the constitutions of those who lay sick in the temple of the god, afterwards prescribed remedies proper for curing their complaints. The invalids who committed the care of their recovery to Æsculapius were not cured by a word or a sentence; but by herbs, juices, and other things such as are used by physicians. Æsculapius' miracles were therefore just such as are done by medical men of the present day. I will prove this by two authentic testimonies, one from a Christian writer, the other from a disbeliever in Christianity. The first is Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 1. p. 35. 36. who thus writes: Dii, si quando, ut fama est, nonnullis attribuere medicinam, aut cibum aliquem jusserunt capi, aut qualitatis alicujus ebibi potionem, aut herbarum et graminum succos superimponi inquietantibus caussis, ambulare, cessare, aut re aliquâ, quæ officiat, abstinere; quod esse non magnum, nec admirationis alicujus stupore condignum promptum est, si volueritis attendere; et medici etiam sic curant.....Nulla autem virtus est medicaminibus amovere, quæ noceant; beneficia ista rerum non sunt curationum potestates, "If the gods, as is reported, ever have administered medicine to any persons, or commanded a certain sort of food to be taken, or liquid of a particular kind to be drunk, or the juices of herbs and grains to be applied to the parts affected, to walk, to rest, or to abstain from any thing that may be hurtful, it is obviously no great thing, nor worthy of any extraordinary degree of wonder, if it be properly considered; and physicians use the same method of cure.....For there is no great power in removing what is noxious by means of medicines; such benefits as these are the powers of the things themselves rather than of the cures." The latter is Lucian, who,

that respect may be called supernatural; yet might notwithstanding be done, God permitting only, by the ordinary and natural power of other invisible created spirits, angels or demons.

Philopseudes, vol. 2 of his works, p. 333. explains the true cause of miracles for which Æsculapius was so famous, in the following words: Ὁ γὰρ Ἀσκληπιὸς αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ παῖδες αὐτοῦ ἥπια φάρμακα πάσσοντες, ἐθεράπευον τοὺς νοσοῦντας, "Æsculapius and his children cured the sick by administering wholesome remedies." See the Clementine, hom. 9. sect. 17. p. 690. vol. 1 of the Patres Apostolici. (2.) If it should be thought that any of the cures of Æsculapius, and that of the blind man in particular, related by Dr. Cudworth on the authority of the marble tablet, cannot be rendered consistent with the above observation, it may be replied, that if all the attendant circumstances were accurately examined, it would be apparent that natural remedies or fraud were concerned in the transaction. As regards the blind man, if we grant that he was really deprived of vision, there is at once ground for suspicion in his being ordered by the oracle to place his fingers on the altar of Æsculapius, and after that with them to touch his eyes. For no doubt the cunning priests had placed upon the altar some ointment good for ophthalmic diseases, with which when the blind man had rubbed his eyes, he suddenly recovered his sight. This might perhaps be more satisfactorily shown, were we informed what kind of disease it was under which he laboured. (3.) And this view is abundantly confirmed from the fact that Æsculapius could not cure all, but only some, namely those whose diseases were curable. But if he cured diseases by a divine power, without doubt, as our Saviour Jesus Christ did, he would have healed all kinds of maladies, even those on which physicians had already exhausted all the resources of their art. The author of the Clementine, a not contemptible writer of the third century, has acutely observed, that those who received help from Æsculapius had their names preserved in his temple, but that those who died could not record their misfortune: hom. 9. sect. 17. p. 690: Ἄλλοι δὲ νοσήσαντες, καὶ εὐξάμενοι, ἐξ αὐτομάτου ὑγιάναντες οὓς ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἔγραψαν, καὶ ἀναθήματα ἐποίησαν· οἱ μὲν τοίγε μετὰ εὐχὴν διαφωνήσαντες, τὰς ἀπορυχίας ἀναθῆναι οὐ δύνανται. The same reproach is also urged by Arnobius against the heathen priests, Adv. Gentes, lib. 1. p. 36: Quot millia vultis à nobis debilium ostendi, quot tabificis affectos morbis, nullam retulisse medicinam? cùm per omnia supplices irent templa, cùm Deorum ante ora prostrati, limina ipsa converrerent osculis, cùm Æsculapium ipsum datorem (ut prædicant) sanitatis, quoad illis superfuit vita, et precibus fatigarent et invitarent miserrimis votis..... Quid prodest ostendere, unum aut alterum fortasse curatos, cùm tot millibus subvenerit nemo et plena sint omnia miserorum infeliciumque delubra, "How many thousand invalids, how many labouring under lingering diseases, do you wish us to point out, who have received no cure? while they went as suppliants to all the temples, and prostrate in the presence of the gods swept the very threshold with their kisses; while they fatigued with their prayers and invoked with pitiable vows, so long as life continued, Æsculapius, the vaunted restorer of health.....What is the use of exhibiting one or two persons cured, when no help is afforded to so many thousands, and the temples are all full of wretched and miserable objects?" To meet this objection, the priests of Æsculapius used to reply, that the gods afforded aid only to the good, and neglected the calamities of the wicked. But this answer is evidently futile, and might be used by all the cheats that fraudulently and deceitfully cozen the credulous vulgar of their money. Facts and miracles calculated to establish a religion ought to be free from any such exceptions as these; and our Saviour benefited good and bad indiscriminately who implored his aid.

IV. After all, the priests of Æsculapius could not so cautiously manage their affairs, but that the more discerning could perceive that the fame and reputation of the Deity rested as much upon fraud and trickery as upon medicines and remedies. For they, like the modern worshippers of the saints, sought revenue and riches for their temples, and for themselves the means of a more easy and luxurious life. Sometimes needy men were hired with money to feign sickness, and then boldly to pretend that they had been suddenly cured by Æsculapius; and sometimes patients lying in the temple were deceived by fictitious visions. An instance has been quoted out of Aristophanes, Pluto, act 5. ver. 555. &c. of a slave named Carion being introduced on the stage, who in very plain terms explains a device once set on foot by the priests of Æsculapius to deceive the unwary. I shall only give one passage out of a Christian, or, if you please,

As, for example, if a stone or other heavy body should first ascend upwards, and then hang in the air, without any visible either mover or supporter, this would be to us a miracle or effect supernatural; and yet, according to vulgar opinion, might this be done by the natural power of created invisible beings, angels or demons; God only permitting, without whose special providence it is conceived they cannot thus intermeddle with our human affairs. Again, if a perfectly illiterate person should readily speak Greek or Latin, this also would be to us a miracle, or effect supernatural; for so is the apostles' speaking with tongues accounted; and yet in demoniacs is this sometimes done by evil demons, God only permitting. Such also amongst the Pagans was that miraculum cotis (as Apuleius calls it) that "miracle of the whetstone," done by Accius Navius, when at his command, it was divided into two with a razor.[3] But secondly, there is another sort of miracles, or effects supernatural, such as are above the power of all second causes, or any natural created being whatsoever, and so can be attributed to none but God Almighty himself, the author of nature, who therefore can control it at pleasure.

As for that late theological politician, who, writing against miracles, denies as well those of the former, as of this latter kind, contending that a miracle is nothing but a name which the ignorant vulgar gives to opus naturæ insolitum, "any unwonted work of nature, or to what themselves can assign no cause of;" as also, that if there were any such thing done contrary to nature, or above it, it would rather weaken than confirm our belief of the divine existence;[4] we find his discourse every way so weak, groundless, and inconsiderable, that we could not think it here to deserve a confutation.

But of the former sort of those miracles is that to be understood, Deut. xiii.: "If there arise among you a prophet, or

a semi-Christian author, from which it will appear that the Christians were not wholly ignorant of the selfish frauds of the priests. The author of the Clementine, hom. 9. sect. 18. p. 691. makes use of these words:—Πόσοι δὲ καὶ καταψεύδονται χρηματισμοὺς καὶ θεραπείας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀποτελεσθείσας, καὶ ταύτας βεβαιοῦνται μετὰ ὅρκων; πόσοι δὲ ἐπὶ μισθῷ ἑαυτοὺς ἐξέδωκαν, δι' ἐνίων ἐπινοιῶν πάσχειν τινὰ ἀναδεξάμενοι, καὶ οὕτως κηρύξαντες, αὐτῶν τὸ πάθος ἀντιπαθείᾳ ἀποκατασταθέντες, κεχρηματίσθαι τὴν θεραπείαν λέγουσιν, ἵνα τὸ ἀναίσθητον ἐπιγράψωσιν σέβασμα; "How many have convicted of falsehood the oracles, and the cures performed by them, which have even been averred by oaths? How many have given themselves up to hire, who voluntarily assuming certain maladies, and giving this out publicly, when they have been cured of the disease by the remedy, say that the recovery was oracularly promised, in order to corroborate their stupid religion?" And that Origen was not ignorant of these frauds, will be apparent, I think, from an attentive perusal of what he says of the miracles of Æsculapius, Adv. Celsum, lib. 3. p. 124.

[3] Vide Livium, lib. 1. cap. 36. p. 67. It is also mentioned by Cicero and other ancient writers. Our author seems to have thought that an evil spirit was present and divided the whetstone, while Accius only appeared to cut it with the razor.

[4] Vide Spinozæ Tractat. Theologico-politic. cap. 6. p. 67.

dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or wonder come to pass whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, and serve them; thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or dreamer of dreams; for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul." For it cannot be supposed, that God Almighty would himself purposely inspire any man to exhort others to idolatry, and immediately assist such a one with his own supernatural power of doing miracles, in confirmation of such doctrine. But the meaning is, that by the suggestion of evil spirits, some false prophets might be raised up to tempt the Jews to idolatry; or at least, that, by assistance of them, such miracles might be wrought in confirmation thereof, as those sometimes done by the Egyptian sorcerers or magicians, God himself not interposing in this case to hinder them, for this reason, that he might hereby prove and try their faithfulness towards him. Forasmuch as both by the pure light of nature, and God's revealed will, before confirmed by miracles, idolatry, or the religious worship of any but God Almighty, had been sufficiently condemned. From whence it is evident, that miracles alone (at least such miracles as these) are no sufficient confirmation of a true prophet, without consideration had of the doctrine taught by him. For though a man should have done never so many true and real miracles amongst the Jews, and yet should persuade to idolatry, he was by them confidently to be condemned to death for a false prophet.

Accordingly in the New Testament do we read, that our Saviour Christ forewarned his disciples, that "False prophets[5] and false Christs should arise, and show great signs or wonders, insomuch, that if it were possible, they should seduce the very elect." And St. Paul foretelleth concerning the man of sin, or Antichrist,[6] "That his coming should be after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and wonders (or miracles) of a lie." For we conceive, that by τέρατα ψεύδους in this place, are not properly meant "feigned and counterfeit miracles," that is, mere cheating and juggling tricks, but "true wonders and real miracles" (viz. of the former sort mentioned) done for the confirmation of a lie, as the doctrine of this man of sin is there afterwards called; for otherwise how could his coming be said to be "according to the working of Satan, with all power?" In like manner also, in St. John's Apocalypse, where the coming of the same man of sin, and the mystery of iniquity, is again described, we read chap. xiii. of a two-horned beast like a lamb, "That he shall do great wonders, and deceive those that dwell on the earth, by means of those miracles which

[5] Luke xxiv. 24. [6] 2 Thessalonians ii. 9.

he hath power to do in the sight of the beast." And again, chap. xvi. "Of certain unclean spirits, like frogs, coming out of the mouth of the dragon, and of the beast, and of the false prophet, which are the spirits of devils working miracles, that go forth to the kings of the earth." And lastly, chap. xix. "Of the false prophet, that wrought miracles before the beast." All which seem to be understood, not of feigned and counterfeit miracles only, but of true and real also, effected by the working of Satan, in confirmation of a lie, that is, of idolatry, false religion and imposture; God Almighty permitting it, partly in way of probation or trial of the faithfulness of his own servants, and partly in way of just judgment and punishment upon those who "receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved;" as the apostle declareth.[7] Wherefore those miracles, pretended, for divers ages past, to have been done before the relics of saints and images, &c., were they all true, could by no means justify or warrant that religious worship by many given to them; because true and real miracles, done in order to the promoting of idolatry, are so far from justifying that idolatry, that they are themselves condemned by it to be τέρατα ψεύδους, "the miracles of a lie," done by the working of Satan.

But as for the miracles of our Saviour Christ, had they been all of them only of the former kind, such as might have been done, God permitting, by the natural power of created spirits, and their assistance: yet forasmuch as he came in the name of the Lord, teaching neither idolatry nor any thing contrary to the clear light and law of nature, therefore ought he, by reason of those miracles, to have been received by the Jews themselves, and owned for a true prophet, according to the doctrine of Moses himself; who both in the thirteenth and eighteenth chapters of Deuteronomy, plainly supposeth, that God would in no other case permit any false prophet to do miracles by the assistance of evil spirits, save only in that of idolatry, and (which is always understood of) what is plainly discoverable by the light of nature to be false, or evil. The reason whereof is manifest, because if he should, this would be an invincible temptation, which it is inconsistent with the divine goodness to expose men unto. And our Saviour Christ was unquestionably that one eximious prophet, which God Almighty, by Moses, promised to send unto the Israelites, upon occasion of their own desire made to him at Horeb. "Let me not hear again the voice of the Lord my God, nor let me see this great fire any more, that I die not." Whereupon the Lord said: "They have well spoken that which they have spoken; I will raise them up a prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and put my words in his

[7] 2 Thessalonians ii. 10.

mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him; and whosoever will not hearken to the words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him."* Which is all one as if he should have said, I will no more speak to them with thunder and lightning, nor reveal my will with a terrible voice out of flaming fire; but the next great manifestation of myself, or further revelation of my will, shall be by a prophet from amongst their own brethren, I putting my words into his mouth, and speaking to them by him. Whose words they shall be as much obliged to hearken to as if I had spoken them (as before) from the top of the fiery mount. And that they may have no colour for their disbelieving this great prophet especially, or their disobeying of him, I plainly declare, that whosoever cometh in my name, and does true and real miracles, shall be acknowledged undoubtedly for a true prophet sent by me, and accordingly believed and obeyed; and none rejected under the notion of false prophets, but only such as either do not real miracles, or else if they do, come in the name of other gods, or exhort to idolatry. Nevertheless, our Saviour Christ wrought other miracles also, of a higher nature, by the immediate power of God Almighty himself; as for example, when before himself he raised Lazarus, who had been dead four days, to life, since it cannot be conceived to be in the power of created spirits (whether bad or good) whenever they please to bring back the souls of men deceased to their bodies again, or change the laws of nature and fate. However, it must not be thought, that God will ever set this seal of his to a lie, or that which is plainly contrary to the light and law of nature.

The conclusion is, that though all miracles promiscuously do not immediately prove the existence of a God, nor confirm a prophet, or whatsoever doctrine; yet do they all of them evince, that there is a rank of invisible understanding beings, superior to men, which the Atheists commonly deny. And we read of some such miracles also as could not be wrought but by a power perfectly supernatural, or by God Almighty himself. But to deny and disbelieve all miracles, is either to deny all certainty of sense, which would be indeed to make sensation itself miraculous; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human testimonies and history. The Jews would never have so stiffly and pertinaciously adhered to the ceremonial law of Moses, had they not all along believed it to have been unquestionably confirmed by miracles; and that the Gentiles should at first have entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, would itself have been the greatest of miracles.[1]

* Deut. xviii. 17—19.

[1] This disputation on miracles will, I doubt not, appear to not a few, as it does to myself, to be wise and profound. The learned Doctor denies that evil spirits have

The last extraordinary phenomenon proposed was that of divination, oracles, prophecies, or predictions of future events, otherwise unforeknowable to men; which either evince a God,

power sufficient to perform true miracles, that is, either to destroy altogether or even to change the laws of nature laid down by God himself: but he allows that they can do many things which seem to us to be miracles, and exceed the faculties of mankind. Nor has any philosopher or theologian, as far as I know, ever raised a doubt on this matter. On the contrary, they all distinguish between *miracles* and *wonders:* affirming that the latter, but not the former, can be performed by demons. Our learned author adds, that this power cannot be exercised by an evil demon among men at his own will and pleasure, especially where the interests of the true religion are concerned, but only when God suffers it: but that God does not permit it except when he wishes to test the will of mankind towards himself, or to visit with condign punishment such nations as have long despised and neglected the light of truth, and to deliver them over to the bondage of error: and that when he wishes to do the former he does not suffer the evil demon to work miracles for the confirmation of any other doctrines than those, the turpitude and falsehood of which can immediately be detected even by the most simple and inexperienced. This doctrine, in my opinion, has nothing in it which can give offence to any one, or militate against that most powerful argument drawn from the miracles of our Saviour in confirmation of the Christian religion. Wherefore, if the moderation and prudence of our author had been imitated by the philosophers and theologians who succeeded him, probably a controversy would never have been raised upon this question: whether or not it is in the power of an evil demon to seduce men by miracles into the adoption of errors. But the most learned of the English and other theologians who since Dr. Cudworth laboured in the investigation of this subject, have overstepped the limits prescribed by him, and in consequence made others afraid lest the cause of God and religion should suffer from their doctrines. Hence eminent men, Sam. Werenfels, Diss. Num miracula sunt certa veritatis signa? in Dissertat. Theologic. Basil. 1718. in 4to. p. 165. Joh. Alph. Turretinus, Diss. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ; Joh. Arnold. Noltenius in a specific Dissert. published at Francfort on the Oder, 1718, [Abrah. le Moine. See Biblioth. Raissonnée, tom. 21. par. 1. p. 153. who likewise contends that God alone can work miracles], and others, positively exclude all power of working miracles from evil demons, and maintain that the sayings of sacred writ and testimonies of ancient authors in which mention is made of miracles performed, or hereafter to be performed, by false prophets, are to be understood solely of frauds, deceptions, and juggling tricks; and the learned Jac. Serces, following in their footsteps, in a copious and elegant French work published at Amsterdam, 1729, has professedly defended this opinion, chiefly in confutation of the late illustrious theologian and mathematician, Dr. Sam. Clarke, who of all the more recent English theologians has given the most lucid and forcible exposition of this subject. I trust I shall be excused by the learned men of both sides when I freely and candidly declare that I cannot assent to either opinion, and that I consider Dr. Cudworth's view to be alone calculated to remove all the difficulties that beset this question. My reasons for thinking so will be apparent from the following observations; which if throwing little or no new light upon the controversy will at least bear evidence of my mind being swayed by truth rather than by authority. I shall first of all explain the opinion of miracles entertained by Dr. Sam. Clarke, and approved of by the most eminent theologians and philosophers, Tillotson, Locke, Le Clerc, Stillingfleet, Barrow, Fleetwood, and many others, and shall state my objections to it; I shall then consider the opposite opinion of Jac. Serces and his party; and lastly shall show that Dr. Cudworth's doctrine, which seems also to be that of the most able and learned of our own theologians, is to be preferred to either of them.

I. Dr. Sam. Clarke, in his book, On the Existence and Attributes of God, tom. 2. cap. 19. treats of miracles generally. According to him a miracle is "an effect contrary to the usual order of nature, produced out of the usual course by an intelligence superior in power to man." [Clarke's opinion is defended, against Des Vœux, if I mistake not, by Chapelle, Nouv. Biblioth. tom. 7. p. 499.] According to this definition of a miracle, there is nothing that I can see, to hinder either good or bad demons from being able to work miracles, inasmuch as they are beings more powerful than man, and therefore can do certain things which seem to us to oppose the usual order of nature. Having

or at least that there are understanding beings superior to men. For if there be any presension or foreknowledge of such future events, as are to human understanding alone altogether unfore-

laid down this definition, the acute writer does not altogether deny that there are some things which exceed all the power of wicked demons, such as the reanimation of the dead, and creation out of nothing: but, with the exception of a few instances of the kind, he denies that we can detect certain marks in any miracle, which will enable us to discern whether it has been performed by God, or by a demon or spirit; for that no mortal knows what limits there are to the power of demons, good or bad, and therefore that no one can decide without danger of error, what they are able and what they are unable to do. Hence he concludes, that miracles of themselves possess not the least efficacy towards proving the truth of any doctrine, and that we must judge from the nature and character of the doctrine itself, whether the miracles which we witness are of heaven and divine, or the work of some malignant demon, who is seeking to lead mankind into error. The doctrines which admit of being confirmed by miracles he distributes into three classes: 1. Those which are manifestly false, impious, and contrary to reason and the law of nature: to which he denies that any miracle whatever can give weight and authority. 2. Those that are *indifferent*, that is, of such a nature that unassisted reason cannot distinguish whether they are true, or false and hollow. When precepts of this kind are put forth by any one, he considers that in this case we are to look to the magnitude of the miracles, and to lean to that side which has the greater and more excellent prodigies in its favour. 3. Those which evidently tend to the advancement of the glory of God, and to the promotion of justice and virtue: when doctrines of this kind are corroborated by miracles, he holds it to be manifest that these miracles are divine and proceed from the supreme Being.

This doctrine, ingenious and plausible as it is, and apparently compact and consistent in itself, nevertheless involves certain points which no reflecting man who is anxious for the truth would easily assent to. I shall not repeat all the copious arguments advanced against it by the learned J. Serces; but shall merely touch upon some of those which, on attentively considering the subject, I hold to be of greatest weight. I. The foundation upon which the whole of this disputation rests is slippery and unsound. The illustrious writer assumes it to be unknown to mortals how far the power given by God to good or bad spirits extends: which no one indeed would readily deny. From this he infers, not only that spirits can work miracles, but also that, with some few exceptions, there is no prodigy, however remarkable, that may not proceed from a spirit. But in reasoning so, the acute man, in the first place, overturns and destroys the very thing he had assumed. He had denied that any one knows the limits of the power of angels: but he who asserts that angels possess such power as to be able to perform even the greatest miracles, acknowledges the power of angels to be known to himself and others. To myself indeed it seems to follow, from the fact of our being ignorant of the limits of those faculties with which angels are endowed, that we cannot know whether angels are able to perform miracles or not. In the next place, he does not perceive how utterly incredible and contrary to reason it appears, that the Deity who, in his supreme wisdom, established and ordained the laws of nature, should have conferred on inferior beings such power that they can violate these laws at will. Certainly that king would not give any great proofs of his wisdom and forethought, who should give to his ministers the power of abrogating or infringing laws which he had himself with great care devised and ratified: and I see no reason why we should think otherwise of the supreme Being. Lastly. Dr. Clarke seems not to have considered that, although the sacred volume does not speak so distinctly on the limits of the power of angels as to remove from our minds all cause for doubt, still it clearly informs us that the power of demons is restrained by the divine will, and that God does not suffer them to abuse it to the destruction of good men or the prejudice of truth, Job i. 12. &c. which indeed is enough for us in this question. For as nothing is greater and more holy than truth and religion, it is evident from thence that the power granted by God to evil demons, how great soever it may be in other respects, is not so great that they can at their own will and pleasure perform miracles in order either to confirm errors or to oppose the heavenly truth. II. The scriptures tell us, that miracles are performed to bear witness to the truth and unexceptionableness of a doctrine, John xx.

knowable, then is it certain, that there is some more perfect understanding, or knowledge in the world, than that of men. And thus is that maxim of the ancient pagan Theists,[2] in the

31. Heb. ii. 4. Now if this account of miracles be true, miracles do not show the truth of a doctrine, but rather the excellence and truth of the doctrine prove the miracles to be divine. Moses we know performed the greatest prodigies in desert places, to teach the people of Israel that there was one God, and that the deities of the Egyptians and other nations were to be rejected. But if we follow Dr. Clarke, these miracles of Moses did not prove the truth of his doctrine concerning the worship of one God, but the doctrine itself, as being altogether consonant with reason, served as an argument to place the truth of Moses' miracles beyond controversy. III. No one, I imagine, will deny, that these miracles which God causes to be performed, are intended for the conviction and advantage of all. They ought not only to instruct the wise and learned, but more especially to operate as proofs and arguments on the minds of the most simple and uninformed. But if we assent to Dr. Clarke's opinion, we must own that God disturbed the nature of things for the sake of those only who possess strong powers of reasoning and can distinguish truth from falsehood. For the eminent men who support it assume that the nature of the doctrine, in confirmation of which the miracles take place, is alone known, and that by means of this those which are divine can be distinguished from such as are wrought by the power of an evil demon: that if the doctrine be in accordance with reason and virtue, there can be no doubt of the divinity of the miracles; but that if it be repugnant to these, or ridiculous and absurd, the miracles must be attributed to an evil demon. Therefore, before any one can decide whether the miracles which he sees performed are divine or not, he must first gravely and seriously examine into the doctrine which the worker of the miracles propounds. But who is so little acquainted with human affairs as not to know that only a few mortals are qualified to enter into such an examination? For to say nothing of the weakness of our reason, the force of opinions imbibed from infancy, the sway of the passions to which we are subject, the authority of others, the love of gain, and many other well-known causes, so obscure, warp and cramp our minds, that those things sometimes appear to us to be most agreeable to reason, which are least of all in accordance with it; and on the other hand, such as are eminently consistent with reason and the glory of God, seem altogether contrary and repugnant to them. All those that now remain of the ancient Persian nation conceive that they act wisely and rationally in paying homage and worship to fire, as the emblem of the divine nature. If, therefore, a prophet were to go to them and inculcate that God is to be worshipped without any image, and, the sooner to persuade them, were to have recourse to miracles, this nation, warped by preconceived opinions, would doubtless consider such miracles to be the deceptions of an evil demon, if, according to this opinion, they thought they were to judge of the divinity of the miracles from the nature and character of the doctrine. The same unquestionably would be done by the great majority of men, possessing but a moderate share of intellect, and tinctured from early childhood with error and superstition. Moreover, if the doctrines be indifferent and not obvious to reason, learned men tell us we are to consider solely the magnitude of the miracles, and to put our faith in that side which recommends itself by the greater and more remarkable ones. Again, therefore, if such be the case, miracles are of use to none but the acute and perspicacious. For in the first place, none of those who possess but little acumen, or are uninstructed in literature and art, can tell what is and what is not indifferent, or what can and what cannot be proved by reason. The common people do not care about this, much less understand it: and even among the learned themselves no slight controversies often spring up on such a question. Besides, scarcely any doctrine is so absurd that its author and propounder cannot reclaim it from the class of indifferent things, and contend for its being easily susceptible of demonstration by the help of reason. But supposing there is controversy with regard to this matter among those who witness the performance of miracles, how many

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[2] Namely the Stoics, who are described by Cicero as reasoning in this manner, De Divinatione, lib. 1. cap. 5. 6. p. 3113. 3114. tom. 9. opp. and elsewhere.

genuine and proper sense thereof, unquestionably true: Si divinatio est, dii sunt, "If there be divination, or presension of future events (undiscoverable by men), then are there gods:"

of them will be qualified to form a just estimate of these miracles, and to compare them with each other, without error? It is notorious that in no case do dissensions arise more easily than in a question of comparison, and that those who have to estimate the relative excellence of things, are rarely concordant and unanimous. Nor is this much to be wondered at. For setting aside the difficulty of the thing itself, all those impediments which usually preclude us from discerning the truth, are wont to obstruct our sight in such inquiries. The miracle performed by our Saviour in restoring to life the already putrid body of Lazarus, John xi. was of the highest order. But let us suppose, that at that time a false prophet among the Jews had commanded fire to descend from heaven. What a subject of discord would the comparison of these two miracles have been to this nation! For my own part I am convinced, that the Jews would have been torn into factions, and that the false prophet would have had as many followers as our Saviour. Imagine two men to go to the Arabians, who inhabit a district destitute of water, each of them stating his mission to be divine, and each promising a miracle. One restores a dead man to life; the other produces a most pleasant and wholesome fountain in the dry and sterile mountains surrounding Mecca and Medina. To raise a dead man to life is manifestly a greater miracle than to obtain water out of the sand. But if I know any thing of human nature, that incredible love of springs and water which is notoriously innate as it were in the Arabians, and the religion professed by them, which enjoins frequent ablutions of the body, would cause many to give a decided preference to the latter miracle. So great is the wretchedness and blindness in which mankind are involved, that they frequently are unwilling to make use of their reason when they are able, and frequently unable when they are willing: in consideration of which the divine goodness and wisdom has fortified the truth of the heavenly doctrine by such arguments as appeal to the senses and remove us farther from the risk of error. IV. It seems incompatible with the wisdom and benignity of God, to suffer demons hostile to mankind and the truth, freely to exercise the power they have received from him, in order to thwart the divine counsels and lead men into vice and error. No one, I imagine, would call that king wise and anxious for the welfare of the state, who, at the same time that he enacts laws most useful to his subjects, permits his enemies to circulate pernicious doctrines and to pave the way for the destruction of the people, supposing he had the power of resisting these attempts. V. Lastly. To pass over what has been already observed by others, it follows, if I mistake not, as a consequence from this opinion, that miracles are not necessary to all those who call themselves the ambassadors of God, but only to such as propound *indifferent* doctrines, with respect to which unassisted reason is unable to decide any thing. For if the divinity of miracles can only be ascertained by the doctrine, in confirmation of which they are wrought, being consonant with sound reason and virtue, those precepts which are in accordance with reason, for example, the doctrine of one God, would require no miracles. Therefore there is nothing to prevent us from supposing that God may sometimes stir up a man to overthrow superstitions and restore the precepts of reason, and still not arm him with the power of working miracles. But those crafty impostors, I fear, who seek to obtain for themselves fame and authority among a people would be able to abuse this opinion for the furtherance of their own designs. Mohammed, it is well known, principally in this manner silenced the Arabians who demanded of him miracles; nor are some of his followers accustomed to return any other answer to those who object that their prophet was destitute of the power of proving the truth of his doctrine by signs and wonders. See Boulanvilliers Vie de Mahomet, livr. 3. p. 309. Miracles, say they, cannot be required of him who propounds doctrines which no reasonable man can repudiate: and this Mohammed did, who sought to instil into men's minds what nature itself teaches every one, that there is only one God.

II. Such being the case, learned men I think have done wisely in opposing this opinion: but they are wrong, in my opinion, when they go to the other extreme, and deny altogether that a demon is able to work miracles. They advance sufficiently weighty reasons for dissenting from the opinion of those who hold that a demon has the unrestricted power of performing them, and that divine miracles can only be

which, in their language, was no more than to say, understanding beings superior to men.

Wherefore we must here distinguish of oracles and predictions,

distinguished from those of demons by a consideration of the doctrine itself: but in supporting and explaining their opinion, they seem to me to be sometimes more ingenious and at others less cautious than they ought. To speak candidly, they would be unwilling, I am convinced, to extend to me the same liberty which they have themselves assumed when confuting the dogmas of others.

I. This opinion does not remove all the difficulties besetting this question. All sensible men will admit, what indeed we have already admitted, that the power of evil demons is not so great as to enable them to disturb the laws of nature and perform real miracles. On the other hand, however, I consider it to be unquestionable that demons are stronger and more powerful than men, as is so often shown in scripture, and on that account can do many things which seem to be opposed to the laws of nature, and have the appearance of miracles. Who, I ask, would deny that a demon can keep a man from sinking in the waters, and enable him to walk upright in the sea? And yet to spectators this would appear altogether repugnant to the laws of nature, although in reality it is not so. This example has been already adduced by G. W. Leibnitz, Quatrieme Replique a la troisieme Response de Mr. Clarke, sect. 44. dans le Recueil de diverses Pieces sur la Philosophie par M. Maizeaux, tom. 1. p. 60. add the Cinquieme Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz, sect. 117. p. 144. Amst. 1720—8. For who is not aware that in the eyes of the generality of mortals those wonderful works which exceed the power of man do not differ from real and divine miracles? A people that sees any one fly aloft through the air, which may be done by the assistance of a demon, is equally struck and moved thereby, as it would be by seeing water converted into wine. This opinion, therefore, does not do away with the difficulty which has hitherto harassed so many: namely, by what marks can real and divine miracles be distinguished from those which do not transcend the power of demons? For although sagacious and learned men may not be easily deceived in this matter, the case nevertheless is otherwise with the multitude: and as miracles concern all men, it is necessary that there be such a criterion as is adapted to the comprehension of all. The champions of this opinion, I am aware, can have recourse to three modes of getting out of this difficulty: They will either deny that demons possess the power of doing those things which can excite great wonder, or they will say that the means of distinguishing between the two kinds of prodigies, must be drawn from the nature and character of the doctrine itself, or lastly, they will assert that God would not suffer demons to exercise this power when the interests of religion and truth are at stake. But if they select the last of these modes they in a certain measure will abandon their own cause, and pass over to the opinion entertained by Dr. Cudworth and ourselves: not to mention that the explication they give of the passages of scripture in which mention is made of the miracles of Satan and his ministers, sufficiently prove that they are altogether opposed to this hypothesis. For why should they interpret the whole of them as referring to frauds and deceptions, if they suppose the natural power possessed by demons, of deceiving mankind by prodigies, to be controlled and restrained by the divine goodness and wisdom? For if such were their opinion they might with perfect consistency concede that these passages treat of prodigies performed by evil demons? If they adopt the second mode, they will themselves fall into all the snares which they have laid for their adversaries. Lastly, if they take the first, they will not only offend against common sense and the authority of sacred writ, but will also admit the certainty of that which they themselves deny, that we know the extent of the power possessed by demons, and the limits which are prescribed to it.

II. The advocates of this opinion, although sparing neither ingenuity nor labour, nevertheless do not interpret the passages of Scripture in which the miracles either of the prince of evil spirits himself or his ministers are spoken of, in such a way as to satisfy those who attentively examine the whole matter. They suppose, forsooth, that all passages of the kind refer to the frauds, impostures, and delusions of the enemies of the heavenly truth, but many others as well as myself will not easily be persuaded of this. I shall now pass over the miracles of the magicians in Egypt, and the history of the woman who is said to have raised Samuel from the dead, and shall merely touch upon the sayings of Moses, Christ, and St. Paul, which bear upon this subject, Deut. xiii.

after the same manner as we did before of miracles, that they may be of two kinds. First, such as might proceed only from the natural presaging power of created spirit superior to men,

1—5 ; Matt. xxiv. 24; 2 Thess. ii. 9. 10. 11. 1. They suppose Moses to have meant to forewarn the Jewish people that in after time prophets would arise by the permission of God who would attempt by frauds and impostures to turn them away from the true religion. Not to speak at present of the meaning of Moses' words, I cannot assent to this interpretation for the following reasons. In the first place, Moses declares that the falsehood of these wonders will be manifest if the Israelites will attend to the doctrine of the man who performs them. He therefore denies that the people can discern from the nature of the miracle itself whether it is true or false. But frauds, impostures, and fallacies can easily be detected by considering them by themselves alone, nor is there any need of comparing the doctrines of these fictitious miracles, in order to expose their absurdity. Again, if the divine man wished to fortify his countrymen against impostures, he undoubtedly would have supplied them with a different rule, namely this: "Do not put faith in those men, but be certain that they are deluding you. Appoint therefore wise and experienced men, and command them to inquire accurately into the nature of the miracle. Those prodigies, believe me, will not bear examination, but the arts by which these impostors seek to delude our minds will immediately be made manifest to the whole people." There is no one, I imagine, but must be sensible that no wiser or better law than this could be given for fortifying the minds of the multitude against imposture. For when once a fraud of the kind is detected and exposed, all hope of deceiving men by them is for the future cut off. Moses, therefore, beyond doubt would have given this law if he had been speaking of fallacies and counterfeit miracles. Besides, Moses says that God will suffer these miracles to be performed in order to prove the minds of the Israelites, and to know whether they still continue to love the Lord, their God. But whatever is to test the piety of a whole people, must necessarily be something superior to those juggling tricks, by which impostors delude a rude and unlettered mob, and of which in populous nations there are always persons fully able to detect and expose the fallacy. Such a temptation would not have pertained to the whole people, to whom Moses however denounces it, but to those only who should be prevented either by their own natural stupidity, or by ignorance, from understanding those impostors' arts. Neither do they gain any thing who suppose that Moses in these words did not foretell things which were assuredly about to happen, but meant merely that if any thing of the kind should happen, the Israelites were to persevere in the love and worship of the Supreme Being. See J. Serces, ibid. p. 199. For it is sufficient for the present question that Moses is speaking of things which can take place, although they may not do so in reality. Wherefore, I have no doubt but that this prophecy is to be understood of such signs and wonders, as have in reference to mankind no less force than true miracles. 2. They assert that our Saviour in like manner, Matt. xxiv. 24. speaks solely of impostures by which false Messiahs were about to induce the people to put faith in them. I will grant that the Greek words admit of this interpretation, and also that the class against which our Saviour is guarding his followers, was numerous and fertile in counterfeit prodigies: as we may learn from Josephus alone: but notwithstanding this, I conceive that something greater is meant. In the first place, it appears to me not at all improbable that our Saviour, if he had meant his words to be understood of mere deceptions, would have signified that nothing more than attention and diligent examination would be necessary for their detection. Again, he foretels that the miracles would be so remarkable that even the *elect* would be deceived by them, unless fortified by divine assistance. The elect I hold to be those saints, who God foresaw would continue in the faith to the end of their lives, and whom he therefore elected to be made partakers of eternal life. If any one takes this word in a more general sense, and supposes it to comprehend all Christians, as many, I am aware do, still this interpretation will not affect the question at issue. In the first place, therefore, it is evident from these words that the miracles spoken of by our Saviour are of such a nature as to produce a greater effect upon those who are without than upon those who possess the true faith. But who is not aware that the impostures of jugglers and quacks do not belong to the class of things which differently affect the followers of Christ and his adversaries? The mists cast before

whether called angels or demons. For these being supposed to have not only clearer understandings than men, and a greater insight into nature, but also by reason of their agility and in-

men's eyes by impostors are not dispelled by faith and piety, but by reason and attention, which are common to the bad as well as the good. For which reason, as daily experience shows us, those of the faithful who are gifted with only a moderate share of perspicacity, are sometimes much sooner deceived by such arts than unbelievers of cultivated intellect. In the next place, it is clear from the same words, that Christ is speaking in this passage of such prodigies as require divine assistance and grace, to prevent men from being misled by them. And we know that those who wish to expose the impostures of jugglers have no need of the special assistance of providence, but merely of the exercise of the mental faculties which they possess by nature. But the case is far otherwise with those prodigies which counterfeit the form and appearance of true miracles. For the elect, who firmly believe in the wisdom, providence, and goodness of God, who "know whom they have believed," 2 Tim. i. 12, and are no longer "carried about with every wind of doctrine," Eph. iv. 14, more easily overcome the power of these than the rest of mankind, and that not by their own strength, but by virtue of divine grace, which has established their hearts so as no longer to waver, Heb. xiii. 9. The testimony of the Holy Ghost which resides in their minds is more powerful than all the miracles by which the slaves of the evil one may attempt to confirm their own impious errors. "Though we, or an angel from heaven preach any other gospel than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed," Gal. i. 8. Neither, if I am not mistaken, are they more fortunate in evading the force of the passage, 2 Thess. ii. 9. 10. 11. wherein St. Paul is treating of the miracles of Antichrist. For even conceding that the words which the apostle there purposely accumulates together to show the greatness of the miracles of Antichrist, *πάσῃ δυνάμει, καὶ σημείοις, καὶ τέρασι ψεύδους* may conveniently be expounded of frauds and empty imposture, which, however, I should hardly admit; still, as has already been most justly observed by Dr. Cudworth, the words *κατ' ἐνέργειαν τοῦ Σατανᾶ* preclude this interpretation. [Des Vœux, Critique du Livre de M. Montgeron, tom. 1. lett. 2. p. 65. eludes this in a different way, and expounds the word *Σατανᾶς* of Antichrist: he also ranks the miracles of the magicians among frauds, p. 66. But the whole of his argument on the subject, is weak and unsound.] For the practice of imposture and the deception of the unwary vulgar, there is no need of the power of Satan, but simply of a crafty and versatile intellect. Again, God we are told, to punish the sins of men, suffers Antichrist to work such great miracles by the help and power of Satan, in order that those who were unwilling to obey the truth may believe lies. But this temptation would be but slight, and the punishment might be evaded by those for whom it was destined, if God suffered such a farce to be acted by certain crafty impostors. The more sagacious and intelligent, unless God were to dazzle their mental perception by some miracle, would find no difficulty in detecting the frauds of Antichrist, and avoiding his snares. Lastly, the apostle is manifestly predicting that the miracles hereafter about to be performed by Antichrist, in order to draw wicked and impious men to himself, would be strange and wonderful, such as never happened before. But what would there be wonderful and unprecedented in jugglers coming forth, and by certain ludicrous tricks imposing upon the eyes and ears of the people? The same thing was done long before the time of our Saviour, and the history of every nation is full of the false and counterfeit prodigies by which the Pagan priests deceived the people. There was no reason why St. Paul should describe in such splendid language the deeds by which the enemy of Christ was about to signalize his coming, if his prodigies were not to be greater than those which had formerly been performed by the priests of Æsculapius and Serapis. I shall pass over the passages adduced by Dr. Cudworth from the Revelations of St. John, which are still plainer even than the above, for example, chap. xiii. 13. where a certain minister of Antichrist is said to be about to cause fire to come down from heaven; a prodigy which, I imagine, no one would class among fallacies and impostures.

II. Between these two opinions lies the one entertained by Dr. Cudworth, which meets all the doubts besetting this argument, and entirely accords with the passages of sacred writ. [Des Vœux also adopts nearly the same view, Critique Generale du Livre de M. Montgeron, tom. 1. p. 29. 30. &c. where there is a long, but occasionally

visibility, opportunity of knowing things remotely distant, and of being privy to men's secret machinations and consultations; it is easily conceivable that many future events nigh at hand,

perplexed and inelegant, dissertation on the power and efficacy of miracles.] This opinion leaves to evil demons the power of performing works which strike mankind with the greatest wonder, and have the form and appearance of miracles: but it denies that they can use this power to defeat the divine counsels and assault the true religion. How far God suffers Satan to exercise the power which he possesses, in the kingdom of nature, no mortal would be rash enough to assert. But in the kingdom of grace God never permits him to make use of this power, except in two cases: first, when he considers it necessary to prove those who believe in him, Deut. xiii. 4. &c. secondly, when he has by a most just judgment determined to deliver the men who have long despised the voice of truth into the power of those who are themselves imbued and wish to imbue others with pernicious errors, Matt. xxiv. 24. 2 Thess. ii. 11. But should this happen to take place, God nevertheless takes care that his own people who may be living amongst the wicked, suffer no harm from the miracles performed by the enemies of truth, and strengthens and confirms the elect, so that they remain unshaken in the faith which they have received, Matt. xxiv. 24. Thus neither are evil spirits deprived of the power which according to the authority of scripture they possess, nor is any injury done to the divine virtues and perfections. By adopting this opinion, 1. we get rid of the whole of that otherwise long and very intricate question respecting the distinctive marks of miracles. For it is unnecessary to inquire, by what signs the miracles either of God himself and his angels, or of good and wicked demons, may be distinguished, if we are certain that the supreme Being only very rarely permits evil spirits to make trial of their power, and when he does happen to permit this, he carefully provides for the safety of his own people. 2. It is evident from thence, that miracles of themselves are indubitable signs of the true religion, and that the most simple even may put faith in them without fear of danger or error, and without entering into any examination of the doctrine; a task for which but few are qualified: which being established, all that can be advanced against the argument which we draw from the miracles of Christ in proof of his divine authority, falls at once to the ground. 3. This doctrine is clearly in accordance with all the passages of sacred writ, in which mention is made of the miracles and prodigies both of the prince of darkness and his servants, and supplies an easy as well as neat and apt interpretation of them. This I consider to be already evident from what I have remarked a little above in reference to some of those passages: I shall now, according to my promise, add a few observations upon the miracles of the Egyptian magicians and the rising of Samuel from the dead.

The miracles said to have been performed by the Egyptian magicians, to destroy the efficacy of those of Moses, are considered by some to contain so much matter of doubt and inexplicable difficulty, that they think it better to leave the whole question undecided than to refer to their cause and origin. This has been done not long ago by the most ingenious J. Saurin, Discours sur la Bible, tom. 2. p. 48. who, to speak candidly, however, seems to me to have unnecessarily magnified the difficulties, and to have sought for knots in a rush. The generality of interpreters suppose this class of men to have performed what is recorded of them by the aid of demons. [Far different, however, is the view of Reinbeck in A. Conf. tom. 4. where there is a long dissertation on miracles; who argues that the magicians performed neither true nor false miracles. In which he is most certainly wrong.] Others, however, contend that the magicians made use of no instruments but their own ingenuity and sleight of hand, which opinion has lately been maintained with great skill and acuteness by J. Serces, Traité des Miracles, p. 157. [Le Moine Bibl. Raisonnée, tom. 41. p. 170. which is opposed p. 172.] For my own part, on considering the whole, I incline to the opinion of those who suppose demons to have had some hand in the matter. For, passing over what has been long ago remarked by others, if the magicians had done every thing by fraud and cunning, Moses could not have better consulted the interests of himself and the sacred cause he was defending, than by unmasking the crafty impostors, and exposing their secret arts to Pharaoh and the Egyptians. Thus all their authority would have vanished, and Egypt, being now made aware of the frauds and impostures of the magicians, would no longer have entrusted either their religion

which cannot be foreknown by men, may be (probably at least) foreseen by them; and that without any miraculous divine revelation, their causes being already in being. As men learned in

or state to so flagitious a brotherhood; in short, there would probably have been no necessity for new and frequently repeated miracles to turn the heart of Pharaoh. [See Tartarotti, Del Congresso Notturno, p. 373. &c.]. Therefore as the divine ambassador did not do this, but sought rather to influence the king's mind by the number of his miracles, it may be taken as a proof, I consider, that the magicians in their contest with Moses were fortified not so much with impostures as with the aid of demons. And lest this should appear surprising, I wish it to be remembered in the first place, as it will relieve the question of many difficulties, that the state of Egypt and its king at that time was such that God consistently with his goodness and justice might permit a demon to deceive men's eyes, and to exercise his power for the purpose of misleading this infatuated nation. This is sufficiently evident both from the whole of history and from the words of God himself, in which he threatens that he will "harden Pharaoh's heart," Exod. iv. 21. vii. 3. For God is not wont to harden any but those who obstinately and wickedly resist truth and the divine counsels. Secondly, the miracles of the magicians are not such as subvert the laws of nature, or cannot well be performed by a demon. They first of all cause the rods which they cast down to become serpents, Exod. vii. 11. 12. There is nothing wonderful in this: for I do not suppose that the demons either really changed the rods into serpents, or produced serpents by their own power, or, lastly, suddenly generated these reptiles from the seed of serpents [Le Brun, Histoire Crit. des Practiques Superst. lib. 1. supposes the demon to have performed this by the rapidity of motion]: on the contrary, I grant that none of these could be done by the power of a demon. In my opinion certain demons were at hand to assist them, and having suddenly snatched up the rods, cast down serpents, of which there were at that time immense numbers in Egypt. They next turn water into blood, or rather gave it the colour of blood, Exod. vii. 22. This is a sort of prodigy that might be performed in a certain measure by those who are skilled in natural science. Thus after the magicians had struck the water with their rods, one or more demons tinged it with a red colour, so that what appeared water before seemed to the Egyptians to be blood. Thirdly, they fill Egypt with a multitude of frogs, Exod. viii. 7. But what difficulty would it be for a demon to collect a number of frogs from the neighbouring fens, and distribute them through the houses, villages, and towns. Nor is it necessary that we should suppose this to have been done instantaneously. The rest of Moses' miracles the Egyptian sorcerers are not said to have imitated, nor were they able to imitate them, because they surpassed the power of demons.

The witch of Endor, by whom the deceased Samuel is said to have been presented alive before king Saul, 1 Sam. xxviii. was not long ago the subject of a temperate and learned controversy between two eminent scholars, the late J. Fr. Buddeus and the able and erudite Genevese theologian J. Alph. Turretinus. The latter, Dissertat. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, supposes the woman to have passed off some optical deception upon Saul. [So also Ant. Van Dalen, De Oraculis, p. 23. 24.] The former, both in his Historia Ecclesiast. Vet. Testam. tom. 2. p. 306. &c. and in a particular Diss. Epistolica ad August. Gotth. Graffium de Pythonissa Endorea, published at Jena in 4to. maintains that she was assisted by a demon, who personated Samuel. Turretinus' opinion is defended at great length and with much elegance by Jac. Serces, Traité des Miracles, p. 203. &c. with whose dissertation, however, it will be worth while to compare what is remarked in illustration as well as in defence of and opposition to it in La Bibliotheque Raisonnée, published at Amsterdam, tom. 4. par. 2. p. 435. J. Saurin, the most eloquent of the Reformed French theologians, espouses an opinion intermediate between these two, the respective arguments of which he also enumerates, Discours sur la Bible, tom. 4. p. 466. &c. For he supposes God himself to have caused Samuel really to appear before Saul. [This opinion is acutely defended by Le Brun, Hist. Critique de Superstit. tom. 4. as also by Launoy. See Biblioth. Nouv. tom. 6. p. 363. &c. See also a specific Diss. in support of this opinion, Memoir. tom. 5. p. 338. &c.] For my own part, having examined the arguments on each side, I profess myself favourable to the opinion, though not to the fullest extent, of those who hold Saul to have been deceived by a demon. Certainly none accords more aptly with the words of Scripture; and God could permit this to be done consistently with

astronomy can foretell eclipses of the sun and moon, which to the vulgar are altogether unforeknowable; and as princes or statesmen, that are furnished with great intelligence, foreign and domestic, can presage more of war and peace, either at home or abroad, and of the events of kingdoms, than ignorant plebeians. And such were those predictions which Democritus, though otherwise much addicted to atheism, allowed of; Cicero writing thus of him:* Plurimis locis, gravis auctor Democritus præsensionem rerum futurarum comprobat, "Democritus, a grave writer, doth in many places approve of the presension of future events." The reason whereof was, because he supposed certain understanding beings superior to men, called by him idols,[3] which having a larger comprehension of things, and other advantages of knowledge, could therefore foretell many future events that men were ignorant of. And though perhaps it may be thought that Democritus would not have entertained this opinion of the foreknowledge of human events, had he not asserted the necessity of all human actions and volitions, but held liberty of will, as Epicurus afterwards did (as if this were inconsistent with all manner of presage, and probable or conjectural foreknowledge); yet is it certain that there is not so much contingency in all human actions, by reason of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by Epicurus, and still is by many supposed; it being plain that men act according to an appearance of good, and that in many cases and circumstances it may be foreknown, without any divine revelation, what such or such persons would do. As for example, that a voluptuous person, having a strong temptation to satisfy his sensual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of shame or punishment, would readily close with the same. Besides which, such invisible spirits, as angels or demons, may sometimes predict also what themselves cause and effect.

Secondly, there is another sort of predictions of future events, which cannot be imputed to the natural presaging faculty of any

his wisdom and goodness. For Saul's impiety had hitherto been so flagrant that he was not unworthy of being delivered up to the snares and wiles of Satan. Neither is the thing itself that took place too great for a demon to perform. For I do not suppose that the wicked spirit either formed a body resembling Samuel out of air or produced a spectre, but I consider him to have deceived the eyes of Saul by an optical illusion, such as, it is well known, we frequently see practised at the present day, by which the inexperienced can be so far misled as to fancy that they see men when they only behold their images and resemblances. [See Tartarotti, Del Congresso Notturno, p. 383. &c.] The precise nature of this artifice it is not my business to explain: I am satisfied, however, that a demon, if permitted by the supreme Being, is well qualified to perform such deceptions. This opinion is not entirely at variance with the view of those who refer the whole matter to fallacies: neither does it altogether accord with it, but in a certain respect combines those who ascribe it either to human cunning or to the power of demons.

* De Divinat. lib. 1. [Cap. 3. p. 3111. tom. 9. opp.]

[3] On these idols of Democritus we have discoursed largely above.

such created spirits, but only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty, or a Being infinitely perfect: as when events remotely distant in time, and of which there are yet no immediate causes actually in being, which also depend upon many circumstances, and a long series of things, any one of which being otherwise would alter the case; as likewise upon much uncertainty of human volitions, which are not always necessarily linked and concatenated with what goes before, but often loose and free; and upon that contingency, that arises from the indifferency or equality of eligibility in objects. Lastly, such things as do not at all depend upon external circumstances neither, nor are caused by things natural anteceding, but by some supernatural power; I say, when such future events as these are foretold, and accordingly come to pass, this can be ascribed to no other but such a being as comprehends, sways, and governs all, and is, by a peculiar privilege or prerogative of its own nature, omniscient. Epicurus, though really he therefore rejected divination and prediction of future events, because he denied providence; yet did he pretend this further reason also against it, because it was a thing absolutely inconsistent with liberty of will, and destructive of the same:[4] Ἡ μαντικὴ ἀνύπαρκτος· εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπαρκτική, οὐδὲν παρ' ἡμᾶς ἤδη τὰ γινόμενα, "Divination is a thing which hath no existence, nor possibility in nature: and if there were such a thing, it would take away all liberty of will, and leave nothing in men's own power." Thus also Carneades, in Cicero,[5] maintained, Ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset, "That Apollo himself was not able to foretell any future events, other than such as had necessary causes in nature antecedent." And some Christian Theists[6] of later times have, in like manner, denied to God Almighty all foreknowledge of human actions, upon the same pretence, as being both inconsistent with men's liberty of will, and destructive thereof. For, say they, if men's actions be free, then are they unforeknowable, they having no necessary causes;

[4] Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 135. p. 660. In the published copy, however, this passage is different from the one here given. For in it the opinion of Epicurus finishes with these words: Οὐδέν πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἡγητέον τὰ γινόμενα, "The events which take place are to be considered as not pertaining to us." The meaning of these words, however, does not differ from that expressed by Dr. Cudworth. The words παρ' ἡμᾶς stand in all the editions of Laërtius previous to that of Meibomius; who first gave the emendation πρὸς ἡμᾶς, and, as I consider, advisedly. But upon what authority Dr. Cudworth has changed ἡγητέον into ἤδη, I am unable to say.

[5] De Fato, cap. 14. p. 3281. tom. 9. opp.

[6] That this is the opinion of Socinus' followers and some others is well known to those who have made the various and discordant opinions of Christians their study. See Faustus Socinus, Prælection. Theologic. cap. 8. 9. 10. f. 32. &c. Jo. Crellius, On God and the Divine Attributes, cap. 24. p. 223. of the Dutch version. Val. Schmalzius, Contra Franzium, p. 472. 473.

and again, if there be any foreknowledge of them, then can they not be free, they being ipso facto necessitated thereby. But as it is certain that prescience does not destroy the liberty of man's will, or impose any necessity upon it, men's actions being not therefore future, because they are foreknown, but therefore foreknown, because future; and were a thing never so contingent, yet upon supposition that it will be done, it must needs have been future from all eternity: so is it extreme arrogance for men, because themselves can naturally foreknow nothing but by some causes antecedent, as an eclipse of the sun or moon, therefore to presume to measure the knowledge of God Almighty according to the same scantling, and to deny him the prescience of human actions, not considering that, as his nature is incomprehensible, so his knowledge may well be looked upon by us as such too; that which is past our finding out, and too wonderful for us. However, it must be acknowledged for an undoubted truth, that no created being can, naturally, and of itself, foreknow any future events, otherwise than in and by their causes anteceding. If therefore we shall find that there have been predictions of such future events as had no necessary antecedent causes; as we cannot but grant such things therefore to be foreknowable, so must we needs from thence infer the existence of a God, that is, a Being supernatural, infinitely perfect and omniscient, since such predictions as these could have proceeded from no other cause.

That there is foreknowledge of future events to men naturally unforeknowable, hath been all along the persuasion of the generality of mankind. Thus Cicero:* Vetus opinio est, jam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani, et omnium Gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Græci μαντικὴν appellant, id est, præsensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum, "This is an old opinion derived down all along from the heroic times (or the mythical age), and not only entertained amongst the Romans, but also confirmed by the consent of all nations, that there is such a thing as divination, and presension or foreknowledge of future events." And the same writer elsewhere, in the person of Balbus:† Quamvis nihil tam irridet Epicurus, quàm prædictionem rerum futurarum, mihi videtur tamen vel maximè confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis. Est enim profecto divinatio; quæ multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparet, cùm in privatis, tùm maximè in publicis. Multa cernunt aruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis providentur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somniis, multa portentis, "Although Epicurus deride nothing more than the prediction of future

* De Divinat. lib. 1.

† De Natura Deor. lib. 2. p. 239. Lamb. [Cap. 65. p. 3046. tom. 9. opp.]

things; yet does this seem to me to be a great confirmation of the providence of the gods over human affairs, because there is certainly divination, it appearing in many places, things, and times, and that not only private, but especially public. Soothsayers foresee many things, the augurs many; many things are declared by oracles, many by prophecies, many by dreams, and many by portents." And indeed that there were even amongst the Pagans predictions of future events, not discoverable by any human sagacity, which accordingly came to pass, and therefore argue a knowledge superior to that of men, or that there are certain invisible understanding beings or spirits, seems to be undeniable from history. And that the augurs themselves were sometimes not unassisted by these officious genii, is plain from that of Attius Navius before mentioned, as the circumstances thereof are related by historians; that Tarquinius Priscus having a mind to try what there was in this skill of augury,[7] Dixit ei se cogitare quiddam; id possetne fieri, consuluit. Ille augurio acto, posse respondet. Tarquinius autem dixit se cogitasse cotem novaculâ posse præcidi; tum Attium jussisse experiri: ita cotem in comitium illatam, inspectante et rege et populo, novaculâ esse discissam, "Told Navius, that he thought of something, and he would know of him whether it could be done or no. Navius having performed his augurating ceremonies, replied, that the thing might be done. Whereupon Priscus declared what his thought was, namely, that a whetstone might be cut in two with a razor. Navius willed them to make trial: wherefore a whetstone being brought immediately into the court, it was in the sight of the king and all the people divided with a razor." But the predictions amongst those Pagans were, for the most part, only of the former kind, such as proceeded merely from the natural presaging faculty of these demons; this appearing from hence, because their oracles were often expressed ambiguously, so as that they might be taken either way; those demons themselves, it seems, being then not confident of the event; as also, because they were sometimes plainly mistaken in the events. And from hence it was that they seldom ventured to foretell any events remotely distant, but only what were nigh at hand, and shortly to come to pass; and therefore might be probably conjectured of from things then in being.[8] Notwithstanding which, we acknowledge that there

[7] These are the words of Cicero, De Divinatione, lib. 2. cap. 17. p. 3129. tom. 9. opp.

[8] Whether demons were concerned or not in the predictions and oracles of ancient nations, will be discussed by us by and by. At present I cannot but remark that the three reasons here assigned for supposing that divinations and oracles, which were held in such high estimation previously to the birth of our Saviour, could proceed from the presaging faculty of demons and genii, admit of a more extensive application than the learned Doctor intends, and may be employed to the complete overthrow of his opinion. 1. He supposes demons, and not God, to have been the authors of those oracles,

are some few instances of predictions amongst the Pagans of the other kind. Such as that intimated by Cicero in his book of Divination,[9] where he declareth the doctrine of Diodorus con-

because they were frequently ambiguous. Another will maintain it to be evident from hence, and in my opinion with good reason, that all those predictions and prophecies of future events are to be attributed solely to the cunning and craftiness of soothsayers, augurs, and priests. II. He considers this to be clear also from the fact that the ancient prophets predicted only those events which were shortly about to come to pass, but not those which were remote and separated by long intervals of time. Another might argue with great probability that this is a strong argument for supposing the whole affair to be referable to the craft and impudence of impostors. For people are not much taken with predictions of those things which they hear are not to happen till they themselves have been long ago dead: on the contrary, the multitude is always eager to know beforehand the fates and fortunes awaiting themselves and their own times. Wherefore it was not worth while for the priests and augurs to foretell to mankind the events of future ages, although they might have done so without any risk to themselves: but it was greatly to their interest to have the credit of being able to predict the fortunes of living men. Not to mention, that the oracles and diviners generally speaking, merely returned answers to inquirers: and no one was absurd enough to inquire concerning matters about to happen after a lapse of some ages. III. It is scarcely necessary for me to remark the same of the third reason. For no one is so dull as not to perceive that the fact of an oracle not being fulfilled by the event is a stronger proof that it proceeded from the craftiness of men than that a demon was its author. But some one will object, perhaps, that there are many examples of predictions which bear evidence of greater perspicacity than is possessed by any man, and therefore could only have been derived from a being of a superior condition to mankind: and this being the case, that there is much weight in these arguments towards proving the oracles of the ancients to have proceeded from demons. But those of a different opinion will answer, that the examples which are usually brought forward on this question are uncertain and doubtful: that it is possible for many things to have happened by mere accident in the way predicted by the priests and augurs; in short, that we may fairly suppose the historians who mention oracles of the kind, to have frequently attended more to fame and popular rumours, or their own superstition, than to reason. But granting it to be true, as is commonly stated, that formerly not a few things were predicted, which no one could have known beforehand, unless instructed by a being superior to man, still this adds no new weight to these arguments towards proving what they are intended to prove. For I do not understand how a man can be refuted who reasons in this manner: With some predictions of the ancients the facts and events corresponded: with others they did not correspond. Some oracles were clear and perspicuous; others again doubtful and ambiguous. Therefore sometimes demons, with the permission of God, predicted by means of their slaves the events which were about to happen to nations and individuals: but at others the priests and soothsayers beguiled and imposed upon the unwary vulgar. Those responses of the gods and oracles which were confirmed by the event, I consider to have proceeded from demons: but those which I observe to be of another character, I ascribe to the impostures of men. The example of Attius Navius, upon which the learned Doctor lays so much stress, does not properly belong to divinations, but to wonderful deeds which are recorded to have taken place in the heroic times, and are ranked by himself, a little above, among miracles. But this rests upon no adequate and satisfactory authority, but merely upon rumour and popular tradition, as is evident even from Livy, and therefore is classed by me among those miracles which are said to have been performed by St. Geneviève among the French, and by St. Patrick among the Irish. Possibly something of the kind did formerly happen at Rome: upon which however we can determine nothing certain, since the circumstances of the time and other relations, from which we ought to form our judgment on the nature of wonderful actions, are at this day un-

[9] He meant De Fato, in which book, cap. 7. p. 3269. tom. 9. opp. these words occur.

cerning necessity and contingency: Non necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quanquam id millesimo antè anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset, "That it was not necessary Cypselus the tyrant should reign at Corinth, though that were a thing predicted by Apollo's oracle a thousand years before." As also this recorded by Varro,[10] of Vectius Valens, an augur in the time of Romulus, who, when Rome was a building, from the flying of twelve vultures, presaged that the continuance of that city would be for twelve hundred years: which seems to have been accordingly fulfilled, in the year of our Lord four hundred and fifty five, immediately after the death of the third Valentinian (whom some make to be the last emperor of the West or Rome) when Gensericus the Vandal took the city the second time, and fired it. But above all, that of the Sibyls; of whose prophecies such things are recorded by pagan writers, as makes it very suspicious, that they did foretell the coming of our Saviour Christ, and the times of Christianity. But were these, and the like pagan prophecies, real, then must they needs have had some higher original than the natural presaging faculty of their demons, especially those of the Sibyls; who, for aught we know, might be as well

known to us. What the more intelligent of the Romans thought of this prodigy of Attius may be learned from these words of Cicero, occurring De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 6. p. 3058. tom. 9. opp. Non possum Attii Navii, quem commemorabas, lituum contemnere. Sed qui ista intellecta sunt, a philosophis debes discere, præsertim cum isti plurimis de rebus divinis *mentiantur*, "I cannot contemn the staff of Attius Navius you have spoken of. But I ought to learn from philosophers, how such things are to be understood, especially as those men, in reference to a great many divine matters, deal in lies." Add what he says, De Divinat. lib. 2. cap. 38. p. 3223. Omitte igitur lituum Romuli, quem in maximo incendio negas potuisse comburi: contemne cotem Attii Navii: nihil debet esse in philosophia commentitiis fabellis loci, "Say no more, therefore, about the staff of Romulus, which you assert could not be burnt in the great conflagration: despise the whetstone of Attius Navius: in philosophy no place should be given to commentitious fables."

[10] The passage of Varro here touched upon by the learned Doctor is found in the Fragments of lib. 18. of his Antiquitates Rerum Humanarum. The words themselves are as follows: Fuisse Vettium Romæ in augurio non ignobilem, ingenio magno, cuivis docto in disputando parem: eum se audivisse dicentem: si ita essent, ut traderent historici de Romæ urbis condendæ auguriis ac duodecim vulturibus: quoniam centum et viginti annos incolumis præteriisset populus Romanus, ad mille et ducentos perventurum, "That Vettius was an augur of no mean note at Rome, possessing great intellect, and a match for any of the learned in disputation: that he had heard him say, that if what historians recorded of the auguries and twelve vultures, at the time of building Rome were true, the Roman people having passed one hundred and twenty years in safety would last for twelve hundred years." Now it is evident from these words that Dr. Cudworth's memory has twice deceived him in this passage. I. He calls the augur, whose prediction he is speaking of, Vectius Valens. But Varro writes that he had no other name than Vettius. The learned Doctor seems to have confounded Vestius Valens, a diviner and soothsayer of Antioch, who foretold the fortunes of new Rome or Constantinople to Constantine the Great, with that other Vettius mentioned by Varro, who presaged the duration of ancient Rome. Concerning the Antiochian seer, consult Gerh. Jo. Vossius, De Scientiis Mathematicis, cap. 37. 6. II. He supposes Vettius the augur to have been contemporary with Romulus, and to have himself seen those vultures, from whose number he predicted the continuance of the Roman city. But it is clear from the words of Varro, that he lived long after.

assisted supernaturally to predict our Saviour Christ, amongst the Pagans in the West, as Balaam was in the East.[11]

But here the Scripture triumpheth over paganism and all its

Romulus, and in the time of Varro himself, and made his conjecture from what was currently reported respecting the twelve vultures seen by Romulus. The matter itself referred to by Vettius, is recorded by Livy, Hist. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 7. These errors have already been noticed by the celebrated J. Le Clerc, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 4. p. 116. &c.

[11] Here a few words will be required in solution of a twofold question. First: Whether the priests who presided over the oracles of the ancients were influenced by evil demons, and by their instruction sometimes predicted future events, or acted a mere farce and deluded those who consulted them by fictitious prophecies? Secondly: Whether the supreme Being ever thought good to grant the faculty of divination to Pagans? The learned Doctor does not hesitate to affirm both these: but there are not a few who will consider this to be done unadvisedly.

Every one who is not entirely ignorant of the history of literature must be acquainted with the ingenious and erudite disputations among the learned of our own times on the subject of the ancient oracles. As most of the ancient Christians, and nearly all theologians after them, had given to oracles an important place among the means by which the prince of darkness, prior to the birth of our Saviour, kept nations in bondage to himself, Ant. Van. Dalen, in a specific work On Oracles, published at the close of the last century, maintained with great copiousness and learning, that no oracle ought to be ascribed to an evil demon, but all of them to the craft and imposture of priests: whose footsteps have been followed by learned men in such numbers, that at this day a man would scarcely escape the stigma of superstition, if he did not pronounce his disbelief, that demons, on some occasions at least, had any concern in these matters. Those who wish to know the history of this controversy may seek it from others: for myself it will be sufficent to notice this one thing, which has escaped those who have recorded it, that to Fr. Baltus, and the others who reject Van Dalen's opinion, an auxiliary arrived not long ago from India, J. V. Bouchet, one of those Jesuists that are sent to India under the auspices of the pope for the purpose of propagating the Christian religion: who, in a tolerably long letter to Balt, recounts examples of oracles seen and witnessed by himself among nations enslaved with the superstition of many gods. See Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses Ecrites des Missions Etrangeres, tom. 9. p. 61—123. For my own part, on reviewing the whole matter, I am disposed to consider this to belong to that class of controversies upon which it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion. Those who dispute upon the matter are agreed as to the existence of demons, or beings superior to man, either as regards intellect, or agility, or the knowledge of recondite causes, or, in short, other things: for if one side were to deny this, there would be an end of the whole disputation, and it would be necessary to inquire concerning demons, before we could come to oracles. They are also agreed that these demons, from various causes, can foresee and predict some things, which no human being can have any foresight of. For if men who excel others in sciences can foretell many things which the less experienced cannot see before they happen, who would deny the same faculty to genii, more powerful and acute than man? Lastly. They both allow that those genii are able to impart to others their knowledge of future events, and that neither God's justice nor goodness always prevents them from doing so. On which matters as those who deliberate upon the causes of oracles are not at issue, I do not understand how it can be proved that demons never predicted future events through the priests, and that all oracles were no better than the idle divinations of soothsayers and the Chaldeans. Those who deny altogether the agency of demons in oracles, in the first place, appeal to the numerous examples in which manifest traces are discernible of fraud and imposture: secondly, they speak of the ambiguity and falsehood of oracles: they then adduce the testimonies of many of the pagan writers themselves, in which these writers ridicule the vanity and fallacy of oracles: lastly, they suppose it to be unworthy of God to suffer evil demons to deceive and delude mankind by their responses. It is unnecessary to enumerate the arguments and observations of minor importance. But the last of these arguments goes too far, and proves more than it is intended to prove. For by parity of reasoning, any one might rightly conclude as follows: It was unworthy of God to suffer priests, sooth-

oracles and divinations; there being contained in it so many unquestionable predictions of events to follow a long time after, and such as can be imputed to nothing but the supernatural

sayers, seers, magicians, expounders of dreams, to mislead people by their divinations and responses. It is all the same, whether a man is deceived by demons or by their minions. Therefore if the supreme Being, as all acknowledge, does nothing unworthy of his majesty by permitting impostors of the kind and the priests of empty idols to circumvent the multitude, neither can it appear inconsistent with his consummate perfections that, previously to the birth of our Saviour, he sometimes allowed evil genii to predict future events through men devoted to themselves. God has not granted reason to mankind for no purpose: which if they will not make use of, but will suffer themselves to be deceived by artful men, or even by demons, they have no cause for blaming God, but only themselves and their own idleness. This argument, therefore, is of equal force against those who ascribe no oracle to demons, as it is against those who maintain demons to have been present in all the temples. As to the three former, they prove clearly that in many oracles the wickedness of men had more to do than that of demons, and that those who surpassed the vulgar in wisdom and sagacity were conscious of this, but they by no means prove all oracles to have been of this kind. For if I could show six hundred instances of oracles proceeding from the craft and imposture of men, still this would not amount to a proof that all oracles were of the same kind, unless I should first prove by clear arguments, that it is impossible for demons to make men acquainted with future events, either through their ministers or in any other manner. Which being beyond the power of any one to do, I consider it to be evident, therefore, that we cannot assert generally that all the accounts which have come down to us in the books of good authors concerning miracles are to be referred to frauds and impostures. The other side, who hold either all or the major part of oracles to have proceeded from demons, draw the chief support of their opinion, partly from the responses said formerly to have been given, and partly from the testimonies of Christians. But that the Christians of the primitive ages are not men who are implicitly to be believed will be doubted by no one who is not ignorant of the various errors into which they incautiously fell. It is difficult to divest ourselves of those opinions which we have been imbued with from infancy: and therefore it is not to be wondered at that men of great piety and worth in other respects should have clung to many of the popular superstitions which they had imbibed almost with their mothers' milk. As to the oracles themselves, some of them undoubtedly seem to surpass the faculties of men: but any one, I imagine, may perceive that those who entertain the opposite opinion will not long be at a loss for something to bring forward against them. They will reply, that it is possible for the event to have corresponded with the prediction by pure accident; or they will call into question the credibility of the authors; or they will contend that the narratives of the facts are not sufficiently clear and perfect. All this being so, I do not hesitate to declare, that every thing is not so clear in this controversy as to warrant us in pronouncing altogether in favour of either side. That the authors of many oracles were crafty priests and not demons, learned men have demonstrated by arguments as valid as can be produced on such questions. But as it still remains certain that there is nothing absurd or contrary to reason in the opinion of those who suppose demons to have sometimes really delivered oracles, I consider I shall do right, if I refrain from fully assenting to either view. On comparing the two opinions, however, it must certainly be owned, that those who refer all the ancient oracles to the craftiness of men are in a somewhat better position than those who suppose demons to have in former times inspired the priests, or themselves delivered responses to inquirers. For the former, having already produced instances of many frauds of the kind, have by that means not only given some probability to their opinion, but have also proved the possibility of its being altogether true. For that which has happened twice or thrice can happen a hundred times. Whereas the latter, who have not yet established either by indubitable examples or testimonies that a demon was ever really the author of oracles, have nothing to rely upon but this, that their opinion cannot be convicted of falsehood. But in my judgment, an opinion supported by arguments, which if not certain are at least probable, has somewhat more of plausibility in it than the one which has no foundation to rest upon, except merely that nobody can wholly refute it: although a wise man would not give his entire assent to either. Every one, I consider,

foreknowledge and omniscience of God Almighty. As for example, those concerning the Messiah, or our Saviour Christ, delivered by Jacob, Moses, David, Isaias, Jeremy, Daniel, and

ought to be left at liberty to decide upon such matters as he likes: for religion is not in the least affected by either the one or the other opinion. I have often been surprised to see worthy men, in other respects of high eminence in sacred as well as profane learning, contend on the side of those who refer the origin of oracles exclusively to demons, as though they were combating for the glory of God and the welfare of the church. For I cannot bring myself to consider it to be to the glory of God, for men to believe that, previously to the time of our Saviour, Satan was permitted to wander about at will, and every where to deceive miserable mortals by all sorts of frauds and fallacies. I have thought proper to observe thus much, even for the sake of satisfying the illustrious scholar, Jo. Christoph. Gottscheid, professor of Leipzig, who, without having received any obligation from me, not long ago most courteously dedicated to me a most elegant German version of Fontanelle's History of Oracles, published in French, and publicly requested my opinion concerning this controversy.

I come now to the second question: Whether there were formerly men among the nations ignorant of the true religion, who for certain reasons were gifted by the supreme Being with the faculty of predicting future events. An immense number of the learned do not hesitate to espouse Dr. Cudworth's opinion. And as many as ascribe any thing to the Sibylline verses, which an infinity of persons notoriously do, cannot but entertain it. [Almost all the ancient Christians thought so. See Beausobre, Hist. des Manich. p. 305. &c.] Of the earlier Christian fathers the author of the Quæstiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos, which at this day bear the name of Justin Martyr, did not scruple to follow the same opinion, Quæst. 2. p. 392. opp. Justini. For after having asked, "Since there were true prophets among the Greeks as well as among Christians, and divinations of future events were given by both parties, by what marks can we distinguish the Christian prophets to be more excellent?" he answers as follows: Τοῦ αὐτοῦ Θεοῦ ἔστι πάντα ταῦτά καὶ ἡ πρόρρησις τῶν λόγων καὶ ἔκβασις τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν τε καὶ ἀποστόλων προμηνύσαντος, ἃ ἔμελλε ποιεῖν, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν τῆς εὐσεβείας αὐτὸς προεμήνυσεν, ἃ ἔμελλε ποιεῖν, "All these, the prediction of words as well as the event of things, are of the same God; who both foretold by the holy prophets and apostles what he was about to do, and in like manner foreshowed future events by those who were strangers to the true worship." Which having proved, although somewhat inaptly, by the example of Balaam and a certain passage of Ezekiel, he again subjoins the following: Οὕτως καὶ διὰ τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι μαντέων ὅσα διὰ τῶν ἔργων τὴν ἔκβασιν ἐδέξατο, αὐτὸς προεμήνυσε, "In like manner he (God) foreshowed by the Greek prophets, whatever was fulfilled by the event." Let us see how far we can assent to this opinion. In the first place it is evident to us from the authority of sacred writ, that God, consistently with his perfections, can impart to impious and flagitious men extraordinary powers, and among these the faculty of divination. For to pass over the example of Balaam, which Dr. Cudworth himself has cited, and of Caiaphas, John xi. 51. the divine prophet Micah in the words of God accuses the prophets of his time of *divining for money*, Micah iii. 11. and our Saviour himself declares that at the last day he will say to many of those who have prophesied in his name, "I never knew you, depart from me, ye that work iniquity," Matt. vii. 23. All these, however, although leading a wicked life, were yet not entirely devoid of the true religion, but were imbued in a great measure with correct sentiments on religion, and not associated with those who despised the true God and worshipped false deities. Wherefore I should consider it to be not yet proved by these examples, that there is nothing to prevent God from entrusting the power of predicting future events to those who are altogether strangers to the true worship. In the next place it is well known that no nation in times past was so barbarous and so forsaken of God, that he did not now and then raise up in it good and wise men, especially before the promulgation of the law by Moses, who abominated the popular superstitions and the worship of idols, and both recommended to the people and themselves followed a better and more holy religion. There occur in sacred writ illustrious examples in proof of this. Even the Jews by universal consent allow, that prior to the time of Moses other nations as well as themselves had their prophets. See Rich. Simonii Lettres Choisies, tom. 3. ch. 9.

most of the prophets; foretelling sundry particular circumstances of his coming, and that grand event, which followed after, of the Gentiles or Pagans' so general reception and enter-

p. 49. Wherefore, if those who think with Dr. Cudworth simply mean that no nation was altogether destitute of divinely inspired men, from whom all who were so disposed might learn the knowledge of the true God, and the way of eternal salvation, there would be nothing in this opinion to be found fault with. But these learned men wish us to concede something more, and require us to believe that the supreme Being sometimes disclosed his will and future events even to those whose minds were entirely devoid of true religion, and contaminated with the most perverse sentiments concerning God. Are we therefore to assent to this opinion? For my part I consider we ought to decide that generally God can do, and sometimes for most just and holy reasons did do, the thing in question. I am led to this conclusion by the example, recorded in Scripture, of Nebuchadnezzar, Dan. ii. 1. This king beyond all controversy served vain gods; and yet God by a remarkable dream informed him of the fate of his empire. I should almost add the example of Abimelech, king of Gerar, to whom the supreme Being is likewise said to have signified his will in sleep, Gen. xx. 6. But on considering all that is recorded of this king, he does not seem to me to have been a man wholly ignorant of the true religion, although I willingly grant that he was not in the strict sense a true worshipper of God. It being certain, therefore, that it is not incompatible with the holiness of God, sometimes to disclose future things to the worshippers of idols, it remains for us to inquire, whether examples of such prophets can be produced from the history of ancient nations, especially of the Greeks and Romans. I shall merely take a review of those adduced by Dr. Cudworth; for as those who hold the same opinion do not bring forward any that are better and greater, by ascertaining the estimation reason requires us to form of these, we shall at once know what we are to think of the whole. 1. I shall begin with the last example, that of Balaam. But it will be already evident from what I have stated above, that this is foreign to the matter in hand. For Balaam, as the whole of his history and the prophecy itself show, was not a stranger to the true religion, but a worshipper of one God, and separated from the people of God only by his vices and place of abode, Num. xxiii. 2. The Sibyls, who here occupy the last place but one among the examples, are the subject of endless questions and doubts among the learned, and therefore cannot supply us with any sure argument on this question. If there were women of the kind in former times, which I consider not unlikely, still we are unable to come to any positive decision respecting the faculty possessed by them, as long as we lack their oracles and poems. That any of them are extant at the present day is denied by most men, nor are those which are commonly passed off for Sibylline verses received as such by persons eminent for their skill in criticism or their knowledge of ancient matters. 3. I could wish that the Roman augur Vettius, who lived in the time of Varro, had been altogether excluded by our author from this number. For the augury of this man is not such as could not proceed from any one but a divine prophet. I can imagine this foolish seer to have prophesied with great confidence, because he knew for a certainty that at the time he pointed out neither himself nor any of his auditors would be living. Neither did the event, as the learned Doctor supposes, confirm this oracle. For although the city was taken, and a great part of it burnt down by Genseric, twelve centuries after Romulus, still it did not utterly perish according to the prediction of Vettius, nor cease to be a splendid, illustrious, and magnificent city after that calamity. But above all, what completely deprives Vettius' oracle of all authority is, that this man predicted the duration of the Roman city from the number and flight of the vultures. Therefore, if God was the author of this oracle it follows that he also caused so many vultures to appear to Romulus, and consequently no one can doubt but that the science of augurs, upon the laws of which Vettius' prophecy chiefly rests, was in former times a divine institution. But what man in his senses, and entertaining correct notions of divine matters, would believe this? 4. The oracle concerning Cypselus, which is the one first instanced here, and taken from Cicero's book De Fato, is regarded by me in no higher light. For this is said to have been predicted of Cypselus by the oracle of Apollo; and it is utterly incredible that the supreme and most holy Deity ever prophesied from the Delphic tripod, or employed the mouth of the Pythian priestess to foreshow the fates of nations and empires. Although there

tainment of Christianity; that is, the belief of the Messiah, promised to the Jews; together with the shaking off of their gods and idols. Amongst which Scripture prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, we must needs reckon for one, and none of the least considerable neither, that of Daniel's weeks, or of four hundred and ninety years, to commence from the going forth of the word, or the decree made by Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, in the seventh year of his reign, for the return of the people of Israel, Priests and Levites, to Jerusalem; and to terminate in the death of the Messiah, and the preaching of the gospel to the Jews only; though we are not ignorant, how some learned men, both of the former and latter times, have stretched their wits, they sometimes using no small violence to divert this prophecy another way. For that these prophecies, concerning our Saviour Christ, could have no other original than the immediate supernatural revelation of God Almighty, is evident from the thing itself; it being such as depended on no natural causes, much less upon those constellations of the astrological Atheists,[1] but only upon his own secret will and counsel.

But besides these prophecies concerning our Saviour Christ, there are others contained in the Scripture, concerning the fates and successions of the chief kingdoms, empires, and polities of the world; as of the rise of the Persian monarchy; of its fall and conquest by the Macedonian Alexander; of the quadripartite division of this Greekish empire after Alexander's death; of the succession of the Seleucidæ and Lagidæ, a prophetic history, so

is no necessity even for this answer. If the learned Doctor had attentively examined Cicero's words he would easily have perceived from them that no oracle of the kind was in fact ever delivered a thousand years before the time of Cypselus, but that Chrysippus, whose opinion and words Cicero is reciting, said merely: Si vel ejusmodi datum fuisset ab Apolline responsum, haud tamen necesse futurum fuisse, ut regnaret Cypselus, "If a response of the kind had been given by Apollo, still it would not have been necessary that Cypselus should reign." The phraseology in these words is similar to that of the apostle St. Paul in 1 Cor. xiii. 1. "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels;" and Gal. i. 8. "Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." Herodotus removes all doubt on this matter, who Histor. lib. 5. cap. 92. p. 320. 321. narrates the history of Cypselus, and cites this very oracle of the Delphic Apollo which Cicero alludes to. For he not only acknowledges it to be doubtful and ambiguous, ἀμφιδέξιον, but states also that it was delivered not prior to the age of Cypselus, but only at the time when he had already arrived at manhood. There is no doubt but that Cypselus, being desirous of the sovereignty, corrupted the priests of the oracle, so as to make the answer of the god correspond to his wishes. In conclusion, therefore, although I grant that God can impart the knowledge of future events even to those who in other respects entertain the most perverse notions of religion and his worship, yet I deny that, with the exception of Nebuchadnezzar, and perhaps of Abimelech, any clear and unquestionable example can be adduced from the histories of ancient nations.

[1] He alludes to Cardan and some others who were so devoted to astrology as most absurdly to subject even the Christian religion itself to the stars. There are in existence two dissertations of J. Fr. Mayer, a celebrated theologian of former times, on this question: whether the fate of religions depends on the stars, published at Hamb. 1700. in 4to. in which much nonsense of the sort is collected together.

agreeable with the events, that it was by Porphyrius[2] pretended to have been written after them; and lastly, of the rise and continuance of the Roman empire. For notwithstanding the endeavours of some to pervert all those Scripture prophecies that extend to the present times, it is clearly demonstrable, that this was Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, or the legs and toes of Nebuchadnezzar's statue, that fourth empire, strong as iron, which came at length to be broken or divided into ten or many principalities, called in the prophetic language, and according to the *eichon*, horns; amongst whom was to start up another "horn with eyes, speaking great words against the Most High, and making war with the saints, and prevailing against them, for a time, times, and half a time." Which prophecy of Daniel's is the ground-work of St. John's Apocalypse, it being there further insisted upon, filled up and enlarged, with the addition of several particulars; so that both Daniel and John have each of them, from their respective ages, set down a prophetic calendar of times, in a continued series (the former more compendiously and generally, the latter more copiously and particularly), to the very end of the world.

And thus do we see plainly, that the Scripture prophecies evince a Deity; neither can these possibly be imputed by Atheists, as other things, to men's fear and fancy, nor yet to the fiction of politicians. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Christianity also; partly as predicted by them in its several circumstances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles' reception of it; and partly as itself predicting future events, this spirit of prophecy being the testimony of Jesus. Both which Scripture prophecies, of Christ in the Old Testament, and from him in the New, are of equal, if not greater force to us in this present age, for the confirmation of our faith, than the miracles themselves recorded in the Scripture: we having now certain knowledge ourselves of many of those events, and being no way able to suspect but that the prophecies were written long before.

To conclude; all these extraordinary phenomena of apparitions, witchcraft, possessions, miracles, and prophecies, do evince that spirits, angels, or demons, though invisible to us, are no fancies, but real and substantial inhabitants of the world; which favours not the atheistic hypothesis: but some of them, as the higher kind of miracles and predictions, do also immediately enforce the acknowledgment of a Deity; a Being superior to nature, which therefore can check and control it; and which comprehending the whole, foreknows the most remotely distant, and contingent events.

[2] See St. Jerome's Prœm. Commentar. in Daniel, tom. 5. opp. p. 481.

And now have we not only fully answered and confuted all the atheistic pretences against the idea of God, tending to disprove his existence; but also occasionally proposed several solid and substantial arguments for a Deity: as, that all successive things, the world, motion, and time, are in their own nature absolutely incapable of an ante-eternity; and therefore, there must of necessity be something else of a permanent duration, that was eternal without beginning: that no Atheist, according to his principles, can possibly give any account of the original of his own soul or mind; that the phenomenon of motion cannot be solved without an incorporeal principle, presiding over the whole; that the τὸ εὐ καὶ καλῶς, "the artificial, regular, and orderly frame of things," together with the harmony of the whole, demonstrate an understanding and intending cause of the world, that ordered things for ends and good. Besides, that there are several other phenomena, both ordinary and extraordinary, which Atheists being no way able to solve, are forced to deny.

True indeed, some of the ancient Theists have themselves affirmed, that there could be no demonstration of a God: which assertion of theirs hath been by others misunderstood into this sense, as if there were therefore no certainty at all to be had of God's existence, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge or science, but only faith and opinion. Whereas the true meaning of those ancient Theists, who denied that there could be any demonstration of a God, was only this, That the existence of a God could not be demonstrated à priori, himself being the first cause of all things. Thus doth Alexander Aphrodisius, in his Physical Doubts and Solutions, after he had propounded an argument for a God, according to Aristotelic principles, from motion, declare himself:* Ἡ δεῖξις κατὰ ἀνάλυσιν, οὐ γὰρ οἱόντε τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων τε καὶ φανερῶν ἀρξαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστῆσαι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν, "That this argument or proof of his was in way of analysis only; it being not possible that there should be a demonstration of the first principles of all. Wherefore (saith he) we must here fetch our beginning from things, that are after it, and manifest; and thence, by way of analysis, ascend to the proof of that first nature, which was before them." And to the same purpose Clemens Alexandrinus, having first affirmed,† ὡς δυσμεταχειριστότατος ὁ περὶ θεοῦ λόγος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι, καὶ γενομένους.

* Lib. 1. cap. 2. [Page 2. Edit. Græc. Venet. 1536. fol.]
† Strom. lib. 5. p. 388. [Cap. 12. p. 695. Edit. Potteri.]

εἶναι, "That God is the most difficult thing of all to be discoursed of; because, since the principle of every thing is hard to find out, the first and most ancient principle of all, which was the cause to all other things of their being made, must needs be the hardest of all to be declared or manifested;" he afterwards subjoins: Ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δε ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει, "But neither can God be apprehended by any demonstrative science: for such science is from things before in order of nature, and more knowable; whereas nothing can exist before that which is altogether unmade." And certain it is, that it implies a contradiction, that God, or a perfect Being, should be thus demonstrated by any thing before him as his cause. Nevertheless it doth not therefore follow, that there can be no certainty at all had of the existence of a God, but only a conjectural probability; no knowledge, but faith and opinion only. For we may have a certain knowledge of things, the διότι whereof cannot be demonstrated à priori, or from antecedent necessary causes: as for example, that there was something eternal of itself, without beginning, is not at all demonstrable by any antecedent cause, it being contradictious to such a thing to have a cause. Nevertheless, upon supposition only, that something doth exist, which no man can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an opinion, but also certain knowledge, from the necessity of irrefragable reason, that there was never nothing, but something or other did always exist from eternity, and without beginning. In like manner, though the existence of a God or perfect Being cannot be demonstrated à priori, yet may we notwithstanding, from our very selves (whose existence we cannot doubt of), and from what is contained in our own minds, or otherwise consequent from him, by undeniable principles of reason, necessarily infer his existence. And whensoever any thing is thus necessarily inferred from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a demonstration, though not of the διότι, yet of the ὅτι of it; that the thing is, though not why it is. And many of the geometrical demonstrations are no other.[3]

[3] The question here touched upon by the learned Doctor: Whether or not there can be any demonstration of God, is one of those which may easily be decided, if discussed by wise and rational men. For taking away the ambiguity of the terms *demonstration* and *à priori*, it will be clear to every one that there is no controversy about the thing itself, but only about the meaning of the words. But still there are some, both among the ancients and moderns, who have denied the demonstrability of God in a sense by no means to be admitted of: to which number I almost suspect Clemens Alexandrinus to have belonged, who at any rate has not expressed himself with sufficient caution on this subject, although he is excused by Dr. Cudworth. Clemens, to show the dignity and excellency of the Christian religion, declares that God cannot otherwise be known and apprehended than by faith and the doctrine inculcated by our Saviour: Λείπεται δή, says he, θείᾳ χάριτι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἄγνωστον εἶναι, "It remains, therefore, that we apprehend the unknown (God) by

It hath been asserted by a late eminent philosopher,[4] that there is no possible certainty to be had of any thing, before we be certain of the existence of a God essentially good; because we can never otherwise free our minds from the importunity of

divine grace, and the Word alone which is with him." Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 12. p. 696. Which if he intended to mean that a more certain and full knowledge of God, than reason can supply, is given to us by Christ, and that by the Holy Spirit and faith our minds are so confirmed in the knowledge of the divine nature as to be freed from all doubt, there would be no cause for reprehension in that precept. But Clemens goes farther, and leaves to reason no efficacy whatever; nay, he tells us that that very knowledge of God which was possessed by some philosophers, proceeded from a certain innate Word, or from Christ, whom he supposes to dwell by nature in the minds of all men; an opinion indeed very closely bordering upon fanaticism. Those certainly are mistaken who fancy that the well-known fanatical doctrine respecting a certain *inward Word*, was first invented by the Mystics and propagated from their books. This is an old doctrine, which grew up in the very infancy of Christianity, especially in Egypt, and being diffused through the masters of the Alexandrine school, and those Christian fathers who combined the precepts of Plato with the Christian religion, was afterwards more elaborately refined and set forth by the mystics. And there were many of the ancient Christian fathers who on this subject followed in the footsteps of Clemens, and maintained that none of those things which can be understood respecting God are to be referred to reason, but all to faith and a certain inward monitor; a doctrine indeed which afforded matter for cavil and ridicule to philosophers, as appears from what Origen says upon this subject, lib. 1. adv. Celsum, p. 8. and elsewhere. If any one, therefore, denies God to be demonstrable in this sense he is by all means to be opposed, lest we should rush into various snares from which it will be impossible ever to escape. There are other fanatics also, not differing much from these, who affirm that God cannot be known by reason, but only by sense and a certain interior feeling of the mind; whom no one again will agree with who does not wish to reject all reason and that natural knowledge of God, which is so highly spoken of by St. Paul. Some of the later theologians, I must confess, who have written against the Atheists, although in other respects entertaining the best of sentiments, have sometimes however, in my opinion, discoursed without sufficient caution and prudence on this question. For there are those among them who openly assert that the Atheists are not to be opposed by arguments, the power of which is merely human, but only by the sayings of holy writ, as possessing divine virtue. But this opinion I consider to be very dangerous, and open to many baneful inferences, nay injurious to the divine authority of the Scriptures. There is undoubtedly in the sayings of sacred writ an incredible power and efficacy towards rousing and turning the hearts of men; but the mind ought to be prepared and imbued as it were beforehand, to receive this influence, and remove the impediments which oppose it. Admirable and elegant are the precepts of Ern. Salom. Cyprianus on this subject in the Dedication prefixed to the Animadversions on Grotius' book De Veritate Religionis Christianæ. As to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, whom we know to have been devoted to Peripatetic principles, by denying that God can be demonstrated he acted according to the precepts of his master, whose rules on demonstration cannot be accommodated to those arguments, by which reason apprehends the existence of God. Aristotle, Analyt. Posterior. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 188. tom. 1. opp. lays down this rule respecting demonstration: *Ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ' εἶναι, καὶ πρώτων, καὶ ἀμέσων, καὶ γνωριμωτέρων, καὶ προτέρων, καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτως γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου,* "It is necessary that demonstrative science should be from what are true, and first, and immediate, and more known, and prior, and the causes of the conclusion; for thus they will be also the proper principles of the thing demonstrated." As Aristotle in these words makes all demonstration proceed from things prior to the thing to be demonstrated, and from its causes, and God has nothing prior to or the cause of himself, it is clear that if we follow the laws of demonstrations laid down by the Stagirite we must deny altogether the possibility of God being demonstrated.

[4] Ren. Des Cartes. See his Meditatio Metaphysica Quarta. p. 25. and Quinta, p. 31. &c.

that suspicion which with irresistible force may assault them; that ourselves might possibly be so made, either by chance or fate, or by the pleasure of some evil demon, or at least of an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as that we should be deceived in all our most clear and evident perceptions; and therefore in geometrical theorems themselves, and even in our common notions. But when we are once assured of the existence of such a God as is essentially good, who therefore neither will nor can deceive; then, and not before, will this suspicion utterly vanish, and ourselves become certain that our faculties of reason and understanding are not false and imposturous, but rightly made. From which hypothesis it plainly follows, that all those Theists who suppose God to be a mere arbitrary Being, whose will is not determined by any nature of goodness or rule of justice, but itself is the first rule of both (they thinking this to be the highest perfection, liberty, and power) can never be reasonably certain of the truth of any thing, not so much as that two and two are four; because, so long as they adhere to that persuasion, they can never be assured but that such an arbitrary omnipotent Deity might designedly make them such, as should be deceived in all their clearest perceptions.

Now though there be a plausibility of piety in this doctrine, as making the knowledge of a God essentially good so necessary a præcognitum to all other science, that there can be no certainty of truth at all without it; yet does that very supposition, that our understanding faculties might possibly be so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions, (wheresoever it is admitted) render it utterly impossible ever to arrive to any certainty concerning the existence of a God essentially good; forasmuch as this cannot be any otherwise proved, than by the use of our faculties of understanding, reason, and discourse. For to say that the truth of our understanding faculties is put out of all doubt and question, as soon as ever we are assured of the existence of a God essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive; whilst this existence of a God is in the meantime itself no otherwise proved, than by our understanding faculties; that is, at once to prove the truth of God's existence from our faculties of reason and understanding, and again to prove the truth of those faculties from the existence of a God essentially good: this, I say, is plainly to move round in a circle, and to prove nothing at all; a gross oversight, which the forementioned philosopher seems plainly guilty of.[5]

[5] This hypothesis of Des Cartes certainly seems to labour under some imperfection, although at first sight it would appear to be highly calculated to strengthen the cause of religion and piety. He lays down as follows: It is impossible for me to know whether I am deceived or not in those things which I perceive clearly and distinctly, until I am certain that he who made me is such, that he will not deceive me. Now,

Wherefore, according to this hypothesis, we are of necessity condemned to eternal scepticism, both concerning the existence of a God, when, after all our arguments and demonstrations for the same, we must at length gratify the Atheists with this confession in the conclusion, that it is possible notwithstanding there may be none; and also concerning all other things, the certainty whereof is supposed to depend upon the certainty of the existence of such a God as cannot deceive.

So that if we will pretend to any certainty at all concerning the existence of a God, we must of necessity explode this new sceptical hypothesis of the possibility of our understandings being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions; by means whereof we can be certain of the truth of nothing, and to use our utmost endeavour to remove the same. In the first place therefore we affirm, that no power, how great soever, and therefore not omnipotence itself, can make any thing to be indifferently either true or false, this being plainly to take away the nature both of truth and falsehood, or to make them nothing but words, without any signification. Truth is not factitious; it is a thing which cannot be arbitrarily *made*, but *is*. The divine will and omnipotence itself (now supposed by us) hath no imperium upon the divine understanding: for if God understood only by will, he would not understand at all.[6] In the next place we add, that though the truth of singular contingent propositions depends upon the things themselves existing without, as the measure and archetype thereof; yet as to the universal and abstract theorems of science, the terms whereof are those reasons of things which exist nowhere but only in the mind itself (whose noemata and ideas they are) the measure and rule of truth concerning them can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the mind, but must be native and domestic to it, or con-

if any one should go on and ask: How therefore can I know that there is a cause which made me, and that it is devoid of all wish to deceive me? The philosopher replies: From this, that when I examine myself, I clearly and distinctly perceive that there must necessarily be such a cause. For I think: therefore, I exist: if I exist, there must be some cause of my existence: But that this cause possesses all the perfections which can take place and be conceived, I conclude, from the notion of him which is in my own mind. This is reasoning in a circle, which all philosophers acknowledge to be most vicious. If it be possible for me to be deceived, even when I perceive most clearly and distinctly; who is to convince me that that notion of God, although innate, and apparently most evident to me, is not fallacious and visionary? This opinion of Des Cartes has also been acutely argued against by Pet. Gassendi, Dub. et Instant. ad Cartesii Meditat. Metaphys. Dubitat. 3. p. 383. tom. 3. opp. The same philosopher has been charged with scepticism also by many others; among whom see Pet. Villemandy, Scepticismus Debellatus, cap. 2. p. 9. &c.

[6] Consult what we have already remarked at great length on this subject above. As we have there proved, but few will question what Dr. Cudworth here lays down as the ground-work of his demonstration. But Des Cartes denies it, and maintains, whether sincerely or not I cannot say, that God can cause things altogether repugnant to each other, to be at the time true.

tained within the mind itself, and therefore can be nothing but its clear and distinct perception. In these intelligible ideas of the mind, whatsoever is clearly perceived to be, is; or, which is all one, is true. Every clear and distinct perception is an entity or truth, as that, which is repugnant to conception, is a nonentity or falsehood. Nay, the very essence of truth here is this clear perceptibility, or intelligibility; and therefore can there not be any clear or distinct perception of falsehood: which must be acknowledged by all those who, though granting false opinions, yet agree in this, that there can be no false knowledge. For the knowledge of these universal abstract truths is nothing but the clear and distinct perception of the several ideas of the mind, and their necessary relations to one another: wherefore, to say that there can be no false knowledge, is all one as to say that there can be no clear and distinct perceptions of the ideas of the mind false. In false opinions, the perception of the understanding power itself is not false, but only obscure. It is not the understanding power or nature in us, that erreth, but it is we ourselves, who err, when we rashly and unwarily assent to things not clearly perceived by it. The upshot of all this is, that since no power, how great soever, can make any thing indifferently to be true; and since the essence of truth in universal abstract things is nothing but clear perceptibility, it follows, that omipotence cannot make anything that is false to be clearly perceived to be, or create such minds and understanding faculties, as shall have as clear conception of falsehoods, that is, of nonentities, as they have of truths or entities. For example, no rational understanding being, that knows what a part is, and what a whole, what a cause, and what an effect, could possibly be so made, as clearly to conceive the part to be greater than the whole, or the effect to be before the cause, or the like. Wherefore, we may presume with reverence to say, that there could not possibly be a world of rational creatures made by God, either in the moon or in some other planet, or elsewhere, that should clearly and distinctly conceive all things contrary to what are clearly perceived by us; nor could our human faculties have been so made, as that we should have as clear conceptions of falsehoods as of truths. Mind or understanding faculties in creatures may be made more or less weak, imperfect, and obscure, but they could not be made false, or such as should have clear and distinct conceptions of that which is not, because every clear perception is an entity; and though omnipotence can make something out of nothing, yet can it not make something to be nothing, nor nothing something. All which is no more than is generally acknowledged by theologers, when they affirm that God Almighty himself cannot do things contradictious; there being no other reason for this assertion,

but only this, because contradictiousness is repugnant to conception. So that conception and knowledge are hereby made to be the measure of all power, even omnipotence or infinite power itself being determined thereby; from whence it follows that power hath no dominion over understanding, truth, and knowledge; nor can infinite power make any thing whatsoever to be clearly conceivable, for could it make contradictious things clearly conceivable, then would itself be able to do them; because whatsoever can be clearly conceived by any, may unquestionably be done by infinite power.[7]

It is true indeed that sense, considered alone by itself, doth not reach to the absoluteness either of the natures, or of the existence of things without us, it being, as such, nothing but seeming, appearance, and fancy. And thus is that saying of some ancient philosophers to be understood, that, πᾶσα φαντασία ἀληθὴς, "every phantasy is true;" namely, because sense and fancy reach not to the absolute truth and falsehood of things, but contain themselves only within seeming and appearance; and every appearance must needs be a true appearance. Notwithstanding which, it is certain that sense often represents to us corporeal things otherwise than indeed they are, which though it be not a formal, yet is it a material falsity. Wherefore sense in the nature of it is not absolute, but πρὸς τὶ, or τινὶ, relative to the sentients. And by sense alone, without any mixture of reason or understanding, we can be certain of no more concerning the things without us, but only this, that they so seem to us. Hence was that of the ancient atomic philosophers in Plato:* Ἢ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳ οὖν ζώῳ, "Neither you nor any man else can be certain, that every other man and brute animal hath all the very same phantasms of colours that himself hath." Now, were there no other perception in us, but that of sense, (as the old atheistic philosophers concluded knowledge to be sense) then would all our human perceptions be merely seeming, fantastical, and relative; and none of them reach to the absolute truth of things. Every one in Protagoras'[8] language would then τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν, "think or opine only his own things;" all his truths being private and relative to himself. And that Protagorean aphorism were to be admitted also in the sense of that philosopher, that πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, "every man is the measure of all things to

[7] Many I have no doubt would have been glad if this demonstration had possessed greater perspicuity and clearness: to me certainly, on attentively reading and examining it over and over again, it has appeared somewhat perplexed and intricate. For this reason I have determined to dismiss it without any remark, lest I should happen to attribute to our illustrious author an opinion which was foreign to him.

* Theæt. p. 154. [P. 119 Edit. Ficini.]

[8] On these precepts of Protagoras, consult Plato, in his Theætetus, p. 116. &c.

himself; and, that no one man's opinion was righter than another's," but τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ, "that which seemed to every one, was to him true, to whom it seemed;" all truth and perception being but seeming and relative. But here lies one main difference betwixt understanding, or knowledge, and sense; that whereas the latter is fantastical and relative only; the former reacheth beyond fancy and appearance to the absoluteness of truth. For as it hath been already declared, whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived in things abstract and universal, by any one rational being in the whole world, is not a private thing, and true to himself only that perceived it; but it is, as some Stoics have called it, ἀληθὲς καθολικὸν, "a public, catholic, and universal truth:" it obtains every where, and, as Empedocles sang of natural justice:

Διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
Αἰθερος ἠνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.[9]

"It is extended throughout the vast ether, and through infinite light or space." And were there indeed infinite worlds, all thickly peopled with rational animals, it would be alike true to every one of them. Nor is it conceivable that omnipotence itself could create any such understanding beings as could have clear and distinct perceptions of the contrary to all that is perceived by us, no more than it could do things contradictious. But in all probability, because sense is indeed but seeming, fantastical, and relative, this is the reason that some have been so prone and inclinable to suspect the like of understanding, and all mental perception too, that this also is but seeming and relative; and that therefore men's minds or understandings might have been so made, by an arbitrary omnipotent Deity, as clearly and distinctly to perceive every thing that is false. But, if notwithstanding all that hath been said, any will still sing over the old song again: that all this which hath been hitherto declared by us, is indeed true, if our human faculties be true, or rightly made; but we can go no further than our faculties; and whether these be true or no, no man can ever be certain: we have no other reply to make, but that this is an over-stiff and heavy adherence to a prejudice of their own minds; that not only sense, but also reason and understanding, and all human perception is merely seeming, or fantastical, and relative to faculties only, but not reaching to the absoluteness of any truth; and that the human mind hath no criterion of truth at all within itself.

Nevertheless, it will probably be here further objected; that this is too great an arrogance for created beings to pretend to an

[9] These verses of his occur in Aristotle, Rhetoricor. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 737. tom. 3. opp.

absolute certainty of any thing, it being the sole privilege and prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore styled in Scripture, ὁ μόνος σοφὸς, "the only wise;" to which we briefly answer, that the Deity is the first original fountain of wisdom and truth, which is said to be the brightness of the everlasting light, the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness. The divine Word is the archetypal pattern of all truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. But created beings have but a derivative participation hereof, their understandings being obscure, and they erring in many things, and being ignorant of more. And it seems to be no derogation from Almighty God to suppose that created minds by a participation of the divine mind, should be able to know certainly that two and two make four; that equals added to equals will make equals; that a whole is greater than the part; and the cause before the effect; and that nothing can be made without a cause; and such-like other common notions, which are the principles from whence all their knowledge is derived. And indeed, were rational creatures never able to be certain of any such thing as this at all; what would their life be but a mere dream or shadow? and themselves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of fantastic vanity? Besides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty should make rational creatures, so as to be in an utter impossibility of ever attaining to any certainty of his own existence; or of having more than an hypothetical assurance thereof, if our faculties be true, (which possibly may be otherwise) then is there a God. We shall conclude this discourse against the Cartesian scepticism with that of Origen's: Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπιστήμη, "Knowledge is the only thing in the world which creatures have, that is in its own nature firm;" they having here something of certainty, but nowhere else.

Wherefore we having now that which Archimedes required, some firm ground and footing to stand upon, such a certainty of truth in our common notions, as that they cannot possibly be false; without which nothing at all could be proved by reason: we shall in the next place endeavour, not to shake or dissettle any thing thereby (which was the undertaking of that geometrician), but to confirm and establish the truth of God's existence, and that from the very idea of him, hitherto made good and defended against all the assaults of Atheists.

It is well known, that Cartesius[10] hath lately made a pretence to do this, with mathematical evidence and certainty, and he dispatches the business briefly after this manner: God, or a perfect Being, includeth necessary existence in his very idea; and

[10] See his Principles of Philosophy, part 1. sect. 13. p. 4. and Meditat. Metaphys. 5. p. 31, and elsewhere.

therefore he is. But though the inventor of this argument, or rather the reviver of that, which had before been used by some scholastics, affirmeth it to be as good a demonstration for the existence of a God, from his idea, as that in geometry, for a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, is from the idea of a triangle; yet nevertheless it is certain, that, by one means or other, this argument hath not hitherto proved so fortunate and successful, there being many who cannot be made sensible of any efficacy therein, and not a few who condemn it for a mere sophism. As for ourselves, we neither have any mind to quarrel with other men's arguments pro Deo; nor yet would we be thought to lay stress, in this cause, upon any thing which is not every way solid and substantial. Wherefore we shall here endeavour to set down the utmost we possibly can, both against this argument, and for it, impartially and candidly; and then, when we have done, leave the intelligent readers to make their own judgment concerning the same.[1]

Against it in this manner; first, because we can frame an idea in our own minds, of an absolutely perfect Being, including necessary existence in it, it will not at all follow from thence, that therefore there is such a perfect Being really existing without our minds; we being able to frame in our minds the ideas of many other things, that never were, nor will be. All that can be certainly inferred from the idea of a perfect Being seems to be this, that if it contain nothing which is contradictious to it, then it is not impossible, but that there might be such a Being actually existing. But the strength of this argument not lying merely in this, that because we have an idea of a perfect Being, therefore it is; but because we have such an idea of it, as includeth necessary existence in it, which the idea of nothing else besides doth; therefore it may be here further objected in this manner: That though it be very true, that a perfect Being doth include necessary existence in it, because that cannot be every way perfect, whose existence is not necessary, but contingent; yet will it not follow from hence, that therefore there is such a perfect Being actually existing; but all that can be deduced from it, will be no more than this, that whatsoever hath no necessary

[1] The learned Doctor discourses here, as in many other places, with great modesty and prudence. For at the time in which he lived and wrote this, the most eminent of the learned men in Britain were violently opposed to each other respecting the force of this argument: to none of whom Dr. Cudworth wished to give offence by a too great freedom of judgment. His most erudite friend, Dr. Hen. More, openly favoured this argument of Des Cartes, as we may learn from his Antidote against Atheism, lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 22. and Scholia on the same, p. 145. &c. and other places. On the other hand, Dr. Sam. Parker, among others, in his Tentamina Physico-Theolog. de Deo, Lond. 1673. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 37. &c. and Disputations on God and the Providence of God, Diss. 6. sect. 24. p. 567. maintained this to be a vain and futile sophism. Nor is it difficult to perceive that our author leant rather to the side of those who contended for its unsoundness and insufficiency.

and eternal existence, is no absolutely perfect Being. And again, that if there be any absolutely perfect Being, then was its existence always necessary, and will be always such; that is, it did both exist of itself, from all eternity, without beginning, and must needs exist to eternity incorruptibly; it being never able to cease to be. It seems indeed no more to follow, that because a perfect Being includes necessary existence in its idea, therefore there is such a perfect Being actually existing; than because a perfect Being includes necessary omniscience and omnipotence in it, that therefore there is such a perfect omniscient and omnipotent Being: all that follows in both cases, being only this; that if there be any Being absolutely perfect, then it is both omniscient and omnipotent, and it did exist of itself necessarily, and can never cease to be. Wherefore here lies a fallacy in this argumentation, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, or upon a supposition of a perfect Being, the conclusion is made concerning it absolutely. As some would prove the necessity of all human events, as for example of Adam's sinning, in this manner, that it always was true before, that either Adam would eat the forbidden fruit, or not eat it; and if he would eat it, he would certainly eat it, and not contingently; and again, if he would not eat it, then would he certainly and necessarily not eat it: wherefore whether he will eat it, or not eat it, he will do either necessarily, and not contingently. Where it is plain, that an absolute necessity is wrongly inferred in the conclusion from an hypothetical one in the premises. In like manner, when upon supposition of an absolutely perfect Being, it is affirmed of it, that its existence must not be contingent, but necessary, and from thence the conclusion is made absolutely, that there is such a perfect Being; this seems to be the very same fallacy. From the idea of a perfect Being including necessary existence in it, it follows undeniably, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, it must exist necessarily, and not contingently: but it doth not follow, that there must of necessity be such a perfect Being existing; these two propositions carrying a very different sense from one another. And the latter of them, that there must of necessity be a God, or perfect Being existing, seems to be a thing altogether indemonstrable, it implying, that the existence of God, or a perfect Being, may be proved *à priori*, or from some antecedent necessary cause; which was before declared to be a thing contradictious and impossible.

And now in justice are we obliged to plead the best we can also on the defensive side. Thus therefore, the idea of God, or an absolutely perfect Being, including in it, not an impossible, nor a contingent, but a necessary schesis, or relation to existence, it follows from thence absolutely, and without any "ifs" and

"ands," that he doth exist. For as of things contradictious, having therefore in the idea of them an impossible schesis to existence, we can confidently conclude, that they never were, nor will be; and as of other things not contradictious or impossible, but imperfect only, which therefore have a contingent schesis to existence, we can pronounce also, that possibly they might be, or might not be: in like manner, a perfect Being including in the idea of it a necessary schesis to existence, or an impossible one to non-existence, or containing existence in its very essence; we may by parity of reason conclude concerning it, that it is neither impossible to be, nor yet contingent to be, or not to be: but that it certainly is, and cannot but be; or that it is impossible it should not be. And indeed, when we say of imperfect beings, implying no contradiction in them, that they may possibly either be or not be, we herein tacitly suppose the existence of a perfect Being, because nothing, which is not, could be possible to be, were there not something actually in being, that hath sufficient power to cause or produce it. True indeed, we have the ideas of many things in our minds, that never were, nor will be; but these are only such as include no necessary, but contingent existence in their nature; and it does not therefore follow that a perfect Being, which includes necessity of existence in its idea, may, notwithstanding, not be. Wherefore this necessity of existence, or impossibility of non-existence, contained in the idea of a perfect Being, must not be taken hypothetically only or consequentially after this manner, that if there be any thing absolutely perfect, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; but absolutely, that though contradictious things cannot possibly be, and things imperfect may possibly either be, or not be, yet a perfect Being cannot but be; or it is impossible that it should not be. For otherwise were the force of the argumentation merely hypothetical, in this manner: If there be a perfect Being, then its existence both was, and will be necessary; this would plainly imply, that a perfect Being, notwithstanding that necessity of existence included in its nature, might either be, or not be, or were contingent to existence; which is a manifest contradiction, that the same thing should exist both contingently and necessarily. And this hypothetical absurdity will more plainly appear, if the argument be expressed in other words, as that necessity of existence, and impossibility of non-existence, and actual existence, belong to the very essence of a perfect Being; since it would be then ridiculous to go about to evade in this manner, that if there be a perfect Being, then it is, and cannot but be. Which identical proposition is true of every thing else, but absurd. Wherefore there is something more to be inferred from the necessity of existence included in the idea of a perfect Being than so; which can be nothing else

but this, that it absolutely and actually is. Moreover, no Theists can be able to prove, that God, or a perfect Being (supposed by them to exist) might not happen by chance only to be; if from the necessity of existence included in the idea of God, it cannot be inferred, that he could not but be. Notwithstanding which, here is no endeavour (as is pretended), to prove the existence of a God, or perfect Being, *à priori* neither, or from any necessary cause antecedent; but only from that necessity, which is included within itself, or is concomitant and concurrent with it; the necessity of its own perfect nature. And now we shall leave the intelligent and impartial reader to make his own judgment concerning the forementioned Cartesian argument for a Deity, drawn from its idea, as including necessity of existence in it, that therefore it is; whether it be merely sophistical, or hath something of solidity and reality in it. However, it is not very probable, that many Atheists will be convinced thereby, but that they will rather be ready to say, that this is no probation at all of a Deity, but only an affirmation of the thing in dispute, and a mere begging of the question; that therefore God is, because he is, or cannot but be.[2]

[2] Those fierce and multifarious contentions, heretofore engaged in by men of the highest note, on the argument by which Des Cartes attempted to prove the existence of God, are known to every one possessing even a moderate acquaintance with the transactions of theologians and philosophers. On each side are armyed men of first-rate talent and perspicacity; the chief of whom are enumerated by P. Bayle, Dictionnaire Histor. et Critique, tom. 4. voce Zabarella, note F. p. 2903. and J. Alb. Fabricius, Delectus Argumentorum pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 10. p. 325. &c. [Add Gabr. Daniel, Voyage au Monde de M. des Cartes, tom. 1. p. 120.] I have no inclination to become arbiter of this long and knotty dispute, nor, if I have, am I one that could justly arrogate to myself a full knowledge of the subject. I shall attempt, however, by a few observations to assist the labours of those who consider it worth while to give it a diligent and attentive examination.

I. In the first place, therefore, I would observe, that this argument from an *innate idea* is not ranked by Des Cartes among those, by which the being and existence of God can be proved to an Atheist. This philosopher regarded it as one by which any man can and ought to convince himself, that there must of necessity be an eternal and most perfect Being. Many learned men, I perceive, far superior to myself in perspicacity, suppose him to have meant that any one who wishes to combat successfully with Atheists should make this argument the basis of the disputation: nor do the principal disciples of this great man appear to me to teach otherwise. But on repeatedly perusing all that he has written upon it, I have been unable to put any such construction upon his words. On the contrary, he merely inquires, how a man left to himself, and, on account of the allaciousness of the senses, doubting about all eternal things, can become satisfied from the very consideration of his own mind, that there is an eternal and most perfect Being, the cause of himself and all things: and this he considers to be possible, if one will only attentively contemplate the notion of God imprinted on one's own mind. Thus he lays down the following as a foundation: No one can be certain of the truth of any thing, unless he knows beforehand that there is a God, who will not deceive us. He then asks, by what means we can arrive at this knowledge, apart from all those things which fall under the senses, and answers that the innate idea of God is of itself sufficient to convince every one of this: inasmuch as the necessity of existing cannot by any means be separated from this idea. All the Metaphysical Meditations of Des Cartes are coherent, and connected with each other; and many, therefore, in explaining, discussing and refuting them, seem to me to have grievously erred, because they have not followed the thread of his reasonings. but have

Wherefore we shall endeavour to make out an argument, or demonstration, for the existence of a God, from his idea, as including necessary existence in it, some other ways. And first,

considered certain opinions of his separately, paying no regard to their connexion with the rest.

II. Des Cartes himself, in explaining this argument, is neither sufficiently perspicuous, as will be proved by an example presently, nor sufficiently consistent, but, if I mistake not, doubtful and wavering. He does not first give us certain and clear definitions of the words he makes use of; seems occasionally to change the principles from which he draws his conclusions; sometimes concedes to his adversaries what at others he wishes to withhold: now might be said to be striking out a new path for himself; and now again to be merely inculcating what has long since been acknowledged by every body: sometimes, hurried away by the heat and fervour of disputation, he hastens to the conclusion faster than the comprehension of the generality of men can follow him, and passing over certain intermediate propositions, indispensable to the perspicuity of the demonstration, arrives at once at the thing to be proved. In reading this great man's works, indeed, I have observed that he is not always sufficiently cautious and happy in the choice of words intended to express the abstract notions of his own mind, and that he is not unfrequently deficient in the course of the disputation itself, that is, omits and suppresses some things which were necessary to be noticed in order to render the demonstration complete and intelligible. This fault is common to those who discuss metaphysical subjects, who, themselves clearly perceiving the connexion and order of the propositions they are considering, suppose that their readers will be able to see every thing with the same facility, and therefore omit some things, which had much better have been expressed: and thus it happens, that they are imperfectly understood by many, and afford occasion for unnecessary disputes. The followers of Des Cartes also are much at variance with each other in explaining this argument, there probably not being three disciples of his school to be found, who adopt the same method in unravelling it and removing the difficulties with which it is encompassed. Nor is there less discord among their opponents, not a few indeed of whom attack, not the opinion entertained by Des Cartes, but that which they themselves suppose him to have entertained. But we shall be less surprised at this, when we consider how difficult it is to expound a matter altogether removed from the senses and to be drawn from the very inmost recesses of our own minds, especially if the words, by which it is to be expressed, have various meanings and definitions.

III. I fancy I can discover two errors in particular in those who have attempted to refute this argument, and to refer it to the rank of sophisms. In the first place two arguments are drawn by Des Cartes from the innate notion of God: one of which seems to me to be as follows: "There is in me a notion or idea of a most perfect being. This notion I have not received from myself; for I am much too weak and infirm to be able to form in my mind so perfect a notion. There is no doubt, therefore, but that I have received it from some one else. But no one who is not himself most perfect can engender a notion of a perfect Being; for as is the effect such is its cause. There must of necessity, therefore, be such a Being as is that notion which I carry imprinted on my mind." See his Principles of Philosophy, part 1. sect. 17. et p. 5. The other argument is that set forth by Dr. Cudworth: "There is in me a notion of a most perfect Being. This notion contains necessary existence; therefore, that must necessarily exist, the notion of which I feel is in my own mind." Des Cartes' followers do not all admit both these two arguments of their master, which are of a different kind, but some one and some the other; while others again assent to both. But their opponents often neglect all distinction between them in their disputations and confound them with each other. Again, there is a twofold way of combating these arguments. For they can either attack the principles and foundations upon which they rest, or leaving these alone assail merely the conclusions drawn from them. The foundation of both arguments is Des Cartes' doctrine of *ideas*, and their distribution into *innate* and *adventitious*. If, therefore, they adopt the former course, they must enter into an intricate and almost interminable controversy about the origin and nature of ideas, which in our time has exercised the abilities of so many eminent men: but if the latter, they must leave Des Cartes' dogmas on innate forms and images untouched, and prove that, even supposing these to be true and certain, still

we shall make an offer towards it in this manner. Though it will not follow from hence, because we can frame an idea of any thing in our minds, that therefore such a thing really existeth;

his arguments would be mere sophisms. But this distinction, in my opinion, has not been observed by all those who have impugned these arguments. Some of them act as though they fully agreed with him in the doctrine of ideas; whereas, it is easy to perceive from the disputation itself that they are violently opposed to it. Again, there are others who handle their subject in such a perplexed and confused manner as to make it altogether uncertain which course they meant to adopt. But in contests of this kind above all others, regarding as they do things cognizable to the mind alone, it is necessary to consider what may be granted to an adversary, and what properly be made matter of dispute.

IV. I shall now say something respecting the latter argument itself, which is here principally treated of; and for the sake of greater perspicuity shall express it in Des Cartes' own way: "My mind," says he, "considering that among the various ideas which it has in itself, there is one, by far the principal one of all, namely, that of a being of consummate intelligence, power, and perfection, recognizes in this idea existence, not possible and contingent merely, as in the ideas of all other things, which it distinctly perceives, but absolutely *necessary* and eternal. And, as for example, from perceiving it to be necessarily contained in the idea of a triangle, that its three angles are equal to two right angles, it plainly convinces itself that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; so from simply perceiving necessary and eternal existence to be contained in the idea of a consummately perfect Being, it ought to conclude that such a perfect Being exists. And it will believe this the more readily by considering that it has not in itself an idea of any other thing, in which in like manner it perceives necessary existence to be contained. For from this it will understand that this idea of a consummately perfect Being is not a creation of its own, or a representation of any thing chimerical, but of a true and immutable nature, and one which cannot but exist, since necessary existence is contained in it." Principia Philosoph. part 1. sect. 14. p. 4. These words manifestly contain the following argument: "God or a most perfect nature exists. For the notion of God which I have implanted in my mind contains necessary existence, or I clearly conceive that existence cannot but belong to the notion of a most perfect nature." Wherefore the learned opponents of the argument have considered it to be chiefly incumbent upon them to show the fallaciousness of this conclusion: "Because necessary existence belongs to the notion of a most perfect thing, therefore that most perfect thing, the notion of which I have in my mind, exists also." Nor are they mistaken in this. I shall also try whether I can explain in suitable and perspicuous terms what has occurred to my own mind on considering this subject; and I shall do so not so much with a view of teaching as of learning and of exercising my mental faculties. Let us dismiss all question about ideas and the nature of ideas, and concede to Des Cartes that we have imprinted on our minds a certain image of the supreme Being, or resemblance entirely corresponding to the divine nature itself. This notion or idea then is maintained by Des Cartes to contain and comprise the notion of existence, and indeed of necessary existence. But this proposition: The idea of God contains necessary existence, seems to me to be not sufficiently plain, but to involve somewhat of ambiguity; and I am particularly confirmed in this opinion by seeing that men even of the highest intellect have not expressed it in one and the same manner. In order to give a clearer insight into this question, I shall first speak of existence generally and then of necessary existence; that is, I shall inquire first what is meant by Des Cartes and several others after him, when they say: "The idea of any thing contains existence:" afterwards, by adding the word *necessary*, I shall examine into the force of this proposition: "The idea of any thing contains necessary existence." By doing so, we shall decide much more easily upon the power and weight of the argument itself. What then do philosophers wish us to understand when they assert: "The idea of this or that thing contains existence"? Existence considered absolutely in itself is a notion or phantasm of the mind, to which nothing in reality corresponds and which we abstract and separate from the thing itself that exists by deep thought alone. And therefore the notion of existence separated by thought from the notion of the thing existing, is properly a non-entity and a shadow. If existence be considered in this point of view, the sense of the precept we are speaking of will be this: "I can by thinking separate existence from

yet nevertheless, whatsoever we can frame an idea of, implying no manner of contradiction in its conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that such a thing was not impossible

this or that notion, and present it to the mind's eye separately and abstractedly." But it is manifest that this cannot be its meaning in the present question. For setting aside other considerations, all things and the notions of all things are such, that existence can be separated from them by thought: but we are here treating of a peculiar character and property not of all but only of certain notions. It follows therefore that in this proposition we are to consider existence not in the abstract, but in so far as it is in the thing itself or the notion of the thing. But existence regarded as in the thing itself which exists, properly speaking does not differ from the thing existing. For a thing or the notion of a thing can be considered by us in a twofold respect; first, as endowed with certain properties and qualities, and secondly as being and existing. An abstract notion of the former kind, if I mistake not, is usually denominated by metaphysicians *essence*, that of the latter kind *existence*. These two are widely different, when we abstract the mind from the senses and examine the natures of things by the thought alone. But when we come back to the thing, we perceive that they do not differ, but are merely different modes of considering one and the same thing. It is not our intention at present to enter into any subtle investigation upon this point: let us lay it down merely that the "notion of existence" here is "the notion of the thing existing in so far as it is and exists." This being established, the proposition: "The notion of a thing contains the notion of existence," or to express the same in other words: "The existence of a thing cannot be severed from its essence," admits I am aware of a threefold acceptation. The first will be: "Whenever I submit the notion of a thing to intelligence and contemplation, I then cannot but consider it as existing." But I can hardly believe such to have been Des Cartes' meaning; for this is proper to all notions whatever, whether they be true or fictitious and imaginary. For no one can think about the essence of any thing, whatever it may be, without at once attaching to it the notion of existence. Figure to your mind an image of the Elysian fields, of Tartarus, Pegasus, a centaur, or any thing else to be met with in the poets more fabulous even than these; as soon as this image shall be present in your mind, the notion of existence will be immediately associated with it, and unless this were so, it would be impossible for you even to think about it. For whatever does not exist, is nothing: and no man ever reasoned or thought or can think about nothing. Divest the notion of a syren or a centaur of the notion of existence, therefore, and all your speculation will immediately be put an end to, since the notion of essence will at the same time be reduced to a nonentity. I do not deny, that a man cogitating upon such or such things may be satisfied that they do not exist; but still, as long as he subjects them to his mental contemplation, he cannot but conceive and view them as existing. Such being the case, Des Cartes' argumentation would certainly have been amusing enough, if he had reasoned in this wise: "God exists: for when I recall to my mind the notion of God, I conceive him as existing, or I regard the notion of God, as the notion of an existing nature." For by the same rule any one else might fairly conclude that Cerberus, the chimæra, sphinx, and other fictitious monsters of the kind, really exist. Another meaning of the proposition we are speaking of may be the following: "The notion of this or that thing is of that kind, that I can easily believe the thing expressed by it to exist, since there is nothing in the notion contradictory to its existence." Some enunciate the same in these words: "From the notion of this or that thing existence follows:" of which I take this to be the sense: "A notion consists of things not repugnant to each other: therefore there is nothing in it to prevent such a thing as the notion presents to my mind from really existing." But if the proposition be stated in this way, it will not warrant us in inferring the thing itself from the notion. For although this conclusion would be legitimate: "Whatever notion consists of things having a certain connexion with and not contrary to each other, admits of having existence joined to it, or it can take place and exist:" still it would not be fair to reason as follows: "If I perceive that a notion present to mind is not a confused and discordant assemblage, but an aptly connected and coherent image, I ought to decide that the thing corresponding to this notion exists." For many notions can be conceived by us, with which existence may be associated, as they consist of things cognate and compatible with each other, although

to be; there being nothing to us impossible, but what is contradictious and repugnant to conception. Now the idea of God, or a perfect Being, can imply no manner of contradiction in it,

it is uncertain whether examples corresponding to these notions exist any where in the world. It is easy for me to imagine to myself a golden mountain; in which notion there is nothing repugnant to its existence: but I should be insane, were I to infer from thence, that such a mountain does really exist. There are many grave and highly intelligent men who have interpreted Des Cartes' opinion in this manner: with whom Dr. Cudworth himself is not far from agreeing. But, evidently, if they are right as to the philosopher's meaning, all that they can make of his demonstration drawn from the *idea of God*, is merely that it is possible for God to exist, or that there is nothing in this notion to preclude us from supposing the existence of a most perfect Being. We come now to the third acceptation of this proposition, which may be thus stated: "The notion of this or that thing is such, that as soon as I contemplate it, a certain interior and mental sense compels me to believe that the thing is: whenever I recall that notion to my thoughts and attentively consider its essence, a sort of testimony arises in the inmost recesses of my mind, which compels me to believe, that that external thing, the image of which I am mentally contemplating, really is." If Des Cartes meant this when he asserted that the *notion of existence* cannot possibly be separated from the notion of God, as some eminent disciples of his seem to say, he might have congratulated himself upon his accordance not only with the ancient fathers of the Christian community, but also with many others. A great number of the early Christian fathers employed the same kind of argument, not merely to prove the existence of God, but of one supreme and most perfect God; and this they called reasoning from the *testimony of the mind;* upon which there is extant an express work by Tertullian. I shall not now inquire into the conclusiveness of this argument against Atheists, which would be foreign to my purpose; but I shall observe, that it is not derived from the notion of God innate in the minds of men, from which Des Cartes intends his to be drawn, but from a certain natural testimony of the mind, distinct from the innate notion. For according to those who make use of this argument, the essence of God is perceived and known from the notion itself; whereas his existence is evident from the testimony of the mind, to which all are at once willing to listen, who attentively consider that notion.

Thus much having been said upon the notion of existence generally, I now approach the subject more closely, and proceed to examine with equal care the *notion of necessary existence*, in which lies the chief stress of Des Cartes' argument, as he himself testifies in his Respons. to the first Object. added to Medit. Metaphys. p. 62. In the outset I shall state it, as it is expounded by himself and repeated by those who are generally considered to have gained a clearer insight into his meaning than others: "If the notion of any thing whatever has the notion of necessary existence inseparably connected with it, the thing necessarily exists: but the notion, which I perceive to be imprinted upon my own mind of a most perfect Being or God, contains the notion of necessary existence: therefore a most perfect Being or God necessarily exists." In order to understand the force of this argument, we must first remove all ambiguity from the phrases, *to exist necessarily*, and *necessary existence*. For as most words employed by metaphysicians have not one certain and definite meaning, so these also admit of a two fold acceptation. The phrase "necessary existence" implies in the first place, the necessity of existing, or the abstract notion of that perfection usually called by schoolmen *aseity* or *independence*, in which they contend consists the *first conception* of God. But the same can also express the *very act of necessarily existing*, which seems to differ from the nature in which this perfection resides, in the conception of our own mind alone. Hence it appears that this proposition: "The notion of a most perfect Being includes necessary existence," upon which the force of the whole of Des Cartes' argument depends, can also be taken in a twofold sense. For first it may signify: "To the notion of a most perfect Being belongs also the notion of *aseity* or of the necessity of existing." Secondly: "The notion of a most perfect Being is such, that the very act of necessarily existing or necessary existence itself cannot possibly be separated from it." This latter proposition may be expressed also in different words, which, as being sufficiently obvious, I shall not now dwell upon. On considering all things, I am afraid that Des Cartes, how mighty soever in intellect, occasionally in the subtlety

because it is only the idea of such a thing as hath all possible and conceivable perfections in it; that is, all perfections which are neither contradictious in themselves, nor to one another.

of meditation confounded these two notions with each other, and used the term *necessary existence* sometimes for the abstract notion of a certain perfection, sometimes for the *very act of existing*, or, in other words, for the notion of *actual existence itself*. And what not a little confirms me in this opinion is, that he has expressed the proposition we are speaking of in ambiguous words. If he had said: "The notion of a most perfect Being contains the notion of the necessity of existing," his meaning would have been plain and clear. But he has abstained from the word *idea* or *notion*, and purposely, as it would appear, employed the abstract noun *necessary existence* itself; so that attentive readers are left uncertain what meaning is to be attached to his words. Almost all his followers tell us, that he has nowhere expressed his mind more clearly and distinctly than in the Respons. to first Objections, subjoined to his Meditat. Metaphysic.; nor would I deny this to be the fact. But after repeatedly reading these Responsions, I am more than ever inclined to believe what I have stated. As will appear however from what we are about to bring forward, it is of little or no consequence as regards the matter in hand, whether *necessary existence* be here taken in one sense or in the other. Only it seems to me to be conducive to a knowledge of the argument itself, and the regularity and order of the disputation, that these two notions should be distinguished.

Let us first assume the words *necessary existence* to have been used by Des Cartes for the *idea* or notion of *aseity*, or *necessary existence* abstractedly considered, and the meaning of his proposition to be this: "From the notion of a most perfect Being it is impossible by any mental operation to disconnect the notion of aseity." This every wise and right-thinking man will acknowledge to be the case. For *aseity* or necessary existence is the highest perfection, and the source and origin as it were of all perfections. Whether it ought to be referred to *positive* or *negative* perfections, as they are called, let those dispute in the dark who delight in verbal contests. To attempt therefore to conceive the notion of a Being absolutely perfect, and exclude from it the notion of necessary existence, would be just as wise as to separate the idea of wings from that of a bird. The idea of a most perfect Being, divested of aseity, is not an image of an absolutely perfect Being at all, but of one that is imperfect and produced from certain causes. This therefore will be Des Cartes' argument. "If the idea of any thing whatever has the notion of necessary existence so connected with it, that on this being taken away the whole notion is at once done away with, that thing necessarily exists externally to my mind: but the idea of a most perfect Being is of such a kind: therefore this Being must necessarily exist externally to the mind." But most men, I am convinced, as soon as they see this syllogism, will complain of the want of sequence in the major proposition: for it does not follow from the fact of existence being connected with any notion, that the thing itself also really exists. Indeed no one I should imagine, according to any rational and legitimate system of philosophizing can infer the thing itself from the notion. To make this more apparent I shall comprise my meaning in the following argument: "The existence of any thing is of the same nature as its essence: but the essence of the idea of a most perfect Being is ideal only: therefore its necessary existence also is not real but ideal only." No reasonable man would question the truth of the major proposition of this syllogism: for existence and essence differ in our own mode of conception rather than in reality. Neither will any one be able to disprove the minor proposition: for what is essence but a vision or fancy of the mind? Consequently it appears obviously to be an error in reasoning to conclude the real existence of a most perfect Being, from the fact that the notion of necessary existence or *ideal necessary existence*, (to use a new phrase) cannot be separated from the idea of such a Being. This probably will be placed in a clearer point of view by our bringing forward and examining a perfectly similar argument. Every body knows that almost all the philosophers of antiquity believed in the eternity of matter: let us suppose one of them to argue as follows: "If the notion of any thing whatever contains the notion of necessary existence, that thing really and necessarily exists: but the notion of eternal matter contains aseity or necessary existence: therefore eternal matter exists." The major proposition of this argument is Des Cartes' own; we have only therefore to inquire into the minor. But how this can be disputed, if the

And they who will not allow of this consequence, from the idea of a perfect Being, including necessity of existence in it, that it doth therefore actually exist, yet cannot deny but that this at

former be admitted to be true, I am at a loss to perceive. For as soon as I conceive the idea of eternal matter, I am compelled in spite of myself to associate necessary existence with it: divested of this, the whole image vanishes along with it. The friends of Des Cartes will tell us perhaps that this necessary existence, which is attached to the idea of eternal matter is merely *objective, ideal, mental,* or *imaginary;* but that the necessary existence in God is *real.* No wise man, however, will be satisfied with this answer. If the question here had regarded God himself, they would have untied the knot admirably: for who will deny that the existence which is in God himself is *real,* or that God necessarily exists? But it does not refer to God but to the idea of God; and existence as belonging to the notions of things is exactly the same in all, namely, *objective* or *ideal* only; neither does the idea of God differ in this respect from the idea of matter, although, in regard to *essence* it is widely different.

Having explained what follows from the former acceptation of the words *necessary existence* in this question, let us now proceed to the other meaning, and consider necessary existence as signifying not only the notion of aseity or the necessity of existence, but also the very act of necessarily existing, or necessary existence itself. As the whole of this disputation turns upon the idea, and not upon the thing itself corresponding to that idea, it is obvious that *actual* existence itself is not understood here, but only what in the language of metaphysicians, is called *mental, ideal, objective,* or the notion of existence, in so far as it does not differ from the thing existing, or is in that nature which exists. For it would be the height of absurdity to combine real existence, or the *act of existing externally to the mind,* with no idea or image inherent in the mind. If the words necessary existence be taken in this sense Des Cartes' proposition will admit of the following interpretation: "When I contemplate the idea residing in my mind of a most perfect Being, I cannot help regarding it as necessarily and really existing." Such most certainly is the case: nor can any one who is not ignorant of himself, harbour a doubt about the truth of this proposition. Wherefore, the following argument will be deduced from it: "If the idea of any thing is such, that he who contemplates it cannot but conceive the thing, of which it is the image, as existing and necessarily existing, that thing is. But the idea of a most perfect Being is of this kind: Therefore, a most perfect Being or God is." But here I am afraid all thinking and intelligent persons will at once question the truth of the major premise. For, agreeably to what we have already remarked, they will assert this to be the nature of all ideas, that the things represented by them cannot be exhibited to the mind otherwise than as existing. All our cogitation upon any thing, whatever be its nature or character, must necessarily cease as soon as the notion of real existence is excluded from its image. Wherefore, if there be any force in this argument, it will go to prove the existence of all things, of which ideas can be formed in the mind. But here Des Cartes will exclaim: "There is a wide difference between existence and necessary existence. All things are conceived by us as existing indeed, but only one, namely, a most perfect Being, as necessarily existing. From the notion of contingent existence, it is impossible to conclude real existence: but the case is different with necessary existence, from the notion of which real existence cannot but flow." "We must distinguish," says he, in his Answer to the first Objections against his Metaphysical Meditations, p. 60. "between possible and necessary existence, and bear in mind that possible existence is contained in the conception or idea of all those things that are clearly and distinctly perceived, but necessary existence in the idea of God only. For any one who attends minutely to the difference between the idea of God and all other ideas will feel convinced, I have no doubt, that although we never conceive other things except as existing, still it does not thence follow that they do, but merely that they can exist: because we do not perceive it to be necessary that actual existence should be combined with their other properties. But that because we perceive actual existence to be necessarily and invariably combined with the other attributes of God, it follows that God exists." These remarks, subtle and ingenious though they are, seem to me to be not sufficiently sound and conclusive to warrant our concurrence. Contingent and necessary existence most assuredly are as widely distinct as finite and infinite, nor is the difference less between the ideas of these two existences.

least will follow, from its implying no manner of contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing possible or not impossible to be. For this much being true of all other contingent things, whose idea implieth no contradiction, that they are therefore possible; it must needs be granted of that, whose very idea and essence containeth a necessity of existence in it, as the essence of nothing else but a perfect Being doth. And this is the first step that we now make in way of argumentation, from the idea of God, or a perfect Being, having nothing contradictious in it, that therefore God is at least possible, or no way impossible to have been. In the next place, as this particular idea of that which is possible includeth necessity of existence in it; from these two

It is also unquestionable that when I think of a thing simply existing, I am convinced that it can either be or not be: but that when I contemplate the idea of a nature necessarily existent, it is impossible for me to entertain such a conviction. But this is not the subject now in question. It is universally admitted that ideas and notions differ widely from each other in their own intrinsic nature, according to the variety of things to which they correspond: nor are we here discussing the essence and nature of ideas, but only their existence or mode of existing. The thing to be ascertained is: Whether the idea of necessary existence exists in a different way from the idea of contingent existence, and consequently, we can pass on by a fair process of reasoning from the idea of necessary existence to real and actual existence; or, Whether necessary existence belongs to the idea of a most perfect Being in a way different from that in which contingent existence pertains to an imperfect nature. But in relation to existence all notions and ideas, although possessing a thousand differences in other respects, are exactly alike: they all exist in the same manner, namely, in our own minds, and are nothing but mental conceptions. In this point of view, therefore, there is no difference between existence and necessary existence. Both are notions: both belong to the essence of the thing they are assigned to only *objectively* and *ideally*: both exist in our own mind and intelligence alone. Consequently, as real existence does not follow from the idea of existence: so neither is it possible for real external existence to flow from the idea of necessary existence. Let me here repeat the argument already made us of: "The existence of any thing is necessarily of the same nature as its essence: but the essence of that idea to which necessary existence is referred, is *objective* and *mental* only: therefore, we cannot conclude differently of necessary existence, which is a part of it."

Des Cartes' words are capable also of another construction, which is as follows: "As often as I contemplate the idea of a necessarily existing nature, I am assured by an inward voice speaking forth from the secret recesses of my mind, that such a nature really exists." But supposing the philosopher's dogma: "The idea of a most perfect Being contains the idea of necessary existence," to have this meaning, the nature of the whole argument is evidently changed. For this reason is not drawn from the idea and image of God, but from an inward consciousness and testimony of our own mind: which we have already slightly touched upon above. But enough of metaphysical subtleties. I cannot flatter myself so far as to suppose that these observations will be acceptable to those very sagacious men to whom the championship of ideas and mental images more particularly belongs: on the contrary I am willing to allow that, except in the form and manner of adducing them, they are not different from those which others much more acute than myself have long since advanced against this argument of Des Cartes. Nevertheless I do hope they will deem it a redeeming point in my favour, that I arrogate nothing to myself, but leave all to the judgment and decision of those whose province it is to enter more deeply into the investigation of such subjects. Whatever may be the force of this illustrious man's argument, still the angry contentions and endless disputations of the most enlightened writers, who are incessantly wrangling about its nature and efficacy, seem of themselves a convincing proof that it is by no means calculated to silence all objections, and to repress the audacity of the profane and infamous race who deny the existence of God.

things put together at least, the possibility of such a Being, and its necessary existence (if not from the latter alone) will it according to reason follow, that he actually is. If God, or a perfect Being, in whose essence is contained necessary existence, be possible or no way impossible to have been; then he is: because upon supposition of his non-existence, it would be absolutely impossible that he should ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning imperfect beings that are contingently possible, that if they be not, it was therefore impossible for them ever to have been; for that which is contingent, though it be not, yet might it for all that possibly have been. But a perfect necessarily existent Being, upon the bare supposition of its non-existence, could no more possibly have been, than it could possibly hereafter be; because, if it might have been, though it be not, then would it not be a necessary existent Being. The sum of all is this, a necessary existent Being, if it be possible, it is; because, upon supposition of its non-existence it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Wherefore, God is either impossible to have been, or else he is. For if God were possible, and yet be not, then is he not a necessary but contingent Being, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

But because this argumentation may perhaps run the same fate also with the former, and, by reason of its subtlety, do but little execution neither, if not be accounted sophistical too; men being generally prone to distrust the firmness and solidity of such thin and subtle cobwebs, (as these and the like may seem to be) or their ability to support the weight of so great a truth; and to suspect themselves to be illaqueated and circumvented in them: therefore shall we lay no stress upon this neither, but proceed to something which is yet more plain and downright, after this manner. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this either actually is, or else if it be not, it is possible for it to be. But, if God be not, he is not possible hereafter to be; therefore he is. The reason and necessity of the minor is evident; because, if God be not, and yet possible hereafter to be, then would he not be an eternal and necessarily existent Being, which is contradictious to his idea. And the ground of the major, upon which all the weight lies, hath been already declared, where we proved before, that if there were no God, or perfect Being, we could never have had any conception or idea of him in our minds, because there can be no positive conception of an absolute nothing, that which hath neither actual nor possible existence. Here the posture of the argument is only inverted; because we have an idea of God, or a perfect Being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, therefore must it needs have some kind of entity or

other, either an actual or possible one; but God, if he be not, is not possible to be, therefore he doth actually exist.[3]

[3] Who was the first inventor and author of this argument, which Dr. Cudworth, for perspicuity's sake, has exhibited in a twofold form, I leave to others to discover. But whoever undertakes the task will find his chief difficulties arise from the fact that its advocates and opponents wonderfully vary it, and exhibit in their explanations an admirable diversity, not only of language, but of opinions. It has not been elucidated by so many writings and controversies of the learned, as the preceding one of Des Cartes, which we have just been discussing: and yet there are not wanting a considerable army of great men, and men too that have reached the very utmost limits of human contemplation, by whom it has either been approved or rejected; which very dissension brings us at once to the conviction, a conviction in which Dr. Cudworth himself was not far from sharing, that it is not an argument that needs only to be stated and explained, in order to compel the minds of men, however reluctant, to assent to it. First of all, it was not entirely unknown to Des Cartes himself, as the following passage from his Respons. ad Object. Primas contra Medit. Metaphys. p. 62. will testify, "If we attentively examine whether existence and what kind of existence is suitable to a supremely powerful Being, we shall be able clearly and distinctly to perceive, that first of all, *possible existence* is at least suitable, as it is to all the other things of which we have in us a distinct idea, even in the case of those which are composed by a figment of the intellect. Secondly, because we cannot conceive its existence to be possible, without at the same time being conscious on considering its immense power, that it can exist by its own proper virtue, we shall hence conclude that *it does really exist*, and has existed from all eternity: For it is well known by the light of nature, that that which can exist by its own proper virtue, exists always: And thus we shall understand that necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely powerful Being, not by a figment of intellect, but because it belongs to the true and immutable nature of such a Being that it should exist." But it was afterwards refined upon, and expressed in more lucid language by others: among whom our author, for the clearness of his exposition deserves a conspicuous place. Many of Des Cartes' disciples followed in the same track, with the view of being able by this means to support the former demonstration of their master, and prevent its utter repudiation. Out of many, see Jo. Hen. Suicer, in his Epistola Apologetica pro Argumento Cartesii ab Idea Dei, p. 19. Nor among the most eminent of the philosophers even of very recent times is this argument without its patrons. The illustrious G. W. Leibnitz most especially has in several passages proclaimed his opinion of its excellence. See his Cogitationes de Cognitione, Veritate, et Ideis, in the Acta Eruditor. Lips. 1684. for November, p. 539. He has expressed his mind even more clearly in the Principia Philosophiæ, to be found in tom. 7. Supplementor. Act. Erud. Lips. sect. 11. p. 500—514. where, sect. 45. he thus speaks, "God, or a necessary Being, alone enjoys this privilege, that he necessarily exists, if he be possible: And as nothing prevents the possibility of that which is without limits and involves no negation, and consequently no contradiction, this alone is sufficient as a convincing proof, *à priori*, of the existence of a God." His example is followed by the most learned Mich. Göttlieb Hansch, in his Principia Philosophiæ Leibnitianæ, Lips. et Francof. 1728. 4to. who after having propounded this Theorem, p. 112. immediately subjoins a demonstration of it in these words: "In God is discerned a sufficient reason of the existence of any possible world whatever, and therefore, the existence of God owns a sufficient reason in God himself. Wherefore, the non-existence of God is absolutely impossible, and consequently God exists of absolute necessity. But the existence of that which exists of absolute necessity, finds a sufficient reason in this alone, that its essence involves no contradiction. Therefore, the possibility of God is alone the principle of his existence." Nay, not all those even who agree neither with Des Cartes nor Leibnitz, venture altogether to spurn this argument: one of whom, Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his book, On the Being and Attributes of God, part 1. cap. 4. declares "that perhaps it is not easy to confute the subtle arguments which have been advanced to prove that we can reason from the possibility of a most perfect nature to its real existence." But these defenders of the argument, great and numerous though they be, are equalled in intellectual acumen and sagacity, no less than in number, by its adversaries, who contend that it is to be

But perhaps this argumentation also, how firm and solid soever, may prove less convictive of the existence of a God to the generality; because whatever is received, is received

ranked among sophisms, and excluded from the class of true and legitimate demonstrations. By way of example, I shall mention only two. One is J. Le Clerc, who, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 5. p. 134. although in other respects bestowing the highest commendations upon Dr. Cudworth, denies that his argument is more conclusive than the preceding one of Des Cartes. For he considers a transition to be erroneously made in it, from the notion of the thing to the thing itself, and the substance of the whole demonstration to be as follows: If there is such a Being, as corresponds to the idea of a most perfect Being, which we have formed in the mind, it must necessarily have existed from all eternity;" but that it can by no means be concluded from hence that there is a most perfect Being of the kind. The other is the most learned divine, Sam. Werenfels, who, Judicium de Argumento Cartesii pro Existentia Dei, p. 657. and Vindiciæ hujus Judicii adversus Suicerum, p. 676. Opusculor. conjunctim Editor. holds the whole of this species of argumentation to be sheer sophistry, and to have originated solely from the author's not having distinguished between what is possible *in itself*, and what is so *in respect to our own knowledge*. It is unnecessary for me to name more.

Where men so illustrious are at issue, it would appear presumptuous on my part to assume the character of arbiter, and attempt a task to which my powers are unequal: but having once entered into a subject so far removed from popular comprehension, I shall offer a few remarks, not by way of pronouncing a decision upon it, but of modestly stating the impressions of my own mind. Whether all those I have named understood this argument in the same sense, I shall not for the present inquire. Some of them, I confess, seem to be separated by no inconsiderable difference: J. Le Clerc in particular deviates, if I mistake not, from the views of him from whom he quotes the argument; but passing over these, I shall follow the guidance of Dr. Cudworth, who appears to me to have given a plainer and more perspicuous exposition of it than most others, and whose opinion and explanation I am satisfied will be concurred in by the generality of its supporters. This, then, is the argument which the learned Doctor and others consider to possess such signal efficacy towards demonstrating the existence of God: "If the idea or notion of any thing consists of things not repugnant to each other, that thing either is or can be: but if God is not, it is impossible for him ever to be: therefore God is." This seems to be one simple argument, but on closer inspection it will appear to contain a succession of arguments, which I consider ought first of all to be distinguished, to enable us more conveniently to inquire into the truth of the whole demonstration. For I have long ago been of opinion that in questions regarding mental conceptions and things removed from sense, we never can dispute with too much precision and clearness, inasmuch as in no others are we more liable to error either in language or opinion. This single demonstration then contains three arguments connected and combined with each other: the first of which is this: "If the idea of any thing is compounded of things not contradictory to each other, that thing either is or can be: but the idea of God or a most perfect Being consists of things not contradictory: therefore God either is or can be." The second will be as follows: "If the idea of any thing contains necessary existence, that thing cannot be and not be: but the idea of God contains necessary existence: therefore God cannot be and not be." There remains the third, which I shall express in these words: "Whatever cannot either be or not be, this, if it can be, is: but God is such that he cannot either be or not be, because his existence is necessary: therefore God is." I am almost convinced that the nature of the whole demonstration is now more apparent, and the drift of all that is briefly discussed by the learned Doctor more clear and intelligible. Let us now examine into these respective arguments, and candidly point out what seems to be defective in each, beginning with that which is the foundation of all. In this argument the minor proposition will readily be admitted by every one who does not pervert the notion of a supreme Being. But the major seems to be ambiguous, and to contain some latent imperfection. For the phrases, *can be, can take place, is possible*, have a twofold meaning. In the first place that is called *possible*, which I clearly understand to be of such a nature that it can take place and be, although perhaps it never will be.

according to the capacity of the recipient: and though a demonstration be never so good in itself, yet is it more or less such to particular persons, according to their ability to comprehend it;

Secondly, that also is said to be possible which is in reality such that it can actually take place and happen. The former possibility might not improperly be termed *metaphysical* or *ideal*, the latter *physical* or *real*. Although I shall have no objection to those who may prefer other epithets, and call the former *intrinsic* or *in respect to us*, the latter *extrinsic* or *in respect to the thing itself*. It is *possible* for the parched fields to be refreshed to day by plentiful showers: for my mind perceives nothing repugnant and contradictory in this. But in reality it is not otherwise possible unless the causes be present by which we know rain is occasioned. It is *possible* for my friend to be carried off in the course of the year by some violent distemper: for there is nothing in my mind to preclude my supposing that such may happen: but in reality this cannot possibly take place unless there be the antecedent causes, which usually produce death. It is possible for Caius to become rich: but this cannot take place unless his relatives die in that order in which it is necessary for them to die, that such a result may be realized. Therefore that which can take place in respect to my knowledge is altogether different from that which can happen in itself and generally does happen. Consequently nothing can be determined upon in reference to the entire proposition till we first understand in what sense the phrase, *can be*, is used in it. If what we have termed metaphysical possibility be meant thereby, every one will admit it to be certain and true; for whatever thing we can form a notion of, not compounded of things discordant and contradictory, this either is or in respect to my intelligence can be. But the same proposition will be false if physical or real possibility be understood. For as is self-apparent, and has just been shown by examples, it is a palpable error to suppose that all those things can actually be or happen, of which plain and clear notions can be formed in the mind. Hence it is already obvious how we are to decide respecting the conclusion of the argument. In this conclusion the words, *God can be*, may be understood either of that which can happen in reference to my own mind, or of real possibility, or in both senses. To interpret them in both senses would be absurd, for if this were done, we should have *more in the conclusion*, as logicians say, than in the premises. But if they be accepted in the sense of physical or real possibility (for perspicuity's sake I do not hesitate to use barbarous terms), we shall be in no better position. For thus, as we have seen before, the conclusion will not correspond with the major proposition, this being false if it be supposed to speak of that which is actually possible. Besides, upon the hypothesis of the words being to be understood of physical possibility, the disjunctive itself would be absurd and foreign to the nature of God. That which can physically and really exist, can do so on account of antecedent causes: for which reason these words admit of being used in that sense of those things only that are imperfect, and are produced from other things: "either are or can be." But when we speak of God or a most perfect Being, we speak of a nature which necessarily exists, and is connected with no other causes; and this being the case, all that we can affirm of it is: "God either is or is not." If you say: "God either is or can be," namely in himself, you predicate that of his nature which is not applicable to it; for "he cannot be." It remains therefore that we expound the words, "God can be," thus: "There is nothing in my mind which precludes me from supposing that such a nature can exist, as the idea of God represents to me." We now perceive this to be the force of the whole argument: "Because the idea of a most perfect Being involves no incongruities or contradictions, therefore my mind must necessarily decide that God, if he be not, is nevertheless possible to be in respect to my intelligence." Some probably among the ranks of those who impiously deny a supreme Being, will cordially assent to this argument, and confess their inability to refute it.

The foundation of the whole demonstration being overthrown, I fear a like fate already appears to threaten the superstructure. Let us proceed in order, and examine each part in detail. The major proposition again of the second argument seems to me to be fallacious; and this, I am confident, when the meaning of the words is explained, will at once be obvious to every one. The phrase, "can be or not be," upon which its force and truth depend, can be understood either of *ideal* and *mental*, or of *real* and *actual existence*. If the former sense be adopted, no

therefore shall we, in the next place, form yet a plainer demonstration for a God from the idea of him, including necessary existence in it: it being first premised, that unquestionably

one I imagine is so foolish as not to admit it to be unquestionably true. But upon this hypothesis its meaning will be as follows: "If from the notion of any thing I am unable to separate the notion of necessary existence, I never can conceive that that thing is possible either to be or not be: I am absolutely compelled to consider it as one which comprises the necessity of existing in its very nature." But if you take the latter sense, the proposition is utterly destitute of truth: as we cannot legitimately reason from the idea of the thing to the thing itself. For its meaning would be this: "If from the idea of any thing whatever my mind is unable to separate the notion of necessary existence, that thing necessarily exists." Here, however, notwithstanding all my efforts, I can discover no logical connexion, nor do I know what should compel me to conclude that necessary existence itself follows from the notion or idea of it. I fancy I clearly understand rather, that the proposition is devoid of all force and truth, unless the words, "if it is," be added: "With the notion of whatever thing the idea of necessary existence is associated, that thing, if it be, cannot be or not be." But by adding these words, the argument itself is divested of all efficiency towards convicting the enemies of God. To render this more apparent, let us suppose a Manichean reasoning thus: "If the idea of any thing contains necessary existence, we ought to consider that thing as necessarily existing; the idea of a certain evil principle, existing like the good from all eternity, comprehends necessary existence: therefore that evil principle exists." Whatever you could urge against this man, would in my opinion be of equal force towards overthrowing the argument into the power and efficacy of which we are now inquiring. You will deny, I suppose, the propriety of proceeding from the conceptions of the mind to the things themselves, and you will be right in denying it. Perhaps you will say there is a wide difference between the idea of a most perfect Being and that of an eternal principle of evil: that the former consists of properties not repugnant to each other, while the latter is compounded of contraries, and therefore does not belong to the ideas of those things which can happen. I will grant such to be the case, although I perceive a fierce war might be carried on among the learned upon this question: Whether the idea of an evil principle, considered abstractedly and not in connexion with external things, can be conceived in the mind, or not. It will be sufficient for me to answer, that in the proposition we are considering, we are not speaking of possibility, but only of necessary existence. From what has been said, no one will have any difficulty in forming a correct opinion upon the conclusion of the argument. If the word God signifies in it a *mental, ideal, objective* being, it is adapted to the premises from which it is drawn, although inefficacious towards proving that which is denied by Atheists; but if this word implies a *real* or actually existent nature, it cannot legitimately be deduced from the two former propositions. And this the second argument being demolished, we have no ground for auguring well of the third, which is connected with it. The phrase, "cannot be or not be," which stands in the major premise, ought doubtless to be understood as in the former argument, of *ideal* or *objective* existence: for unless this be the case, the whole proposition will be altogether futile and nugatory. For this would be its sense: "Whatever necessarily and really exists, does exist." A clever proposition truly! It is merely necessary therefore to inquire into the term *to exist*. Suppose it to signify the same as *to exist really*, and you will have this sentence: "Whatever exists necessarily in my mind, exists also out of my mind." But, if I happen not to be wrong in measuring the intellect of others by my own, no reflecting man who looks to the logical consequences of a thing will ever admit this. In the mind of Aristotle and his followers the world existed necessarily and of itself. Were they therefore at liberty to conclude from that, that the world necessarily existed in reality also? But suppose *to exist*, to be the same in this proposition as *to exist in the mind*, and we get the following: "Whatever cannot either be or not be in my mind, is in my mind." But who is so mad as not immediately to perceive the absurdity of such a dogma? I shall say nothing of the minor proposition and the conclusion. For I cannot suppose any of my readers to be so dull as not to know that by these observations the force of the whole argument is destroyed. If in these two propositions the word God denotes the notion of God, there is an end of the whole argumentation: if it means God himself, these two propositions

something or other did exist from all eternity, without beginning: For it is certain that every thing could not be made, because nothing could come from nothing, or be made by itself; and therefore if once there had been nothing, there could never have been any thing. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always something, and consequently, that there was something unmade, which existed of itself from all eternity. Now all the question is, and indeed this is the only question betwixt Theists and Atheists; since something did certainly exist of itself from all eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a perfect, or an imperfect Being? We say therefore, that whatsoever existed of itself from eternity, and without beginning, did so exist naturally and necessarily, or by the necessity of its own nature. Now, nothing could exist of itself from eternity, naturally and necessarily, but that which containeth necessary and eternal self-existence in its own nature. But there is nothing which containeth necessary eternal existence in its own nature or

are at variance with the first. The same may easily be applied to the words *to be* and to exist. Such being the case, I consider that although this argument may be very subtle and acute, it proves nothing, and that the whole sum and substance of it amounts to this: "Because the idea of God is not compounded of things repugnant to each other, nor contradicts any known truth, therefore there is nothing in my mind to hinder me from believing that God exists, if sufficient arguments be brought forward to convince me of this." Such is the weakness of the human intellect, that even the greatest men are too apt to consider the visions and images of their own minds as things really existing, and very often inadvertently forget the infinite distinction between *to conceive* and *to be*. There is not in the life of men a fault more common than this, especially among metaphysicians. And perhaps I myself, while absorbed in meditation I am pursuing the fleeting notions and shadows of things, have not altogether avoided it. Let the candid and intelligent judge.

Some most acute reasoners of our own time have struck out a new and different path from the others we have mentioned, in order to prove the *existence* of a supreme Being from the notion or idea of it; which, as I have once entered upon this knotty topic, I shall briefly notice. The demonstration is based upon this precept: "If the notions of any thing whatsoever are so deeply implanted in our minds that, do what we will, they cannot by any means be eradicated, those things exist." I will explain this dogma in the words of the illustrious philosopher and mathematician Dr. Sam. Clarke, from his book on the Existence of God, part 1. chap. 4. "If I find the idea of a thing in my mind, and that it is as impossible for me to divest myself of this idea as it is to divest myself of the idea of the equality of twice two and four, it is evident that the certainty of the existence of this thing is the same, and rests upon the same foundation, as the certainty of the relation between twice two and four. For the relation of equality between twice two and four has no other certainty than this, that it is impossible to change or abolish the idea of this relation without falling into a real contradiction." They then assume the notion of a most perfect Being to belong to this class of ideas: from which they conclude that there is a God. But what I consider among other things as particularly fatal to this argument is, that some notions, although altogether crochetty and absurd, nevertheless adhere so pertinaciously to the minds of some persons, that no art nor force nor reason can dislodge them. To confess my own sentiments frankly: Those seem to me to have the best of this controversy who deny the possibility of proving from the mere naked notion or idea of a thing, apart from every thing else, and that too *à priori* by merely contemplating what the notion consists of, that a nature corresponding to this notion really exists externally to the mind. For as every one, I am convinced, must be aware, there is no notion or vision of the mind, to which *real* and *actual* existence belongs.

essence, but only an absolutely perfect Being; all other imperfect things being in their nature contingently possible, either to be, or not be. Wherefore since something or other must and doth exist of itself naturally and necessarily from eternity unmade, and nothing could do this but what included necessary self-existence in its nature or essence; it is certain that it was a perfect Being, or God, who did exist of himself from eternity, and nothing else; all other imperfect things, which have no necessary self-existence in their nature, deriving their being from him. Here therefore are the Atheists infinitely absurd and unreasonable when they will not acknowledge that which containeth independent self-existence, or necessity of existence (which indeed is the same with an impossibility of non-existence) in its nature and essence, that is, a perfect Being, so much as to exist at all; and yet in the meantime assert that which hath no necessity of existence in its nature, the most imperfect of all Beings, inanimate body and matter, to have existed of itself necessarily from all eternity.

We might here add, as a farther confirmation of this argument, what hath been already proved, that no temporary successive Being (whose duration is in a continual flux, as if it were every moment generated anew) and therefore neither our own souls, nor the world, nor matter moving, could possibly have existed from eternity, and independently upon any other thing, but must have had a beginning, and been caused by something else; namely, by an absolutely perfect Being, whose duration therefore is permanent, and without any successive generation or flux.[4]

But besides all these arguments, we may otherwise from the idea of God (already declared) be able both exactly to state the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, and satisfactorily to decide the same. In order whereunto, there is yet something again to be premised; namely this, that as it is certain every thing was not made, but something existed of itself from eternity

[4] Who but a fool and a madman would deny the clearness and excellence of this argument? "It is utterly impossible but that something must have existed from all eternity. That which existed from all eternity exists necessarily and of itself. Whatever contains necessary existence in its own nature cannot but be absolutely perfect. Therefore God, or a most perfect Being exists." Certainly every thing whatever is more or less remote from perfection by reason of its not being self-existent, but dependent upon antecedent causes, which are again connected with other causes. Hence it necessarily follows, that all perfections are combined in that nature, from which all cause is absent. But if I am not mistaken, most men will deny this argument to be drawn solely from the innate idea of God, or a most perfect nature; and will assert, on the contrary, that we ascend in it from the idea of an eternal nature to that of a most perfect nature, and that this very idea of an eternal nature is perhaps adventitious, and derived from the contemplation of external things and our own nature. As regards the matter itself, it is of no consequence what this argument is borrowed from or to what class it belongs, provided it possesses sufficient efficacy to refute the profane crew who deny the existence of God.

unmade; so is it likewise certain, that every thing was not unmade neither, nor existed of itself from eternity, but something was made, and had a beginning. Where there is a full agreement betwixt Theists and Atheists, as to this one point, no Atheist asserting every thing to have been unmade, but they all acknowledging themselves to have been generated, and to have had a beginning; that is, their own souls and personalities, as likewise the lives and souls of all other men and animals. Wherefore, since something certainly existed of itself from eternity, but other things were made, and had a beginning (which therefore must needs derive their being from that which existed of itself unmade), here is the state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists, whether that which existed of itself from all eternity, and was the cause of all other things, were a perfect Being and God, or the most imperfect of all things whatsoever, inanimate and senseless matter. The former is the doctrine of Theists, as Aristotle* affirmeth of those ancients, who did not write fabulously concerning the first principles: Οἷον Φερεκύδης, καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον τὸ Ἄριστον τιθέασι, καὶ οἱ Μάγοι· καὶ τῶν ὑστέρων δὲ σοφῶν, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας, "As namely, Pherecydes, and the Magi, and Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and many others; that they agreed in this, that the first original of all things was the best and most perfect." Where, by the way, we may observe also, that according to Aristotle, the ancient Magi did not acknowledge a substantial evil principle, they making that, which is the best and most perfect Being, alone by itself, to be the first begetter of all.[5] This, I say, is the hypothesis of Theists, that there is one absolutely perfect Being, existing of itself from all eternity, from whence all other lesser perfections, or imperfect beings, did gradually descend, till at last they end in senseless matter or inanimate body. But the atheistic hypothesis, on the contrary, makes senseless matter the most imperfect thing, to be the first principle, or the only self-existent being, and the cause of all other things; and consequently all higher degrees of perfections, that are in the world, to have climbed up, or emerged by way of ascent from thence; as life, sense, understanding, and reason from that, which is altogether dead and senseless. Nay, as it was before observed, there hath been amongst the ancient Pagans a certain kind of religious Atheists, such as acknowledging verbally a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, supposed this notwithstanding to have first emerged also, out of senseless matter, Night and Chaos; and therefore doubtless to

* Met. lib. 12. c. 5. [Cap. 4. p. 446. tom. 4, opp.]

[5] This observation is to be added to the copious disputation in chap. 4. on the religion and theological opinions of the Magians and ancient Persians.

be likewise dissolvable again into the same. And of these is that place in Aristotle* to be understood: Βασιλεύειν καὶ ἄρχειν φασὶν οὐ τοὺς πρώτους οἷον Νύκτα, καὶ Οὐρανὸν, ἢ Χάος, ἢ καὶ Ὠκεανὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸν Δία, "They suppose, not the first things, as Night, and the Heaven, and Chaos, and the Ocean, but Jupiter (or God) to rule and govern all." Where it is intimated, that the Heaven, Night, Chaos, and the Ocean, according to these, were seniors to Jupiter, or in order of nature before him; they apprehending, that things did ascend upward from that, which was most imperfect, as Night and Chaos, to the more perfect, and at length to Jupiter himself, the mundane Soul, who governeth the whole world, as our soul doth our body. Which same opinion is afterwards again taken notice of, and reprehended by Aristotle† in these words:[6] Οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴτις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς, τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν· ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων δὲ ἀεὶ τὰ τελείοτερα· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι σπέρμα πρῶτον, "Nor would he think rightly, who should resemble the principle of the universe to that of animals and plants: where, from indeterminate and imperfect things (as seeds) do always arise the more perfect. For even here also is the case otherwise than they suppose; for it is a man that generates a man; nor is the seed the first."

The controversy being thus clearly stated betwixt Theists and Atheists, it may now with great ease, and to the full conviction of all minds unprejudiced, and unprepossessed with false principles, be determined; it being, on the one hand, undeniably evident, that lesser perfections may naturally descend from greater, or at least from that which is absolutely perfect, and which virtually containeth all; but, on the other hand, utterly impossible, that greater perfections, and higher degrees of being, should rise and ascend out of lesser and lower, so as that, which is the most absolutely imperfect of all things, should be the first fountain and original of all; since no effect can possibly transcend the power of its cause. Wherefore it is certain, that in the universe things did not thus ascend and mount, or climb up from lower perfection to higher; but, on the contrary descend and slide down from higher to lower: so that the first original of all things was not the most imperfect, but the most perfect Being. But to speak more particularly; it is certain, notwithstanding

* Met. lib. 12. c. 4. [Page 446. tom. 4. opp.]

† Met. lib. 12. c. 5. Du Vall. [Page 448. tom. 4. opp.]

[6] In these words of Aristotle, Dr. Cudworth has omitted a portion which is, however, of no slight importance towards comprehending his full meaning; I shall therefore supply it. After the word τελειότερα the philosopher thus proceeds: Διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησὶν, ὡς τὶ μηδὲ ὄντι εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τέλειαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ, ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα. Ἄνθρωπος, κ. τ. λ. "Wherefore they say the like is the case in first principles, and suppose that no entity is of itself one. But here the principles from which all things proceed are perfect."

all the vain pretences of Lucretius, and other Atheists, or Semi-Atheists, to the contrary, that life and sense could never possibly spring out of dead and senseless matter, as its only original, either in the way of atoms (no composition of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to produce cogitation), or in the way of qualities, since life and perception can no more result from any mixture of elements, or combinations of qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, &c. than from unqualified atoms. This being undeniably demonstrable from that very principle of reason, which the Atheists are so fond of, but misunderstanding abuse (as shall be manifested afterward) that nothing can come from nothing. Much less could understanding and reason in men ever have emerged out of stupid matter, devoid of all manner of life. Wherefore we must needs here freely declare against the darkness of that philosophy, which hath been sometimes unwarily entertained by such as were no Atheists, that sense may rise from a certain modification, mixture, or organization of dead and senseless matter; as also that understanding and reason may result from sense: the plain consequence of both which is, that senseless matter may prove the original of all things, and the only Numen. Which doctrine therefore is, doubtless, a main piece of the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. But this darkness hath been of late in great measure dispelled by the light of the atomic philosophy, restored, as it was in its first genuine and virgin state, unde flowered as yet by Atheists; this clearly showing how far body and mechanism can go, and that life and cogitation can never emerge out from thence; it being built upon that fundamental principle, as we have made it evident in the first chapter, that "Nothing can come from nothing." And Strato and the hylo zoic Atheists were so well aware, and so sensible of this, that all life and understanding could not possibly be generated or made, but that there must be some fundamental and substantial, or eternal unmade life and knowledge, that they therefore have thought necessary to attribute life, and perception (or understanding) with appetite, and self-moving power, to all matter as such, that so it might be thereby fitly qualified to be the original of all things; than which opinion as nothing can be more mon strous, so shall we elsewhere evince the impossibility thereof. In the mean time, we doubt not to aver, that the argument pro posed is a sufficient demonstration of the impossibility of atheism; which will be further manifested in our answer to the second atheistic objection against a divine creation, because nothing can come from nothing.[7]

[7] I should say the same almost of this argument as of the preceding one. It is powerful and convincing, and pre-eminently calculated to confound the abettors of atheism; but it is not deduced from the abstract notion of God *à priori*, as the learned

But this controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists may be yet more particularly stated from the idea of God, as including mind or understanding in it essentially, viz. Whether mind be eternal and unmade, as being the maker of all; or else, Whether all mind were itself made or generated, and that out of senseless matter? For, according to the doctrine of the pagan Theists, mind was προγενέστατος, καὶ Κύριος κατὰ φύσιν, "the oldest of all things senior to the world and elements, and by nature hath a princely and lordly dominion over all." But, according to those Atheists, who make matter, or body, devoid of all life and understanding, to be the first principle, mind must be ὑστερογενὴς, "a postnate thing," younger than the world; a weak, umbratile, and evanid image, and next to nothing.

And the controversy, as thus stated, may be also clearly and satisfactorily decided. For first, we say, that as it is certainly true, that if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing; so is it true likewise, that if once there had been no life in the whole universe, but all had been dead, then could there never have been any life or motion in it; and if once there had been no mind, understanding, or knowledge, then could there never have been any mind or understanding produced. Because, to suppose life and understanding to rise and spring up out of that which is altogether dead and senseless, as its only original, is plainly to suppose something to come out of nothing. It cannot be said so of other things, as of the corporeal world and matter, that if once they had not been, they could never possibly have been; because, though there had been no world nor matter, yet might these have been produced from a perfect, omnipotent incorporeal Being, which in itself eminently containeth all things. Dead and senseless matter could never have created or generated mind and understanding, but a perfect omnipotent mind could create matter. Wherefore, because there is mind, we are certain, that there was some mind or other from eternity without beginning; though not because there is body, that therefore there was body or matter from eternity unmade. Now these imperfect minds of ours were by no means themselves eternal or without beginning, but from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being; but since no mind could spring out of dead and senseless matter, and all minds could not possibly be made, nor one produced from another infinitely;

Doctor seems to suppose. The reasoning altogether proceeds as follows: It is impossible but that many things must have had an origin and beginning. But whatever was the first fountain and original of all must necessarily be more perfect and excellent than the things that sprung from it. Therefore there is a most perfect nature which produced all things. We thus, I consider, ascend by contemplation from the things of which the universe consists to the knowledge of God, or by the process *à posteriori*, which schoolmen formerly called the process of *eminence* and *causality*, but do not prove his existence *à priori* from the abstract notion.

there must of necessity be an eternal unmade mind, from whence those imperfect minds of ours were derived. Which perfect omnipotent mind was as well the cause of all other things as of human souls.[8]

But before we proceed to any further argumentation, we must needs take notice here, that the Atheists suppose no small part of their strength to lie in this very thing, namely, their disproving a God from the nature of understanding and knowledge; nor do they indeed swagger in any thing more than this. We have already set it for the eleventh atheistic argument, that "knowledge being the information of the things themselves known, and all conception the action of that which is conceived, and the passion of the conceiver; the world and all sensible things must needs be before there could be any knowledge or conception of them, and no knowledge or conception before the world as its cause." Or more briefly thus: the world could not be made by knowledge and understanding, because there could be no knowledge or understanding of the world, or of any thing in it, before it was made. For, according to these Atheists, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things; they meaning by "things" here such only, as are sensible and corporeal. So that Mind and Understanding could not be the creator of the world and these sensible things, itself being the mere creature of them; a secondary, derivative result from them, or a fantastic image of them; the youngest and most creaturely thing in the whole world. Whence it follows, that to suppose mind and understanding to be the maker of all things would be no better sense, than if one should suppose the images in ponds and rivers to be the makers of the sun, moon and stars, and other things represented in them. And upon such a ground as this, does a modern writer presume to determine, that knowledge and understanding are not to be attributed to God Almighty, because they imply imperfection, and dependence upon corporeal things without:* Quoniam scientia et intellectus in nobis nihil aliud sunt, quàm suscitatus à rebus externis organa prementibus animi tumultus, non est putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim est potentiæ ab alio dependentis. Which is again Englished thus:† "Knowledge and understanding being in us nothing else but a tumult in the mind, raised by external things, that press the organical parts of man's body; there is no such

[8] Neither can this reason, strong and powerful as it is in itself, in my opinion be properly ranked amongst what are usually termed *à priori* arguments. For it proceeds from the effects to the cause, and from a consideration of existing things infers the nature of that Being, which was the parent and founder of all things. In this manner the existence of God is not deduced from the notion but rather it is shown from the nature of existing things, what sort of idea we are to form of an eternal nature or God.

* De Cive Rel. c. 15. sect. 14. † Lev. cap. 31.

thing in God, nor can they be attributed to him, they being things which depend upon natural causes." Where this writer thus denying knowledge and understanding to God, upon pretence that it speaks imperfection, and dependence upon external corporeal things (it being nothing but a tumult raised by the motions and pressures of them) he must needs absolutely deny the first principle of all things to be any knowing understanding nature, unless he had asserted some other kind of knowledge distinct from that of men, and clearly attributed the same to God Almighty. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.[9]

Now we shall, for the present, only so far forth concern ourselves in confuting this atheistic doctrine, as to lay a foundation thereby for the demonstration of the contrary, namely, the existence of a God, or a Mind before the world, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. First, therefore, it is a sottish conceit of these Atheists, proceeding from their not attending to their own cogitations, that not only sense, but also knowledge and understanding in men, is but a tumult, raised from corporeal things without, pressing upon the organs of their body; or else, as they declare themselves more distinctly, nothing but the

[9] The whole of this passage on the nature and origin of human knowledge, which is ably and ingeniously handled by the learned Doctor, I have for cogent reasons determined to leave untouched. On Hobbes' opinion, which Dr. Cudworth himself here in some measure excuses, I remember having already said something in another place. The rest of those who suppose all knowledge either to spring from the senses or to proceed from the interior nature of the mind, are distributable into two classes, and therefore cannot conveniently be comprehended in one and the same argument. Some of those even who contend fiercely with each other upon these matters are probably less at variance in opinions and sentiments than they themselves suppose. I cannot but observe, however, that this is not one of those controversies which form a constituent part of the contest between us and Atheists, and are so connected with the cause of religion, that its welfare depends upon their decision; but that it may be argued on either side without religion being at all affected. For there were many among those who worshipped God most devoutly, and even among the early Christian fathers themselves, for example Tertullian, who considered all knowledge to proceed from a contemplation of external things, and altogether repudiated the doctrine of innate notions. Nor can one be ignorant, that the greatest philosophers of later times, eminent for their piety in other respects, have strenuously maintained the same opinion. On the other hand, some of the most bitter enemies of religion, and particularly of Spinoza's school, have not hesitated to affirm that the seeds of all knowledge are inherent in our minds; nay even have absurdly attempted to deduce from this very doctrine inferences confirmatory of their impiety. I know, indeed, that some have shamefully abused this opinion, which derives all knowledge from the senses, to the overthrow of religion; nor would I wholly exempt Hobbes from this class. But I do maintain that it is by no means a sure and indubitable sign of erroneous sentiments respecting God; and I consider this intimation necessary, lest any one should be induced by Dr. Cudworth's disputation at once to brand all who are favourable to it with the stigma of impiety. If any Atheist ever reasoned in this manner: "All human knowledge springs from things which affect the senses; therefore, there is no God, the maker of all things," he acted foolishly and absurdly, and, in my opinion, was deserving of ridicule rather than a long and serious refutation. This argument is of the same nature and form as the following: "I know by means of my senses alone, that there are cities united together by laws and compacts, that there are watches, that there is an art of constructing convenient and elegant houses: therefore there are no founders of cities, no watchmakers, no architects."

activity of sensible objects upon them, and their passion from them. For if this were true, then would every thing that suffered and reacted motion, especially polite bodies, as looking-glasses, have something both of sense and of understanding in them. It is plain, that there comes nothing to us from bodies without us, but only local motion and pressure. Neither is sense itself the mere passion of those motions, but the perception of their passions in a way of fancy. But sensible things themselves (as for example light and colours) are not known or understood either by the passion or the fancy of sense, nor by any thing merely foreign and adventitious, but by intelligible ideas exerted from the mind itself, that is, by something native and domestic to it: nothing being more true than this of Boetius,[10] that; Omne, quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium naturâ, vi, et facultate cognoscitur, "Whatsoever is known, is known not by its own force and power, but by the force and power, the vigour and activity of that thing itself, which knows or comprehends it." Wherefore, besides the phantasms of singular bodies, or of sensible things existing without us (which are not mere passions neither), it is plain, that our human mind hath other cogitations or conceptions in it; namely, the ideas of the intelligible natures and essences of things, which are universal, and by and under which it understands singulars. It is a ridiculous conceit of a modern atheistic writer, that universals are nothing else but names, attributed to many singular bodies, because whatsoever *is*, is singular. For though whatsoever exists without the mind be singular, yet is it plain, that there are conceptions in our minds objectively universal. Which universal objects of our mind, though they exist not as such any where without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible entity for this very reason, because they are conceivable: for since nonentity is not conceivable, whatsoever is conceivable, and an object of the mind, is therefore something. And as for axiomatical truths, in which something is affirmed or denied, as these are not all passions from bodies without us (for what local motions could impress this common notion upon our minds, that things which agree in one third agree amongst themselves, or any other?), so neither are these things only gathered by induction from repeated and reiterated sensations; we clearly apprehending at once, that it is impossible they should be otherwise. Thus Aristotle ingeniously: Οὐδὲ ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν, ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν

[10] The learned Doctor quotes this passage of Boetius from memory, and on that account gives his opinion rather than his words, which are as follows, De Consolat. Philos. lib. 5. p. 134: Omne, quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem, "Whatever is known is comprehended not according to its own force but according to the faculty of those that know it."

ὀρθαῖς ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ οὐχ ὡς φασὶ τινὲς ἐπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τῷ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἔστι,[1] "It is evident, that there is no knowledge (of the universal theorems of geometry) by sense. For if we could perceive by sense, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right; yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge hereof; but would seek further after a demonstration of it: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals." When from the universal idea of a triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where, without our mind, but yet hath an intelligible entity, we see a plain necessity, that its three angles must be equal to two right, then do we know the truth of this universal theorem, and not before: as also we understand, that every singular triangle (so far as it is true) hath this property in it. Wherefore the knowledge of this, and the like truths, is not derived from singulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of ascent from singulars to universals; but, on the contrary, having first found them in the universals, we afterwards descending, apply them to singulars: so that our knowledge here is not after singular bodies, and secondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of nature before them, and proleptical to them.

Now these universal conceptions, some of which are also abstract (as life, sense, reason, knowledge, and the like) many of them are of such things whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; which therefore could never possibly be impressed upon us from singular bodies by local motion: and again some such, as though they belong to corporeal and sensible things, yet, as their accuracy cannot be reached to by sense, so neither did they ever exist in that matter of this lower world which here encompasseth us, and therefore could not be stamped upon us from without: as for example, the ideas of a perfect straight line, and a plain superficies, or of an exact triangle, circle, sphere, or cube; no material thing here amongst us being terminated in so strait lines but that even by microscopes there may be discovered much irregularity and deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly straight lines, no such triangles, circles, spheres, or cubes, as answer to the exactness of our conceptions in any part of the whole material universe, nor never will be. Notwithstanding which, they are not absolute nonentities, since we can demonstrate things concerning them, and though they never were nor will be, yet are they possible to exist, since nothing can be conceived but it either is or else is

[1] Analyt. Posterior. lib. 1. p. 226. tom. 1. opp. These words however are not read in this order in Aristotle, Dr. Cudworth having joined two separate passages together: yet not so as to do any violence to the sense.

possible to be. The human mind therefore hath a power of framing ideas and conceptions, not only of what actually is, but also of things which never were, nor perhaps will be, they being only possible to be. But when, from our conceptions, we conclude of some things, that though they are not, yet they are possible to be; since nothing that is not can be possible to be, unless there be something actually in being which hath sufficient power to produce it; we do implicitly suppose the existence of a God or omnipotent Being thereby, which can make whatsoever is conceivable, though it yet be not, to exist; and therefore material triangles, circles, spheres, cubes, mathematically exact.[2]

The result of what we have hitherto said is this, that since singular bodies are not the only objects of our mind and cogitation, it having also universal and abstract ideas of the intelligible natures or essences of things (some of which are such, whose singulars do not at all fall under sense; others, though they belong to bodies, yet sense can never reach to them, nor were they ever in matter); moreover, since our mind can conceive of things which nowhere actually exist, but are only possible, and can have such a demonstrative science of universal truths, as sense can never ascend to: that therefore human knowledge and understanding itself is not the mere image and creature of singular bodies only; and so derivative, or ectypal from them, and in order of nature junior to them, but that, as it were hovering aloft over all the corporeal universe, it is a thing independent upon singular bodies, or proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them.

But what account can we then possibly give of knowledge and understanding, their nature and original, since there must be νοητὸν, "that which is intelligible," in order of nature, before νόησις, or "intellection?" Certainly no other than this, that the first original knowledge is that of a perfect Being, infinitely

[2] Some perhaps will deny the conclusiveness of this argument, as a proof of the existence of God or a nature infinitely powerful. It is unquestionable indeed that while we contemplate the possibility of any thing, the mind at the same time conceives some cause capable of producing that which we consider to be possible. But I can see nothing that should compel us to decide that there exists an eternal Being endowed with infinite power. A disciple of Epicurus' school says he clearly understands that the world we inhabit might have been constructed and disposed in a very different manner from what it is at this day: neither does he deny, while asserting so, that this would have been owing to certain causes. But he by no means on that account places an omnipotent Deity over this work, but foolishly imagines that a different concourse of atoms would have produced a different world. No one doubts the possibility of a field being perfectly free from weeds and every useless plant, although nothing of the kind is ever seen; for the idea of such a field contains nothing repugnant and contradictory: yet no man who conceives the idea of such a field in his mind, however certain he may be, that there must be antecedent causes to produce so fertile a soil, ascends at once in thought to an infinite and all-powerful Being. The same may be said of cubes, triangles, spheres, &c. which are here instanced by the learned Doctor. A geometrician who perceives the possibility of a perfect sphere will perhaps look for causes capable of producing this perfection in the motion and nature of matter itself.

good and powerful, comprehending itself, and the utmost extent of its own fecundity and power, that is, the possibilities of all things; their ideas, with their several relations to one another; all necessary and immutable truths. Here therefore is there a knowledge before the world and all sensible things, that was archetypal and paradigmatical to the same. Of which one perfect mind and knowledge all other imperfect minds (being derived from it) have a certain participation; whereby they are enabled to frame intelligible ideas, not only of whatsoever doth actually exist, but also of such things as never were, nor will be, but are only possible, or objects of divine power.

Wherefore, since it is certain, that even human knowledge and understanding itself is not a mere passion from sensible things, and singular bodies existing without (which is the only foundation of that forementioned atheistic argument, that "things made knowledge," and "not knowledge things"), and consequently it must needs have some other original: moreover, since knowledge and understanding apprehend things proleptically to their existence (mind being able to frame conceptions of all possible entities and modifications) and therefore in their nature do plainly suppose the actual existence of a perfect Being, which is infinitely fecund and powerful, and could produce all things possible or conceivable; the first original Knowledge, or Mind, from whence all other knowledges and minds are derived, being that of an absolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or of its communicability, that is, the ideas of all possibilities of things, that may be produced by it, together with their relations to one another, and their necessary immutable truths; accordingly as wisdom and understanding are described to be,* ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης, ἔσοπτρον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ, "the breath (or vapour) of the power of God, and an efflux (or emanation) from the glory of the Almighty, a clear mirror (or looking glass) of his active energy or virtue, and the image of his goodness:" I say, the result of all is this, that the nature of knowledge and understanding is so far from being a ground of disproving a Deity (as the Atheists ignorantly pretend) that it affordeth a firm demonstration to us, on the contrary, of the existence of a God, a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or all possibilities of things; a mind before the world, and senior to all things; no ectypal, but archetypal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual world, the paradigm or platform, according to which this sensible world was made.

* Wisd. cap. 7.

And this may be further confirmed from what is generally acknowledged, and indeed cannot reasonably be denied by any, viz. that there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor can ever be destroyed, or cease to be: as for example, such common notions as these, that equals added to equals make equals; that the cause is in order of nature before the effect, &c. together with all geometrical theorems; as Aristotle himself declareth, he writing in his Ethics[3] after this manner: *Περὶ ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι,* "Concerning eternal (and immutable) things no man does consult; as for example, concerning the diameter or diagonal of a square, whether it should be incommensurable to the sides, or no." Where he plainly affirmeth this geometrical theorem, that the diameter or diagonal of a square is incommensurable to the sides, to be an eternal truth. Neither are there such eternal truths as these only in mathematics, and concerning quantity, but also in ethics concerning morality; there being here *αἰώνια δίκαια,* as Justin Martyr[4] calls them, "things eternally just," which were not made such at certain times by law and arbitrary command, but, being such in their own nature immutably, were from everlasting to everlasting, and (as it is said of that eternal Word, which comprehends all truth) "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever."* For of these is that famous passage of Sophocles in his Antigona:[5]

> *Οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθὲς, ἀλλ' ἀεί πότε*
> *Ζῇ ταῦτα, κουδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνῃ,*

"These are not things of to-day, or yesterday, but they ever live, and no man knows their date, or from whence they came." No man can declare the time when all common notions and geometrical truths were first made and generated out of nothing,

[3] Ethic. ad Nicomach. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 39. tom. 3. opp. But Dr. Cudworth has not quoted the entire passage, having omitted the words *περὶ τοῦ κόσμου* after *οἷον*. For it is notorious that Aristotle ranked the world among eternal and immutable things.

[4] There can scarcely be a doubt that the learned Doctor alludes to the following passage of Justin, which occurs in the Dialogue with Tryphon, p. 246. opp.: *Ἀλλὰ καὶ Σκύθης ἤ τις, ἢ Πέρσης, ἔχει δὲ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ γνῶσιν καὶ τοῦ Χρίστου αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ ΑΙΩΝΙΑ ΔΙΚΑΙΑ, περιτέτμηται τὴν καλὴν καὶ ὠφέλιμον περιτομὴν, καὶ φίλος ἐστὶ τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δώροις αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῖς προφοραῖς χαίρει,* "Moreover a Scythian or Persian, if he has a knowledge of God and his Christ, and observes *the thing eternally just,* is circumcised with the good and profitable circumcision, and is acceptable to God, and rejoices in his gifts and offerings." These *αἰώνια δίκαια* are the precepts of the law of nature, which Justin is in the constant habit of opposing to the law of Moses, in so far as it enjoins rites and ceremonies. In p. 266 of the same dialogue there is another passage of this kind, in which Justin designates what he here calls *αἰώνια δίκαια* by a different but kindred name: *Τὰς αἰωνίας καὶ φύσει δικαιοπραξίας καὶ εὐσεβείας,* "Eternal and natural acts of justice and true religion." Compare p. 320 of the same.

* Heb. xiii. 10.

[5] Vers. 467. 468.

or brought out of antecedent non-existence into being. Certain it is, that such truths as these, that the "diameter and sides of a square are incommensurable, or that the power of the hypotheneuse in a rectangular triangle is equal to the powers of both the sides," were not made by any man's thinking, or by those first geometricians who discovered or demonstrated the same; they discovering and demonstrating only that which was. Wherefore these truths were before there was any man to think of them, and they would continue still to be, though all the men in the world should be annihilated; nay, though there were no material squares and triangles any where in the whole world neither, no nor any matter at all: for they were ever without beginning before the world, and would of necessity be ever after it, should it cease to be.

Now, if there be eternal truths, which were never made, and could not but be, then must the rationes rerum, the "simple reasons" of things also, or their intelligible natures and essences, out of which those truths are compounded, be of necessity eternal likewise. For how can this be an eternal truth, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with the sides, if the rationes, the "reasons" of a square, diameter, and sides, or their intelligible essences, were not themselves eternal? These are therefore called by Plato[6] (a man of much meditation, and no contemptible philosopher) not only ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, "things which are always the same, and unchangeable," but also τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὄντα, "things which were never made, but always are;" and sometimes, μήτε γιγνόμενα, μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, "things that were neither made, nor can be destroyed;" sometimes, τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα, "things ingenerable and incorruptible." Of which Cicero thus:[7] Hæc Plato negat gigni, sed semper esse, et ratione et intelligentiâ contineri, "These things Plato affirmeth to have been never made, but always to be, and to be contained in reason and understanding." And, though perhaps it may seem strange, even Aristotle[8] himself also, notwithstanding his so often clashing with Plato's ideas, here really agreeth in the main, that the forms and species, or the universal intelligible essences of things, which are the proper and immediate objects of science, were

[6] These and other names by which Plato designates his models or *ideas* of things are scattered every where throughout his works.

[7] Oratore ad Brutum, cap. 3. p. 695. tom. 2. opp. where Cicero is speaking of Plato's ideas.

[8] See Metaphys. lib. 7. cap. 8. p. 361. and lib. 14. cap. 3. p. 473. tom. 4. opp. in which two passages the prince of the Peripatetics professes to prove that form properly speaking is neither made nor generated. But I am afraid those who compare this opinion of Aristotle's on form with Plato's doctrine of eternal ideas and truths, will detect a very considerable discrepancy. I have here no opportunity of entering into this disputation, which moreover is too dry and lifeless to be generally acceptable.

eternal and never made. Thus in his Metaphysics: Τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾶται, "No man makes the form, or species of a thing, nor was it ever generated;" and again: Τοῦ σφαῖρα εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, "There is no generation of the essence of a sphere;" and, Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὰ εἴδη, "The forms or species of things are without any generation or corruption." And he sometimes calleth these objects of science ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν[9] or φύσιν, "an immutable essence or nature." Lastly, where he writeth against the Heraclitics, and those other Sceptics, who denied all certainty of science, he first discovers the ground of their error herein to have been this, that they supposed singular bodies, or sensibles existing without, to be the only things or objects of the mind, or knowledge:[10] Αἴτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις, ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, τὰ δὲ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον, ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει . . . . ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατάγε τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περίγε τὸ πάντως πάντα μεταβάλλον, οὐκ ἐκδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν, "The original of these men's mistake was this, because truth was to be looked for in things, and they conceived the only things to be sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the indeterminate nature. Wherefore they, perceiving all the nature of sensibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirmed concerning that, which is not the same but changeable, concluded that there could be no truth at all, nor certainty of science; those things, which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same." And then he subjoins in way of opposition to this sceptical doctrine of theirs, and the forementioned ground thereof:[1] Ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην

[9] On the οὐσία ἀκίνητος and its truth Aristotle discourses copiously in his Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 2. p. 472. cap. 6. p. 477. But I am inclined to think the learned Doctor is mistaken in his opinion that Aristotle supposed this *immoveable essence* to be the eternal truths which nothing can change. For Aristotle's ἀκίνητος οὐσία is that nature from which he derives all motion in the universe of things, in short it is his God.

[10] Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 313. tom. 4. opp.

[1] That these words occur in Aristotle, and perhaps even in his books of Metaphysics, I have no doubt: but they certainly are not to be found in the place indicated by Dr. Cudworth. Neither have I been able to meet with them in other passages wherein the philosopher is professedly proving the existence of eternal and immoveable things. But in my opinion the learned Doctor is mistaken when he supposes that the things which Aristotle calls eternal, immoveable, and subject to no corruption or generation, are no other than the forms, species, and eternal models of things, and eternal truths. His partiality for the opinions he had himself espoused, seems to me to have had such influence upon his mind as to make him see things in Aristotle to which that philosopher was strongly opposed. The nature which Aristotle declares to be without generation or corruption is *heaven*, or τὸ πᾶν, *the universe*, as I shall prove by a striking passage of his. Thus after inveighing against those who asserted that all things flow, and therefore that there is no true and certain knowledge of any thing, he adds that it is in the highest degree insufferable in these men to affirm the same of heaven as of other things: that sensible things indeed are generated and corrupted, but not likewise τὸ

οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ᾗ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει οὐτὲ φθορὰ οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν, "We would have these men therefore to know, that there is another kind of essence of things, besides that of sensibles, to which belongeth neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all." By which essences of things, that have no generation nor corruption, he could understand nothing else but those intelligible natures, species, and ideas, which are the standing and immutable objects of science. And certain it is, that there could be no constant and immutable science at all, were there no other objects of the mind but singulars and sensibles, because these are all mutable. Wherefore the proper and immediate objects of the geometrical science are no singular and material triangles, squares, spheres, and cubes, &c., not only because none of these are found mathematically exact, and because geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, could not have the same singular bodies before them, but also because they do none of them continue immutably the same; all corporeal things being more or less in perpetual motion and mutation; whereas, that of which any geometrical theorem is verified and demonstrated, must be immutably and unalterably the same. The triangles and circles, spheres and cubes of Euclid, Archimedes, Pappus, Apollonius, and all other ancient and modern geometricians, in all the distant places and times of the world, were both indivisibly one and the same, and also perfectly immutable and incorruptible, the science of geometry being such. For which cause it is affirmed also of these mathematical things, by the forementioned Aristotle, that they

πᾶν and ὁ οὐρανὸς. Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 313. 314. Περὶ ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀπεφήναντο· ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τόπος, ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει διαμένει μόνος ὤν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, μόριον τοῦ παντὸς ἔστιν, "They affirmed the like of the entire heaven. For the place of the sensible, which surrounds us, is alone in generation and corruption, and forms no part, so to speak, of the universe." But the immoveable or ἀκίνητος οὐσία, as he calls it, is God himself, as may easily be learnt from the fourteenth book of the Metaphysics. Still I will not on that account deny that Aristotle approved of Plato's distribution of things into τα ὄντα and τὰ αἰσθητὰ, since I know he every where adopts it; but I do maintain those to be in error who fancy that the τὰ ὄντα of Plato and Aristotle are not different. The τὰ ὄντα of Aristotle are heaven, God, and the genii subordinate to God, whom he has placed over the celestial orbs, in short, all things above the moon: but those of Plato are the eternal forms and exemplars of things. Aristotle, I grant, held the existence of immutable and eternal, or *universal* truths, but I deny that his opinion on these universals can be properly identified with Plato's. For Plato exempted his eternal and universal essences from the nature of things, and supposed them to have nothing in common with the things that fall under the senses: but Aristotle, on the contrary, believed the universals to be immersed as it were in these very sensibles, and to be incapable of being separated from them except in thought. The former held that the ideas and eternal forms of things are innate in the minds of men: the latter, that they are imprinted on the mind by study, and result from the contemplation of external objects. See Metaphys. lib. 12. p. 436. tom. 4. opp. It is superfluous in this place to go into a more detailed demonstration of that, which no one can be ignorant of who has paid due attention to the first principles of Aristotle's philosophy.

are nowhere as in a place, as all singular bodies are:* Ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἅμα τοῖς στερεοῖς τοῖς Μαθηματικοῖς ποιῆσαι, ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἴδιος· διὸ χωριστὰ τόπῳ· τὰ δὲ Μαθηματικὰ, οὐ ποῦ, "It is absurd to make mathematical things to be in a place, as solid bodies are; for place belongeth only to singulars, which are therefore separable from one another by place; but mathematical things are not any where." Because they being universal and abstract, are only in minds: nevertheless, for the same reason are they also every where, they being in every mind that apprehends them. Lastly, these intelligible essences and ideas of things are called also by Philo,[2] ἀναγκαιότατα οὐσίαι, "the most necessary essences;" as being not only eternal, but having likewise necessary existence belonging to them: for though there be no absolute necessity that there should be matter or body, yet is there an absolute necessity that there should be truth.

If therefore there be eternal intelligibles or ideas, and eternal truths, and necessary existence do belong to them; then must there be an eternal mind necessarily existing, since these truths and intelligible essences of things cannot possibly be any where but in a mind. For by the essences of things, when they are said to be eternal, must not be meant their very substances, as if every thing were in itself eternal and uncreated; or that God in creation did only, as a modern writer abusively expresseth it, sartoris instar, vestire essentias rerum novâ existentiâ, "clothe the antecedent essences of things with a new garment of existence;" but only their esse cognitum, their "possible and intelligible natures," as they were objects of infinite power and understanding, before they were made. There must be a mind senior to the world, and all sensible things, and such as at once comprehends in it the ideas of all intelligibles, their necessary scheses and relations to one another, and all their immutable truths; a mind, which doth not ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν (as Aristotle[3] writeth of it), sometimes understand, and sometimes

* Metaphys. lib. 12. cap. 5. [P. 448. tom. 4. opp.]

[2] Legis Allegor. lib. 1. p. 68. opp. But Philo means Plato's ideas, for which he entertained no slight partiality.

[3] In no place that I remember has Aristotle said of mind simply and absolutely that it sometimes understands and sometimes does not understand, much less has he let fall these words in reference to the eternal mind, or God. But the worthy Doctor was thinking no doubt of this passage of the philosopher, Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 9. p. 483. wherein he declares that the consideration of mind is encompassed with certain difficulties, whether it be conceived as dormant or as understanding: Πῶς δ' ἔχων (νοῦς) τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας· εἴτε γὰρ ΜΗΔΕ'Ν ΝΟΕΙ˜, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σέμνον, ἀλλ' ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἴη ὁ καθεύδων, εἴτε ΝΟΕΙ˜ τοῦτον δ' ἄλλο κύριον . . . οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη, "In whatever state such may be, it presents certain difficulties. For if it understands nothing, but is situated as one that sleeps, what of excellence will there be? and if it understands, and something else is its principal . . . it will not be the best substance."

not understand, as if it were sometimes awake, and sometimes asleep, or like an eye, sometimes open, and sometimes shut; but οὐσία ἐνέργεια, such a mind as is essentially act and energy, and hath no defect in it. And this, as we have already declared, can be no other than the mind of an omnipotent and infinitely perfect Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or how far itself is communicable, that is, all the possibilities of things that may be made by it, and their respective truths; mind and knowledge, in the very nature of it, supposing the actual existence of an omnipotent or infinitely powerful Being, as its Νοητὸν, or "Intelligible;" it being nothing but the comprehension of the extent of infinite or divine power, and the measure of the same.

And from hence it is evident also, that there can be but one only original mind, or no more than one understanding Being self-existent; all other minds, whatsoever partaking of one original mind; and being, as it were, stamped with the impression or signature of one and the same seal. From whence it cometh to pass, that all minds, in the several places and ages of the world, have ideas or notions of things exactly alike, and truths indivisibly the same. Truths are not multiplied by the diversity of minds that apprehend them; because they are all but ectypal participations of one and the same original or archetypal mind and truth. As the same face may be reflected in several glasses; and the image of the same sun may be in a thousand eyes at once beholding it; and one and the same voice may be in a thousand ears listening to it: so when innumerable created minds have the same ideas of things, and understand the same truths, it is but one and the same eternal light that is reflected in them all ("that light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world"), or the same voice of that one everlasting Word, that is never silent, re-echoed by them. Thus was it concluded by Themistius,[4] that one man, by teaching, could not possibly beget in the mind of another the very same notions, conceptions, and knowledges, which himself had in his own mind, εἰ μὴ ταὐτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος, "were not the minds both of the teacher and of the learner, as it were, printed and stamped alike." As also that men could not possibly so confer together as they do, presently apprehending one another's meaning, and raising up the very same senses in their minds, and that merely by occasion of words and sounds, εἰ μήτις ἦν Εἷς Νοῦς οὗ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν, "were there not some one mind, which all men did partake of." As for that anti-monarchical opinion of many understanding beings, or minds, self-originated, and independent (none of

[4] These passages of Themistius are taken, I suspect, from his Paraphrase on Aristotle's books De Anima, which I have not had an opportunity of consulting.

which therefore could be omnipotent), is neither conceivable, how such should all agree in the same truths, there being no common measure of truth betwixt them, no more than any common rule of their wills; nor indeed how should they have any knowledge or understanding at all, properly so called, that being the comprehension of the possibilities of things, or of the extent of infinite power: whereas according to this hypothesis, there is no infinite power at all, the power of each of those many supposed principles or deities being limited and finite, and therefore indeed not creative of any thing neither, since that which could create one thing, could create all, and consequently would have all depending upon it. We conclude therefore, that from the nature of mind and knowledge it is demonstrable, that there can be but one original and self-existent Mind, or understanding Being, from which all other minds were derived. And now have we, more copiously than we designed, confuted the first atheistic argument; we having not only asserted the idea of God, and fully answered and refelled all the atheistic pretences against the same; but also from this very idea of God, or a perfect Being, demonstrated his existence. We shall dispatch the following atheistic objections with more brevity.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION. II.

1. A CONFUTATION of the second atheistic argument, against omnipotence and divine creation; that nothing can, by any power whatsoever, be made out of nothing. In answer to which three things to be insisted on. First, that de nihilo nihil, "nothing out of nothing," is in some sense an axiom of unquestionable truth, but then makes nothing against theism, or divine creation. Secondly, that nothing out of nothing, in the sense of the atheistic objectors, viz. that nothing, which once was not, could by any power whatsoever be brought into being, is absolutely false; and that, if it were true, it would make no more against theism than it does against atheism. Lastly, that from this very axiom, "nothing out of nothing," in the true sense thereof, the absolute impossibility of atheism is demonstrable. 2. De nihilo nihil, "nothing from nothing," in some sense, is a common notion of unquestionable truth. For, first, certain that nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being; or, that nothing can take beginning of existence from itself; or, that nothing can be made or produced without an efficient cause. From whence demonstrated, that there was never nothing, or, that every thing was not made, but something did exist of itself from eternity unmade, or underived from any thing else. 3. Again, certain also, that nothing could be efficiently produced by what hath not at least equal perfection, and a sufficient active or productive power. That an effect, which transcends the perfection of its supposed cause, must come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Nor can any thing be produced by another, though having equal perfection, unless it have also a sufficient active or productive power. Hence certain, that were there once no motion at all in the world, and no other substance besides body, which had no self-moving power, there could never possibly be any motion or mutation to all eternity, for want of a sufficient cause, or productive power. No imperfect being hath a productive power of any new substance, which was not before, but only of new accidents and modifications; that is, no creature can create. Which two forementioned senses respect the efficient cause. 4. Thirdly, nothing can be materially produced out of nothing pre-existing or inexisting. And therefore, in all natural generations (where the supernatural power of the Deity interposes not) no new real entity, or substance produced, which was not before, but only new modifications of what substantially pre-existed. 5. Nothing out of nothing, so much insisted on by the old physiologers before Aristotle, in this sense, commonly misunderstood by modern writers, as if they designed thereby to take away all divine creation out of nothing pre-existing. Granted, this to have been the sense of the Stoics and of Plutarch; he affirming the world to have been no otherwise made by God, than a house is by a carpenter, or a garment by a tailor. Plutarch and the Stoics therefore imperfect Theists, but nevertheless zealous religionists. But the ancient Italic philosophers here acted only as physiologers, and not as theologers, or metaphysicians; they not directing themselves against a divine creation out of nothing pre-existing; but only contending, that neither in natural

generations any new real entity was created, nor in corruptions annihilated; but only the modifications of what before existed, changed: or, that no new real entity could be made out of matter. 6. That this was the true meaning of those ancient physiologers, evident from the use which they made of this principle, "nothing out of nothing;" which twofold. First, upon this foundation, they endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either similar or dissimilar; homœomery or anomœomery. Anaxagoras from hence concluded, because nothing could be made out of nothing pre-existing and inexisting, that therefore there were in every body similar atoms, of all kinds, out of which, by concretions and secretions, all natural generations made; so that bone was made out of bony atoms pre-existing and inexisting; flesh out of fleshy, and the like. This the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle, "nothing out of nothing." But the ancient Italics, both before and after Anaxagoras (whom Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus here followed), with greater sagacity concluded, from the same principle, "nothing out of nothing," that those qualities and forms of bodies, naturally generated and corrupted, were therefore no real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, but only different modifications thereof, causing different fancies in us; and this an anomœomery, or dissimilar atomology, the atoms thereof being devoid of qualities. Those simple elements or letters (in nature's alphabet) out of which, variously combined, these philosophers spelled out or compounded all the syllables and words (or complexions) of corporeal things, nothing but figure, site, motion, rest, and magnitude of parts. Were qualities and forms real entities distinct from these, and not pre-existing (as Anaxagoras dreamed) they must then have come from nothing, in natural generations; which impossible. 8. Another improvement of this principle, "nothing out of nothing," made by the Italic philosophers; that the souls of animals, especially human, since they could not possibly result from the mere modifications of matter, figure, site, motion, &c. were not produced in generations, nor annihilated in deaths and corruptions; but being substantial things, did pre and post-exist. This set down as the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists, in Lucretius. Whether souls were generated, or insinuated into bodies. Generations and corruptions of animals, to these Pythagoreans, but anagrammatical transpositions. That those philosophers, who asserted the pre-existence and ingenerability of souls, did not therefore suppose them to have been self-existent and uncreated, but derived them all from the Deity. Thus Proclus, though maintaining the eternity of souls, with the world. The ingenerability of souls in Plato's Timæus, no more than this, that they were not generated out of matter; and for this cause also, were they called principles, in the same sense, as matter was so accounted. Souls therefore, to Plato, created by God, though not in the generation of animals, but before. 9. St. Austin himself sometime staggering and sceptical, in the point of pre-existence. That we have a philosophic certainty of no more than this, that souls were created by God, out of nothing pre-existing, sometime or other; either in generations, or before them. That unless brutes be mere machines, the reason the same also concerning brutish souls; that these not generated out of matter, but created sometime or other, by the Deity; as well as the matter of their bodies was. 10. That all these three forementioned particulars, wherein it is true, that nothing can possibly come from nothing, are reducible to this one general proposition, that nothing can be caused by nothing; which will no way clash with the divine omnipotence or creative power, as shall be showed afterwards; but confirm the same. But those same

words "nothing out of nothing," may carry another sense; when that ἐκ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," is not taken causally, but only to signify the terminus à quo, "the term from which," or "an antecedent non-existence:" and the meaning thereof will be, that nothing, which before was not, could afterwards, by any power whatsoever, be brought into being. And this the sense of the Democritic and Epicurean objectors; viz. That no real entity can be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; and therefore the creative power of Theists an impossibility. 11. Our second undertakings in way of answer hereunto; to show, that nothing out of nothing, in this sense, is false; as also, that, were it true, yet it would make no more against theism, than it doth against atheism; and therefore ought not to be used by Atheists as an argument against a God. If this universally true, that nothing at all, which once was not, could ever be brought into being, then could there be no making, nor causing at all, no motion nor action, mutation or generation. But ourselves have a power of producing new cogitation in our minds, and new motion in our bodies. Wherefore Atheists forced to restrain this proposition to substantials only. And here some deceived with the equivocation, in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων "out of nothing;" which may be taken either causally, or else to signify the term from which, that is, from an antecedent non-existence; they confounding both these together; whereof the first only true, the latter false. Again, others staggered with the plausibility of this proposition; partly because no artificial thing (as a house or garment) can be made by men, but out of pre-existing matter; and partly because ancient physiologers maintained the same also concerning natural generations, that no new real entity or substance could be therein produced; and lastly, because it is certain, that no imperfect created being can create any new substance; they being therefore apt to measure all power whatsoever, by these scantlings. But as easy for a perfect Being to create a world, matter and all, out of nothing (in this sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence), as for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays. For an imperfect substance, which once was not, to be brought into being by God, this not impossible, in any of the forementioned senses; he having not only infinitely greater perfection, but also sufficient productive or emanative power. True, that infinite power cannot do things in their own nature impossible, but nothing thus impossible but what contradictious: and though a contradiction for any thing, at the same time, to be and not be; yet none at all, for an imperfect being (which is in its nature contingent to existence), after it had not been, to be. Wherefore, since the making of a substance to be, which was not before, is no way contradictious, nor consequently in its own nature impossible; it must needs be an object of perfect power. 12. Furthermore, if no real entity or substance could possibly be brought out of non-existence into being, then must the reason hereof be, because no substance can derive its whole being from another substance. But from hence, it would follow, that whatsoever is substantial, did not only exist from eternity, but also of itself, independently upon any thing else. Whereas, first, the pre-eternity of temporary beings not agreeable to reason; and then, to suppose imperfect substances to have existed of themselves and necessarily, is to suppose something to come from nothing, in the impossible sense; they having no necessary self-existence in their nature. As they, who affirm all substance to be body, and no body to be able to move itself, though supposing motion to have been from eternity; yet make this motion to come from nothing, or be caused by nothing. What in its nature contingently possible to be, or not be, could not exist of itself;

but must derive its being from something else, which necessarily existeth. Plato's distinction therefore betwixt two kinds of substances must needs be admitted, that which always is, and was never made; and that which is made, or had a beginning. 13. Lastly, if this true, that no substance makeable or producible, it would not only follow from thence (as the Epicurean Atheist supposes) that matter, but also that all souls (at least human) did exist of themselves, from eternity, independently upon any thing else; it being impossible, that Mind or Soul should be a modification of senseless matter, or result from figures, sites, motions, and magnitudes. Human souls substantial, and therefore, according to this doctrine, must have been never made; whereas Atheists stiffly deny both their pre and post-existence. Those pagan Theists, who held the eternity of human minds, supposed them, notwithstanding, to have depended upon the Deity, as their cause. Before proved, that there can be but one understanding Being, self-existent. If human souls depend upon the Deity as their cause, then doubtless matter also. 14. A common, but great mistake, that no pagan Theist ever acknowledged any creative power out of nothing; or else, that God was the cause of any substance. Plato's definition of effective power, in general, and his affirmation, that the divine efficiency is that whereby things are made after they had not been. Certain, that he did not understand this of the production of souls out of matter, he supposing them to be before matter, and therefore made by God out of nothing pre-existing. All philosophers, who held the immortality and incorporeity of the soul, asserted it to have been caused by God, either in time, or from eternity. Plutarch's singularity here. Unquestionable, that the Platonists supposed one substance to receive its whole being from another; in that they derive their second hypostasis or substance, though eternal, from the first; and their third from both; and all inferior ranks of beings from all three. Plotinus, Porphyrius, Jamblichus, Hierocles, Proclus, and others, derived matter from the Deity. Thus the Chaldee Oracles; and the old Egyptian, or Hermaic theology also, according to Jamblichus. Those Platonists, who supposed the world and souls eternal, conceived them to have received their being, as much from the Deity as if made in time. 15. Having now disproved this proposition, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense, viz. That no substance was caused, or derived its being from another, but whatsoever is substantial, did exist of itself from eternity, independently; we are, in the next place, to make it appear also, that were it true, it would no more oppose theism than it doth atheism. Falsehoods (though not truths) may disagree. Plutarch, the Stoics, and others, who made God the creator of no substance, though not genuine, yet zealous Theists. But the ancient Atheists, both in Plato and Aristotle, generated and corrupted all things; that is, produced all things out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduced them into nothing again; the bare substance of matter only excepted. The same done by the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, the makers of this objection: though, according to the principles of their own atomic physiology, it is impossible that life and understanding, soul and mind, should be mere modifications of matter. As Theists give a creative power of all, out of nothing, to the Deity; so do Atheists to passive and dead matter. Wherefore this can be no argument against theism; it equally opposing atheism. 16. An anacephalæosis; wherein observable, that Cicero makes de nihilo fieri, and sine causa, "to be made out of nothing," and "to be made without a cause," one and the selfsame thing; as also, that he doth not confine this to the material cause only. Our third and last undertaking; to prove, that Atheists produce real

entities out of nothing, in the first impossible sense; that is, without a cause. 17. A brief synopsis of atheism; that matter being the only substance, is therefore the only unmade thing; and that whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance thereof, was made out of matter, or produced from that alone. 18. The first argument; when Atheists affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things to be made out of that, they suppose all to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing in an impossible sense. Though something may be made without a material cause pre-existing; yet cannot any thing possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made which was not before, there must of necessity be besides matter, some other substance, as the active efficient cause thereof. The atheistic hypothesis supposes things to be made without any active or effective principle. Whereas the Epicurean Atheists attribute the efficiency of all to local motion; and yet deny matter or body (their only substance) a self-moving power. They hereby make all the motion that is in the world to have been without a cause, or to come from nothing; all action without an agent; all efficiency without an efficient. 19. Again, should we grant these Atheists motion without a cause, yet could not dead and senseless matter, together with motion, ever beget life, sense, and understanding; because this would be something out of nothing, in way of causality, local motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site and disposition of parts. Hence also those spurious Theists confuted, who conclude God to have done no more in the making of the world, than a carpenter doth in the building of a house, (upon this pretence, that nothing can be made out of nothing;) and yet suppose him to make souls out of dead and senseless matter, which is to bring them from nothing in way of causality. 20. Declared before, That the ancient Italics and Pythagorics proved in this manner, that souls could not possibly be generated out of matter; because nothing can come from nothing, in way of causality. The subterfuge of the atheistic Ionics out of Aristotle; that matter being the only substance, and life, sense, and understanding nothing but the passions, affections, and dispositions thereof; the production of them out of matter, no production of any new real entity. 21. Answer: Atheists taking it for granted that there is no other substance besides body or matter, therefore falsely conclude life, sense, and understanding to be accidents or modes of matter; they being indeed the modes or attributes of substance incorporeal and self-active. A mode that which cannot be conceived, without the thing, whereof it is a mode; but life and cogitation may be conceived, without corporeal extension; and indeed, cannot be conceived with it. 22. The chief occasion of this error, from qualities and forms; as because the quality of heat and form of fire may be generated out of matter, therefore life, cogitation, and understanding also. But the Atomic Atheists themselves explode qualities, as things really distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, for this very reason, because nothing can be made out of nothing causally. The vulgar opinion of such real qualities in bodies, only from men's mistaking their own fancies, apparitions, passions, affections, and seemings, for things really existing without them. That in these qualities, which is distinct from the figure, site, and motion of parts, not the accidents and modifications of matters, but of our own souls. The atomic Atheists infinitely absurd; when exploding qualities, because nothing can come out of nothing, themselves bring life, sense, and understanding, out of nothing, in way of causality. That opinion, that cogitation is nothing but local motion, and men themselves but mere machines, prodigious sottishness, or intolerable

impudence. 23. Very observable here, that Epicurus himself, having a mind to assert contingent liberty, confesseth, that he could not do this, unless there were some such thing in the principles; because nothing can be made out of nothing, or caused by nothing: and therefore does he ridiculously feign a third motion of atoms, to solve that phenomenon of free-will. Wherefore, he must needs be guilty of an impossible production, of something out of nothing, when he brings soul and mind out of dead, senseless atoms. Were there no substantial and eternal life and understanding in the universe, there could none have been ever produced; because it must have come from nothing, or been made without a cause. That dark philosophy which educes, not only real qualities and substantial forms, but also souls themselves, at least sensitive, out of the power of the matter, educes them out of nothing, or makes them without a cause; and so prepares a direct way to atheism. 24. They who suppose matter, otherwise than by motion, and by a kind of miraculous efficiency, to produce souls and minds, attribute that creative power to this senseless and inactive matter, which themselves deny, to a perfect Being, as an absolute impossibility. Thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all atheism from this very principle, That nothing can be made from nothing, or without sufficient cause. 25. Wherefore, if no middle betwixt these two, but all things must either spring from a God, or matter; then is this also a demonstration of the truth of theism, by deduction to impossible: either there is a God, or else all things are derived from dead and senseless matter: but this latter is impossible; therefore a God. Nevertheless, that the existence of a God may be further directly proved also from the same principle, rightly understood, "nothing out of nothing" causally, or nothing, caused by nothing, neither efficiently, nor materially. 26. By these steps: first, that there was never nothing, but something or other did exist of itself from eternity, unmade, and independently upon any thing else, mathematically certain; from this principle, "nothing from nothing." Had there been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. Again, Whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, must have so existed necessarily, and not by any free will and choice. Certain therefore, that there is something actually in being, whose existence is and always was necessary. Now that, which exists necessarily, of itself, must have necessity of existence in its nature; which nothing but a perfect Being hath. Therefore there is a perfect Being; and nothing else besides this did exist of itself from eternity, but all other things whatsoever (whether souls or matter) were made by it. To suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, that hath no necessary existence in its nature, is to suppose that necessary existence to have come from nothing. 27. Three reasons, why some Theists have been so staggering and sceptical about the necessary self-existence of matter. First, from an idiotical conceit, that because artificial things cannot be made by men, but out of pre-existent matter, therefore nothing by God, or a perfect Being, can be otherwise made. Secondly, because some of them have supposed ὕλην ἀσώματον, "an incorporeal hyle," or first matter unmade; an older opinion than Aristotle. Whereas this really nothing, but a metaphysical notion of the potentiality or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity. Lastly, because some of them have conceived body and space to be really the same thing; and space to be positively infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent. But if space be not the extension of the Deity itself, as some suppose, but of body, only considered abstractly, from this or that, and therefore immoveably; then no sufficient ground for the positive infinity, or the indefinity thereof, as Cartesius imagined: we being certain of no

more than this, that be the world and its space, or extension, never so great, yet it might be still greater and greater infinitely; for which very cause, it could never be positively infinite. This possibility of more body and space, further and further indefinitely, or without end, as also its eternity, mistaken, for actual space and distance positively infinite and eternal. Nor is there perhaps any such great absurdity, in the finiteness of actual space and distance (according to this hypothesis), as some conceive. 28. Moreover, the existence of a God may be further proved from this common notion, "Nothing from nothing causally;" not only because were there no God, that idea, which we have of a perfect Being, must have come from nothing, and be the conception of nothing; but also all the other intelligible ideas of our minds must have come from nothing likewise, they being not derived from sense. All minds, and their intelligible ideas, by way of participation, from one perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself. 29. However, certain from this principle, "nothing from nothing," or "nothing caused by nothing;" that souls and minds could never have emerged out of dead and senseless matter, or from figures, sites, and motions; and therefore must either have all existed of themselves, necessarily from eternity; or else be created by the Deity, out of nothing pre-existing." Concluded, that the existence of a God is altogether as certain, as that our human souls did not all exist from eternity, of themselves, necessarily. Thus is the second atheistic argumentation against omnipotence or divine creation, from that false principle, "nothing out of nothing," in the atheistic sense (which is, that nothing could be brought out of non-existence into being, or no substance derive its whole being from another substance, but all was self-existent from eternity) abundantly confuted; it having been demonstrated, that unless there be a God, or a perfect omnipotent Being, and Creator, something must have come from nothing in the impossible sense; that is, have been caused by nothing, or made without a cause.

We come, in the next place, to the Achilles of the Atheists, their invincible argument against a divine creation and omnipotence; because, "Nothing could come from nothing." It being concluded from hence that whatsoever substantially or really is, was from all eternity of itself unmade or uncreated by any Deity. Or else thus: by God is always understood a Creator of some real entity or other out of nothing; but it is an undoubted principle of reason and philosophy, an undeniable common notion, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," and therefore there can be no such creative power as this. And here we shall perform these three things; first, we shall show that in some senses, this is indeed an unquestionable truth, and common notion, that "Nothing can come from nothing," and what those senses are. Secondly, we shall make it evident that in the sense of this atheistic objection, it is absolutely false that "Nothing can come from nothing," or be made out of nothing; and that a divine creation and omnipotence can be no way impugned from the forementioned principle rightly understood. Thirdly and lastly, we shall prove that as from this principle or common notion, "Nothing out of nothing," there can be no

execution at all done against theism, or a divine creation; so from the very same rightly understood, the impossibility of all atheism may be demonstratively proved, it bringing something out of nothing in an impossible sense; as also the existence of a God evinced.

We grant therefore, in the first place, that this is in some sense an undoubted principle of reason, or an undeniable common notion, that "Nothing can come from nothing." For, first, it is unquestionably true, that "Nothing, which once was not, could ever of itself come into being;" or that "Nothing could bring itself out of non-existence into being;" that "Nothing can take beginning of existence from itself;" or that "Nothing can be be made or produced without an efficient cause." And from hence, as hath been already intimated, is it demonstratively certain that every thing was not made, but that there is something necessarily self-existent, and which could not but be. For had every thing been made, then must something of necessity have been made out of nothing by itself; which is impossible.

Again: As nothing which was not could ever of itself come into being, or be made without any efficient cause; so is it certain likewise, that nothing can be efficiently caused or produced by that which hath not in it at least equal (if not greater) perfection, as also sufficient power to produce the same. We say, nothing which was not could ever be brought into being by that which hath not formally equal perfection in it; because nothing can give what it hath not, and therefore, so much of the perfection or entity of the effect, as is greater than that of the supposed cause, so much thereof must needs come from nothing, or be made without a cause. Moreover, whatsoever hath equal perfection to another thing, could not therefore cause or produce that other thing; because it might either have no active power at all, as matter hath not, it being merely passive, or else no sufficient active and productive power. As for example, though it be not impossible that motion, which once was not, should be produced; yet is it impossible that it should be ever produced without a sufficient cause. Wherefore, if there were once no motion at all in the whole world, nor no life, or self-active power in any thing, but all were dead; then is it certain that there could never possibly arise any motion or mutation in it to all eternity. There being no sufficient cause to produce the same; since nothing can produce motion but that which hath life or self-activity in it; and if motion, or any thing else, should begin to be, without a sufficient cause, then must it needs be caused by itself, or of itself come into being: which is a thing impossible. Now, no imperfect Being whatsoever hath a sufficient emanative power to create any other substance, or produce it out of nothing; the utmost that can be

done by imperfect beings, is only to produce new accidents and modifications; as human souls can produce new cogitations in themselves, and new local motion in bodies. No imperfect being is substantially emanative, or can produce another substance out of non-existence. Therefore, for any substance to be brought into being by an imperfect substance, which hath not sufficient emanative or creative power, is a thing plainly impossible; it being all one as to say, that a substance might of itself come out of nothing into being. And thus is it granted, that no substance could be created, or brought out of non-existence into being, but by the sole efficiency of an absolutely perfect Being, which hath both greater perfection, (it eminently containing all things in it,) and also a sufficient emanative or creative power.

And now have we given an account of two senses, wherein it is impossible for *any thing to come from nothing;* one, for a thing which was not, to bring itself into being, or to be made without an efficient cause. Another, for a thing to be efficiently caused by that which hath not at least equal perfection in it, or a sufficient emanative or productive power. Both which senses of this axiom respect the efficient cause; and thus was it frequently understood by divers of the ancients, and particularly by Cicero.[5] We shall now propound a third sense, wherein this axiom is also verified, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," respecting chiefly the material cause. For since no imperfect natural being hath any creative power, or can efficiently produce any new substance, or real entity, which was not before, into being, but only act upon pre-existing matter by motion, and modify the same; and since matter, as such, being merely passive, cannot cause any thing that was not before, or will not result from the composition or modification of it; it follows undeniably, that in all natural generations and productions out of pre-existent matter (without a divine creation) there can never be any new substance or real entity brought out of non-existence into being. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the ancient physiologers meant, when, (as Aristotle[6] tells us) they so much insisted upon this principle: Τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον, "That it was impossible that any real entity should be (naturally) made or generated out of nothing; or, as it is also otherwise expressed:[7] Οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, "That no real

[5] The learned Doctor adduces a passage to this purport below from Cicero's book, De Fato.

[6] Natural. Auscultat. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. tom. 1. opp. See also cap. 8. p. 457. and elsewhere.

[7] Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 457. tom. 1. opp. There are some other passages to the same effect in Aristotle, which I consider it superfluous to quote in this place.

entity was either generated or corrupted." That is, that in natural generations, corruptions and alterations, (where God is supposed not miraculously to interpose) there is no creation of a new substance, or real entity, out of nothing, nor annihilation, or destruction of any into nothing.

We are not ignorant that the generality of modern writers have interpreted this doctrine of the old physiologers in Aristotle into quite different sense; as designing therein to take away all divine creation out of nothing, (or non-existence;) they making all things to have sprung out of matter (existing of itself from eternity) either without a God, or else rather (because Parmenides and Empedocles, and other assertors of this doctrine, were undoubted Theists) with him. So that God could not create any new entity out of nothing, but only make things out of pre-existing unmade matter, as a carpenter doth a house, or a weaver a piece of cloth. And thus is it commonly taken for granted, that no Pagan philosopher ever went so far as to acknowledge a divine creation, of any thing out of nothing, in the sense of Christian theologers. And here we grant indeed, that besides the Stoics,[8] there have been some other philosophic Theists amongst the Pagans of this persuasion, that nothing was, nor could be made by God, otherwise than out of something pre-existing; as Plutarchus Cheronensis for one, who in a place already cited positively affirmeth:[9] Τὸν μὲν κόσμον

[8] That the Stoics asserted two principles of things, one active and the other passive, namely, God and eternal matter, is unquestionable. Consult what Justus Lipsius, among others, has collected upon this subject in his Physiologia Stoicorum, lib. 1. diss. 4. p. 9. and lib. 2. diss. 2. p. 57. &c. Wherefore, all the philosophers of this sect must necessarily have rejected the idea of creation out of nothing, although Seneca is generally considered to have had no great aversion to this doctrine: of whom it is our intention to speak elsewhere. But there seems to have been considerable dissension among the Stoics about the nature of matter itself, which they all acknowledged to be eternal. For while some of them, including M. Antoninus, lib. 17. ad se ipsum, sect. 1. maintained matter to be always obedient and subservient to God, so that he can do with it what he pleases, others asserted that it not unfrequently refuses this obedience, and thwarts the wishes of the Creator: from which contumacy of matter, they declared, spring all the evils that afflict mankind and the nature of things. This controversy has been touched upon by Seneca, in his Præfat. Quæst. Natur. and others. For my own part, I consider the whole to be a contest about words; which, if space permitted, I could demonstrate by arguments drawn from the interior philosophy of the Stoics. All the Stoics that ever existed, if they did not wish to contradict themselves, must necessarily have acknowledged: that matter is not adapted to receive all imaginable forms. Consequently, those who insisted upon matter being sometimes refractory, meant merely that it is impossible to make from it every thing that an all-wise mind can conceive. Nor was this denied by those on the other side, who held matter to be always obedient to God; inasmuch as they simply affirmed that matter never hinders God from making those things out of it which its nature permits. What therefore is left of the controversy? In my opinion, very little: or if any thing does remain, it turns altogether upon the divine will, and resolves itself into this question: Whether the supreme Being sometimes wills, and not only wills, but tries to accomplish those things, which he knows to be impossible by reason of the nature of matter. But the Stoics, if I mistake not, would act foolishly and abandon their own principles, were they to condescend to determine this question.

[9] Libro de Procreatione Animæ ex Timæo, p. 1014. tom. 2. opp. The learned Doctor

ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ, "That though the world were indeed made by God, yet the substance or matter out of which it was made, was not made." And then he subjoins this very reason for it: Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ ἀνδριάντος, "Because there can be no making of any thing out of nothing, but only out of something pre-existing, not rightly ordered or sufficiently disposed; as in a house, garment, or statue." From which conceit of Plutarch's, though he were otherwise ingenious, it may well be supposed that the dull Bœotic air had too much effect upon him. However, neither Plutarch nor the Stoics, as we conceive, are for this to be accounted absolute and downright Atheists, but only imperfect, mongrel, and spurious Theists. And therefore, were Atheists never so much able to prove that there could be no creation out of nothing pre-existing, which they cannot at all do; yet would not this overthrow theism in general, there being a latitude therein. Nevertheless, it will undeniably appear from what shall follow, that those ancient Italics and Pythagorics were so far from intending here any such thing, to deduce all things out of matter, either without, or with a God, as that they plainly designed the very contrary; namely, to prove that no real entity could be made out of matter, and particularly that souls could not be generated out of the same; which therefore of necessity must, according to them, have another divine original, and be made by God, not out of matter, but out of nothing pre-existing; since it could not be supposed by any, that all souls existed of themselves from eternity unmade. And indeed, all those Pagan philosophers who asserted the incorporeity of souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of pre-existing matter, but by God out of nothing. Plutarch being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle besides God and matter, a disorderly soul, or evil demon self-existent, who therefore seems to have supposed all particular human souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of that evil soul, and God, blended together: upon which account does he affirm souls to be not so much ἔργον as μέρος θεοῦ, not so much "the work of God" as "a part of him." And now, let

ought to have added that Plutarch gives this as Plato's, rather than his own opinion, and merely considers it as preferable to the rest of the dogmas put forth by philosophers on the subject of the world. But being a warm admirer of Plato's discipline, and sparing no pains to purge and clear him from all taint of error, he thought proper to omit this altogether.

any one judge, whether upon Plutarch's account, there be not yet further reason to complain of this Bœotic air.[10] Wherefore we conclude that those old physiologers in Aristotle, who insisted so much upon that principle, that no real entity could be made or generated out of nothing, acted only as physiologers therein, and not as theologers or metaphysicians; they not opposing a divine creation out of nothing pre-existing, but only contending that no new entity could be made out of matter, and that in natural generations and corruptions there was no creation or annihilation of any thing.[1]

But what the true scope and meaning of these physiologers indeed was, will more plainly appear from that use or improvement which themselves made of this philosophic principle; and this was twofold. For first, it is certain that upon this foundation, they all of them endeavoured to establish a peculiar kind of physiology, and some atomology or other, either a homœomery or an anomœomery, a similar or dissimilar atomology, For Anaxagoras, looking upon this maxim of the Italic philosophers, that nothing could be physically made out of nothing, or no real entity generated or corrupted, as an undoubted principle of reason; and being also not able to conceive otherwise of the forms and qualities of bodies, than that they were real entities, distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications; concluded, that therefore in generations, corruptions, and alterations, these were not created out of nothing, and annihilated into nothing, but that every thing was naturally made, ἐκ προϋπαρχόντων καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων, "out of pre-existent, and inexistent things;" and consequently that there were, in all things, similar atoms and particles of every kind, though by reason of their parvitude, insensible to us, and every thing seemed to be only that which was most predominant and conspicuous in it. To wit, that bone was made out of bony atoms, and flesh out of fleshy, hot things out of hot atoms, and cold things out of cold, black out of black, and white out of white, &c. and nothing out of

[10] On this opinion of Plutarch we have already commented at some length, cap. 4. sect. 12. and our remarks there will show with how much justice it is ascribed to him. At present, I would observe merely, that Plutarch, in his book De Animæ Procreatione ex Timæo, from which the words here censured are extracted, does not bring forward this as his own, but as what he considers to be Plato's doctrine on the soul, as propounded in the Timæus. As to himself, after the manner of the Academics, to which sect he in all probability belonged, he neither altogether rejects it, nor carries his approval so far as to hold it to be unquestionably true. This being the case, the learned Doctor seems here to be somewhat too severe in his invectives against Plutarch.

[1] It is a question of no small importance: Whether any of the ancient philosophers who followed reason for their guide, ever proceeded so far by thinking and reasoning, as to decide that God formed matter or even souls out of nothing. For the better and more convenient discussion of which we intend to collect and examine all that has been advanced by Dr. Cudworth and others on this argument, in a separate Dissertation, to be appended to this section.

nothing, but every thing out of pre-existing familiar atoms. Thus was the sense of Anaxagoras plainly declared by Aristotle,[2] that "because contraries were made out of one another, they were therefore before in-existent. For since every thing must of necessity be made either out of something, or out of nothing, and all physiologers agree that it is impossible for any thing to be made out of nothing; it follows unavoidably, that whatsoever is generated, must be generated out of things pre-existing and inexisting, though by reason of their parvitude, insensible to us; that is, out of similar or homogeneal atoms, of which there are some of all kinds in every thing; every thing being mingled in every thing." Here, therefore, have we the Anaxagorean homœomery, or similar atomology, built upon this principle of reason, as its foundation, that "Nothing can naturally be made or generated out of nothing."

But the Italics or Pythagorics, as well before Anaxagoras, as after him, (with whom also hitherto concurred Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, those atheizers of the Italic physiology) did with much better reason from the same fundamental principle conclude, that since these forms and qualities of bodies were unquestionably generated and corrupted, they were therefore no entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its modifications, but only different dispositions or modifications of the insensible parts thereof, causing in us different phantasms: and this was the first original of the dissimilar atomology. In matter or body therefore, as such, there was nothing else to these philosophers conceivable, but only magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; and these were those few elements, out of which inexisting, and variously combined together, they supposed all those forms and qualities of bodies, (commonly so called) in generations to result, without the production of any new real entity out of nothing. For as out of a few letters in the alphabet of every language, differently placed and combined, do result innumerable syllables, words, and sounds, signifying all the several things in heaven and earth; and sometimes from all the very same letters, neither more nor fewer, but only transposed, are begotten very different phantasms of sounds in us, but without the production of any new

[2] The passage alluded to, which occurs, Natural. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. tom. 1. opp. is deserving of being transcribed in the original, that a more correct opinion may be formed of its meaning: Ἔτι δὲ ἐκ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία· ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα. Εἰ γὰρ πᾶν μὲν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντων, ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, τούτων δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ φύσεως) τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν, ἐξ ὄντων μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεσθαι, διὰ δὲ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναισθήτων ἡμῖν. Διὸ φασὶ πᾶν ἓν παντὶ μεμίχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἐώρων γινόμενον. How much of truth there is in the learned Doctor's corollary from this passage, will be made apparent below, when we come to the discussion of the whole of this question.

real entity out of nothing: in the very same manner, from those fewer letters in the alphabet of the corporeal nature, variously combined, or from the different modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude, of parts, figure, site, and motion, are made up and spelled out all those syllables of things that are in the whole world without the production of any new real entity. Many times the very same numerical matter, neither more nor less only differently modified, causing very different phantasms in us, which are therefore vulgarly supposed to be forms and qualities in the things; as when the same water is successively changed and transformed into vapour, snow, hail, and ice. And to this very purpose is the fore-mentioned similitude elegantly pursued by the Epicurean Poet,* in these following verses:

Quin etiam refert nostris in versibus ipsis,
Cum quibus et quali sint ordine quæque locata.
Namque eadem cœlum, mare, terras, flumina, solem,
Significant, eadem fruges, arbusta, animantes.
Sic ipsis in rebus item jam materiai
Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figuræ,
Cum permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

For were those supposed forms and qualities, produced in generations and alterations, entities really distinct from the substance of matter, or its different modifications, in respect of the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts (there being no such things before inexisting, as Anaxagoras supposed); then would they materially proceed from nothing, which is a thing impossible. And this dissimilar atomology of the ancient Italics, so far as to these material forms and qualities, seems to be undoubtedly the only true physiology; it being built upon this sure principle of reason, that because nothing can give what it hath not, therefore no new substance or real entity can be materially produced in the generations and alterations of nature as such, but only modifications. As when an architect builds a house, or a weaver makes a piece of cloth, there is only a different modification of the pre-existent matter.

This is the first improvement which the ancient Italic philosophers made of this principle, "Nothing can be (physically and materially) generated out of nothing;" or that "No real entity is naturally generated or corrupted;" that therefore the forms and qualities of bodies were no real entities, but only different modifications. But besides this, there was also another thing which these philosophers principally aimed at herein, as a corollary deducible from the same principle concerning souls; that since the souls of animals, especially human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter, and all its modifications (no

* Lib. 2. p. 191. Lamb. [Verse 1012.]

magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, being ever able to beget cogitation or consciousness, much less a power of understanding eternal verities); that therefore these could not be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. Because forms and qualities are continually generated and corrupted, made out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; therefore are they no entities really distinct from matter and its different modifications: but because souls, at least human, are unquestionably entities really distinct from matter and all its modifications, therefore can they not possibly be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same. For if human souls were generated out of matter, then must some real entity be materially produced out of nothing, there being nothing of life and cogitation in matter; which is a thing absolutely impossible. Wherefore, these philosophers concluded concerning souls, that being not generated out of matter, they were insinuated or introduced into bodies in generations. And this was always a great controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists concerning the human soul, as Lucretius expresseth it:[3]

Nata sit, an contra nascentibus insinuetur,

Whether it were made or generated out of matter (that is, indeed out of nothing), or else were θύραθεν, "from without," insinuated into bodies in generations? Which latter opinion of theirs supposes souls as well to have existed before the generations of all animals, as to exist after their deaths and corruptions; there being properly nothing of them generated, but only their union with those particular bodies. So that the generations and corruptions or deaths of animals, according to this hypothesis, are nothing but an anagrammatical transposition of things in the universe, pre and post existent souls being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another. But it doth not therefore follow, because these ancient philosophers held souls to be thus ingenerable, and to have pre-existed before the generation of animals, that therefore they supposed all souls to have existed of themselves from eternity unmade: this being a thing, which was never asserted any more by Theist than Atheist; since even those philosophic Theists, who maintained æternitatem animorum, "the eternity of human minds and souls," together with the worlds, did notwithstanding assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun; as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradiation from an eternal sun. Even Proclus[4] himself, that great champion for the eternity of the world and souls in this very case, when he

[3] Lib. 1. v. 114. p. 48.
[4] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 116

writes against Plutarch's self-existent evil soul, expressly declaring, that *πᾶσα ψυχὴ γέννημά ἐστι τοῦ Θεοῦ*, "there is no self-existent soul;" but every "soul whatsoever is the work, effect and production of God." Wherefore, when they affirmed souls to be ingenerable, their meaning was no more than this, that they were not mere accidental things, as forms and qualities are, nor any more generated out of matter, than matter itself is generated out of something else; upon which account, as Aristotle[5] informs us, souls were called also by them, *ἀρχαὶ*, "principles," as well as matter, they being both of them substances in the universe alike original; that is, neither of them made out of the other.

[5] The passage here meant, if I mistake not, occurs De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 5. tom. 2. opp. and runs as follows: "Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπέβλεψαν, οὗτοι τὸ κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν ψυχήν· ὅσοι δὴ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὴ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν ΤΑΣ ΑΡΧΑΣ, "As many, therefore, as looked to the motion of the thing animated, considered the soul to be pre-eminently adapted for moving: but those who regarded the knowledge and sense of things that are, call the soul *principles*." I have thought proper to transcribe the whole of this passage of Aristotle, in order to be better able to discuss his opinion: for Dr. Cudworth seems to me to err materially in his exposition of it. He supposes the ancient philosophers, whose opinion the Stagirite is here reciting, to have called souls *ἀρχαὶ*, or principles, because they considered them, like matter itself, to be self-existent natures and principles, as it were, of all things. But in addition to that being exceedingly questionable, which the learned Doctor supposes to be certain, that the philosophers to whom Aristotle attributes this sentiment are Pythagoreans, the meaning of those philosophers was very different from this. Aristotle distributes all philosophers, who had expressed an opinion upon the nature of the soul, into two classes, and tells us, that some regarded the motion produced by the soul in the body, and pronounced the soul to be a nature pre-eminent for the faculty of moving; while others attended rather to the sense and knowledge possessed by the soul, and decided it to be *ἀρχαί*. What was strictly meant by these latter is manifest from the words which follow in Aristotle: for he straightway goes on to say: Οἱ *μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες τὰς ἀρχὰς, οἱ δὲ μίαν ταύτην*, "But some make more principles, others this one only." After which, in order to illustrate what he has advanced, he first of all adduces the example of Empedocles, who held the soul to be compounded of all the elements: *Ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων πάντων*· then adds that of Plato, who in his Timæus, he tells us, in like manner made the soul consist of all the elements: *Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ*. In this disputation of Aristotle's, therefore, *στοιχεῖα* and *ἀρχαὶ* have the same signification, and mean those first principles or elements, from which philosophers suppose the whole nature of things to be derived. Such being the case, it appears that those who, according to Aristotle, called the soul *ἀρχαὶ* or principles, taught that the soul is composed of those elements of which universal nature consists. That many of the philosophers of antiquity held this opinion, is known to every one possessing even a moderate acquaintance with these subjects. But inasmuch as they disagreed among each other as to the number, some supposing one, others two, others four principles of things, it followed as a matter of course, that they should be at issue also respecting the nature of the soul and the elements, whether few or more, that it consisted of. That this is the correct interpretation of Aristotle's passage is evident also from his saying that those philosophers who supposed the soul to be *ἀρχαὶ*, fell into this opinion in consequence of their looking rather to the sense and knowledge possessed by the soul, than to its faculty of moving. For Empedocles himself, by whose example the prince of the Peripatetics confirms and illustrates his position, entertained no doubt of knowledge being a kind of sense, and supposed the perception of the mind to arise from its being compounded of all the principles. I have shown this at greater length on cap. 1. where I have attempted to explain Empedocles' philosophy on the soul and the elements of things. And besides Empedocles, many other philosophers of antiquity were unquestionably imbued with the same doctrine.

But they did not suppose them to be ἀγεννήτους, "ingenerate" or "unmade" in the other sense, as if they had been self-originated and independent, as Plutarch's second and third principles, his evil soul, and matter, were by him imagined to be; but so doubtless, as that if the world had had any beginning, they should then have been all created together with it out of nothing pre existing. But as for the perpetual creation of new souls, in the successive generations of animals, this indeed is a thing, which these philosophers were extremely abhorrent from, as thinking it incongruous, that souls, which are in order of nature senior to bodies, should be in order of time juniors to them; as also not reasonable, that divine creation (as it were prostituted) should without end perpetually attend and wait upon natural generations, and be intermingled with them.[6]

[6] It is my intention to explain in the sequel, what I consider to be wanting in this disputation of the learned Doctor's, on the meaning and doctrine of the Italic philosophers. For the present I shall briefly notice the arguments, upon which he considers this sect to have founded their notion, that souls existed from all eternity, or at least before bodies. It might be asked first of all, whether these philosophers really did argue in the way Dr. Cudworth mentions, or he himself supplied them with these reasons from conjecture. Certainly no one of the ancient Pythagoreans is stated in ancient authors to have held such an argument: though of the junior Platonists who affected to follow in the footsteps of Pythagoras, some perhaps may have done so: but I never can persuade myself that all the dogmas of these men were derived from the school of Pythagoras. Dismissing these matters for the present, however, I shall inquire merely into the reasons themselves, which I consider to be exceedingly weak and puerile.

I. "It is absurd," say they, "to suppose that souls, which are prior to bodies in the order of nature, are posterior to them in time." If I rightly comprehend their meaning, "to be prior to any thing in the order of nature" is nothing more than "to have a more excellent nature." Thus man is prior in the order of nature to brute animals, which are also inferior to him in perfection and excellence. But by what arguments it can be proved, that "that which is more excellent must have been created before that which is worse and of an inferior order," I am wholly at a loss to understand. Assuredly no Christian would reason in this manner, as he cannot but be aware, that man, the most excellent animal, was not created till the sixth day, subsequently to the beasts of the field, and all inanimate things. Nor will any philosopher even, who hearkens to reason alone, readily admit the truth of this dogma, since it is manifestly possible from various causes, for a thing which is posterior in nature to be made before another that is greater and more excellent. There is no living and animate body that, in respect to nature, is not much more perfect than those which are inanimate and without life: but who is not aware, that the bodies of men and animals, far superior as they are in virtue and dignity, and at the same time endowed with life and sense, are junior, in point of time, to the metals, iron, silver, gold, to earth, water and infinity of other things, which are lower in the scale of nature, and altogether destitute of life? If, therefore, the proposition, "Whatever is prior in nature must also be prior in time," is to be admitted as true, we shall be driven to the conclusion, that all the bodies of men and animals were created before any matter was in existence.

But II. These philosophers consider it to be "unworthy of God, to be present at all natural generations, and perpetually to wait and attend as it were upon each." But acute and sagacious as they are, they do not perceive the full force of this argument, which may be applied with equal efficacy to the overthrow of their own theory, as to the refutation of those who hold the soul to be created by God at the same time as the body. For they themselves, while maintaining the existence of souls from all eternity, confess, nevertheless, that they are introduced by God into bodies in procreation. They therefore attribute to him the very thing which they pronounce to be foreign to his glory and majesty. For, if this be the case, God is in a certain way present at each

But as for this pre-existence of souls, we have already declared our own sense concerning it, in the first chapter. Though we cannot deny, but that, besides Origen,[7] several others of the ancient fathers before the fifth council, seem either to have espoused it, or at least to have had a favour and kindness for it; insomuch that St. Austin[8] himself is sometimes staggering in this point, and thinks it to be a great secret, whether men's souls existed before their generations or no; and somewhere concludes it to be a matter of indifferency, wherein every one may have his liberty of opining either way without offence. Wherefore, all that can be certainly affirmed in this in this case is, that human souls could not possibly be generated out of matter, but were sometime or other created by God Almighty out of nothing pre-existing, either in generations or before them. Lastly, as for brute animals, we must confess, that if they be not mere machines or automata, as some seem inclinable to believe, but conscious and thinking beings; then from the same principle of reason it will likewise follow, that their souls cannot be generated out of matter neither, and therefore must be derived from the fountain of all life, and created out of nothing by him; who since he can as easily annihilate as create, and does all for the best, no man need at all to trouble himself about their permanency or immortality.

And now have we given a full and particular account of all the several senses, wherein this axiom must be acknowledged to be undeniably true, that "Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," or "come from nothing;" namely, these three. First, that "Nothing, which was not, could ever bring itself into being," or "efficiently produce itself;" or, that "Nothing can possibly be made without an efficient cause." Secondly, that "Nothing, which was not," could be produced, or "brought into being by any other efficient cause, than such as hath at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power." For if any thing were made by that, which hath not equal perfection, then must so much of the effect as transcendeth

natural generation, and, to adopt their own phraseology, waits and attends upon each, in order to insinuate one of the infinite store of souls into the newly generated body. It is needless to notice, that, in reasoning as they do, they imagine to themselves a God not like himself, but resembling rather the kings of the earth, whose personal attention to all matters is supposed to be derogatory to their majesty. If the advocates of this doctrine, therefore, had nothing besides these two arguments to bring forward in support of it, no reasonable man could be expected to listen to them.

[7] See Pet. Dan. Huet, Origenian. lib. 2. quæst. 6. sect. 4. p. 93. who also, sect. 10. p. 97. produces a long list of ancient fathers, who held the same opinion as Origen on this subject. Add Henr. Norisius, in his Vindiciæ Augustianæ, appended to his Historia Pelagiana, cap. 4. sect. 3. p. 101. &c.

[8] Norisius has collected the passages of St. Augustine on this point, in his Vindic. Augustian. cap. 4. p. 101. &c. and at the same time vindicated his memory from this charge of indecision.

the cause, be indeed made without a cause (since nothing can give what it hath not) or be caused by itself, or by nothing. Again, to suppose a thing to be produced by that which hath no sufficient productive power, is really to suppose it also to be produced from itself without a cause, or from nothing. Where it is acknowledged by us, that no natural, imperfect created being can create, or emanatively produce a new substance, which was not before, and give it its whole being. Hitherto is the axiom verified in respect of the efficient cause. But in the third place, it is also true in respect of the material likewise. Not that "nothing could possibly be ever made" by any power whatsoever, but only out of pre-existent matter; and consequently, that matter itself could be never made, but was self-existent. For the falsity of this is sufficiently evident from what hath been already declared concerning human souls, their being undoubtedly substances incorporeal, which therefore could never be generated out of matter; and it will be further manifested afterwards. But the third and last sense is this, that "Nothing, which is materially made out of things pre-existing (as some are) can have any other real entity," than what was either before contained in, or resulteth from the things themselves so modified. Or, that there can be no new entities or substances naturally generated out of matter; and therefore that all natural generations are really nothing else but mixtures, or new modifications of things pre-existing.

These, I say, are all the senses, wherein it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of nothing, or come from nothing; and they may be all reduced to this one general sense, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing causally;" or, that "Nothing cannot cause any thing, either efficiently or materially." Which as it is undeniably true, so is it so far from making any thing against a divine creation, or the existence of a God, that the same may be demonstratively proved, and evinced from it, as shall be showed afterward.

But there is another sense, wherein things may be said to be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or "out of nothing," when those words are not taken causally, but only so as to signify the terminus à quo, or "term from which" they are made, to wit, an antecedent non-existence. And then the meaning of this proposition, that "Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," will be this; that "Nothing, which once was not," could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being. And this is the sense insisted on in this second atheistic argumentation, framed according to the principles of the Democritic or Epicurean atheism; That no real entity, which once was not, could by any power whatsover be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; and consequently, that no creative power out of nothing

can possibly belong to any thing, though supposed never so perfect.

In answer whereunto, we shall perform these two things. First, we shall make it appear, that "Nothing out of nothing," taken in this sense declared, is so far from being a common notion, that it is not at all true. And secondly, we shall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more against atheism, than it doth against theism, and therefore ought by no means to be used by Atheists, as an argument against a Deity. First, therefore, it is unquestionably certain, that this cannot be universally true, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made, or brought out of non-existence into being; because, if it were, then could there be no such thing as making or causing at all; no action nor motion, and consequently no generation nor mutation in the corporeal universe, but the whole world would be like a stiff immoveable adamantine rock: and this would doubtless be a better argument against motion, than any of Zeno's[9] was. But we have all experience within ourselves of a power of producing new cogitations in our own minds, new intellectual and moral habits, as also new local motion in our bodies, or at least new determinations thereof, and of causing thereby new modifications in bodies without us. And therefore are the Atheists forced to restrain the sense of this proposition to substantial things only, that though there may be new accidents and modifications produced out of nothing, yet there can be no new substances made; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reason, why one of those should be in itself more impossible than the other, or why no substance should be makeable. But that some are so staggered with the seeming plausibility of this argument, is chiefly upon these following accounts. First, by reason of the confusion of their own conceptions; for, because it is certain, that "nothing can possibly be made out of nothing," in one sense, to wit, causally; they not distinguishing senses, nor being aware of the equivocation that is in this ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," inadvertently give their assent to those words in a wrong sense; that no substance (as matter) could possibly be brought out of nonexistence into being. Secondly, by reason of their unskilful arguing from artificial things; when, because nothing can be artificially made, but out of pre-existing matter, as a house or garment, and the like (there being nothing done in the production of these things, but only a new modification of what before substantially was) they over-hastily conclude, that no power whatsoever could produce

[9] On Zeno's argument against motion, consult in particular, Pet. Bayle, Dictionnaire Histor. et Critique, tom. 4. art. Zeno, not. E. p. 2909.

any thing otherwise, than out of pre-existing matter, and that matter itself therefore could not possibly be made. In which conceit they are again further confirmed from hence, because the old physiologers maintained the same thing concerning natural generations likewise, that nothing was in them produced ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing" neither; or that there was no new substance or entity made in them really distinct from the pre-existing matter and its modifications; they unwarily extending this beyond the bounds of physics into metaphysics, and unduly measuring or limiting infinite power accordingly. Lastly, because it is undeniably certain concerning ourselves, and all imperfect created beings, that none of these can create any new substance which was not before; men are therefore apt to measure all things by their own scantling, and to suppose it universally impossible, according to human reason, for any power whatsoever thus to create; whence it follows, that theology must in this be acknowledged to be contradictious to the principles of natural light and understanding. But since it is certain, that imperfect created beings can themselves produce some things out of nothing pre-existing, as new cogitations, and new local motion, new modifications and transformations of things corporeal; it is very reasonable to think, that an absolutely perfect Being could do something more, that is, create new substances out of nothing, or give them their whole being. And it may well be thought to be as easy for God, or an omnipotent Being, to make a whole world, matter and all, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," as it is for us to create a thought, or to move a finger, or for the sun to send out rays, or a candle light; or lastly, for any opaque body to produce the image of itself in glasses or water, or to project a shadow; all these imperfect things being but the energies, rays, images, or shadows of the Deity. For a substance, which once was not, to be made by God, or a Being infinitely perfect, this is not for it to be made out of nothing, in the impossible sense, it coming from him who is all. Nor can it be said to be impossible, for anything whatsoever to be made by that, which hath not only infinitely greater perfection, but also a sufficient active power to produce the same, it being substantially emanative. It is true indeed, that infinite power itself cannot do things in their own nature impossible; and this is therefore the only thing which the Atheists have to prove, that it is in itself absolutely impossible for a substance (though not for an accident or modification) to be produced out of non-existence into being. Whereas nothing is in itself absolutely impossible, but what implies a contradiction; and though it be contradictious for a thing to be, and not to be, at the same time; yet is there no manner of contradiction at all in this, for any imperfect contingent being, which before

was not, afterwards to be. Wherefore, this being in itself no way impossible, it must be acknowledged to be a due object of infinite power, or that which may be done by a perfect omnipotent Being existing.

If nothing could be made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," in this latter sense, that is, "Nothing which before was not," afterwards brought into being; then must the reason hereof be, because no substance or real entity can be caused by any other substance, so as to receive and derive its whole being from it: and consequently whatsoever substance or real entity is in the whole world, was not only from eternity without beginning, but also existed of itself necessarily, and independently upon any thing else. But first, it hath been already declared, that it is repugnant to the human faculties, that any temporary successive being whatsoever, or that time itself, should be eternal without beginning, because upon that hypothesis there would always have been an infinity of time past; and if so, then would there of necessity have been time past, which was never present.* But, to make every substantial thing, not only to have existed from eternity without beginning (which yet hath been done by some mistaken Theists), but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its cause, or original, and therefore of itself necessarily; this, I say, is itself to make "Something to come from nothing in the impossible sense," to wit, causally. For as when some Atheists affirm, that "Nothing could ever move itself," and yet suppose notwithstanding, that there hath been motion from all eternity, they plainly make this motion (however supposed to be eternal) to come from nothing in the impossible sense: so, in like manner, they who suppose things to have existed of themselves necessarily, which have no self-existence, and necessary existence contained in their nature (as nothing but a perfect Being hath) do make this necessary existence of such things to have come from nothing. Wherefore though it be certain that something did exist of itself necessarily from all eternity, namely, a perfect Being (whose necessary existence is therefore not from nothing, because essentially included in its own nature) yet is it certain likewise, that there can be but one such thing; necessity of existence being natural and essential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature contingently possible to be or not to be, reason pronounces of them, that they could not exist of themselves necessarily, but were caused by something else; and derived their original from that one absolutely perfect and necessarily existent Being. So that Plato's[10] distinction must needs

* See Enchir. Met. cap. 10.

[10] See the discourse of Socrates in Plato's Phædo, p. 384. 385. Add Plato, De Republica, lib. 4. p. 479. and elsewhere. Where the passage of Aristotle which fol-

be here allowed of betwixt two kinds of beings: Τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ὂν, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, "That which always is, and was never made, nor had beginning;" and Τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε, "That which was made, or had beginning, but never truly is;" it having not a permanent, but successive or flowing duration. Accordingly whereunto, Aristotle also affirmeth, "That there is no necessity all things should be unmade or self-originated; but some things might be made from others unmade."[1]

lows is to be found, I am unable to say, nor do I suppose Dr. Cudworth to have given the words, but only the meaning of the philosopher. Perhaps he had in his mind the following passage, occurring De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 2. p. 674. tom. 1. opp.: Οὔτε πάντων ἐστὶ γένεσις, οὔθ' ἁπλῶς οὐδενός, "Generation is neither of all things, nor simply of nothing."

[1] As the learned Doctor has truly observed, the opponents of God and religion, if they deny creation out of nothing, will be compelled to decide that one substance cannot possibly generate and produce another. Whether at the time in which he wrote any Atheist had publicly avowed this, I am unable to say; but in the very year in which this book of Dr. Cudworth's made its appearance, the posthumous works of Spinoza were also published, in which this man lays down the following among the first principles of his infamous philosophy: "One substance cannot be produced by another substance." See his Ethica More Geometrico Demonstrata, part 1. prop. 6. p. 4. opp. posthumor. Although satisfied of the insane folly of those who hold this doctrine, still I confess my doubts of the aptitude and efficacy of the objections urged against them by our author. The substance of his argumentation, if I mistake not, is this: "If creation out of nothing be disallowed, it will follow that no substance can be generated and produced by another: but this is a downright absurdity; therefore it must be acknowledged that all things were created out of nothing." But to show the absurdity of supposing that no substance can be produced by another, he observes, that if this be true, all substances must be admitted to have existed from an infinite period without any beginning: but that this is impossible from the very nature of things. He therefore assumes a plurality of substances in the world: but Atheists, I imagine, will deny this: at any rate it was denied by Spinoza, who notoriously inculcated, that there is but one substance, and that all the rest of things are modifications of this one.

Dr. Cudworth himself denies bodies to be substances, and grants them to be mere modifications of matter alone; therefore the substances which he assigns to the world will be atoms or parts of matter, spirits and souls, chiefly human. But these men will deny atoms to be substances, and contend that they are merely particles or modifications of matter; and to one word about spirits no Atheist will listen, as he holds them all to be figments of the human brain. There remain therefore souls, on which he pursues the discussion in the following clause, and that too in such a way that many, I suspect, of those who have not entirely bidden adieu to reason will assent to his opinion. I will give a brief digest of his arguments. "Souls," says he, "are either modifications of matter or substances: but to call them modifications of matter is madness: for life and reason cannot be produced from the affection and disposition of matter. They are therefore self-existent natures or substances: but if they are substances and no substance can produce another, it follows that souls have existed of themselves from all eternity: which indeed is grossly absurd: there is of necessity therefore an eternal nature which produced and created all souls: consequently it is manifest that a substance can be produced by a substance." Clear and satisfactory as I allow this reasoning to be to the understanding of most men, still I question whether it will generally convince the Atheists, or even alter the opinion of all those who acknowledge a God, but repudiate creation out of nothing. The Atheists, especially if they be of the more stubborn sort, and have no predilection for the corpuscular philosophy to which Dr. Cudworth is favourable, will persist in contending, however foolishly, that souls are not substances but mere accidents or modifications of a more subtle matter which is unknown to us. Whereas those who grant the existence of a God, but at the same time hold the eternity of matter, some of whom as is well known are to be found

Lastly, we shall disprove the truth of this assertion, that whatsoever substantially and really is, did exist of itself from all eternity unmade, after this manner. Because it would follow from thence, that not only matter, and unqualified atoms (as the Democritic Atheists suppose) but also souls, especially human, must needs have existed of themselves too, from eternity unmade. For as no man can be so sottish as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own soul or mind, and personality to be no real entity, whilst every clod of earth is such; so is it certain, that mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless matter or body, nor result, as a modification thereof, out of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or substance incorporeal; the Democritic Atheists being here grossly deceived in thinking, that because forms and qualities of bodies may be resolved into those forementioned elements of matter, and consequently concluded to be no entities really distinct from the substance thereof, but only different modifications of the same, that therefore the like may be said of souls too, the rational not excepted. Wherefore, if no substance or real entity could ever be brought out of non-existence into being, or be caused by any thing else, then must all human souls and personalities, as well as matter and atoms, have existed not only from eternity, without beginning, but also of themselves independently upon any other thing. But the Atheists are so abhorrent from this eternity of human souls, that they will by no means admit of their post-existence or immortality; they apprehending, that if any living understanding being should prove immortal, they could not sufficiently secure themselves against the possibility and danger of a God. Some Theists indeed have asserted æternitatem animorum, not only the pre-existence, but also the eternity of all human minds, together with the world, as Cicero more than once doth; who

among the Christians themselves, will dispute the logical propriety of concluding from souls to matter. They will maintain that souls are allied to the nature of God, and therefore capable of being produced by him from himself; but that matter being entirely of a different nature, it is utterly unintelligible how God could have created it; that though there is nothing inconsistent with reason in the idea of like producing its like, yet the generation of a nature dissimilar to its cause is wholly incomprehensible. It is to be regretted therefore that the learned Doctor did not discourse more fully upon what properly deserves the name of substance, as well as upon other points involved in this controversy, before he adopted this argument: but it may be stated in his excuse, that at that time Spinoza's doctrine of one substance was little known. I have thought proper to offer these remarks as a caution to any one against the indiscriminate use of this reason in contests with Atheists; in which class there are those against whom all that is here said possesses great force and efficacy; and others again who are to be met upon far different grounds. It is hardly possible to express the pleasure afforded to the enemies of God, and the injury done to the cause of religion, by the rashness and imprudence of those who attack all Atheists, though consisting of various grades, with the same weapons, and rush headlong into the encounter before once thinking of the principles from which the whole disputation can be successfully drawn.

also, in his book of Divination,[2] thus further declares himself concerning it: Animus, quià vixit ab omni æternitate, versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quæ in naturâ rerum sunt, videt, "Our mind, because it hath existed from all eternity, and conversed with innumerable minds, seeth all things that are in nature." And again: Cum animi hominum semper fuerint futurique sint, "Since the minds of men ever were, and ever will be." Nevertheless, none of these ever maintained, that human minds, and their distinct personalities, were thus all, of themselves, independently upon any thing as their cause or original. And, as it was before demonstrated from the nature of knowledge and understanding (it comprehending the possibilities of all things, and therefore supposing infinite power) that there can be but one mind, or understanding Being, self-existent, all minds partaking of that one mind; so is it hardly possible for any one in good earnest to entertain such a conceit as this, that his own particular soul, mind, and personality, and consequently all human souls, though subject to such laws of fate as now they are, did not only pre-exist before their respective bodies, and were from eternity without beginning, but also existed of themselves necessarily and independently upon any thing else. Wherefore, if human souls, minds, and personalities, being unquestionably substantial things and really distinct from matter (which therefore could not possibly be generated out of it) did not all exist from eternity of themselves, necessarily, and independently, it is certain, that they must derive their whole being from the Deity, or be created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," or nonexistence by it. And if human souls were unquestionably thus created, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that matter or body itself was created likewise out of nothing, or caused by the Deity; forasmuch as that which created one thing out of

[2] De Divinatione, lib. 1. cap. 51. p. 3174. tom. 9. opp. But the learned Doctor is mistaken in attributing this opinion to Cicero. For apart from the fact that Cicero, as an Academic, regarded nothing as certain, he is not speaking here in his own person, but introduces his brother Quintus discoursing upon divination. Quintus, however, as he himself confesses, is defending in this book the Stoical doctrine of divination, and therefore sustains the part of a Stoic, but very frequently employs those arguments which were repudiated by the Stoics and admitted by the Platonists alone. And to these arguments of the Platonic school belongs the very one here drawn from the eternity of souls, upon which he mainly relies as demonstrative of what the Stoics called the natural species of divination. Instead of Cicero, therefore, it would have been more correct to have ascribed this opinion to Plato. It is Cicero's habit, let me observe by the way, on almost all occasions to temper the austere discipline of the Stoics with the milder precepts of Plato, and to accommodate to his own arguments doctrines borrowed either from one school or the other. Hence in those places where he is discoursing according to the Platonic sense, he not rarely intermingles some Stoical tenet, and on the other hand when arguing upon Stoical grounds, he very frequently has recourse to the arguments of Plato: a habit which those who do not attend to, are liable to fall into error, and on the authority of Cicero to attribute either to the Stoics or the Platonists what was altogether foreign to the principles of these sects.

nothing could create every thing; and there is really more of substance, that is, a higher degree of entity, in minds and souls, conscious self-moving and understanding beings, than in senseless matter, or inactive bulk.

But forasmuch as this doctrine of a divine creation out of nothing pre-existing lies under no small prejudice upon this account, because it is so generally taken for granted, that none of the pagan Theists, who are supposed to have kept close to the simple light of nature, did ever acknowledge in the Deity any such creative power out of nothing, or that God was the cause of any substance; we must of necessity here declare this, how common soever it be, to be a great mistake. For besides that Plato, in his Sophist,[3] having defined the efficient or effective power in general after this manner: *Ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι*, "to be a power or causality, whereby that which was not before was afterwards made to be;" and then dividing this efficiency into divine and human, he immediately subjoins concerning the former: *Ζῶα δὴ πάντα*, &c. *μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα*, "Shall we not then say, that all animals, and other things, were by the divine efficiency alone, after they had not been made to be?" Where thus much at least is certain, that Plato did not at all question the possibility of a thing's being made out of nothing in this sense; that is, brought into being, after it had not been, by a divine power. But because it may be thought, that he meant this no further, than of the first compages of animals, in which notwithstanding every thing, souls and all, might be made out of pre-existing matter; we shall here further add, what in his Timæus[4] he declareth concerning the soul: *Τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄρξασθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρου εἴασεν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότην καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἄρξομένου συνεστήσατο*, "That God did not make it after body, and junior to it; since it was not fit that the elder should be ruled or governed by the younger; but he made soul before body, older than it, and superior to it, as well in respect of time, as dignity." Which notion is further pursued by him in his tenth De Legibus:[5] *Ὀρθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατα τε καὶ τελεώτατα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἦμεν, ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν· σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον*

[3] P. 168. opp. edit. Ficini. On this and the other passages of the ancients here quoted we shall comment below.

[4] P. 528. opp. In this passage, however, he is treating of the soul of the world and not of souls universally.

[5] Page 669.

ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν, "Wherefore, it was rightly, properly, and most truly affirmed by us, that soul was made first, as that which ruleth; but body afterward, as that which is to be ruled and governed thereby." From whence also he draws this consectary: Ὡς εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος· ὅσα καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα· τρόποι καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι, πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος, "That if the soul be older than the body, then must the things of the soul also be older than those of the body; and therefore cogitation, and the several species of it, must be, in order of nature, not only before local motion, but also before longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies." From whence it is plain, that Plato's first γένεσις, or production of souls by God, could not be out of any pre-existing body or matter, they being affirmed by him to be before, not only this and that particular body, but all body whatsoever, before longitude, latitude, and profundity. Which may be further confirmed from hence, because in his Sophist[6] he plainly condemns that opinion of some, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν σῶμά τι κέκτῆσθαι, "that the soul itself had something of body in it;" and he often elsewhere declares the soul to be incorporeal. It is certain also, that not only Plato, but all those other pagan philosophers too, who asserted the incorporeity and immortality of human souls, could not possibly conceive souls to have been made out of pre-existent matter, but either ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," they being not eternal, but having a newness of being, (as Plato himself seemed to suppose;) or else if they were conceived to be eternal by them, (which was the opinion of most of the junior Platonists, yet) to have derived their whole substance from the Deity, and always to depend upon it; as eternal light would depend upon an eternal sun. Plutarch and his followers, being only here to be excepted, who would neither have souls made out of nothing by God, nor yet out of corporeal matter pre-existing, (they being themselves incorporeal;) but out of a strange commixture of the substance of God himself with the substance of a certain disorderly soul, self-existent and uncreated; of which we have spoken already. But that the genuine Platonists did universally suppose that one substance might be caused by another, and derive its whole being from it, is undeniably evident from hence, because their second divine hypostasis or substance, (though eternal) was according to them derived from or begotten by their first, and their third hypostasis or substance produced both from the first and second; and other inferior orbs of being, as the particular

[6] Page 170.

souls of demons and men, from that whole trinity of divine hypostases jointly concurring. And as for matter or body itself, it is certain also that Proclus and other Platonists expressly denied it to have been ἀγέννητον, "unmade" or "self-existent," and conceived it to have derived its whole being from the Deity; who accordingly is styled by Proclus,[7] ἄῤῥητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, "the ineffable cause of matter." In like manner have we already shown, that, according to the Chaldee oracles, matter itself was also caused or produced by the Deity, to which purpose is this verse cited by Proclus:[8] Ἔνθεν ἄδην ἅρώσκει γένεσις πολυποικίλου ὕλης, "From whence (that is, from the Deity) abundantly springs forth the generation of the multiform matter." The metre here requiring that it should be read ἄδην, and not ἄρδην, as it is in Proclus' copy. Moreover, Jamblichus hath recorded in his Mysteries,[9] that Hermes, and the old Egyptian theologers likewise, held matter not to be ἀγέννητον, that is "self-existent, unmade," or "underived" from the Deity, but to have been caused by it.*. Whence does Proclus[10] conclude it probable, that Plato was of the same persuasion also; as likewise Orpheus before had been, he deriving this, as is supposed, with other things, from the Egyptians. It is true indeed, that many of these philosophers asserted matter, souls, and the whole world, to have been eternal without beginning, and consequently not created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, in that stricter sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence in time. Notwithstanding which, they did suppose them to have received their whole being from the Deity, and to have depended on it every jot as much, as if, having once not been, they had afterward been made by it. And that which gives to any substance its whole being, though from eternity, so that it never was not; the same upon supposition, that it once had not been, could unquestionably have produced it, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," or an antecedent non-existence.[1]

We have now sufficiently disproved the truth of that assertion, that "Nothing could be made out of nothing," in the atheistic

[7] Comment. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 116.

[8] Ibid. p. 118. This verse is extant in the Oracles of Zoroaster, as they are now edited, v. 15. p. 370. in the fourth book of Stanley's Philosophia Orientalis, appended to Le Clerc's Pneumatologia, and is emended from Proclus in the way proposed by Dr. Cudworth. We shall inquire into its sense below.

[9] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 5. cap. 23. p. 138. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159.

* Thus Hierocles in Photius: Δημιουργὸν θεὸν προϋφίστησιν ὁ Πλάτων πάσης ἐμφανοῦς τε καὶ ἀφανοῦς διακοσμήσεως ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋποκειμένου γεγενημένης, &c., Plato censuit mundum à Deo ex nullâ priùs existente materiâ productum, &c.

[10] Comm. in Timæum Plat. lib. 2. On this subject we have already spoken elsewhere. The junior Platonists were anxious to avoid all appearance of dissent from their master. Hence, not only Proclus, but Chalcidius and others as well, spare no efforts to make it appear that Plato held the same doctrine as themselves on the eternity of the world.

[1] On all these matters we shall treat expressly below.

sense thereof, viz. that "Nothing, which before was not, could afterwards possibly be made to be:" though this should not be extended so far, as to accidental things and modifications, but restrained and confined only to substantials; "That no substance whatever could have a newness of being, or be caused by any other substance:" but whatsoever substantial thing any where is in the world, the same did exist of itself from eternity, and independently upon any thing else; nothing but different modifications being made or produced. Which same assertion has been also sometimes otherwise thus expressed: "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing substance;" the meaning hereof being this, that nothing can be made but new accidental modifications of what before substantially was; no substance itself being makeable or producible by any other substance, neither in time, (so as to have a newness or beginning of being) nor yet from eternity. Where the Atheists and some others taking it for granted that there is no other substance besides body, or matter, do further limit and restrain the sense of that proposition in this manner: "Nothing can be made but out of pre-existing matter;" that is, nothing can be made but out of corporeal substance pre-existing. An idolum specus[a] (if I may use that language) which in all probability had its first original chiefly from men's measuring the extent of all power by their production of artificial things. Because forsooth, a carpenter or architect cannot make a house but out of pre-existing timber, bricks, and stones; nor a tailor a garment, but out of pre-existing cloth; nor a cook, puddings or pies, but out of pre-existing materials or ingredients; that therefore no power whatsoever, no, not that of God Almighty, can extend any further, than to the new-modifying of pre-existent matter, but not to the production or causing of any substance. We shall in the next place make it appear, that were this assertion true, That no substance or real entity, which once was not, could be caused or produced, yet would it notwithstanding, of the two, more impugn atheism, than theism (it being possible for falsehoods, though not for truths, to disagree) forasmuch as the Atheists do bring more out of nothing, or non-existence, than the Theists do; and therefore ought not to make this an objection against theism. For though, according to the true and genuine theology, God, or a perfect Being, be supposed to be the only necessary self-existent thing, and the cause of all other substance, and consequently to have produced all imperfect things, not only souls, but also matter itself, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of nothing," or an antecedent non-existence; yet is there, by reason of the weakness of human understandings, a

[a] Lord Bacon it is well known, applied this appellation to a certain class of popular opinions.

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latitude in theism. Wherefore some there are, who though imposed upon by that "idolum specus," or imprisoned in it, That "nothing can possibly be made but out of pre-existing matter," by the new modification thereof; do notwithstanding devoutly worship a Deity, according to their notion of it, a perfectly understanding Being unmade; though not the creator of matter, yet the maker of the whole world out of it, and the supreme governor of the same; they thus supposing two principles in the universe, an active and a passive one, God and Matter.[3] Besides which, it is not impossible for others to think, that though matter or body be not the only substance, but human souls are incorporeal, yet the substance of these souls was not created out of nothing, no more than that of body, but they were made either out of some pre-existing common soul, (as their intelligible matter) or out of the substance of the Deity itself; or else existed of themselves from eternity unmade: and yet nevertheless may these acknowledge one supreme understanding Being self-existent also, though neither the creator of matter, nor of souls, yet the supreme governor and orderer of all. And it is certain that Plutarch's God was no better than than this; and yet was that Pagan notwithstanding, a devout religionist in his kind, as well as a hearty moralist. And such a theism or theology, as either of those forementioned, (though not genuine and sincere, but imperfect and mongrel things) would perhaps be to the Atheists little less troublesome and uneasy, than the truth. Thus have we shown that this principle, "That nothing can come out of nothing," or be made, otherwise than out of pre-existing substance or matter, though it be indeed contradictious to the true and genuine theology, yet is it not absolutely inconsistent with all manner of religion; there being certain spurious or imperfect forms of theism built upon this foundation. But now, on the contrary, we shall make it manifest, that this very principle made use of by the Atheists, is in truth and reality contradictious to all manner of atheism, and destructive of the same; the Atheists universally generating and corrupting real entities and substantial things, that is, producing them out of nothing, or non-existence, and reducing them to nothing again: forasmuch as they make all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted, (which to them is either no determinate thing, or else nothing but mere bulk, or resisting and divisible magnitude) to come out of nothing, and to go to nothing. Thus does Aristotle,[4] in a place before cited, declare the atheistic sense:

[3] Among whom are to be reckoned not a few of the later Christians, and especially of those who subject all religion to the empire of reason. But as will be shown below, even the earlier church was not altogether free from such men.

[4] De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 668. tom. 1. opp. But I am almost convinced that this passage of Aristotle is but little calculated either to adorn or strengthen the cause

Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἳ φασιν οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, "There are certain men who affirm that nothing is unmade, but all things generated or made." Whose

here maintained by Dr. Cudworth. To enable the reader to form a more correct opinion upon the question, I shall transcribe the entire passage. Thus then, the chief of the Peripatetics: Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἳ φασιν οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι· γενόμενα δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἀφθαρτα διαμένειν, τὰ δὲ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι· μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον· εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες· οἱ δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαί τε φασὶ καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν· ἓν δέ τε μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὅπερ ἐοίκασι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφήσιος, "There are some who affirm that nothing is unmade, but that all things are made or generated: and that of things generated, some remain uncorrupted, others are corrupted. So especially Hesiod, and after him the first physiologists. Others assert that all the rest of things are generated and flow, and none of them is firm and stable; but that one alone is permanent, out of which all the others are produced by transformations: which seems to be what Heraclitus, the Ephesian, as well as many others, meant to say." In this passage, it is evident that Aristotle speaks of two opinions of the ancients, on the generation and origin of all things, although he is not sufficiently clear in his distinction of them, or so apt in the choice of his terms, as became a philosopher whose object was the instruction of others. One he states to be the opinion of those who hold that all things are generated, and that of these some are permanent and others corrupted. It would have been difficult at this day to ascertain from his words the nature of this dogma, if he had not declared it by adducing the example of Hesiod. Now Hesiod, as is manifest from his Theogony, supposed that all things were generated from Chaos and Night, not excepting even the gods, but that the gods, though produced in the same way as all other things, are immortal, and never perish. It appears, therefore, that the first class here introduced by Aristotle, are those who formerly believed not only the principles and elements of things and everything compounded of them, but the whole race of the gods also, to be the offspring of Chaos, and nevertheless, invested the gods with immortality. Those who in time past entertained this most foolish and absurd opinion, or who entertain it at the present day (for the sect is not wholly extinct, but still lingers among the Japanese, Chinese, and other Eastern nations) however religious and pious they may wish to appear, are in reality Atheists, and utterly subvert the first principles of all true religion. The other class mentioned by Aristotle consists of those who imagine one stable, constant, and eternal nature, whose various modifications produce all the rest of things, which possess no stability, but perpetually flow, or are generated, changed and finally dissolved. Among these he reckons Heraclitus, the Ephesian. The nature of this doctrine is less difficult to understand. They suppose namely that the only substance in existence is matter, and that probably animate, and that all other things that are produced are nothing more than its various dispositions and modifications. On the whole, this theory does not appear to vary very materially from the one either invented or revived in the last century by Spinoza. But it differs from Hesiod's opinion in two respects. For in the first place, Hesiod supposes the elements of all things to have been intermixed formerly with each other, and afterwards at some finite time, and by some undefined process, disjoined and separated; but the others repudiate this chaos, and acknowledge only one simple and stable matter, which transformed itself into a thousand shapes from all eternity. Again, Hesiod considers that a portion of generated things are permanent, and return not again to their original elements; whereas, these assert all things to flow, and whatever is generated to be also doomed to corruption. But whether or not besides this one matter, from which they educed all things, they held the existence of a certain mind, controlling the motions of matter and presiding over the universe, is neither intimated here by Aristotle, nor is the present an opportunity for us to inquire. On Heraclitus' philosophy we have offered some remarks above, chap. 4. Having illustrated and explained this somewhat obscure passage of Aristotle, which I think will not be altogether an unprofitable labour, we shall have little difficulty in showing in what respects the learned Doctor has here displayed less than his usual sagacity. I. First of all, he is mistaken in confounding these two opinions, which Aristotle speaks of as distinct, with each other and supposing that the

sense is afterwards more distinctly thus proposed by him: Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν· ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν, "That all other things are generated and flow, and none of them firmly is, (they being perpetually educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing) but that there is only one thing, which remaineth; namely, that out of which all the other are made, by the transformation thereof." Which one thing (to wit, matter) as the same Aristotle further adds, they affirmed to be the only substance, and from eternity unmade; but all other things whatsoever, being but πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθ οεις, "passions, affections, and dispositions" thereof, γίγνεσθαι κα. φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις, "to be generated and corrupted infinitely; that is, to be produced out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduced again to nothing without end. And doubtless this is the true meaning of that passage in Plato's tenth De Legibus,[5] not understood by the Latin interpreters;

latter words, which treat of a widely different doctrine, are a mere explication of the former. II. Aristotle ascribes neither opinion to Atheists. The former one, namely, that of Hesiod, is hostile to all true religion, as we have already acknowledged, although Aristotle does not by any means say so: and yet Dr. Cudworth himself defends Hesiod in other places, and supposes him to have delighted in the notion of a supreme Being. The other dogma, foul and deformed though it be, and connected with inferences highly injurious to God, is not of that wicked character that none but an Atheist and contemner of God can entertain it: nay, he himself contends in other places, that Heraclitus ought to be ranked among the less genuine Theists. To state my own candid opinion, Dr. Cudworth seems to have been unwilling to quote the entire passage of Aristotle, lest the names of Heraclitus and Hesiod, to whose reputation he is a well-wisher, should interfere with his present purpose. For he wishes to make it appear that Aristotle is recounting the opinions of Atheists in that passage. III. The remark which follows, that those who are stated to have acknowledged but one immutable nature, believed all the rest of things to be its πάθη, ἕξεις and διαθέσεις, "passions, affections," and "dispositions," and so on, is not borrowed from Aristotle, who has nothing of the kind in the part quoted, but added in explanation by himself. IV. If Aristotle were recording no other opinion than that of downright Atheists alone, still the passage would be of little or no importance as respects the design of our author, who is bent upon proving the doctrine of atheism to be wholly indefensible, except upon the admission that "something can come out of nothing." But this is by no means evident from the fact that they refer all things to matter. By the laws of consecutive reasoning indeed, such an inference may be deduced from it, and is clearly so deduced by the learned Doctor afterwards; but this passage, were it even such as he describes it, does not in the least facilitate this conclusion, which depends upon reason alone, and upon no authority, either of Aristotle or any one else. There is no one who holds the memory and character of this great man in higher estimation than myself, but where I find him betraying proofs of human infirmity, I should deem it an abandonment of my own duty to suffer others to be misled by them.

[5] P. 665. opp. But here again I have a few remarks to offer. It is certain that Plato is here treating of the opinion of Atheists and the enemies of all piety and religion: which is abundantly evident from his succeeding words. But, I. I cannot see the reason why this passage has been appealed to: for as far as I have the faculty of judging, it is not of the slightest use towards explaining the opinion of Atheists. Every body well knows, without requiring to be told so by Plato, that they all entertain the hypothesis here ascribed to them; nor, unless absolutely insane, can they possibly entertain any other. Whoever repudiates God, must necessarily come down to the opinion that nature, chance and art are the efficient causes of things; although they

where being to represent the atheistic hypothesis of the system of the universe, he discovereth their grand arcanum, and that, which they accounted, *σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων*, "the wisest and most mysterious of all doctrines," after this manner: *Λέγουσι ποῦ τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα καὶ γενόμενα, καὶ γεννησόμενα· τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχης*, "Certain men affirm, that all things are made, and have been made, and will be made; some by nature, and some by art, and some by fortune or chance." For unquestionably here, Plato's, *Λέγουσι ποῦ τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα γιγνόμενα*, "Certain men affirm, that all things are generated or made," &c. is the very same with Aristotle's, *Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες, οἵ φασιν, οὐδὲν ἀγέννητον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι*, "Certain men affirm, that there is nothing unmade, but that all things are made or generated." And perhaps this of Aristotle's was

are not obliged to adopt the same method of explaining it. II. What the learned Doctor means by saying, that the Latin interpreters of Plato have not understood this passage, I know not; certainly the words are so plain and intelligible, that no person even moderately versed in the Greek language can easily make a mistake in translating them. I cannot say how Serranus may have rendered it, as at present I have not his version at hand; but the interpretation of Ficinus very closely resembles his own: Res omnes, nonnulli aiunt, quæ fiunt, quæ futuræ, quæque factæ sunt, vel natura, vel fortuna, vel arte fieri, "Some say, that all things, which are made, and will be made, and have been made, are made either by nature, or by chance, or by art." III. That these words of Plato express the same sentiment as is contained in the passage adduced from Aristotle, would never have been stated by the learned Doctor, had he carefully inspected both at the time. Aristotle, as we have clearly shown before, is glancing at the opinion of Hesiod and the ancient physiologers, who foolishly imagined the whole nature of things, not even the gods excepted, to be the offspring of Chaos; whereas, according to the testimony of Plato himself, those who are represented as believing all things to have been generated by nature, chance and art, were far from entertaining this opinion. For they affirmed, that the four elements, fire, water, earth, air, exist by "nature and chance:" *Πῦρ, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ γῆν, καὶ ἀέρα, φύσει πάντα εἶναι, καὶ τύχῃ φασί*, ibid. p. 666. In associating *τύχη* and *φύσις*, and making these the causes of the four elements, which constitute all things, they seem to have meant, that *φύσει*, or by nature, there existed from all eternity a rude and undigested mass or chaos; and that it was brought to pass *τύχῃ*, or by chance, or it fortuitously happened, that things which before lay in confusion and disorder were separated, and each assigned its own fit and suitable place. Those who suppose that chaos formerly existed, and that God took no part in disposing it, cannot help entertaining this idea of the origin of the world. They ascribed the subsequent construction and fabrication of all other natural bodies, the sun, moon, men, animals, to *τύχη* or chance, and excluded God from the work altogether: *Οὕτω γεγενῆκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανὸν, καὶ ζῶα, καὶ φυτὰ ..... οὐ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ φύσει καὶ τύχῃ*, "That in this manner the entire heaven, and all things that are in it, as also animals and plants ..... were produced; not by art, but by nature and chance." Where, let it be observed, the word *οὐρανὸς* signifies the whole universe of things, a sense in which it is often used by Plato and Aristotle. What things they referred to art, is self-evident. So far there seems to be no great disparity between the doctrines of Hesiod and the Atheists reprehended by Plato; but as respects the gods they are manifestly different. For Hesiod believed in the existence of gods, produced like the rest of things from chaos, and lasting to infinity; whereas nothing of the kind was assented to by the Atheists of Plato, who asserted that all gods are introduced by art and laws, that is, they denied their existence altogether: *Θεοὺς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτον φασὶν οὗτοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ τίσι νόμοις*, "They assert, my friend, that the gods exist not by nature, but only by art and certain laws."

taken out of that of Plato's: which yet nevertheless is so to be understood, as it is afterwards explained by Aristotle; all things whatsoever, the bare substance of matter only excepted. Wherefore it is certain, that either there is no real entity in the whole world, besides the bare substance of matter; that is, besides divisible and separable extension, or resisting magnitude, and consequently that life and cogitation, sense and consciousness, reason and understanding, all our own minds, and personalities, are no real entities; or else that there are, according to the atheistic hypothesis, real entities produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Whereas Theists suppose all the greatest perfections in the universe, as life and understanding, to have been eternal and unmade in a perfect Being, the Deity, and neither brought out of nothing or non-existence, nor reducible to nothing; only imperfect beings to have been made out of nothing, or produced out of non-existtence, by this one perfect Being or Deity: the Atheists, on the contrary, supposing the lowest and most imperfect of all beings, matter, bulk, or divisible and resisting extension, to be the only self-existent and unmade thing, conclude all the greatest perfections in the universe, life, cogitation and understanding, to be made out of nothing or non-existence, as also to be reduced to nothing again. Indeed the hylozoic Atheists, being sensible somewhat of this inconvenience of making all life and understanding out of nothing, and that there must of necessity be some fundamental life and perception, which is not accidental but substantial, and which was never generated, and cannot be corrupted, have therefore attributed a kind of life and perception to all matter, as such. Notwithstanding which, even these also, forasmuch as they deny to matter animal sense and consciousness, suppose all animal life or sense, and conscious understanding, to be generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Neither can life, cogitation, and understanding, be reckoned amongst the modes of matter, that is, of magnitude, or divisible and antitypous extension, since they may be conceived without the same; whereas modes cannot be conceived without their substance. Standing, sitting, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body, and that fitly organized too; and therefore are they nothing but different modes of such a body. When that human body, which before did stand, doth afterwards sit, or walk, no man can think, that here is the miraculous production of any new real entity out of nothing; nor when the same matter, which was square or cubical, is made spherical or cylindrical. But when there is life and understanding, which was not before, then is there unquestionably a new real entity produced. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves, according to the tenor of the atomic physiology, acknowledge no other modes of matter or body, but only more

or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. And upon this very account do they explode qualities, considered as entities really distinct from these modes; because, in the generation and alteration of them, there would be real entities made out of nothing, or without a cause; whereupon they resolve these qualities into mechanism and fancy. But life, cogitation and understanding, are things which have more real entity in them, and can no way be solved by mechanism and fancy; wherefore undoubtedly they are no modes of matter or body, but attributes of another kind of substance incorporeal. All cogitative beings, especially human souls, and personalities, are unquestionably substantial things; and yet do the Atheists bring these, and consequently themselves out of nothing, or non-existence, and reduce them to nothing again. The conclusion is, that these very Atheists, who contend against Theists, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," do themselves bring all things out of nothing or non-existence, and perpetually reduce them to nothing again; according to whose principles, as once there was no life nor understanding at all in the universe, so may there be none again. They who deny a God, because there can be no creative power belonging to any thing, do themselves notwithstanding attribute to matter (though a mere passive, sluggish, and inactive thing) a creative power of things substantial (as human souls and personalities) out of nothing. And thus is that formidable argument of the Atheists, that there can be no God, because nothing can be made out of nothing, not only proved to be false, but also retorted upon these Atheists themselves, they bringing all things besides senseless and unqualified matter out of nothing.

We have now declared, first, in what sense this proposition is unquestionably true, that nothing can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing, viz. causally, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be made without a cause, and a sufficient cause. Or more particularly these three ways; first, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be brought into being by itself, or without an efficient cause. Secondly, that nothing, which once was not, could be made or produced efficiently by any thing, which had not at least equal perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive power; and consequently that no new substance can be made, but by a perfect Being, which only is substantially emanative. Thirdly and lastly, that when things are made out of pre-existing matter, as in artificial productions and natural generations, there can be no new real entity produced, but only different modifications of what before substantially was; the material cause, as such, efficiently producing nothing. And thus was this axiom understood by Cicero, that "Nothing could be made out of nothing," viz. causally, in

his book De Fato,[6] where he reprehendeth Epicurus for endeavouring to avoid fate, and to establish liberty of will by that absurd figment of atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular. Nec cum hæc ita sint, est causa, cur Epicurus fatum extimescat, et ab atomis petat præsidium, easque de via deducat; et uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles, unam, ut sine causâ fiat aliquid, ex quo existit, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipsi, nec cuiquam physico placet, "Nor is there for all that any reason, why Epicurus should be so much afraid of fate, and seek refuge in atoms, he supposing them, in their infinite descents, to decline uncertainly from the perpendicular, and laying this as a foundation for liberty of will; whereby he plunged himself at once into two inextricable difficulties, the first whereof was the supposing of something to be made without a cause, or, which is all one, out of nothing; a thing, that will neither be allowed by any physiologer, nor could Epicurus himself be pleased or satisfied therewith." The reason whereof is, because it was a fundamental principle of the atomic philosophy, that "Nothing (in this sense) could be made out of nothing." Moreover, we have in the next place declared, in what other sense this proposition, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing," is false, namely, when this "out of nothing" is not taken causally, but so as to signify the terminus from which; that nothing can be made out of an antecedent non-existence: that no real entity or substance, which before was not, could by any power whatsoever be afterwards brought into being: or, that nothing can possibly be made, but out of something pre-existing, by the new modification thereof. And it appears from that of Cicero, that the true and genuine sense of this proposition, De nihilo nihil fit (according to the mind of those ancient physiologers, who laid so great stress thereupon), was not, that nothing could by any power whatsoever be brought out of non-existence into being; but only, that "nothing could be made without a cause." Nor did they here by "cause" mean the material only, in this sense, as if nothing could possibly be made, but out of pre-existing matter; Epicurus being taxed by Cicero for introducing that his third motion of atoms, or clinamen principiorum,[7] out of nothing, or without an efficient cause; as indeed all motion also was, to those atomic Atheists, in this sense, from nothing.[8] Neverthe-

[6] Cap. 9. 3273. tom. 9. opp.

[7] Vid. Lucret. De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. vers. 292. p. 216.

[8] If I am not much mistaken, Dr. Cudworth deduces more from this passage than the legitimate rules of consecution will permit. For he supposes it to prove, I. That according to the ancient physiologers, the proposition, "Nothing out of nothing," meant only, that "nothing is made without a cause." But though it is plain enough from these words, that they did sometimes attach such a sense to it, still it is not equally clear that they never understood it in any other. II. It is apparent, he thinks, from the same passage, that by the word *cause* they did not always mean matter only;

less, we have also showed, that if this proposition, "Nothing out of nothing," in that atheistic sense (as levelled against a Deity) were true; yet would it of the two more impugn atheism itself, than it does theism; the Atheists generating and corrupting all things, the substance of matter only excepted, all life, sense and understanding, human souls, minds and personalities, they producing these, and consequently themselves, out of nothing, and resolving them all to nothing again. We shall now, in the third and last place, make it manifest, that the Atheists do not only bring real entities, and substantial things, out of nothing in the second sense, that is, out of an antecedent non-existence (which yet is a thing possible only to God, or a perfect Being), but also that they bring them out of nothing in the absolutely impossible sense; that is, suppose them to be made without a cause, or "nothing to be the cause of something."

But we must prepare the way hereunto, by setting down, first, a brief and compendious sum of the whole atheistic hypothesis. The Atheists therefore, who contend, that nothing can be made, but only new accidents, or modifications of pre-existing substance; taking it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do conclude accordingly, that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter or body. And then they add hereunto, that matter being the only substance, the only unmade self-existent thing, whatsoever else is in the world, besides the bare substance of this matter, was made out of it, or produced by it. So that there are these three things contained in the atheistic hypothesis; First, that no substance can be made or caused by any thing else, but only new modifications. Secondly, that matter or body is the only substance; and therefore whatsoever is made, is made out of pre-existing matter. Thirdly and lastly, that whatsover there is else in the whole world, besides the substance of matter, it is made or generated out of matter. And now we shall demonstrate the absolute impossibility of this atheistic hypothesis, from that very principle of the ancient physiologers, that "nothing can be made out of nothing," in the true sense thereof; it not only bringing real entities, and substantial things, out of an antecedent non-existence (though nothing but an infinitely perfect Being neither can thus create), but also producing them without a cause.

since Cicero finds fault with Epicurus for having introduced a third kind of motion produced without any cause. But I am utterly unable to perceive the force of this reasoning: Cicero reprehends Epicurus, because, while acknowledging the truth of the axiom, "From nothing comes nothing," he at the same time feigned a sort of motion without a cause; and consequently offended against his own precepts, or educed something out of nothing: therefore the ancient physiologers believed in another cause of things besides matter. For Cicero does not say what kind of cause Epicurus ought to assign of this motion in accordance with their system, but simply complains that he has assigned no cause of it at all.

First, therefore, when they affirm matter to be the only substance, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly suppose all things to be made without an efficient cause, which is to bring them out of nothing, in an impossible sense. For though it be not true, that nothing can be made, but out of pre-existing matter (and consequently that God himself, supposed to exist, could in this respect do no more than a carpenter or tailor doth); I say, though it be not universally true, that every thing, that is made, must have a material cause (so that the quaternio of causes in logic is not to be extended to all things caused whatsoever), yet is it certain, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made without an efficient cause. Wherefore, if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity, besides matter, be some other substance existing, as the efficient cause thereof; forasmuch as matter alone could not make any thing; as marble cannot make a statue, nor timber and stones a house, nor cloth a garment. This is our first demonstration of the impossibility of the atheistic hypothesis; it supposing all things, besides the bare substance of matter, to be made out of matter alone, without any other active principle or deity, or to be made without an efficient cause; which is to bring them from nothing in an impossible sense. To which may be added, by way of appendix, that whereas the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists admit of no other efficient causality in nature, than only local motion, and allow to matter or body, their only substance, no self-moving power, they hereby make all the motion that is in the whole world, to be without a cause and from nothing, action without any subject or agent, and the efficiency of all things without an efficient.

In the next place, should we be so liberal, as to grant to the atomic Atheists motion without a cause, or permit Strato and the hylozoic Atheists to attribute to matter a self-moving power; yet do we affirm, that this matter and motion both together could not possibly produce any new real entity, which was not before; matter, as such, efficiently causing nothing, and motion only changing the modifications of matter, as figure, place, site, and disposition of parts. Wherefore, if matter, as such, have no animal sense and conscious understanding, essentially belonging to it (which no Atheists as yet have had the impudence to assert); then can no motion or modification of matter, no contexture of atoms, possibly beget sense and understanding, soul and mind; because this would be to bring something out of nothing, in the impossible sense, or to suppose something to be made by itself without a cause. Which may serve also for a confutation of those imperfect and spurious Theists, who will not allow to God Almighty (whether supposed by them to be

corporeal or incorporeal) a power of making any thing, but only out of pre-existent matter, by the new modifying thereof; as a carpenter makes a house out of pre-existing timber and stone, and a tailor a garment out of pre-existing cloth. For since animal life and understanding are not by them supposed to belong at all to matter, as such; and since they cannot result from any modifications, or contextures thereof, it would plainly follow from hence, that God could not possibly make animals, or produce sense and understanding, souls and minds, which nevertheless these Theists suppose him to have done; and therefore ought in reason to acknowledge him, not only to be the maker of new modifications of matter (and one, who built the world only as a carpenter doth a house) but also of real entities distinct from the same.[9]

And this was the very doctrine (as we have already declared) of the most ancient atomic physiologers: not that "every thing whatsoever might be made out of pre-existing matter;" but, on

[9] Great as is the force of this reasoning against those who hold the Deity to be incapable of producing any thing without matter, and on that account imagine two principles of things, God and eternal matter; still, if I am not mistaken, it will not effectually silence the whole race. I fear they will yet find some outlet for escape, and require to be met by an entirely new line of argument. They will assert, perhaps, that animal life consists in the motion of the blood and of the most subtle particles of matter; and will refer the origin of souls to a different source. Some of them will maintain, perhaps, that they are formed by God out of a certain celestial and ethereal matter, or out of the most subtle and attenuated particles: nor will they be at any loss for supporters of this opinion, either among ancient or modern philosophers. Indeed, it has long ago appeared very doubtful to me, whether any ancient philosopher ever entertained the same idea of souls as we do at the present day, and entirely divested them of all matter. If this opinion should be met by the learned Doctor's observation, that thought and understanding cannot result from any modification and contexture of matter; they will grant this to be true of that grosser matter we are acquainted with, but will insist that there is nothing to prevent the existence of other matter, endowed with far different affections and properties. Should any one proceed further, and remind them that this opinion goes to overthrow the immortality of souls, since whatever consists of matter can also be dissolved and perish, not even then will they acknowledge themselves vanquished. They will probably espouse the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who supposed two kinds of matter; one of a grosser nature and dissolvable from various causes; the other more subtle, and capable of being destroyed by divine power alone. Some, perhaps, will argue, that the immortality of souls depends not upon their own nature but upon the divine will; for that God is able to prevent the dissolution and annihilation of that which is otherwise destructible; an opinion well known to be held at this day by not a few even of those who are neither deficient in intellectual acumen, nor ill-affected towards God and religion. Others possibly will attempt to evade the argument by saying that souls are effluxions from the divine nature itself, and certain portions as it were of the supreme Being, having nothing in common with matter. In throwing out these suggestions, I have not the slightest intention of giving any support to the cause of those who contend for the eternity of matter; foreign as this would be to my duty, and altogether inconsistent with the sentiments of my own mind; since I shall hereafter prove these persons to be deaf to the voice both of reason and divine revelation. My object has been simply to show, that this argument is not of itself sufficient to put down the whole sect, so as to leave them without the means of further opposition. It is, I consider, much to the interests of Christianity, that its defenders should display no less caution than firmness in the contest, and should not make use of arguments, against which certain exceptions may be taken, as though they were in all respects sound and unobjectionable.

the contrary, that in all natural generations there is no real entity produced out of the matter, which was not before in it, but only new modifications; and consequently, that souls and minds, being not mere modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, could never be produced out of it, because they must then of necessity come from nothing; that is, be made either by themselves without a cause, or without a sufficient cause. It hath also been before noted out of Aristotle, how the old atheistic materialists, being assaulted by those Italic philosophers after that manner, that nothing, which was not before in matter, besides its modifications, could possibly be produced out of it, because nothing can come out of nothing, and consequently, that in all natural generations and corruptions, there is no real entity made or destroyed; endeavoured, without denying the words of that proposition, to evade after this manner: Διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὐδὲν οἴονται, οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην, &c. That there is indeed nothing generated or corrupted (in some sense), forasmuch as the same substance of matter always remains, it being never made or destroyed. For, as men do not say that Socrates is made, when he is made musical or handsome; nor destroyed, when he loseth these dispositions, because the subject Socrates was before, and still remaineth; so neither is any substantial thing, or real entity in the world, made or destroyed in this sense; because matter, which is the substance of all, perpetually remains;" and all other things whatsoever are but πάθη καὶ ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, "passions and affections, and dispositions thereof," as musicalness and unmusicalness, in respect of Socrates. Which is all one, as if they should say, that all things whatsoever, besides matter, being but accidents thereof, are generated out of it, and corruptible into it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing, or the deduction of any into nothing, so long as the substance of matter, which is the only real entity, remains always the same. Wherefore, though life, sense, and understanding, all souls and minds, be generated out of matter; yet does it not follow from thence that therefore there is any real entity made or produced, because these are nothing but accidents, and modifications of matter. This was the subterfuge of the old hylopathian Atheists.[10]

[10] The passage here quoted is from Aristotle, Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 264. tom. 4. opp. where he is expounding the opinion of the ancient physiologers, or those usually called Italic philosophers, on the causes of things. But I doubt whether all that Dr. Cudworth considers to be evident from this passage can fairly be inferred from it. I. What he states respecting the contention between the Italic and Ionic philosophers rests solely upon conjecture and the prodigious fertility of his own mind; for it is nowhere recorded that any thing of the kind took place. But being satisfied that the ancient Italic philosophers entertained the same opinion as himself on indivisible corpuscules and the nature of things, and that the Ionics were hostile to God, he easily

Now it is true, indeed, that whatsoever is in the universe, is either substance, or accidents; and that the accidents of any substance may be generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real entity out of nothing, and reducing of any into nothing; forasmuch as the substance still remains entirely the same. But the Atheists taking it for granted that there is no other substance besides body or matter, do therefore falsely suppose that, which is really incorporeal substance, or else the attributes, properties, and modes thereof, to be the mere accidents of matter, and consequently conclude these to be generable out of it, without the production of any real entity out of nothing. We say therefore, that it does not at all follow, because the same numerical matter (as for example, a piece of wax) may be successively made spherical, cubical, cylindrical, pyramidal, or of any other figure; and the same man may successively stand, sit, kneel, and walk; both without the production of any thing out of nothing; or because a heap of stones, bricks, mortar, and timber lying all together disorderly and confusedly, may be made into a stately palace, and that without the miraculous creation of any real entity out of nothing; that therefore the same may be affirmed likewise of every thing else, besides the bare substance of matter, as namely, life and understanding, soul and mind, that though there be no such thing in matter itself, yet the production of them out of matter would be no production of something out of nothing. One ground of which mistake hath been from men's not rightly considering what the accidents of a substance are, and that they are indeed nothing but the modes thereof. Now, a mode is such a thing as cannot possibly be conceived without that whereof it is a mode; as standing, sitting, kneeling, and walking, cannot be conceived without a body organized, and therefore are but modes thereof; but life and cogitation may be clearly apprehended without body, or any

arrived at the conclusion that they had had frequent skirmishes with each other, and that the Italics assaulted their foes with no other weapons than those with which Atheists were to be assailed by himself. II. It has not yet been placed beyond all controversy, that the Italic philosophers referred the nature of things to atoms, and as the learned Doctor supposes, separated their metaphysics, or theology, from this physical science: neither is it certain that those Ionics were Atheists: on which subject we have commented at some length above on chap. 3. Hence all that is here said about the disputes of these sects appears to be exceedingly doubtful and uncertain. III. He discovers more in the passage itself than I have been able to detect in it: for he supposes it to prove that the Ionics, or ancient physiologers, held all souls to be generated from matter, and to be nothing more than its accidents and modifications; which I do not find expressly stated by Aristotle. Those who defend the Ionics, and seek to rescue their memory from the charge of atheism, of whom there is no inconsiderable number among the learned of the present day, will maintain that the whole passage is to be understood of the generation and corruption of bodies: nor do I see any thing that should compel them to alter their opinion. At all events, as we have shown above on chap. 3. there is not so much truth as many imagine in the opinion, that the Ionics generally are accused by Aristotle of the grossest impiety towards God.

thing of extension: nor indeed can a thought be conceived to be of such a length, breadth, and thickness, or to be hewed and sliced out into many pieces, all which laid together, as so many small chips thereof, would make up again the entireness of that whole thought. From whence it ought to be concluded, that cogitation is no accident, or mode of matter, or bulky extension, but a mode or attribute of another substance, really distinct from matter, or incorporeal. There is indeed nothing else clearly conceivable by us in body or bulky extension, but only more or less magnitude of parts, figures, site, motion, or rest; and all the different bodies, that are in the whole world, are but several combinations or syllables, made up out of these few letters: but no magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, can possibly spell or compound life and sense, cogitation and understanding, as the syllables thereof; and therefore to suppose these to be generated out of matter, is plainly to suppose some real entity to be brought out of nothing, or something to be made without a cause; which is impossible.

But that which hath principally confirmed men in this error, is the business of sensible qualities and forms, as they are vulgarly conceived to be distinct entities, from those forementioned modifications of matter, in respect of magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion, or rest. For since these qualities and forms are unquestionably generated and corrupted, there seems to be no reason why the same might not be as well acknowledged of life, sense, cogitation, and understanding, that these are but qualities or accidents of matter also (though of another kind), and consequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of nothing. But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves have, from the principles of the atomic philosophy, sufficiently confuted and rectified this mistake concerning sensible qualities; they exploding and banishing them all, as conceived to be entities really distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, and that for this very reason, because the generation of them would, upon this supposition, be the production of something out of nothing, or without a cause; and concluding them therefore to be really nothing else but mechanism, or different modifications of matter, in respect of the magnitude of parts, figure, site, and motion, or rest; they only causing different fancies and apparitions in us. And in very truth, this vulgar opinion of real qualities of bodies seems to have no other original at all than men's mistaking their own fancies, passions, and affections, for things really existing in the objects without them. For as sensible qualities are conceived to be things distinct from the forementioned modifications of matter, so are they really nothing but our own fancies, passions, and affections; and consequently no accidents or

modifications of matter, but accidents and modifications of our own souls, which are substances incorporeal. Now if these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists themselves concluded that real qualities, considered as distinct from the modifications of matter, could not possibly be generated out of it, because this would be the production of something out of nothing; they ought certainly much more to have acknowledged the same concerning life and cogitation, sense and understanding, that the generation of these out of senseless matter would be an impossible production of something out of nothing; and consequently, that these are therefore no corporeal things, but the attributes, properties, or modes of substance incorporeal; since they can no way be resolved into mechanism and fancy, or the modifications of matter, as the vulgar sensible qualities may, and ought to be. For though the Democritics and Epicureans did indeed suppose all human cogitations to be caused or produced by the incursion of corporeal atoms upon the thinker; yet did never any of them arrive to such a degree, either of sottishness or impudence, as a modern writer[1] hath done, to maintain that cogitation, intellection, and volition, are themselves really nothing else but local motion or mechanism, in the inward parts of the brain and heart; or that mens nihil aliud præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici, "that mind itself is nothing but motion in some parts of the organized body;" who therefore, as if Cartesius had not been sufficiently paradoxical in making brute animals (though supposed by him to be devoid of all cogitation) nothing but mere machines, and not contented herewith, hath advanced much further, in making this prodigious conclusion, that all cogitative beings, and men themselves, are really nothing else but machines and automata; whereas he might as well have affirmed heaven to be earth, colour to be sound, number to be figure, or any thing else in the world to be any thing, as cogitation and local motion to be the very self-same thing. Nevertheless, so strong was the atheistic intoxication in those old Democritics and Epicureans, that though denying real qualities of bodies, for this very reason, because "Nothing could be produced out of nothing," they notwithstanding contradicting themselves, would make sense, life, and understanding, to be qualities of matter, and therefore generable out of it; and so unquestionably produced real entities out of nothing, or without a cause.

Moreover, it is observable, that Epicurus having a mind to

[1] Thom. Hobbes: see his Physica seu Naturæ Phænomena cap. 25. which is De Sensione et Motu Animali, p. 192. &c. and Leviathan, par. 1. cap. 1. and 2. p. 4. where however I have been unable to find this definition of mind, although the thing itself is expressly declared by him both there and elsewhere.

assert contingent liberty in men, in way of opposition to that necessity of all human actions, which had been before maintained by Democritus and his followers, plainly acknowledges that he could not possibly do this, according to the grounds of his own philosophy, without supposing something of contingency in the first principles, that is, in the motion of those atoms, out of which men and other animals are made:*

Si semper motus connectitur omnis,
Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo,
Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus
Principium quoddam, quod fati fœdera rumpat
Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur;
Libera per terras unde hæc animantibus extat,
Unde est hæc, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas?

The reason for which is afterwards thus expressed by him, Quoniam de nihilo nil fit, "Because nothing can be made out of nothing." Upon which account he therefore ridiculously feigned, besides his two other motions of atoms from pondus and plagæ, "weight" and "strokes," a third motion of them, which he calls clinamen principiorum, a "contingent" and "uncertain declination," every way from the perpendicular; out of design to solve this phenomenon of free-will in men, without bringing something out of nothing, according as he thus subjoineth:

Quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necesse est,
Esse aliam præter plagas et pondera causam
Motibus, unde hæc est nobis innata potestas;
De NIHILO quoniam FIERI NIL posse videmus.
Pondus enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant
Externa quasi vi. Sed ne mens ipsa necessum
Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,
Et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,
Id facit exiguum CLINAMEN PRINCIPIORUM,
Nec ratione loci certa, nec tempore certo.[2]

Now if Epicurus himself conceived, that liberty of will could not possibly be generated in men out of matter or atoms, they having no such thing at all in them (that is, no contingent uncertainty in their motion), without bringing of "something out of nothing;" which was contrary to the fundamental principles of the atomic philosophy (though this were intolerably absurd in him, thus to suppose contingency, and a kind of free-will in the motions of senseless atoms, so that indeed he brought his liberty of will out of nothing[3]), certainly sense and under-

* Lib. 2. p. 134. Lamb. [Ver. 251.]

[2] Lib. 2. ver. 283. p. 315.

[3] The whole of this doctrine of Epicurus on a third motion of atoms, or as Lucretius has it, on a "declination or principles," is childish and trifling, and therefore not undeservedly ridiculed by Cicero and other ancient writers. The assertion however of

standing, soul and mind in animals and men, could not possibly be generated out of atoms or matter, devoid of all sense and understanding; for the very same reason, "Quoniam de nihilo

Cicero, De Fato, cap. 10. p. 3275. and cap. 20. p. 3288. tom. 9. opp. and De Finibus Bonor. et Malor. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2347. tom. 8. opp. and of many others besides Dr. Cudworth after him, that this philosopher had the gross folly to suppose that this declination of atoms is produced *without a cause*, and consequently that free-will in men can arise out of nothing, or at least pointed out no cause of this declination, seems to me to be somewhat too free and unqualified. He has assigned causes, although not such as can be admitted by any sensible man. I will explain this point of his discipline, as neither Cicero, who in other respects makes it the subject of severe invective against him, nor Gassendi, nor any one else, that I am aware of, has cared to give it much attention. And this diligence on my part will, I hope, be in some slight degree instrumental in repressing the ardour of those persons, who even at this day, never cease to extol the consistency and wisdom of the Epicurean philosophy. It appears from Lucretius that he supposed a twofold declination of atoms, one in void and empty space, and external to the bodies of animals, the other in these bodies themselves. The former he introduced for the purpose of more easily demonstrating in what manner the world and its parts could be constructed out of atoms without any efficient cause; the latter, that he might not be compelled to adopt the fate of Democritus, to which according to the testimony of Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 134. p. 659. he was vehemently opposed. He did not attribute both kinds of declination to the same cause, but assigned a proper and peculiar one to each. The atoms external to animal bodies were supposed by him to decline by a force of their own, or frequently to be carried from the perpendicular into an oblique direction by their own weight. This is testified by Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. ver. 216. &c.

Illud in his quoque te rebus cognoscere avemus.
Corpora quom deorsum rectum per inane feruntur,
Ponderibus propriis incerto tempore ferme,
Incertisque locis spatio se pellere paullum:
Tantum quod nomen mutatum dicere possis.

After which the poet explains the reason that induced Epicurus to adopt this opinion:

Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum,
Imbris uti guttæ, caderent per inane profundum:
——————Ita nil unquam natura creasset.

Add what he says lower down, ver. 288. on the same subject:

Pondus enim prohibet, ne plagis omnia fiant.

I consider Epicurus to have meant, therefore, that certain atoms larger than the others (for he did not suppose all atoms to be of the same magnitude), are sometimes compelled by their own weight, although at random and fortuitously, to deviate from the straight course, and to be carried not in a perpendicular direction into a lower place. That he did not attribute this declination to all corpuscules, but only to some of the larger of them, is obvious, if I mistake not, from the very nature of the thing itself. For if he had asserted this of all atoms, he would have defeated his own purpose, and would have been unable to explain by means of this third motion the generation of so vast a variety of things. Cicero, indeed, De Finibus Bonor. et Malor. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2347. doubts whether he ascribed it to all or only to some: "Nam si omnes atomi declinabunt, nullæ unquam cohærescent: sive aliæ declinabunt, aliæ nutu suo recte ferentur; primum exit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare, quæ recte, quæ oblique ferantur; deinde eadem illa atomorum turbulenta concursio hunc mundi ornatum efficere non poterit," For if all atoms decline, none will ever cohere; and if some decline and others are carried straight along by their own impulse, this in the first place will be to assign to atoms their provinces or departments, as it were, which are to be carried in a

nil fit, "Because nothing can be made out of nothing." For unquestionably, were all life and understanding, all souls and minds generated out of dead and senseless matter; and

straight and which in an oblique course; secondly, that disorderly concourse of atoms will not be able to produce this beauty and harmony of the world." But the great man doubts without any occasion: for if he had considered the reason why Epicurus invented this devious and erratic commotion of atoms, he would have perceived it to be quite impossible that he could have asserted the declination of all atoms whatever. For Epicurus was not such a fool as not to know what accorded and harmonized with his own principles. We are nowhere informed, however, of the manner in which Epicurus explained this dogma of the declination of atoms being caused by their own gravity: although it is most likely he did so, as he boasted of his being able to assign causes for all things. If conjectures are at all admissible in so very doubtful a matter, I should suppose him to have laid down this law of motion: "It can sometimes happen that bodies larger, and therefore heavier than others, if pressed and urged by many lighter ones, are compelled by their own weight to depart out of their course and proceed in an oblique direction, while the others of less weight descend in a straight line." Perhaps also he attributed some share in this business to the figures of the atoms. Wherefore whoever wished to refute this declination ought to have opposed him with no other weapons than those of natural philosophy and geometry, and to have demolished his insane theory by a reference to the true and universally recognized laws of motion. The manner in which this may be done I leave to geometricians and physiologers: for myself it is sufficient to have shown that Epicurus assigned a cause for the external declination of atoms, namely the greater gravity of the atoms themselves.

The interior declination, however, which takes place in the human body, and gives rise to liberty of will, he ascribed to a far different cause, and inculcated that the soul of man, or the mind and will residing in his breast, cause the atoms to deviate from the straight line, and to enter upon whatever course he himself pleases. But it is right to prove this to have been his opinion.

Thus, then, writes Lucretius, the most able expositor of his entire discipline, De Rerum Natura, ver. 259. &c.

> Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo
> Nec regione loci certa, sed *ubi ipsa tulit mens*:
> Num dubio procul his rebus *sua quoique voluntas*
> *Principium dat*; et hinc motus per membra rigantur.

Having illustrated this by the example of horses issuing forth from the goal, the poet thus proceeds, ver. 269.

> Ut videas initium motus (obliqui) *a corde oreari*
> *Ex animique voluntate* id procedere primum,
> Inde dari porro per totum corpus et artus.

Shortly afterwards he pursues the subject in these verses:

> Jamne vides igitur, quamquam vis extera multis
> Pellit, et invitis cogit procedere sæpe,
> Præcipitesque rapit, tamen *esse in pectore nostro*
> *Quiddam*, quod contra pugnare, obstareque possit,
> *Quojus ad arbitrium* quoque copia materiai
> Cogitur interdum flecti per membra, per artus
> Et projecta refrænatur, retroque residit?

These verses put it beyond all doubt, that Epicurus traced the oblique motion of atoms in man to the will, soul, heart, and mind residing in his breast, as its principal and efficient cause. But here most certainly, if any where, this philosophy is weak and silly; in short any thing but philosophy, which ought to be based upon clear and satisfactory principles. The soul, says Epicurus, and will of man is the cause why the

were there no substantial or essential life and understanding in the whole universe; then must it of necessity be all made out of nothing, or without a cause, and consequently real entities and

atoms abandon their natural downward motion, and are carried along in an oblique course. This, as far as the words are concerned, has a smack of philosophy, and appears to have some semblance of reason in it; but if the meaning attached to the words be examined, it is more worthy of an old woman than a philosopher. What is the soul according to Epicurus' theory? It is a coagmentation of round and very light corpuscules scattered through the whole body, of which the part partaking of reason resides in the breast. Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 63. p. 629. Ἡ ψυχὴ σῶμά ἐστι λεπτομερὲς, παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον, "The soul is a body consisting of subtle parts, dispersed through the whole mass." A little afterwards, segm. 66. p. 630. he speaks more clearly: Λέγει (Ἐπίκουρος) ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀτόμων συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλωτάτων . . . καὶ τὸ μέντοι αὐτῆς ἄλογον εἶναι, ὃ τῷ λοιπῷ παρεσπάρη σώματι, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν, ὃ ἐν τῷ θώρακι, "Epicurus says that the soul is compounded of the lightest and roundest atoms . . . and that the irrational part of it is dispersed throughout the rest of the body, but the rational is seated in the breast." Add Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 3. ver. 205. &c. It appears that, like many more things, this opinion on the nature of the soul was borrowed by him from Democritus, who is stated by Cicero among others, Disput. Tusculan. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 2575. and cap. 18. p. 2589. tom. 8. opp. animum levibus et rotundis corpusculis effecisse concursu quodam fortuito, "to have formed the soul out of light and round atoms by a certain fortuitous concourse." Hence we can clearly understand the meaning of this magnificent verbinge of Epicurus, which amounts to this: a certain concretion of very light, round, and fiery atoms, seated in the human breast, oftentimes presses upon heavier atoms, which are descending perpendicularly by their own impulse, so that they deflect from the straight line, and are carried in a different direction. Most admirable truly! Let us grant it to be possible, first of all, for this impulse and fiery force of atoms, of their own nature most light and swift, to compel other corpuscules to change their course. But what is it, I ask, that impels and incites this most subtle mass of atoms to rush headlong against other atoms, and drive them from their position and motion? Is it some external power and cause, or an internal one? If an external power impels them, we are thrown back upon fate, which Epicurus so greatly abhors, and endeavours to elude by this very figment of the declination of atoms. For unquestionably a motion produced by an external power is necessary; and this external cause will be again connected with other antecedent causes, which entirely put an end to all freedom of will. Cicero has already observed, De Fato, cap. 20. p. 3288. that the doctrine of fate is confirmed rather than overthrown by Epicurus: Nec vero, says he, quisquam magis confirmare mihi videtur non modo fatum, verum etiam necessitatem et vim omnium rerum, sustulisseque motos animi voluntarios, quam hic, qui aliter obsistere fato fatetur se non potuisse, nisi ad has commentitias declinationes confugisset, "No one appears to me to confirm not only fate, but also the necessity and force of all things, and to have done away with all voluntary motions of the mind, more than this man, who confesses that he would otherwise have been unable to withstand the doctrine of fate, unless he had had recourse to these imaginary declinations." Although Cicero, I confess, does not fortify his accusation with those arguments which Epicurus, had he been living at the time, would have found unanswerable; on which subject it would be foreign to my purpose to offer any comment at present. But our philosopher repudiates any such external power or cause, and supposes the light and round atoms to be excited by their own internal power, or *will*, to impinge against the other heavier corpuscules. Let him explain to us, therefore, if he can, what is this internal and inherent power. That light round bodies can decide and determine, that it is their own wish to rush against other atoms, and impede their direct progress, and can execute this purpose, is an enigma inexplicable even to Œdipus, or rather it is a statement utterly destitute of sense or meaning. And what, after all, moves them to decide and determine? An external or internal power? Epicurus will tell us that this will of the atoms is natural, this decision natural, in short, that the motion arising therefrom is natural. For argument's sake, for we have no wish to enter into a long disputation upon so absurd a theory, let us grant it to be natural; but even so it will be fatal. For that which takes place

substantial things be made out of nothing, which is absolutely impossible. For though we do not say, that life and cogitation, sense and understanding, abstractly considered, are substances; yet do we affirm them to be entities really distinct from matter, and no modifications or accidents thereof, but either accidents and modifications, or rather essential attributes of substance incorporeal; as also that souls and minds, which are the subjects of them, are indeed substantial things. Wherefore, we cannot but here again condemn the darkness of that philosophy, which educes not only species visible and audible (entities perfectly unintelligible) and real qualities, distinct from all the modes of body, and even substantial forms too (as they call them), but also sensitive souls themselves, both in men and brutes, ex potentia materiæ, "out of the power of the matter;" that is, indeed out of nothing. Forasmuch as this prepares a direct way to atheism; because, if life and sense, cogitation and consciousness, may be generated out of dead and senseless matter, then might this well be supposed the first original of all things; nor could there reasonably be any stop made at rational souls, especially by these men, who also conclude them to be rasæ tabulæ, "mere white sheets of paper," that have nothing at all in them, but what is scribbled upon them by corporeal objects from without; there being nothing in the understanding or mind of man, which was not before in sense: so that sense is the first original knowledge, and understanding but a secondary and derivative thing from it, more umbratile and evanid.

Hitherto have we demonstrated that all things whatsoever could not possibly be made out of matter, and particularly that life and sense, mind and understanding, being no accidents or modes of matter, could not by motion be generated out of it, without the production of real entities out of nothing. But because some may possibly imagine, that matter might otherwise than thus by motion, by a miraculous efficiency, produce souls and minds, we shall add in the last place, that nothing can efficiently produce any real entity or substantial thing, that was not before, unless it have at least equal perfection to it, and a substantially emanative or creative power. But scarcely any man can be so sottish as to imagine, that every atom of dust hath equal perfection in it to that of the rational soul in man, or

naturally takes place necessarily. But if the lighter atoms, by the necessity of nature, impinge against the heavier, and stop or change their course, there will be an end of all liberty of will, and not only this impulse of the will which causes the atoms to decline, but this very declination itself also, will take place by the necessity of nature. On the whole, therefore, let us conclude, that although Epicurus mentions a certain cause of each declination of atoms, he properly speaking mentions none, and therefore that Cicero, who is followed by Dr. Cudworth and others, was in a certain sense right, when he asserted that this philosopher supposed this third notion of atoms to be without any cause at all.

to attribute a creative power to all matter (which is but a passive thing) whilst this is in the mean time denied by him to a perfect Being; both these assertions also, in like manner as the former, producing real entities out of nothing causally. And thus have we demonstrated the impossibility and nonsense of all atheism, from this very principle, by which the Atheists would assault theism, in the true sense thereof, that "Nothing can be made without a cause," or that "Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing."

Now if there be no middle betwixt atheism and theism, and all things must of necessity either spring from senseless matter, or else from a perfect understanding Being; then is this demonstration of the impossibility of atheism a sufficient establishment of the truth of theism; it being such a demonstration of a God, as the geometricians call a deduction ad impossibile, which they allow of for good, and frequently make use of. Thus, either there is a God; or else matter must needs be acknowledged to be the only self-existent thing, and all things else whatsoever, to be made out of it; but it is impossible, that all things should be made out of senseless matter: therefore is there a God. Nevertheless, we shall here, for further satisfaction, show how the existence of a God may be directly demonstrated also from this very principle, which the Atheists endeavour to take sanctuary in, and from thence to impugn theism, De nihilo nihil, that "Nothing can be made out of nothing causally," or that "Nothing cannot be the cause of any thing."

In the first place therefore, we shall fetch our beginning from what hath been already often declared, that it is mathematically certain, that "Something or other did exist of itself from all eternity, or without beginning, and unmade by any thing else." The certainty of which proposition dependeth upon this very principle, as its foundation, that "Nothing can come from nothing," or be "made out of nothing," or that "Nothing, which once was not, can of itself come into being without a cause;" it following unavoidably from thence, that if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. And having thus laid the foundation, we shall in the next place make this further superstructure, that because something did certainly exist of itself from eternity unmade, therefore is there also actually a necessarily existent Being. For to suppose, that any thing did exist of itself from eternity, by its own free-will and choice, and therefore not necessarily, but contingently, since it might have willed otherwise; this is to suppose it to have existed before it was, and so positively to have been the cause of itself; which is impossible, as hath been already declared. When a thing therefore is said to be of itself, or the cause of itself, this is to be understood no otherwise, than either in a negative sense,

as having nothing else for its cause; or because its necessary eternal existence is essential to the perfection of its own nature. That therefore, which existed of itself from eternity, independently upon any thing else, did not so exist contingently, but necessarily; so that there is undoubtedly something actually in being, whose existence is, and always was necessary. In the next place, it is certain also, that nothing could exist necessarily of itself, but what included necessity of existence in its own nature. For to suppose any thing to exist of itself necessarily, which hath no necessity of existence in its own nature, is plainly to suppose that necessary existence of it to come from nothing, since it could neither proceed from that thing itself, nor yet from any thing else. Lastly, there is nothing, which includes necessity of existence in its very nature and essence, but only an absolutely perfect Being. The result of all which is, that God, or a perfect Being, doth certainly exist; and that there is nothing else, which existed of itself from eternity, necessarily and independently; but all other things whatsoever derived their being from him, or were caused by him, matter or body itself not excepted.

That which hath staggered some Theists here, and made them so inclinable and prone to believe, that matter also existed from eternity unmade, is partly (as hath been already intimated) an idiotical conceit, that because nothing can be artificially made by men, otherwise than out of pre-existing matter, as houses and garments, puddings and pies; therefore there could be no other making of any thing, by any power whatsoever: though even men themselves can produce something out of no pre-existent matter, as cogitations and local motion. And the same partly proceedeth also from certain false opinions entertained concerning matter. For some Theists have supposed ὕλην ἀσώματον, an "incorporeal first matter;" out of which incorporeal matter, together with an incorporeal form joined to it, they conceived the essence of body to have been compounded, and made up. And no wonder, if these same fanciful philosophers have further added also hereunto, that from this incorporeal matter, by an incorporeal form, were begotten likewise incorporeal qualities of body. Now it is not conceivable, what else should be meant by this incorporeal Hyle, or matter, but only a metaphysical notion of the potentiality, or possibility of things, respectively to the Deity; which, because it is indeed eternal, and as much unmade as God himself is, it being nothing but the divine power considered passively, or the reverse of it; therefore, in all probability, were these philosophers so prone to think the physical matter of this corporeal universe to have been eternal and unmade. Neither was this incorporeal Hyle, or matter, a novel opinion, entertained only by some junior Platonists, but older than

Aristotle himself, as appeareth plainly from these following words of his in his Metaphysics:* Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, ἐάν τε σῶμα, ἐάν τε ἀσώματον τιθῶσιν, "Some speak of the principle as matter; whether they suppose this matter to be body, or to be incorporeal." But this incorporeal matter in physiology can be accounted no better than a kind of metaphysical nonsense.[4] Again, others seem to have been the

* Lib. 1. cap. 6. [Page 273. tom. 4. opp.] Thus Porphyr. Τῆς ὕλης τὰ ἴδια κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους τάδε· ἀσώματος, &c. Materiæ Proprietates, secundum Veteres, hæ sunt; Quod sit Incorporea, &c. [In Sentent. ad Intelligibilia Ducentibus, sect. 21. p. 226. Ed. Cantab.]

[4] Some perhaps will consider our learned author to be a little too severe against those who subtly discoursed in times past upon a certain primary matter of bodies. I have no high opinion of these men, neither do I deny that there is much in the precepts of the ancients on matter, which possesses more of the appearance than of the essence of sound wisdom; still I cannot help thinking, that their adversaries sometimes do them injustice, and that not a few of their tenets admit of an apt and rational interpretation, although at first view they may appear foolish and absurd to ourselves, who make use of other terms, and philosophize in a different manner. And among these, in my opinion, may be ranked this very dogma of the "incorporeity of matter," which here as well as elsewhere is so violently assailed by Dr. Cudworth, and which we hold to be ridiculous for no other reason than because we have rejected the phraseology of the ancients and their prescribed rules of philosophizing. Those who in the last century revived the atoms of Epicurus and Democritus, and to these in conjunction with the laws of motion ascribed the construction and fabrication of the universe, spared no pains to bring the old physical discipline of the Peripatetics into contempt, and, as it were, to overwhelm it with reproaches and maledictions; and as the dogma in question, which to a certain extent was common both to the Peripatetics and Platonists, formed no unimportant part of this discipline, it became the especial object of their rancour. [In this view Leibnitz, Epp. vol. 2. p. 126. is not far from coinciding. Compare what he says also in vol. 3. p. 27. &c. Add, however, Thomasius, Resp. ibid. p. 32. &c.] Dr. Cudworth, therefore, having enrolled himself among their number, his motive for the harsh judgment passed upon those who asserted a certain *first matter*, is at once understood. But it is not our present object to expound and defend the whole doctrine of the old physiologers on ὕλη, or first matter; we shall simply offer a few observations in illustration of what is here brought forward, so as at the same time to give some sort of insight into the precepts of the ancient philosophy.

Dr. Cudworth suspects that the absurd opinions of the ancients on first matter led many to the belief that matter is eternal and unmade; for first matter, being nothing more than a metaphysical notion of a certain divine perfection, which, properly speaking, does not differ from God himself, and consequently is eternal, that therefore certain philosophers transferred this property to physical matter also, and concluded it to be eternal. Whatever credit this conjecture may deserve on the score of ingenuity, it seems to me to be little in accordance with the truth. I acknowledge that philosophers very often made a sudden transition from mere mental notions and phantasms to the things themselves, and became satisfied of the real external existence of that which existed only in their own minds; but I much doubt whether the same took place, or could take place, in the matter now before us. The learned Doctor here assumes three things, which probably no one versed in these subjects will admit: first, that first matter is nothing else but a metaphysical notion; secondly, that those philosophers who disputed so acutely upon first matter were not entirely ignorant of this; and lastly, that they asserted a twofold matter, physical and metaphysical, and rashly transferred to the latter what belonged to the former alone. Not one of these, in my opinion, is simply and absolutely true. First matter, I allow, in so far as it is separated from all body, is a certain notion of the mind; but not such as has nothing real and corporeal out of the mind to correspond to it. Those ancients who discoursed upon it were so far from supposing it to be a mere vision of the mind, that they regarded it rather as a really existent and natural object. Neither ought we to forego this opinion, because both the Aristotelians and Platonists use various expressions in reference to it,

more prone to think matter or body to have been self-existent and unmade, because they both conceived it to be really the same thing with space, and also took it for granted, that space was

which seem to divest it of all real existence. For, as we have intimated before, these expressions are not to be judged of by our own phrases and modes of speech, but examined according to the rule and standard of the ancient philosophers; in which case we shall find them to be much less absurd and foolish than we supposed. Many, for instance, are offended because the Platonists, Plotinus, Porphyry, and some of the Aristotelians are wont to call ὕλη, or "matter," μὴ ὄν, "a nonentity." See Porphyry, in his Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, sect. 21. p. 226. Plotinus, Περὶ ὕλης, Ennead. 2. lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 169. and De Impassibilitate Incorporeor. Ennead. 3. lib. 6. cap. 7. p. 210. For they suppose this term to have the same signification as our word *nothing*; and therefore when they afterwards hear these philosophers discoursing upon matter, as upon something really existent, they appeal to the faith of gods and men, execrate the stupidity of the ancient philosophers, and cry aloud that their *first matter* is altogether a farce, a downright jest, which both exists and does not exist. Far otherwise, however, would they think, did they but recollect that the language of Plato is widely different from our own, and that the Platonic *nothing* and ours have no affinity between them. *Nihil*, says Cicero, Tusculan. Disput. lib. 1. cap. 24. p. 2598. tom. 8. opp. Plato putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum *esse*, quod semper tale sit, "Plato supposes that to be nothing, which has a beginning and perishes, and that alone to be an *entity* which is always such." To others it seems not less absurd, that the Platonists should deny it to be possible for ὕλη, or matter, to suffer any thing. See Plotinus, De Impassibilitate Rerum Incorporear. cap. 8. p. 311. But they would cease to be surprised at this dogma, or at least pronounce a milder judgment upon it, did they but know that in this school πάσχειν, or *to suffer*, is equivalent to *being changed* and *corrupted*, and that matter is ranked by them among simple things, which are susceptible of no change. Those who wish correctly to estimate the precepts and doctrines of antiquity will find it necessary first of all to unlearn the phraseology of the later philosophers. The learned Doctor's surmise respecting a twofold matter, physical and metaphysical, and the transition from one to the other, is altogether destitute of foundation; for these philosophers, strictly speaking, held but one, and that physical ὕλη, or matter. I am aware that it was divided by some of the later Platonists into *intelligible* and *sensible*, or into the matter of the world called νοητὸς, and of the visible world. See Plotinus in his book De Materia, cap. 3. &c. p. 160. &c. where he argues at some length that there is also something corresponding to matter in the νοητὸς world. But to pass over many other things, this *intelligible matter* is not what the ancients called ἀσώματος, or "incorporeal:" which at present, however, is alone under consideration.

II. Much greater light will be thrown upon all these points by a more lucid and detailed exposition of the ancient philosophers' doctrine on ἀσώματος, or "incorporeal" matter. All who philosophized in former times were unanimous in supposing a something out of which were compounded the first principles of all sensible things, or ὑποκείμενον τι καὶ ὑποδοχὴν εἰδῶν, "something which is the subject of all bodies, and adapted for the reception of forms," to use the words of Plotinus in his book Περὶ ὕλης, cap. 1. p. 159. By what appellation it was designated by them is at this day unknown; for the name ὕλη is of more recent origin, as is evident even from the fact that neither Ocellus Lucanus in his book on the Universe, nor Plato, makes use of it. In the course of time, however, the word ὕλη, which otherwise usually denoted *artificial* or *mechanical* matter, and is employed even by Plato in this sense, was applied to this *natural* matter; and the example of the Greeks was imitated by the Latins, who in like manner transferred the name *materia*, heretofore belonging to mechanical matter, to this substance, that was supposed to be the subject of all bodies. Others, as Chalcidius, expressed the Greek ὕλη by the Latin term *sylva*. But the nature of this first substance of which they supposed the elements of all bodies to be composed, was not equally known and agreed upon. Hence philosophers were split into various sects, which however may conveniently be classed under two principal heads. For some endowed the primary matter of all things with inherent qualities and affections; while others asserted matter abstractedly considered to be simple, and utterly destitute of quality, although adapted to receive all qualities and forms. The whole of the opinions of antiquity on the nature of things may be referred to one or

infinite and eternal, and consequently necessarily existent. In answer whereunto, we reply first, that though space and distance should be granted to be positively infinite, or to have no bounds

other of these two classes; but each was again subdivided into various minor sects, which it would be foreign to our present purpose to enumerate in detail. To the former belong all those physiologers who held either water, or air, or fire, or earth, or a nature concreted and compounded out of all these, to be the first principle of things; since they all supposed one or more qualities to be inherent in matter itself. Of the latter we shall speak more particularly by and by. Between these two the discipline of Democritus, Epicurus, and others, who regarded atoms and corpuscules as the first principles of things, holds as it were an intermediate place; for while they divest first matter of qualities, and in that respect approach the latter class, they leave it magnitude and figure; which in some degree connects them with the former. Some of the ancients, however, refer the sect of Democritus to one of the abovementioned classes, as Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, and others; which, as will be made appear in the sequel, may not unreasonably be done, provided the class to which this school belongs be correctly and accurately distributed into its subordinate sects.

These two classes of physiologers to which, as we before stated, all the others are referable, were commonly distinguished in after times, when philosophy had attained greater maturity, as holding matter to be either *ἀσώματος* or *σῶμα*, "incorporeal" or "body;" the former being said of those who denied, and the latter of those who assigned qualities to matter. This distinction we first meet with in Aristotle, in lib. 1. Metaphys. cap. 6. p. 273. t. 4. opp. the passage adduced by Dr. Cudworth; and as he does not mention it in any other place, it is most probable he was its author. After Aristotle it frequently occurs in the writings of those who have treated of the opinions of the ancients on the nature of things, or who have themselves inquired into this subject. That those who divested matter of all quality and figure were said to make it *ἀσώματος*, will be abundantly manifested from the testimonies about to be produced by and by; for the present I shall quote merely two passages selected out of many, to prove that those who attributed qualities and forms to matter, were formerly regarded as holding it to be *σῶμα*, or "body." The first is from Aristotle, Natural. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. tom. 1. opp.: Οἱ *μὲν γὰρ ἓν ποιήσαντες τὸ ὂν* ΣΩΜΑ *τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἢ τῶν τριῶν τι, ἢ ἄλλο, ὃ ἐστὶ πυρὸς μὲν πυκνότερον, ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον, τἆλλα γεννῶσι*, "Others (of the physiologists) holding some one *body* to be the subject matter of all, namely, either one of the three elements, or something else, which is more dense than fire and more rare than air, produce the rest of things." The other is from Plutarch, who De Placitis Philosoph. cap. 9. p. 882. tom. 1. opp. has the following words: Οἱ *δ' ὕδωρ λέγοντες, ἢ γῆν, ἢ πῦρ, ἢ ἀέρα τὴν ὕλην, οὐκέτι ἄμορφον αὐτὴν λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ* ΣΩΜΑ, "Those who say that matter is water, or earth, or fire, or air, do not hold it to be formless, but *body*." The distribution we speak of is found also in Sextus Empiricus, lib. 9. Adv. Mathematicos. cap. 5. p. 619. who, however, either misunderstood, or purposely perverted it, as, for the sake of having something to dispute against he is sometimes wont to do, when recording the opinions of the ancient philosophers: *Περὶ τῶν*, says he, *ἀνωτάτων καὶ ἀρχικωτάτων στοιχείων δύο μὲν αἱ πρῶται γεγόνασι στάσεις——οἱ γὰρ σώματα ἔλεξαν εἶναι τὰ τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα, οἱ δὲ ἀσώματα*, "Respecting the elements which are highest and have most the nature of principles, there were two principal sects——for some asserted the elements of things to be bodies, others incorporeal." In the former class he ranks almost all the ancient physiologers, even Democritus and Epicurus, which as we have already said is in a certain measure admissible: but when he comes to the other he commits a manifest error: *Τῶν δὲ*, says he, sect. 364. p. 621. *ἀσώματα δογματιζόντων, οἱ μὲν περὶ Πυθαγόραν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἔλεξαν πάντων ἄρχειν, οἱ δὲ Μαθηματικοὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα τὰς ἰδέας*, "Of those who held the doctrine of their being incorporeal, the Pythagoreans affirmed numbers, mathematicians the boundaries of bodies, and the Platonists ideas, to be the principles of all things." Most foolishly and erroneously! The men who were stated in former times to hold the principles of things to be incorporeal, were those who divested the first matter of all quality, quantity, and form. Nor was Pythagoras, or Plato, or any geometrician ever so stupid as to regard either numbers, or the forms of things, or the extremities of bodies, as the first matter or principle.

nor limits at all, as also to have been eternal; yet, according to the opinion of some, would it not follow from thence, that matter was infinite, eternal, and necessarily existent; not as if space or

Plato is one of those who affirm matter to be ἀσώματος, but Sextus is very much deceived if he supposes this ὕλη ἀσώματος to be Plato's ἰδέαι or exemplars of things. Plato classes ideas among those things which he calls ἀσώματα. Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 882. tom. 1. opp. Ἰδέα ἐστὶν οὐσία ἀσώματος, "An idea is an incorporeal substance." But he was by no means so insane as to decide that ideas alone are the principles of things, and wholly to discard all corporeal matter. That spirit, whether of carelessness and negligence, or of perverseness and malignity, which every where prevails in our own day, and leads many to mutilate, falsify, and distort the opinions of others, has flourished in all ages, and formerly invaded and corrupted the minds even of those who are now held forth as perfect paragons of wisdom. By losing sight of which it not unfrequently happens, that many persons suppose the dogmas of the ancients to have been such as not a barber even or ploughman would entertain.

But I shall come to a somewhat closer examination of the subject, and not only explain the origin of this ancient distribution of physiologers, but also show who first asserted matter to be incorporeal, as well as the force and meaning of the dogma itself. For otherwise it will be impossible to know whether this opinion can in a certain sense be tolerated, or is as foolish and absurd as it is considered by Dr. Cudworth and by the generality of those who ascribe the nature of things to atoms and mechanical laws. To begin then with the origin of this division, the reason that induced the ancients to call matter endowed with qualities ἀσώματος or "incorporeal," and the same if divested of qualities and forms, σώματος, or "corporeal," will scarcely be comprehensible unless we first are in possession of their opinion on the nature of body. In the earliest ages the Greeks, from whom the Latins derived all their philosophy, used the word σῶμα in so wide an acceptation as to apply it to every nature which falls under the senses. Hence they did not hesitate to call the first matter of all things σῶμα. This is evident from the most ancient writer Ocellus Lucanus, Περὶ τοῦ παντὸς, cap. 2. p. 516. who thus defines matter: Τὸ πρῶς ἀφὴν ὑφεξόμενον ΣΩΜΑ πᾶσι τοῖς εἰς γένεσιν ἐρχομένοις, "Palpable body, the subject of all things which come to generation." The same, p. 519. calls it: ΣΩΜΑ αἰσθητὸν, "body perceptible to the sense." But afterwards when the philosophy of the Greeks assumed a more accurate and systematic form, they restricted the notion of body, and therefore distinguished between σῶμα and ὕλη. We have among the ancients, as at this day, various definitions of body, on which consult Sextus Empiricus, lib. 1. adv. Physicos, cap. 5. p. 619. In general, however, they almost all pronounce it to be that which consists of form and matter, or, as others say, of matter and quality. To form or quality, for as might be proved by numerous passages of the ancients, these words are here used indiscriminately and signify one and the same thing, belong shape, figure, magnitude, and other properties, which philosophers in a stricter sense usually denominate qualities. According to the ancient physiologers, therefore, body is a certain mass or aggregation of matter, endowed with magnitude, figure, and affections. Cicero, Academicar. Quæstion. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 2231. tom. 8. opp.: Quod ex utroque, id jam *corpus* et quasi qualitatem quamdam nominabant, "That which consists of both (matter and form) they (the ancient philosophers) called *body* and a sort of quality." Porphyry, in his Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ, sect. 22. p. 228. ΣΩΜΑ ἐστὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους, "Body is a compound of matter and form." Plotinus, Περὶ ὕλης, cap. 6. p. 162. Ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἕκαστον (σῶμα), "Each body consists of matter and form." Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 317. p. 393. Quod proprie dicitur corpus ex sylva constat et qualitate, "What is properly called body consists of matter and quality." It is not known who first thus circumscribed the meaning of body: but a clear distinction between matter and body is already observed by Timæus Locrus, De Anima Mundi, p. 544. whose example is followed by Plato in his Timæus, who, p. 534. defines matter to be φύσιν τὰ πάντα δεχομένην σώματα, "a nature which receives all bodies," or out of which all bodies are made. Which passage is well calculated to show, of what Plato and the rest of the ancients held the nature of body to consist. For by saying that matter is the recipient of bodies, he evidently implies that that which constitutes body is not inherent in

distance could exist alone by itself, an accident without a substance, it being plainly impossible, that nothing should have any accidents, modifications and attributes, or be mensurable by

matter, but comes to it from elsewhere. Hence what was formerly called body consists of form and qualities, which the ancients supposed to be introduced into matter. And this in my opinion shows us the reason, why the early philosophers asserted matter to be made *corporeal* by those who assigned qualities to it, and *incorporeal* by those who divested it of all quality. For placing the nature of body in qualities, affections, and figure, they accordingly called that incorporeal which was said to be destitute of all these. Nor is it difficult to understand, after this explanation, how it happened that Democritus and the others who supposed the nature of things to be contained in atoms, were referred by some of the ancients to one or other of the above-mentioned sects. For if body be applied in its more extensive acceptation to every thing which falls under the senses and is endowed with figure, Democritus would certainly belong to those, who were formerly represented as holding matter to be corporeal: but if according to the more circumscribed notion we call nothing body except that in which certain properties and qualities are inherent by nature, he must be classed among those who were said to make it incorporeal: for he held his atoms to be devoid of all qualities. In my own opinion, however, it will be best to assign to this philosopher an intermediate place, as we have already stated, between the two classes: for there is something of each which he adopts, and something again which he rejects and repudiates.

An immense number, however, of the greatest and most illustrious men of former times were always on the side of those who, in the way we have stated, asserted matter to be ἀσώματος, or incorporeal. Cicero tells us that the whole of the philosophers from the time of Plato held this doctrine, Academic. Quæstion. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 2232. tom. 8. opp. Sed subjectam putant (philosophi) omnibus sine ulla specie, atque carentem omni illa qualitate *materiam* quamdam, ex qua omnia expressa atque efficta sint, "But philosophers suppose a certain matter, the subject of all things, without form or shape, and destitute of all qualities, out of which all things were fashioned and framed." But it was entertained by many of the Pythagoreans long before Plato, as may be understood from Timæus Locrus, an eminent and most ancient philosopher of this school, De Anima Mundi, cap. 1. p. 544. ed. Galei. Τὰν ὕλαν ἄμορφον δὲ καθ' αὑτὰν καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, δεχόμενον δὲ πᾶσαν μορφάν, "(Timæus said) that matter is of itself devoid of all form and figure, but receives every form." In whose footsteps Plato follows, and in his Timæus, p. 534. opp. clearly and distinctly professes himself to be of the same opinion. I am aware that Aristotle, De Generat. et Corruptione, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 726. tom. 1. opp. accuses Timæus and Plato of obscurity on this subject, and denies the possibility of forming any opinion upon matter from what is said in the Timæus: Ὡς δ' ἐν Τιμαίῳ γέγραπται, οὐδὲν ἔχει διορισμόν, "What is written (concerning matter) in the Timæus, has nothing certain and definite." But his jealousy and dislike of Plato prevented him, I am afraid, from understanding his meaning, although sufficiently clearly expressed, and from perceiving that on this question at least that philosopher and himself were not at issue. For Aristotle had adopted the opinion of those who held matter to be incorporeal, as is proved by his definition of matter which occurs Metaphys. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 353. Λέγω δὲ ὕλην, ἣ καθ' αὑτὴν μήτε τι, μήτε πόσον, μήτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν λέγεται, οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν, "I call that matter, which of itself is neither said to be a quiddity, nor quantity, nor any thing else, by which an entity is defined." I am not ignorant of the debates and conflicts to which this definition of the Stagirite has given rise among his disciples, nor of the clamours and cavils it has called forth from the opponents of his philosophy. See out of many Dan. Geo. Morhof, Polyhistor. tom. 2. lib. 2. par. 1. cap. 12. p. 226. In my opinion, however, they both might have remained at peace. Aristotle, although expressing himself somewhat obscurely, said no more than what many other eminent men had inculcated before him and what he had learnt from his master Plato, that matter considered by itself and independently of body is destitute of all those affections and properties which constitute the nature of body, or in other words is *incorporeal*. After Plato and Aristotle, philosophers innumerable adopted the same dogma. On the Stoics in particular see Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 7. segm. 134. p. 449. But most of all the later Platonists, who took especial delight in the more sublime contemplation of

yards and poles; but because this space is by them supposed, not to be the extension of body, but the infinite and unbounded extension of the Deity.[5] But, in the next place, if space be con-

incorporeal things, were indefatigable in their efforts to polish and refine it. As one example for all, consult Plotinus in his two very subtle and acute treatises, De Materia, and De Impossibilitate eorum, quæ sunt incorporea, the former being the fourth book in the second, and the latter the sixth in the third Ennead: for when once we know his opinion, we are acquainted with the doctrine of the whole sect. Plotinus proves first of all, cap. 6. of the former book, p. 162. that there is a primary matter in bodies: he then, cap. 7. refutes the opinions of others on matter: and thence, cap. 8. proceeds to explain the affections of matter, which, cap. 10. 11. 12. he shows to be destitute of all quantity, and, cap. 13. 14. of all quality, that is, to be *incorporeal*, and lastly, cap. 15. to be *indeterminate*. But these new Platonists, by their excessive ingenuity and subtlety, brought the doctrine into general disrepute, and caused many to rank it among idle and visionary conceits. Still these difficulties did not deter the Christians from receiving it and pronouncing for the incorporeity of matter. I pass over an immense array of ancient fathers who gloried in its avowal, and appeal to the testimony of St. Augustine alone, whose voice in succeeding ages was revered as divine. This holy man, Confession. lib. 12. cap. 3. p. 158. tom. 1. opp. tells us that he learnt it from God himself: "Hast not thou, O Lord, taught me, that before thou didst form and separate that shapeless matter, not any thing was, not colour, not figure, not body, not spirit?" He subsequently deplores his former infatuation, which prevented him from perceiving this truth, and praises God for having revealed it to him, cap. 6. p. 159. "And if my voice and pen were to confess all that thou hast revealed to me on this question, who of my readers would understand it? Nevertheless my heart shall not cease to give thee the glory, and to praise thee for the things which it is unable to dictate." Such are the vicissitudes of human opinions! A dogma which St. Augustine does not hesitate to call divine, which he declares to be comprehensible to no one, unless he be enlightened and instructed by God's mercy, which he ranks in short among the greatest of divine blessings, is at a later period styled foolish, absurd, stupid, fanatical, irrational. That I may not wander too far from my purpose, I shall not descend to succeeding ages and examine into the grave conflicts of schoolmen on primary matter. Suffice it to add, that of the Jews, Philo, De Opificio Mundi, p. 4. maintains the same opinion, and the later masters are not opposed to it.

When in the last century the physical philosophy of the Peripatetics was expelled from our schools, and its place supplied by atoms and mechanical laws, this dogma above all others was exploded and characterized as fraught with the grossest folly. The matter of the Peripatetics and Platonists, it was said, is a thing undefined and incomprehensible, destitute of form, quantity, and quality, totally disconnected from body, and yet not spirit. What is it therefore? strictly *nothing:* and out of nothing do those, who refer the elements of the universe to this matter, create all things. I am almost persuaded however that those who inveighed with such bitterness against it, superior as they are in other respects to all praise of mine, looked rather to the words by which it is usually expounded than to the doctrine itself, and in passing so severe a sentence were influenced in many instances by the insane questions and disputes of schoolmen on primary matter. They who hold matter to be incorporeal mean simply that it is a certain first nature constituting all bodies and devoid of most of the affections of body, to which God or a superior nature, when bodies are generated, imparts form and qualities. I should not consider the doctrine to be so absurd, as to be wholly unworthy the attention of a wise man, were it disencumbered of the usual explanatory phraseology and freed from the idle questions which some over sagacious persons have connected with it. Let us examine it a little more minutely and inquire to what extent its supporters and opponents are at issue. They both agree that there is a first nature or principle, of some description or other, from which all sensible things are produced and generated; they likewise agree, that a philosopher by meditation can

[5] On those who suppose the divine nature and infinite space to be the same, a sect not extinct even at the present day, as also on space itself and its nature, we have spoken above, in discussing the subject of infinity.

cluded to be certainly nothing else but the extension and distance of body, or matter, considered in general (without respect to this or that particular body) and abstractly in order to the

dissever this first nature from body, although it nowhere exists separately, and contemplate it by itself. This is done certainly by the Atomists; for in thought, like the Platonists and Peripatetics, they abstract their matter from body, place it in a certain shape, and in short variously compound and divide it. So far, therefore, the assertors of incorporeal matter do not offend against reason. Consequently the whole dispute will turn upon the nature of matter. The Platonists and Peripatetics assert matter to be devoid, first of all quality, then of all quantity, all form, and lastly of all body. With respect to the first of these, they cannot be complained of by their adversaries; for these also deprive their corpuscles of all inherent quality. The controversy remains upon the other three. The defenders of the atomic doctrine leave quantity and form to these minute corpuscles: and they are compelled to do so, because they regard matter as divided and separated into innumerable parts. But the Platonists and Aristotelians cannot do this, inasmuch as they look upon it as something continuous and undivided. This alone, therefore, is the chief point of difference between them: that the former contemplate matter as a nature infinitely divided, and the latter as simple and continuous. Such being the case, those who choose to accuse this sect of folly, ought to show that it is absurd and foolish to conceive matter as a nature continuous and separated by no intervals, and yet at the same time, as Timæus Locrus says, De Anima Mundi, p. 544. *μεριστὰν περὶ τὰ σώματα*, "divisible in respect to bodies." For my part, I cannot see any thing at all irrational in this. Besides, those who held matter to be finite, by no means deprived it of what Aristotle calls *continuous quantity*. But surely, they will say, it is madness in them to make matter to be neither body nor spirit, and to call it *ἀσώματος*. Say rather, that it seems madness to us, who are accustomed to attach other significations to the words *σῶμα*, *σώματος*, and *ἀσώματος*. If *body* meant the same with us as it did with the earlier philosophers, this dogma would appear to be sufficiently sound and wise. But having lost the ancient meanings of words, and at the present day designating every thing as body which falls under the senses and is extended, we therefore consider whatever is said to be divested of body either as spirit or nothing. But those ancient philosophers themselves, who held matter to be *ἀσώματος*, carefully guarded against being understood in the sense in which many afterwards understood them, and by a variety of expressions showed, that in denying matter to be body, they by no means denied its close proximity to the nature of bodies. Some asserted matter to be, not indeed *σῶμα*, but yet *σωματική*, or "corporeal." Stobæus, Eclogar. Physicar. lib. 1. cap. 14. *Περὶ ὕλης*, p. 129. *Οὐ σῶμα δὲ τὴν ὕλην φασὶν, οὐχ ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐστερῆσθαι δοκεῖ τῶν περὶ σῶμα διαστάσεων, ἀλλὰ ὅτι καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀπολείπεται, κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον· ἃ τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει, σχηματισμοῦ, χρώματος, βαρύτητος, κουφότητος, ὅλως, πάσης ποιότητος καὶ ποσότητος· εἰ γὰρ τούτων μετεῖχεν, τὸ ποίων ἦν καὶ πόσων· οὐ μετειληφυῖα δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, σῶμα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΗ δὲ διὰ τὸ πάσαις, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκμαγεῖον, ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν*, "They deny matter to be body, not only because it appears to want the intervals of body, but also because it is itself destitute of many other things belonging to body, as figure, colour, heaviness, lightness, and in short all quality and quantity. For if it partook of these, it would be of the class of things having a certain quality or quantity. But being in itself destitute of them, it is not body, but corporeal, because, like a mirror, it is the subject or recipient of all qualities." Others called it *σωματοειδῆς*, "similar or allied to body." Plutarch, De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 882. tom. 1. opp. *Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην ΣΩΜΑΤΟΕΙΔΗ καὶ ἄμορφον, ἀνείδεον, ἀσχημάτιστον, ἄποιον μέν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει*, "Aristotle and Plato asserted matter to be allied to body, to be without shape, form, or figure, and of its own nature destitute of all quality." Others again sought to remove all ambiguity from the word *ἀσώματος*, by saying, that matter is different from body. Porphyry, Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, sect. 21. p. 226. *Ὕλη ἀσώματος, ἑτέρα γὰρ σωμάτων*, "Matter is incorporeal; for it is different from body." Plotinus is still more clear in his explication of this term, Ennead. 3. lib. 6. cap. 7. *Περὶ ἀπαθείας τῶν ἀσωμάτων*, p. 210. *Ἐστὶ μὲν ὕλη ἀσώματος· ἐπείπερ τὸ σῶμα ὕστερον καὶ σύνθετον καὶ αὐτὴ μετ' ἄλλου ποιεῖ σῶμα*, "Matter is called incorporeal; because body is posterior and compound, and in

conception of motion, and the mensuration of things (for space thus considered is necessarily immoveable, as to the parts thereof respectively; as the two extremes of a yard distance can never

forming body it is joined with something else." St. Augustine, Confession. lib. 12. cap. 6. p. 159. fancied he should best explain the meaning of the word ἀσώματος by defining matter to be "something between a thing formed and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, but almost a formless nothing." Lastly, some of the later Platonists, to preclude all occasion for misinterpreting their dogma, considered that the use of the term ἀσώματος ought to be abstained from altogether; and while denying matter to be body, denied also that it was incorporeal. Among these is Apulcius, De Dogmate Platonico, p. 4. ed. Elmenhorstii: "Plato admits matter to be neither corporeal nor incorporeal. He does not consider it body, because all body possesses some sort of form: and he cannot affirm it to be without body, because nothing incorporeal exhibits body." The same is stated by Alcinous, Introd. in Philosophiam Platonis, cap. 8. But Chalcidius discusses and explains this doctrine the most copiously of any, in Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 317. &c. p. 393. &c. All these considered, there seems to me to be not so wide a difference of opinion between the Platonists and the assertors of atoms, on the nature of first matter, as many suppose: nor have the latter had much cause, that I can see, for treating the former with contempt and ridicule. The whole controversy between them, if I mistake not, amounts to this: whether it is wiser and more correct to contemplate first matter as a nature divided into infinite particles necessarily possessing form and quantity, or as something continuous and therefore divested of these. Some one, however, will object, perhaps, that there is a great difference between the two, when they come afterwards to account for forms and qualities: that the Atomists deny qualities to be distinct and separate from matter; but that the others affirm this: that the former assign clear and satisfactory causes of qualities, whereas the latter labour hard to show how qualities enter into matter, and arrive at no successful issue. I will grant this in a certain measure to be true, nor will I take upon myself the defence of the Platonists and Aristotelians, although more perhaps might be said in their favour than many imagine. But we are neither inquiring here into the philosophical fitness and utility, nor into the comparative excellence of the two doctrines: the only point under consideration being, whether the opinion of those who held matter to be incorporeal is so ridiculous and childish as many persons consider it, and a pre-eminent specimen of metaphysical folly.

III. I cannot understand the drift of Dr. Cudworth's remark, that the Platonic doctrine of incorporeal matter is nothing but the abstract notion of *potentiality*, or of the *possibility of all things in respect to God*, although I willingly agree with him as to its being a subject for the contemplation of metaphysicians rather than of physiologers. For the inquiry is not about a nature, which really exists separately, as it is conceived in the mind to exist, but simply: what idea ought to be formed in the mind of that thing which enters into the nature of all bodies, although it nowhere exists of itself out of body, so that all the phenomena of bodies can be accounted for. But even on this question, the philosophers who are pleased to contemplate matter in that manner are to a certain extent at variance. For some of them, as Plato and his genuine disciples, suppose this world to have been framed and made out of matter; and in conformity with this opinion, maintain that matter at one time existed of itself, before bodies were produced from it. See Plutarch, in his book, De Animæ Procreatione ex Timæo, p. 1014. tom. 2. opp. But others, with Aristotle at their head, who is followed in this respect by the junior Platonists, deny all beginning of the world, and consider either that God himself created the universe from all eternity, the view taken by the Platonists; or that all bodies were generated from an infinite period by the very necessity of nature, which seems to have been Aristotle's opinion. In this disputation, the former do not merely perform the part of metaphysicians, and deliberate upon a mental notion alone, to which nothing out of the mind corresponds; but also fulfil the office of physiologers, because they contemplate an object which at one time existed really and of itself, before all bodies, although at present, after once being divided, it has no longer an existence separate from them. And here I would apply that celebrated saying of Timæus Locrus, De Anima Mundi, p. 545. which was afterwards adopted by Plato and all the Platonists, but which some expounded in one way and some in another: "Matter is known λογισμῷ νόθῳ, by a spurious reason." In this maxim, Timæus denies that

possibly come nearer to one another): then do we say, that there appeareth no sufficient ground for this positive infinity of space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the world, or any figurative body, never so great, it is not impossible, but that it might be still greater and greater, without end. Which indefinite increasableness of body and space seems to be mistaken for a positive infinity thereof. Whereas, for this very reason, because it can never be so great but that more magnitude may still be added to it, therefore can it never be positively infinite. Nor is there perhaps so great an absurdity in this, that another world could not possibly be made a mile distant from this, forasmuch as there being nothing between them, they must needs touch; or that this finite world could have no mountains and valleys in the exterior surface of it, since it might be either spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or of any other regular figure, whatsoever the maker pleased to form it in. To conclude therefore, by space without the finite world, is to be understood nothing but the possibility of body, further and further, without end, yet so as never to reach to infinity; and such a space as this was there also, before this world was created, a possibility of so much body to be produced. But space and actual distance, as really mensurable by yards and poles, though it may be greater and greater without end, yet can it not be positively infinite, so as that there could be no more added to it; and therefore there can be no argument from hence to prove the necessary existence of matter.

Moreover, the existence of a Deity might be further demonstrated from this common notion, That nothing can come from nothing causally; because, if there were no God, as we could not have had any idea of him, or a perfect Being, since it must have come from nothing, and have been the idea or conception of nothing; so neither could there have been indeed any knowledge or understanding at all. For singular bodies existing

matter is comprehended by pure λογισμὸς, by simple intelligence, or νοῷ κατ' ἐπιστάμαν, as he elsewhere expresses himself, "by mind and intelligence:" and it is easy to understand his motive for doing so. For the forms are images of things alone, which are stable and eternal, have this peculiarity, that they can be contemplated and known by pure reason; whereas matter is not a form and image, but formerly existed as a nature similar to body. And yet he affirms that it can be understood by a spurious kind of reason. For at this day, after it has ceased to exist separately, and God has framed this world out of it, it belongs to the class of forms and images, and therefore is comprehended only by mind and intelligence. But formerly it existed of itself apart from all form: hence it is not perceived by pure mind, but reason is in a certain measure assisted by αἴσθησις and δόξα, "sense" and "opinion." The latter, who hold the world to be eternal, must necessarily deny that matter ever existed out of bodies. Consequently, when they dispute and reason upon this, their thoughts are confined to the mental notion alone, and therefore they merely sustain the part of metaphysicians. But I shall dismiss an argument, which in itself involves many difficult questions admitting of no satisfactory solution, and which has been rendered much more perplexed and complicated by the controversies of those who can suffer no subject to escape them, and will throw all things into confusion rather than confess themselves to be men to whom much must for ever be unknown.

without us cannot enter into us, and put understanding in us; nor is there any thing but local motions propagated from them to our organs of sense. The mind must have its immediate intelligibles within itself, for otherwise it could not possibly understand any thing; which intelligibles and their relations to one another, or verities, are (as was said before) eternal. Moreover, the mind can frame ideas or conceptions, not only of things actually existing, but also of all possibilities; which plainly implies and supposes the actual existence of a Being infinitely powerful, that could produce them. So that the proper object of mind and understanding is a perfect Being, and all the extent of its power; which perfect Being, comprehending itself and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all things, is the first original Mind, of which all other minds partake. Wherefore, were there no perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and its own power, or all the possibilities of things; the intelligible objects of the mind and ideas must have come from nothing.

However, it hath been already proved from this principle, "Nothing from nothing," that the powers of sense and understanding, or the entities of soul and mind, could never have resulted from any modifications of senseless matter whatsoever. Wherefore, since it is mathematically certain that our human souls and persons could not possibly have been generated out of matter, one of these two things will undeniably follow; that either they must all have existed of themselves, from eternity unmade; or else have been created ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, "out of an antecedent non-existence," by a perfect understanding Being unmade, or at least have derived their whole substance from it. So that it is altogether as certain that there is a God, as that our human souls and persons did not all exist from eternity of themselves. And that there must be some eternal, unmade Mind, hath been already demonstrated also from the same principle, "Nothing out of nothing." Thus have we abundantly confuted the second atheistic argumentation, that there can be no omnipotence, nor divine creation, because nothing can be made out of nothing; we having plainly shown, that this very principle, in the true sense thereof, affordeth a demonstration for the contrary.

LE CLERC'S OBSERVATIONS

ON THE PRECEDING SECTION, AGAINST THOSE WHO DENY THAT ANYTHING CAN BE MADE OUT OF NOTHING.

I. Those who deny that anything can be made out of nothing, in opposition to what is said by theologians on the subject, sometimes take this expression in a sense not noticed by Cudworth, which sufficiently shows how much occasion for abuse there is in the ambiguity of words and phrases of this description.[1] For they explain it as if divines in making use of it, meant that something could be made out of nothing in the same way as different kinds of vessels are formed out of a particular material; and therefore, they regard "nothing" as the material out of which God formed and framed the whole universe; a most absurd and ridiculous supposition. Perhaps some Atheists have suspected that this meaning was attached by theologians to this dictate of reason, because the Peripatetics speak of the formation of bodies just as if the matter of which they consist were a mere nothing. For to say the truth, the *matter* of the Peripatetic is an undefinable existence; something destitute of all properties and not at all corporeal. And in like manner what they call *form* is an entity of which no conception can be entertained, which when joined and united with matter makes it extensible, divisible, solid, and moveable, adapted to receive not only all shapes but also properties of every kind; though in itself it is neither extensible, divisible, solid, nor moveable, nor adapted to take any shape whatever. This, however, is the same thing as saying that two nothings, united and associated together, can make and constitute something; than which nothing can possibly be more absurd. But the schoolmen have not perceived the folly of this opinion, partly because they use a very obscure style of speaking, and partly because it is their fixed principle to follow the authority of their masters without hesitation. But no absurdity of this kind can be charged upon theologians, who, when they affirm that from nothing, ἐκ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, something

[1] Le Clerc names no Atheist who thus understood this expression; but it is certain that Spinoza, Orobio, and others fell into this error. Perhaps those divines who say that *nothing* is the *negative material of creation* have contributed to this.

can be made, only mean, as Cudworth has well shown, that the Divine power could make a thing, which did not previously exist, begin to have a being and existence. Apart from this, it is certain that nothing is produced without a cause or by itself.

II. Cudworth also correctly and excellently remarks that the being, whose property it is to make another being commence its existence, must not only be possessed of all the perfections which the being produced by it is supposed to enjoy; but must also have a power of action by which it can be the cause of something. A stone, for example, or any other material substance, could by no means produce an intelligent being, such as an angel or a human soul, because mere material existences are destitute of intelligence. Further, it is utterly impossible that the stone should make another stone, like itself, or even inferior and less than itself, to begin to exist.

III. This being premised, it is plainly impossible that any thing can be produced out of nothing without a cause, or that matter can be the efficient cause of bodies and minds. On which account theologians attribute the creation of these existences to God alone, as the Being who, possessing universal and absolute perfection, contains all perfections or properties (for these words have the same import), and has a power of acting and operating. If then it be inquired how it is known that such perfections belong to God, the tenet itself explained by Dr. Cudworth will supply an answer to this question. For since the perfections of all existences are not inherent in matter, which, for example, is entirely destitute of thought and action; and many natures endowed with the power of thought and action, as for instance, the human mind, have not always existed, but have had some beginning to their existence; it is absolutely necessary that they must have received these properties or perfections from him to whom they owe their orgin, that is to God; for if this were not the case, it would follow that thought and action individually produced themselves out of nothing. If those who are sceptical respecting the existence of a God were carefully and attentively to consider these arguments, I have no doubt they would perceive that the denial of a Deity involves the most absurd admissions, totally unworthy of those who lay claim to superior ability. For nothing can be imagined more irrational than to deny principles and conclusions as inevitable as geometrical propositions.

IV. I will not indeed deny that it is difficult for us to comprehend how God combines in his own nature the perfections of all things, or in what manner he operates in the creation of fresh existences or the changes he wills in others. But these difficulties ought not to induce us to despise and reject those arguments, clearer than noonday, which fully assure us of the creation of all

things. For though we may be ignorant of the manner in which a fact takes place, yet we are not on that account to deny the fact itself, if it be established by sound and indubitable reasons; for if this were permitted, we might deny the greatest part of the things we see and perceive; since a very partial acquaintance with philosophy is sufficient to show that the mode of existence of most things is wholly inexplicable. Those who are in earnest in their prosecution of truth ought to be endowed with two virtues especially, to say nothing of many others. First, they must be apt and ready for the conception of any demonstration, and its preservation in the mind; for if not, they will either make no proficiency, or if they do, they will shortly afterwards lose the fruit of their labour, and will return to their former state of ignorance. Secondly, they ought to be of such a temperament that they can remain in partial ignorance without being confused and drawn into pernicious consequences. There is an incredibly great number of things, the nature of which is unknown to the human mind; and it is the part of wisdom to regard these with composure, and not to bring them within the bounds of reasoning, lest mere verisimilitude and probability should be mistaken for truth and certainty. Our ignorance of some things does not prove that every thing is uncertain; and on the other hand, from our knowledge of much it does not follow that we can know all. Therefore, let us hold fast what we know for certain, and not be too solicitous about what evades our research; but quietly wait till some light be thrown upon it; and if this our expectation be disappointed, let us remember that another state of existence awaits us, which will entirely dispel all darkness from our minds. These are the precepts, I admit, of logicians; but the matter in hand calls for their repetition, since those with whom we now have to do seem to be forgetful of them.

V. We will endeavour then to the best of our ability to see whether we can in any way explain how it is that God possesses the perfections of all things, and how he produces other natures, to which he imparts just as many properties as are according to his will. Only two kinds of beings are known to us; one capable of thought, among which is to be ranked the human mind, and another corporeal, and therefore extensile, divisible, and solid. We have therefore to show how God possesses the perfections of these different things. First then, I assert that God possesses all the perfections of spirits, that he can understand, judge, will, and act; since from him they draw their beginning and origin. This is as easy to understand as it is to comprehend that there are other intelligent spirits besides the human mind. Nor do we find it more difficult to conceive that there are other spirits much better and more excellent than our

own, and that of these there may possibly be an infinite number. Moreover we can go further than this, and can form an idea of a spirit knowing all that can possibly be known, disturbed by no commotion of the will, and able to do all that can possibly be done. And reason itself requires us to attribute these perfections to God. For the finite and limited nature of our own perfections arises from the want of will in our Creator to afford us higher powers. If we were self-existent and independent, our perfections would be unlimited, our knowledge unbounded, our power insuperable. The perfections and attributes of God, existing from all eternity, and not being derived from another existence, can be bounded by the power and strength of no being whatever; and he who possesses eternity, which is, so to speak, the most excellent of all things, can be in want of nothing. The Deity therefore not only possesses our perfections, but also so possesses them that they are free from all limit and all imperfection; for imperfection is nothing else than a deficiency or limit to any attribute. Our minds act and operate both in themselves, and externally to themselves upon our bodies; but there is an infinite number of things to which they are not adequate; as for instance, among other things, they cannot bring into existence another mind like themselves. But the omnipotent Being can create spirits much inferior to himself; as is plain from the example of the human mind alone.

VI. But it will perhaps be asked, In what properly consists that action which is called *creation*, by which it comes to pass that what before had not an existence begins to be? First of all, there can be no doubt but that it includes a certain determination of the Divine will, since it is God that wills that any thing should be and exist. Our own minds can perform no action but willing, and therefore we cannot conceive of any other action in another spirit. But God is able to operate in a widely different manner; a manner of which we are ignorant only because we possess not ourselves a similar power. And here we must call to mind the premises laid down in sect. IV. above. Because, in this action of the Deity there is something beyond the grasp of our minds, it does not therefore follow that the certain and indubitable arguments which prove a *creation* are to be despised and rejected. Who can tell how opium produces lethargy? or in what way Peruvian bark cures intermittent fevers? And yet no doubt is entertained of the virtues of these drugs. So ought we also firmly and unwaveringly to abide by those arguments which establish the truth of a creation, though we cannot at all comprehend its mode. Nor ought it to appear marvellous or extraordinary to any rational mind, to require mankind to proceed onward with tranquillity and repose in ignorance of so great and sublime a matter; for there are innumerable particulars in the

events we see happening around us, of which we remain ignorant without anxiety or solicitude.

VII. If spirits are created by God out of nothing, there is no reason why the same should not be said of bodies. For it is not more difficult to confer the commencement of existence on bodies, than it is to create out of nothing a soul or spirit. But if the subject be regarded in reference to our own understandings, it will be far more difficult to comprehend how God, who is not corporeal, but a mere spirit, includes within his own nature the properties of bodies, than it will be to understand how he comprises spiritual attributes. But nevertheless, since God created bodies he must necessarily contain their perfections, nor ought we to deny this fact because our reason cannot comprehend its mode and nature. It must however be observed that as God possesses the properties of finite spirits without the admixture of any fault or blemish, so also he possesses the properties of bodies without any of their imperfections. Since this is the case, let us see what are the perfections inherent in bodies, and endeavour to distinguish them from those which are not corporeal.

VIII. In the first place, bodies are extensile: but this extension is contained within certain limits, because corporeal matter is imperfect. But God, who is free from all imperfection, cannot (so to speak) be finite, and must therefore necessarily have some attribute corresponding to infinite extension. And this is what is termed by theologians his *immensity* or *omnipresence*. But it is the less wonderful that we are unable to form a distinct and accurate notion of this attribute, since we have not an accurate and complete idea even of matter itself. On this account some philosophers have supposed that what we conceive of as a void and unbounded space, in which all bodies are placed, which is immoveable, immutable, prior to all bodies in existence, and the beginning of which cannot be understood, is nothing else than God himself. This opinion was embraced by Philo Judæus, as is apparent from many passages in his writings. In his book on Dreams,[2] for example, he says that God is to be called "*the Place*, since he contains all things, and is contained by none." I am unwilling to touch upon this thorny and very intricate question; but I must insist that there must necessarily be in God some perfection corresponding to infinite extension.

IX. Matter can be cut and divided; but not so God. For to be divisible is an imperfection, which arises from the finite nature of matter, and its capability of being moved, that is of being subject to the action of another being able to change its state. But God is able to divide bodies, since we ourselves,

[2] Page 575. ed. Paris. On this opinion, which is not yet extinct, we have already offered some observations.—*Mosheim.*

imperfect as we are, are able to do this. There is however in this respect a great deal of difference between our own power and that of the Deity. God can by dividing and dissecting bodies come to the elements of which they consist. But we can only dissect them to a certain extent, namely so far as our senses can apprehend their particles. What is called solidity in bodies is only a mutual connexion and cohesion of the particles of which they consist, the causes and manner of which are unknown to us. If we are able to render compact and united the particles which otherwise would be dispersed and disjointed, much more is God able to do this; and he alone knows the reason, inscrutable to us, why they mutually adhere to each other. Therefore, though not possessing the attribute of solidity himself, he is able to confer it upon bodies. The adaptation of bodies to take a certain shape and form arises from their being finite, moveable, and visible. These properties being rather *passive* than *active*, cannot inhere in the Deity.

X. It is therefore plain that God contains all the perfections that are to be found in matter, and this would be much more clearly understood by us if we were acquainted with the internal nature of bodies. All that we know of them, however, suffices to prove that God possesses *eminently*, as the schoolmen say, that is in a far more excellent way, and without the admixture of any blemish or imperfection, all that appears in matter to have any appearance or semblance of perfection. Now if it be required to explain and describe that action of the Deity by which he brings into existence a body that was not in being before, and the manner in which he imparts to bodies the properties which we see they possess, we must ingenuously confess that the weakness of our minds will not allow of this; and that we can *à posteriori* ascertain only this one fact, that material beings were created by God. In all matter there is so much imperfection that it is impossible to believe that it has existed from eternity; nor does there appear in it any indication of its being everlastingly existent, and owing none of its properties to another being. It would be ridiculous and foolish presumption to think that the creation of matter was not to be admitted, because we cannot form by reasoning a clear and perspicuous idea of its creation. For there are innumerable things of which we have no clear and perspicuous ideas. And if we were immediately to deny the truth of all of which we could form only a confused and imperfect idea, we must deny almost every thing except the relations that exist between certain abstract ideas. Who can claim an acquaintance with the internal nature either of bodies or spirits? And yet that there are such beings does not admit of a doubt. Who can pretend to a knowledge of the manner in which one of these kinds of beings acts upon the

other? Who can justly boast that he is acquainted with the causes which give rise to the effects which we see constantly happening in connexion with certain bodies? Yet no one will dare to doubt this operation of the soul on the body, or the effects produced by it. Let us, therefore, hold fast what we know for certainty, and not suffer ourselves to be moved from it because there are on the other hand many things, of the nature of which we are ignorant. Let us rather bear with tranquillity the reflection, that many things escape our faculties and exceed our knowledge.

A DISSERTATION

BY

JOHN LAURENCE MOSHEIM,

SHOWING WHETHER ANY HEATHEN PHILOSOPHER EVER TAUGHT THAT THE WORLD WAS CREATED BY GOD OUT OF NOTHING.

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1. The doctrine of the creation of the world out of nothing was in force among Christians from the very commencement of Christianity. 2. Yet some disallowed it, particularly the followers of Origen and the Platonists. 3. Whether certain heathen philosophers were of the same opinion, is doubtful. 4. The utility of this question. 5. State of the controversy. 6. Two passages of Aristotle explained, which refer generally to this subject. 7. Opinions of the ancient philosophers respecting the origin of things explained and illustrated. 8. Verses of Empedocles relating to this subject. 9. Passages of Seneca. 10. Whether Orpheus allowed of a creation out of nothing. 11. On Hesiod. 12. On Xeniades, the Corinthian. 13. Certain Pythagoreans who seem to favour this opinion are rather chargeable with Spinozism. 14. Nor is it clear that Philolaus, the Pythagorean, embraced it. 15. Plato is supposed by many to be the favourer of a creation out of nothing. 16. This, however, is easily contradicted out of Plato himself. 17. Nor is any objection to this valid, drawn from his Timæus and Sophist, or from the Philebus. 18. Dacier's reasons in support of the affirmative futile. 19. Matter and sensible objects called "nothing" by the Platonists. 20. Whether a creation out of nothing was held by Aristotle or by the Stoics. 21. Or by the Egyptians. 22. Or by the Chinese. 23. Or by the Japanese. 24. Or by the Modern Hindoos. 25. Or by the ancient Brahmins. 26. Or by the Phœnicians. 27. Or by the ancient or modern Persians. 28. Or by the Etruscans. 29. Many ancients and moderns have supposed that some of the later Platonists have advocated a creation out of nothing. 30. Passages by them on this subject. 31. But all this sect believed the world to have existed from all eternity. 32. Those of them therefore who have said that matter was created, have meant only the "idea" of matter.

I. AMONG the doctrines justly esteemed sacred by Christians, as being taught by our Saviour, not the least important is that which refers the origin of the whole universe solely to the Deity, and inculcates a belief that the world was created and made out of nothing by the infinite power of God. This tenet was in force in the very commencement of Christianity, nor was any one admitted into church-fellowship without a public profession

that God was the Creator and Author of all things, and even of matter itself, the material of which they consist; which fact alone, even if the scriptures were silent on the subject, would be an argument to candid and considerate persons that the doctrine proceeded from Christ and his apostles. The unknown ancient Christian writer, called Hermas, who lived in the first century, places this very tenet among the principles of the Christian religion which he enjoins all to receive. Πρῶτον πάντων, says he,[1] πιστεῦσον ὅτι εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ ποιήσας ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι, "First of all believe that there is one God, who created and made all things out of nothing." And Christian ministers afterwards constantly maintained the same doctrine, with a few exceptions in which human subtleties were preferred to Christian simplicity; a fact which, if it were necessary, might be proved by innumerable passages out of their writings. There are, moreover, extant long and able disputations of most of the ancient fathers against those who held that matter, like God, had existed from all eternity;[2] which clearly demonstrate what were their views respecting the creation. (There is a discussion by Beausobre on this subject, Histoire des Manichées, vol. 2. p. 166, but not characterized by much diligence or accuracy.) Wherefore those who within our own and our fathers' memory have rashly asserted that this opinion was not in existence previously to the time of the schoolmen, and that it was unknown to the primitive Christians (as it is certain some have done[3]), do not stand so much in need of a refutation as of an admonition to look to their own ignorance, and not to utter any more decisions till they have acquired a greater knowledge of ancient history and philosophy.

II. There can be no doubt that previously to the Christian era the Jews held the same opinion derived from Moses. (See 2 Maccabees vii. 28. This, however, is called in question by Beausobre, Histoire des Manichées, vol. 2. p. 182.) No church indeed is so pure and holy as not sometimes to contain some corrupt members, and therefore I will not deny that there were some, both among the Jews and the primitive Christians, who, rejecting the opinion publicly and generally entertained, preferred their own fancies respecting the origin of nature rather than the reception of the doctrines of holy writ. But it is

[1] Shepherd, lib. 2. commandment 1. p. 85. vol. 1. of Patres Apostolici, ed. Coteler. See also lib. 1. vision 1. p. 75.

[2] See the collections made from various writers by Eusebius, Prepar. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 19. &c. p. 333. &c.

[3] James Windet, a learned English physician, in his book De Vitâ Functorum Statû, sect. 2. p. 48. says, "A certain madman, however, in his 'Introduction,' p. 19. has thought proper to accuse the schoolmen as having been the first to imagine a creation out of nothing, from an erroneous signification of the Hebrew word בָּרָא." Compare also Burnet's Archæologia Philos. lib. 2. cap. 9. p. 453.

neither wise nor candid to form an opinion of the whole mass, or of a majority, from a few instances and examples. Procopius Gazæus, a respectable Scripture interpreter of the sixth century, says that in his time there were some who asserted that Moses learned from the Egyptians that the world was made by God out of a certain eternal kind of matter, and that therefore in the Greek Septuagint version of the first chapter of Genesis, the word ἐποίησε, "made," is made use of, which is also usually applied to the formation of things out of some material. I will adduce Procopius' own words from the Greek, which have been quoted by the Jesuit Stephen Souciet,[4] and will give a translation of them; since that of Clauser, published in his Comment on Genesis,[5] is obscure, and not faithful to the original. Τὸ γὰρ ἐποίησεν, ἐπειδὴ λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ τινὸς γιγομένων, οἷον ὅτι ἐκ σιδήρου δρέπανον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ὁ τεχνίτης ἐποίησε, δέδωκε τισὶ λαβὴν τοῦ λέγειν, ὡς Μωυσῆς ἐξ Αἰγυπτίων μαθὼν ἐξ ὕλης προϋκειμένης γεγονέναι τὸ πᾶν, εἰκότως εἶπεν ἐποίησεν. Ὧν ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν συκοφαντίαν οἱ ἑρμηνεύσαντες ἐποίησεν εἶπαν, "Since the word ἐποίησε is used also of those things which are made from any material, as for instance when a workman makes a scythe out of iron, or any thing of a similar description, hence occasion has been given to some to say that Moses learning from the Egyptians that the universe was made out of pre-existing matter, agreeably to this opinion made use of the word ἐποίησε. Of whose cunning the translators being ignorant, rendered the Hebrew word by ἐποίησε." There were therefore at that time among Christians some, who not only denied the creation of the universe out of nothing, but also endeavoured to claim Moses as being of their opinion. (Several Christian authors holding the eternity of matter have been enumerated by Faydit, Eclaircissements sur l'Histoire Ecclesiastique, p. 35, who is not however implicitly to be trusted. Beausobre has mentioned his doubts respecting Justin Martyr, ubi supra, p. 165. See also p. 234.) I suspect that the disciples and followers of Origen are here aimed at; for since Origen allowed himself to be ensnared by the delusions of the later Platonists, he also followed them in maintaining the eternity of the universe, and asserted that God had from infinite ages always produced matter from himself, as is evident from Methodius,[6] and other passages already adduced

[4] In his "Observations" on the posthumous work of Richard Simon, which was published at Paris, 1730. 4 vols. 8vo. and entitled, Critique de la Bibliothèque des Auteurs Ecclesiastiques de M. Dupin, vol. 1. p. 690. Souciet owned himself to be the author of these "Observations," though his name does not appear on the title-page; so that it is a mistake to ascribe them to Tournemine, a learned antiquarian of the same order.

[5] Page 2 of the Latin edition by Conrad Clauser, Zurich, 1555. folio. This Comment has not yet been published in Greek.

[6] In his book Περὶ τῶν γεννητῶν, in Photius, Bibliothecæ, Codex 235. p. 934.

by P. D. Huet,[7] by which doctrine he almost abrogated a creation out of nothing. He differed indeed a little from Hermogenes, Marcion, and others, who held that matter was equally eternal with God, and was not at all subject to the Deity; but these the vigilance of Christian ministers never suffered to be ranked among the number of orthodox Christians, but by their acts and writings expelled them from the church. Yet Origen agreed with them so far as to deny that all things were created by God out of nothing, though at the same time he affirmed that matter, out of which all things were made, depended from all eternity upon God. From Origen, whose authority among Christians of the third and fourth centuries was incredible, and from the Platonic philosophers, who enjoyed at that time the highest reputation, this dangerous sentiment was derived to several others, and infected the minds of some, both Greeks and Latins, who were in other respects considered advocates and defenders of purer doctrine. I will give one instance out of many, in a great man who was canonized after his death; I mean Boethius, who exactly followed the Platonists respecting the universe, and disallowed its eternity, while admitting it to have been perpetual. "Therefore," says he, "if we wish to denominate things correctly, following Plato, we say that God is eternal but the world perpetual." So that even among those Christians who were not otherwise chargeable with any serious doctrinal errors, there were some who repudiated the ancient doctrine respecting the origin of the universe; but this is no reason why we should not consider the public and common opinion among the primitive Christians to have been, that through divine power what formerly had no existence began to be and exist at the time when the world was created. I say nothing now of another sort of Christians, among whom there were some eminent men, who formed a kind of connecting link between Platonists and Christians, and who granted that the visible universe was made by God out of nothing, but at the same time held that another and a far better universe, which could not yet be seen, had together with God existed from all eternity;[8] a part of which opinion was also adopted by those among the Greeks who in the fourteenth century were called Palamites, and some later divines among the Roman Catholics.

III. It is not however agreed among the learned whether, besides the Jews and Christians, who derived this tenet from the Scriptures, any heathen or infidel philosophers ever attained so far under the sole guidance of reason as to hold that the whole universe, not only in its form but also in its

[7] In his Origeniana, lib. 2. quest. 12. sect. 4. p. 165.

[8] See Basil the Great's Comment. in Hexaëmeron, hom. 1. sect. 5. p. 5 of the 1st vol. of his works.

material, was made by God. It is thought by many that the whole crowd of philosophers, Greek, Latin, and Barbarian; all who were not acquainted with divine revelation, either considered the universe itself to be eternal, or at least held that the matter composing the universe had no beginning, supposing that it received the form it now bears by means of some law or natural motion, or else that it was so ordered and arranged by God. "All philosophers," says Gassendi,[9] "agree in the preexistence of the matter of which the universe is composed, because nothing can be produced from nothing; whereas, however, scripture truth declares that the universe was created out of nothing, and from no material." With him agree many respectable and learned authors, among whom, to prevent tediousness, it will be sufficient for me to name James Thomas,[10] who is known to have been well versed in the doctrines and opinions of the ancients. (Other authorities are given by Beausobre.) Thomas Burnet has gone further still, denying that the Jews believed the creation of the universe out of nothing, and maintaining that this doctrine is not of older date than the Christian religion. "It is to be remarked," says he,[1] "that the ancients believed that out of nothing nothing was produced, and that all substance always did and always will exist in some mode or other. For the doctrine respecting the eduction of beings from nothing and their annihilation was unknown to the philosophers, and seems to have been first introduced by Christian theology." And shortly after: "Creation and annihilation in the modern sense are factitious words; for no single word is to be found either in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, possessing anciently this signification." This, however, is strenuously opposed by others not inferior in learning; who, though they do not deny that many of the ancient philosophers were ignorant of a creation out of nothing, yet think that some of them, more able than the rest, attained by dint of thought to this opinion, and that others were instructed by their ancestors to entertain the same opinion as Christians respecting the origin of nature. This opinion was mooted by some of the Christian fathers, who are known to have anxiously avoided the appearance of any discrepancy between the doctrines of the philosophers and those of Christianity. Among these Clemens Alexandrinus asserted that not only Plato and Orpheus, but also the Stoics themselves maintained

[9] Physics, sect. 1. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 163. tom. 1. opp. See also lib. 7. cap. 6. p. 481. 484. &c.

[10] Schediasma Philosophicum, sect. 37. p. 54. 55.

[1] Archæologia Philosophica, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 326. See also lib. 2. cap. 9. p. 453; and Francis Baltus's Défense des Pères accusés de Platonisme, lib. 3. p. 325. "Neither Plato nor the other ancient philosophers have ever recognized a creation properly so called."

that the world was made out of nothing.[2] The moderns, however, who have lived since the revival of literature, have defended this view with greater ability and erudition; their object being to give a more favourable aspect in some minds to the Christian religion, by showing that its most difficult doctrines were formerly embraced by those who had no other guide than the light of reason. Augustine Steuchus, bishop of Eugubium, throughout the whole of the seventh book of his well-known work De Perenni Philosophiâ, does nothing but endeavour to prove that all philosophers of every locality and description, among Greeks and Barbarians, admitted that God was the Creator and Architect of the universe. But he is not so explicit as the nature of the case requires, nor does he show with sufficient clearness whether he merely means that these philosophers denied the eternity of the universe, or whether he supposes that they held that matter itself was made out of nothing by God. There is no doubt but that the most eminent and excellent among the ancient philosophers supposed the universe to have had a beginning, that it did not always exist, and even that it was constructed and put together by divine contrivance. But it is very doubtful whether any of them ever said that the matter itself of which the universe is composed had no existence before it was produced by divine omnipotence. Steuchus gives hints here and there, from which it may be with great probability concluded that he was favourable to the opinion which supposes that the material of the universe was an efflux from the Divine nature itself; and it must also be remarked that he supposed a certain divine and uncreated light to have existed from eternity, and to have flowed from the Deity himself; which opinion of his has been severely censured by Dionysius Petavius.[3] Hence it appears, that he himself did not entertain precisely correct opinions concerning the origin of things, and seems in a manner himself to have denied the creation of the universe out of nothing; whence the reason is very obvious why he speaks with such obscurity and confusion on this topic. I mention this for the sake of those who say that Steuchus has shown more copiously than any one else, that there was no difference between the ancient philosophers and Christians on the origin of nature: an assertion which, taken without any modification, is undoubtedly erroneous. Those who have written on this subject since the time of Steuchus have not thrown much more light upon it. Hugo Grotius endeavours to prove[4] that the Phœnicians, Hin-

[2] Stromata, lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 701. 724. See also Eusebius, Demonstratio Evangelica, lib. 3. cap. 3. p. 106.

[3] Dogmat. Theol. tom. 1. lib. 3. De Deo et Proprietatibus Dei, cap. 5. sect. 3. p. 144. &c.

[4] In the notes to his book De Veritate Religionis Christianæ, lib. 1. sect. 16. p. 29.

doos, Egyptians, and Greeks, agreed with Moses respecting the origin of the universe; but he has left his readers to guess how far he meant this affirmation to extend, and does not clearly signify whether he supposed that even Moses himself taught a creation out of nothing. Peter Daniel Huet, in his Questions on the Accordance of Reason and Faith, which he has entitled Alnetanæ, in a remarkable chapter,[5] has taken upon himself to prove that the most famous philosophers had the same views of the origin of the universe as the ancient Hebrews and Christians; and at the very commencement of his discussion he mentions that three opinions were entertained respecting the universe, the first place among which he assigns to that which supposes that all things were created by God out of nothing. But he afterwards entirely forgets this classification, and does not point out which of the philosophers whose sentiments he mentions he intends to comprehend under the first class, with the single exception of Plato, whom he expressly affirms to have referred the formation of all things to the Deity. Almost the same deficiency is to be met with in Tobias Pfanner, a similar writer. He says[6] that many philosophers, though they held that God was the maker of the universe, yet joined with him an eternal matter; but at the same time he notices that some of them were much better than others, and ascribed a beginning to matter also. But it will be in vain to inquire of him who, out of the long list he has mentioned, those were who entertained the orthodox sentiment. But there are not wanting others who have been less ambiguous in the explanation of this subject, and have mentioned by name those who have thought that not only the form but also the matter of the universe had a beginning. For to pass by those, some of whom I shall hereafter mention, who have proved that one or another of the philosophers have entertained this opinion, Livius Galantes, a professor of both kinds of philosophy at Imola, has endeavoured to prove that not a few of the Platonists had opinions respecting the origin of the universe not inferior to those of Christians.[7] This has been also done by Cudworth, who has given us the occasion of making these observations, and supposes that as in other things so also in this particularly, the later Platonists are not to be considered much below the Christians.[8] Others have gone a little further, and have endeavoured to bring into the association of those who hold this opinion not only the Platonists, but also all the Greek and Barbarian philosophers of any name or standing. Edmund Dickinson, an Englishman, thinks

[5] Lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 109.

[6] Systema Theologiæ Gentilis Purioris, cap. 5. sect. 3. &c. p. 156.

[7] Comparatio Christianæ Theologiæ cum Platonicâ, lib. 9. p. 236. Bologna, 1627, fol.

[8] Intellectual System, cap. 5. sect. 2. p. 73, &c.

that all the ancient natural philosophers before Aristotle, as well as the Phœnicians, Egyptians, and also Hesiod, supposed the Supreme Deity to be the artificer and creator of matter.[9] Among the divines of our own [Lutheran] communion, Adam Tribbechovius[1] thinks that all the ancients, with few exceptions, entertained no doubt respecting the origin of matter. J. A. Fabricius[2] has also done something towards proving the truth of the same view; and has quoted some passages from the ancients not noticed by others. Very recently the authors of the Universal History, in their Prolegomena, translated last year into French, maintain that not only some of the more excellent of the Greeks, but also the Etruscans, Magi, Hindoos, Japanese, Chinese, and others, were but little different from the Christian religion in this particular.[3] It is not necessary to enumerate any more of the same opinion; since these are by far the principal for weight of authority, extent of learning, and number of quotations.

IV. This disagreement among learned men has induced me to take some pains in the elucidation of this question, which I shall attempt in the present Dissertation. Nor is this inquiry of small importance. For since it is always useful to know how far those who possessed not divine revelation attained in the knowledge of the truth, so at the present time it is requisite to understand how much confidence may be assigned to those who are always talking about the unison of philosophy with Christianity; who are constantly accused by many inimical to all religion of ignorance of antiquity and of pious frauds, while by others they are thought to occasion more injury than advantage to the interests of Christianity. I say nothing of the benefits resulting to those who have to explore the recesses of philosophic or of sacred history, and to ascertain the real nature of the doctrines and opinions which were taught by the founders of philosophic sects and by the bishops of Christian churches. I will therefore go over in order, those to whom learned men have attributed the honour of a uniformity of belief respecting the origin of nature with the followers of our Saviour, and I will candidly inquire whether they merit this degree of commendation. First of all I will bring under notice the Grecian philosophers who have had the credit of this opinion, and from whom the Latins afterwards derived their doctrines; then I will pro-

[9] Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. De Creatione Materiæ, p. 195. 198.

[1] In a Dissertation entitled Veritas Creationis Mundi, prout à Mose descripta est, ostensa in Traditionibus, Gentium ac Vetustissimis Antiquitatis Profanæ Monumentis, Kiel, 1668; which has been reprinted by Thomas Cren, and published in his Fasciculus Dissertationum Historico-Critico-Philologicarum, Rotterdam, 1691, 8vo.; cap. 2, p. 276, and elsewhere.

[2] Bibliotheca Græca, lib. 2. cap. 12. sect. 7. p. 464.

[3] P. 139. ed. Hague, 1731.

ceed to the nations that are usually termed "barbarous," in accordance with the custom of the Greeks and Romans; and last of all will come in the later Platonists, who founded an entirely new and peculiar sect; the nature of which I have elsewhere explained, and who have more patrons and defenders than the other ancient philosophers; on which account I think it necessary to treat of them separately and more in detail.

V. But before I come to the point in dispute, it will be necessary for me carefully to define what is the precise subject in question, and to be discussed; lest any opening should be left for the unskilful or the contentious. The inquiry is not whether any philosopher or other individual of intellect or ability, but destitute of divine revelation, ever attained so far as to believe that God was the only maker of this world either as regards form or material; nor yet, whether the doctrine of a creation out of nothing be one of those which unassisted human reason could of itself discover. I am persuaded that such is the power of the human mind, especially of those who through the favour of Divine Providence are able to perceive the consequences and the repugnances of things, that even without divine revelation they may be able to know and comprehend that to join with God an eternal matter, and to suppose that from this he formed the world, involves inextricable difficulties, and leads to very absurd and irrational conclusions; and that on this account they might conclude that the universe was altogether created by God, though their mental ability was entirely inadequate to explain how this came to pass. And in this opinion I am supported by those who cannot be accused of ignorance or stupidity, or of an undue partiality for the interests of Christianity. Benedict Pererius, a very learned Jesuit, whose works, though now neglected, are not destitute of ability or eloquence, brings, as I remember, eight arguments from which reason alone might ascertain that in the doctrine of a creation out of nothing, there was no great cause of offence to any wise man.[4] (See Bibliotheca Britannica, vol. 5. sect. 1. p. 145.) And among these there are some that could not fail to strike the mind of any one sincerely desirous after truth. Bayle also[5] endeavours to prove by the most weighty reasons, that no one who wishes to avoid the most absurd opinions can doubt that the material of the universe proceeded from God. Two of the greatest philosophers of our own day, John Locke and Sir Isaac Newton, not only contend that the creation of the universe is consistent with right reason, but also maintain that we can in some sort comprehend the mode of this, if we endeavour to emancipate ourselves from

[4] De Communibus Omnium Rerum Naturalium Principiis et Affectionibus.
[5] Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 3. art. Ovidius, note C. p. 2140.

the bonds of popular opinions on the subject.[6] Though this may be rather too bold an assertion, yet since it is made by authorities which few will object to when subjects of a difficult and transcendental nature are in question, it is something in favour of those who hold that the darkness of our minds need not prevent us from ascending up to one Parent and Maker of the whole universe. And who does not know that those who have by their writings confuted infidels, have by weighty arguments convicted them of ignorance and dulness in supposing that the universe, or at least the matter of which it is composed, never had a beginning. I know that no stone has been left unturned by the enemies of God and the foes of religion, to prove that the Christian doctrine respecting the origin and commencement of nature is in the highest degree irrational; among whom Count Boulainvilliers may claim the first place for boldness and cunning.[7] But after all their efforts they can do nothing more than prove what no wise man will deny, that the human mind is too limited to take in and comprehend so great a subject; but it is quite beyond their power to prove, what however they ought to prove in order to gain their point, that to suppose a necessary and self-existent Being capable of forming something out of nothing, involves a contradiction.[8] These things being considered, I will readily grant that not one perhaps, but several formerly existed, unknown to us at the present day, who so far raised themselves by dint of reasoning above the vulgar as to admit that the Deity made the world out of no pre-existing material. The question here, therefore, will be respecting those sects and philosophers whose books or opinions have come down to our own times; nor shall we inquire what they might have thought under the guidance of reason, but what they really did think, and what they inculcated on others. To sum up the whole in a few words: I shall only undertake to examine whether among the ancients or their philosophers, whose tenets and doctrines are recorded in literature, or whose writings are still extant, any were so sober and rational as to conclude that God not only brought the universe into shape, but also by his infinite power formed and created matter which had no previous existence.

VI. Those who are in favour of the affirmative of this proposition, in the first place appeal to some passages of the ancients

[6] Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, lib. 4. cap. 10. sect. 18. p. 566. and also the Observations of Peter Coste on this passage, in a recent edition of the French translation, Amsterdam, 1729. 4to.

[7] Refutation du Système de Spinoza, as his pestiferous book is entitled, which ought rather to have been inscribed Explication et Défense des Sentimens de Spinoza, p. 68.

[8] On this subject it is worth while to consult the remarks of Isaac Orobio, a learned Jew, in his Certamen Philosophicum Propugnatæ Veritatis Divinæ et Naturalis adversus Johannem Bredenberg, p. 400 & 463.

from which they think this may be generally understood. Two of these are taken from Aristotle, one from Empedocles, and the last from Seneca. Aristotle has left it on record that all the philosophers previously to himself affirmed that heaven was generated or made: Γενόμενον μὲν οὖν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν.[9] These words have been interpreted by Dickinson and others as if Aristotle meant that all the ancient sages thought that the world was made out of nothing. But it is obvious that this is an unwarranted assumption. For does the assertion that any thing is made and produced involve at the same time the affirmation that nothing existed from which it could be generated and made? Many of the ancients, indeed, attributed to the universe a beginning and origin; but they did not on that account the less strenuously maintain that matter had existed from eternity. An additional consideration, which entirely refutes this exposition, is, that Aristotle in other passages, which I shall presently adduce, says that all the natural philosophers denied that out of nothing any thing could be produced. The other passage of Aristotle has a more specious appearance, and may occasion a great deal of perplexity to those who estimate the expressions of the ancients according to our own modes of speech. The leader of the Peripatetics is disputing against Xenophanes, who had held that out of nothing, nothing could be produced, and wishes to show that this tenet was neither true nor was approved of by all the philosophers; a point which he proves without much ingenuousness, for, like the sophists, he changes the meanings of words in order to overwhelm his opponent. This however by the bye. Let us now only attend to the manner in which he shows that there were some who thought that from nothing something could be produced: Λέγεταί τε καὶ σφόδρα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαί τε τὰ μὴ ὄντα, καὶ μὴ γεγονέναι πολλὰ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι οἱ τυγχάνοντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δοξάντων εἶναι σοφῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν,[10] "And it is often said by them that the things that are not exist, and that not many things have existed of things that are not; and this not the vulgar merely, but even some of those who are accounted wise men have said." He then subjoins a passage out of Hesiod; and afterwards passes on to another sect: Πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι εἶναι μὲν οὐδέν φασι, γίνεσθαι δὲ πάντα· λέγοντες ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα· ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς γε δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἂν γίνεσθαι, "Many others say that nothing *is*, but that all things *exist*, asserting that existing things exist out of things that are not; so that it is plain that to some it appears that they exist out of things that are not." It is plain that two sects of philosophers are here alluded

[9] Lib. 1. de Cœlo, cap. 10. p. 632. tom. 1. opp.

[10] De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ, cap. 1. p. 836. tom. 2. opp.

to by Aristotle as maintaining that something can be produced out of nothing. Can there then exist a doubt that this doctrine was advocated by some among the ancient sages? Indeed, I still doubt it, and hope to be able show that this passage of the Stagirite is not sufficient entirely to remove all hesitation on this subject. In the first place I will call upon Aristotle himself, who in many other places says that the whole crowd of natural philosophers esteemed nothing to be more ancient and important than the axiom, Ex nihilo nihil fit. On one occasion he says that the first professors of philosophy feared nothing more than the admission of any thing inconsistent with this dogma: Ὁ μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες, τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γένεσθαι προϋπάρχοντος.[1] In another place he says that "the common opinion of naturalists," κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν φυσικῶν,[2] was such as we have mentioned. And many other similar expressions are to be found in Aristotle's writings, which it is not necessary here to transcribe. That Aristotle was correct in making these assertions may be known from the opinions of the naturalists and philosophers which are recorded by him, and explained in other writings of the ancients. How then can he contradict himself, and in the passage which we have under consideration affirm, that an important section of philosophers held that many things were created out of nothing? But it is easy to perceive that this observation will not be sufficient to overturn the views of those who maintain that the ancient philosophers did not greatly differ from the doctrines of Christianity. Therefore I will come more directly to the passage under discussion, and will show that it must be understood in a sense widely different from what it appears to bear to those who annex modern ideas to ancient expressions. And in the first place, I wish to observe that Aristotle is not here speaking of the creation and origin of the universe at large, but only of the production of the things we perceive by daily experience in our own world; whence it is evident that even if these words were to be taken in the sense put upon them, yet they would afford little aid to those who seek for a creation by divine power out of nothing among the tenets of the ancient philosophers. For though to believe that something is made out of nothing when an animal, a tree, or any other being is produced, involves some necessity, for the sake of consistency, of admitting that God once created all things out of nothing; yet still the cases are far from being identical. In the next place, I contend that the very words of Aristotle are opposed to the supposition that any of the ancient philosophers were so acute as to entertain the same sentiments

[1] Lib. 1. De Generatione et Corruptione, cap. 3. p. 705. tom. 1. opp.
[2] Natural. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 450.

as the Christians did respecting the origins of things. Two kinds of philosophers are evidently spoken of by Aristotle; the first of which held, as he says, τὰ μὴ ὄντα γίγνεσθαι, "that the things that are not, exist." If the term τὰ μὴ ὄντα be here taken in the sense of *nothing* or *nonentity*, the opinion mentioned will be most foolish and absurd. For these philosophers would then be made to say that nothing, a nonentity, existed; that is, that what neither does nor can exist, yet began to be and exist. So that, unless we suppose the philosophers so greatly praised by Aristotle to be utterly deranged, we must conclude that the words τὰ μὴ ὄντα must have had with them a very different meaning from that of "nothing." The other kind of philosophers are said by the Stagirite to inculcate "that nothing *is*, but that all things *exist*;" to explain which he adds, that they held that ἐκ μὴ ὄντων "of things that are not all things exist." If in this sentence the phrase τὰ μὴ ὄντα has the same meaning as "nothing," then these teachers would inculcate that all things which now exist and are produced, are made out of no material, but are entirely created and produced, nor is there now any material from which any thing could be produced; for they do not say that all things once existed out of nothing, but that they always do so; nor do they say that there was once a time when nothing *was*, but that nothing *is*. Thus then they would have taught that something *is* and *is* not; for things that exist and are generated, certainly *are*; and they must have entirely annulled the evidence of the senses, and yet at the same time have asserted their infallibility; to say nothing of other consequences equally absurd and ridiculous, for which they must be held accountable if this were their meaning. On which account it is plain that these words of Aristotle are to be explained in a widely different sense from what is assigned to them by those who think they have in them discovered philosophers who are in favour of a creation out of nothing; nor do the words τὰ μὴ ὄντα bear the meaning of "nothing."

VIII. I will now try whether I can so explain the opinions mentioned by Aristotle, and which are at the present day involved in obscurity, as to make his meaning apparent to all. This endeavour will not be without its use, since it will afford me the opportunity of making some observations, of which I perceive many to be ignorant, yet without which it is impossible correctly to explain the doctrines either of the ancient philosophers or primitive Christians. I will begin with the words τὸ ὂν and τὸ μὴ ὂν, which gradually, as often happens, acquired a very different meaning from what they had in earlier Greek periods. Τὸ ὂν, among the most ancient Greek philosophers, meant what is immutable, constant, perennial, fixed, and definite; τὸ μὴ ὂν what does not possess a certain and constant

nature, but is perpetually flowing, changing, gliding onwards, and altering. If proof of this be required it may be found in Aristotle's Physics, his books De Generatione et Corruptione, and his Metaphysics, and also in Plato's Parmenides and other dialogues; though it will be sufficiently evident from what will be presently adduced. Now, of all the controversies that divided the ancient speculative philosophers, this was among the principal: —whether or not there were any τὸ ὂν, any immutable nature free from all change. The affirmative was held by many great and famous men, and the negative by others. Those who maintained that there was a τὸ ὂν, some abiding nature entirely free from all actual change, were yet divided among themselves as to what kind or description it was of. Those who on the other hand contended that the universe was subject to perpetual changes, and thought that nothing was stable, but every thing transitory, were again very diversified in their opinions when they came to speak more in detail respecting the whole question, and to give an account of natural phenomena. On this discord and variety of opinions which divided the ancient sages, much more might be easily said; but my present purpose compels me to study brevity. But in nothing was there a wider and greater difference between these philosophic sects than in the explanation of the production of all things; a subject which at all times greatly exercised the minds of those who endeavoured to explain the causes of natural events. Those who believed there was a stable and immutable nature, τὸ ὂν, made no doubt but that out of this all things were produced that are in existence, yet in such a manner that this nature should receive no injury, but remain always one and the same, though it were changed into various forms and shapes. Those, on the contrary, who had decided that all things suffered a perpetual flux and eternal mutation, could not but hold that not only external forms and appearances were changed when any thing was brought into existence, but that also the internal nature of the material was changed and altered. And these two sects were parted into several subdivisions, to speak of which particularly would take up a great deal of time. Therefore, although there were many opinions among the ancients respecting the origin and production of things, which are often brought under review by Aristotle[3] and other ancient authors; yet they may all be reduced with propriety to these two general heads. Some taught that all things were produced and created ἐκ τῶν ὄντων, "of things that truly *are*;" which was the opinion of those who believed in the τὸ ὂν, though, as I have already observed, they were not all agreed

[3] Lib. 1. De Generatione et Corruptione, cap. 1. p. 697. cap. 3. p. 704. Physic. Auscult. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 451. lib. 3. De Cœlo, cap. 1. p. 687. tom. 1. opp.

among themselves, Others, opposed to these, decided that all things were made and produced ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, which is the same thing as if they had said that in production things became what they were not previously, and passed into another nature; and this was the opinion of those who contended that there was nothing immutable or free from change. It will be proper to confirm this difference of opinion among the ancients respecting the generation of things by the words of Aristotle himself, since our principal business at present is to ascertain the force and meaning of his words. Zeno, Parmenides, and Melissus supposed that there was a τὸ ὄν, a stable and immutable nature, as is well known to those who are acquainted with the history of ancient philosophy; therefore they were reckoned among those who taught that all things were produced and created ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος. Aristotle says of Zeno: Πρῶτον μὲν ὂν λαμβάνει καὶ οὗτος τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ὄντος, ὥσπερ ὁ Μέλισσος,[4] "And first indeed he also, like Melissus, supposes that what exists, exists *out of what is*;" that is, that beneath all things that exist there lies concealed one perpetual and immutable nature, which in different ways passes into such various forms. Those who were of this way of thinking were said by ancient writers entirely to annul all generation and corruption; an expression, which not being correctly understood by writers of succeeding ages, led them into an entirely absurd opinion of these philosophers. For they have left it on record, that it was believed by persons of this description, that nothing at all was born or died, and that no motion existed, which if they had maintained they must have been plainly stupid and mad, and more worthy of any name than that of philosophers. So that I am sorry that modern writers of ability and acuteness should have been so incautious as to make no doubt but that this was correctly attributed to them; an error which they might have avoided by greater diligence in the examination of the modes of expression made use of by the ancients. But on this subject I have already made some observations elsewhere;[5] to which I may now add that I was very glad when I understood that great and acute man, Peter Gassendi, not to differ greatly from my own opinion.[6] Those who were opposed to the philosophers of whom I have been speaking, and who denied the existence of any stable and perennial substratum of all things, said that every thing was produced ἐκ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, "from things that *are not*." Aristotle says of this class: Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἁπλῶς γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, "For first they confess that any thing simply exists out of what *is not*;" that is, they taught that when things

[4] De Xenophane, Zenone, et Gorgiâ, cap. 4. p. 841. tom. 1. opp.
[5] Notes on Cudworth, vol. 1. pp. 528. 529.
[6] See his Physics, sect. 1. lib. 7. cap. 1. p. 458. tom. 1. opp.

are produced what was not before, had an existence. Between these two sects, which had however many internal subdivisions, there were certain of a middle way of thinking, who while admitting the being of a τὸ ὄν, yet at the same time asserted the existence of something ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, though even they did not all agree in the way in which this was to be understood. Aristotle in a manner associated himself with these, since it is plain that he taught that all things existed and were produced from matter or *entity*, and an immaterial addition which he termed *nonentity*. This is a subtle opinion, which many say cannot be understood; on which account I will express it in the author's own words: Συντόμως δὲ καὶ νῦν λέκτεον, ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ἁπλῶς γίνεται, τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον ἐξ ὄντος ἀεί· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὄν, ἐντελεχείᾳ δὲ μὴ ὄν, ἀνάγκη προϋπάρχειν, "For the present we must shortly say that in a manner existence is *from nonentity* and in another manner always *from entity*; for it is necessary that *entity* should pre-exist in power and *nonentity* in action." With these explanations it will be much easier to understand than at first appears, what is the meaning we ought to attach to those words of Aristotle which have given rise to our present observations. A certain sect of philosophers, who believed in the existence of τὰ μὴ ὄντα, and that from these again a few things were created. They evidently then held the belief of a τὸ ὄν, a certain immutable nature, without which no creation could take place; and that from this material were produced τὰ μὴ ὄντα, things which have no innate permanency, but which are transitory, having no stability; which come daily into existence, and are again dissolved and return to their own elements. But what is the meaning of their thinking that out of "the things that *are not*," some things but not many, μὴ πολλὰ, are created and produced? Did these philosophers think that out of those transitory things which are created from a perpetual and immutable material, new natures could rise into existence? This I can never believe; nor can I ascertain the purport and object of this opinion. I could wish Aristotle had spoken more plainly; for here, as well as in innumerable other passages, he writes as if he thought that every body kept a sphinx at home, to which they might apply for divining enigmas. The "few things" which these philosophers are said to have believed to be created "out of the things that *are not*" are not at all things or beings, or, to speak philosophically, *substances*, but only certain *accidents* of things. They therefore taught that in all productions the first portions were to be attributed to a stable and immutable material; but that to every thing produced were added certain things which were not previously in the material, and therefore arise, so to speak, out of nothing. But what were these? Doubtless such as shape, size, position, motion, rest;

which are not properly inherent in the matter from which things are made, but arise from its concretion and different admixture, and can therefore be said in a manner to be made of things that are not. If Aristotle's words be thus explained, as in my opinion they ought to be explained, there may be easily recognized in them the philosophy of the followers of Democritus and Epicurus. For these first of all laid down the existence of a τὸ ὂν, or a certain fixed and definite number of individual atoms, the internal nature of which it is impossible to alter; and from these atoms they decided were made τὰ μὴ ὄντα, other things which have no permanency, but whose nature is gradually to wear away and dissolve; and lastly they held that external conformation, size, appearance, and motion, were produced in a manner from the things that are not. The second sect, which he afterwards mentions, differed very much from these; since they denied the existence of τὸ ὂν, any stable, immoveable, and definite nature; and held, on the contrary, that all things were carried forward by a perpetual motion; which is shown with sufficient perspicuity by Aristotle when he says that they taught οὐδὲν εἶναι, that "nothing *is*," but γίγνεσθαι, "that all things exist;" that nothing was stationary, permanent, and unchangeable, but that all things passed not only from one shape to another, but also from one nature to another without limit or end. Hence they also necessarily taught, as he adds, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα, "that all things which exist, exist out of things that *are not*;" that is, in all productions, that the thing itself out of which any other thing exists, is changed and becomes different from what it was before; and that creation does not consist wholly in concretion, separation, aggregation, or diminution.

VIII. Aristotle has detained me longer than I had expected, yet I do not think I shall have lost my labour, since this explanation of certain principles of ancient philosophy is of some use towards a clearer knowledge than is usual of similar passages, not only of Aristotle but also of other ancient writers. In the elucidation of the passages of Empedocles and Seneca, which are quoted on this subject, less sagacity and diligence will be required. Plutarch has preserved for us the following verses of Empedocles:[7]

> Νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονες εἰσὶ μέριμναι,
> Οἱ δὴ γίνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν
> Ἤτοι καταθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντη.

"Foolish and short-sighted are they who hope that any thing which is not can exist, or that any thing can perish and be utterly destroyed." To the quotation of which verses Plutarch

[7] Libro adv. Colotem, p. 1113. tom. 2. opp.

adds this explanation of them: Οὐκ ἀναίρει γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οὐδὲ φθορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντη, τουτέστι τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπολύουσαν, "He does not take away all production, but only that which is from what is not; nor yet corruption, excepting that which is entire, that is that in which things are reduced to what is not." The most learned men think that in these words Empedocles is refuting those who thought that all things were produced and made out of nothing; whence they afterwards conclude that there were then living some philosophers who were of this opinion; since no wise man will fight with shadows, and refute opinions which no one ever entertained. But perhaps these great men will pardon me for thinking that they discover more in the verses of Empedocles than is really contained in them. For the philosopher is not speaking in them of the creation of the universe out of nothing, but of the daily production and corruption of things. Many of the Pythagoreans (to which sect Empedocles belonged) thought that there was a certain and eternal quantity of things, out of which all productions are formed by a certain mutation of particles, and into which they are again dissolved when they seem to perish, the total quantity still remaining the same and unalterable. This doctrine is the one taught in these verses; but is explained with greater elegance and beauty by Ovid when versifying the tenets of Pythagoras; and it is worth while to quote the passage, as being admirably adapted to illustrate the meaning of Empedocles:

> Nec perit in tanto quicquam, mihi credite, mundo,
> Sed variat, faciemque novat: nascique vocatur
> Incipere esse aliud, quàm quod fuit antè, morique
> Desinere illud idem: cùm sint huc forsitan illa,
> Hæc translata illuc: *summá tamen omnia constant.*[8]

But most persons, who are not accustomed to abstract their minds from what is seen by their eyes, persuade themselves that something new is born and made, when they see any thing produced and existing; and, when any thing is destroyed, they make no doubt but that it has entirely perished and come to nothing. Empedocles confutes and ridicules this foolish opinion of the vulgar, and therefore does not at all attack those philosophers who taught that the very basis or material of things did not exist previously to its being made out of nothing by God; whom, if indeed he had wished to refute them, he would have treated with more polite and gentle language than calling them foolish, and perplexed about unnecessary trifles. The common people, who are full of business, and only believe their own eyes, he might well speak of in such harsh terms; but not philoso-

[8] Metamorphoses, lib. 15. v. 255. &c.

phers, who were so zealously addicted to contemplative habits of thought as by their meditations to have gone beyond matter, and discovered that at one time nothing had existed. The same answer may be given to those who call in Lucretius to their aid on this subject, and who, because this poet laboriously and copiously proves that out of nothing nothing can be produced,[9] take this for an argument that there were some in his day who thought that the world was created out of nothing. For he undertakes to prove nothing except that there are definite causes for every thing that happens in this world, and that all that is produced and made is formed out of matter already in existence. To this it may be added that those who are defending by solid argument any doctrine against all aggressions, do not always thus act because they are aware that there are some persons who are averse to it, but often only in order to confirm and corroborate their subsequent positions, and to give them greater access to the human mind.

IX. There remains a passage of Seneca, on which I must speak before I come to particular sects and individuals. Speaking of the benefits derivable from the study of philosophy, among other expressions he uses the following: "Quàm utile existimas ista cognoscere, et rebus terminos ponere? Quantum Deus possit: *materiam ipse sibi formet*, an datâ utatur? Utrùm idea materiæ priùs superveniat, an materia ideæ, "How useful dost thou think it to know these things, and to assign bounds to things? How far extends the power of God; *did he form matter for himself*, or make use of that given? Whether the idea was prior to matter, or matter to the idea."[10] Authors have supposed that from these words it is evident that Seneca doubted whether matter were formed by the Deity out of nothing, or whether it had existed from eternity; since he says that this question can be solved only by the aid of philosophy. Justus Lipsius, after observing that all the ancient philosophers agreed with Democritus, who taught that out of nothing, nothing could be produced, proceeds to say, "And yet it is wonderful that Seneca doubts whether God is the creator of matter. For he thus speaks in his Quæstiones Naturales . . . . . Thus he hesitates to believe what some Christians have not been ashamed to deny, asserting with the ancients the eternity of matter."[1] A similar opinion is entertained by G. J. Vossius, who says, "It is remarkable that among the Gentiles Seneca alone has not dared to affirm that matter is eternal; but doubted on this point: for thus he writes in his Quæstiones Naturales," &c. &c.[2]

[9] De Naturâ Rerum. lib. 1. v. 149. &c. p. 153.
[10] Præf. Quæstion. Natural. tom. 2. opp. p. 485.
[1] Physiologia Stoica, lib. 2. diss. 2. p. 57, a.
[2] Theses Historico-Theologicæ, diss. 1. p. 9.

These have been followed by many since, whom it is not now necessary to name; while others go still further, and think that from this passage of Seneca it may be concluded that this was a common subject of disputation among the philosophers of that age, and that two sects existed, one holding that "God formed matter for himself," or made it out of nothing, and the other contending that the Deity "made use of matter given," or eternal. I do not at present contend against those who think that a creation out of nothing was anciently known to none excepting Jews and Christians. But if the meaning of Seneca's words be really what is attributed to them, yet they will not afford much aid to those who seek for patrons of this doctrine among the ancient sages. For it cannot be proved from them that any persons ever really embraced this opinion; but it only appears that when Seneca or others were closely engaged in meditation, some doubt occurred to their minds on this subject, by which however they did not long allow themselves to be troubled. But I freely confess that I do not know in what way and from what principles they can imagine they find the mention of a creation out of nothing in this passage of Seneca's. Do they think that the phrase formare sibi aliquid, regarded in itself, is equivalent to ex nihilo fingere? I can scarcely think so; nor will Seneca himself allow of this interpretation, since with him the word *formare* always signifies to give shape to any shapeless mass. Causa autem, says he, in another place,[3] id est ratio, *materiam format* et quocumque vult versat, ex illâ varia opera producit. What he here terms *formare*, he calls a little further on *faciem dare*; Statua et materiam habuit, quæ pateretur artificium; et artificem, qui materiæ *daret faciem*. In short, in the very passage whence the words are taken, about the meaning of which we are now inquiring, he uses the word in this sense. For shortly afterwards he proceeds to say, Deus quidquid vult efficiat, an in multis rebus illum tractanda destituant, et à magno artifice pravè *formentur* multa. Nor does the addition of the word *sibi* require us to change the idea in the present passage. For any one may with propriety be said formare sibi aliquid, when he disposes, shapes, and modifies matter according to his own will and pleasure. Or do they suppose that from the opposite expression, datâ materiâ uti, there can be deduced evidence of the meaning we have mentioned being correctly assigned to this sentence? Such seems to be the case. But I should be glad to be informed whether one who is said datâ non uti materiâ can be correctly said to form matter for himself, and to create it out of nothing. My own opinion will be entirely different, nor do I think that many, after an attentive consideration, will differ from me. Let

[3] Epist. 65. p. 160. tom. 2. opp.

us imagine two workmen, to whom gold is given, in order that they may make an image of it. One of them carefully prepares the gold previously to commencing his work, and frees it from adventitious particles and impurities. The other, without any purification, forms the statue he was ordered to execute, out of the material delivered to him. Would it be improper and inaccurate to say of these two men, as Seneca does, Alter ipse sibi format materiam, alter datâ utitur materiâ? Nor can I think that Seneca's words are to be taken in any other sense. He was, as is well known, of the Stoic sect, among whom there was no difference of opinion respecting the nature and origin of matter; for all the Stoics believed it to be equally eternal with the Deity himself and destitute of any beginning; a fact which has been abundantly proved by Justus Lipsius.[4] 'And Seneca never calls in question this tenet of his sect, but every where openly approves of it. Dicunt, ut scis, he says, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum naturâ, ex quibus omnia fiant; causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat:[5] "Our Stoics, as you are aware, say that there are two things in nature, cause and matter; and that matter lies inert, prepared for every thing, ready to stop if no one moves it." It was, however, a moot point among philosophers who thought that the universe was made by God, and even among the Stoics, whether matter were shapeless and destitute of all qualities and beauty before the Deity began to arrange and beautify it, or whether the qualities and shapes of things were latent in matter itself, so that it only required Divine energy to bring them into proper order, and arrange them in a suitable manner. It has been generally supposed that Plato advocated the first of these alternatives, which is evident even from Plutarch;[6] but the latter has not been without its defenders. Perhaps the best method of understanding this controversy would be to compare with it the question respecting the natural state of the soul, which separated the Platonists from other philosophers; the former holding that the soul came into the body furnished with the ideas and images of things, and the latter thinking that it was imbued and furnished with these by education and teaching while in the body.[7] And I think Seneca has a reference to this dispute in the words, into the meaning of which we are now inquiring. For those who believed that all forms and qualities had been conferred upon matter by the Deity, said that he had "formed matter for himself," or had endowed it with the forms and qualities he chose. But those who decided otherwise, and held that forms

[4] Physiologia Stoica, lib. 1. diss. 4. p. 9.
[5] Epist. 65. p. 160.
[6] De Animæ Procreatione, ex Timæo, 1014. tom. 2. opp.
[7] See Chalcidius, on Plato's Timæus, cap. 13. p. 391. &c.

and qualities were previously inherent in matter, maintained that God only "made use of matter as given," and merely ranged and digested the mass of nature on a new plan, so as to produce that beauty and splendour which we now behold in the universe. Nor do I think that any other meaning is to be attached to Seneca's other expressions, which are not very different from these of which we have now been speaking, and which seem to have rather greater force in this respect, though they have escaped the observation of learned men who have treated of the subject now under discussion. Equidem, says Seneca, tum naturæ rerum gratias ago, cùm illam non ab hâc parte video, quæ publica est, sed cùm secretiora ejus intravi; cùm disco quæ universi *materia* sit, quis *auctor*, aut *custos*, "Indeed I give thanks to nature, not when I regard it in its popular aspect, but when I investigate its secrets; when I learn what is the *material* of the universe and who is its *author* or *guardian*."[8] Here again the philosopher hesitates and is in doubt; nor does he determine with sufficient precision whether it is proper to call God the "author" or the "guardian" of matter. But does not the profession of a doubt whether God be the author of matter imply that such is the case, and that matter was therefore created out of nothing by God? It will then be evident at least from this quotation that neither Seneca, nor perhaps any other philosophers, believed that there was aught repugnant to reason in the doctrine which modern atheists think to be so irrational. These considerations have an appearance of truth, I will not deny; but fall far short of an absolute proof. For who can be ignorant, that the appellation of the "author" of any thing is also given to one who frames and forms it out of supplied material? Nor does the word custos, "guardian," when opposed to the name auctor, "author," necessarily require that we should assign to the latter any other meaning. Wherefore, since the Stoics, as we have already observed, were fully convinced of the eternity of matter, I can easily believe that those who called God "the author" of matter only meant that God gave to matter the nature it now possesses, and transmuted it from a totally shapeless state, unfit for any purpose, to a better and more useful condition; while those who termed the Deity "the guardian" of matter thought that he only preserved and guarded the forms and qualities latent in it. Were I desirous of being more copious and erudite, some other considerations might be added, tending to overthrow the common interpretation of Seneca's words; but these will be sufficient to show that he does not afford any effectual aid to those who suppose that some of the philosophers entertained

[8] Præf. Quæst. Natural. p. 482. tom. 2. opp.

opinions respecting the origin of nature identical with those of Christians.

X. After disposing of these more general testimonies, we will now come to particular sects and individuals, who are said to have held God to be the creator of matter. Orpheus is said to have been the founder and author of all the religion and wisdom anciently prevalent among the Greeks. This celebrated man was formerly reckoned by Clemens Alexandrinus among those who maintained a creation out of nothing. For after reciting some verses of Orpheus in which God is called μητροπάτωρ, "father of the mother," he thus proceeds: Διὰ μὲν τοῦ Μητροπάτωρ, οὐ μόνον τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γένεσιν ἐμήνυσεν· δέδωκεν δὲ ἀφορμὰς τοῖς τὰς προβολὰς εἰσάγουσι, τάχα καὶ σύζυγον νοῆσαι τοῦ Θεοῦ, "In calling him 'Father of the mother,' he not only intimated the production of things out of nothing, but also gave occasion to those who introduce such pretences [viz. the Valentinians] of also assigning a wife to the Deity."[9] Thus Clement supposed that matter was called "the mother," and therefore when God was called "the father of the mother," he was said to be the creator and author of matter.[10] But who does not know that scarcely any thing can be more uncertain than the relations given respecting Orpheus and his verses? The remains of the Orphic verses which are extant at the present day are generally believed to have been composed by a Jew or by some degenerate Christian, who wished to fortify and corroborate his own tenets by the authority of so distinguished a name; an opinion which those who in other respects make much of the Orphic doctrine do not venture entirely to reject.[1] In the next place great inconsistency of opinion may be perceived in the verses themselves; which is an evidence that they do not all proceed from one author. So that if I were entirely to set aside out of the present question these verses of Orpheus quoted by Clement, as being of doubtful authenticity and genuineness, I should not be destitute of reason or good authority. But since this testimony of Orpheus can be invalidated in another method, I will not at present adopt this course. Let these verses be admitted to possess some degree of authority; and let Clement's interpretation of the word μητροπάτωρ also be granted. The inquiry still remains whether it thence follows as a consequence that the author of these verses considered God to be the creator of matter. It will, I hope, be granted that from one word, and that very ambiguous, it can by no means be proved what was the opinion of this author on so difficult a question; but that the

[9] Stromata, lib. 5. p. 724.

[10] A similar explanation has been given of this word by Edmund Dickinson, Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. p. 198.

[1] See Cudworth's Intellectual System, cap. 4. sect. 17.

other remains of his verses ought to be compared with it, and that from the comparison his meaning should be deduced. If this be done, this Orpheus, whoever he was, will be found so far from agreeing with the Christians, that he is little if at all removed from the profanity of Spinoza. For, as I have elsewhere observed,[2] his poetry inculcates the idea that God is the universe, and that all things have so proceeded from God that the several parts of the universe are to be regarded as members and parts of the Divine nature. Who will venture to compare so impious and profane a writer with the followers of Christ? Therefore in calling God the "father of the mother," or of matter, he doubtless meant to be understood that matter was generated and created from the Divine nature as a daughter, and was therefore part of the Divine nature itself. All which being considered, I could wish that men otherwise learned had praised Orpheus more sparingly; among whom Thomas Burnet[3] and Andrew Christian Eschenbach[4] have thought the highest commendations far below his excellency and virtue.

XI. Edmund Dickinson[5] reckons the ancient Greek poet Hesiod, as one of the principal assertors of a creation out of nothing. His words are as follows:—"That most ancient and learned cosmologist Hesiod also learned from the Egyptians that Chaos, by which name he called the material of the universe, was not eternal, but produced, for he says, Ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ', "First of all Chaos was made."[6] And other learned men have been nearly of the same opinion, both among ancients and moderns, as we have elsewhere already observed.[7] But if Hesiod be worthy of this honour, it may also be claimed by Ovid, who has paraphrased the opinion of the Greek bard in these Latin verses:—

> Ante mare et tellus et quod tegit omnia cœlum
> Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,
> Quem dixere Chaos: rudis indigestaque moles.[8]

And perhaps Aristophanes may make out as good a case; since it is well known he has left this verse on record:—

> Χάος ἦν καὶ νὺξ ἔρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον καὶ τάρταρος εὐρύς.[9]

"There was Chaos, and night, and black Erebus, at first, and broad Tartarus." Our previous observations, unless I am deceived, will be sufficient to destroy this good opinion of learned

[2] Notes on Cudworth.
[3] Archæologia Philosophiæ, lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 354.
[4] Epigene, seu Liber de Poësi Orphicâ, p. 41. &c. præf. et al.
[5] Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. p. 199. [6] Theogonia, v. 116.
[7] Notes on Cudworth. See also Bessarion, in Calumniatores Platonis, lib. 2. cap. 5.
[8] Metamorphoses, lib. 1. v. 5. &c. [9] Birds, v. 694. p. 404. ed. Kusteri.

men respecting Hesiod. First of all, it will not be denied by any one acquainted with the Greek language and poetry, that the Greek verb γένετο, on which this interpretation is put, may be translated in the way in which it is usually rendered, and as it has been understood by innumerable interpreters, both ancient and modern; Primo omnium quidem Chaos fuit. Hence considerable doubt has arisen whether the poet affixed to it this latter signification, or the former, which has been preferred by some learned men. It is assuming too much, when an ambiguous word occurs, to prefer one of its meanings, without any good reason, and then from this meaning to estimate the doctrine of an author. If it were as certain as it is uncertain and dubious, that this word in Hesiod signifies "it is made or produced," yet even then the matter would not be entirely clear. For Hesiod does not add that Chaos was made by God, nor does he say that it was made and produced out of nothing; which is an evident refutation of his eulogists. But, apart from these considerations, I will make it evident that the common explanation of this word ought to be retained, and that Hesiod means nothing else than what Ovid speaks of, that Chaos existed before the formation of the world. In the first place, the words themselves require this interpretation; for if he had been speaking of the rude and undigested mass which is called Chaos he would, no doubt at the same time have mentioned its efficient cause; since it is usual, when any thing is said to be generated and made, not to be forgetful of its parent and maker. Who can believe that Hesiod, when relating a fact of such importance and magnitude as the creation of Chaos out of nothing, should not mention, even by a word, the author of so great an achievement? If this argument should fail to convince, a knowledge of this poet's religious system will immediately prevail. Hesiod knew of no greater or higher god than his Jupiter, as is evident even from a cursory inspection of his poem. This deity he proclaims to be the parent of gods and men, the manager of all things, the greatest and the best. But of this Jupiter he had very mean and abject ideas; saying, that he was the son of Saturn, and that Saturn himself was born of heaven and earth, subsequently to the beginning of this present world; that is, that he sprang out of the ground by the power of the air; on which subject I have already made some more detailed observations.[10] Can it possibly be believed that a poet openly disrespectful towards the Deity, and imbued with so puerile a religion as to make the human son of Saturn and Rhea the universal Ruler, could have thought in a wise and pious manner respecting the origin and creation of matter?

[10] Notes to Cudworth.

XII. With Hesiod I shall unite Xeniades, a very ancient philosopher. Sextus Empiricus sometimes mentions him, and among other particulars relates of him as follows: Ξενιάδης δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος (οὗ καὶ Δημόκριτος μέμνηται) πάντ' εἰπὼν ψευδῆ καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν καὶ δόξαν ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν πᾶν τὸ φθειρόμενον φθείρεσθαι, δυνάμει τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται τῷ Ξενοφάνει στάσιος,[1] "But Xeniades, the Corinthian, (who is also mentioned by Democritus) saying that all things are false, and that every fancy and opinion is fallacious, and that every thing that exists, exists out of nonentity, and that whatever perishes returns into nonentity, substantially agrees with Xenophanes." By these words of Sextus, Peter Gassendi, who is otherwise acute and skilful in ancient philosophy, has been led to doubt whether this Xeniades were not to be reckoned among those who hold that all things were created out of nothing. He adds, however, that this opinion "may be understood in the same way as when Aristotle himself teaches that something is made from nonentity, that is, not from simple nonentity, but from what is such by accident."[2] But the celebrated editor of Sextus, J. A. Fabricius, in his note upon this place, unhesitatingly denies that this passage has any thing to do with a creation out of nothing, and that Xeniades only taught, as many other philosophers did, that when any thing is produced, the production becomes something that it was not before, and on the other hand, that when any thing perishes, it puts on an entirely different nature. This author's opinion is pretty near the truth; and the very nature of the case shows that no inquiry is instituted in this passage of Sextus respecting the origin of matter, since he is discussing the tokens of truth, and endeavouring to prove that the science of logic rests upon insecure foundations. Xeniades is by Sextus reckoned among those who abrogated all the distinctions of true and false, and all certain knowledge; and in order to sustain these views he is said by the same authority to have asserted that all things are made and produced from things which are not, and that whatever perishes, returns again into what is not. If the words τὰ μὴ ὄντα meant the same as *nothing*, Xeniades would have been inconsistent with himself, nor would he have taken away from mankind all knowledge and discrimination of truth; for to determine that all things are made from nothing, and return again to nothing, it is necessary to be furnished with certain and infallible rules and principles from which this may be known; and therefore this cannot be the case with those who think that not only all

[1] Lib. 7. adv. Mathematicos, or Lib. 1. adv. Logicos, sect. 53. p. 381.
[2] Physics, sect. 1. lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 232. tom. 1. opp.

visible things, but also all opinions are uncertain and destitute of truth. Therefore, τὰ μὴ ὄντα must mean things that are unstable, transitory, and subject to perpetual changes; and the philosopher's meaning can only be that things which are produced are created from what is destitute of any permanency, and that therefore they widely differ from the material out of which they are made; and on the other hand, things that perish entirely change their nature and gain fresh qualities. It is indeed no wonder that those who entertain such an opinion should reject the decisions both of sense and reason, and abolish every standard of truth and certainty.

XIII. I now hasten to the philosophical sect of which Pythagoras is recorded to have been the founder. The great inconsistency of ancient writers has made it almost impossible to ascertain what were Pythagoras's own opinions on the origin of nature; and it is probable that those who professed to be his disciples were uncertain what were their master's views; since they differ among themselves, and are not all unanimous in their opinions respecting the universe and matter. It is however probable that their founder's views were most clearly understood by those who taught (to use the words of Chalcidius[3]) sylvam minimè genitam, exornatam à Deo, illustratam et eo digestore generatam esse, "that matter was not produced, but arranged and adorned by God, and under his disposal generated." But some of his followers are said to have departed so far from their teacher's track as to say that matter itself was made and produced by God. Chalcidius seems to testify this; for after he had recited the real opinion of Pythagoras out of Numenius, he relates on the same authority, that some of that philosopher's disciples had altogether perverted his views. "But some Pythagoreans," says he, "not rightly understanding the meaning of this opinion, have thought that it [matter] also began as an unbounded and immense duality from one unity, the unity departing from its own nature and putting on the nature of a duality. This is not correct," he proceeds to observe, "that what was a unity should cease to be so, and should become a duality that did not previously exist; and that from the Deity matter, and from an immense and unlimited unity duality should result."[4] In whatever way I understand these words, I can nowhere discover in them a creation out of nothing; but rather another deadly and pestilential opinion, very nearly akin to the impiety of Spinoza. "Unity," in the style of the Pythagoreans, which is followed by Chalcidius, means God; and "an immense and unlimited duality," matter, as being destitute of bounds and limits. So that when these Pythagoreans say that a duality began from a

[3] Comment. in Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 293, p. 387. [4] Ubi supra.

unity they mean that matter was the workmanship of God. Thus far they are right enough; but when they come to explain the mode in which God produced matter, they exhibit symptoms of extreme irrationality; for they say that God or "unity" changed his nature and put on the nature of a duality, or converted himself into matter; and that this being done, he ceased to be unity or God, and began to be merely duality or matter; in short, that from God matter and from unity duality was made. What can be more impious and absurd than these opinions? for those who entertain them openly confess that the universe is God, and that there is nothing divine beyond the universe and matter. For if God has departed from his own nature, and converted himself into matter, what is left us, excepting the material universe, to worship as the Deity? And what else is God, on this supposition, than matter animated and furnished with a kind of spiritual nature? I fear lest those who embraced this sentiment might also at the same time have asserted that this change of the divine nature took place from eternity, and not at any definite time; and if this suspicion be correct, there are certainly no ancient philosophers who may with greater propriety be classed among those who defended the impieties of Spinoza, long before he himself was born. Hence, as Chalcidius rightly subjoins, this opinion was so futile and absurd that it could not possibly affect those whose minds had been even in a moderate degree cultivated by learning; a sentence he would never have passed upon it, if these Pythagoreans had agreed with Christians respecting the origin of matter; for this interpreter of Plato is so far from contemning the doctrines of Christianity, and has on the contrary so constantly commended them, that many have thought him to be altogether a Christian.

XIV. Philolaus the Crotonian, who occupied, as we are informed, an illustrious place among the first disciples of Pythagoras, has with greater probability been classed among those who supposed that all things were made out of nothing. For Claudius Mamertus[5] says that in a certain book of his that has been lost, the following passage was contained:—"God, who made all things out of nothing, as he began by his work, so he incorporated matter with all things, among which the soul is to be reckoned. As he distributed weight, number, and measure, so he placed quantity." What can be clearer than this? God is said to have "made all things out of nothing;" he is said to have "began matter by his work," which seems to be the same thing as to have prepared and arranged it. Have we not therefore here one of the school of Pythagoras who taught

[5] De Statû Animæ, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 106. ed. Barth.

with propriety respecting the origin of nature? I think not; and have reason to believe that not even Philolaus ought to be associated in this matter with the followers of Christianity. For some expressions of this philosopher are extant in Jamblichus,[6] in which he expressly denies that unity or God is the origin of all things, and affirms that *duality* or matter should be associated with him as a second principle in the creation of all things: Οὐ γὰρ ἓν φησὶν Φιλολάος ἀρχὰ πάντων, καὶ τοῖς ἑτερομήκεσιν εἰς γένεσιν ὕσπληγκα ὁμοίως ἑαυτὴν παρέξει, οὐκέτι δὲ νύσσα ἔσται τῆς καθ' ὑποστροφὴν παλινδρομίας καὶ ἐπανόδου, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡ δύας ἀντ' αὐτῆς ὑποστήσεται, "For Philolaus says that *unity* is not the beginning of all things, and like things longer on one side affords itself as a starting-base for generation; nor will it be a goal for the turning point of return and recursion; but this the *duad* will do instead of it." These words are very obscure, as are almost all which have been handed down to us from the esoteric and secret doctrines of Pythagoras; but what was in the main the opinion of Philolaus may be easily understood. Amongst the Pythagoreans it is well known that God is called Ἓν or *Unity;* while matter is termed δύας *duad.* And Jamblichus himself is a witness to this; for a little further on he says, Δύας ὕλης λόγον ἔχει, "The *duad* has the nature of matter." So that it is evident that Philolaus teaches generally that there were two first principles of all things, God and matter. Nor will Jamblichus allow us to doubt of this; for, after taking some pains to corroborate and explain this opinion of Philolaus, laying aside all disguises and mathematical expressions, he enunciates it in plain and perspicuous terms:[7] Διότι δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη, φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ εἴη· εὑρίσκεται δὲ ἀναλόγως καὶ ἐν ταῖς κοσμικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ὁ δημιουργὸς Θεὸς, μὴ ὢν τῆς ὕλης γεννητικὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴν ἀίδιον παραλαβὼν εἴδεσι καὶ λόγοις τοῖς κατ' ἀριθμὸν, διαπλάττων καὶ κοσμοποιῶν· εἰ δέ γε τὰς τῶν λοιπῶν ἑτερομηκῶν εἰς διαστάσεις κατὰ μόνην τὴν πρόοδον, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ἐπιδώσει αὐτὴν ἡ μονὰς, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ εἰς ἐπάνοδον, "Wherefore, it was not from a beginning, says Plato, nor yet shall be a beginning; but in the mundane first principles a creative Deity is found, not being indeed the generator of matter, but taking it as eternal, arranging and forming the universe according to forms and arithmetical methods, if indeed the unity affords itself to arrangements of the other unequal-sided things, only in the way of advance and not of retrogression." A comparison of these words with those of Philolaus, which we have already quoted, will immediately show that they are a more free and perspicuous exposition of the opinion deli-

[6] In Nicomachi Geraseni Arithmetic. Introduct. p. 109. ed. Tennulii.
[7] L. c. p. 111.

vered by him in more obscure terms. So that from these considerations it necessarily follows, that we must assign to his words, as preserved and translated into Latin by Claudian, a different sense from what at first sight they seem to have. The "nothing," or τὸ μὴ ὄν, here spoken of, is no doubt the "nothing" of the Platonists, among whom, as we shall presently show, matter is called "nothing," because it is subject to perpetual changes, and is possessed of no stability. And when God is said to have "made all things out of nothing," this must be taken to mean that God prepared and formed the universe out of matter, which is destitute of any constancy or perpetuity. To "begin matter by his work," opere instituere materiam, which is here ascribed to God, is nothing else than to shape and arrange matter by his power; a meaning assigned to the verb instituere in innumerable passages of the Latin writers. The Pythagoreans must not therefore be accounted as ancient defenders and patrons of a creation out of nothing.

XV. From the very beginning of Christianity, so much sagacity and industry has been shown by distinguished men in the reformation of Plato, and in reconciling him with Christian doctrine, that it is scarcely possible to enumerate them. It is therefore no wonder that he has also been made to appear to have a more correct opinion respecting the origin of nature than he really entertained. The principal person, so far as I know, who has ranked him among the advocates of a creation out of nothing, is Clemens Alexandrinus: Ὅποτ' ἂν εἴπῃ, says he,[8] τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητόν τε ἔδειξε τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι σημαίνει, καθάπερ υἱὸν πατέρα δὲ αὐτοῦ κεκλῆσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκ μόνου γενομένου καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος ὑποστάντος, "When he [Plato] says this, [that it is difficult to find out the Maker and Parent of this universe,] he not only shows that the world is made, but also intimates that it was made from him [God], as if in the relationship of father and son, as existing from him alone and from what *is not*." Clement indeed thought that Plato and other philosophers had not found out this opinion by their own reasoning and ingenuity, but had taken it from the writings of Moses; and all the ancients who have with Clement been persuaded that Plato improved his wisdom by reading the books of Moses (as it is well known many of them did), have also favoured this opinion of his. From among the sect of the later Platonists, Hierocles and some others have ascribed the same dogma to their master; but since they did this in a different way from the Christians, and had not the same views that we have of the origin of nature, it will be better to take them into consideration at the end of this discussion, when we shall come to speak of the opinions en-

[8] Stromata, lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 701.

tertained by the later Academicians respecting the nature and origin of the universe. At the commencement of the revival of letters the Platonists, who made their appearance in Italy, asserted that in this, as in many other things, Plato was altogether a Christian. Among these Marsilius Ficinus stands pre-eminent, who was inordinately attached to Plato, and who, though in his Commentary on the Timæus[9] he seems to leave this question doubtful, and will not decide whether God, the author of the universe, is in Plato's opinion, the creator of matter; yet in the index, added by him to his edition of Plato's works, he hesitates not to join himself with those who think that Plato considered matter to be created by God.[10] I pass over others of less ability and celebrity, a large number of whom might be named; since they produce nothing worthy of particular attention, and rather show what they wish others to believe, than confirm their own views by argument. It will be sufficient to name three most famous and worthy men[1] of modern times, who were unusually diligent in defending the memory of Plato, and who have not endeavoured to convince their readers by their own authority, but by evidences and arguments. The first of these is Livius Galantes,[2] who endeavours to prove out of the Philebus, that this philosopher did not at all differ from the doctrines of Christianity respecting the creation of the universe. The second is P. D. Huët,[3] who has explained the opinion of Plato through the medium of the later Platonists' expositions; though that great man could not be ignorant that these were the worst interpreters of their master, and that they did not agree among themselves. The third place may be assigned to Andrew Dacier,[4] who endeavours to prove his point not so much by testimonies as by argumentation more ingenious than solid. But this learned man was inflamed with an incredible degree of attachment to Plato, by which he is often so far led away as to seem to place that philosopher scarcely below Christ and his apostles; so that it sometimes happens that he mistakes the most frivolous reasons for weighty arguments.

XVI. If ability and ingenuity could make the divine Plato appear in fairer colours than really belong to him, by the assistance of such great men he would long ere this have been endowed with surpassing lustre. But he himself rejects their

[9] Cap. 9. 10. p. 1441. tom. 1. opp.

[10] For under the word Deus in this index are to be found the following words:—Deum omnia ex nihilo creâsse, p. 168. Respecting the passage here pointed out some observations will be made further on.

[1] I had almost forgotten to add to these our author, Dr. Cudworth, in the 5th chapter of his Intellectual System.

[2] Comparatio Theologiæ Christianæ et Platonicæ, lib. 9. p. 237.

[3] Quæst. Alnetanis de Concordiâ Rationis et Fidei, lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 109.

[4] Vie de Platon, p. 178.

patronage, and will not be cleansed. His real opinions respecting the origin of the universe cannot be better and more clearly understood from any of his writings than from his Timæus. But in this dialogue he has so plainly ascribed eternity to matter, and so obviously declares that God did not create matter, but only arranged and beautified it, that stronger language can scarcely by possibility be used. On this account several of the ancients who have explained his doctrines have said that three principles of nature have been laid down by him, *God, matter,* and *ideas.* Nor was any other opinion entertained by those of his disciples, Alcinous,[5] Apuleius, and others, who have with the greatest perspicuity and fidelity explained their master's system. "Plato," says Apuleius,[6] "thought there were three principles of things, God, and matter, and the forms of things, which he called *ideas.* . . . But he says that matter is uncreated and incorruptible." Chalcidius himself, who in other respects agrees with the later Platonists, cannot persuade himself to deny or doubt a matter so plain and evident as this. "The principles [of Plato] therefore are," says he,[7] "God and matter and ideas; God the first moving cause, and represented as in action; matter, from which whatever is produced was first made." In another passage[8] he announces his approval of the opinion which supposed that Plato taught "that there had always been a power of mind as well as of body; that God had not made the universe out of the things that are not, but had arranged those which were destitute of order and method; that therefore he had rather adorned existing things than produced those which were not." I pass over so many of the Christian fathers who not only attributed to Plato the dogma of the eternity of matter, but even attacked him on account of it in long and very serious disputations. Not a few of the ancients have thought that Plato considered the universe to be equally eternal with the matter of which it is composed; but that in the Timæus, in which he proposes to instruct the more ignorant, he speaks as if the universe had been framed by God as its author and parent; nor is this supposition, as I have elsewhere shown,[9] destitute of all probability. But those who think that according to Plato's opinion, God made the universe out of things that were not, will find no safe defence, nor prove any point, till they shall either have annihilated the Timæus or shown that it is not Plato's production. But let us briefly go over what learned men have brought forward in opposition even to Plato himself and so

[5] Introductio in Doctrinam Platonis, cap. 12. p. 338. in the Philosophical History of Thomas Stanley.

[6] Libro de Habitud. Doctrinæ Platonicæ, p. 3. opp.

[7] Comm. in Timæum, cap. 13. sect. 305. p. 390.

[8] Cap. 2. sect. 31. p. 287.

[9] Notes on Cudworth.

many of his followers, in order to be able to rank him among Christian philosophers.

XVII. The observations of Clemens Alexandrinus on this subject are scarcely worthy of refutation. For what can be more futile than such argumentation as this:—Plato called God the Parent and Maker of the universe; therefore he thought that matter was created by him out of nothing? As if the calling of any being the father of a man, or the framer and maker of a thing, were the same thing as believing that he produced his son or his work out of nothing. Clemens would no doubt have altered his opinion if he had called to mind the immediately subsequent context in Plato's Timæus, and had not too eagerly desired to establish a concord between the philosophers and the Christians. Whether Plato has or has not borrowed some parts of his philosophy from the books of Moses, will be more properly examined in another place. Marsilius Ficinus and Dr. Cudworth ground the proof of their opinion upon the following passage of Plato:[10] Ζῶα δὴ πάντα θνητὰ καὶ φυτὰ, ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ξυνίσταται, σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα μὲν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ Θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; "Shall we say that all mortal animals and plants, as many as are produced upon the earth from seeds and roots, and whatever inanimate things exist in the earth, liquefiable and non-liquefiable bodies, were produced by any other agent than God, not having previously existed?" To this question Theodorus, one of the interlocutors, shortly afterwards answers, that he was persuaded that all things were produced by God. But who is so obtuse as not to perceive that in these words no inquiry is instituted respecting the origin of matter, but only respecting the generation and procreation of animals and plants? Plato certainly believed that these things were made and constructed out of matter by God, if indeed he spoke his real opinion in the Timæus; but at the same time he held that the matter from which all things are made was eternal and without a beginning. Livius Galantes thinks that another of his dialogues, the Philebus, affords sufficient materials for his defence in this particular. I will transcribe this author's own words, in order the more plainly to disclose the gist of the argument. Materiam primam, says he, summus ille Deus produxit, exemplar, vel mundus idealis corpus dedit et vestigiis quibusdam formatum ornavit, quod corpus visibile factum et ornatum mundum hunc conformarunt. Hæc præclara et scitu digna positio Platonis in Philebo auctoritate confirmatur. Sunt verba ipsius in Philebo, unum illud primum ex se, et non ex nihilo produxisse πέρας et ἀπειρίαν,

[10] In Sophistâ, p. 168.

hoc est, terminum et finem, vel infinitatem, quæ tamquam duo principia mixtionis entium omnium per entia et corpora permearent in corporibus hisce completis; finis et terminus est ipsa forma, infinitas vero est ipsa materia.[1] More follows to the same effect. Orpheus and Hermes are said to have been advocates and favourers of the same opinion; but in these cases it is of less consequence to quote the very words of the writer. But Galantes was more vigilant than was needful in giving this interpretation of Plato, and he either mistook his author's meaning, or was misled by the authority of the later Platonists, whose explanations he held in high estimation, from perceiving the drift of Plato's discourse. This interpretation of the Philebus is indeed ancient, and not invented by Galantes, but taken from those Platonists who attempted to reconcile together all the sages of antiquity, and principally Plato and Aristotle. Beside others, Proclus is a witness of this,[2] to whom may be associated, from among the moderns, Cardinal Bessarion, who is known to have been a most diligent student of Plato, and to have collected together from the more ancient Platonists nearly all that he brings forward for the illustration of his master's doctrine. "In the Philebus," says he,[3] "he [Plato] most plainly declares matter to be not fetched from without, but produced by the great Artificer. 'From unity,' says he, 'and multiplicity exist those things which are said always to be, and have a bound and infinitude generated in themselves. And elsewhere we have said that God brought this double kind of nature to light; I mean the finite and the infinite, from which both corporeal beings and all others are framed. To these hot and cold, moist and dry, great and little, and other similar qualities, may be added without end.' If bodies consist of boundary and infinitude, and the boundary is nothing else than form, for this bounds and defines matter, it is plain that matter is infinitude, and that in this passage Plato means that since God produces all infinitude, he produces matter also, which is the ultimate infinitude." Yet this opinion did not hinder these Platonists from maintaining that Plato, as well as Aristotle, thought the universe to be eternal; on which point we shall treat further on. For the present we will give attention

[1] I know not how it has happened that the truly learned Thomas Gale has embraced the same opinion. For in his Notæ ad Jamblichum de Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, p. 276, he says, "Plato's opinion about matter is not clearly apparent from the Timæus. He seems indeed to oppose matter to the Creator, and to distinguish it from him; but in the Philebus he plainly says that God τὸ μὲν πέρας ἐτεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον. It is plain that by ἀπειρίαν is meant matter." This great man has doubtless been led astray by too great an attachment to the later Platonists, who find whatever they please in Plato.

[2] Comm. in Timæum, lib. 2. p. 117.

[3] Lib. 2. in Calumniatores Platonis, cap. 5.

to Galantes, who follows the Platonists. First of all he assumes that ἀπειρία in Plato's Philebus means nothing else than matter itself, and πέρας the shape of matter; then, secondly, he affirms that Plato has left it on record that God produced ἀπειρίαν, or matter. Neither of these positions will be conceded by an attentive reader of the Philebus. Plato, or Socrates, at the beginning of this dialogue, that the Supreme Deity, in all things which have been made and produced, united and associated together ἀπειρίαν the infinite and πέρας the boundary or finite. Τὸν Θεὸν, says Socrates, among other observations, ἐλέγομεν ποῦ, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας· These are evidently the very words which Galantes supposes principally support his cause; but in which an extraordinary degree of acuteness will be necessary to perceive any traces of a creation out of nothing. Galantes would have us believe that δεῖξαι in this passage means the same as to *produce*; in which respect, as we have seen, he followed the later Platonists. "Plato," says he, "teaches that matter is *shown*, and uses this very word, which word the Platonists interpret to *produce*. And certainly what is produced is shown to have a beginning." Then again he thinks that by ἄπειρον is meant matter. From these premises he concludes the meaning of Plato's words to be, that God produced matter out of nothing, and endowed it with a boundary or form. A rash and injudicious conclusion truly; for who could ever suppose δεῖξαι to be the same as to produce out of nothing? and how can it be proved that ἄπειρον means matter? He has indeed quoted the later Platonists as his authorities. But no judicious person will allow these to possess more weight and influence than reason and a careful consideration of Plato's words. The plain and simple meaning of this passage of Plato (the import of which was not apprehended by Ficinus, who has given an incorrect interpretation of innumerable sayings of the same philosopher) is, that God every where shows or discloses both the finitude and infinitude of the things that are and exist; an exposition which is confirmed and corroborated by the whole texture and series of his discourse. So far is the word ἄπειρον from being used by Plato to mean matter, that it is rather a designation of several ideas and feelings entirely abstracted from all corporeal substantiality. I will endeavour to explain this part of Plato's philosophy, respecting the finite and the infinite, in such a way as to make it intelligible to all. It is not in itself very abstruse and difficult; but it is a source of confusion to many, because it is not accommodated to our own laws of disputation and philosophy, and is not easily to be comprehended by any one who has not first freed his mind from the shapes and forms of visible things, and raised it to the contemplation of abstract ideas. Ἄπειρον, or *infinity*, according to Socrates, or

rather Plato, denotes all that description of affections, things, and qualities, which, regarded abstractedly and in themselves, have no boundary or termination; but may be increased, diminished, strengthened, or relaxed. Of this kind, therefore, are pleasure and pain, cold and heat, slowness and swiftness, beauty and deformity, with innumerable other entities to which any thing may be added or from which aught may be taken away, and which have not any term or boundary prescribed and appointed by nature. In a word, the *infinite* of Plato is an abstract notion of all things, properties, qualities, or affections whatever, so far as they are destitute of a boundary, and may either increase or decrease. This may be shown by the philosopher's own words:[4] Ὅπως ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνηται μάλλον τε καὶ ἧττον γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα δεχόμενα, καὶ τὸ λίαν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, πάντα εἰς τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ τιθέναι, "Whatever appears to us greater or less, and is capable of intensity, or abatement, or excess, and things of this kind, all these should be reckoned as one kind of the *infinite*." Now then what is the meaning of πέρας, or *finitude*, which is opposed to *infinitude*? This has not been so plainly declared by Plato, who is often very obscure in his metaphysical definitions, and follows the method of Pythagoras's teaching. Οὐκοῦν, says he, τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἐναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα· μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ διπλάσιον, καὶ πᾶν ὅ, τί περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς, ἢ μέτρον πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξύμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας ἀπολογιζόμενοι, "But whatever are not susceptible of these, but are susceptible of all the contraries of these, as, firstly, equality and equability, and next after equality, duplicity, and all the proportions of number to number, or measure to measure, all these we reckon among finites." This passage is scarcely intelligible without an interpretation. What are the things which are not susceptible of increase or diminution, but which may nevertheless become equal, unequal, single, double, or triple? For these are said by Plato to be comprehended under the general denomination of *finite*, πέρας. The answer to this question must be sought by the attentive reader out of the whole disputation, by dint of meditation and research. And either I am much mistaken, or it is plain from this philosopher's whole works that πέρας, or *finitude*, with him denoted the measures, modes, proportions, and numbers of things, but regarded abstractedly and apart from the things themselves. For, as is apparent from the Timæus, he thought himself at liberty, after the method and manner of the Pythagoreans, to regard numbers, modes, and proportions as actual existences, in the same manner as he was accustomed to speak of the ideas and forms of things as actually

[4] In Philebo, p. 28.

existent beings. So that πέρας is nothing else than a word denoting the abstract idea of all numbers, measures, and proportions, by which all things, affections, and qualities which in themselves are destitute of any mode of existence, are governed, defined, and bounded, so that a certain mutual consent and harmony of things and qualities is the result. With these premises it will not be difficult further to understand what Plato meant when he said that all things were mixed and compounded of the finite and the infinite; or that the infinite, as he himself says, is in a manner bound up in all things by the finite—ξυμπάντων ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων[5]—that God had also conjoined in all created things the infinite with the finite and bounded. His opinion therefore is, that the things, qualities, properties, and affections, which in themselves are destitute of mode or limit, are always wisely determined, and are defined in weight, number, and measure, so as to produce the beauty of nature and the happiness of living creatures. For instance, in music the finite is conjoined with the infinite, and from this union arises that harmony which delights the ear and the mind. Sounds regarded in themselves, whether they be grave or acute, swift or slow, belong to the category of things called infinite; for they may be increased or diminished, qualified or augmented. But the art of music gives a limit or boundary to this infinitude; that is, it circumscribes and defines in a fixed proportion the infinity of sounds, so that the sweetness of harmony results. In every part of the universe, and in all living beings, there are things, qualities, and properties destitute in their own nature of all limit; and therefore infinitude is every where present. But the divine counsel and wisdom have added a boundary and limit, and thus have defined by certain universal laws fire, cold, moisture, hardness, weight, softness, pleasure, pain, and other things, in order to ensure the welfare of the universe and all its parts; so that finitude or boundary every where exists. In every man there are desires, which by nature have no limit; but the intellect of a wise man adds to these a boundary or termination, and confines his wandering desires within a certain limit. There is, therefore, in a wise man πέρας καὶ ἄπειρον, "finite and infinite." Some, perhaps, will be ready to say that this wisdom of Socrates or Plato is not very recondite, but very plain and easy; and that all this might be expressed in a simple and popular manner; so that they are not worthy of very high praise for having by new terms and subtlety of disputation thrown an obscurity over very clear subjects. With these sentiments I will not find fault just now; but will rather confess that in most of Plato's disputations there seems to me to exist a method of demonstration

[5] Philebus, p. 79.

and discussion too long, cumbrous, and unpopular, and a diction much more poetical and figurative than is consistent with the simple nature of truth. But at the same time I could wish it to be kept in remembrance that every one has his own peculiarities and mode of instruction, which a wise man ought to tolerate; and that perhaps Plato had weighty reasons, of which we are now ignorant, why he should always prefer unusual words, circumlocutions, and obscurity, to simplicity and brevity of language.

XVIII. I shall not now touch upon the testimonies by which Huëtius hoped to prove that Plato seemed to deny the eternity of matter; for they are taken, as I have already said, from Hierocles and similar sources, whose reasonings I have determined to consider separately. I proceed now, therefore, to the arguments by which Dacier thought that Plato could be rescued from his position among the advocates of the eternity of matter. First of all he reasons thus:[6] "A philosopher who in so many passages asserts the unity of God, cannot have fallen into so gross an error. If matter were eternal it would then be God, and there would then be two Gods, contrary to what he has laid down." The sum of this argument is, that he who believes in one God only, cannot at the same time maintain that matter is eternal. So indeed we may admit it to be if an individual be consistent with himself, and makes his teaching agree with his doctrine respecting the divine unity. But who does not know that many philosophers have entertained several mutually repugnant opinions, and have not perceived all the consequences of their own doctrines? This was the case with Plato, who, though he speaks so often of the unity of God, did not perceive or reflect that the unity of God would be abrogated if matter were considered to be equally eternal with the Deity. And this is the less to be wondered at, since it is very evident that innumerable others besides Plato have fallen into the same error, and while admitting the unity of God, have at the same time joined with him an eternal matter; for all whom, upon Dacier's principles, an apology might easily be made. Aristotle, though entertaining erroneous opinions respecting the divine nature, still maintained the existence of one first cause; and yet, as is well known, he held the universe to be eternal. Let the assumption of Dacier therefore be taken for granted, and then there will be no difficulty in freeing Aristotle from this gross error; for it may be said that he who admits of only one God cannot at the same time ascribe eternity to the universe, or otherwise there would be two Gods and not one. In examining into the opinions of ancient philosophers, it is proper to inquire not

[6] Vie de Platon, p. 178.

what they ought to have thought, in accordance with their own doctrines and precepts, so as not to be inconsistent with themselves; but rather to ascertain what they have plainly expressed and professed, even though this should be somewhat at variance with their other opinions. Let us listen, however, to another of Dacier's arguments: "Plato," says he, "cannot have thought that matter was eternal, since he affirms that the soul is more ancient than the body; for the soul being more ancient than the body, the body must be created, and consequently cannot be eternal." The premises of this argumentation are certainly correct; that Plato taught that the soul was more ancient than and prior to all corporeal substance. But it must not hence be concluded from this opinion that he assigned a beginning to matter. I am surprised that a learned man, who undertook the translation of Plato, should be so ignorant of Plato's diction as not to know that he put a great difference between σῶμα and ὕλη. By the latter he means the primary matter from which all things were made; but by σῶμα he understands body when brought into shape, which consists of the original matter and the qualities imparted to matter by God. And this difference between the significations of the two words was studiously preserved by the more eminent of those who followed Plato as their guide; a point which I recollect has been more fully and copiously demonstrated by me in another place. But this fact has escaped the notice of many, who judge of the meaning of ancient expressions from our own ideas; so that they often heedlessly fall into very serious errors. Plato always maintains that the soul is more ancient than and prior to body; but he has nowhere said that ὕλη, or primary matter, which is the foundation of all bodies, is more recent than the soul. Dacier's third argument has been already refuted; for in this he agrees with Clemens Alexandrinus, who thinks that Plato's calling God the *parent* and *artificer* of the universe is an argument that he held a creation out of nothing; since the name of *parent* shows that God created matter out of nothing; and the word ποιητὴς or *artificer*, that matter when created was ordered, arranged, and adorned by him. "He calls," says Dacier, "God the Father or Creator, and the Artificer of the world. By the title of Creator he intimates that he brought forth the world out of nothing, and by that of Artificer he signifies that after having created it he conferred on it arrangement and order." An ingenious exposition, to be sure! But Plato will not allow us to put confidence in this interpretation of his words. For in the Timæus itself, in which these names of the Deity are to be found, he declares in the plainest terms the eternity of matter, so that it is evident that the learned expositor has given an erroneous interpretation of these words. The fact that Plato expressly taught the

eternity of matter has not escaped him, nor is he unaware that this might be an obstacle to the general reception of his opinion; but he thinks that he has found a method of removing this objection, contending that Plato, in saying that matter existed from eternity, did not intend this to be understood of that matter which is tangible, visible, and sensible, but only of the form and appearance of this matter, or of *ideal* matter, so to speak: that there was from all eternity in the divine mind the image and notion of this matter, which, at last, as he maintained, God produced from out of the things that are not; and this eternal idea of matter, according to Dacier, is what Plato means when he says that matter had no beginning. "When Plato," says he, "called matter eternal, he did not mean to say that it existed visibly from all eternity, but that it existed intellectually in the eternal idea of the Deity." This view of the matter is closely allied to that opinion which is mentioned by Adam Tribbechovius[7] as being prevalent among some of the ancients, who, when they asserted that matter was eternal, "meant by *matter* the power of creating the universe which existed from eternity in God." Such a method of interpretation as this will promptly and easily make the blackest and most deadly foe of all truth and religion appear pure, holy, and without a blemish. But it is a wiser course, I think, and more worthy of an impartial inquirer after truth, not by ingenuity and artifice to extract from a philosopher's words what they could wish he had taught, but rather to ascertain what he has plainly and explicitly professed, even if it should be most highly unworthy of him. It adds nothing to the dignity and excellence either of philosophical or religious truth, for some of the ancient teachers to be thought better than they really were; but on the contrary, this preposterous desire of associating the philosophers with the Christians is often detrimental to the progress of revealed religion. To return to Plato, whom Dacier will have to speak of the idea and form of matter, and not of matter itself, when he says that matter is eternal: This learned man has made choice of a very unsafe refuge, from which his beloved Plato himself shall draw him forth. First of all, Plato, in his Timæus, opposes to each other the universe and matter; the first he affirms to have had a beginning and to have taken its origin from God; the latter he says was eternal. How will this agree with Dacier's subtle interpretation? The universe was eternal in the same sense as matter, if its form and idea only were in question; for how can it be denied that the form of the universe was eternally present to the Divine intellect? What then could have induced Plato to say that the universe was not, and that matter was,

[7] Veritas Creationis Mundi, cap. 2. p. 279.

eternal? Shall we say that so great a man as Plato was at the same time so inconsistent as to oppose to the idea of matter the actually existing universe; affirming that the latter had a beginning and that the former had not? Indeed I have a greater respect for the memory of this philosopher, whom antiquity styled Divine, than to believe that he acted thus; and even if I were willing to entertain the supposition, his Timæus would not permit me. The truth is that Plato inculcates that out of matter, which he considers to be eternal, God formed and constructed the universe. Let it be granted then that by *matter* he means the form and idea of matter; on this supposition the philosopher will be made to say that the universe was formed by God out of an eternal form or idea of matter; a proposition in the highest degree absurd. The same matter which he calls eternal Plato says was confused, malignant, and agitated by various motions destitute of law or order, before God began to put it in order, and to construct the universe. Θεὸς, says he,[8] ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, "God, taking up whatever is visible, not as being possessed of tranquillity, but greatly and irregularly agitated, brought it from disorder into order." It is well known that he also held that the badness and perversity of matter resisted the will of the Supreme Deity, and prevented him from making the universe such as he wished, free from all fault and evil. Could any wise man have persuaded himself that these and other properties of a similar description belonged to the eternal idea of matter existing in the Divine mind? Could the eternal notion of matter in the intellect of the Deity be termed disorderly, malignant, restless, and confused, previously to its being brought into order by God? Could it be said to have prevented the Deity from removing all fault and evil from the universe which he had made? Any further arguments to prove the incorrectness of Dacier's opinion, may easily be gathered from a perusal of the Timæus, since it may be at once perceived to be in the highest degree inconsistent with the general strain of that treatise.

XIX. Before parting with Plato, I think it will not be foreign to my purpose to remove a stumbling-block which has been an occasion of error to some, and may still be so to others, who have eagerly desired to make this philosopher out to be a Christian. Frequent mention is made in the writings of Plato and his followers of τὸ μὴ ὂν, or *nothing*, as of a really existent nature, out of which all things exist and are produced. This being noticed by those who are not sufficiently acquainted with the style of this philosopher, occasions them to think that there

[8] Timæus, cap. 14. p. 527. See also Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 3. segm. 69. p. 207.

is little or no difference between the sentiments of the Christians and those of the Platonists respecting the origin and commencement of nature. In opposition to this, it ought to be observed, that Plato calls all things which are destitute of perpetuity and constancy, which rise and set, are increased or diminished, nothing and *τὰ μὴ ὄντα*: and since all that comes under the notice of the senses, all matter and all the bodies that are created from it, are of that nature, on this account they are classed by him under the same denomination. This has been already well observed by Cicero, whose words[9] are these: *Nihil* Plato putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum esse, quod semper tale sit, qualem *ideam* appellat ille, nos speciem, "Plato thinks that to be *nothing* which begins and perishes, and that that alone *is*, which is always the same; such as he calls *idea* and we *species*." Diogenes Laërtius takes the same view of the matter. Τὸ γοῦν, says he,[10] *αἰσθητὸν, καὶ ὂν καλεῖ καὶ μὴ ὄν· ὂν μὲν, διὰ τὸ γένεσιν αὐτοῦ εἶναι· μὴ ὂν δὲ, διὰ τὴν συνεχῆ μεταβολήν*, "Plato calls sensible objects both *being* and *not being*; *being* indeed on account of generation, and *not being* on account of their continual change." The later Platonists are also accustomed to give to matter the same appellation; yet they do not precisely agree on this point with their master. For he considers as *nothing* and *not-being* all that comes under the cognizance of the senses, all matter, whether regarded as destitute of forms and qualities, or as endowed with qualities and consolidated into bodies. But they only give this name to matter as it is conceived of abstractedly in the mind, and regarded in itself apart from all form, figure, and qualities; but they never apply this designation to matter as contained in bodies, endowed with forms and properties, and visible to the eyes. Respecting this formless matter, which is only to be viewed and contemplated by the mind, Plotinus speaks as follows: Ὕλη *μὴ ὂν ἂν εἰκότως λέγοιτο· καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ κίνησις μὴ ὂν, ἢ στάσις μὴ ὄν, ἀλλὰ ἀληθινῶς μὴ ὂν, εἴδωλον καὶ φάντασμα ὄγκου καὶ ὑποστάσεως ὕφεσις*, "Matter may with propriety be called *not-being*, but not in the same sense that motion or rest is so called; but as really *not-being* the mere image and phantasm of mass, and an appetency of substance." The same proposition, almost in the same words, may also be found in his disciple Porphyry,[1] who calls matter *ἀληθινὸν μὴ ὂν*, "truly *not-being*," and gives some subtle reasons for thus denominating it. The reason why primary matter obtains this name among these philosophers, is, because it has no fixed and certain nature, but varies and changes its appearance in different

[9] Tuscul. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 24. p. 2598. tom. 8. opp.
[10] De Vitis Philosophorum, lib. 3. segm. 64. p. 202.
[1] De Impassibilitate Corporeorum, ennead 3. lib. 6. cap. 7. p. 310.
[2] Sententiæ ad Intelligibili a ducentes, sect. 21. p. 226.

bodies and things. The pretended Dionysius Areopagitus applies this very word to matter,[3] and both his interpreters, Maximus and Pachymeres, in commenting upon this passage, explain the reason of the name of these words: Λέγεται δὲ μὴ ὂν ἡ ὕλη, οὐχ ὅτι παντελῶς οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μή ἐστι, "Matter is called *not-being*, not because it is absolutely nothing, but because it *is not*," that is, it is destitute of a stable and immutable nature. Some learned men have pressed too far both this name, given by the Platonists to matter, and also other expressions made use of by this sect on the same subject; and have thought themselves at liberty to conclude from them that the *matter* of the Platonists was actually nothing and a nonentity; but these, as I have already elsewhere observed, seem to be too severe against this philosophical party, and not to have used all the diligence requisite in examining into the meaning of the words they make use of, and investigating their whole method of philosophizing. "Among the Peripatetics," says Marsilius Ficinus,[4] "those who call matter *not-being*, call it absolutely nothing. But among the Platonists, who give a wider and greater upward and downward extension to the nature of unity than to the nature of entity, though they may call matter *not-being*, yet they do not therefore account it nothing."[5] Among modern philosophers, Robert Fludd and many others, who have admired and endeavoured to propagate Plato's sentiments, have chosen to imitate this fashion of the Platonists, and to call matter *nothing*; which they seem to do for this reason among others, that it may not be known how far his doctrine respecting the origin of nature differs from that universally received in the Christian church. For though they make use of Christian expressions in speaking of the commencement of the universe, and like ourselves say that all things were produced out of nothing, yet they do not attach the same meaning as we do to the words, and by the word *nothing* they only intend a rude and shapeless kind of matter, which they will have to be a second principle of all things. These unfair interpretations have been well exposed, among others, by Peter Gassendi, whose words are worth quoting. "As respects creation," says he,[6] "must not be understood a production of something out of nothing, in the same sense as the Mosaic creation of the universe is commonly intended by divines. For though Fludd makes

[3] De Divinis Nominibus, cap. 4. sect. 18. p. 570. tom. 1. opp.

[4] Comment. in Plotini Librum Περὶ Ὕλης, cap. 17. p. 1654. tom. 2. opp.

[5] John Scotus Erigena, De Divisione Naturæ, lib. 3. cap. 14. p. 118. has these words: "Many Gentile philosophers have thought that unformed matter was co-eternal with God, and that from it he made all his works; on which account they called matter *nothing*, because previously to its receiving a form and a shape from God it did not appear, and was, as it were, nothing at all. For whatever has no form or appearance, may without impropriety be called *nothing*."

[6] Examen Philosophiæ Fluddanæ, part 1. p. 218. tom. 3. opp.

use both of the words and the narrative of Moses, yet he uses all these in a symbolical manner. By the word *creation*, therefore, he understands, in the first place, the production or generation of any thing which is said to be made out of nothing, only as being from obscurity, or matter, *which by him is called nothing.* It is also said to be by and from God, inasmuch as light, which by him is called God, by dividing, preparing, and forming matter, constitutes things what they are." It is not necessary now to open and discuss the internal nature of this philosophy, a task which would be foreign to my present purpose. I merely wish to take the present opportunity of warning those who read the works with which these persons are now inundating the Christian world, not to trust too much to the mere sounds of words, but rather to endeavour to ascertain and judge of their meaning from the doctrines held by the writers themselves.

XX. The doctrine of the eternity of the universe is so interwoven with Aristotle's philosophy, that on its removal, a large part of his system must necessarily fall to pieces. Take away from his doctrine the eternity of the universe, and his opinions respecting heaven, God, intelligences, and other things, will be utterly destitute of support; for all his tenets on these points rest entirely on this foundation. So that none of the ancients, whether favourable or opposed to him, ever doubted that he considered the universe and motion to have been as destitute of a beginning as their Cause and Author. But what will not result from a blind attachment to great names? There have been found some among Christians who have enrolled Aristotle, in spite of himself, amongst those who believed that God created existing things out of things that were not. Daniel George Morhof relates that the class of persons called schoolmen were so preposterously attached as this to their great idol Aristotle. "The schoolmen," says he,[7] "wish to persuade us that Aristotle acknowledged the creation of primary matter out of nothing." Who these were I must confess I do not know; nor do I think it worth while to spend time (than which nothing is more precious to me) in inquiring after the names of those who lent their aid to so perverse an opinion. The authority of Morhof is, I think, quite sufficient; for he possessed an endless amount of reading and accurate industry. And I am aware of the bold rash spirit of this sect, and that Thomas Aquinas[8] himself has endeavoured to prove that Aristotle contended, not for the eternity of the universe simply and absolutely, but only

[7] Polyhistor. Philosoph. lib. 2. part 1. cap. 12. sect. 9. p. 227.

[8] Summa, part. 1. quæst. 46. art. 1. Many of the schoolmen agree with Aquinas on this point. See the Jesuits Conimbricenses on Aristotle's Physics, lib. 8. cap. 2. p. 378.

comparatively and in a certain sense; whose authority induced many to attempt something further, and to endeavour to clear away all improprieties whatever from so great a philosopher. Subsequently to the schoolmen, Georgius Trapezuntius,[9] a famous Greek writer of the fifteenth century, contended that Aristotle (whom he idolized) entertained no opinions respecting the origin of the universe and of matter that would be unworthy of a Christian; as is plain from his opponent Bessarion, who completely deprives his opinion of any semblance of truth.[10] Of the more modern admirers of the Stagirite, many might be named who have entertained the same view as Trapezuntius; for the same thing has happened to the Peripatetics as to others who have surrendered themselves entirely to a party, and renounced the liberty they received from God; that one blindly follows another, and proves what he sees to have been already proved and decided by others. I will however content myself with two, whose names are well known in our own [Lutheran] church. One is John Zeisold, who has published a book, De Aristotelis cum Scripturâ Sacrâ Consensû, in which, among other particulars, he copiously maintains that "Aristotle allowed of a true principle and creation of the universe, with a newness of being."[11] The other is Adam Tribbechow, who thinks that Zeisold has completely justified Aristotle on this point.[1] It is not necessary for me to dispute with persons of this description; for they shut their eyes at noon-day, and try to make that doubtful which must be well known to every one who is even slightly acquainted with the elements of the Peripatetic philosophy. Besides, some learned authors, who in other respects have a good opinion of Aristotle's piety, have refuted this error of theirs by solid arguments, and have shown from the Stagirite's own writings that he held the opinion attributed to him by Lactantius,[2] "that the world had always existed and always would." Those worthy of especial notice are the Jesuits Conimbricenses,[3] Benedict Pererius,[4] Francis Patricius,[5] and of our own countrymen James Thomasius,[6] who are equal to a host on this point. The principal passage on which

[9] Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis, Venet. 1523. 8vo. See also Leo Allatius, de Georgiis et eorum Scriptis, sect. 50. p. 726. at the end of the 10th volume of the Bibliotheca Græca of J. A. Fabricius.

[10] Adversus Calumniatorem Platonis, lib. 3. cap. 13. 20. 27. ed. Rom. no date.

[11] Diss. 2. art. 1. sect 1. p. 60. and sect. 13. p. 71.

[1] Veritas Creationis Mundi, cap. 2. p. 279.

[2] Institut. Divin. lib. 7 cap. 1 p. 774.

[3] Comment. in Libros Phys. Aristot. lib. 8. cap. 2. quæst. 3. art. 1. p. 375. and quæst. 4. p. 382. &c.

[4] De Communibus Rerum Naturalium Principiis et Affectionibus, lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 286.

[5] Discussiones Peripateticæ, tom. 5. lib. 4. p. 400.

[6] De Stoicâ Mundi Exustione, diss. 4. p. 58.

the defenders of Aristotle depend, is the following:[7] Θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, "God seems to be the cause and a kind of beginning to all things." But it is obvious that generalities of this description must be understood and explained in accordance with the fundamental principles of a writer's philosophy. A contrary course of proceeding, in which short sentences of this description are to be taken as a standard by which to regulate the whole substance of an author's philosophy, would cast uncertainty over the clearest truths, and involve all investigation into ancient opinions in inextricable confusion. Nor is there any thing in this passage of Aristotle's inconsistent with an hypothesis that God was the author only of forms and modes, and yet that the universe was eternal. I say nothing at present of the Stoics, who, as I have already observed,[8] have been ranked by Clemens Alexandrinus among those who supposed that no pre-existing substance was present to the Deity when he created and formed the material universe; for there cannot be the least doubt but that this sect laid down two first principles, God and matter, nor could they, on the fundamental maxims of their philosophy, allow of any beginning to matter.

XXI. Dismissing therefore the Greek sects and philosophers, I now pass on to the barbarian nations, who have been supposed by learned men to have entertained correct opinions respecting the creation of the universe. I have already observed that all disputation on the philosophy and religion of the nations of antiquity must be very uncertain, unsatisfactory, and doubtful; since they were not bound by any specific laws, confessions, or formularies, to any uniformity of opinion throughout a state; but it was left to individual priests and citizens to embrace and defend, and even to propound and teach, whatever opinions appeared to them most consistent with propriety and truth, provided only that they did not entirely neglect or oppose the worship of the gods as established by the laws; while every one interpreted according to his own pleasure, without opposition, the ceremonies and public observances of religion; as is evident from innumerable passages and testimonies of the ancients. Hence it might have happened that there were in a nation as many religions as provinces, cities, colleges of priests, or even individuals, who chose to use their private judgment respecting sacred things. But we are apt to judge of the religion and theology of a whole nation from a few expressions of some of their writers; how erroneously, the very want of agreement among these writers themselves is sufficient to show. The diversity existing among ancient authors respecting the religion of the Persians and Egyptians is a proof to my mind that, with the

[7] Libro 1. Metaphys. cap. 2. p. 263. tom. 4. o p.
[8] Sect. III. of this Dissertation.

exception of a few primary principles, no certain belief was prevalent in these nations respecting religion, and that these authors have rather given us the private opinion of a few than the public creed of all. But I have discussed these points more copiously elsewhere; for the present we will follow the beaten track, and take it for granted that some kind of certain knowledge can be obtained by us respecting the general religion of ancient nations. I will begin with the Egyptians, who excel almost all other nations in reputation for wisdom, antiquity, and almost every other advantage. It is said that Hermes Trismegistus taught this nation the doctrine of a creation out of nothing; and this is said to be evident from his writings which are still extant.[9] It is added that this is further manifest from the Physiology of the Egyptians, in which ἀρχὴ, *a beginning*, is expressly attributed to matter. "Thus also," says Dickinson,[10] "the Physiology of the Egyptians attributes τὴν ἀρχὴν, that is, a beginning, to matter; and supposes that when it first began to exist it was in a very confused state, being a mingled mass of all kinds of particles; but that after these bodies had been separated from each other, the universe fell into the order in which we now see it." And lastly Jamblichus, who has been generally supposed to be very learned in the opinions and doctrines of the Egyptians, seems expressly to assert that they entertained no doubt upon this point. If I were disposed to be contentious, I might here oppose to these authorities those who have given a different account of the Egyptians, namely that they so far held matter to be the principle of all things as scarcely to take any account of the Deity in explaining the origin of nature; and after hearing these testimonies, I might contend that they were preferable to the former, in antiquity and number. Nor do I think this method of procedure would appear wanting in force and bearing; but I will take a milder course, and will review in their order the value of the proofs adduced. First of all then, I take leave to deny that any conclusion can be drawn from Hermes on this point; for the books extant under his name are rejected as spurious by the most competent judges, and if they have any part of the genuine Egyptian doctrine (which is however very doubtful) they are at the same time corrupted by many tokens of fraud and deception, so that it is quite impossible to tell what part of them is really Egyptian.[1] But let us also pass by this consideration, and come more closely to the point. What, after all, does this "thrice-great" Hermes say, to induce us to believe that he taught the Egyptians the doctrine of a creation out of nothing? Nothing but what we shall presently hear also taught by Jam-

[9] Livius Galantes, Comparatio Theologiæ Platonicæ, p. 237. 238.
[10] Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. p. 198.
[1] See Cudworth's Intellectual System.

blichus, and what was approved of by almost all the sect of the later Platonists; that the universe was an eternal efflux from the Deity, and that all things therefore are God.[2] Away with the advocate of so absurd a sentiment! which appears to me to be even worse than the opinion which supposes the addition to the Deity of an eternal matter. The "Physiology of the Egyptians," which Dickinson calls in to his aid, is a narrative of the origin of all things, which (as appears from Dickinson's own words[3]) has been left to us by Diodorus Siculus; for this has usually been considered by learned men to be a "Physiology of the Egyptians," though it is not called so by Diodorus, nor does Eusebius, by whom it is also quoted,[4] attribute it to the Egyptians, but to the Greeks. However this may be, it shows a great want either of discernment or impartiality, to suppose that the authors of this system of cosmogony ascribe a beginning to matter. Let impartial judges peruse the following words of Diodorus, and say how far the ancient Egyptians, if indeed they were the authors of this philosophy, can claim any credit from them: Οἱ δὲ γεννητὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον εἶναι νομίσαντες, ἔφησαν ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τυχεῖν τῆς πρώτης γενέσεως ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῶν ὅλων σύστασιν, μίαν ἔχειν ἰδέαν οὐρανόν τε καὶ γῆν, μεμιγμένης αὐτῶν τῆς φύσεως· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαστάντων τῶν σωμάτων ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸν μὲν κόσμον περιλαβεῖν ἅπασαν τὴν ὡρωμένην ἐν αὐτῷ σύνταξιν, "Those who supposed the universe to be produced and incorruptible, also said that the generation of mankind took place at a certain specific time; for when *at the beginning* the union of all things took place, heaven and earth had but one form, their natures being commingled together; but afterwards upon a separation of the bodies from each other, the universe assumed the order which is now seen in it." Here indeed a certain ἀρχή, a beginning, is attributed to the *union* of all things; whence it is apparent that the former advocates of this system did not consider the universe to be eternal; but I see no evidence of a belief that matter, like the universe, had a beginning. To this may be added the more important consideration, that no mention is made of the Deity in this explanation of the origin of the universe; which has already induced some learned men to suspect that the authors of this philosophy are to be classed among those who have not feared to ascribe the origin of the universe to natural causes and the fortuitous motion of matter.[5] I have lighted upon two passages in Jamblichus, which have reference to the matter in hand.

[2] See Cudworth.

[3] Bibliotheca Histor. lib. 1. p. 7. 8.

[4] Præparatio Evangelica, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 19.

[5] This was the opinion of Eusebius, Præp. Evan. cap. 7. p. 21. with whom many moderns have agreed. See Sentiments des Philosophes sur l'Origine du Monde, p. 56.

Porphyry, in his epistle to Anebo, an Egyptian priest, had inquired, among other questions, what the Egyptians thought of matter, whether they considered it to be eternal, or produced and created? Εἰ ἀγέννητον ὕλην, ἢ γεννητήν. To this question Jamblichus replies in these words:[6] Ὕλην δὲ παρήγαγεν ὁ Θεὸς ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσιότητος ὑποσχισθείσης ὑλότητος, ἣν παραλαβὼν ὁ δημιουργὸς ζωτικὴν οὖσαν, τὰς ἁπλᾶς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς σφαίρας ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐδημιούργησε, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον αὐτῆς, εἰς τὰ γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ σώματα διεκόσμησε, "God produceth matter by dividing materiality from essentiality; which [matter] being vital, the Creator taking, formed from it simple and incorruptible spheres, and the last part of it he arranged into generated and corruptible bodies." The meaning of the following passage is the same as that of the former, though it is not expressed with equal force and perspicuity:[7] Μὴ δή τις θαυμαζέτω ἐὰν καὶ ὕλην τινὰ καθαρὰν καὶ θεῖαν εἶναι λέγομεν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ὅλων καὶ αὐτὴ γενομένη, τὴν τελειότητα ἑαυτῆς ἐπιτήδειαν κέκτηται πρὸς θεῶν ὑποδοχήν, "Nor let any one wonder if we also say that some matter is pure and divine; for it also being produced by the Father and Creator of all things, possesses a perfection of its own, necessary for the reception of the gods." Shall these passages then induce us to say that the Egyptians thought matter to be the work of the Deity? They wear, I will admit, an aspect not unadapted to persuade the unwary; but I will endeavour to prove the contrary of this, and to show that Jamblichus is not better than the rest, who have been already seen entirely to differ from Christian doctrine on the origin of nature.

In the first place, Jamblichus was a man of a vain and corrupt mind, and not at all a proper authority from which to learn the doctrines and opinions of the ancient Egyptians. His time fell at an epoch when the ancient philosophy of Hermes had already perished, and had from various causes become obliterated; and even if this philosophy had still been in existence, a Platonist could not be considered a just and proper interpreter of it; for this sect never endeavoured simply to ascertain what the ancients really thought, but rather sought with all their might to pervert the opinions of antiquity in order to make these appear to agree with their own. This was the case with Jamblichus. I would therefore allow that there are some fragments of Egyptian philosophy in his works, such as it existed in his own time among some of the priests; but one must be very ignorant of the history of Platonism not to perceive that these are very much corrupted, and accommodated to the opinions and genius of the

[6] De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, sect. 8. cap. 159.
[7] Sect. 5. cap. 23. p. 138.

sect to which Jamblichus belonged, while at the same time they are entirely deprived of their native force and power, and expounded in a method contrary to the intention of their authors. But let us pass by these considerations, and have a higher opinion of this teacher of Egyptian philosophy than he deserves; yet it will not be possible to prove from these passages of his, that the Egyptians had the same ideas of matter as the Christians. Matter is said by him to have been produced by God; and then he asserts that from matter all things were created also by the Deity. The matter here spoken of is not however all of one kind; but is divided into the grosser and the more subtle; from the more subtle and ethereal God made the stars, and from the grosser and heavier the other bodies. This is well enough so far as words go; but it will be found very much otherwise, if their meaning and import be inquired into. If it be first demanded, how and in what manner did God produce matter, Jamblichus will reply, that "God, when he produced matter separated materiality from essentiality." Who can explain what this means? They certainly intend that God educed matter from his own essence and interior nature; or that he separated and secreted matter from his own nature. Jamblichus is therefore to be reckoned among the number of those who considered matter as part of the Divine nature, and held that it had at some former period emanated from the Deity;[8] a doctrine which is obviously very different from that of Christianity. For what was always in the Deity was not created out of nothing; but already had an existence before it flowed from the Deity, and was separated from the Divine nature, though in another form and in a different mode and aspect; and it appears to me to be of little consequence whether matter be supposed to have eternally existed within the Deity, or externally to the Divine nature. I am not unaware that a large number of ancients and moderns might be produced, who have adopted this view of creation, and yet have not thought that by so doing they did violence to Christian doctrine; but at the same time I know that even in Augustine's time this doctrine was publicly proscribed, and cannot be embraced excepting by those who are more attached to freaks of ingenuity than to Christian simplicity, and who do not object, in order to escape some difficulties, to accept of opinions at once portentous and wicked.[9] But let us proceed to inquire from Jamblichus, with whom alone we have here to do, whether he supposed that matter emanated from the Deity

[8] This opinion is professed by Jamblichus, sect. 1. cap. 9. p. 15. Τὰ δ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐν τοῖς πληρώμασι τῶν θεῶν ἔχοντα τὸ εἶναι, "Terrestrial things have their being from the fulness of the gods."

[9] See the late Abraham Hinckelmann's Detectio Fundamenti Boëhmiani, p. 69, &c., where this opinion is expressly refuted.

from all eternity, or whether he thought that this occurred at a definite time; and the falsity of the opinion which he ascribes to the Egyptians will be more clearly apparent. His own words seem to favour the latter opinion; but it is necessary to be careful in trusting the words of a Platonist, which often have concealed a very different meaning from what they seem at first to bear. Philosophers of this description are accustomed very often to speak of God previously to creation with such magnificent phrases, and to speak in such a way respecting creation, as to make it appear as if it happened at a certain definite time, and had been spontaneously undertaken by the Deity. But when they do this they sustain the character of metaphysicians, and understand a *state of reason* or *mental abstraction*, to speak scholastically; that is, they conceive of God, the universe, and creation *absolutely, abstractedly, and without any determination;* and when they lose sight of this abstract idea, they hold that the universe, like the Deity, existed from all eternity, and never emanated from his nature. The same must be said of Jamblichus, who, like the other Platonists, held that the universe was eternal, and had from infinite ages emanated from the Divine nature; so that when he here says that God had taken matter, and had from it formed other things, he regards God, matter, and creation, in an abstract point of view, and speaks after the manner of metaphysicians, when they separate *universals*, as they call them, from the things in which they inhere, and treat of them in a separate aspect. And indeed it was more consistent for Jamblichus to use a degree of license in the explanation of these matters, than it was for the other Platonists: since he believed that a philosopher might, in his instructions, for the sake of more easily informing the ignorant, assume that the universe had its beginning in time, whereas in reality it had no beginning. The emperor Julian has alluded to this opinion of his with an expression of disapprobation:[10] Οἶδα μεν, says he, καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸν μέγαν καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον ἄνδρα τοῖς χρόνοις μὲν, οὔτι μὴν φύσει καταδεέστερον, τὸν Χαλκίδεα φημὶ τὸν Ἰαμβλίχον . . . . ἄχρις ὑποθέσεως τῷ γεννητῷ προσχρωμένους καὶ οἱονεὶ χρονικήν τινα τὴν ποίησιν ὑποτιθεμένους, ἵνα τὸ μέγεθος τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ γινομένων ἔργων ἐπινοηθείη, "I know that the great Plato, and another, who was second to him in time but not in genius, I mean Jamblichus the Chalcidian . . . . hypothetically considered the universe as produced, and suppose a certain creation in time, in order that the greatness of the things made by him may be understood." The emperor adds that this opinion did not appear to him free from danger. These things considered, there can be no doubt but that Jamblichus and the Egyptians, whose senti-

[10] Orat. 4. in Solem, p. 146.

ments, he says, agreed with his own, were very far removed from the Christian doctrine respecting the origin of the universe. For this author, if we look only at his words, and strip off all disguises, will be found to have taught, that God is one and all things, for that matter, of which all things consist, emanated from all eternity from the Divine nature, and diffused itself into the whole universe; so that whatever exists is part and portion of God. But scarcely any doctrine can be more injurious towards the Almighty than this, or more in accordance with the principles of atheism. Hence also Proclus, who is well known to have been a most strenuous defender of the eternity of the universe, quotes the first of the above-mentioned passages of Jamblichus, and intimates that it favours his own views.[1] And the same was the case with Bessarion, the chief of that Platonic sect which formerly pervaded part of Italy; who, while far from denying that all the Platonists asserted the eternity of the universe, thought at the same time that these expressions of Jamblichus or Hermes are not at all opposed to this opinion. "God the Creator," says he,[2] "also produces matter, and so imparts to it being as to be inseparable from form. This is the opinion of Plato, of Plotinus, Porphyry, Amelius, Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and all who followed the doctrine of Plato. Jamblichus also informs us that this was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus; since he asserts that Hermes held that matter was produced from substance." How these words are to be understood is plainly apparent from the whole chapter whence the words are taken; and particularly from the following expressions: "That eternal Being which comprehends within itself at once all infinitude of entity, such as Plato supposed God to be, is different from that eternal being which possesses its own essence, not absolutely, but connected with the flux of generation, and acquires from elsewhere the possibility of being perpetual; such as in Plato's opinion the universe is." This distinction of eternities will be explained further on, when we come to the younger Platonists.

XXII. From the Egyptians I proceed to the Chinese, whom learned men have, by a very probable conjecture, suspected to be the root-stock of the Egyptians. This nation bears in general a very bad character; for the mass of the common people are supposed to be slaves to the grossest superstitions; and the literati, as they are called, are considered to be entirely ignorant of God, and destitute of all religion. But there are some writers who contend that the ancient Chinese, before the impieties of the Hindoos and other nations had crept into the empire, had very

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 117.
[2] In Calumniatorem Platonis, lib. 2. cap. 5.

different views, and were at no great distance from true religion and sound wisdom; and the testimonies in favour of this, adduced by them out of Chinese books and other writings, are not unworthy of notice. Those who wish to know more on this point, may consult Athanasius Kircher,[3] the Jesuit editors of Confucius,[4] M. V. La Croze,[5] and T. S. Bayer,[6] the most recent writer on this subject, a very famous author, exceedingly learned in oriental languages and history, and professor in the university of Petersburg. On the general subject, Leibnitz's Epistles may be consulted, vol. 11. p. 441; and respecting the opinions of the modern Chinese, Longobardus, *l. c.* pp. 197, 329. It is also said that some remains of this golden age are still not wanting in this populous nation: but that there are still worthy and honest individuals, who abhor the novel and nefarious religion of the rest of the people. These therefore have been thought by some eminent authors to have had such just ideas respecting the origin of all things and the creation of the universe as not to be at all unworthy of being ranked in this respect with the Christian believers in a Divine revelation. Of this opinion are the authors of the Universal History, who think that this better portion of the Chinese people teach that there is a God, the supreme Ruler of heaven and earth, governing and wisely managing all things, who created all that is substantial and consists of matter; that chaos is of two kinds, the one occult or imperfect, which they call *Yin;* and the other plain or perfect, which they term *Yang*;[7] that these two principles parted again into other two, these again into four, the four into eight, and so on to many more, the first ratio of the division being always preserved.[8] If this be indeed the doctrine of the ancient Chinese, and of those among the modern nation who excel the rest in wisdom, I do not think we shall find in China any with whom we may form an alliance on the question of the origin of the universe. They affirm that God produced all things out of Chaos, or *Tay Kie*, as they call it; and that Chaos is not all of one kind, but by its various admixtures had produced the universe. But whence was Chaos? Was it made by God? Did it exist within the Deity from all eternity, or externally to God? The Chinese philosophers are silent on this point, and I fear that this silence will condemn their cause, and show that they thought

[3] China Illustrata, part 3. p. 129. &c.
[4] Declaratio Procemialis, part 1. sect. 1. p. 54. &c.
[5] Histoire du Christianisme des Indes, livre 6. p. 440.
[6] Commentarii Originum Sinicarum, sect. 3. &c. p. 269. &c. tom. 2. of the Museum Sinicum, Petersburg, 1730, 8vo.
[7] Some have it *Yam*.
[8] Sentiments des Philosophes sur l'Origine et la Création du Monde, p. 153. See also the Jesuit editors of Confucius, who have given a copper-plate illustrative of this doctrine, Declaratio Procemialis, part 1. sect. 7. p. 42.

Chaos to be equally eternal with the Deity himself. Those who think that God created all things out of Chaos, and do not add the source whence Chaos was derived, may well be ranked with Ovid and other ancient poets, who say the Deity, as a superior nature, divided and compounded,

Non benè junctarum discordia semina rerum :

but not with the Christians, who think that there was absolutely nothing at all in existence previously to the creation of matter and the universe by the Deity. However, the learned authors of the Universal History do not seem to have followed the best authorities, but rather to have confounded together the ancient and the modern philosophy of the Chinese. Let us therefore take for our guides those who have treated this question with more accuracy, so that the truth may become more clearly apparent. The modern philosophers of China call the first principle of all things *Tay Kie;* and though they speak respecting this in magniloquent phrases, yet even the Jesuits themselves confess that by this term "they merely mean primary matter;"[9] nor do they deny that "it can be plainly perceived from these philosophers' method of speech, that they acknowledge a certain kind of antecedent eternity of things arising and setting, in that numerous cycle of years, infinitely repeated, which they assign to our world." Those who entertain such absurd sentiments ought rather to be classed with profane and atheistical persons, than to be ranked among the lovers of wisdom; and this even the Jesuits admit. "For," say they, "when they copiously, but very intricately and confusedly, treat of their Ly and Tay Kie, they seem by degrees to glide into atheism; since they exclude every supernatural efficient principle; and though they sometimes seem to abstract themselves from sense and matter, yet in reality they continue in material ideas." All who are accurately skilled in Chinese literature agree in this opinion; even those who attribute more to this people than to almost all the other nations of the earth. The question therefore is settled, as regards the piety of those who seem at the present day to have in China the greatest regard for wisdom. But some eminent authors deny that the ancestors of the Chinese held similar sentiments; and think that, previously to the coming of some foreign philosophers, principally Hindoos, so pernicious a doctrine was scarcely heard of in this nation. Let us listen to what is said by that great man, himself a host, T. S. Bayer, who says:[10] "There are some among the Chinese, who in their writings lay down a principle

[9] Prœmialis Declaratio ad Confucium, part 2. sect. 1. pp. 56. 57.

[10] Commentarii Originum Sinicarum, sect. 3. p. 272. tom. 2. Musei Sinici. See also what is said by the Jesuits, ubi supra, p. 59. who go into this matter more in detail.

of all things different from this,—Tay Kie. But since these words signify a great termination or pole, it will, I think, be evident that all this has proceeded from some philosophical ratiocination, which spurns the ancient faith of their ancestors. For what is now the opinion of the Brahmins prevailed also 1700 years ago among the Chinese, that a perpetual succession of worlds existed for infinite ages before our time; so that some arose out of others, and that the present also, as it proceeded from its predecessor, so when its cycle is accomplished it will terminate, and leave behind the germ of another." Let us take it for granted that these statements are correct; for there is no reason why we should refuse to credit those who are well skilled in Chinese literature, and have studied with great diligence the ancient writings of that people, particularly when no suspicion can possibly attach to them of any sinister design. It remains, therefore, for us to inquire how the first philosophers among the Chinese reasoned respecting the origin of things. The Jesuit editors of Confucius say that they attributed a beginning to every thing. "In which," say they,[1] "they [the modern philosophers] are at variance with the common consent of Chinese antiquity, which, so far as can be gathered from its traditions, assigned a beginning to heaven and earth, and the first man and woman, with such a nicety, as even unhesitatingly to state the hour in which they began to exist." Bayer is rather more industrious on this point. He has observed out of the treatise Siao-ul-lun [Seaou-heŏ—*Davis*] or "The Instruction of Youth," which the Chinese masters are accustomed to explain to the children, that the ancient sages of this nation called the principle of all things *Tay-ku*, and also *Puen-ku*. [Pa-kua?][2] This *Tay-ku*, though some incorrectly think it to be the name of a very ancient king, he contends, in accordance with Christian Menzelius, is a vast eternity existing before the commencement of the universe. "The Chinese," says he, "have received from their ancestors the doctrine of the existence of a vast eternity before the beginnings of things, which they concisely call *Tay-ku*, extreme antiquity, or *Puen-ku*, prime antiquity." From these premises and explanations he proceeds to lay down the opinion of the founders of the Chinese nation respecting the origin of nature, in the following terms:[3] "Those ancient men had heard nothing of an eternal vicissitude of worlds and things; for they thought that this *Tay-ku*, which had preceded the origin of the heaven and of the earth, contained a tranquil and quiet chaos of all things, until by a certain impulse it put on motion and form: which opinion, rightly interpreted, does not differ greatly from

[1] Ubi supra, p. 56.
[2] Commentarii Originum Sinicarum, sect. 3. pp. 269. 270. 271.
[3] Ubi supra, p. 272.

the sacred faith of the patriarchs and of Moses." This learned man seems to proceed even further than this, and endeavours to prove that the primitive Chinese entertained the same opinion as the Phœnicians, Thales, and others, are said to have held: "that from water, as the material, the forms of all things were produced."[4] Let all this be taken for granted; for who would dare, without evidence, to accuse of falsehood learned men who have spent a great part of their lives in the examination of Chinese learning? Yet I am not thus induced to believe that the early Chinese understood and believed the doctrine of a creation out of nothing. The ancient sages of China assigned indeed a beginning to the universe and to the human race; they taught that eternity contained a tranquil and quiet chaos of things, until being acted upon by the Deity it acquired the form which at present it wears. But these are rather the sentiments of men who join with the Deity an eternity of matter, than of those who contend that nothing was in existence before the universe was made by God. For if eternity embraced and contained within its bosom a tranquil and quiet chaos, there must have been from all eternity a rude and undigested mass of matter, which afterwards submitted itself to the disposing and formative hand of God. Therefore, the learned men from whom these statements are derived, do not dare to say that the ancient Chinese were altogether sound upon this point. The Jesuits, by the use of the qualifying expression, "at least," evidently show that they did not venture to clear them of all suspicion, and that nothing was clearly ascertainable from their ancient books, except that they had more reason and truth than to believe in the eternity of the universe. The learned Bayer only says that the opinions he ascribes to the ancient Chinese in some measure approached to Christian truth, especially if a favourable interpretation were put upon them; which is the same thing as saying that there was not a little difference between the doctrines of the Christians and those of the ancient Chinese respecting the origin of the universe. Therefore, even if we should grant that the modern philosophy of the Chinese has considerably departed from the ancient form, and has become wonderfully corrupt; yet still more weighty testimonies are required, before we can agree that the early Chinese believed that God was the only parent and author of all things that exist.

XXIII. From the Chinese, I proceed to the Japanese and Hindoos. As regards the former, Ludovic Froes relates[5] that

[4] Sect. 4. p. 274. &c.

[5] In a letter in the Portuguese language, dated from Japan in the year 1565, quoted by Athanasius Kircher, China Illustrata, part 3. cap. 2. p. 142. The Portuguese original runs as follows:—Que antes desto mundo ceos e terra, serem creados, o Fombum semper

some of this nation are wiser and better than the rest, and hold sentiments widely different from those of the common people respecting their deity Amida. For they were persuaded that this god existed prior to the formation of heaven and earth, and that he would be eternal; that all things were made and framed by him; that his nature or essence was diffused throughout heaven and earth; that it even extended far beyond both these; and lastly, that all things were governed and preserved by his providence. Some there are who think these particulars sufficient to prove that among the Japanese there were not wanting the advocates of a creation out of nothing. But I think the matter is not yet quite so plain, and demands a little further consideration. Let it be granted that Froes correctly understood the sentiments of the Japanese with whom he conversed, and did not inadvertently accommodate their words to Christian doctrine; a thing, however, that is very often done by those who examine into the religion and customs of foreign nations. The only conclusion that can be drawn from his words is, that this sect did not accede to the doctrine of the eternity of the universe; for those who hold that the Deity formed all things out of eternal matter, would not hesitate to profess and approve the sentiments they held respecting creation. A comparison of the Timæus of Plato with this opinion will show the intimate alliance between the two. But I fear that Froes, misled by a similitude and congruity of expression, has fallen into error on this point, and has attributed to this description of persons a more correct sentiment than is just. For Engelbert Kæmpfer, who has very lately inquired into the sects, religion, and opinions of the Japanese, with greater sagacity than any preceding author, has met with nothing in the whole nation, but ignorance and impiety; and never met with persons of such correct sentiments, though he had diligently perused their sacred writings and the books of particular sects, and had conversed with the mystagogues of all religions. Three principal sects are in existence amongst the Japanese. The first called *Sintos*, is the most ancient, and seems to have been originated and matured in the island itself. The second is called *Budsdo*, or "the religion of foreign deities," and was brought to the Japanese from the neighbouring parts of Asia. It does not seem to differ from Brahminism. The third is that of the philosophers, and is called *Siuto*, that is, "the way of the wise." This is easily recognised by those acquainted with oriental religions, as approaching very near to the modern doctrine of the Chinese; nor is this denied by its followers, who hold Confucius in high veneration, and venerate their ancestors

fora enunca tivera principio, nem havia de ter fim, e qua por elle foraon creadas todas as conzas, que seu ser estava dentro na terra e nos ceos.

and the souls of their deceased parents, after the manner of the Chinese. Those called Sintos entertain the multitude with tales respecting the gods and their exploits; but studiously conceal their real doctrine respecting the origin of nature, and only disclose it to their disciples after a terrific oath that they will never discover this sublime mystery to the profane and stupid multitude. But Kæmpfer, out of the book of this sect which is called Odaiki, brought this doctrine to light; upon which elucidation, it was found to be worthy of eternal oblivion. For this senseless sect think that the being who created and formed all things was produced out of eternal chaos or matter, and made all things by a certain fatal necessity. The words of the book I have above mentioned, and in which all this sacred doctrine is contained, are as follow:[6] "In the beginning of the opening of all things a chaos floated, as fishes swim in the water for pleasure. Out of this chaos arose a thing like a prickle, moveable and transformable. This thing became a soul or spirit, and this spirit is called '*Kunito Kodatsno Mikotto.*'" There is, I think, little doubt but that Froes heard one of this sect describing the origin of the universe, and interpreted his words according to the doctrine of Moses, who is well known to have declared that the Spirit of the Lord moved the waters when the universe was created by God; whence it has happened that he also accommodated the other doctrines of this philosophy to agree with the tenets of Christianity. Those who follow the religion called Budsdo by the Japanese, seem to entertain the idea of a certain eternal succession of worlds, such as the Stoics formerly professed, and many of the Hindoos imagine. The Siodosju, or philosophers, entertain such improper sentiments respecting all religious truth, that we shall not be far wrong in classing them among Atheists. Most of them worship no god except a kind of soul of the universe, which they think pervades all things, and acts only by fatality and necessity. Some, though they admit of a soul as distinct from body, yet deny that it is the parent of all things, and are even so senseless as to think that this soul, which they think rules and governs all things, was generated and produced from the conjunction of the heaven and earth, or Yin and Yo.[7] Both kinds think the world to be eternal, and that men and animals were produced by the power of heaven, and of the five terrestrial elements.[8]

XXIV. In inquiring into the religion and opinions of the Hindoos respecting the Deity and divine things, the Hindoo philosophers are principally to be understood, who are called

[6] History of Japan, lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 207.

[7] Kæmpfer's History of Japan, lib. 3. cap. 7. pp. 249. 250.

[8] Ubi supra, p. 250. "They make the world eternal, and suppose men and animals to have been produced by Yin and Yo, the heaven and the five terrestrial elements."

Brahmans or Brahmins, and who have enjoyed a high reputation for wisdom from the remotest antiquity. For it is universally admitted by all that have visited that country, that the rest of the people are buried under a mass of senseless fables and gross errors, and rarely raise their minds to the contemplation of abstract subjects. And therefore, some learned men, relying upon the narratives of some travellers, do not hesitate to reckon these Brahmins among those who refer the origin of all things and of matter itself to one God. But if there be any thing doubtful, obscure, and uncertain, it is the religion of the Brahmins, of which there are almost as many opinions as there are authorities who have undertaken to explain it; on which account it is not clear what they think, or what they ought to think, respecting the origin of the universe. Some say that they maintain an eternal series of successive worlds, and that the modern Chinese derived this doctrine from them; an opinion that is not destitute of probability, as is plain from what M. V. La Croze [9] has related respecting the great number of worlds spoken of by them. Others say that they hold creation to have been nothing else than an amplification of the Divine nature, and say that when the Deity purposed to create the universe, he drew the material of all things from his own essence, just as a spider draws its web from its body; whence it follows that all things are identical with the Deity, and that whatever exists is part of the divine nature.[10] A similar report makes them believe that the Deity himself was first of all converted into a certain kind of egg, or into matter, and that from this egg, or rather from the Deity, emanated heaven and earth, and all things.[1] But a very different account is given out of the books of the Hindoos, by Bartholomew Ziegenbalg, who is well known to have propagated Christianity among them in our own time with great zeal and considerable success; for he says that when the sages of the nation are questioned respecting the origin of nature, they produce a kind of genealogy of the gods. They say that the first of all this imaginary family was an infinitely powerful being, destitute of any beginning, whom they call *Barabara Wastu;* this being, who is identical with the supreme Deity, is said to have generated eternity; from eternity was generated *Tschiwen,* the most powerful god; from this god was born the goddess *Tshaddy;* she again produced *Putadi,* or the elementary and sensible world.[2] Thus these triflers proceed, and string together an endless series of gods and things, mutually

[9] Histoire du Christianisme des Indes, livre 6. p. 467.

[10] François Bernier, Voyages aux Terres du Grand Mogol, tom. 2. p. 164.

[1] La Croze, ubi supra, p. 462. Sentiments des Philosophes sur l' Origine du Monde, p. 150.

[2] Der Königl. Dänschen Missionarien Berichte aus Ostindien, tom. 1. pt. 1. p. 47.

produced and dependent on each other, until after a long train they come to the creation of man. I have contented myself with giving the beginning of the fable. But I suspect that all this is but a development of the opinion which makes all things to have flowed from the divine nature itself, for they say that the supreme and omnipotent nature is the source whence all things have emanated, and to which they must all return; so that their meaning is obvious. Another form of Brahminism is given by Abraham Roger,[3] whose accuracy and diligence are commended by all who have had occasion to give their attention to Hindooism. He relates that the Brahmins worship one supreme Deity, whom they call Vishnu; that this Deity was believed by them to have produced another god of the name of Brahma, previously to the existence of aught else; and that when asked whence this Brahma was produced, they were accustomed to reply that the god was made from a flower which swam in the immense abyss before the creation of the universe. They add that Brahma possessed so much faith and virtue, that the supreme Deity imparted to him the power of creating the natural world. Here are plainly perceptible the traces of an ancient error respecting the eternity of matter. For what else is that immense vortex in which floated the flower from which Brahma was produced, but an eternal chaos, which these ridiculous sages maintain that Brahma afterwards put in order? It would be easy to enumerate many more opinions, that have been generally attributed to Hindoo philosophers by the writings of those who have lived in the East. But this is unnecessary; since we have in those which have already been adduced sufficient evidence to prove, upon an attentive consideration, that inextricable difficulties attend the ascertainment of the real doctrine of the Brahmins respecting the origin of the universe. Doubtless there are several more opinions among them upon this subject, and every one embraces which he pleases, since there is no law enacted to bind them to any fixed opinions; for I am unwilling to suppose that those who have reported this diversity of fables and doctrines were either deceived themselves, or wished to deceive others. But in all those which I have quoted, or others that I have read, there is none accordant with Christian sentiments, or consistent with the doctrine we profess to believe respecting the origin of nature. I will grant that the professors of most of these opinions do not agree with those who think that the universe never had a beginning, and that, on the contrary, they assent to the doctrine that a certain infinite Being created the universe; but at the same time I think it certain that some of them had such erroneous views of the method of

[3] Offene Thür zum verborgenen Heidenthum, pt. 2. cap. 1.

creation as to make little or no difference between the universe and God, while the rest imagined to themselves a kind of eternal chaos from which all things were produced. But both are thus far removed from Christians, who, unless they wish to contemn the authority of the sacred Scriptures, cannot but abhor both these views. But if (what however I very much doubt) any of the Hindoos could be produced, who in all respects approved the doctrines of Christianity respecting the origin of nature, it would in the first instance be necessary to ascertain whether they had retained inviolate the genuine doctrine of their ancestors, or whether by their intercourse with Europeans, and the disputations of the missionaries, they had introduced into it some emendations; for I think there can be no doubt that many of the Brahmins, particularly those upon the coasts, have derived no small advantage from their conferences with Christians, and being constrained by the force of truth, have in some respects accommodated their own philosophy to Christian doctrines.

XXV. It may perhaps here be said, that no account should be taken in this inquiry of the modern Brahmins; since they have gradually departed in innumerable instances from the laws and customs of their ancestors, and subsequently to the Mogul conquest have become almost entirely different from what they were before, and that comparatively few of them understand the dialect in which their ancient books are written, containing the principles of Hindoo philosophy; much less do they comprehend the doctrines of the ancients. It may further be asserted that great latitude of opinion has now for a long time prevailed among the people; and that nothing hinders any persons from interpreting the metaphysical philosophy of their ancestors according to their own will; that the poets also, who have had great authority among them, have wonderfully obscured and corrupted their ancient wisdom by their fabulous and puerile embellishments; moreover, that most of them are altogether barbarous and ignorant, and use many expressions the meaning of which they themselves do not understand; that the books from which is drawn the picture of Hindooism given us by travellers and divines, are themselves of modern origin, and composed subsequently to the change and perversion which took place in the form and constitution of ancient doctrine. On these accounts the whole question may be turned over to those Brahmins who lived previously to this change taking place in Hindooism; and we may be told that the memory of these sages, and of the philosophy which they taught, is to be found in the Greek writers, while even to the present day a sacred volume is preserved among themselves, to which all who wish to be called Brahmins pledge their obedience, though they differ wonderfully from each other; that hence alone is to be ascer-

tained the true and genuine religion of the Hindoos, and that the fictions of the modern nation should be left to their authors. I will not deny that all this is to a great extent true; and I could wish it were, as well as many other considerations, never forgotten by those who undertake to discuss the religions of the East. Let us therefore take this course, and see whether so we can prove that the ancient sages of India entertained a correct opinion respecting the origin of the universe, and that their posterity, if they would be worthy of them, must conform to it also. The opinions of the ancient Brahmins are explained by Megasthenes, in Strabo.[4] He says that they "considered the universe to have been produced and to be corruptible, and that it was of a spherical shape," ὅτι γὰρ γεννητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς, καὶ ὅτι σφαιροειδής, "that God was its manager and maker, and that he pervaded the whole," ὅτι διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν θεὸς δι' ὅλου διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτοῦ, "that water was the first thing created," τῆς δὲ κοσμοποιίας ἀρχὴ τὸ ὕδωρ. I pass over other particulars, less relevant to the matter in hand. With this entirely agrees what is said by Philostratus or (if the supposition be preferred) Jarchas, the prince of Hindoo philosophers, as reported by Philostratus.[5] Among other particulars, he very plainly declares that the world is an animal, and in order to illustrate this doctrine he compares it with a ship, and ascribes to the God who made this animal the principal share in the government of this ship, associating with him minor gods: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ δὴ πρώτην καὶ τελειωτάτην ἕδραν ἀποδοτέον θεῷ γεννέτορι τοῦδε τοῦ ζωοῦ, "The first and most perfect place may be given to God the producer of this animal." Let all this be taken for granted; for who would venture to assert the contrary? But still it is very insufficient to prove that the Brahmins assigned a beginning even to matter itself. For to say that the universe was created by God, to hold that the Deity supplies the place of a soul to the world, and that the universe may again be dissolved and perish, is after all compatible with a belief that the matter itself of which the universe was composed was destitute both of beginning and end. I know not how it has happened that even learned men, when they read that any of the ancients taught that God was the maker of the universe, at once conclude that they held the whole circle of Christian truth in reference to the origin of nature; as if the admission that the universe was made were identical with saying that matter was made also. Since therefore no help for the Hindoos is to be obtained out of the Greek writers, we must next come to their own books, which they assert to be divine and given to them by the founder

[4] Geographia, lib. 15. p. 677.
[5] Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. 3. cap. 34, p. 125. &c.

of their nation. There is still extant among the Brahmins a very ancient collection of books, which they call the Veda. These this ignorant nation say that they received from the god Brahma himself; these they revere with great zeal and veneration, nay even with profounder reverence than Christians do the Old and New Testaments. They are allowed to be read by none even of the Brahminical order, except by those who have been previously prepared by a sacred ceremony, and freed from all impurities of mind and body. These books, in short, they hold to be the only rule and standard of all religion and wisdom, and there is no Brahmin who will not allow that all their knowledge is contained in the precepts contained in them, though they are otherwise divided amongst themselves by diversity of sentiments. I will grant that the real religion of the Hindoos is to be drawn from this volume alone, and in common with other authors I wish that very shortly this most ancient document may be published and translated into a language better understood. But the Brahmins say that this law is written for and binding upon themselves alone; on which account they preserve it with the greatest care, and will not allow it even to be seen by any but those of their own caste, but least of all will they allow any Europeans, whom they consider to be profane persons, to meddle with it. And after all the attempts of the Jesuits (who have imitated the manners and customs of the Brahmins, and said that they were Brahmins from the north), to obtain a copy of the Veda, they have never been able to accomplish their purpose; a fact which shows that the golden fleece of old was never so strictly guarded as this law, supposed by the Hindoos to be divine. Some particulars, I am aware have been given us by learned men of the general plan and argument of this work, which they profess to have received by oral communication from the Brahmins; but these are few in number and mutually contradictory, so that it is evident either that their Indian authorities deceived them, or otherwise were not sufficiently acquainted with their own literature. I pass by other considerations of which, were it not for the sake of brevity, I could easily take notice, and will touch only upon what is here in question, namely, the doctrine of the origin of the universe, as given in the Veda. Those authorities who have explained this subject more fully and accurately than others, Abraham Roger, Bouchet the Jesuit, and Francis Bernier, agree that it is divided into four books; that the first of these treats of God, the universe, its origin, primary matter, and similar topics; but they do not specify what is the nature of the doctrine which this book contains. Abraham Roger intimates that it teaches that the supreme Deity first of all produced the god Brahma from a flower floating in the vast abyss, and that Brahma afterwards

created all other things, as we have mentioned above. Bernier says that it relates that when the chief of all the gods began the creation of the universe, he produced first of all three most perfect natures, Brahma, Beschen [Vishnu], and Mehahdeu [Mahadeo]; that by the first the universe was created, by the second it is preserved, and by the last it will be destroyed.[6] Bouchet, the most recent authority, so far as I know, is more brief upon the point, who, writing to P. D. Huet,[7] respecting this law book of the Brahmins, merely says that it is written in it that in the beginning nothing existed but the Deity and water, and that the Deity floated on the surface of the waters; a doctrine which this Jesuit thinks does not widely differ from what is said by Moses respecting the origin of nature.[8] A comparison of these reports with each other will show that they are not so different as to be irreconcileable, or incapable of reduction to one system. It will also, I think, unless I am mistaken, be perceived that they do not throw sufficient light upon the whole doctrine of the Brahmins respecting the universe, and give more countenance to the suspicion that the ancient Hindoos ascribed eternity to matter, than to the opposite opinion. For what else is water, or the immense vortex, which they say existed from the beginning with God, but the chaos spoken of by the Greek poets, or the undigested material which, according to Plato, was skilfully arranged by the Deity for the benefit of the human race? And what can be said of the flower from which Brahma, the creator of the world, is reported to have been born? Would it be altogether an ungrounded suspicion, that this nation is not far removed from the opinion of the Japanese, who, as we have already observed, were persuaded that the generative nature which arranged the mass of matter, was produced from the bosom of matter itself, and had been from eternity concealed within it? But I am unwilling to delay my readers by conjectures, and only wish them to bear in mind, that the ancient sages of India do not seem to have been better than the moderns.

XXVI. I had almost forgotten the Phœnicians, a famous nation, and formerly much lauded by several authorities. If Eusebius is to be believed, they were very little better than

[6] Voyage aux Etats du Grand Mogol, tom. 2. p. 139. Bernier calls the sacred books of the Hindoos by different names from the others; but it is plain from his whole narrative that he speaks of the same collection, which is called by the Hindoos the Veda.

[7] In a letter to be found in the Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, écrites des Missions étrangères par quelques Missionaires de la Compagnie de Jesus, 9 recueil, p. 38. &c.

[8] Ubi supra, p. 40. La première partie du Vedam, qu'ils appellent Irroucou-Vedam, traite de la première cause et de la manière dont le monde a été creé. Ce qu'ils m'en ont dit de plus singulier, par rapport à notre sujet, c'est qu'au commencement il n'y avait que Dieu et l'eau. La ressemblance de ce trait avec le premier chapitre de la Genèse n'est pas difficile à remarquer.

atheists, and worshipped no other gods than the sun, moon, and stars, to which they ascribed the origin and destruction of all things. Φοίνικας, says he,[9] ἁπάντων κατέχει λόγος ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστέρας θεοὺς ἀποφῆναι, μόνους τε εἶναι τῆς τῶν ὅλων γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἰτίους, "The Phœnicians, it is reported, considered the sun, moon, and stars, to be gods, and the only causes of generation and corruption." He repeats the same thing in other passages, and studiously confirms them from those well-known fragments which are attributed to Sanchoniathon, a very celebrated philosopher of this nation. And this opinion of his is approved by the most acute writers. But so severe an accusation against the Phœnicians has been rebutted by Edmund Dickinson, who, in opposition to Eusebius and so many learned men, places them in the number of those who suppose the Supreme Deity to be the framer and parent of matter. "Hence," says he,[10] "the cosmogony of the Phœnicians plainly teaches, that not only the universe but also its material, which was σπορὰ κτίσεως, the seed of creation, is γεννητὸν, or produced." But either this learned man has wished to deceive us, or was hindered by his prepossessed opinions from perceiving the truth himself. The cosmogony in which he fancies he finds such exalted wisdom are those very remains of Sanchoniathon from which, Eusebius contends,[1] it is evident that the Phœnicians philosophized respecting the origin of the universe in so impious and wicked a manner as even to deny the existence of the Deity altogether: Τοιαύτη μὲν αὐτῶν ἡ κοσμογονία, ἀντικρὺς ἀθεότητα εἰσάγουσα, "Such then is their cosmogony, evidently introducing atheism." The words which led him [Dickinson] to adopt his opinion are the following: Καὶ ἐκ ταύτης ἐγένετο πᾶσα σπορὰ κτίσεως καὶ γένεσις τῶν ὅλων, "And from this all the seed of creation and the generation of all things existed." This learned man was persuaded that the term σπορὰ κτίσεως meant matter, and that it was said to be generated and produced by God; but nothing could be farther from the truth than this; for the being from which Sanchoniathon says this "seed of creation" existed, was not the Deity, but *Mot*, as the Phœnicians called it, an indescribable kind of existence which, as he himself says, some called "mud," and others "the corruption of the watery mixture." What can be imagined more opposed to Christian doctrine than this? This "seed of creation" was not the primary material of all things, which, according to the opinion of the Phœnicians, existed long before what they called Mot; but it was a certain disposal of matter to receive those forms into which it was afterwards changed when the creation and produc-

[9] Præparatio Evangelica, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 17.
[10] Physice Vetus et Vera, cap. 12. p. 198.
[1] Ubi supra, lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 33.

tion of all things took place. Indeed I am so far from agreeing with those who find no small portion of divine truth in the doctrine of the Phœnicians, as explained by Sanchoniathon, that I think on the contrary that Eusebius accurately perceived the enormities of this system; and I am of opinion that this nation ought to be associated with those who hold that all things were produced from an eternal matter by a certain power and law of nature, and who exclude the Deity altogether from the creation of the universe. If the Phœnicians are to be taken as guides, it must first of all be believed that from all eternity there existed a certain darksome atmosphere, pregnant with a certain spirit, and at the same time a turbid, rude, and undigested chaos; and also that these two principles are destitute both of beginning and end. How absurd is all this, and how injurious towards the Deity! For these men refuse to acknowledge any other God than a certain spirit mixed with a gloomy atmosphere. Nor is the sequel any better. This spirit was once inflamed with a love of Chaos, and therefore united itself with it. This conjunction of spirit and of rude matter they call ποθὴν or *desire;* and from this desire they suppose to have been derived the commencement of creation. The purport of all this it is not difficult to conjecture. After spirit had insinuated itself into eternal matter and pervaded it, there existed in it a certain blind impetus to generate and produce from itself all things that were afterwards created. Nor is it their theory, as one might suppose, that this spirit acted by a plan and method, and arranged matter by a preconcerted design; for it was not of such a nature as to undertake any thing of this description. It was on the contrary ignorant what would take place, and did not foresee what would happen; that is, all things happened by necessity and fatality. Αὐτὸ δὲ πνεῦμα, says Sanchoniathon, οὐκ ἐγίνωσκε τὴν αὐτοῦ κτίσιν, "The spirit did not know its own work," or those things which ensued from its conjunction with matter. From the union of spirit and chaos was born Mot, a certain slime or mud, as I have already shown; Mot produced first of all the sun, moon, and stars; the stars afterwards by their heat and power generated mankind and animals. Fine wisdom truly! which will be readily embraced by all who wish to expel the Deity from the universe.

XXVII. Some learned men of considerable ability and extensive reading have persuaded themselves that the ancient Persians also referred the creation of matter to the Supreme Deity, and that their modern descendants entertain equally correct sentiments. But I have never met with any thing in ancient or modern writings which should make me assent to this proposition, nor do I perceive that any thing of the kind has ever been adduced by the authors who have embraced this opinion. If we

may believe Herodotus, the ancient Persians were so far remote from the truth, that they acknowledged no supreme Deity, except one that was substantial and corporeal. For he says that "they call the whole circle of heaven Jupiter," τὸν κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλέοντες.[2] But I have already said elsewhere, that the Greeks seem to me to have attributed so erroneous a sentiment to the Persians, because they made use of no temples, and worshipped the Deity in the open air in mountains. I should therefore set lightly by this testimony, and, not to be prolix, I will grant not only that the Persians worshipped one omnipotent and eternal Deity, but also thought that by the power and might of this Deity the universe was created. It only remains that those who desire to favour the Persians should point out but one passage of some ancient writer from which it may be apparent that the very nature of all things was considered by them to be the work of the Deity. Such a supposition as this appears to me to be incredible, upon a consideration of the absurd fables of this people respecting the two principles of nature, Oromasdes and Ahriman, and also what they say about Mithras and other matters. Those who at the present day wish to appear to retain the ancient religion of the Persians, have already for some time very greatly departed from the laws and institutions of their ancestors, and have accommodated many of their tenets to agree with the opinions of the Mohammedans, in order that they may live with greater security among them; and this is not denied by those who in other respects make great account of this nation because of their antiquity. They cannot therefore be competent witnesses to the ancient religion of the Persians. But neither do I recollect that any thing has been produced from their sacred books to prove that their opinion respecting the origin of the universe was entirely correct. Learned men, who have expressly inquired into their opinions respecting theology, have said that the common opinion of this nation was that God at six periods, consisting of unequal numbers of days, and included within the space of a year, created the world and all its several parts. That in the first period, which contained fifty-five days, the heaven was created; in the second, containing sixty days, the waters; in the third the earth; in the fourth plants and trees; in the fifth animals; and that lastly, in the sixth, mankind came into existence.[3] These particulars, I will admit, are not very different from what is related by the divinely inspired Moses; and I apprehend they are taken from the Christian or Jewish scriptures, rather than born in the gardens of Persia. But it is not at all clear from

[2] Lib. 1. sect. 131. p. 55.

[3] Thomas Hyde, Historia Religionis Veterum Persarum, p. 64. &c. and Henry Lord, Account of the Religion of the Parsees, pp. 6. 41. &c.

hence, that they ascribed a beginning to matter; for although they say that heaven was at first created by God, it is not decided whether they supposed that it was produced out of nothing, or out of a certain eternal matter. To my own mind the latter appears most probable, and that for several reasons, which, for the sake of brevity, I now pass by.

XXVIII. Some respectable writers assert that the Etruscans used more diligence in the investigation of natural causes than other nations. Let them enjoy this reputation; while we in our turn will take the liberty to investigate, if possible, how far they had advanced in wisdom and learning in this respect. Indeed I have met with more traces of Etruscan superstition and folly than of wisdom in ancient books which speak of them; and this, I think, will be assented to by all impartial judges of things and opinions. But still the Etruscans have their advocates; who, though they do not deny that this people erred in many respects from the truth, yet make no doubt of their being orthodox in reference to the universe and its creation. They quote, as the originator of this favourable opinion, a certain unknown author, whose words have been preserved by Suidas.[4] He states that the Tyrrhenians or Tuscans held that the God by whom all things were created,[5] would occupy twelve thousand years in the fabrication of his works; that in the first thousand years the heavens and the earth were formed by him; that next to these the visible heaven was constructed; then the sea and all the waters were made; from hence the sun, moon, and stars were produced; that to these succeeded the birds, fishes, and other animals; and that the creation of man was the conclusion of the whole work; that in each of these tasks the Deity spent a thousand years; that therefore six thousand years elapsed before man was created by God; and that the human race would pass the other six thousand years on the earth. Suidas' narration terminates here; but it is very probable that the Etruscan prophets added, that at the close of the twelve thousand years the world would be destroyed, and would be again constructed anew by God. For it is apparent from Plutarch[6] that they believed that after the lapse of a certain number of years fixed by the Deity, and which they called "the great year," a vast revolution of all things usually took place. I will not quarrel with those who will have that this writer, whose name Suidas has not given, is worthy of all credit; although I might perhaps justly use my privilege in this respect; but I must contend that very little can be drawn from this testimony to prove that the Etruscans held the same views as the Chris-

[4] Lexicon, tom. 3. verbo Τυῤῥηνία χῶρα.
[5] Τὸν δημιουργὸν τῶν πάντων Θεόν.
[6] Life of Sylla, p. 456. tom. 1. opp.

tians respecting the creation of the universe. For not a word can be found in this account, to show that they thought that matter arose into being at the command of God, not having had any previous existence. On the contrary, some parts of it induce me to believe that this doctrine never entered their minds. They say that the Deity, forsooth, consumed six thousand years in the preparation and embellishment of this world. But the infinitely powerful God, whose will all things obey, who is able by a word to bring all things into existence out of nothing, does not require so much time to prepare and produce what he wills. Therefore it appears to me, in the first place, that the ancient Etruscans thought that some obstacle prevented the Deity from finishing his work, and consumed so great a number of years in its fabrication. What hindrance, then, was the cause of such slowness to the Creator? Was it in his own nature, or external to him? It will be the same thing to my argument, whichever view be embraced. If the Divine Being himself, in the opinion of the Etruscans, was so weak in his own nature as not to be able to perform his designs at once, I can never persuade myself that they attributed to him the greatest of all possible achievements, the creation of matter out of nothing. If the cause be sought for externally to the Deity, an eternal matter will at once be brought into supposition. This it was, unless I am much mistaken, which by its obstinacy, inertness, and depravity, prevented the Deity from more speedily accomplishing his designs. When to this I add what I have already quoted from Plutarch respecting the "great year" imagined by the Etruscans, I readily agree that they formed one sect with those who held a kind of eternal succession of worlds; a tenet altogether inconsistent with the truths we profess to believe. I have now therefore gone over the principal nations who have been in such good standing with the learned, that they have wished to set the tenets taught by them respecting the creation of the universe on a par with the divine doctrines of Christianity. For I am unwilling to enter upon a discussion respecting the ancient Northern nations, and some of the people of America, who have found advocates of a similar character; since the whole ancient history of these people is too barren and obscure to afford any solid and certain data respecting their religion.

XXIX. It now only remains for me to speak of the later Platonists, who, proceeding from Egypt, propagated their doctrine through almost all the more civilized regions of the world, and are not destitute of friends and favourers at the present day. Not a few authors of talent have failed in the explanation of the views and opinions of this sect, partly because they have interpreted their style and diction in accordance with vulgar usage, and partly because they have not properly observed that many

things said by them are to be taken *in a state of reason*, or *of mental abstraction*, to use scholastic language. And I fear that this has been the case in the present instance. Some of the ancient Christians put so favourable an interpretation on some of these Platonic dogmas respecting the universe, as to think they differed not at all from their own doctrines. This is shown by Æneas Gazæus, a very famous philosopher of the fifth century, who, in confutation of those Platonists who held that the universe was eternal, and denied that either it or the matter of which it is composed ever had a beginning, opposes to them the pillars of the Platonic school; and contends that Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as the Oracles called Chaldæan, exhibited the same views respecting matter as the Christian. His words are as follow: Οὐ γὰρ ἀγέννητος ῥυὲ ἄναρχος ἡ ὕλη· τοῦτό σε καὶ Χαλδαῖοι διδάσκουσι καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος· ἐπιγράφει δὲ καθ' ὅλου τὸ βιβλίον, ὃ εἰς μέσον προάγει τῶν Χαλδαίων τὰ λόγια· ἐν οἷς γεγονέναι τὴν ὕλην ἰσχυρίζεται, καὶ τὸ Πλωτίνου διανοίγων βιβλίον ὅθεν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν που λέγει, ἀγέννητον δὴ εἶναι τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχαῖς τιθέναι, ὡς ἄθεον δόγμα παραιτητέον.[7] This passage is thus translated into Latin by Caspar Barth: Materia ipsa neque ingenerata, neque caret principio. Hoc quidem et Chaldæi te docuerint et Porphyrius, libro quem Catholon scripsit, producendis eorumdem dogmatibus compositum. In hôc factam esse materiam convincit, et Plotini enarrans commentarium statuit, opinionem eorum, qui sylvam illam ingenitam et principii expertem docent, in Deum impietatis explodendam. This version labours under several inaccuracies, which will be immediately apparent upon a comparison of the Greek with the Latin; and the worst of which is, that the words καθ' ὅλου and their context are rendered by Barth as if Porphyry had left behind him a book called Catholon, and that in it he had only collected the oracles of the Chaldæans. No book of this description, written by Porphyry, is extant; nor do Gazæus' words require us to believe that in the volume which is here mentioned he had merely collected, or perhaps explained, the oracles of the Chaldæans. This error has been already noticed by the learned Lucas Holstenius, who denies that the words καθ' ὅλου are the title of a book, and translates the period thus:[8] Ille enim integrum librum conscripsit, quo Chaldæorum oracula producit, quibus materiam esse genitam confirmatur. But neither can I quite agree with him. I rather suspect that, after all, the title of some book of Porphyry's is here mentioned by Gazæus, but that his text is corrupted by the carelessness of transcribers. He wrote, I imagine, καθ' ὕλης, and refers to the volume which,

[7] In Theophrasto, seu Dialogo de Opificio Mundi, p. 56.
[8] De Vitâ et Scriptis Porphyrii, cap. 9. p. 56. ed. Cantab.

according to Suidas, Porphyry wrote περὶ ὕλης, or "On Primary Matter." And this, I think, is evident both from the nature of the case (for the discourse here is respecting matter), and also because Gazæus adds that a certain treatise of Plotinus was expounded in this book by Porphyry; for a book of Plotinus περὶ ὕλης is still extant, which doubtless his disciple endeavoured to elucidate in this work. Many among the moderns have followed these authorities among the ancients, and have not hesitated to affirm that Plato and all his genuine disciples thought that matter was produced and created by God. Among these the first place may be assigned to Bessarion, who says,[9] "God also produced matter itself, and imparted to it such an existence as to be inseparable from form; this is the opinion of Plato respecting matter, as well as of Plotinus, Porphyry, Amelius, Jamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and of all, in short, who have followed the doctrine of Plato. This also, Jamblichus informs us, was the belief of Hermes Trismegistus, since he affirms that Hermes held that matter was produced from substantiality." But here Bessarion is not quite accurate, since he ascribes the same opinion to all the Platonists, which, as will presently appear, is not at all possible; nor does he in any way favour those who affirm that the later Academy embraced the opinion of Christians respecting the origin of the universe, since he does not in the least deny that this sect at the same time attributed eternity to the universe. Livius Galantes[10] has written with more accuracy and diligence on this point, whose treatise, rightly divided into its several parts and divisions, but with the omission of whatever does not pertain to the main purpose, I will here introduce.

Galantes inscribes the chapter in which he discusses this subject with the following title: "Was the universe created out of nothing, or out of pre-existing matter?" In the chapter itself he divides the Platonists into three classes. In the first class he includes those who thought matter to be equally eternal with the Deity, of whom, he observes, Plato himself is usually accounted the leader and head. To this he subjoins a second class, of those who thought indeed that matter was created and produced by God, but at the same time held that the universe was

[9] Lib. 2. contra Calumniatorem Platonis, cap. 5.

[10] Comparatio Christianæ Theologiæ cum Platonicâ. The great J. A. Fabricius was in error when he said, Bibliotheca Græca, lib. 2. cap. 12. p. 464. that Galantes had adduced passages from Syrianus, Hermias, Damascius, and Priscianus Lydius, which proved that these philosophers favoured the idea of a creation out of nothing. For Galantes does not quote the passages of these authors, but only mentions their names; nor does he say that they held the same views as the Christians, but only that Proclus, Porphyry, and Jamblichus deserved this commendation, as will appear from the substance of his discussion, which we shall here exhibit. I should not have mentioned this, were it not that I feared there might be some who, relying on the authority of so great a man, may suspect that I may not have accurately reported Galantes' dissertation.

eternal. "Other principal Platonists in this sect," says he, "or those who derived their origin from Ammonius Sacca, . . . Plotinus, his disciple Porphyry, Jamblichus the hearer of Porphyry, Syrianus of Jamblichus, Proclus of Syrianus, Ermias of Proclus, Damascius of Ermias, Priscianus Lydius, who was the master of Damascius, and this whole school of eminent Platonists, universally seem to think that primary matter was generated and produced by God." But he immediately subjoins that this sect, if all its doctrines be rightly considered, could not claim a place among the genuine assertors of a creation out of nothing; since they held that the universe was eternal; on which account what they say respecting the production and creation of matter is to be understood not of *a true and real production*, but *only of one causal and rational*. "For," says he, "if they supposed that the universe was produced only causatively, that is in reason, not in reality, but really eternal, how was it they did not think matter to be eternal, with this mundane eternity to wit? It must therefore be said that as they held the universe never to have been really produced, so also they thought primary matter to be in reality unproduced, but said that it was produced, not by a real production but by a causal or rational one, since it not only was never destitute of shapes, but can scarcely even be conceived of as so." These observations are wisely and justly made, and if all other parts of Galantes' work were like them, it would be worthy of the highest praise. But he considers that some of the Platonists taught better doctrines than the rest, and did not in any respect deteriorate the Christian doctrine respecting the creation of the universe. These he places in the third class. "There are some," says he, "who follow Proclus and others, in thinking that matter was produced *in reality and in time* by God." In the following context he names Porphyry and Jamblichus as favourers of this opinion. These, he first asserts, supported their views by the authority of Plato, Hermes, and Orpheus, and plainly intimates that they seemed to him to be sound interpreters of these philosophers; and then confirms their opinion by some reasons and arguments. It is not necessary for us to repeat these two last named particulars here. For we have above copiously shown that Plato and the rest are not at all favourable to the opinion of the creation of matter by the Deity out of nothing; and the arguments by which he says these Platonists defended their opinion, are excogitated by Galantes himself, and not drawn from their writings. Nearly the same course is pursued by Cudworth, who, though he admits that many of the Platonists held that the universe was eternal, and that therefore matter was so also, makes no doubt but that some of this sect held and approved more correct views, and thought that matter itself was made by God; of which sort he thinks, besides others, are Plotinus, Por-

phyry, Jamblichus, Hierocles, and Proclus, who, he says, followed the Chaldee oracles, the Egyptians, and Orpheus.[1] Beyond all the other Platonists Hierocles is quoted by learned men as a most strenuous defender of this more correct opinion respecting the origin of the universe; and certainly he has spoken more decidedly on this point than the rest of his sect, and not only, as will be presently apparent, inveighs with asperity against those of his associates who have been bold enough to join eternal matter with the Deity, but also zealously endeavours to prove that matter itself was created and produced by divine operation. On this account P. D. Huët[2] has thought his sole authority sufficient to prove that Plato, and all those who really followed his doctrine, held as correct views as the Christians respecting matter. Bayle, however, was induced by Hierocles' words to suspect that he derived this doctrine from Christian writings, and that upon a consideration that it was in the highest degree consistent with the divine majesty, he deserted the common doctrine of his sect.[3] In which supposition, I do not think that ingenious writer to be far wrong; for nothing can be more certain than that the later Platonists transferred not a few things from Christianity into their own sect, and at least imitated the Christians in their words and phrases, even if their doctrines appeared to be too inconsistent with their own tenets to obtain their approval.

XXX. A regard merely to the words of these philosophers, without a comparison of them with their other opinions, which are enunciated with apparent magnificence and wisdom, will almost induce an agreement with the views of the authors above mentioned; for I must admit that they sometimes speak of matter and its causes as if they entirely agreed with the Christians. Proclus,[4] the most subtle writer of this sect, warmly contends that God himself is ἄῤῥητον αἴτιον, "the ineffable cause" of matter, and that as he had made all ἀπειρίαν, or "infinity," so also he had made matter, which is "ultimate infinity." Εἰ οὖν, says he, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ὁ Θεὸς πᾶσαν ἀπειρίαν ὑφίστησι, καὶ τὴν ὕλην ὑφίστησιν, ἐσχάτην οὖσαν ἀπειρίαν. He also bitterly inveighs against those who lay down two principles of nature, God and matter, and strenuously endeavours to vindicate his beloved Plato from the imputation of this opinion; so that you might

[1] Intellectual System, chap. 5. sect. 2.

[2] Quæstiones Alnetanæ, lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 109.

[3] Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, tom. 2. art. Hierocles, note A. p. 1464. "Je me persuade qu'il l'avait lu dans les écrits des Chrétiens, et qu'ayant été frappé des arguments qui combattent l'existence d'une matière increée, et qu'ayant joint à cela les notions du Créateur qui portent au plus haut point la puissance et la majesté divine, il supposa pour la gloire de la secte, que son fondateur avait connu Dieu sous l'idée d'une nature dont un simple acte de volunté peut suffire à la formation de l'univers."

[4] Comment. in Timæum, lib. 2. p. 17.

fancy another Eusebius or Basil to be speaking, and sharply reproving the errors of a profane philosophy. Nor are some other philosophers of the sect less zealous on this point, who need not, however, now be brought in question. It will be sufficient to name Hierocles,[5] who is more energetic and copious than the rest, both as regards language and argument. First of all, he vehemently reproves those among the Platonists who held that God had formed all things out of a certain eternal matter, whether this were supposed to have taken place in time or in eternity. He thinks that this opinion is both repugnant to the divine goodness and opposed to sound reason; and to many his ratiocinations will appear very just. He takes his first argument from the nature of those things which are self-existent and destitute of beginning. Whatever, says he, is neither generated nor produced, but is necessarily self-existent, cannot but be perfect, well-ordered, and free from every fault. Wherefore, whatever is added to any thing of this kind, alters its nature; whatever alters its nature, vitiates and corrupts it. If, therefore, the Deity had set in order, arranged, and modified eternal and self-existent matter, he would have undertaken a task that was superfluous and useless, rather than one accordant with his goodness, (ὃ *περιεργία μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη, ἢ ἀγαθότητος Θεοῦ,*) and would not have rendered matter perfect, but would have deteriorated and spoilt it. His other argument may, I think, be most properly set out and explained as follows: Whoever transfers a thing that is eternal, and not subject to his control, and over which he has no legitimate power, out of its natural state into another contrary to its nature, does wrong, and is, in a manner, guilty of an improper action. On which account, if God did not suffer eternal matter, which was, as it were, his sister, to remain in its own state, but modified and altered it upon a new plan, he would undoubtedly have done an improper and unjust action: Ἀλλ' *οὐδὲ ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸς κακῶν αναίτιος ἔσται, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς δημιουργίας ἀπό τινος κακοποιΐας ἐνστησάμενος,* "But neither God himself would be innocent, founding the commencement of creation in a kind of evil-doing." What is said by Hierocles in a confused and concise manner, I have reduced into order for the sake of perspicuity; a plan which I think no wise man will blame. After laying down these propositions, he separately attacks those who held that God had created the universe out of matter, not from eternity, but in time; and contends that they were worse than those who said that the Deity had arranged matter from infinite ages. But this I pass by, lest I should wander too far from the point. If any inquiry should now be made, what is correct sentiment re-

[5] Lib. 7. de Providentiâ et Fato, apud Photium, Bibliotheca, codex, 251. p. 1379. &c. See also his extracts from the same book, cod. 214. p. 559.

specting the creation of the universe, Hierocles will reply that every sane person will think that God, by his own mere will, produced out of no eternal matter, or out of nothing, the universe both visible and invisible, and that this was also Plato's opinion: Ὅτι δημιουργὸν Θεὸν, φησὶ, προϋφίστησιν ὁ Πλάτων ἑφεστῶτα πάσης ἐμφανοῦς τε καὶ ἀφανοῦς διακοσμήσεως, ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋκειμένου γεγενημένης· ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνου βούλημα εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὄντων. Who could remain unmoved by such express words? However, by long experience and reading of Platonistic writings, I have learned that no sect require their expressions to be more narrowly watched than this Alexandrian one; and that what at first sight seems to be said by them in a favourable and excellent manner, loses all its force and beauty, if it be compared with those tenets which are the foundation of their whole philosophy. This will be proved by what I shall presently say, from which it will be apparent that the opinion of the Platonists, respecting the universe and matter, differs greatly from the words by which it is explained.

XXXI. First of all, in elucidation of this question, it must be observed, that the whole sect of Platonists considered the world to be equally eternal with God, and to be appended to him, in the same manner as a shadow to the substance, from infinite ages. This is a trite and sacred doctrine in their schools; nor can it be repudiated by any one of them, without at the same time abjuring their whole philosophy, and passing over to another party; for the eternity of the universe follows as necessarily from their tenets as from the axiom: "Equals added to equals make the sum equal," is deduced the consequence that "two and two make four." Καθάπερ, say the Platonists themselves, in Zacharias Mitylenæus,[6] αἴτιον τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἑκάστου σκιᾶς γίνεται· ὁμόχρονος δὲ τῷ σώματι ἡ σκιὰ καὶ οὐχ ὁμότιμος. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος παρακολούθημα ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ αἰτίου ὄντος αὐτῷ τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ συναίδιος ἐστι τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ ὁμότιμος, "As every substance is the cause of its own shadow; and the shadow is coeval with the substance, but not of equal honour; so the universe is the accompaniment of the Deity, who is the cause of its existence, and is co-eternal with God, but not equally honourable." This the common opinion of the whole sect, which if any one deserted, he would doubtless be disowned by its leaders. They usually illustrate this doctrine by examples and similes, taken from such things as an eternal staff and its eternal shadow, an eternal sun and his eternal ray, an eternal foot and its eternal imprint. For what an eternal shadow would be to an eternal staff, what an eternal imprint to an eternal foot, what an eternal ray to an eternal sun, that (they say) the eternal

[6] Dialogus de Opificio Mundi, p. 187. ed Barth.

universe is to the eternal Deity. I remember that I have treated this subject elsewhere more copiously; on which account I shall be the briefer here. The very philosophers who have been named by authors as the defenders of a creation out of nothing, have testified their adherence to this dogma of the sect. Plotinus professes in so many passages of his works to believe that the universe emanated from all eternity from the Deity, like an eternal ray from an eternal sun, that one must needs be a mere tyro in his writings not to know this. But a knowledge of the doctrines of Plotinus will at once show what were the views of his disciple Porphyry, who is so attached to his preceptor as in many instances to adopt his very words; as is apparent from his "Sentences," edited by Lucas Holstenius. Of Jamblichus I have spoken already.[7] He differs from the other Platonists in supposing that for the sake of argument and disputation it might be proper to assume that the universe had a beginning; which opinion of his is rejected by the Emperor Julian; yet he makes no doubt that the universe is in reality destitute of any beginning, and is to be regarded as an eternal *causation*, to speak metaphysically, of an eternal *cause*. Proclus is so far from thinking that the universe commenced at a definite period, that (as is well known) in a singular book he defended the eternity of the universe against the Christians; which treatise of his was attacked on the part of the Christians by Johannes Philoponus.[8] Nor was Hierocles of any other opinion, as is apparent from his calling the Deity ἐξ ἀϊδίου ἐνεργοῦντα,[9] or "the operator from eternity;" for in the style of the Platonists "to operate from eternity," and "to create the universe from eternity," are phrases of the same import. This is evident also from the fact that in his books on Providence and Fate (as we learn from Photius) he endeavoured, with the utmost care and diligence, to reconcile Plato and Aristotle, and to prove that both entertained the same opinion respecting the universe and its origin. But who does not know that Aristotle held that the universe was eternal and destitute of beginning? Nor do any of the Platonists attribute any other opinion to Aristotle. I am not unaware that this sect often speak magnificently, and even deny that the universe is eternal; but no one at all versed in their writings will be disturbed by this. For when they say that the universe was founded and made by the Deity, they do not mean such a creation as we do, but an eternal one; and this they often expressly assert. Again, when they deny any eternity of the universe, and attribute it solely to the Deity,

[7] Sect. 21. of this Dissertation.

[8] See J. A. Fabricius, Bibliotheca Græca, lib. 5. cap. 26. p. 522. tom. 8. and lib. 5. cap. 37. p. 362. tom. 9.

[9] Apud Photium, Bibliotheca, cod. 251. p. 1378.

they do not intend this to be understood of all kinds of eternity, but only of one particular sort; for they assert that the Deity is eternal in one way, and the universe in another. They were accustomed to distribute eternity into an *eternity of time* and an *eternity of cause*, and again into a *flowing*, and a *stable* or *constant* eternity; of which distinction and its causes I have already treated more copiously elsewhere. That eternity which relates to *time* they held to be common to the universe and the Deity; but the eternity of *cause* they deny to the universe but attribute to God alone. Boethius has well explained this opinion, to which he himself was addicted. "For," says he,[10] "the Deity ought not to seem older than nature by quantity of time, but rather by a property of his undivided nature." Again, they said that the eternity which I have termed "flowing" was congruous with the universe, in which all things are carried on by perpetual vicissitudes and changes; so that one thing is produced out of another, and a new series and succession of things always follows the preceding; but to God alone they attributed the *stable* eternity, destitute of all succession. "It is one thing," says Boethius, "to be led through an interminable life, which is assigned by Plato to the universe; and another that the whole presence of an interminable life should be simultaneously embraced, which is manifestly a property of the divine mind." Also when the Platonists deny that the universe is equally eternal with the Deity, their meaning only amounts to this: that the universe has emanated from all eternity, without any beginning, from the Deity as its cause and author, as an eternal shadow would from an eternal substance, or an eternal ray from an eternal sun. Since this is the opinion of the whole Platonic sect, it is obvious that, according to the tenets of the doctrine they profess, they could not possibly agree with the Christians respecting the universe and matter, or do otherwise than reject the creation of them. Is it then true, that the Platonists are inconsistent with themselves, when they affirm that not only the universe, but also the matter of the universe, was made and produced, and even that it was produced out of nothing by the volition of the Deity? Do they not thus become oblivious of the very elements of the philosophy to which they adhere? or do they deceptively hold language contrary to their real sentiments? This enigma I will solve, and will show that these philosophers are neither inconsistent with themselves nor disingenuous with regard to others.

XXXII. The Platonists, in most of their writings, bear a double character, that of natural philosophers and of metaphysicians; and an ignorance of this fact cannot but be productive of the most serious errors in the exposition of their opinions. In

[10] De Consolatione Philosophiæ, lib. 5. p. 138.

their character of naturalists, they explain the matters of which they treat just as they are in themselves and in nature, in accordance, of course, with the spirit of the philosophy whose tenets they maintain. But when they assume the guise of metaphysicians, they distinguish in reasoning between things that are naturally associated, and treat of these abstract portions in such a manner as if there were no alliance between them, and they were even independent existences. This is always permitted, to a certain extent, to metaphysicians; but this sect has burst all bounds in their use of this license. For after passing from the visible universe to the *ideal*, or *imaginary*, they are so suddenly carried away by the force of imagination and idealism, as to convert the notions of their own minds not only into real persons, but even into gods. The whole sect labour under this defect; but out of them some are worse than others. Some, as Proclus, Jamblichus, and Damascius, are so hot-headed when they have passed the bounds of nature, that I think no poet has ever given such a loose to his imagination. This is the first point necessary to be recollected on the present subject. As long as the Platonists bear the character of naturalists, and do not, in their discussions, fly beyond the moon and the stars, they maintain the universe to be eternal, and to have existed together with the Deity from all eternity, in such a manner as to have received its whole nature from God as its efficient cause. This opinion is not very different from the view of Aristotle respecting God and the universe, as we have already elsewhere observed, and is akin to some very noxious errors, and even to atheism itself. But the same persons, when they give a loose to their imaginations, and pass over into the imaginary world of forms and ideas, or when (what is the same thing) they assume the character of metaphysicians, treat of the universe, the Deity, and matter in a way apparently inconsistent with themselves, and suppose that there is no connexion whatever between the Deity, the universe, and matter. They separate, in idea, the great First Cause from the universe, and when they have done this, they speak in as grave and accurate a manner respecting the universe, as if they held that God had made a commencement of his labours, and had maintained and observed a certain order in creation, as Christians have learned from the inspired writer, Moses. These statements being read by those who are not aware of, or do not remember, the other tenets of this sect, make them easily believe that nothing can be more orthodox than these philosophers' sentiments. But those who are not ignorant of what is to be found in other parts of their writings, respecting the eternal union of God and matter, will at once perceive that the creation of the universe of which they speak is merely metaphysical, and that the whole affair is to be found in the *intermundia* [limbo] of

Epicurus, or rather in these men's brains, who in their abstractions dissociate and reunite, according to their own fancy, things that are by their own nature joined together. For what is "eternal creation", but the union of two words, the ideas of which are utterly incongruous? Or in what way can that which existed from all eternity, and always depended upon God, be made to appear to be founded according to certain laws and in a particular order? But the Platonic doctors, not content with these considerations, take a more subtle course, and as they separate in their reasonings the Deity from the universe, so also they disjoin the matter of which the universe consists from the universe itself; that is, they form in their minds an idea and notion of matter regarded abstractedly, and *per se*. When they have attained to this contemplative height, and stand aloft, above the universe and the heavens, it is scarcely possible to give an idea of the extravaganzas they enact. For they dispute about this idea of matter, its origin and properties, just as if they were considering and handling some animal or man; as is apparent from Plotinus's book on Matter, and other treatises of the same description. Any one not much acquainted with the sect would swear that a very grave and serious matter was in question, and that the Platonists were persuaded that, previously to the formation of any thing, there existed a certain kind of matter, and that this matter was made use of by God when he designed to frame the universe; but those who more carefully weigh all considerations, and do not allow themselves to be deluded with rhetorical and poetical obscurities, will perceive that so wordy, long, and thorny a disputation is undertaken only respecting a certain mental abstraction, or Platonic *idea*. This ideality they almost seem sensibly to finger; this they turn about on every side; this they distinguish into I know not how many different subdivisions, in the consideration of which they are so acute and ingenious as to escape and elude even the most industrious speculatist. And since dissensions and quarrels arise in nothing more easily than in matters remote from the cognizance of the senses, and which can only be contemplated by a very close and attentive application of the mind, it hence results that they often fall into bitter controversies on the nature and properties of this idea, and declare each other's errors to be altogether intolerable. We may pass by, for the present, their other inquiries respecting matter, and only consider the doctrines of their schools respecting its origin. Among them it was an arduous and very subtle question, Whence was derived the existence of matter? which is therefore placed by Porphyry among those on which he thought proper to inquire the opinion of the Egyptians, in his epistle to Anebo the Egyptian priest. After a diligent perusal of the writings of their doctors, it

appears to me that three opinions were entertained among them on this point. Some maintain that matter is a nature existing from all eternity, altogether separate and apart from the divine nature, which was arranged and subjected to certain laws by the Deity, when he created the universe. Those who are imbued with this sentiment principally call in to their aid the Timæus of Plato. But they do not seem to have many followers; on which account Proclus, Hierocles, and others, as we have already seen, take a safe liberty in reproaching them, and insinuating that they are almost Atheists. Others think that matter eternally emanated from the divine nature itself, and that therefore it is part of the divine essence. This seems to be the opinion of Plotinus and of Porphyry; and Jamblichus, as we have already shown (to speak of no others), openly professed it. Others again, deeming even this view not sufficiently honourable to the Divine Being, stretched their genius still further, and have determined that matter was created out of nothing by the sole will of God. This opinion is professed by Hierocles, as is apparent from his words above cited; and the same was doubtless the case with several others. But I suspect, since I can meet with no vestige of this opinion among the elder Platonists, that it was originated in the third century, when Christianity had already attained to considerable prevalence, and was perhaps even excogitated by Hierocles himself; who, as he held a great deal of intercourse with the Christians, and was well versed in their writings, thought he should do well if he made use of their own words, and in order the more readily to persuade them, should explain the origin of nature in the same way that they did. And it has already been noticed by others, that he borrowed the language rather than the doctrines of the Christians, and united them with the tenets of his own sect, in order to render the latter more agreeable and acceptable to the Christians. An impartial spectator of these controversies and contentions of the Platonists will be easily induced to believe that they supposed matter to be really disjoined from the universe and the Deity, and considered it to be a self-existent nature. But a different opinion will be the result of an acquaintance with the esoteric dogmas of the sect, and a removal of the veil which covers their disquisitions. For it will be perceived that these sturdy belligerents are acting under a metaphysical disguise, and are scarcely better than those who are said to have instituted a long law-suit respecting the shadow of an ass. All the quarrel is about "a rational entity," or "a mental abstraction," a mere figment of the mind. Setting aside all oratorical figures of speech, the sum of the whole disputation amounts to this:—Is it more wise and correct, after forming an abstract notion of matter in the mind and thoughts, to conjoin with this notion the idea of an eternal

existence, or eternal emanation; or to associate with it the idea of creation out of nothing? A contest and discussion well worthy, indeed, of such acute minds! As if it were of any consequence to the social or spiritual interests of mankind to know in what manner the forms and ideas of things are to be conceived of in the mind, which never had a separate existence, and were from infinite ages such as they are now. Let there be imagined a golden chain from all eternity depending from the hand of Jove; then fancy three philosophers sharply contending with each other whether the gold of which this chain is made, separated and abstracted in imagination from the chain itself, be in itself eternal, or whether it emanated from Jove's own hand; or again, whether it were created out of nothing. What would be said on hearing the trio contending and battling with each other by mutual reproaches? Would it not be said they were not far from crazy? For since this chain was always such as it now is, and always will be the same, it is not only useless but absurd and stupid to enter into a contention as to what kind of idea ought to be formed in the mind respecting the gold of which it consists. If this gold were neither made nor generated, and never existed apart from the chain, and the chain itself were never destitute of existence, what is the use of disputing about what the gold would be if it had been generated, and had at some period existed apart from the chain? Transfer this simile to the Platonists, and it will be at once apparent what value ought to be attached to their speculations respecting matter, regarded apart from the universe. We Christians, when we teach that matter was made out of nothing by God, intend a real thing actually existent; they, when they use similar language, speak, not of matter itself, but only of the abstract idea and notion of matter, a shadow, a figment of the imagination. Let us now therefore close this discussion, having finished our design, and shown that as yet no philosopher or people has been offered us by the records of antiquity, who entertained the same opinion as the Christians respecting the origin of nature.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION III.

The six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, (the disproving, first of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity) next taken all together. In way of answer to which three things. First, to confute the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity, being the third and fourth. Secondly, to show that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism, in their fifth and sixth arguments, incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that therefore the two following atheistic arguments, (built upon the contrary supposition) are also insignificant. 2. Before we come to the atheistic arguments against an incorporeal Deity, premised, that though all Corporealists be not Atheists, yet Atheists universally mere Corporealists. 3. In disproving incorporeal substance, some difference amongst the Atheists themselves. First, those who held a vacuum, (as Epicurus and Democritus, &c.) though taking it for granted that what is unextended or devoid of magnitude, is nothing; yet acknowledged a double extended nature; the first impenetrable and tangible body; the second penetrable and intangible space or vacuum; to them the only incorporeal. Gassendus' officiousness here to help the Atheists; that space is neither accident nor substance, but a middle nature, or essence betwixt both. But whatsoever is, must either subsist by itself, or else be an attribute, affection, or mode of something that subsisteth by itself. Space, either the extension of body, or of incorporeal substance, or of nothing: but nothing cannot be extended; wherefore space supposed not to be the extension of body, must be the extension of an incorporeal substance infinite, or the Deity. 3. Epicurus' pretended gods, such as could neither touch nor be touched, and had not corpus, but quasi corpus only; and therefore incorporeals distinct from space. But granted that he juggled in this. 4. Other Atheists who denied a vacuum, and allowed not space to be a nature, but a mere imaginary thing, the phantasm of a body, or else extension considered abstractly. 5. This argument against incorporeal substance answered two manner of ways; some assertors of incorporeal substance denying the minor, whatsoever is, is extended; others the major of it, whatsoever is extended is body. First, the generality of ancient Incorporealists really maintained, that there was something unextended, indistant, devoid of quantity and of magnitude, without parts and indivisible. Plato and Aristotle. 6. Philo's double substance, distant and indistant. God also to him both every where, and yet nowhere, as in a place; place being created by him together with bodies. Plotinus and Simplicius much concerned in this doctrine. 7. Porphyrius' assertion, that were there such an incorporeal space, (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed) Mind, or God, could not be co-extended with it; but only body. The whole Deity, indivisibly and indistantly present to every part of divisible and distant things. 8. Thus Origen against Celsus. St. Austin, that the human soul hath no dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness, and is in itself illocabilis. 9. That therefore no novel or recent opinion, that the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there, nor mensurable by yards and poles; but the whole undivided, present to every part of the world. We shall further show, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to quit themselves of them. The first objection; that to suppose the Deity and other incorporeal substances unextended, is to make them absolute parvitudes. Plotinus' answer.

The second objection; that what neither great nor little, and possesses no place, a nonentity. This according to Plato, Plotinus, and Porphyrius, a mistake proceeding from men's adhering to sense and imagination. They grant that an unextended Being is ἀφάνταστον, "unimaginable." Porphyrius, that mind and fancy are not the same, as some maintain. That which can neither do or suffer, not nothing, though it swell not out into distance. Two kinds of substances to Plotinus; bulky tumours and unbulky active powers. Which latter said by Simplicius to have nevertheless a certain depth in them. Something ἀφάνταστον "unimaginable," even in body itself. We cannot possibly imagine the sun of such a bigness as reason evinces it to be. Urged also by Plotinus, that an unstretched-out duration, as difficult to be conceived as an unextended substance; and yet must this needs be attributed to the Deity. That God and human souls no otherwise incorporeal, than as σῶμα λεπτομερὲς, "*a thin or subtle*" body, false. Because the difference of grossness or subtlety in bodies, according to true philosophy, only from motion. That the most subtle body may possibly be made as gross as lead or iron; and the grossest as subtle as ether. No specific difference of matter. The third argument against unextended substance; that to be all in the whole, and all in every part, a contradiction and impossibility. This granted by Plotinus to be true of bodies, or that which is extended; that it cannot be ὁμοῦ πᾶν· but impossible, that what hath no parts, should be a part here, and a part there. Two answers of Plotinus. First, that by Hades may be meant only the invisible, or the soul's acting without the body. Secondly, that if by Hades be meant a worse place, the soul may be said to be where its idol is. 10. Some excerptions out of Philoponus, concerning the soul's spirituous or airy body (after death) is declared. Intimated by Philoponus, that, according to some of these ancients, the soul hath such a spirituous body here in this life, which then adheres to it, when its outer garment is stript off by death. An opinion of some, that the soul may, in this spirituous body, leave its grosser body for some time, without death. True, that our soul doth not immediately act upon bones and flesh; but certain thin and subtle spirits, the instruments of sense and motion. He further addeth, that besides both the terrestrial, and this spirituous body, there is yet a third kind, peculiar to such as are souls, as are more thoroughly purged after death; called by them a luciform and heavenly body. Of this Proclus also upon the Timæus (who affirmeth it to be unorganized); as likewise Hierocles. This called the thin vehicle of the soul, in the Chaldee Oracles, according to Psellus and Pletho. By Hierocles, a spiritual body, in a sense agreeable to that of the scripture: by Synesius, the divine body. 11. That many of these Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed the soul, in its first creation, to be clothed with this luciform body; which also did always inseparably adhere to it, in its after-descents into the terrestrial; though fouled and obscured. Thus Pletho. The same intimated by Galen; when he calls this the first vehicle of the soul. Hence was it, that besides the moral and intellectual purgation of the soul, they recommended also a mystical way of purifying the ethereal vehicle. This much insisted on by Hierocles. What Pliny's dying by wisdom, or the philosophic death. 12. But this not the opinion of all, that the same numerical ethereal body always adhereth to the soul; but only, that it every where either finds or makes a body, suitable to itself. Thus Porphyrius and Plato. This affirmed by Hierocles to have been the cabala of the Pythagoreans. Hierocles' definition of a man, a rational soul together with a cognate immortal body. 13. That it would be no digression here, to compare the forementioned Pythagoric cabala with the doctrine of Christianity. First therefore, a clear agreement of

these philosophers with Christianity in this, that the highest happiness of human nature consisteth not in a separate state of souls un-united to any body. Thus Plotinus, who sometimes runs as much into the other extreme, in supposing human souls to animate, not only the bodies of brutes, but of plants. Thus also Maimonides amongst the Jews; and therefore suspected for denying the resurrection. His Iggeroth Teman written purposely to purge himself of this suspicion. The allegorizers of the resurrection, and of the life to come. 14. Christianity correspondeth with the philosophic cabala, concerning human souls, in this, that their happiness consisteth not in conjunction with gross terrestrial bodies; scripture, as well as philosophy, complaining of them, as a burden to the soul; which therefore not to be taken up again at the resurrection. The difference betwixt the resurrection-body and this present body in scripture. The resurrection body of the just (as that of the philosophic cabala) immortal and glorious, spiritual and angelical. Not this gross fleshly body, gilded and varnished over in the outside only, but changed throughout. Our souls strangers and pilgrims in these terrestrial bodies: their proper home and country, the heavenly body. That the grossest body, that is, according to philosophy, may merely by motion be brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether. 15. But whether human souls after death, always united to some body, or else quite naked from all body, until the resurrection, not so explicitly determined in Christianity. Souls after death live unto God. According to Origen, this a privilege proper to the Deity, to live and act alone, without vital union with any body. If natural to the soul, to enliven a body, then not probable, that it should be kept so long in an unnatural state of separation. 16. Again; probable from scripture, that wicked souls after death have punishment of sense or pain, besides remorse of conscience: which not easily conceivable, how they should have, without bodies. Thus Tertullian. He adding, that men have the same shape, after this life, which they had here. Though indeed he drives the business too far, so as to make the soul itself to be a body. But Irenæus plainly supposed the soul after death (being incorporeal) to be adapted to a body, such as has the same character with its body here. Origen also of this persuasion, that souls after death have certain subtle bodies, retaining the same characterizing form, which their terrestrial bodies had. His opinion, that apparitions of the dead are from the souls themselves, surviving in that which is called a luciform body. As also, that St. Thomas did not doubt, but that the body of a soul departed might appear every way like the former: only he disbelieved our Saviour's appearing in the same solid body, which he had before death. 16. Our Saviour telling his disciples that a spirit had no flesh and bones, that is, no solid body, as himself then had, seems to imply them to have thinner bodies. Thus in Apollonius, is touch made the sign to distinguish a ghost appearing, from a living man. Origen on our Saviour's body after his resurrection. Moses and Elias visibly appearing to our Saviour, had true bodies. 17. The regenerate in this life have a certain earnest of their future inheritance, gathered from scripture by Irenæus and Novatian. Which prelibations cannot so well consist with a perfect separation from all body, after death, until the day of judgment. This opinion of Irenæus, &c., does not clash with the Christian article of the resurrection. 18. The last thing in the Pythagoric cabala, that demons or angels consist of soul and body united together. Thus Hierocles, that no incorporeal substance, besides the Deity, is complete without the conjunction of a body. God the only incorporeal in this sense. Origen's full agreement with this old Pythagoric cabala misrepresented by Huetius, as asserting angels not to have bodies. 19. Some of the fathers concluded angels to be

corporeal. The Origenic and Pythagoric hypothesis, that they consist of incorporeal and corporeal substance. Most of the ancient fathers for neither of those extremes. They did not suppose angels to be perfectly unbodied spirits, evident from their affirming devils, as the Greek philosophers did demons, to be delighted with the nidours of sacrifices. Thus Porphyrius and Celsus. Amongst the Christians, Justin, Athenagoras, Tatianus, &c. St. Basil, concerning the bodies of demons being nourished with vapours. Several of the fathers plainly asserting both devils and angels to consist of soul and body. St. Austin, Claudianus, Mamertus, Fulgentius, &c. 20. The fathers, though herein agreeing with the philosophic cabala, yet seemed to have been led thereunto by scripture. As from that of our Saviour, "they who shall obtain the resurrection of the dead, shall be ἰσάγγελοι, equal to the angels." From that of St. Jude, that angels sinning lost their own heavenly body (called οἰκητήριον by St. Paul), and thereupon cast down into the lower Tartarus. Again, from that fire said to have been prepared for the devils, implies them (as Psellus concludeth) to be bodied. 21. If all created incorporeals be souls vitally united to bodies, then probable that human souls, after death, not quite naked from all body; a privilege proper to Deity. Nor is it at all conceivable how imperfect beings could have sense and imagination without bodies. Origen distinguisheth the τὸ σκῆνος in St. Paul (translated "tabernacle"), from the earthly house; he understanding by the former a thin spirituous body, and which the soul remaineth still clothed with, after death. This opinion of Origen's, that the soul after death, not quite separate from all body, never reckoned up in the catalogue of his errors. Origen not taxed by Methodius, for asserting souls to have bodies, but for not asserting them to be bodies; there being no truly incorporeal substance but Deity. This one of the extremes mentioned. The Origenic hypothesis to be preferred before that of Methodius. 22. Origen not singular in this opinion concerning human souls; Irenæus, Philoponus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, Psellus, and others, asserting the same. St. Austin in his De Gen. ad Lit. granted, that souls after death cannot be locally moved without a body. Himself seems to think the punishment of souls, before the resurrection, to be fantastical. In his book De Civ. Dei. he conceives that Origenic opinion not improbable, that some souls before the resurrection, may suffer from a certain fire, which could not be without bodies. 23. Hitherto showed, how the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals answered all the objections against the illocality and immobility of created incorporeals; or according to Origen, that the soul stands in need of a body for local motions. Next to be considered their reasons for this assertion, of unextended and indistant substance. 24. That whatever arguments do evince other substance besides body, the same against the Atheists demonstrate that there is something unextended. Other arguments propounded by these ancients to prove unextended substance. Plotinus, to prove the human soul and mind such. Either every part of an extended soul, is soul; and of mind, mind; or not. Again, Plotinus endeavours to prove, from the energies of the soul, that it is unextended; because it is one and the same indivisible thing, that perceiveth the whole sensible object. This further pursued; if the soul be extended, then must it either be one physical point, or more. Impossible, that it should be but one physical point. If therefore more, then must every one of those points, either perceive a point of the object, and no more, or else the whole. A fourth supposition, that the whole extended soul perceives both the whole object, and all the parts thereof; because the whole of an extended substance nothing but all the parts. Lastly, he disputes farther from the rational energies. A magnitude could not understand, what hath no

magnitude, and what is indivisible: whereas we have a notion, not only of latitude as indivisible to thickness, and of longitude as to breadth, but also of a mathematical point, every way indivisible. We have notions of things also, that have neither magnitude nor site, &c. Again, all the abstract essences of things indivisible. We conceive extended things themselves unextendedly; the thought of a mile, or a thousand miles distance, taking up no more room in the soul than the thought of an inch. Moreover, were that which perceiveth in us a magnitude, it could not be equal to every sensible, and alike perceive things greater and lesser than itself. 25. Besides which, they might argue thus; that we, as we can conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension, so can we not conceive cogitation with extension; nor the length, breadth, and thickness of a thought. Thoughts therefore must be nonentities, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing; as also metaphysical truths, they having neither dimensions nor figure. So volitions and passions. If the things belonging to soul and mind be unextended, then must themselves be so. Again, if mind and soul have distant parts, then could none of them be one, but many substances. If life divided, then a half of it would not be life. Lastly, no reason could be given, why they might not be as well really, as intellectually divisible. Nor could a Theist deny, but that divine power might cleave a thought into many pieces. 26. The sense of the ancient Incorporealists therefore this; that in nature, two kinds of substances. The first of them passive bulk, or distant and extended substance; which is all, one thing without another; and therefore as many substances as parts, into which it can be divided. Essentially antitypous; one magnitude joined to another always standing without it, and making the whole so much bigger. Body all outside, having no internal energy, nor any action besides local motion; which it is also passive to. Were there no other substance besides this, there could be no motion, intellection, volition; but all would be a dead lump; nor could any one thing penetrate another. Wherefore another substance, whose character φύσις δραστήριος, "the active nature," life, self-activity, cogitation: which no mode or accident of extension, it having more of entity in it. Nor are these two, extension and life, inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance. A thinker a monad; or one single substance. Not conceivable, how the several parts of an extended substance should jointly concur to produce the same thought. 27. The energies of these two substances very different. The one nothing but local motion, a mere outside thing: the other cogitation, an internal energy; or in the inside of that, which thinks. Which inside of the thinking nature hath no length, breadth, or profundity, no out-swelling tumour. Were a cogitative being extended, yet must it have, besides this extended outside, an unextended inside. But one and the same substance cannot be extended and unextended. All summed up together. 28. Hitherto the sense of the ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals represented to the best advantage. These and other arguments do demonstrate against the Atheists, some other substance besides body: but whether they prove this to be indistant and unextended, left to others to make a judgment. The Atheists, who deny this, must acknowledge every thought to be not only mentally, but also physically divisible, together with the soul; as also deny internal energy; and consequently make cogitation nothing but local motion; and that no substance can co-exist with another, more inwardly than by juxtaposition. 29. This the first answer to the fore-mentioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, by denying the minor, that though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended. But the argument otherwise

answered by some learned assertors of incorporeal substance, by denying the major; that though every thing be extended, or what unextended nothing; yet whatever is extended is not body; they asserting another extension incorporeal, which is both penetrable, and not made up of parts physically separable from one another; to which belongeth life, self-activity, and cogitation. Probable, that some would compound both the forementioned hypotheses together; by supposing the Deity to be altogether unextended; but souls to have an unextended inside, diffused into an extended outside. Ourselves here only to oppose Atheists; and dogmatize no further than to assert, that, besides body, there is another substance, which consisteth not of parts really separable; which is self-active, and hath an internal energy, distinct from local motion. All which is demonstratively certain. This the full answer to the first atheistic argument against incorporeal substance. 30. The second atheistic assault against incorporeal substance; by pretending the original of this mistake to have sprung from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves; and the abuse of abstract names and notions, they being made to be substances existing by themselves. For, though the opinion of ghosts and spirits sprung first from fear; yet that these should be incorporeal could never have entered into the minds of men. 31. The first general reply to this, that it is all but romantic fiction. That the opinion of the Deity sprung not from fear, and that all invisible ghosts are not fancies, already sufficiently proved; as also the existence of a God demonstrated by reason. That apparitions are real phenomena; and there may be invisible aërial and ethereal, as there are visible terrestrial animals. Sottishness to conclude, that there is no understanding nature superior to man. 32. The second particular reply, that the opinion of spirits incorporeal sprung not from the scholastic essences. No man supposing these to be things really and substantially existing without the mind; either an universal man and universal horse, or else humanity and equinity: and that these walk up and down in airy bodies. These essences of things said to be eternal as their verities. The meaning of these eternal essences, not, that they are so many eternal substances incorporeal; but that knowledge is eternal, and that there is an eternal unmade Mind, that comprehends them; which all other minds partake of. 33. Again, that another atheistic dream, that the abstract names and notions of the mere accidents of bodies were made substances incorporeal; souls, minds, and ghosts. Conscious life no accident of bodies; but the essential attribute of another substance, which incorporeal. 34. The following atheistic arguments to be despatched with more brevity. That the four next, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, proceed only upon this supposition, that there is no other substance in the world, besides body or matter; and therefore signify nothing to the assertors of an incorporeal Deity. Stoics only concerned to answer them. Nevertheless, a necessity of incorporeal substance will be evinced. 35. Here two atheistic corporealisms founded upon these suppositions, that all is body or matter; and, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding. The first in the way of qualities and forms generable and corruptible, called the hylopathian. This the most ancient atheistic form, viz. that bulky extension, the only substantial and unmade thing, and all other things but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof; makeable out of it, and destroyable into it. The consequence from whence, that there is no substantial unmade life and understanding; and that no mind could be a Creator; it being all accidental and factitious. 36. This hylopathian atheism, called also Anaximandrian. Simplicius conceives Anaximander to have held an homœomery, or similar atomology, of eternal unmade qualities, as Anaxagoras afterwards; only that he acknowledged no unmade Life

or Mind, but generated it all from the fortuitous commixture of those qualified atoms. Anaximander supposed life and understanding to be at least secondary qualities, and accidents of body, generable and corruptible. 37. The second atheistic corporealism, in the way of unqualified atoms, producing all things, from figures and magnitudes of parts. Whence it will also follow, that Mind is no primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative; Democritus the first inventor of the dissimilar atomology; who made dissimilar atoms the principles of all things whatsoever. 38. Not to be denied, that from these two things granted, all is body, and, that the first principles of body are devoid of life, it would follow, that there is no God. Therefore the Stoics, who were corporeal Theists, denied the latter; they supposing an understanding Fire, the maker of the whole mundane system. Truly observed by Origen, that this corporeal god of the Stoics was but by accident incorruptible and happy. This no genuine Theism. 39. But an absolute impossibility in both these atheistic corporealisms; not only because they suppose no active principle; but because they bring something out of nothing. The atomic Atheists most to be condemned, because so grossly contradicting themselves. From that true principle, that matter, as such, is devoid of life and understanding, an absolute necessity of another substance incorporeal, which is essentially vital and intellectual. That all life cannot possibly be factitious and accidental, generable and corruptible; but there must be substantial life; and also some eternal. 40. The truth of this acknowledged by the Hylozoists; that there must of necessity be both substantial and unmade life and understanding; who therefore attribute the same to all matter, but without animality; which, according to them, was all factitious and accidental. Wherefore this hylozoic atheism also brings conscious life out of nothing; or makes them without a cause. The argument of the Epicurean Atheists, against stratonism or hylozoism, unanswerable: that upon this supposition there must be, in every man and animal, a heap of innumerable percipients; and so no one thinker. The pretence of the Hylozoists, that all the particles of matter in every animal do confederate, ridiculous. 41. Thus the fifth and sixth atheistic argumentations fully confuted; and from that true supposition in them, that matter is devoid of life and understanding, incorporeal substance plainly demonstrated. 42. The third and last, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two following atheistic argumentations altogether insignificant. The seventh not properly directed against theism, but against a religious kind of atheism; which supposed a god of the world generated out of senseless matter, and the offspring of Chaos. A sober and true sense of the world's animation; that there is a sentient and understanding Nature, presiding over the world. But the sense of pagan Theists, that the whole corporeal world animated is a God, exploded by us. This argument therefore being against theogonism; the confutation thereof might be here well omitted. But because the denying of a living understanding nature, presiding over the world, is atheistical, the ground of this assertion briefly declared, that life and understanding are accidents of bodies, resulting only from such a composure of atoms, as produce flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized; and, that there is no reason to be found any where but only in human form: which also confuted. 43. The eighth atheistic argumentation, that there can be no living being immortal, nor perfectly happy; built upon that false supposition, that all life and understanding results from a contexture of senseless atoms, and therefore is annihilable. But that there is life essential and substantial, which naturally immortal: as also a necessity of an eternal life, and Mind unmade, and unannihilable; which perfectly happy.

THE six following atheistic argumentations, driving at these two things, First, the disproving of an incorporeal, and then of a corporeal Deity (from both which, the Atheists conceive, it must follow of necessity, that there can be none at all); we shall take them all together, and, in order to the confutation of them, perform these three things. First, we shall answer the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity (contained in the third and fourth heads). Secondly, we shall show, that from the very principles of the atheistic corporealism (as represented in the fifth and sixth heads) incorporeal substance is demonstrable. And lastly, that there being undeniably incorporeal substance, the two following atheistic argumentations also, against a corporeal Deity (in the seventh and eighth sections) prove altogether insignificant.

We begin with the first of these; to show the invalidity of the atheistic argumentations against an incorporeal Deity. It hath been already observed, that though all Corporealists be not therefore of necessity Atheists, yet Atheists universally have been corporealists; this being always their first and grand postulatum, that there is no other substance besides body. Thus Plato long ago declared concerning them;* Διϊσχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν, "They contend strongly, that that only really is, which is tangible, or can resist their touch; concluding body and substance to be one and the self-same thing: and if any one should affirm, that there is any thing incorporeal, they will presently cry him down, and not hear a word more from him." For there can be no doubt,[1] but that the persons here intended by Plato were those very Atheists, which himself spake of afterward, in the same dialogue:[2] Μῶν τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ῥήματι

* Soph. p. 172. Fic. [P. 160.]

[1] This opinion of Dr. Cudworth is not altogether free from doubt. I confess that the persons who are stated by Plato to have held the whole nature of things to be corporeal, seem to be distinct from those whom he speaks of at the end of the dialogue, as having wholly excluded the divine mind and power from the construction of this world. For in addition to these two classes being separated by a long interval in Plato's treatise, those who are represented by him as denying incorporeal things are no other than the opponents of forms and images, or *ideas*, as is manifest from what follows; and the philosopher is censuring them for no other reason than because they despised his favourite doctrine of eternal ideas. But this contempt of Plato's ideas does not preclude the possibility of their being imbued with some sort of religion and regarding God as a nature endowed with a most subtle body, an opinion which was entertained by many. But as will be shown by and by, Dr. Cudworth had a certain motive for identifying the persons introduced by Plato as denying incorporeal things with the Atheists of the same author.

[2] These very words of Plato, however, induce me to believe that those who are represented by him as denying the existence of any thing in the universe except body, were not so impious as altogether to discard God. For I. It is clear from the very controversy here touched upon by Plato, that the question in dispute between this class

χρώμενοι φήσομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ πάντα γεννᾶν, ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, καὶ ἄνευ διανοίας φυούσης; ἢ μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας, ἀπὸ θεοῦ γιγνομένης, "Whether shall we assent to that opinion now-a-days entertained by so many, That nature generateth all things from a certain fortuitous cause, without the direction of any Mind or Understanding? or rather, that it produceth them, according to reason and knowledge, proceeding from God?" Indeed the philosopher there tells us, that some of these atheistic persons began then to be somewhat ashamed of making prudence, and justice, and other moral virtues, corporeal things, or bodies: Ἀποκρίνονται τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμά τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὧν ἠρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν, ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα διϊσχυρίζεσθαι, "Though they affirm concerning the soul itself, that this seems to them to be corporeal; yet, concerning prudence, and those other virtues mentioned, some have now scarcely the confidence to maintain these to be either bodies or nothing." But this (saith he) was indeed no less than the quite giving up of the cause of atheism: Εἰ γάρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συγχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἐξαρκεῖ, "Because, if it be but once granted, that there is never so little incorporeal, this will be sufficient to overthrow the atheistic foundation." Wherefore he concludes, that such as these were but mongrel and imperfect Atheists: Ἐπεὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἓν ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν, ὅτι γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοιντ' ἄν, πᾶν ὅ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἔστι, "For they, who are thoroughpaced and genuine Atheists indeed, will boggle at neither of those forementioned things; but contend, that whatsoever they

and their adversaries was not upon God and religion, but upon *ideas* and forms. The earlier champions of ideas and eternal exemplars of things were wont to instance human virtues, wisdom, justice, love, and the rest, or rather the notions and forms of those virtues, and to ask of those, who opposed ideas and included all things in bodies: Whether they held these forms in the virtues to be nothing or bodies. But to this highly captious question the contemners of ideas here spoken of did not venture to give any definite answer, nor could they persuade themselves to say that those virtues were either nothing or bodies. Unquestionably, however, they were not wholly silent. Plato has not thought proper to give such an explanation of the state and nature of this controversy as to make it perfectly clear to ourselves; and hence it is impossible for us to ascertain whether they benefited or injured their cause by this silence or hesitation. But it is enough for us to know that the dispute with them was not upon God and religion, but merely upon the existence of forms and ideas. II. Plato says that they admitted the soul κεκτῆσθαι σῶμά τι, "to possess a certain body." This again inclines me to think more favourably of this class than the learned Doctor does. For if they had been hostile to God and all religion, they would have asserted the soul to be either σῶμα, "body," or a mode and affection of body. But they simply maintain that it partakes of or possesses body; which makes it probable that they regarded the soul as a nature separated from an earthy and grosser body like our own, and yet not incorporeal, but endowed with a more subtle kind of body. But every man conversant with these subjects must know that this was the opinion of many in times past, who in other respects entertained correct notions of God and things divine, and that it is not subversive of all piety and religion.

cannot grasp with their hands, is altogether nothing."[3] That is, that there is no other substance nor entity in the world, but only body, that which is tangible, or resists the touch. Aristotle[4] also representeth the atheistic hypothesis after the same manner: Τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν, οὐσίαν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων, "They affirm, that matter, or body, is all the substance, that is; and that all other things are but the passions and affections thereof." And again, in his Metaphysics:* Ἕν τὸ πᾶν, καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, "These men maintain all to be one, and that there is but one only nature, as the matter of all things, and this corporeal, or endued with magnitude." And now we see plainly, that the ancient Atheists were of the very same mind with these in our days, that body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing; from whence it follows, that an incorporeal substance would be the same with

[3] Dr. Cudworth's translation of these words is in conformity with his own rather than Plato's opinion. For Plato makes no mention in this passage of Atheists, neither does he say that the men whose opinion he is reciting, if they were really Atheists, would answer that nothing exists except what can be laid hold of by the hands. The Elean guest, introduced into this dialogue as speaking, asks Theodorus whether these men, who denied the existence of any thing besides body, ranked human virtues also among bodies. Theodorus replies, that they attributed body to the soul, but were undecided as to the nature of the virtues. Upon this the stranger says he now has favourable hopes of them: "For if they were genuine and indigenous Spartans," that is, if they were of the frank and noble disposition of the Lacedemonians, who spoke out the sentiments of their mind freely and undisguisedly, and were at the same time indigenous as the Spartans wished to appear, "they would not long delay, but would freely and sincerely acknowledge the virtues to be either nothing or bodies, nay, would openly avow that there is nothing except what can be touched and laid hold of by the hands." Plato therefore does not pronounce them to be semi-atheists, but indirectly denies that they are true, genuine, and indigenous Spartans.

[4] The former of the passages here adduced from Aristotle I have not been able to find in that philosopher's works, notwithstanding a very diligent search; I have no doubt, however, of their being somewhere extant therein. The other is read in Aristotle as it is here given, but in my opinion has little or no bearing upon the question under consideration. For Aristotle does not affirm, that the persons represented by him as holding matter to be the principle of all things are Atheists. The learned Doctor, however, brings forward this testimony to prove that the ancient foes of the divine nature referred all things to matter and body. I acknowledge this to be the case, nor do I believe that an Atheist, either ancient or modern, ever associated another immaterial nature with matter. But I deny that those whom Aristotle is censuring in these passages are Atheists, as he does not charge them with this crime; and Dr. Cudworth himself admits it to be possible for a man to believe in the existence of nothing but body, and still not despise God and all religion. Our worthy author, I am afraid, here suffered himself to be carried a little farther than he ought by his otherwise proper dislike of Hobbes and his philosophy. Hobbes denied the existence of any thing besides body, and even asserted God himself to be corporeal. To show the pernicious tendency and gross impiety of this opinion, Dr. Cudworth endeavours to prove from Plato and Aristotle, that the ancient Atheists held the same. This certainly was well calculated to excite odium against Hobbes and his friend, and to deter men from adopting his wild and foolish theories; nor can it be denied that the Atheists of old entertained this opinion. But the passages of Plato and Aristotle, he relies upon, are manifestly foreign to his purpose, and ought not to be understood of Atheists.

* Met. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 274. tom. 4. opp.]

an incorporeal body, i. e. an impossibility, and that there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But in the management of this cause, there hath been some disagreement amongst the Atheists themselves. For first, the Democritics and Epicureans, though consenting with all the other Atheists, in this, That whatsoever was unextended, and devoid of magnitude, was therefore nothing (so that there could neither be any substance, nor accident, or mode of any substance, unextended); did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable, and tangible, or resist the touch, which is body. And secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly; which is space or vacuum: a nature, according to them, really distinct from body, and the only incorporeal thing that is.[5] Now since this space, which is the only incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room to bodies to subsist in, or pass through; therefore can there not be any active, understanding, incorporeal Deity. This is the argumentation of the Democritic Atheists.

To which we reply, That if space be indeed a nature distinct from body, and a thing really incorporeal, as they pretend, then will it undeniably follow from this very principle of theirs, that there must be an incorporeal substance; and (this space being supposed by them also to be infinite) an infinite, incorporeal Deity. Because, if space be not the extension of body, nor an affection thereof, then must it of necessity be, either an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance, which is impossible; or else the extension, or affection, of some other incorporeal substance, that is infinite. But here will Gassendus step in, to help out his good friends the Democritics and Epicureans at a dead lift; and undertake to maintain, that though space be indeed an incorporeal thing, yet it would neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an incorporeal substance or affection thereof; nor yet that it is an accident existing alone by itself, without a substance; because this space is really neither accident, nor substance, but a certain middle nature or essence betwixt both. To which subterfuge of his, that we may not quarrel about words, we shall make this reply; that unquestionably, whatsoever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of

[5] To the followers of Democritus he might have added the Stoics, of whom Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 7. segm. 140. p. 453: Ἐξωθεν δὲ κόσμου περικεχυμένον εἶναι τὸ κενὸν ἄπειρον· ὅπερ ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ εἶναι· ἀσώματον δὲ τὸ οἷόν τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σωμάτων, οὐ κατεχομένου, "(The Stoics say) that without the world an immense vacuum is circumfused, which is incorporeal: and that that is incorporeal which can be contained by bodies but is not contained." This doctrine of the Stoics, however, I confess differs in a certain respect from Democritus' theory concerning space.

something, that doth subsist by itself. For it is certain, that there can be no mode, accident, or affection of nothing; and consequently, that nothing cannot be extended, nor mensurable. But if space be neither the extension of body, nor yet of substance incorporeal, then must it of necessity be the extension of nothing, and the affection of nothing; and nothing must be mensurable by yards and poles. We conclude, therefore, that from this very hypothesis of the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, that space is a nature distinct from body, and positively infinite, it follows undeniably, that there must be some incorporeal substance, whose affection its extension is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the infinite extension of an incorporeal Deity; just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted. And thus is the argument of these Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, against an incorporeal Deity, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that from that very principle of their own, by which they would disprove the same, it is against themselves demonstrable.[7]

[7] The learned Doctor here employs the argument *ad hominem*, as the schoolmen say, and overthrows the reasoning of the Democritics and Epicureans against an incorporeal God from their own axioms on the nature of space. Whether this argumentation is such as completely to put those to silence who with Epicurus and Democritus discard God, but acknowledge infinite incorporeal space, or whether some means of defence are still left them, let others determine. To myself, indeed, he seems to assume something which, if I mistake not, both sides are not yet sufficiently agreed upon; for example, that nothing can be infinite except God. But passing over these things I shall notice two points which have some bearing upon the present question. I. Although the learned Doctor nowhere clearly indicates whether he is more favourable to those who regard space as a mere notion of the mind or affection of bodies, or those who suppose it to be a really existent nature, he here however seems evidently to incline to the opinion that God is not different from extension or space, or that space and extension are a property of a God. Compare chap. 2. sect. 8. and our remarks there? I have already shown in another place on chap. 5. sect. 1. sect. 25. that not a few of the ancient fathers, the Greeks especially, maintained this opinion. Whoever wishes to see a variety of passages to this effect may consult Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 1. lib. 3. cap. 9. sect. 10. p. 161. &c. who however seems to me not sufficiently to distinguish the passages, but to confound those of a different purport and opinion; on which this is no place for comment. In a later age this opinion was caught up among the English in particular, and defended by men of the highest ability, but not in the same words or the same manner. At the time when Dr. Cudworth wrote this, his friend Dr. Hen. More had already publicly approved of it; and at this day the disciples of the illustrious Newton are most of them among its supporters. [A dispute is carried on in England on this subject at the present time against Dr. Clarke. See Biblioth. Raisonnée, tom. 13. par. 1. p. 229. &c. tom. 14. p. 468.] Among our own countrymen Andr. Rüdiger, Physica Divina, lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 4. p. 346. 347. has adopted it. Compare Appendix de Monitis Censorum, p. 790. &c. The whole question concerning space and its nature is exceedingly abstruse, and embarrassed with infinite difficulties; wherefore they perhaps show greater wisdom who choose to know nothing at all of the matter, rather than include all things within the limits of their own mind, and advance any thing which themselves must be aware may with great show of truth be impugned by others. [For space Mussehenbroek Journ. Litt. tom. 22. par. 2. p. 246.] I am certain that there is space; nor do what I will can I divest my mind of this notion. On its nature and relations I feel no disposition to dispute, and confess myself not to possess intellect sufficient to grasp and comprehend so pro-

To which it might be here further added, that Epicurus, who professedly opposed Plato's incorporeal God, as an impossibility, did notwithstanding manifestly contradict himself, when he asserted such a Democracy of monogrammous gods, as were not compounded of atoms and vacuum (though, according to him, the only principles of body), that so they might be incorruptible; nor yet could touch or be touched, but were penetrable, as is declared in those verses of Lucretius,[8]

> Tenuis enim natura deûm, longeque remota
> Sensibus à nostris, animi vix mente videtur.
> Quæ quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum,
> Tactile nil nobis quod sit, contingere debet.
> Tangere enim non quit, quod tangi non licet ipsum.

(though tangibility and impenetrability were elsewhere made by him the very essence of body); and lastly, such as had not corpus, but quasi corpus, and therefore must needs be really incorporeal. Though there is no doubt to be made, but that Epicurus colluded in all this; himself not believing a jot of it, nor any such gods at all.

But other Atheists there were, who concluding likewise, That whatsoever was unextended was nothing, were sensible of the inconvenience of making space thus to be a thing really distinct from body (from whence it would follow unavoidably, that it was an affection of incorporeal substance); and therefore acknowledged, not two natures of extended things, but as we had it before in Aristotle, μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν, "one only nature, and that bodily;" space being therefore to them, either a mere imaginary thing, that hath no reality without our minds, but only a phantasm of our own, and, in their modern language, a kind of ghost, apparition, or spectre of a body; or

found and recondite a subject. Let others, however, retain the right of explaining this matter as they please, provided they broach nothing derogatory to the divine perfections. II. I cannot agree with Dr. Cudworth when he tells us that Gassendi, in asserting space to be something intermediate between substance and accident, meant to help the Democritics and Epicureans. After Gassendi several others, who could not fairly be ranked among Atheists, have adopted a similar view, or at least have professed their ignorance to what class of things space belonged; among whom it will be sufficient to name Dr. Cudworth's acute countryman, J. Locke, on the Human Understanding, lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 192. When the subject of inquiry lies far above human comprehension, and the distributions and distinctions invented by philosophers are not yet cleared of all difficulty, and lastly, when the words themselves, which are used to designate the various kinds of things, are undefined and ambiguous, I should consider it the wisest course to be content with knowing the thing itself, and to hazard no positive assertion as to its mode or nature. Should any one on account of this opinion call me ignorant and inexperienced, as Andr. Rüdiger accuses Gassendi of folly, Physica Divina, lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 2. I will bear it with patience; but he to whom I appear ignorant may, on the other hand, perhaps seem to me to be too bold and confident, and it is at least a question, whether the latter is the more excusable fault.

[8] De Natura Rerum, lib. 5. v. 149. &c. p. 245. &c. On these sportive gods of Epicurus, see what is said above, chap. 2. sect. 2.

else indeed the very extension of body itself, considered in general, and abstractly, from this or that singular body, moveable. And these men therefore framed their argumentation against an incorporeal Deity after this manner: Nothing truly is, but what is extended, or hath a certain magnitude (because that which is unextended, and hath no magnitude, is no where, and consequently nothing). But whatsoever is extended, and in a place, is body. Therefore is there no other substance besides body; and consequently there can be no incorporeal Deity. Or else to put the argument into a more approvable syllogistic form; whatsoever is extended, is body, or corporeal; but whatsoever is, is extended. Therefore whatsoever is, is body, or corporeal. And by consequence, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

To which argumentation the assertors of incorporeal substance have replied two manner of ways. For first, the generality of the ancient incorporealists taking it for granted, that whatsoever was extended in magnitude, and had parts one without another, was divisible, as also probably impenetrable by any thing else extended, because there can be no penetration of dimensions; and therefore no one magnitude can be imbibed or swallowed up into another, but must of necessity stand without it, adding so much to the quantity thereof: they readily gave their assent to that proposition, that whatsoever is extended into longitude, latitude, and profundity, is body. But being strongly persuaded of the existence of some other substance besides body, they denied that other proposition of theirs, that whatsoever is, is extended; or what is unextended, is nothing: maintaining, that besides body, or extended substance, there was another substance incorporeal, which therefore was ἀδιάστατος, and ἀμεγέθης, and ἄποσος, and ἀμερὴς, and ἀδιαίρετος, "unextended," and devoid of "quantity" and "magnitude," without "parts," and "indivisible."[9] That Plato himself philosophized after this manner, might be proved from sundry passages of his writings; as that in his tenth De Legibus, where he affirmeth, that the soul itself, and those things which belong to it, as cogitative, are πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ βάθους καὶ πλάτους, "in order of nature, before the longitude, and latitude, and profundity of bodies." Where, doubtless, his meaning was not, as if there were longitude, latitude, and profundity in souls, but of a different kind from that longitude, latitude, and profundity of bodies, and before it; but that longitude, latitude, and profundity, being the essential properties of body only, soul and cogitation, as devoid of these, was in order of nature before them. Again, from that

[9] Bayle, Dictionn. tom. 4. art. Simonides, supposes that before Des Cartes no one supposed spirit to be unextended.

in his Timæus, where speaking of place, space, and matter, he condemneth this for a vulgar error. That whatsoever is, must of necessity be in some place or other, and what is in no place, is nothing. Τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος τὸ τῆς χώρας, ἕδραν παρέχον ὅσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν——πρὸς δ δὲ καὶ ὀνειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες, καὶ φαμὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί που, τὸ ὂν ἅπαν ἔν τινι τόπῳ, καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινὰ· τὸ δὲ μήτε ἐν γῇ, μητέπου κατ' οὐρανὸν, οὐδὲν εἶναι, "The third kind is that of space, which gives room to all things that are generated. And when we look upon this, we dreamingly affirm, that every thing, that is, must of necessity be in some place, and possess a certain room and space, and that whatsoever is not somewhere, either in earth, or in heaven, is nothing. Which drowsy or dreaming imagination (saith he), like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity." Whereas this philosopher himself, discoursing elsewhere of God, under the title of πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, "the vast sea of pulchritude," describeth him after this manner: Οὐδέπου ὄν, ἢ ἐν γῇ, ἢ ἐμ οὐρανῷ, ἄλλ' αὐτὸ, μεθ' αὐτοῦ, μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, "As that, which is not any where, either in earth, or in heaven, but itself alone by itself, and with itself, all other beautiful things partaking of it."[10]

[10] These passages, from which Dr. Cudworth considers it may be proved that Plato abstracted both the soul and God from all extension, seem at first sight to possess no inconsiderable weight: but if they be examined with more attention, and regarded in strict reference to the construction of the words, I am very much afraid they will lose all their force and efficacy. I. The first one from book 10. De Legibus, p. 669. is altogether foreign to this question, and our worthy author is manifestly mistaken in his interpretation of it. In that passage Plato is merely endeavouring to show that the soul is prior to all body, but as to its internal nature is altogether silent. Nor have his words any other meaning than this, that the affections of the soul, as well as the soul itself, existed before all bodies. This will at once be made evident by producing the entire passage. The Athenian guest says he has before demonstrated that the soul is more ancient than the body, and therefore that those things which are in it, the affections, virtues, and the rest, are so also. Τρόποι δὲ, he proceeds, καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι, πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων, καὶ πλάτους, καὶ βάθους, καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἂν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος, "Therefore affections, morals, wills, cogitations, true opinions, cares, memories, were all before the longitude, latitude, profundity, and strength of bodies, as the soul also is before body." He must be rude and uninformed indeed who cannot understand Plato's meaning to be simply, that, as the soul is prior to the body, so the affections also and virtues of the soul are necessarily prior to the properties and affections of bodies, as longitude, latitude, and so on. If the words be taken in the sense attached to them by Dr. Cudworth, he would be made to say what no man in his senses ever questioned, that ratiocination, opinion, recollection, are destitute of extension. But Plato's opinion on the soul would not allow of his denying all extension to it. For as is incontrovertibly clear from the Timæus, he supposed the soul to be compounded of *the same*, or an indivisible nature, and *the different*, or, as almost all the Platonists correctly interpret it, all the elements and first principles of things. See the Timæus, sect. 19. p. 242. and sect. 20. p. 244. edit. Fabricii. Chalcidius, In Timæum Platonis, sect. 51. p. 298. thus writes: "Plato compounds the soul of all the elements, so that it is cognizant both of the elements themselves and of those things which follow the elements and universally of all existing things, and judges of all." See also Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 13. cap. 16. p. 696. on this dogma, who, cap.

And as for Aristotle's sense in this particular; that he here departed not, as he did in some other things, from his master Plato, may appear from that whole chapter, or section, at the

17. p. 700. quotes a remarkable passage from the Disputatio de Animo of the Platonist Severus, in which he castigates this doctrine of his master and shows that it goes to overthrow the soul's immortality. How that which consists of a twofold nature and of the elements of all bodies can be void of extension, I am at a loss to understand. II. As regards the other passage, which is quoted from the Timæus, p. 535. I would observe, first of all, that the last portion of it which stands here only in English, is translated by Dr. Cudworth more freely than the words will permit. In the Greek of Plato the words here given are followed by these: *Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄϋπνον καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν, ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνειρώξεως οὐ δυνατοὶ γιγνόμεθα ἐγερθέντες διοριζόμενοι τ' ἀληθὲς λέγειν, ὡς εἰκόνι μεν.* These the learned Doctor has interpreted freely and according to the sense, rather than translated, as follows: "Which drowsy or dreaming imagination, like a ghost, continually haunteth and possesseth men, and that even then, when they think of that true and awakened nature of the Deity." Ficinus has rendered them thus: "And all these and similar imaginations we ourselves, occupied by such dreams, are unable to distinguish from the wakeful and really existing nature." In whatever way these words be translated it will always be clear from this passage of Plato, I. That he considered those men to be deceived who suppose all existing things to be in some place, or in heaven and earth. II. That in particular a certain nature, which he calls *wakeful* and *really existent*, is excluded by this philosopher from place and space. In the first place it will be evident to the more attentive readers of Plato, that he is here covertly rebuking those persons in particular who opposed his favourite doctrine of the eternal forms and ideas of things by the following argument: "Whatever is not in place, is nothing: the forms of things are not in place or space: therefore they are nothing and mere fictions." This class are like dreamers, he says, and attribute more to phantasy than to reason. But that he is not speaking of ideas alone is evident from the fact that he particularly mentions a certain *ἄϋπνος* or "sleepless" nature, which is in like manner to be abstracted from space. This word is not applicable to the ideas and forms of things, but means undoubtedly a nature that always contemplates all things with the purest mind and intelligence. For he contrasts men as frequently dreaming and that ever wakeful nature with each other. Those dreamers are evidently the men who leave too much place and efficacy in the soul to the power of the imagination. The ever wakeful and sleepless nature therefore is unquestionably most pure mind, which divested of all body at no time either obeys or can obey the vagaries of fancy: consequently I will readily admit that the name designates God himself. The opinion of Plato seems to me to be aptly explained by Chalcidius, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, cap. 13. sect. 347. p. 404: "By a sleepless and wakeful nature he means that intelligible and incorporeal kind, which is ever the same, and subsists as principal and chief, without beginning and without end, having no connexion with the senses, perceptible by pure mind: that is to say, God and his intelligible cogitations and incorporeal forms." Wherefore it is certain from this passage that Plato denied the Supreme Being to be in space: but it does not appear to me to be equally plain from it that he held God to be devoid of extension. *Χώρα* and *τόπος* are with Plato nothing more than the space which bodies occupy: as will be evident to any one who reads him with attention. For he defines space to be that "which affords a place to all things that are generated," *ἕδραν ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν.* Afterwards when he adds that those are mistaken who suppose all things to be either in heaven or in earth, he at the same time intimates that they know of no other space than that which contains heaven and earth. Whether he ranked this corporeal space, if it may be so called, among the affections and properties of body and matter, or believed it to be a nature distinct from matter, I leave to others to decide. For he has not expressed himself sufficiently clearly. He distinguishes space I observe from matter; but I cannot say whether he did so merely in mind and thought, or supposed these two to be in reality different. Such being the case, this passage of Plato proves no more than this: that God is not in the space and place occupied by bodies, or is neither in heaven nor in earth. But besides this space by which bodies are contained, he believed in other space extending far above heaven and earth, the seat of all con-

end of his physics, spent upon this very subject, to prove ὅτι τοῦτ' ἀμερὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος, "that his first Immoveable Mover (which is God Almighty) must of ne-

ceivable pulchritude and the abode of the supreme Being himself. On this region he makes Stesichorus discourse in his Phædrus, p. 345. as follows: Τὸν δὲ ΥΠΟΥΡΑΝΙΟΝ ΤΟΠΟΝ οὔτε τις ὑμνησέ πω τῶν τῇδε ποιητὴς, οὔτε ποθ' ὑμνήσει κατ' ἀξίαν· ἔχει δὲ ὧδε——ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ, μόνῳ θεατῇ νῷ χρῆται, κ. τ. λ. "Of this supercelestial place no one of our poets has sung or ever will sing according to its dignity. Its nature is this——without colour, without figure, without contact, an essence really existent, it uses contemplative intellect alone, the pilot of the soul," &c. Therefore, though he excluded God from heaven and earth, or the space and place in which bodies are, he nevertheless assigned him another place more exalted than heaven and earth: from which it follows that he did not discard all extension from the divine nature. Maximus Tyrius, who, Diss. 1. p. 15. discourses with great clearness on this subject, affirms that according to Plato's doctrine, heaven and earth are the bounds and limits of the divine abode. Synesius also, a well-known devoted admirer of Plato, Hymn. 1. in Deum, p. 315. perspicuously expresses the opinion of his master when he says that God is seated in tranquillity above the heavens:

Ὑψιθώκων
Ὑπερ οὐρανοῦ καρήνων,
Ἀλύτῳ κύδει γαίων
Θεὸς ἔμπεδος θαάσσει,

"Above the lofty summits of heaven, rejoicing in immortal glory, is God firmly enthroned." This might be further proved from the interior discipline of Plato, and especially from his doctrine of demons: but the present is not a fitting opportunity, neither does the subject itself much require it. I cannot omit to mention, however, that Cicero in the part where he recounts the opinions of the Platonists and Aristotelians on the nature of things, expressly denies that they supposed any thing to exist, which is without place and devoid of extension, Academic. Quæstion. lib. 1. cap. 6, p. 2231. tom. 8. opp. Nullam vim (efficientem) dicebant hi philosophi esse sine aliqua materia. *Nihil est enim, quod non alicubi* (id est in loco quodam) *esse cogatur.* "These philosophers asserted that there is no (efficient) force without some matter. For there is nothing that is not necessarily somewhere (that is, in some place)." According to his authority therefore, which I think ought to be attended to, Plato considered something of matter to be associated with all natures, and upon this ground that nothing can exist without place. The question however which has exercised the learned even of our own time: whether or not Plato supposed God to be destitute of body and matter, it is not my present intention to discuss: highly difficult and doubtful as it is, owing to the ambiguity of the words, *body, matter, simple, incorporeal, corporeal,* to which no one meaning can be attached. When we meet with these words in ancient authors we estimate them according to the laws of our own language: a practice which has sometimes led men otherwise acute and ingenious into error. I am satisfied that Plato wholly abstracted God from this gross and mutable matter of which bodies are composed, nor can I agree with those, who would persuade us to the contrary for the purpose of more conveniently classing this philosopher among Atheists. But still I have scarcely a doubt that he supposed him to partake of a certain most subtle, most simple and indivisible matter. [He held the soul to be corporeal. See Beausobre Hist. du Manich. p. 482.] Neither do I abandon this opinion because Plato calls God ἀσώματος, "incorporeal and destitute of parts." For I have proved above on chap. 1. sect. 27. from many passages of the ancients that the word ἀσώματος had not the same meaning formerly as it has at this day. To pass over other significations of this word, the ancient philosophers held that to be ἀσώματος which does not consist of various elements, nor is so compounded as the bodies which fill the universe. It will be sufficient to show this by one passage of Apuleius: Plato ranks the stars and heroes among the gods: and no one will deny that the stars are bodies, and that a body, however subtle, was attributed by him to heroes. But Apuleius declares that according to the discipline of his master Plato, these deities are divested of all body, De Deo Socratis, p. 43. opp. "Which gods Plato regards as *incorporeal by*

cessity be devoid of parts, or indivisible, and have no magnitude at all." The conclusion of which section, and his whole book of Physics,[1] is this: Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔχειν τι μέγεθος· εἰ γὰρ μέγεθος ἔχει, ἀνάγκη ἤτοι πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄπειρον· ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μέγεθος εἶναι, δέδεικται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς· ὅτι δὲ τὸ πέπερασμένον ἀδύνατον ἔχειν ἄπειρον δύναμιν, δέδεικται νῦν· φανερὸν τοίνυν, ὅτι ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἀμερὲς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος, "These things being thus determined, it is manifestly impossible, that the first Mover should have any magnitude. For if it hath magnitude, that must of necessity be either finite, or infinite. But that there can be no infinite magnitude, was before demonstrated in the Physics; and that nothing which hath a finite magnitude can have infinite power, hath been now proved. Wherefore it is plain, that the first Mover is indivisible, and devoid of parts, and hath no magnitude at all." Which same doctrine is again taught and asserted by Aristotle, in his Metaphysics:* Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὐσία τὶς ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀκίνητος, καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· δέδεικται δε καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν

nature, animal, having no end or beginning, but wholly and retrospectively eternal, remote in their nature *from the contagion of body*." But the ancients called that destitute of parts, which they supposed to be incapable of being cut and divided. We indeed consider every thing consisting of matter to be divisible: but many of the early philosophers thought otherwise and held the existence of a certain kind of matter, the parts of which no force can disturb and disarrange. Let those who are sceptical about this, only reflect upon the fiery god of the Stoics and the soul of Plato. III. But it is time to come to the third passage here cited from Plato. It occurs in his Symposium or De Amore, p. 331. but if I am not altogether deceived is also totally irrelevant to the matter under consideration. Plato is not speaking there of God, as Dr. Cudworth fancies, but of the abstract form and idea of beauty. He first of all states that whoever wishes to know what the beautiful is, must not contemplate this or that man or animal or deity, but plunge ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, "into the vast sea of beauty." He then, to explain this thing more clearly, declares that there is a certain eternal and immutable form of beauty, which is conceived by reason and intelligence alone, and is not to be found in any thing perceptible to the eyes and sense. Even this is a proof of their being in error who fancy that these words of Plato are to be understood of God. The philosopher is discoursing upon corporeal beauty; and how can any one know what is really beautiful in corporeal and sensible things by contemplating the form and idea of the supreme Being? What affinity is there between God and those things which are manifest to the eyes, hands, and ears? But what necessity for longer discussion? Plato's words themselves, here appealed to, if they only be examined entire, refute those who understand them of God. For in Plato they run as follows: Οὐδέπου ὂν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ, οἷον 'ΕΝ ΖΩΊΩι, ἢ ἐν γῇ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ. The words οἷον ἐν ζώῳ, "as in an animal," are here omitted by Dr. Cudworth, whether purposely or by a slip of the memory I cannot say, although they put it beyond all dispute that Plato is by no means speaking in this place of the nature of God. For his discourse would have been utterly absurd and ridiculous, if he had said that the supreme Being is not to be sought for in any animal. For what man was ever so insane as to estimate the form and image of God from that of an animal. Yet this not unfrequently happens, that men derive their notions of the nature of universal beauty from this source: an error which the philosopher is here exposing.

[1] Page 608. tom. 1. opp.

* Page 14. cap. 7. [Page 480. tom. 4. opp.]

ταύτην τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι·[2] οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει δύναμιν ἄπειρον πεπερασμένον, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἄπειρον, "From what hath been declared, it is manifest, that there is an eternal and immoveable substance, separate from sensibles; as also, that this substance cannot possibly have any magnitude, but is devoid of parts, and indivisible. Because no finite thing can have infinite power, and there is no such thing possible as infinite magnitude." Neither doth Aristotle appropriate this to the supreme Deity, "To be thus devoid of magnitude and of parts," and consequently "indivisible;" he somewhere[3] attributing the same also to all other immaterial or incorporeal things, and particularly to the human mind, ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὕλην ἔχον, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, "every thing that is devoid of matter, is indivisible, as the human mind." And the like doth he assert, at once, both concerning the mundane and the human soul, that they are no magnitudes, though ridiculously (after his manner) imputing the contrary opinion to Plato:[4*] Οὐ καλῶς

[2] The words which follow are not read in Aristotle in the same order as here quoted, but are extracted from a longer sentence, although not strictly in adherence to the philosopher's meaning.

[3] Metaphys. lib. 14. cap. 9. p. 484. tom. 4. opp. But this passage seems to have little bearing upon the present question. For in it Aristotle makes no positive and definite assertion, but merely doubts, whether every thing that is devoid of rude and gross matter, is indivisible: Ἔτι δή, says he, λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον, "There remains a doubt, whether that which is understood is compound;" .... Ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς· ἢ ὅγε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἐν τίνι χρόνῳ; "Or every thing, not possessing matter, is indivisible, as the human mind: or whatever is compound is in some time." But granting it to be evident from this passage, that the founder of the Peripatetics held the human mind to be both devoid of matter and indivisible, still it does not follow, that he deprived it of extension and magnitude. For when the ancients assert any thing to be destitute of matter, they mean the gross and dense matter that bodies are composed of, and are not necessarily to be supposed on that account to detract all matter from the nature which they hold to be immaterial. Many of the ancients affirm, that human souls are devoid of matter, and therefore immortal, and yet they hold the same to be igneous. Nor do those who suppose a thing to be indivisible necessarily separate and disconnect it from all matter. For formerly many believed in the existence of natures partaking of a certain matter, and yet of that kind, that their parts were wholly incapable of separation. To pass over other examples for the present, let those to whom this appears to be scarcely credible, bear in mind the god of the Stoics.

[4] I have a remark or two to offer upon this passage of Aristotle. I. Dr. Cudworth speaks as though Aristotle had entertained no doubt of this world being endowed with a soul, as was supposed by Plato and others. But not at present to mention that this philosopher has long since been shown to have at least rejected such a soul of the world as Plato imagined, no such inference can be drawn from this passage. For Aristotle is merely endeavouring to show that Plato's opinion on the soul of the world is opposed to truth and reason. II. The learned Doctor complains that Aristotle accuses Plato of supposing the soul to be extended. It is true he here finds fault with Plato for having in his Timæus not only compounded the soul of the world out of all the elements, but endowed it also with a certain magnitude: nor do I agree with Dr. Cudworth in considering that there is any thing so very ridiculous in his doing so. I will admit that Aristotle in other places has perverted his master's doctrines for the mere purpose of censure, but this dogma concerning the soul of the world is clearly put forth

* De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 3. [p. 9. 10. tom. 2. opp.]

τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχὴς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ νόησις· ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα· ταῦτα δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἓν, ὡς ὁ ἄριθμος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος· διόπερ οὐδὲ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχὴς, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθός τι συνεχής· πῶς γὰρ δὲ καὶ νοήσει μέγεθος ὤν, ὅτῳ οὖν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὐτοῦ; μορίων δὲ ἤτοι κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ στιγμὴν· εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμὴν, αὗται δ' ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό· Ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ; "It is not rightly affirmed either of the mundane or rational soul, that they are magnitudes. For the Intellect is one and continuous, as Intellection is, which is the same with the Intelligibles. But these are one, not as magnitudes, but as numbers. Wherefore the Intellect is not so continuous, but either devoid of parts, or not continuous as magnitude. For how, being magnitude, could it understand with any of its parts, whether conceived as points, or as lesser magnitudes; since either way there would be an innumerable company of intellections? Moreover, how can it conceive any thing that is indivisible, by what is divisible?" Furthermore, in this same book, De Anima,[5] Aristotle stiffly denies souls in general either to be in a place, or to be locally moved, otherwise than by accident, as they are said to be moved together with the motion of the body. Thus Simplicius:[6] Ὅρα ὡς πανταχοῦ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀποσείεται τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις, "See how Aristotle

by Plato in his Timæus: nor do his best interpreters deny this. See what we have adduced on this subject a little above, as well as in other places. III. The learned Doctor has omitted many things in the passage itself. After the words μέγεθος εἶναι, Aristotle has interposed an explanation of Plato's opinion, without which it is impossible clearly to understand the demonstration which follows. The substance of what he says, in reference to this opinion is, that "Plato did not regard the soul of the world as a sentient or concupiscent, but as a rational soul." Having laid down this, he proceeds to show that such a rational soul cannot possibly be endowed with magnitude: "for intellect," says he, "is one and continuous, &c." Again, after the words νοήσει τὸ αὐτὸ at the close of this passage, many things are omitted which I shall not repeat here, although they are indispensable towards a full comprehension of his demonstration. On the demonstration itself contained in this passage of the Stagirite, I am not disposed to touch, or on his doctrine respecting the soul of the world. For it has long ago been confessed by men pre-eminent for virtue and erudition, that Aristotle's precepts on the soul are so abstruse and intricate that no one can make out his real meaning. I should suppose that the philosopher was unwilling to speak clearly and explicitly on the subject, lest he should excite the jealousy and hatred of the multitude: nor should I say otherwise of his doctrine of a first mover, which he likewise denies to partake of magnitude. There are persons who highly commend it for its subtlety and excellence, and who maintain it to be in accordance with true religion: while others again reject it as absurd and futile, and contend that the man did not himself know what he was saying. Both however agree that it is difficult of comprehension, and cannot be explained in words so as to make it intelligible to all. On the comparative merits of these two opinions let others decide. For my own part I frankly acknowledge my lack of sufficient acumen to be able to comprehend its entire tenor and import; and from the same cause it happens also that I consider it to be scarcely reconcileable with his other opinions concerning God.

[5] Lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 12. tom. 2. opp.

[6] Comment. in Libros Aristotelis de Anima, fol. 6. ed Græcæ Franc. Asulani, Venet. 1527. fol.

doth every where remove or exclude from the soul, corporeal (or local) motions." And again:* Ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινεῖσθαι τὰ ἀσώματα τῆς κινήσεως αἴτια κἂν πρῶτα κἂν μέσα κἂν ἔσχατα ᾖ, "Aristotle will by no means allow any incorporeal things whatsoever, whether of the first, second, or lowest rank, (they being all the causes of motion) themselves to be moved." Philoponus[7] likewise: Ὁρᾷς ὡς πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις ἀποβλέπων, οὕτως αὐτὴν ἀκίνητον εἶναί φησι· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ σῶμά ἐστιν, "You see how Aristotle, respecting corporeal motions, pronounces of the soul, that it is immoveable. For whatsoever is in a place (and moveable) is body." Lastly, in that passage before cited, Aristotle plainly makes the essence of corporeal substance, as opposed to incorporeal, to consist in magnitude.

Besides Plato and Aristotle, we might here instance in sundry other of the ancient Incorporealists, who clearly maintained the same doctrine. Philo doth not only assert in general a double essence or substance, ἀδιάστατον, and διαστηματικὴν, "a distant and indistant one;" but somewhere writeth thus concerning the Deity:† Ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πεπλήρωται τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντος, οὐ περιεχομένου, ᾧ πανταχοῦ τε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνῳ· οὐδαμοῦ μὲν, ὅτι καὶ χώραν καὶ τόπον αὐτὸς τοῖς σώμασι συγγεγέννηκε· τὸ δὲ πεποιηκὸς ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων θέμις εἰπεῖν περιέχεσθαι· πανταχοῦ δὲ, ὅτι τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ διὰ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀέρος τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ τείνας, &c. "All things are filled with God, as containing them, but not as being contained by them, or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to be both every where and nowhere. Nowhere, because himself created space and place, together with bodies, and it is not lawful to include the Creator within any of his creatures. And every where, because he extendeth his virtues and powers throughout earth and water, air and heaven, and leaveth no part of the world destitute thereof; but, collecting all things together under himself, hath bound them fast with invisible bonds."[8] But none

* Fol. 6.

[7] Comment. in Libros tres Aristot. de Anima, fol. 13. ed Græcæ Venet. 1553. fol.

† De Confus. Ling. p. 339.

[8] I can hardly believe Philo, however, to have belonged to the number of those who formerly denied all extension to God: on the contrary, he appears to me to have inclined to the opinion that God is mind pervading the whole universe of things, and that the divine nature does not differ from all-comprehending space. It will not be foreign to our purpose to demonstrate this by one or two passages. In his first book, Allegoriar. Legis, p. 48. he thus speaks concerning God: Θεοῦ γὰρ οὐδὲ ὁ σύμπας κόσμος ἄξιον ἂν εἴη χωρίον καὶ ἐνδιαίτημα· ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ τόπος, ᾗ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ πλήρης καὶ ἱκανὸς ὁ Θεὸς, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐπιδεᾶ, καὶ ἔρημα, καὶ κενὰ ὄντα πληρῶν καὶ περιέχων, αὐτὸς δὲ ὑπ' οὐδένος ἄλλου περιεχόμενος, ἅτε εἷς καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸς ὤν, "For of God not even the whole world would be a worthy and fitting dwelling-place: for God is his own place, and full of and sufficient for himself, filling and containing all other things which are deficient, desert, and empty

hath more industriously pursued this business than Plotinus, who every where asserts body and magnitude to be one and the same thing;[9] and that, besides this, there is another sub-

wherens he is contained by no other thing, as being one and all things." What Philo here calls *deficient*, *desert*, and *empty*, are undoubtedly terrene and corporeal things, or in a word, the universe. His meaning therefore is, that God is that space, so to speak, in which bodies exist and revolve, and which penetrates and pervades all things. There is another still more explicit passage to the same effect, in his book De Somniis, p. 575. Αὐτὸς, says he, ὁ Θεὸς καλεῖται τόπος, τῷ περιέχειν μὲν τὰ ὅλα, περιέχεσθαι δὲ πρὸς μηδένος ἁπλῶς, καὶ τῷ καταφυγὴν τῶν συμπάντων εἶναι αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐπειδήπερ αὐτός ἐστι χώρα αὐτοῦ, κέχωρηκὼς ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἐμφερόμενος μόνῳ ἑαυτῷ, "God himself is called place, because he contains all things and is contained by nothing whatever, and because he is himself a refuge for all things, and is contained and filled by himself alone." He further illustrates his opinion by a comparison between God and men: Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ εἰμὶ τόπος, ἀλλ' ἐν τόπῳ, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὁμοίως· τὸ γὰρ περιεχόμενον διαφέρει τοῦ περιέχοντος· τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπ' οὐδένος περιεχόμενον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τόπος ἑαυτοῦ, "I am not place, but in place, as likewise are all things. For the contained differs from the containing: but the divinity being contained by nothing is necessarily his own place." If these words have any meaning at all, they signify that God is that space which surrounds and encompasses the whole nature of things. In another place he asserts that heaven is bounded by God, or that God is the boundary of heaven, in his book Quis Rerum Divinarum Hæres, p. 512. Ὁ δὲ οὐρανὸς——ἀπειρομεγέθης ἐστὶ——ἐστὶ δὲ ὅρος αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἡνίοχος καὶ κυβερνήτης· ὥσπερ οὖν ἀπερίληπτον τὸ ὄν, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ὁριζόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ μέτροις τοῖς εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐπίνοιαν ἡκουσιν οὐ μετρεῖται, "Heaven——is of infinite magnitude——but God is its boundary, and ruler and governor. Therefore, as being is itself incomprehensible, so also that which is bounded by it is not measured by measures coming within our knowledge." The sense of which is evidently that heaven is not co-extensive with God himself: whence it necessarily follows that the divine nature extends through and pervades the whole region of heaven. Nor do the words of Philo here quoted by Dr. Cudworth show him to have entertained any other opinion: which in my judgment contain nothing more than what might easily be assented to by those who hold God to be space or in space. "God," says Philo, "is every where, and nowhere." "He is nowhere," that is, he is included and contained in no certain place: which all will acknowledge even who deny God to be different from infinite space, as they distinguish between place and space. They certainly are very much deceived who suppose that all the ancients who denied God to be in place, or asserted him to be nowhere, divested the supreme Being of all extension and concretion. Tertullian notoriously attributed extension to God, nay, held him in a certain respect to be corporeal: and yet he denies him to be in place, Contra Praxeam, cap. 16. p. 355. "God holds the whole world in his hand, like a nest, whose throne is heaven and footstool earth. *In him is all place, and he is not in place*, being the extreme limit of the universe." But according to Philo, God is also *every where*: which in like manner is admitted by all who maintain God to be extended. And Philo himself, a little after the words here in question, openly asserts that God is a nature distributed and passing through all parts of the universe, p. 340. Θεὸς ἐγκεκόλπισται τὰ ὅλα καὶ διὰ τῶν τοῦ παντὸς μερῶν διελήλυθε, "God contains all things in his bosom, and passes through all the parts of the universe." I am aware that the expressions of the ancients on the immensity and omnipresence of God are sometimes not to be taken too strictly, and that many of them thought more wisely and correctly on this subject than they spoke. The doctrine I confess is both abstruse and recondite in itself, and of a nature that will scarcely admit of being properly stated and explained in human language. Whatever you may say, another, if he feels disposed, will be able so to explain, as to make you apply to God what is proper to bodies alone. Nor have the divine fathers themselves employed any other phrases than those borrowed from human things: which has been a manifest source of error to many both of ancient and modern times. But Philo, I consider, has declared his sentiments so clearly and openly that no one can doubt his having entertained the opinion ascribed to him.

[9] Let it not be supposed, however, that wherever Plotinus is discoursing of an

stance incorporeal, which consequently, is ἄποσος and ἀμεγέθης, and ἀμερὴς, devoid of quantity, and of magnitude, and of parts, locally distant from one another; ὃ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ποσὸν εἶναι ὑπερβέβηκεν, "it having in its nature transcended the imperfection of quantity." And who hath also written two whole books[10] upon this very subject: Τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον, "That one and the self-same numerical thing may be all of it entirely every where." Wherein his principal design was to prove, that "the Deity is not part of it here, and part of it there;" and so much thereof in one place, and so much in another, (as if the very substance of it were mensurable by yards and poles:) but the whole undivided Deity every where: Πρὸ τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ἁπάντων (saith he) "God is before all things, that are in a place."[1] And[2] θαυμάζειν οὐ δεῖ, εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ, παντὶ τῷ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντι, ὅλως πάρεστι, φησὶ γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τόπον οὐκ εἰληχότι, ᾧ πάρεστι, τοῦτῳ ὅλον παρεῖναι, "It is not at all to be wondered at, that God, being not in a place, should be present to every thing, that is in a place, wholly and entirely; reason pronouncing, that he, having no place, must therefore of necessity be ὅλως, all of him indivisibly present to whatsoever he is present." Neither is this, saith he, a thing only deduced by reason, but that which is before reason, suggested by the instincts of mankind:[3] Τὸ ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, πανταχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι, κοινὴ ἔννοια φησὶν εἶναι, ὅταν πάντες κινούμενοι αὐτοφυῶς λέγωσι, τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν Θεὸν, ὡς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν, "That one and the same numerical substance (to wit of the Deity) is at once entirely everywhere, is agreeable to the common notions, as sentiments of mankind,

indivisible nature, destitute of parts, quantity, and quality, God and the soul are always to be understood. For in some places, the nature we have alluded to is no other than matter of which we have spoken above. See his book Περὶ ὕλης, and another in which he proves ἀσώματα, or incorporeal things, to be impassible.

[10] These two books are the fourth and fifth of the sixth Ennead. opp. Plotini. Dr. Cudworth, writing from memory, has expressed their title inaccurately: for they are thus inscribed: Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταυτὸ ὂν ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον. But in both these books, as almost every where, the philosopher discourses on the subject so subtly and acutely, that great attention is required in order to ascertain his meaning. And the difficulty is increased by the language he makes use of in common with other Platonists, which approaches closely to the poetic, and is, as it were, intermediate between prose and poetry. Indeed, the style employed by most of the junior Platonists has caused many to interpret their opinions erroneously, and to apply what is said of mental notions and abstract forms to really existent things.

[1] These words are used by Plotinus not of God himself, as Dr. Cudworth's version implies, but of the soul of the world.

[2] Namely, in the former of the books written by him upon this argument, cap. 3. p. 647. It must be observed, however, that the passage is not read in Plotinus as here quoted. For after ὅλως πάρεστι many words intervene in explanation of this subject.

[3] With these words Plotinus begins the latter of the two books from which these testimonies are adduced, p. 660. The argument comprised in them is similar to that which the ancient Christian fathers are accustomed to draw *from the testimony of the soul*, to prove that there is only one God.

when we do so often by the instincts of nature speak of that God who is in every one of us, supposing him to be one and the same in all." Where the philosopher subjoins: Καὶ ἔστι πάντων βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχὴ, ἣν ὥσπερ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν φθέγγονται, &c., "And this is the firmest of all principles, that which our souls do, as it were, naturally and of themselves speak; and which is not collected by reason, but comes forth from them before ratiocination." Moreover he often affirmeth of the human soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is the whole or all of it, in every part of the body, that is, undividedly:[4] Ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ, καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει, "As for the human soul, it is one and the same numerically in the hand and in the foot." And again: Εἶτα πῶς ἐν ποδὶ καὶ χειρὶ τὴν αὐτὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ μέρει τοῦ παντὸς οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐν τῷδε; "Since we commonly suppose our own soul to be the same, both in our foot and in our hand, why should we not in like manner, acknowledge that of the mundane soul or Deity," which is in one part of the universe, to be the same with that in another? In like manner, Simplicius[5] proving that body is not the first principle, because there must of necessity be something self-moving, and what is so, must needs be incorporeal, writeth thus: Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀμερὲς εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάστατον, μεριστὸν γὰρ καὶ διαστατὸν ὑπάρχον, οὐ δύναται ὅλον ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ ἐφαρμόττειν, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἶναι κινοῦν, καὶ ὅλον τὸ αὐτὸ κινούμενον, "Because what is such, must of necessity be indivisible and indistant; for were it divisible and distant, it could not all of it be conjoined with its whole self; so that the whole should both actively move, and be moved." Which same thing seems further evident in the soul's being all conscious of itself, and reflexive of its whole self; which could not be, were one part of it distant from another. Again, the same philosopher expressly denieth the soul, though a self-moving substance, to be at all locally moved, otherwise than by accident, in respect of the body, which is moved by it: Οὐ τὰς σωματικὰς κινούμενον κινήσεις (κατὰ γὰρ ἐκείνας ἀκίνητόν ἐστι) ἀλλὰ τὰς ψυχικὰς, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, διανοεῖν, δοξάζειν, κινεῖ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὰς σωματικὰς κινήσεις, "The soul, being not moved by corporeal or local motions, (for in respect of these it is immoveable) but by cogitative ones only, (the names whereof are Consultation and Deliberation, &c.) by these moveth bodies locally." And that this was really Plato's meaning also, when he determined the soul to be a self-moving substance, and the cause of all bodily

[4] If I am not mistaken this dogma is not to be found expressed in these words in the books of Plotinus, from which these passages are quoted. I should suppose that the learned Doctor elicited it from the passage which follows, in which it is evidently contained. But this latter passage occurs in the former book, cap. 6. p. 649.

[5] Comment. in Aristot. Libros de Anima. loc. supra indic. fol. 7.

motion; that moving itself in a way of cogitation, it moved bodies locally, (notwithstanding that Aristotle would not take notice of it) sufficiently appears from his own words, and is acknowledged by the Greek scholiasts themselves[6] upon Aristotle's De Anima. Thus again Simplicius elsewhere: Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ψυχὴ, οὐδ' ἂν κινοῖτο, τὰς τῶν ἐν τόπῳ ὄντων κινήσεις, "Since the soul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local motion."

We should omit the testimonies of any more philosophers, were it not that we find Porphyrius so full and express herein, who makes this the very beginning of his ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ

[6] I am aware that the later Platonists, some of whom wrote scholia upon Aristotle's books De Anima, in expounding the meaning of Plato, represent him as having discarded all *corporeal* or *local* motion from the soul, and having left it only such motion as is suited to rational souls, namely, cogitation, deliberation, ratiocination, and the like: but I know also that they are accustomed to attribute many things to Plato to which he was wholly opposed, and in defiance of all truth to accommodate his doctrine to the rule and standard of philosophy invented by themselves. I cannot see indeed how it can be proved that the dogma put forth by Plato in his Phædrus, tenth book De Legibus, and elsewhere, of the soul's being moved not by any thing external, but by its own inherent virtue, ought to be understood in the sense attached to it by Dr. Cudworth on the authority of the later Platonists. On the contrary, as Plato ascribed extension to the soul, which we have shown a little above to be the case, he could not help also attributing to it such a motion as belongs to extended natures. The passage of Plato, here appealed to by Dr. Cudworth in proof of his own position, is doubtless the one which occurs in the tenth book De Legibus, and which Simplicius, the interpreter of Aristotle's De Anima, has in part adopted as his own: Ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν, ταῖς αὐτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματα ἐστὶ, βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς, εὐσεμνῶς, χαίρουσαν, λυπουμένην, θάρρουσαν, φοβουμένην, μισοῦσαν, στέργουσαν, καὶ πάσαις ὅσαι τούτων συγγενεῖς ἡ πρωτουργαὶ κινήσεις, τὰς δευτερουργοὺς αὖ παραλαμβάνουσι κινήσεις σωμάτων, ἄγουσι πάντα εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, κ. τ. λ., "The soul leads all things in heaven, in earth, and in the sea by its own motions, the names whereof are volition, cogitation, care, consultation, true or false opinion, joy, sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and by all other motives which are kindred to these and primary, which also receiving the secondary motions of bodies, lead all things to increase and decrease, &c." But this passage, in my opinion, affords little support to the opinion of those who suppose Plato to have divested the soul of all exterior motion. For the philosopher is not expressly enumerating the kinds of motion which the soul partakes or is destitute of, but simply explaining in what way or by what kind of motion the soul of the world impels and excites bodies. Thus he shows that the soul, inherent in the whole body of the world, can by meditation, cogitation, and ratiocination, alone cause matter to obey and to assume or relinquish any particular form. But even here he is not sufficiently consistent. For a little afterwards, p. 670. when treating of the motion of the sun, he openly acknowledges his ignorance of the nature of the motion by which the soul moves the sun, although it is certain that its motion proceeds from some soul: It may be done he says in three ways, that is, it may either be in the sun, and give motion to that globe as our soul does to us, or it may be enclosed in some aerial or igneous body, and impel body by body, or lastly, it may move the sun from without in a manner unknown to us: but which of these three motions it employs he does not determine. Now, how can this be reconciled with what he had said a little before, that the soul causes all motions of bodies by meditation, deliberation, and ratiocination alone? To confess the real truth: Plato is not a man whose opinion is always so clear and plain as to leave no room for doubt and difficulty. For the rest, the passage of Aristotle wherein he states that Plato attributed motion to the soul occurs in his De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 9. tom. 2. opp.

νοητὰ, his "manuduction to intelligibles:" Πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἀσωμάτων ἐν τόπῳ, "That though every body be in a place, yet nothing that is properly incorporeal is in a place." And who afterwards further pursues it in this manner:* Οὐδὲ τοπικῶς διέρχεται τὸ ἀσώματον· ὅπου βούλεται· ὄγκῳ γὰρ συνυφίσταται τόπος· τὸ δ' ἄογκον παντελῶς καὶ ἀμέγεθες, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄγκῳ ἀκράτητον, τοπικῆς τε κινήσεως ἄμοιρον, διαθέσει τοίνυν ποίᾳ ἐκεῖ εὑρίσκεται, ὅπου καὶ διάκειται· καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ φανερὰ ἡ παρουσία αὐτοῦ γίνεται, "Neither does that, which is incorporeal, move locally by will, place being relative only to magnitude and bulk. But that which is devoid of bulk and magnitude, is likewise devoid of local motion. Wherefore it is only present by a certain disposition and inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its presence there discernible otherwise than by its operations and effects." Again, concerning the three divine hypostases he writeth thus:† Ὁ Θεὸς πάνταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ὁ νοῦς πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, καὶ ψυχὴ πανταχοῦ ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ, &c., "The supreme God is therefore every where, because he is nowhere; and the same is true also of the second and third divine hypostasis, Nous and Psyche. The supreme God is every where and nowhere, in respect of those things which are after him, and only his own, and in himself. Nous, or Intellect, is in the supreme God, every where and nowhere, as to those things that are after him. Psyche, or the mundane soul, is both in intellect and the supreme God, and every where and nowhere, as to bodies. Lastly, body is both in the soul of the world, and in God." Where he denies God to be locally in the corporeal world, and thinks it more proper to say, that the "corporeal world is in God, than God in it;" because the world is held and contained in the divine power, but the Deity is not in the locality of the world. Moreover, he further declares his sense after this manner:[7] Οὐδ' εἰ κενὸν οὖν τι ἐπινοηθείη ἀσώματον, ἐν κενῷ οἷόν τε εἶναι Νοῦν, σώματος μὲν γὰρ δεκτικὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ κενόν. Νοῦ δὲ ἐνέργειαν χωρῆσαι ἀμήχανον, καὶ τόπον δοῦναι ἐνεργείᾳ, "Nor, if there were conceived to be such an incorporeal space, or vacuum (as Democritus and Epicurus supposed) could Mind, or God, possibly exist in this empty space (as co-extended with the same) for this would be only receptive of bodies, but it could not receive the energy of mind or intellect, nor give any place or room to that, that being no bulky thing." And again:[8] Ὁ μὲν κόσμος ἐν τῷ νῷ διασ-

* Page 229. 230. [Sect. 28. ed. Cantab.] . † Page 251.

[7] These words of Porphyry are extant in the Appendix Sententiarum sive Graduum ad Intelligibilia, first published by Luc. Holstenius from a MS. of Aloysius Lolinus, sect. 44. p. 278. ed. Cantabr.

[8] In the second part of his Sentent. ad Intelligibilia Ducentium, first published by Holstenius, sect. 35. p. 241. The words ἐν τῷ νῷ towards the beginning are a false reading for τῷ νοητῷ.

τατικῶς πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον τῷ κόσμῳ ἀμερῶς, καὶ ἀδιαστάτως· τὸ δὲ ἄμερες ἐν διαστατῷ ὅλον γίνεται κατὰ πᾶν μέρος, ταυτὸν ὂν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ· αὐτὸ ἀμερῶς πάρεστι καὶ ἁπλῃδύντως καὶ ἀτόπως, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, τῷ μεριστῷ, καὶ πεπληδυσμένῳ, καὶ ὄντι ἐν τόπῳ, "The corporeal world is distantly present to the intelligible (or the Deity); and that is indivisibly and indistantly present with the world. But when that which is indistant and unextended, is present with that which is distant and extended, then is the whole of the former one and the same numerically in every part of the latter. That is, it is indivisibly and unmultipliedly, and illocally there (according to its own nature) present with that which is naturally divisible, and multipliable, and in a place." Lastly, he affirmeth the same likewise of the human soul, that this is also οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, "a substance devoid of magnitude, and which is not locally present to this or that body, but by disposition and energy; and therefore the whole of it in every part thereof undividedly.[9]

And as for Christian writers, besides Origen, who was so famous an assertor of incorporeal substance, that (as Socrates[10] recordeth) the Egyptian monks and Anthropomorphites threatened death to Theophilus the Alexandrian bishop, unless he would at once execrate and renounce the writings of Origen, and profess the belief of a corporeal God of human form; and who also maintained incorporeal substance to be unextended,[1] as might be proved from sundry passages, both of his book against Celsus, and that Peri Archon; we say (besides Origen and others of the Greeks (St. Austin amongst the Latins clearly asserted the same; he maintaining in his book De Quantitate Animæ,[2] and elsewhere, concerning the human soul, that being

[9] I suppose he is alluding here to the definition of the soul which occurs Sententiar. par. 1. sect. 18. p. 225: Ἡ ψυχὴ, οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἄϋλος, ἄφθαρτος, ἐν ζωῇ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἐχούσῃ τὸ ζῆν, κεκτημένη τὸ εἶναι, "The soul is a substance without magnitude or matter, imperishable, and possessing its essence in a life vital of itself."

[10] Histor. Ecclesiast. lib. 6. cap. 7. p. 310.

[1] I regret that Dr. Cudworth has not proved this by some passage or other from Origen. I do not deny that the fact is as he states: for he who had derived so many other things from the school of the Platonists might easily imbibe their precepts on the nature of the soul. After a careful perusal and examination however of all that learned men have collected from the writings of Origen, in illustration of his opinion on the soul, I feel by no means relieved of all doubt on this subject. I am aware he calls the soul ἀσώματος or incorporeal: but I am not convinced by this epithet that he divested it of all matter, much less of all extension. For the word is very vague and ambiguous among the ancient Christian authors, as well as among philosophers, and they very often call that incorporeal which at other times is termed corporeal: namely *incorporeal* as respects the grosser bodies of men and animals, but *corporeal* in regard to God, whom most of them held to be abstracted from all body. It is unnecessary to exemplify this by passages.

[2] Extant in tom. 1. opp. Augustini, ed. Benedictor. p. 298. &c. Add his Epistola 166. sect. 4. p. 444. where he explains more clearly the respective senses in which the soul may be called body and incorporeal. In his book De Quantitate Animæ, St. Augustine is disputing from Platonic precepts, to which he frequently ascribes more importance than they deserved, and consequently advances many things which will not

incorporeal, it hath no dimensions of length, breadth and profundity, and is illocabilis, nowhere as in a place. We shall conclude with the testimony of Boetius, who was both a philosopher and a Christian: Quædam sunt (saith he[3]) communes animi conceptiones, per se notæ, apud sapientes tantum; ut incorporalia non esse in loco, "There are certain common conceptions, or notions of the mind, which are known by themselves amongst wise men only; as this for example, that incorporeals are in no place." From whence it is manifest, that the generality of reputed wise men were not formerly of this opinion, quod nusquam est, nihil est, "that what is nowhere, or in no certain place, is nothing;" and that this was not looked upon by them as a common notion, but only as a vulgar error.

By this time we have made it unquestionably evident, that this opinion of incorporeal substance being unextended, indistant, and devoid of magnitude, is no novel or recent thing, nor first started in the scholastic age;[4] but that it was the general persuasion of the most ancient and learned assertors of incorporeal substance, especially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the substance thereof mensurable by yards and poles, as if there were so much of it contained in one room, and so much and no more in another, according to their several dimensions; but that the whole undivided Deity was at once in every part of the world, and consequently nowhere locally after the manner of bodies. But, because this opinion seems so strange and paradoxical, and lies under so great prejudices, we shall in the next place show, how these ancient Incorporealists endeavoured to acquit themselves, in repelling the several efforts and plausibilities made against it. The first whereof is this, that to suppose incorporeal substances unextended and divisible is to make them absolute parvitudes, and by means of that, to render them all (even the Deity itself) contemptible: since they

be admitted by all those who philosophize upon sound and legitimate principles. Whoever therefore wishes to read this book with advantage must separate St. Augustine's own opinion from the arguments by which he supports it.

[3] Dr. Cudworth has quoted this testimony of Boetius from memory, and on that account has not given the exact words. In Boetius' book entitled Quomodo Substantiæ in eo, quod sint, bonæ sint, cum non sint substantialia bona, p. 167. the passage runs thus: Alia (enunciatio) est doctorum tantum, quæ tamen ex talibus communis animi conceptionibus venit, ut est, quæ incorporalia sunt, in loco non esse, et cætera: quæ non vulgus, sed docti comprobant, "There is another proposition of the learned only, which comes however from such common conceptions of the mind, as for example, that incorporeals are not in place, &c. which is admitted not by the vulgar but by the learned." As St. Augustine and Boetius were the common teachers of the Latins in succeeding centuries, it is not difficult to understand therefore from what source this opinion was derived by all the more able and erudite fathers that lived after them.

[4] Hobbes and not a few others besides him ranked this doctrine of unextended natures and of God and the soul being devoid of all extension, among those dogmas which owed their origin to the too great sagacity of the scholastic doctors: in which they were unquestionably mistaken.

must of necessity be either physical minimums, that cannot actually be divided further by reason of their littleness (if there be any such thing) or else mere mathematical points, which are not so much as mentally divisible: so that thousands of these incorporeal substances, or spirits, might dance together at once upon a needle's point. To which it was long since thus replied by Plotinus:* Οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ἀμερὲς ὡς μικρόν· οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ μεριστὸν ἔσται· καὶ οὐ παντὶ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμόσει· οὐδ' ἂν αὐξομένῳ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέσται· ἀλλ' οὐδ' οὕτως ὡς σημεῖον, οὐ γὰρ ἓν σημεῖον ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδ' ὡς ἐφαρμόσει, "God, and all other incorporeal substances, are not so indivisible, as if they were parvitudes or little things, as physical points; for so would they still be mathematically divisible; nor yet as if they were mathematical points neither, which indeed are no bodies nor substances, but only the termini of a line. And neither of these ways could the Deity congruere with the world; nor souls with their respective bodies, so as to be all present with the whole of them."[5] Again, he writeth particularly concerning the Deity thus:† Οὔτε οὕτως ἀμερὲς, ὡς τὸ σμικρώτατον, μέγιστον γὰρ ἁπάντων, οὐ μεγέθει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει·——λεπτέον δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον αὐτὸν, οὐ τῷ ἀδιεξιτήτῳ, ἢ τοῦ μεγέθους, ἢ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπεριλήπτῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, "God is not so indivisible as if he were the smallest or least of things, for he is the greatest of all, not in respect of magnitude, but of power. Moreover, as he is indivisible, so is he also to be acknowledged infinite; not as if he were a magnitude, or a number, which could never be past through, but because his power is incomprehensible." Moreover, the same philosopher condemneth this for a vulgar error, proceeding from sense and imagination, that whatsoever is unextended, and indistant, must therefore needs be little; he affirming, on the contrary, the vulgar to be much mistaken, as to true greatness and littleness:‡ Μέγα νομίζοντες τὸ αἰσθητὸν, ἀποροῦμεν πῶς ἐν μεγάλῳ καὶ τοσούτῳ ἐκείνη ἡ φύσις ἐκτείνεται· τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ λεγόμενον μέγα μικρόν· ὃ δὲ νομίζεται μικρὸν εἶναι μέγα· ἐπεὶ ὅλον ἐπὶ πᾶν τούτου μέρος φθάνει, μᾶλλον δὲ

* Page 656. [Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 13.]

[5] Dr. Cudworth's translation of this passage, it is evident, does not correspond to Plotinus' words, but is a somewhat free interpretation of them, although on the whole sufficiently in accordance with the author's meaning. He has, moreover, not adduced the whole passage, but made several omissions. In order fully to comprehend its force, it will be necessary to ascertain first of all what the ancient philosophers meant by μικρὸν and σημεῖον. Μικρὸν is the *point*, and σημεῖον the *sign* of the Latins. We shall give the definition of each in the words of St. Augustine from his book De Quantitate Animæ, cap. 11. sect. 18. p. 303. tom. 1. opp. "It is called a point when it is in the middle of a figure: but if it is the beginning of a line or lines, or even the end, or simply denotes any thing understood to be without parts and is not in the middle of a figure, it is called a sign. But a point is a mark in the middle of a figure. Consequently every point is also a sign but not every sign a point."

† Page 764. [Ennead 6. lib. 9.] ‡ Page 645. [Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 2.]

τοῦτο πανταχόθεν τοῖς αὐτοῦ μέρεσιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ἰὸν εὑρίσκει αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ πᾶν καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτοῦ, "We commonly, looking upon this sensible world as great, wonder how that (indivisible and unextended) nature of the Deity can every where comply, and be present with it. Whereas that which is vulgarly called great, is indeed little; and that which is thus imagined to be little, is indeed great. Forasmuch as the whole of this diffuseth itself through every part of the other; or rather, this whole corporeal universe, in every one of its parts, findeth that whole and entire, and therefore greater than itself." To the same purpose also Porphyrius:* Τὸ ὄντως ὂν οὔτε μέγα, οὔτε μικρόν ἐστι· (τὸ γὰρ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κυρίως ὄγκου ἴδια) ἐκβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν· καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ μέγιστον καὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐλάχιστον, ταυτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὄν· εἰ καὶ εὑρίσκεται ἅμα ὑπὸ παντὸς μεγίστου, καὶ ὑπὸ παντὸς ἐλαχίστου εὑρισκόμενον· μήτε ἄρα ὡς μέγιστον αὐτὸ ὑπονοήσεις· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπορήσεις, πῶς μέγιστον ὂν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ μειωθὲν, ἢ συσταλέν· μήτε ὡς ἐλάχιστον, εἰ δὲ μή, πάλιν ἀπορήσεις, πῶς ἐλάχιστον ὂν τοῖς μεγίστοις ὄγκοις πάρεστι, μὴ πολλαπλασιαθὲν, ἢ αὐξηθὲν, "The Deity, which is the only true Being, is neither great nor little (forasmuch as great and little properly belong to corporeal bulk or magnitude); but it exceedeth both the greatness of every thing that is great, and the littleness of whatsoever is little (it being more indivisible, and more one with itself, than any thing that is little, and more powerful than any thing that is great); so that it is above both the greatest and the least; it being found all one and the same by every greatest and every smallest thing participating thereof. Wherefore you must neither look upon God as the greatest thing (that is, in a way of quantity) for then you may well doubt, how being the greatest, he can be all of him present with every least thing, neither diminished, nor contracted; nor yet must you look upon him as the least thing neither; for if you do so, then will you be at a loss again, how, being the least thing, he can be present with all the greatest bulks; neither multiplied, nor augmented." In a word, the sum of their answer amounts to this, that an incorporeal unextended Deity is neither a physical point, because this hath distance in it, and is mentally divisible; nor yet a mathematical one, because this, though having neither magnitude nor substance in it, hath, notwithstanding, site and position; a point being, according to Aristotle,[6] a monad having site and position. It is not to be conceived as a parvitude, or very little thing, because then it could not congruere with all the greatest things; nor yet as a great thing, in a way

* Sent. p. 243. [Sect. 36.]

[6] De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 13. Στιγμὴ μονάς ἐστι, θέσιν ἔχουσα. Add Metaphysicor, lib. 13. cap. 12. p. 471. tom. 4. opp. where he explains in what way a point differs from a monad.

of quantity and extension; because then it could not be all of it present to every least thing. Nor does true greatness consist in a way of bulk or magnitude, all magnitude being but little; since there can be no infinite magnitude, and no finite magnitude can have infinite power, as Aristotle before urged. And to conclude, though some, who are far from Atheists, may make themselves merry with that conceit of "thousands of spirits dancing at once upon a needle's point;" and though the Atheists may endeavour to rogue and ridicule all incorporeal substance in that manner, yet does this run upon a clear mistake of the hypothesis, and make nothing at all against it; forasmuch as an unextended substance is neither any parvitude, as is here supposed (because it hath no magnitude at all), nor hath it any place, or site, or local motion, properly belonging to it; and therefore can neither dance upon a needle's point nor any where else.

But in the next place, it is further objected, that what is neither great nor little, what possesses no space, and hath no place nor site amongst bodies, must therefore needs be an absolute nonentity, forasmuch as magnitude or extension are the very essence of being or entity, as such; so that there can be neither substance, nor accident unextended. Now, since whatsoever is extended, is bodily, there can therefore be no other substance, besides body, nor any thing* incorporeal, otherwise than as that word may be taken for a thin and subtle body; in which sense fire was, by some in Aristotle,[7] said to be, *μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον*, and *ἀσωματώτατον*, "the most incorporeal of all the elements;" and Aristotle[8] himself useth the word in the same manner, when he affirmeth, that all philosophers did define the soul by three things, motion, sense, and incorporeity; several of those, there mentioned by him, under-

[7] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 6. tom. 2. opp.

[8] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 7. tom. 2. Were I disposed to be prolix I might here quote a vast number of passages from ancient authors, both Christian and profane, in which the word *ἀσώματος* is used in this sense: but I have already repeatedly produced testimonies of the kind. I shall, however, briefly point out the various senses in which it occurs among the ancient philosophers. In the first place they call that *ἀσώματος* which is imperceptible to the sense, and known and comprehended by the mind alone. This is a frequent meaning with the Platonists, who apply the term to ideas, or the species and forms of things, to the faculties of the mind, and to virtues and perfections; the whole of which, however, although the Platonists speak of them as self-existent natures, are, abstractedly considered, nowhere but in our own minds. Secondly, that is termed *ἀσώματος* which is destitute of form and quality, though in other respects consisting of undigested, rude, and gross matter; in this sense many called *ὕλη incorporeal*, on which subject we have already spoken above. Thirdly, they designated by this name whatever consisted of most slight and subtle particles. Thus many of the ancients asserted fire and air to be incorporeal. Not a few of the early Christian fathers also might be instanced, as St. Basil and others, who, although holding the angels to possess bodies, nevertheless call them *ἀσώματοι*, or incorporeal, in reference, namely, to our own terrestrial and concrete bodies. Lastly, the Platonists in particular apply this word to natures altogether free from bodily concretion, and in no respect susceptible of extension.

standing the soul to be no otherwise incorporeal, than as σῶμα λεπτομερὲς, "a thin and subtle body." In answer to which objection, we may remember, that Plato, in the passage before cited, declareth this to be but a vulgar error, that whatsoever doth not take up space, and is in no place, is nothing. He intimating the original hereof to have sprung from men's adhering too much to those lower faculties of sense and imagination, which are able to conceive nothing, but what is corporeal.[9] And accordingly Plotinus;* Ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις, ᾗ προσέχοντες ἀπιστοῦμεν τοῖς λεγομένοις, λέγει ὅτι ὧδε καὶ ὧδε· ὁ δὲ λόγος τὸ ὧδε καὶ ὧδε φησὶν, οὐκ ἐκταθεῖσαν ὧδε καὶ ὧδε γεγονέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκταθὲν πᾶν αὐτοῦ μετειληφέναι, ὄντος ἀδιαστάτου αὐτοῦ, "Sense indeed, which we attending to, disbelieve these things, tells us of here and there; but reason dictates, that here and there is so to be understood of the Deity, not as if it were extendedly here and there, but because every extended thing, and the several parts of the world, partake every where of that, being indistant and unextended." To the same purpose Porphyrius:† Δεῖ τοίνυν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσι κατακρατοῦντας τῆς ἑκατέρου ἰδιότητος μὴ ἐπαλλάττειν τὰς φύσεις· μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ προσόντα τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, μὴ φαντάζεσται καὶ δοξάζειν περὶ τὸ ἀσώματον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ σωμάτων, ἐν συνηθείᾳ πᾶς· ἐκείνων δὲ μόλις ἐν γνώσει γίνεται. ἀοριστῶν περὶ αὐτὰ, ἕως ἂν ὑπὸ φαντασίας κρατῆται, "We ought therefore, in our disquisitions concerning corporeal and incorporeal beings, to conserve the property of each, and not to confound their natures; but especially to take heed, that our fancy and imagination do not so far impose upon our judgments, as to make us attribute to incorporeals what properly belongeth to bodies only. For we are all accustomed to bodies; but as for incorporeals, scarcely any one reaches to the knowledge of them; men always fluctuating about them, and diffiding them, so long as they are held under the power of their imagination." Where afterwards he propoundeth a form for this, how we should think of incorporeals, so as not to confound their natures with corporeals: Ἐν ἀπείροις μέρεσι τοῦ διαστατοῦ παρὸν ὅλον τὸ ἀδιάστατον, οὔτε μερισθὲν πάρεστι, τῷ μέρει διδὸν μέρος, οὔτε πληθυνθὲν τῷ πλήθει παρέχειν ἑαυτὸ πόλλα πλησιασθὲν· ἀλλ' ὅλον πᾶσί τε τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὀγκωμένου, ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀπληθύντως καὶ ὡς ἓν ἀριθμῷ· τὸ δὲ μερικῶς καὶ διῃρημένως ἀπολάυειν αὐτοῦ, "That the indistant and unextended Deity is the whole of it present in infinite parts of the distant world, neither divided, as applying part to part; nor yet multiplied into many wholes, according to the multiplicity of those things, that partake thereof. But the whole of it (one and

[9] See above, where this passage of Plato is quoted and illustrated with some observations.

* Page 656. † Ἀφ. p. 242.

the same in number) is present to all the parts of the bulky world, and to every one of those many things in it, undividedly and unmultipliedly; that in the mean time partaking thereof dividedly." It was granted therefore by these ancients, that this unextended, and indistant nature of incorporeals is ἀφάνταστον, "a thing altogether unimaginable;" and this was concluded by them to be the only reason, why so many have pronounced it to be impossible, because they attended only to sense and imagination, and made them the only measure of things and truth; it having been accordingly maintained by divers of them (as Porphyrius tells us), that imagination and intellection are but two different names for one and the same thing:* Ὀνόματος διαφορᾶς προστεθείσης τῇ τοῦ νοῦ ὑποστάσει, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας, ἡ γὰρ ἐν λογικῷ ζώῳ φαντασία δέδοκτο αὐτοῖς νόησις, "There is a difference of names only, and no more, betwixt mind and fancy; fancy and imagination, in rational animals, seeming to be the same thing with intellection." But there are many things, which no man can have any phantasm or imagination of, and yet are they, notwithstanding, by all unquestionably acknowledged for entities, or realities; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other faculties in us, which extend beyond fancy and imagination. Reason indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either do, or suffer any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly something; but that whatsoever is unextended, and hath no distant parts one without another, must therefore needs be nothing, is no common notion, but the spurious suggestion of imagination only, and a vulgar error. There need to be no fear at all, lest a Being infinitely wise and powerful, which acts upon the whole world, and all the parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a nonentity, merely for want of bulk and extension; or, because it swells not out into space and distance, as bodies do, therefore vanish into nothing. Nor does active force and power, as such, depend upon bulk and extension; because then whatsoever had the greater bulk, would have the greater activity. There are therefore two kinds of substances in the universe; the first corporeal, which are nothing but ὄγκοι, "bulks," or "tumours," devoid of all self-active power; the second incorporeal, which are ἄογκοι δυνάμεις, "substantial powers, vigours, and activities;" which, though they act upon bulk and extension, yet are themselves unbulky, and devoid of quantity and dimensions; however, they have a certain βάθος in them in another sense,† an "essential profundity," according to this of Simplicius:[10] Μεριστὴ μὲν

* Page 224. Ἀφ. † In Ar. Phys. p. 3.

[10] I suppose Simplicius' meaning to be simply that the nature of what is cognizable to intelligence and reason alone, is difficult of comprehension to us, in the same way as the apostle St. Paul ascribes a certain βάθος to wisdom and the other divine perfections,

ἁπλῶς ἡ σωμάτικὴ οὐσία πᾶσα, ἄλλων ἀλλαχοῦ τῶν μορίων κειμένων· ἀμέρίστος δὲ εἰλικρινῶς ἡ νοερὰ, πολὺ δὲ βάθος ἔχουσα, "All corporeal substance is simply divisible, some parts of it being here and some there; but intellectual substance is indivisible, and without dimensions, though it hath much of depth and profundity in it in another sense." But that there is something ἀφαντάστον, "unimaginable," even in body itself, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely divisible or not, as you must of necessity suppose one or other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of corporeal things themselves according to imagination, is manifest from hence; because, though astronomical reasons assure us, that the sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole earth, yet can we not possibly, for all that, imagine the sun of such a bigness, nor indeed the earth itself half so big, as we know it to be. The reason whereof is, partly because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast bigness at once, as that of either of them; and partly because our sense always representing the sun to us, but ὡς πεδιαῖον, "as of a foot diameter;"[1] and we being accustomed always to imagine the same according to the appearance of sense, are not able to frame any imagination of it, as very much bigger. Wherefore if imagination be not to be trusted, nor made the criterion, or measure of truth, as to sensible things themselves, much less ought it to be as to things insensible. Besides all which the ancient Incorporealists argued after this manner, that it is as difficult for us to conceive a substance, whose duration is unextended or unstretched out in time, into past, present, and future, and therefore without beginning; as that which is unextended as to parts, place or space, in length, breadth, and thickness; yet does reason pronounce, that there must needs be not only a duration without beginning, but also ἄχρονος αἰὼν, a "timeless eternity," or a permanent duration, differing from that successive flux of time (which is one of Plato's[2] γεννητὰ, "things generated," or that had a beginning), this parity of reason is by Plotinus thus insisted on:*[3] Διὸ οὐδ'

Rom. xi. 33. If, as the learned Doctor supposes, he understood any thing else by this term, and intended to denote some natural property of incorporeal things, he would not, if he were alive, be himself able to explain his own meaning to us in clear and perspicuous words.

[1] He imitates the words of Cicero, Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 26. p. 2294. tom. 8. opp. Quid potest esse sole majus? quem mathematici amplius duodeviginti partibus confirmant majorem esse, quam terram: quantulus nobis videtur? mihi quidem quasi pedalis, "What can be greater than the sun? which mathematicians assert to be eighteen times larger than the earth: of what size does it appear to us to be? to me indeed about a foot in diameter."

[2] In Timæo, p. 529. opp.

* Page 669. [Ennead. 6. lib. 5. cap. 11.]

[3] Dr. Cudworth has given a paraphrastic interpretation rather than a translation of these words of Plotinus.

ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀλλὰ παντὸς χρόνου ἔξω, τοῦ μὲν χρόνου σκιδναμένου αἰεὶ πρὸς διάστασιν, τοῦδ' αἰῶνος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μένοντος καὶ κρατοῦντος, καὶ πλείονος ὄντος δυνάμει ἀϊδίῳ, τοῦ ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκοῦντος ἰέναι χρόνου, "For the same reason, that we deny local extension to the Deity, must we also deny temporal distance to the same; and affirm, that God is not in time, but above time,-in eternity. Forasmuch as time is always scattered and, stretched out in length and distance, one moment following after another; but eternity remaineth in the same, without any flux, and yet nevertheless outgoeth time, and transcendeth the flux thereof, though seeming to be stretched and spun out more into length." Now, the reason why we cannot frame a conception of such a timeless eternity, is only because ourselves are essentially involved in time, and accordingly are our conceptions chained, fettered and confined to that narrow and dark dungeon, that ourselves are imprisoned in; notwithstanding which, our freer faculties, assuring us of the existence of a being, which far transcendeth ourselves, to wit, one that is infinitely perfect; we have, by means hereof, μαντείαν τινὰ, "a certain vaticination," of such a standing timeless eternity, as its duration.

But as for that conceit, of immaterial or incorporeal bodies, or that God, and human souls are no otherwise incorporeal than as σῶμα λεπτομερὲς, "a thin and subtle body," such as wind or vapour, air or ether; it is certain that, according to the principles of the most ancient atomic philosophy (before it was atheized) there being no such real quality of subtlety or tenuity (because this is altogether unintelligible) but this difference arising wholly from motion, dividing the insensible parts, and every way agitating the same, together with a certain contexture of those parts; it is not impossible, but that the finest and most subtle body that is, might become as gross, hard, heavy, and opaque, as flesh, earth, stones, lead, or iron; and again, that the grossest of these bodies, by motion, and a different contexture of parts, might not only be crystalized, but also become as thin, soft, and fluid as the finest ether. So that there is no specific difference betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opaque and pellucid, an hard and soft body, but accidental only; and therefore is there no reason why life and understanding should be thought to belong to the one rather than to the other of them. Besides which, the reasons of the ancient Incorporealists (afterwards to be produced) will evince, that the human soul and mind cannot possibly be any body whatsoever, though never so fine, thin, and subtle, whose parts are by motion dividable, and separable from one another.[4]

[4] I am by no means disposed to become the advocate of those who hold souls and spirits to be most subtle bodies; yet I think I may be permitted to express my doubts, whether this argument, borrowed from the atomic philosophy, will effectually silence

But it is further objected against this unextended nature, of incorporeal substances, as they are said to be all in the whole, and all in every part of that body, which they are united into,

them. This sect will perhaps grant it to be the case with natural bodies, that they may be increased or diminished, become gross or thin, according to the different contexture of the particles they are composed of; but will deny the possibility of founding any argument upon this against themselves. For that far different is the nature of celestial and ethereal bodies; which always continue such as they were made at the beginning, and are not subject to any change or assume any other form, but ever remain in the same individual state. Such being the case, the whole controversy will be reduced to this question: Whether it is repugnant to reason and the nature of things, that there should be corporeal natures, that is, consisting of a certain matter, endowed with a certain form, extended and therefore included in a certain space, and lastly, moveable; but at the same time so thin and subtle that they are imperceptible to the senses, can be separated by no force, admit of no increase or diminution, and are destructible by nothing short of infinite power. Those who hold the souls of men, and good as well as evil genii, to be corporeal, see nothing contradictory in this opinion; and in this they have the fellowship and concurrence of an immense host both of ancient and modern philosophers. Whoever supposed God to resemble the nature of fire, or to be a soul pervading the whole universe, or the souls of men to be either igneous or ethereal, and at the same time immortal, or souls to be compounded of the various elements and yet incapable of perishing, all maintained the existence of bodies, or, if you will, a celestial matter of the kind, against which no force whatever is of any avail. And how vast is the multitude of these? I speak not now of the heaven of the Peripatetics which is devoid of all conversion and change, although extended and corporeal. Even those Platonists themselves, who in times past contended with so much zeal for the existence of unextended natures, seem to me to be not very far from this opinion. For one of the tenets of the major part at least of these philosophers is, that a certain body is united with every soul and demon, but much more thin, slight, and fine than our bodies, and bearing a sort of resemblance in its subtlety to fire, light, and ether. The learned Doctor himself seems to lean to the opinion, which was more openly avowed by his friend Dr. Henry More. As this body, according to the doctrine of this sect, perpetually adheres to souls and demons, and is utterly incapable of being separated from them, it is necessarily as immortal, immutable, eternal, and constant as the natures, themselves that are invested with it. Hierocles, Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 213.: Ὁ ἄνθρωπος ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφυοῦς ἀθανάτου σώματος, "Man is a rational soul with a congenerate immortal body." These philosophers, therefore, not only acknowledge bodies, more gross or subtle of their own nature, but also maintain that there is a substance consisting of parts, included in space, extended, in a word, corporeal, and yet at the same time indivisible and perennial, and susceptible of injury from no power short of the divine. And I must frankly confess I do not consider this to belong to that class of opinions which are termed self-contradictory; nor, when I contemplate the infinite power of God, can I perceive any thing to prevent me from supposing that it is possible for him to create natures, in a certain respect corporeal, and yet so continuous and consistent, as not to admit of being changed, dissolved, or dissipated.

But those who deny souls and spirits to be bodies more slight and subtle than our own, will perhaps come into closer collision, and abandon the course pointed out by Dr. Cudworth. They will grant, in the first place, that it is possible for such natures as we have been speaking of to exist; but will then add, that this is by no means the point in dispute, which is simply, Whether spirits and souls are such natures; and that this is utterly impossible, because matter cannot be made to partake of thought and ratiocination. Liberius Fromondus, Philosophiæ Christianæ de Animo, lib. 14. cap. 2. p. 801. thus writes: "It would be necessary to insert into that soul another second soul; because that man discharges the vital functions, and especially those of intellect and will by means of another principle infused into matter." But they do not appear to me to gain much even by this argument. For they themselves acknowledge that the properties and virtues of that celestial and ethereal matter, from which their opponents suppose souls and spirits to be compounded, are wholly unknown to them. By what right therefore do they contend that a thing, the nature of which they are

or act upon; that this is an absolute contradiction and impossibility, because if the whole of the Deity be in this one point of matter, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining, but that must needs be another whole, and nothing the same with the former. In like manner, if the whole human soul be in one part of this organized body, then can there be none at all of it in any other part thereof; and so not the whole in the whole. To which objection the ancient Incorporealists made this twofold reply. First, in way of concession, That this is indeed an absolute contradiction for an extended substance, or body, to be all of it in every one part of that space, which the whole occupieth. Thus Plotinus:* Σώματι ἀδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν, "It is impossible for a body, or extended substance, to be one and the same, all of it in every part of that space, which it possesses; and for every part thereof, to be the same with the whole.† But, secondly, as for an unextended and indistant substance, which hath no parts one without another, it is so far from being a contradiction, that it should be all of it in every part of that body, which it acts upon; that it is impossible it should be otherwise, only a part in a part thereof, so that an equal quantity of both should co-exist together, because this is to suppose an unextended substance to be extended. We say it is contradictious to the nature of that substance, which is supposed to be, ἀμεγέθης, ἄποσος, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερὴς, ἀδιαίρετος, "devoid of magnitude, and of quantity, and of parts indistant, and indivisible;" that it should be otherwise united to, or conjoined with an extended body, than after this way, which is looked upon as such conjuring; namely, that the whole of it should be

ignorant of, cannot become possessed of any particular perfection? While they syllogize in this manner: "Matter can neither reason, nor will, nor understand: human souls and spirits reason, will, and understand: therefore they cannot consist of matter and body;" they erroneously transfer the affections of this gross and terrestrial matter, the chief properties of which we know, to that celestial and aerial matter which is altogether distinct from our own. But it is vicious and illogical to confound things of a different kind, and from those that are more known to infer the nature and character of those that are unknown. If those who dispute about the nature of the soul were to adopt the course I should suggest, they would some of them display greater wisdom and accuracy in their controversies with each other. We are taught by the scriptures that the soul is a nature distinct and separate from all visible body, and at the same time perennial and immortal. Again, the notion of divine holiness and justice, which is implanted by nature herself in the minds of all men, proclaims that it is utterly impossible for the soul to be annihilated with the body. With these two truths we ought to rest content, and to defer the others to that time when, having put off this concrete and grosser body, we shall be made acquainted with the inmost recesses of things. But in our anxiety to know every thing, we measure ourselves by a standard not our own, and task our minds in the vain effort to investigate the internal nature of souls, and yet complain in the same breath that the subject is too abstruse and recondite. In attempts of which kind we are generally found wanting, and act as though we were familiar with the nature and relations of all created things, when scarcely the slightest portion of them is known to us.

* Ennead. 4. lib. 7. p. 460. † [See Beausobre, Hist. du Manich. p. 488.]

present with, and act upon every part thereof. Thus Plotinus:* Οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀλλότριον οὐδὲν, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας φύσεως ἑλκύσας, "This form of doctrine, concerning Incorporeals, is necessarily taken from the thing itself (viz. the nature of them as unextended) and hath nothing in it aliene from that essence, as confounding the corporeal nature therewith." Whatsoever is unextended and indistant, cannot possibly co-exist with an extended substance, point by point, and part by part, but it must of necessity be ὅλον ἓν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀριθμῷ, "All of it, one and the same numerically;" that is (like itself), undividedly, in every part of that which it acts upon. Wherefore the word ὅλον, in this form, when it is said, that the whole Deity is in every part of the world, and the whole soul in every part of the body, is not to be taken in a positive sense, for a whole consisting of parts, one without another, but in a negative only, for μὴ μεμερισμένον, "an whole undivided;" so that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that the Deity is not dividedly in the world, nor the soul dividedly in the body, a part here and a part there; but the Τὸ Θεῖον is πανταχοῦ ὅλον μὴ μεμερισμένον, "every where all of it, undividedly." Thus again Plotinus:† Εἰ οὖν πανταχοῦ θεὸς, οὐχ' οἷόν τε μεμερισμένον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πανταχοῦ αὐτὸς εἴη, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ μέρος, τὸ μὲν ὧδὶ, τὸ δὲ ὧδὶ ἔσται, αὐτὸς οὐχ εἷς ἔτι ἔσται, ὥσπερ εἰ τμηθείη τι μέγεθος εἰς πολλὰ, καὶ τὰ μέρη πάντα, οὐκ ἔτι τὸ ὅλον ἐκεῖνο ἔσται· πρὸς τούτοις δὲ καὶ σῶμα· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀδύνατα, πάλιν ἂν ἀνεφάνη τὸ ἀπιστούμενον, ἐν φύσει ἄνθρώπου, ὁμοῦ θεὸν νομίζειν καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὅλον εἶναι, "If therefore God be everywhere, it cannot possibly be, that he should be so dividedly; because then himself would not be everywhere, but only a part of him here, and a part of him there, throughout the whole world; himself being not one undivided thing. Moreover, this would be all one, as if a magnitude were cut and divided into many parts, every one of which parts could not be that whole magnitude. Lastly, this would be the very same as to make God a body." Now if these things be impossible, then must that so much disbelieved thing (looked upon as such a puzzling griphus, or rather as contradictious nonsense) be an undoubted truth, according to the common notions of mankind, that God is everywhere; to wit, that he is all of him the same whole, undividedly, everywhere. The sum of all is, that though it be an absolute contradiction for a body, or quantum, to be ὁμοῦ πᾶν, "all of it in every part" of that space, which the whole is in; yet it is no contradiction at all for an unextended and indistant being, to be all of it undividedly, in every part of that body it acts upon; but on the

* Page 662. † Ibid.

contrary, it would be flatly contradictious to it to say, that it is only part of it in a part; this being to divide an indivisible thing into parts.

The fourth and last objection against incorporeal and unextended substance is from that illocality and immobility (which will follow thereupon) of human souls, and other finite particular spirits, such as demons or angels; that this is not only itself very absurd, to suppose these finite and particular beings to be thus illocal and immoveable, no where, and every where (from whence it would seem to follow that they might act the whole corporeal universe, or take cognizance of all things therein every where); but also, that this conceit is contradictious to the very principles of religionists themselves, and plainly confuted by the same; they acknowledging universally that human souls (at death) departing out of this body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, called Hades, Hell, or Inferi. Now the latter part of this objection is first to be answered. And this is indeed a thing which the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, were not unaware of; that the vulgarly received tradition, of human souls (after death) going into Hades, might be objected against them. For the satisfying whereof Plotinus suggesteth these two things:* First, Τὸ μὲν εἰς Ἅϊδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ Ἅϊδεῖ τὸ χωρὶς λέγεται, "That if by Hades be meant nothing but τὸ ἀειδὲς, the invisible (as many times it is), then is there no more signified by the soul's going into Hades, than its no longer being vitally united to this earthy body, and but acting apart by itself, and so hath it nothing of place necessarily included in it."[5] Secondly, Εἰ δέ τινα χείρω τόπον· τί θαυμαστόν; ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν οὗ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ κἀκείνη λέγεται ἐκεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντος ἔτι σώματος; ἢ τὸ εἴδωλον εἰ μὴ ἀποσπασθείη, πῶς οὐκ ἐκεῖ οὗ τὸ εἴδωλον, "But if by Hades be understood a certain worser place (as sometimes it also is), what wonder is this? since now where our body is, there in the same place is our soul said to be also? But you will reply, how can this be, when there is now no longer any body left? We answer, that if the idol of the soul be not quite separated from

* Ennead. lib. 4. [Cap. 16. p. 659.]

[5] This version is manifestly a very free and diffuse exposition of a few words of Plotinus; I consider however that Dr. Cudworth has expressed the philosopher's general meaning, although the whole of what is here given is by no means inculcated in the passage from which these words are extracted. In translating the passage which follows also he has taken greater liberty than the words will bear, and yet in my opinion has advanced nothing contrary to the doctrine of Plotinus. This author belongs to that class, whose words it is sometimes necessary not merely to translate but to explain in different and much more copious language, in order to render their real meaning clear and manifest. Which course his interpreter Marsilius Ficinus has very often neglected, and his version on that account is in many places extremely obscure and intricate, so as to be intelligible to those alone who are conversant with the discipline and diction of the Platonists.

it, why should not the soul itself be said to be there also, where its idol is?" Where, by the idol of the soul, Plotinus seems to mean an airy or spirituous body, quickened and vitalized by the soul, adhering to it after death. But when the same philosopher supposes this very idol of the soul to be also separable from it, and that so as to subsist apart by itself too, this going alone into Hades, or the worser place, whilst that liveth only in the intelligible world (where there is no place or distance), lodged in the naked Deity, having nothing at all of body hanging about it, and being now not a part but the whole, and so situate neither here nor there; in this high flight of his, he is at once both absurdly paradoxical, in dividing the life of the soul as it were into two, and forgot the doctrine of his own school,[6] which, as himself elsewhere intimateth, was this:[7] Τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν τόδε

[6] What Dr. Cudworth here reprehends in Plotinus, and considers to be foreign to the doctrine of the Platonic school, is contained in these words of his which immediately follow the part here quoted: Εἰ δὲ παντελῶς λύσειε φιλοσοφία καὶ ἀπέλθοιτο εἴδωλον εἰς τὸν χείρω τόπον μόνον, αὐτὴ δὲ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, οὐδενὸς ἐξυρημένου αὐτῆς, "But if philosophy should altogether set it free, the idol alone goes into a worse place; but the soul itself lives purely in the intelligible world, nothing being then taken out of it." But if I am not completely mistaken, Dr. Cudworth has here misrepresented the opinions of the ancients, especially the Platonists, on the image or idol of the soul, and is wrong in asserting that Plotinus forgot the doctrine of his own school, and that Porphyry therefore deserted his master. In my judgment Plotinus does not offend against the precepts of his sect, and Porphyry, so far from despising, strictly follows the discipline of his master. This I hope will be made manifest from what we shall observe below on this recondite dogma of the Platonists, a great portion of which was transferred to the Christians. But any error our learned author may happen to have committed here, is not to be imputed to him as a crime: for the obscurity of the Platonists is so great, and their subtleties so refined and abstruse, that even the most perspicacious may fail in exploring them, and before Dr. Cudworth those have frequently erred in expounding this dogma, who affected to appear the principal masters of the Platonic discipline: a fact which might be proved, if necessary, by the example of Ficinus and others.

[7] In this passage Plotinus does not intimate, as Dr. Cudworth here states, that the whole of the Platonic school held this among their precepts: that no soul is ever without body; but merely that τινὲς, some of them, maintained it. The soul of the world, he informs us, is not said to quit its body, as our soul is said to abandon our body: Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἡ ἡμετέρη λέγεται καταλείπειν τὸ σῶμα, "For it (the soul of the world) is not said to quit its body in the same way as ours." After which he subjoins: Καίτοι τινὲς φασὶ τόδε μὲν σῶμα καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι, "Although some say it will quit this body, but yet not be altogether out of body." If these words therefore be considered absolutely, the Platonists held two opinions on this subject. For while some supposed the soul on its departure from the body to be divested of all body whatever, others on the contrary maintained that some body always remains connected with the soul, notwithstanding its having put off this gross and earthy body, which is compounded of the elements of physical things. Plotinus himself appears disposed to assent to neither side: and yet whoever puts such a construction upon his words will in my opinion deviate from their meaning. The whole of the Platonists were agreed that the soul always possesses a certain celestial body, and that it is invested with such body when it descends into this concrete body, which it again takes away on its departure from it. What, then, does the philosopher mean? He seems to me to be speaking of that body alone which philosophers called εἴδωλον, when he tells us that some supposed the soul to be at no time entirely separated and freed from body. On this body, the nature of which we shall explain by and by, these philosophers were at variance with each other. Some main-

μὲν σῶμα καταλείψειν, οὐ πάντη δὲ ἔξω σώματος ἔσεσθαι,* "That our soul, though it shall quit this body, yet shall it never be disunited from all body." Wherefore Porphyrius answering the same objection, though he were otherwise much addicted to Plotinus, and here uses his language too, yet does he in this depart from him, adhering to the ancient Pythagoric tradition; which, as will appear afterwards, was this, "That human souls are always united to some body or other."† Ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς εἶναι ψυχῇ ἐστὶν, οὐ τὸ γῆς ἐπιβαίνειν, ὡς τὰ σώματα· τὸ δὲ προεστάναι σώματος, ὃ γῆς ἐπιβαίνει· οὕτω καὶ ἐν ᾅδου εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῇ, ὅταν προεστήκει εἰδώλου, φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, σκότει δὲ τὴν ὑπόστασιν κεκτημένου· ὥστε εἰ ὁ Ἅιδης ὑπόγειός ἐστι τόπος σκοτεινὸς, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾅδου γίγνεται ἐφελκομένη τὸ εἴδωλον· ἐξελθούσῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος, τὸ Πνεῦμα συνομαρτεῖ, ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν συνελέξατο· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔνυγρον, ἄχρι τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν· οὐχ ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία μεταβαίνει τόπους, καὶ ἐν τόποις γίνεται· ἀλλ' ὅτι τῶν πεφυκότων σωμάτων, τόπους μεταβαίνειν, σχέσεις ἀναδέχεται, "As the soul's being here upon earth (saith he), is not its moving up and down upon it, after the manner of bodies, but its presiding over a body, which moveth upon the earth; so is its being in Hades nothing but its presiding over that idol, or enlivened vaporous body, whose nature it is to be in a place, and which is of a dark subsistence. Wherefore, if Hades be taken for a subterraneous and dark place, yet may the soul nevertheless be said to go into Hades, because when it quits this gross earthy body, a more spirituous and subtle body, collected from the spheres (or elements) doth still accompany it. Which spirit being moist and heavy, and naturally descending to the subterraneous places, the soul itself may be said in this sense to go under the earth also with it, not as if the substance thereof passed from one place to another, but because of its relation and vital union to a body which does so." Where Porphyrius addeth, contrary to the sense of Plotinus: "That the soul is never quite naked of all body, but hath always some body or other joined with it suitable and agreeable to its own present disposition (either a purer or impurer one). But that at its first quitting this gross earthy body, the spirituous body, which accompanieth it (as its vehicle), must needs go away fouled and incrassated with the gross vapours and steams thereof, till the soul afterwards by degrees purging itself, this becometh at length a dry splendour, which hath no misty obscurity, nor casteth any shadow."

tained that it can be completely put off, and by virtue of philosophy thoroughly expelled from the soul; while others denied this to be possible, and consequently supposed that the soul is never ἔξω σώματος, but is always associated with some form or other of this gross and earthy body.

* Ennead. 4. lib. 3. cap. 4. [Page 374.] † Ἀφ. p. 235.

But because all this doctrine of the ancient Incorporealists, concerning the human soul's being always (after death) united to some body or other, is more fully declared by Philoponus than by any other that we have yet met withal, we shall here excerp some passages out of him about it. First, therefore, he declareth this for his own opinion, agreeable to the sense of the best philosophers:* Τὴν μὲν λογικὴν χωριστὴν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον, τούτου μὲν χωριστὴν, ἄλλου μέντοι τινὸς σώματος ἀχώριστον, λέγω δὲ τοῦ Πνευματικοῦ, ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς δόξα, ὡς δείξομεν, "That the rational soul, as to its energy, is separable from all body; but the irrational part, or life thereof, is separable only from this gross body, and not from all body whatsoever, but hath (after death) a spirituous or airy body, in which it acteth; this I say is a true opinion, as shall be afterwards proved by us." And again: Ἡ δὲ ἄλογος οὐκ ἔτι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ἐπιδιαμένει γὰρ καὶ μετὰ ἔξοδον τὴν ἐκ τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς· Ὄχημα καὶ Ὑποκείμενον ἔχουσα τὸ πνευματικὸν σῶμα· ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἔστι μὲν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων, λέγεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος τοῦ ἀέρος· ὥσπερ καὶ τοῦτο γήϊνον λέγεται ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζοντος, "The irrational life of the soul hath not all its being in this gross earthy body, but remaineth after the soul's departure out of it, having for its vehicle and subject, the spirituous body; which itself is also compounded out of the four elements, but receiveth its denomination from the predominant part, to wit, air; as this gross body of ours is called earthy from what is most predominant therein." Thus do we see that, according to Philoponus, the human soul, after death, does not merely exercise its rational powers, and think only of metaphysical and mathematical notions, abstract things, which are neither in time nor place, but exerciseth also its lower sensitive and irrational faculties, which it could not possibly do, were it not then vitally united to some body; and this body then accompanying the soul he calls pneumatical, that is (not spiritual in the scripture sense, but) spirituous, vaporous, or airy. Let us therefore, in the next place, see what rational account Philoponus can give of this doctrine of the ancients, and of his own opinion agreeably thereunto:* Ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἡμετέρα, μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τούτου ἔξοδον, ὁμολογεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποδείκνυται, εἰς ᾅδου ἀφικνεῖσθαι, καὶ ποινὰς ἐκεῖ τῶν οὐ καλῶς βεβιωμένων παρέχειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν φροντίζει ἡ πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι· διὸ οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐξολισθήσασα, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτῇ διὰ γλυκυθυμίαν ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρθῆναι δι' ἀλγύνσεως αὐτῇ γενήσεται· κάνταῦθα γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἰάματα· διὰ τοῦτο ἀλγύνεται ἡ καθαιρομένη ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ γὴν δικαιωτηρίοις διὰ κολάσεως. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἀσώματος ἡ ψυχὴ,

* Procem. in Aristot. De An. † Ibid.

ἀδύνατον αὐτὴν παθεῖν· πῶς οὖν κολάζεται; ἀνάγκη οὖν πᾶσα σῶμά τι αὐτῆς ἐξῃφθαι, ὃ διακρινόμενον ἀμέτρως ἢ συγκρινόμενον, ὑπὸ ψύξεως ἢ καύσεως ἀμέτρου, ἀλγύνει τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν συμπάθειαν· ποῖον οὖν σῶμά ἐστι τὸ ἐξημμένον αὐτῆς; οὐ δήπου τοῦτο· ἀνελύθη γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, τὸ Πνευματικὸν, ὃ λέγομεν ἐν τούτῳ οὖν εἰσὶ πάντως διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "Our human soul (in those who are not purged and cleansed in this life) after its departure out of this body, is acknowledged, or rather demonstrated, to go into Hades, there to receive punishment for its evil actions past. For providence does not only take care of our being, but also of our well being. Therefore is the soul, though lapsed into a preternatural state, yet not neglected by providence, but hath a convenient care taken of it, in order to its recovery. And since sinning had its original from the desire of pleasure, it must of necessity be cured by pain: for here also contraries are the cures of contraries. Therefore the soul being to be purged, is punished and pained in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, in order to its amendment. But if the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. How then can it be punished? There must of necessity be some body joined with it; which being immoderately constringed or agitated, concreted or secreted, and discordantly moved by heat and cold, or the like, may make the soul sensible of pain, by reason of sympathy, as it is here in this life. What body therefore is that which is then conjoined with the soul, after the dissolution of that earthy body into its elements? Certainly it can be no other than this pneumatical or spirituous body, which we now speak of; for in this are seated, as their subject, the irascible and concupiscible passions, and they are inseparable from the same; nor could they be in the soul disunited from all body: and that soul, which is freed from these, would be forthwith freed from generation; nor would it be concerned in those subterraneous judicatories and prisons, but be carried up aloft to the higher celestial regions," &c. After which he endeavours further to confirm this opinion from the vulgar phenomena: Δῆλον δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὅτι τί ἐστι τὸ πνευματικον σῶμα, καὶ τούτου ἀχώριστα θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐνεργείας· πόθεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τάφοις τὰ σκιοειδῆ φαίνονται φαντάσματα; οὐ γὰρ δήγε ἡ ψυχὴ ἐσχημάτισται, ἢ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁρατὴ· ἀλλὰ φασὶ τὰς ἀκαθάρτους ψυχὰς, μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον τούτου τοῦ σώματος πλανᾶσθαι ἐπί τινα χρόνον μετὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ τοῦτο παραδεικνῦναι περὶ τοὺς τάφους· διὸ φροντιστέον εὐζωΐας· ὑπὸ τούτου γὰρ φασὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, παχυνθέντος ἐκ μοχθηρᾶς διαίτης, κατατπᾶσθαι περὶ τὰ πάθη τὴν ψυχὴν, "Furthermore, that there is such a pneumatical (spirituous, vaporous, or airy) body, which accompanieth souls unpurged after death, is evident also from the phenomena them-

selves. For what account can otherwise be given of those spectres and phantoms which appear shadow-like about graves or sepulchres, since the soul itself is neither of any figure, nor yet at all visible? Wherefore these ancients say, that impure souls, after their departure out of this body, wander here, up and down, for a certain space, in their spirituous, vaporous, and airy body, appearing about sepulchres, and haunting their former habitations. For which cause there is great reason that we should take care of living well, as also of abstaining from a fouler and grosser diet; these ancients telling us likewise, that this spirituous body of ours, being fouled and incrassated by evil diet, is apt to render the soul, in this life also, more obnoxious to the disturbances of passions." And here Philoponus goes on to gratify us with a further account of some other of the opinions of these ancients, concerning this spirituous or airy body, accompanying the soul after death: Ἔχει γάρ τι καὶ αὐτό φασι τῆς φυτικῆς ζωῆς, καὶ γὰρ τρέφεσθαι· τρέφεσθαι δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ὡς τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀτμῶν οὐ διὰ μορίων, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλου, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ὡς οἱ σπόγγοι, δέχονται τοὺς ἀτμούς· διὰ τοῦτο φροντίζουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῆς λεπτοτέρας διαίτης καὶ ξηροτέρας, διὰ τὸ μὴ παχύνεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα, ἀλλὰ λεπτύνεσθαι· πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς καθαρμούς φασι παραλαμβάνειν· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι πλύνεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ καθαρμοῖς διὰ τῶν ἀτμῶν· διὰ γὰρ ἀτμῶν τινῶν τρέφεται, τινῶν δὲ καθαίρεται· οὐ διωργανῶσθαι δέ φασιν αὐτό, ἀλλ' ὅλον δι' ὅλου ἐνεργεῖν, κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διὸ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ, ὅτι ἡ κυρίως αἴσθησις μία, καὶ τὸ κυρίως αἰσθητήριον ἕν, "They further add, that there is something of the plantal and plastic life also, exercised by the soul, in those spirituous or airy bodies after death; they being nourished too, though not after the same manner, as these gross earthy bodies of ours are here, but by vapours; and that not by parts or organs, but throughout the whole of them (as sponges), they imbibing every where those vapours. For which cause they, who are wise, will in this life also take care of using a thinner and drier diet, that so that spirituous body (which we have also at this present time within our grosser body) may not be clogged and incrassated, but attenuated. Over and above which, those ancients made use of catharms, or purgations, to the same end and purpose also: for as this earthy body is washed by water, so is that spirituous body cleansed by cathartic vapours; some of these vapours being nutritive, others purgative. Moreover, these ancients further declared concerning this spirituous body, that it was not organized, but did the whole of it, in every part throughout, exercise all functions of sense, the soul, hearing, and seeing, and perceiving all sensibles by it every where. For which cause, Aristotle himself affirmeth, in his Metaphysics, that there is properly but

one sense, and but one sensory; he, by this one sensory, meaning the spirit, or subtle airy body, in which the sensitive power doth all of it, through the whole, immediately apprehend all variety of sensibles. And if it be demanded, how it comes then to pass, that this spirit appears organized in sepulchres, and most commonly of human form, but sometimes in the form of some other animals? to this those ancients replied, That their appearing so frequently in human form proceedeth from their being incrassated with evil diet, and then, as it were, stamped upon with the form of this exterior ambient body in which they are, as crystal is formed and coloured like to those things which it is fastened in, or reflects the image of them; and that their having sometimes other different forms proceedeth from the fantastic power of the soul itself, which can at pleasure transform this spirituous body into any shape; for being airy, when it is condensed and fixed, it becometh visible, and again invisible, and vanishing out of sight when it is expanded and rarified."

Now, from these passages cited out of Philoponus, it further appeareth, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also here in this life, before death, as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it when that other gross earthly part of the body is, by death, put off, as an outer garment. And some have been inclinable to think (by reason of certain historic phenomena[8]) these two to be things so distinct, that it is not impossible for this spirituous body, together with the soul, to be

[8] Thus some are recorded to have been seen in two places at the same time; others to have been a long time inanimate, and afterwards on being restored to themselves to have declared that in the meanwhile they had seen most wonderful and extraordinary things. These examples led well-meaning but over-credulous persons to believe that the human soul, clothed in its own interior body, is for a certain time absent from this body even before death. That not a few traces of these opinions, which are here cited from the Platonists, still remain among Christians, especially the Roman Catholics, must be known to every one acquainted with the popular opinions and superstitions. The Platonic philosophy, indeed, which was approved by the ancient Christians, has been abandoned, and another substituted in its place: but the dogmas and conclusions derived from it have been retained by most men in all their pristine integrity. And any one conversant with the ancient philosophy, might write a long and copious commentary upon *the relics of the Platonic philosophy among Christians*. Thus happens it with mortals. The primary and fundamental doctrines of a sect are very often repudiated by those who preside over communities; while they either are unwilling to interfere with the consequences and institutions that proceed from them, owing to their ignorance of their origin, or are unable to do so, because the people is not easily prevailed upon to abandon inveterate customs. In the course of time, many opinions and rites are held sacred, which those who are addicted to them would hold in far different estimation, if they were thoroughly aware of their origin.

locally separated from the other grosser body, for some time before death, and without it. And indeed thus much cannot be denied, that our soul acteth not immediately only upon bones, flesh, brains, and other such like gross parts of the body, but first, and chiefly upon the animal spirits, as the immediate instruments of sense and fancy, and that, by whose vigour and activity the other heavy and unwieldy bulk of the body is so nimbly moved. And therefore we know no reason but we may assent here to that of Porphyrius:[9] Τὸ αἷμα νομὴ καὶ τροφή ἐστι τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς, "That the blood is the food and nourishment of the spirit, (that is, that subtle body called the 'animal spirits') and that this spirit is the vehicle of the soul, or the more immediate seat of life."

Nevertheless, the same Philoponus there addeth, that according to these ancients, besides the terrestrial body, and this spirituous and airy body too, there is yet a third kind of body, of a higher rank than either of the former, (peculiarly belonging to such souls after death, as are purged and cleansed from corporeal affections, lusts and passions) called by them, σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, and οὐράνιον, and αἰθέριον, &c. a "luciform," and "celestial," and "ethereal body." The soul (saith he) continueth either in the terrestrial or the aerial body, so long, ἕως ἑαυτὴν καθάρασα ἀνενεχθῇ, τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλαγεῖσα· τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀποτίθεται μετὰ τούτου τοῦ ὀχήματος, τοῦ πνεύματος λέγω· εἶναι δέ τι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄλλο τι ἀϊδίως αὐτῆς ἐξημμένον, σῶμα οὐράνιον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀίδιον, ὅ φασιν Αὐγοειδὲς ἢ Ἀστροειδὲς· τῶν γὰρ ἐγκοσμίων οὖσαν ἀνάγκη πάντως ἔχειν τινὰ κλῆρον, ὃν διοικεῖ, μέρος ὄντα τοῦ κοσμοῦ· καὶ εἰ ἀεικίνητός ἐστι, καὶ δεῖ αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖν, δεῖ ἔχειν ἀϊδίως ἐξημμένον τὸ σῶμα, ὃ ἀεὶ ζωοποιήσει· διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τὸ αὐγοειδές φασι σῶμα αὐτὴν ἀεὶ ἔχειν, "until that having purged itself, it be carried aloft and freed from generation. And then doth it put off both the irascible and concupiscible passions at once, together with this second vehicle, or body, which we call spirituous. Wherefore these ancients say, that there is another heavenly body always conjoined with the soul, and eternal, which they call luciform, and star-like: for it being a mundane thing, must of necessity have some part of the world as a province allotted to it, which it may administer. And since it is always moveable, and ought

[9] Where this precept of Porphyry's is to be met with I leave to others to discover, having in vain sought for it in those books wherein he discourses on the soul and the things pertaining to it. It is so much at variance, however, with his opinions, as we find certain axioms in his book, De Antro Nympharum, which are closely allied to it. Thus p. 257. he tells us that some souls "delight in blood and in the moist juices:" Αἷμα μὲν οὖν ταύταις καὶ ὁ διυγρὸς γόνος φίλος. In another place, p. 259. Δι' αἵματος, he says, καὶ ἐξ αἱμάτων ἡ σαρκογονία· καὶ χιτών γε τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ, ὃ ἠμφίεσται, "By means of the blood and from blood flesh is produced: and the body is the vestment of the soul, with which it is clothed."

always to act, it must have a body eternally conjoined with it, which it may always enliven. And for these causes do they affirm the soul always to have a luciform body." Which lucid and ethereal body of the soul is a thing often mentioned by other writers also: as Proclus, in his commentary upon the Timæus:* Καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς ἐξήρτηταί τι τοιοῦτον ὄχημα αἰθέριον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν· ἐμβιβάσαι γοῦν εἰς ὄχημα καὶ αὐτὴν φησὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν· καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων ἀϊδίοις καὶ εὐκινήτοις χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν, "The human soul hath also (saith he) such an ethereal vehicle belonging to it, as Plato himself intimates, when he affirmeth the Demiurgus at first to have placed it in a chariot. For of necessity every soul, before this mortal body, must have an eternal and easily moveable body, it being essential to it to move." And elsewhere the same Proclus:† Ἄνω μένοντες οὐδὲν δεόμεθα τούτων τῶν μεριστῶν ὀργάνων· ἃ ἡμῖν συνήρτηται κατελθοῦσιν εἰς γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ τὸ ὄχημα τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς, πάσας ἔχων ἡνωμένας τὰς αἰσθήσεις, "Whilst we remain above we have no need of these divided organs, which now we have descending into generation; but the uniform, lucid, or splendid vehicle is sufficient, this having all senses united together in it." Which doctrine of the unorganized, luciform, and spirituous vehicles seems to have been derived from Plato, he, in his Epinomis, writing thus concerning a good and wise man after death:[10] Ὃν καὶ διϊσχυρίζομαι παίζων καὶ σπουδάζων ἅμα, ἐάνπερ θανάτῳ, τὴν αὐτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, μήτε μεθέξειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε, καθάπερ νῦν, αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς μοίρας μετειληφότα μόνου, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι, "Of whom, whether I be in jest or earnest, I constantly affirm, that when dying he shall yield to fate, he shall no longer have this variety of senses, which now we have, but one uniform body, and live a happy life." Moreover, Hierocles[1] much insisteth upon this: Αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα, this "luciform" and "ethereal body," ὃ καὶ

* Page 290. † Page 164.

[10] In these words of Plato, however, which occur p. 705. opp. I find no clear trace of the Platonic doctrine on the shining body of the soul: on the contrary, I consider them to prove nothing beyond this, that in Plato's opinion wise men will be freed after death from this grosser earthy body, and will no longer be happy by means of the senses, but in a much more simple way. For when Plato affirms that a wise man, after his departure from this life "will become partaker μιᾶς μοίρας, of one lot, and be made one out of many," I do not think it follows from this that he is to have a splendid and luciform body when he has been emancipated from the thraldom of this earthy one. Dr. Cudworth indeed, to give some colour to his own opinion, has rendered the words μιᾶς μοίρας, "one uniform body:" but by doing so, he interprets Plato according to his own sense, rather than translates him: not to mention that critics and philologists of the highest eminence, not only modern but ancient, maintain by no contemptible arguments, that the dialogue entitled Epinomis, was not written by Plato, but by some one of his disciples. Consult the Dissertation of the Abbé Sallier on this subject, Histoire de l'Academie des Inscriptions et de Belles Lettres, tom. 3. p. 143.

[1] Comm. in Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina, p. 214. 215.

ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα οἱ χρησμοὶ καλοῦσι, "which also (saith he) the oracles call the thin and subtle vehicle or chariot of the soul;" he meaning, doubtless, by these oracles, the magical or Chaldaic oracles before mentioned. And amongst those now extant under that title, there seems to be a clear acknowledgment of these two vehicula of the soul, or interior induments thereof; the spirituous and the luciform body, the latter of which is there enigmatically called Ἐπίπεδον, or a plain superficies, in these words:[2] Μὴ Πνεῦμα μολύνῃς, μηδὲ βαθύνῃς τὸ Ἐπίπεδον, "Take care not to defile or contaminate the spirit; nor to make the plain superficies deep." For thus Psellus glosseth upon that oracle: Δύο χιτῶνας ἐπενδύουσι τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Χαλδαῖοι· καὶ τὸν μὲν Πνευματικὸν ὠνόμασαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐξυφανθέντα αὐτῇ· τὸν δὲ Αὐγοειδῆ, λεπτὸν καὶ ἀναφῆ, ὅνπερ Ἐπίπεδον, "The Chaldaic philosophers bestow upon the soul two interior tunicles or vestments, the one of which they call pneumatical, or the spirituous body, which is weaved out, as it were, to it, and compounded of the gross sensible body, (it being the more thin and subtle part thereof,) the other the luciform vestment of the soul, pure and pellucid, and this is that which is here called the plain superficies." Which, saith Pletho[3] is not so to be understood, as if it had not three dimensions (forasmuch as it is a body also) but only to denote the subtlety and tenuity thereof. Wherefore, when the aforesaid Hierocles[4] also calls this luciform and ethereal body, τὸ Πνευματικὸν Ὄχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, "the spiritual vehicle of the rational soul," he takes not the word πνευματικὸν, in that sense, wherein it is used by Philoponus, and others; as if he intended to confound this ethereal body with that other spirituous or airy body, and to make but one of them, but rather styles it spiritual, in a higher sense, (and which cometh near to that of the Scripture) as being a body more suitable and cognate with that highest and divinest part of the

[2] Oracul. Zoroastr. sect. 10. v. 274. p. 394. ed. Clerici.

[3] Comm. in hoc Oracul. Whether Psellus, however, has correctly expounded this oracle or not, is not apparent. For the obscurity of most of those called Chaldaic oracles is so great, that no wise and discreet man can decide with any certainty as to their sense: nor ought we always to put faith in the junior Platonists, who are accustomed rashly to accommodate many things to the principles of their own philosophy, which are altogether foreign to them. If it be proper to hazard a conjecture, I should suppose the words πνεῦμα and ἐπίπεδον in this oracle to be synonymous, and merely two names of one and the same thing. For I find no mention of a twofold body of the soul in other parts of these oracles: neither, as will be made appear presently, did all the Platonic philosophers maintain such a doctrine.

[4] Comm. in Aurea Carmina, p. 222. Ταῦτα γὰρ ἰδίως καθαίροντα καὶ τελειοῦντα τὸ πνευματικὸν ὄχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, τῆς μὲν ὑλικῆς συζωΐας αὐτὸ χωρίζει, "For these properly purge and perfect the spiritual vehicle of the rational soul, and separate it from all association of matter." The learned Doctor justly observes that the word πνευματικὸς is not taken by Hierocles in the sense in which it is used by Philoponus and other Platonists. For Hierocles seems to have belonged to those Platonists who ascribed but one body to the soul.

soul, mind, or reason, than the other terrestrial body is (which, upon that account is called also, by the same Hierocles,[5] as well as it is by St. Paul, σῶμα ψυχικὸν, "the animal or natural body." So that this spiritual body of Hierocles is not the airy, but the ethereal body, and the same with Synesius'[6] θεοπέσιον σῶμα, "his divine body." And that this distinction of two interior vehicles or tunicles of the soul, besides that outer vestment of the terrestrial body, (styled in Plato τὸ ὀστρεῶδες, the "crustaceous," or "ostraceous body") is not a mere figment of the latter Platonists since Christianity, but a tradition derived down from antiquity, appeareth plainly from Virgil, in his sixth Æneid, where, though not commonly understood,[7] he writeth first of the spirituous, or airy body, in which unpurged souls receive punishment after death, thus:

> Quin et supremo cum lumine vita reliquit,
> Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes
> Corporeæ excedunt pestes; penitusque necesse est
> Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
> Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
> Supplicia expendunt; aliæ panduntur inanes
> Suspensæ ad ventos: aliis sub gurgite vasto
> Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.

And then again of the other pure ethereal and fiery body, in this manner:

> Donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
> Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
> Æthereum sensum, atque auraï simplicis ignem.

Now, as it was before observed, that the ancient assertors of the soul's immortality, supposing it to have, besides this ter-

[5] Ibid. p. 214. Λείπεται δ οὖν ἡ τοῦ ΨΥΧΙΚΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ κάθαρσις, "There remains therefore the purgation of the animal soul." The passage of St. Paul occurs 1 Cor. xv. 44. It is very probable that Hierocles, who unquestionably had read the divine books, borrowed this word from St. Paul: as he is considered by learned men to have transferred many moral precepts from the epistles of the divine writers into his own commentary. But to the rest of the Platonists who were not so conversant with the books and doctrines of the Christians as Hierocles, this style of language is unknown.

[6] He means no other passage of Synesius than the following, which occurs in his book, De Insomniis, p. 140. opp. "Ὑλης γὰρ σκύβαλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ θεσπέσιον σῶμα," "For the divine body cannot be the dregs and refuse of matter." I shall have an opportunity below of making an observation or two upon the opinion put forth in this passage of Synesius.

[7] And yet some of Virgil's interpreters very closely approach the learned Doctor's exposition of this passage. Also Renat. Vallinus, Not. ad Boëthium de Consolat. Philosoph. p. 62. interprets Virgil's *ethereal sense* of the celestial body of the soul. For my part, however, I do not hesitate to dissent from these learned men in reference to this passage, and consider the dogma contained in it to be drawn, not from the secret recesses of the ancient philosophy, but from the opinions of the vulgar. I shall state my own opinion by and by.

restrial body, another spirituous or airy body, conceived this not only to accompany the soul after death, but also to hang about it here in this life, as its interior vest or tunicle; (they probably meaning hereby the same with that which is commonly called the animal spirits, diffused from the brain, by the nerves, throughout this whole body[8]) in like manner it is certain, that many of them supposing the soul, besides those two forementioned, to have yet a third luciform, or ethereal body, conceived this in like manner to adhere to it even in this mortal life too, as its inmost clothing or tunicle; yet, so as that they acknowledged the force thereof to be very much weakened and abated, and its splendour altogether obscured by the heavy weight and gross steams or vapours of the terrestrial body. Thus Suidas, upon the word Αὐγοειδὴς tells us out of Isidore, ὡς ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ Αὐγοειδὲς Ὄχημα, λεγόμενον ἀστροειδές τε καὶ ἀΐδιον· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα τῷδε ἀποκέκλεισται ἐνίοις μὲν εἴσω τῆς κεφαλῆς, "That according to some philosophers, the soul hath a certain luciform vehicle, called also star or sun-like, and eternal; which luciform body is now shut up within this terrestrial body (as a light in a dark lanthorn) it being supposed by some of them to be included within the head," &c. With which agreeth Hierocles:[9] Ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ἡμῶν σώματι, τὸ Αὐγοειδὲς ἔγκειται, προσπνέον τῷ ἀψύχῳ σώματι ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν αὐτοῦ συνέχον, "The splendid or luciform body, lieth in this mortal body of ours, continually inspiring it with life, and containing the harmony thereof." The ground of which opinion was, because these philosophers generally conceived the human soul to have pre-existed before it came into this earthly body, and that either from eternity, or else from the first beginning of the world's creation; and being never without a body, and then in a perfect state, to have had a lucid and ethereal body, either co-eternal, or co-eve with it (though in order of nature junior to it) as its chariot or vehicle; which being incorruptible, did always inseparably adhere to the soul, in its after-lapses and descents, into an aerial first, and then a terrestrial body; this

[8] Nearly the same opinion as the one here put forth by Dr. Cudworth on the ethereal body of the soul, is entertained by Renat. Vallinus, Ad Boëthium de Consol. Philosoph. p. 62. But long before them the illustrious Galen, De Dogmat. Platon. et Hippocratis, lib. 7. cap. 6. p. 1037. tom. 1. opp. says he considers it very probable that the spirit contained in the ventricles of the brain is the first primary seat and instrument of the soul." [It has recently been maintained by Bishop Berkeley that the animal spirits, the fire of the soul, are the vehicle and instrument of God himself. See Biblioth. Raisonnée, tom. 35. par. 1. p. 49. &c.] Neither was Proclus, if we are to believe Marsil. Ficinus, Comment. in Platon. p. 799. far from entertaining the same view. "The soul," says he, "carries with it something visible, that is, a certain vestment or covering, either air, or compounded of the *vapours* and *spirits* of its own body, as is supposed by Proclus." But few, I imagine, of those who are familiar with the dogmas of the Platonists will concur in this opinion.

[9] Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 214. ed. Needhami.

being, as it were, the vinculum of union betwixt the soul and them. Thus Pletho declares their sense:[10] Διὰ δὲ τοιούτου σώματος τῷ δὲ πότε τῷ θνητῷ τήνγε ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν συγγίγνεσθαι, ὅλου ὅλῳ τῷ τοῦ ἐμβρύου ζωτικῷ πνεύματι διὰ συγγένειαν ἐπεπμεκολένου ἅτε πνεύματός τινος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος, "By this ethereal body is our human soul connected with its mortal body; the whole thereof being implicated with the whole vital spirit of the embryo, forasmuch as this itself is a spirit also." But long before Pletho was this doctrine declared and asserted by Galen, as agreeable both to Plato's and his own sense; he first premising, that the immediate organ or instrument of sight was αὐγοειδὲς, a "luciform" and "ethereal spirit:* Δεόντως οὖν ἐροῦμεν αὐγοειδὲς μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ὄργανον, ἀεροειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς, ἀτμοειδὲς δὲ τὸ τῆς ὀδμῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεύσεως ὑγρὸν, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς γεῶδες, &c., "Wherefore we may reasonably affirm, that the organ of sight is a luciform or ethereal body: as that of hearing is aerial; that of smelling vaporous; that of taste moist or watery; and that of touch earthy; like being perceived by like." And he accordingly thus understanding those known verses of Empedocles, which as Aristotle otherwise interprets them, are nonsense: Καὶ τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἦν ὃ βούλεται δηλοῦν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν οἷς φησὶ, Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν, &c.: αἰσθανόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως τῷ μὲν γεωδεστέρῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, τῆς γεώδους φύσεως, τῷ δ' αὐγοειδεστέρῳ τῆς ὄψεως, τῆς Αὐγοειδοῦς, "And this was that which Empedocles meant to signify, in those famous verses of his; it being certain, that by the most earthy of our senses, the touch, we perceive the earthy nature of sensibles; and by the most luciform, viz. that of sight, the passions of light; by that which is aerial, sounds; by that which is moist and sponge-like, tastes; and lastly, by the organ of smelling, which is the extremity of those former cavities of the brain, as replenished with vapours, odours." After which he writeth of the essence or substance of the soul, in this manner: Εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς οὐσίας ἀποφήνασθαι χρὴ, δυοῖν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ἢ τοῦτ εἶναι τὸ οἷον Αὐγοειδὲς, καὶ Αἰθερῶδες σῶμα λεκτέον αὐτὴν, εἰς ὃ κἂν μὴ βούλονται κατ' ἀκολουθίαν ἀφικνοῦνται Στωϊκοὶ, ἢ αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον ὑπάρχειν οὐσίαν, ὄχημά τε τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς εἶναι τουτὶ τὸ σῶμα, δι' οὗ μέσου τὴν πρὸς τ' ἄλλα σώματα κοινωνίαν λαμβάνει· τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ δι' ὅλου λεκτέον ἡμῖν ἐκτετᾶσθαι τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου· τῇ δέ γε πρὸς αὐτὸ κοινωνίᾳ τὸ κατὰ τὰς ὄψεις αὐτῶν πνεῦμα φωτοειδὲς γίγνεσθαι, "And if we should now declare any thing concerning the essence or substance of the soul, we must needs affirm one or other of these two things; that either itself is this luciform and ethereal body

[10] In Oracul. Chald. ibid.

* Dog. Hip. et Plat. lib. 7. [Cap. 13. p. 1043 tom. 1. opp.]

(which the Stoics, whether they will or no, by consequence will be brought unto, as also Aristotle himself), or else that the soul is itself an incorporeal substance, but that this luciform ethereal body is its first vehicle, by which, as a middle, it communicates with the other bodies. Wherefore we must say, that this ethereal lucid body is extended throughout the whole brain; whence is that luciform spirit derived, that is the immediate instrument of sight." Now from hence it was, that these philosophers, besides the moral purgation of the soul, and the intellectual or philosophical, recommended very much a mystical or telestic way of purifying this ethereal body in us, by diet and catharms. Thus the forementioned Hierocles:[1] Ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῷ Αὐγοειδεῖ ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφυ σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν, καθαρεῦσαι δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο, &c., "Since to our lucid or splendid body, this gross mortal body is come by way of accession, we ought to purify the former also, and free it from sympathy with the latter." And again after-

[1] Ibid. p. 214. Dr. Cudworth has expressed this passage as it stands in the older editions, which have the reading: Καθαρεῦσαι δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. But if this reading be retained, the philosopher seems to be speaking of the purification of the mortal body, although it is clear from the context that he means that of the lucid or splendid body. For which reason that great ornament of his country, the sagacious Dr. Bentley, considered that the passage required emendation, and that τούτου should be substituted for τοῦτο. If we adopt this conjecture, highly ingenious as it certainly is, and altogether in accordance with the Platonic doctrine, the sense of the words will be as follows: "The ethereal body of the soul, which is united with the mortal, must be purified and freed from this mortal body and divested of all sympathy with it." Undoubtedly the followers of Plato in former times derived all the dross and impurities of the soul from the grosser and mortal body: and therefore the learned Pet. Needham, who has published an elegant edition of Hierocles, has not hesitated to prefer this emendation to the ancient reading and to receive it into the text. See his Annotations, p. 431. 432. Nevertheless, to confess my own candid opinion, I consider there is more acuteness and ingenuity than truth in this correction. For if τούτου be substituted for τοῦτο the sentence, if I am not mistaken, becomes broken and disconnected, since the laws of grammar require a *pronoun* in it that can be referred to σώματι αὐγοειδεῖ. Besides the particle καὶ prefixed to the word τοῦτο is fatal to this critical conjecture. For as Hierocles before these words mentions nothing else from which the vehicle of the soul is also to be purged, it is clear that the pronoun following this particle pertains to the thing itself which he says is to be purified. Are we therefore to adhere strictly to the ancient reading and to suppose that Hierocles has expressed himself inaptly and improperly, and not attended sufficiently to grammatical rules? I consider indeed, there would be no fault in our doing so: nor am I such an admirer of the ancients as to believe that they were always more fortunate than ourselves, who, when absorbed in profound meditation, very often inadvertently offend against the decrees of grammarians. If the meaning of a sentence be plain and perspicuous, as in this case, we ought not to be too severe upon any occasional errors in ancient or modern authors, nor impute that to them as a crime which probably arose from a mere slip of the memory or some other pardonable cause. But on attentively examining this passage of Hierocles I find an easy way of purging him from all charge of negligence. All that gives critics offence in this sentence has proceeded I suspect from the copyists, who interchanged the two kindred words αὐτο and τοῦτο, and put one in place of the other: than which no mistake could happen more easily. I conjecture therefore that Hierocles wrote as follows: Καθαρεῦσαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ΑΥ̓ΤὈ καὶ τῆς πρὸς ΤΟΥ̓ΤΟ συμπαθείας ἀπαλλαγῆναι; but in such matters nothing can positively be decided upon. Observe also that in the beginning of this passage the reading of the MS. is not ἐπειδὴ but ἀλλὰ δή.

wards:[2] Αἱ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεις καὶ τοῦ Αὐγοειδοῦς ὀχήματος προμηθοῦνται, ὅπως ἂν αὐταῖς ὑπόπτερον καὶ τοῦτο γενόμενον μὴ ἐμποδὼν ἵστηται πρὸς τὴν ἄνω πορείαν, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "Together with the purgations of the rational soul, the purification of the luciform or ethereal vehicle is also to be regarded, that this being made light, and alate or wingy, might no way hinder the soul's ascent upward: but he that endeavours to purify the mind only, neglecting the body, applies not himself to the whole man."[3] Whereupon he concludes: Τὴν Τελεστικὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγω, τὴν τοῦ Αὐγοειδοῦς καθαρτικὴν δύναμιν, "I therefore call this the telestic or mystic operation; which is conversant about the purgation of the lucid or ethereal vehicle." And whereas philosophy was by Plato and Socrates[4] defined to be a continual exercise of dying (which Pliny[5] thought to be nothing

[2] Ibid. p. 216.

[3] Those acquainted with the Greek language will easily perceive that this translation of Dr. Cudworth's does not correspond to the words of Hierocles. That of Needham is better: "For the purgations of the rational soul regard also the luciform vehicle, that having acquired wings by means of these, it may not impede the journey (of the soul) upwards." The words: *But he*, &c. subjoined to the version of this passage do not occur in the same part of Hierocles as the preceding, but stand at a considerable distance from them. In Greek they run as follows, p. 222.: Ὁ γὰρ ψυχῆς μόνης ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενος, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ἀμελῶν, οὐ τὸν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον καθαίρει.

[4] See Plato's Phædo, p. 378. &c. where Socrates discourses at great length upon this subject.

[5] This is a singular and very ingenious interpretation of the well-known words of Pliny, Histor. Natural. lib. 8. cap. 50: Atque etiam morbus est aliquis per sapientiam mori. Claud. Salmasius in his Exercit. Plinian. in Solinum, tom. I. p. 283. supposes that φρενῖτις is called by Pliny the disease of wisdom or philosophy: "as the disease of the joints," says he, "is called ἀρθρῖτις——so also φρενῖτις is a disease, to which philosophy is subject, or the disease of philosophy." But Dr. Cudworth seems to me to be right in considering this meaning to be inapplicable to the present passage: whose opinion again J. Le Clerc has attempted to refute, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 8. p. 56. What this most erudite scholar supposes to make particularly against it is another passage of Pliny, lib. 7. cap. 51. where he in like manner speaks of this death by philosophy [See Biblioth. Raisonnée, tom. 13. par. 2. p. 348. &c. and Heumann in the Miscellan. Lips. tom. 1. p. 80. &c.]. Jam signa lethalia in furoris morbo risum, *sapientiæ* vero *ægritudine* fimbriarum curam et stragulæ vestis plicaturas, "That the fatal symptom in madness is laughter, but in the disease of philosophy a care about fringes or the folds of a coverlet:" for that it is evident from this passage that the disease by philosophy is classed by Pliny among bodily maladies, and therefore that it is more probable he meant some species of insanity by this term, in which men discourse upon matters pertaining to philosophy even until death. I confess that those who suppose Pliny to be speaking of one and the same distemper in these two passages, which almost all critics do, cannot help preferring this opinion to the exposition of Dr. Cudworth and understanding it of some bodily disease, which at the same time deprives the sick person of his senses. But I am almost satisfied that learned men are in error when they associate these two passages of Pliny together, and suppose him to be speaking of one and the same thing. In the former passage he treats of *death by philosophy*, which he declares to be a *disease*, or species of disease; but in the latter he does not make mention of death by philosophy but the disease of philosophy. And these two, it must be evident to every body, differ from each other, the same as death and disease. Wherefore I consider that these two evils, mentioned by Pliny, ought by no means to be confounded. The sense of the former passage is simply this: "Those who die by wisdom or philosophy are affected with a certain disease," or to explain it more diffusively: "Although those who die by philosophy seem to be any thing rather than ill, they in reality have lost their health and are labouring under some disease."

but an hypochondriacal or atrabiliarian distemper in them), in those words of his, which Salmasius and other critics can by no means understand: Est etiam quidam morbus, per sapientiam mori, "That the dying by wisdom or philosophy, is also but a certain kind of bodily disease or overgrown melancholy"), though they supposed this principally to consist in a moral dying to corporeal lusts and passions; yet was the design thereof partly mystical and telestic also, it driving at this further thing, that when they should put off this terrestrial body, they might at once die also to the spirituous or aerial; and then their soul have nothing left hanging about it, but only the pure ethereal body, its light-winged chariot: which in Virgil's language is—

Purumque relinqui
Æthereum sensum, atque auraï simplicis ignem.[6]

Notwithstanding which, the Pythagoreans and Platonists seem not to have been all of them of this persuasion, that the

He here says that death by wisdom is a disease, but not a sort of disease which may be called the *disease of wisdom*. He who bears this in mind will no doubt confess that Dr. Cudworth's exposition of this passage is the best and most convenient one. For the philosophers, especially those who were devoted to Pythagoras and Plato, inculcated that the soul is to be abstracted and drawn away from the contagion and association of the body by close and incessant meditation and the study of philosophy: and those who obeyed this precept were said to die like Socrates philosophically, or as Pliny says "by wisdom." Pliny, who had no care about religion or moral discipline, tells us that this class of men, although they discourse magnificently upon the releasing of the soul from the body by philosophy, are any thing rather than sane and are afflicted with some disease. But in the other passage he is unquestionably treating of some disease of the body: and as he contrasts this disease with madness, which the Greek physicians call *μανία*, I hold the opinion of Salmasius to be not improbable, who conceives that *φρενῖτις* is denominated by Pliny "the disease of wisdom."

[6] If this and what the learned Doctor states a little before be true, therefore, the Platonists inculcated a twofold kind of philosophical death: *moral* and *mystical* or *telestic* death. But I nowhere remember their mentioning it. Socrates, when said that the life of a philosopher is a perpetual exercise of dying, meant simply, as is manifest from Plato's Phædo, that it is the part of a wise man to endeavour through the whole of his life to abstract the mind from the passions, lusts, and perturbations of the body. Neither did the junior Platonists add much to this dogma, except that they prescribed certain courses for obtaining this death, which Socrates, had he lived in their time, would no doubt have despised and ridiculed. For this great and acute man was by no means favourable to those who recommended the killing of the body by hunger, thirst, and the like: than which these philosophers considered nothing to be more efficacious for purging the soul from the contagion of the body. Hence Porphyry, according to the prescript of his own school, asserts that there are only two kinds of death, one natural, the other philosophical, Sentent. ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, sect. 9. p. 221. Ὁ γοῦν θάνατος διπλοῦς· ὁ μὲν συνεγνωσμένος, λυομένου τοῦ σώματος ἀπὸ ψυχῆς· ὁ δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων, λυομένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος· καὶ οὐ πάντως ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ἕπεται, "Death is twofold: one known to all, wherein the body is freed from the soul; the other of philosophers, when the soul is released from the body: neither does one always follow the other." Wherefore the mystic and telestic purgation of the soul, continually dwelt upon by the Platonists, is by no means a new kind of death, different from the philosophical and moral, but merely pertains to those things by which this class of philosophers supposed that the philosophical death could be accelerated. Much also has been collected on this subject by Jac. Thomasius in his Dissertat. Varii Argumenti, dis. 14. de Philosophia Mortis Meditatione, p. 124. &c.

same numerical ethereal body, which the soul was at first created with, continueth still about it, and adhereth to it inseparably to all eternity, during its descents into other grosser bodies; but rather to have supposed, that, according to the moral disposition of the soul, it always finds or makes a cognate and suitable body correspondently pure or impure; and consequently, that by moral virtue and philosophy, it might again recover that celestial body, which was lost by its fall and descent hither. This seemeth to have been Porphyrius' sense in these words of his:[7] Ὡς ἂν διετέθη ἡ ψυχή, εὑρίσκει σῶμα τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισμένον· διὸ καθαρώτερον μὲν διακειμένη σύμφυτον τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀΰλου σῶμα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον, "However the soul be in itself affected, so does it always find a body suitable and agreeable to its present disposition; and therefore to the purged souls does naturally accrue a body that comes next to immateriality; that is, an ethereal one." And probably Plato[8] was of the same mind when he affirmed the "soul to be always in a body, but sometimes of one kind and sometimes of another."

Now from what hath been declared, it appeareth already, that the most ancient assertors of the incorporeity and immortality of the human soul supposed it, notwithstanding, to be always conjoined with a body. Thus Hierocles[9] plainly: Ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία συμφυὲς ἔχουσα σῶμα, οὕτω παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἄνευ σώματος· ἀλλ' αὐτὴν μὲν ἀσώματον, ἀποπερατοῦσθαι δὲ εἰς σῶμα τὸ ὅλον αὐτῆς εἶδος, "The rational nature having always a cognate body, so proceeded from the demiurgus, as that neither itself is body, nor

[7] In Sententiis ad Intelligibilia Ducentibus, sect. 32. p. 233. It does not follow from these words of Porphyry, as Dr. Cudworth supposes, that the celestial and ethereal body, which in the opinion of the Platonists is cognate with the soul, can be lost and again recovered. For granting, what however may be denied, that σῶμα αἰθέριον in this passage is correctly understood of that splendid chariot or vehicle of the soul, in which the Platonists supposed it to be placed by God immediately on its creation, the words may conveniently be explained as follows: "If the soul moderates and controls its propensities, that celestial body is contaminated by no foreign impurity but remains pure and unsullied." This explication is confirmed by the words which follow a little after: Ὅταν δὲ μελετήσει ἀφίστασθαι φύσεως, αὐγὴ ξηρὰ γίνεται, ἄσκιος καὶ ἀνέφελος, "But when it purposes receding from nature (corporeal things), it becomes a dry splendour, without shadow or cloud." I can hardly believe that any of the Platonists ever imagined the first and lucid body of the soul to be capable of being entirely lost and again restored. For since they held this body to belong to the nature of the soul itself, if they had entertained this opinion, they must have supposed it possible for the nature of the soul to be changed and dissipated: which is altogether at variance with their doctrine. But the obscurity and dissension of these philosophers, when they touch upon this argument, is wonderful and almost incredible: whence it happens that it is not always possible to come to any clear and satisfactory conclusion as to their real meaning.

[8] This passage of Plato occurs in the tenth book De Legibus. But I have shown below on chap. 5. sect. 5. that it has no reference to this matter, but ought to be understood rather of the wanderings of souls and their migrations into various bodies in this life.

[9] Comm. in Aurea Carmina, ed. ver. 67. p. 210.

yet can it be without body; but though itself be incorporeal, yet its whole form, notwithstanding, is terminated in a body." Accordingly whereunto, the definition which he gives of a man is this:* Ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφυοῦς ἀθανάτου σώματος, "A rational soul, together with a cognate immortal body." He concluding there afterwards, that this enlivened terrestrial body, or mortal man, is nothing but εἴδωλον ἀνθρώπου,[10] "the image of the true man," or an accession thereunto, which is therefore separable from the same. Neither doth he affirm this only of human souls, but also of all other rational beings whatsoever, below the supreme deity, and above men, that they always naturally actuate a body. Wherefore a demon or angel (which words are used as synonymous by Hierocles) is also defined by him after the same manner:[1] Ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωτεινοῦ σώματος, "A rational soul together with a lucid body." And accordingly Proclus upon Plato's Timæus,[2] affirmeth: Πάντα δαίμονα τῶν ἡμετέρων κρείττονα ψυχῶν, καὶ νοερὰν ἔχειν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον, "That every demon, superior to human souls, hath both an intellectual soul and an ethereal vehicle, the entireness thereof being made up or compounded of these two things." So that there is hardly any other difference left betwixt demons or angels, and men, according to these philosophers, but only this, that the former are lapsable into aerial bodies only, and no further; but the latter into terrestrial also.[3] Now Hierocles positively affirmeth this to have been the true cabala, and genuine doctrine of the ancient Pythagoreans, entertained afterwards by Plato: Καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἦν δόγμα, ὃ δὲ Πλάτων ὕστερον ἐξέφηνεν, ἀπεικάσας ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἡνιόχου; πᾶσαν θείαν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν, "And this was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, which Plato afterwards declared; he resembling every, both human and divine soul (that is, in our modern language, every created rational being) to a winged chariot, and a driver or charioteer, both together:" meaning by the chariot an enlivened body; and by the charioteer, the incorporeal soul itself acting it.[4]

* Page 290. [Page 212.] [10] Page 214.

[1] By these words Hierocles is defining what the Platonists call a hero, p. 212. But with him *hero*, *demon*, and *angel* are synonymous terms. See his Comm. p. 36.

[2] Lib. 5. p. 230.

[3] Certainly many of the Platonists formerly held this opinion concerning demons. See Porphyry, De Abstinentia ab Esu Animalium, lib. 2. sect. 38. p. 81. &c. and others.

[4] This digression upon the celestial and ethereal body, formerly ascribed by the Platonists and others to Hesiod, has earned for our author a high meed of praise among the learned who are versed in these subjects. [It is commended by Jo. Grammius, Diss. 7. de Allegatione τῶν LXX. in N. T. where he also makes some remarks upon the body of the soul, p. 260. 262. &c.] J. Le Clerc confesses that no modern writer has more elaborately and learnedly illustrated this argument, which is however of such great importance towards a full and correct comprehension of the

And now have we given a full account, in what manner the

ancient philosophers and early Christian fathers, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 8. p. 59. The venerable J. Christ. Wolf, Nota ad Origenis Philosophumena, declares that he knows of no one that has expounded this dogma of the Platonists more clearly, copiously, and elaborately than Dr. Cudworth. I pass over others who pronounce this portion of his work to be especially deserving of commendation. From this judgment of scholars of the highest eminence it would be rashness in me or any one else to dissent. Still I doubt not I shall be pardoned by the wise, if, although far inferior in erudition and intellect, I add a remark or two to so many excellent and learned observations, and modestly correct certain statements of our author which seem to me not to be characterized by his accustomed caution and accuracy.

Sect. I. In the first place, we ought I consider, to inquire more minutely into the origin of this Platonic doctrine on the body or bodies of souls: for unless this be done, it is impossible but that many mistakes must arise in judging of its true nature and character, and in expounding the sayings both of the ancient philosophers and Christians. As far then as the obscurity of antiquity will permit, I shall first examine the source from which the whole of this philosophy emanated. That the first founders of this sect arrived at the dogma by reason and meditation, I can never be made to believe, although many worthy men seem to entertain this view: on the contrary, I am satisfied that it was wholly derived and collected as it were from the vulgar and popular opinions which, long before the existence of the junior Platonic sect, were diffused through the Greek and oriental nations. Let others think what they please of the discipline of the junior Platonists; for my part, after bestowing no trifling labour upon its investigation, a task which no one ought to shrink from who wishes to become acquainted with the affairs of the earliest Christians, I have come to the firm conviction that this discipline is for the most part nothing more than an accumulation of popular opinions, accommodated to the precepts of the ancient philosophers, especially of Pythagoras and Plato. It is evident from innumerable sayings of the, philosophers of this school, that they held as one of their primary and fundamental precepts, that the tenets and opinions of their ancestors were to be scrupulously retained, and that no popular doctrine derived from ancient times was to be repudiated, but merely required an apt and suitable interpretation. Hence, there is no opinion in Homer and Hesiod, no superstition of the vulgar, which they do not every where endeavour to refine upon and to explain in conformity with their own doctrines: a fact that, if the subject and space would permit, might be proved by an infinity of examples. In matters pertaining to the nature and condition of the soul, above all others, they considered that the opinions of the ancients, that is, the vulgar, were to be adhered to, and under no consideration to be abandoned. That I may not appear to have said any thing at random, I shall demonstrate this by some passages of Plotinus, a common preceptor as it were of this sect. This philosopher, then, Ennead 2. lib. 9. cap. 6. p. 704. discourses as follows: *Μηδὲν τοὺς θείους ἄνδρας διασύροντας· ἀλλ' εὐμενῶς δεχομένων τὰ ἐκείνων ὡς παλαιοτέρων· καὶ ἃ καλῶς λέγουσι παρ' ἐκείνων λαβόντας, ψυχῆς ἀθανασίαν, νοητὸν κόσμον, θεὸν τὸν πρῶτον, τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν δεῖν φεύγειν τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ὁμιλίαν, κ. τ. λ.* "It behoves us by no means to cavil at the divine men, but kindly and favourably to interpret the mysteries of the ancients, receiving from them what they well and truly speak of, the immortality of the soul, the intelligible world, the first God; also that the soul ought to fly from the intercourse of the body: again, that its separation from the body is nothing more than its transition from generation to essence." And afterwards: *Οὐ παρὰ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ψέγειν, λέγοντας ἑαυτοὺς ἐκείνων ἀμείνους εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τά γε εἰρημένα τοῖς παλαιοῖς περὶ τῶν νοητῶν, πολλῷ ἀμείνω καὶ πεπαιδευμένως εἴρηται, καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐξαπατωμένοις τὴν ἐπιδεύουσαν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπάτην, ῥᾳδίως γνωστήσεται,* "It is wholly ridiculous for them to declare that they are better than those (the ancients): for what the ancients have recorded respecting intelligible things, is much better and more learnedly said, and will be understood by those who are not deceived by the fallacy diffused among men." But this partiality for the ancients and their opinions had been imbibed from Plato himself, who in his Timæus, sect. 26. p. 249. thus expresses himself, whether seriously or not, I cannot say: *Ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν παισὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνευ εἰκότων τε καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσι, ἀλλ' ὡς οἰκεῖα φάσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν, ἑπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον,* "It is impossible therefore to disbelieve the sons of the gods, although

ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, answered

they speak without probable arguments and conclusive demonstrations; but as they profess to relate matters belonging peculiarly to themselves, we ought to obey the law and believe them." Nor is Plato unmindful of this precept in his writings, in which, as every one conversant with them must be aware, he rarely dissents from the tenets and opinions of his own time, but endeavours, with all the dexterity he is master of, to adapt and accommodate them to his own doctrines. Add also what Marinus, in his life of Proclus records of the talent of this great Platonist, and his predilection for the ancients, cap. 19. p. 47. cap. 22. p. 53. &c. The Platonist in Æneas Gazæus, in Theophrastus, p. 65. ed. Barthii, expressly calls these very opinions on the bodies of souls, *τὰ τῶν παλαίων ἀπορρήτα*, "the sacred mysteries of the ancients."

Sect. II. Such being the case, those who wish to understand the true nature of the Platonic dogma on the body of the soul and the state of the soul itself, must investigate the vulgar discipline, such as was in vogue before the time of Plato himself, and compare it with the tenets of this sect. I will try whether I can furnish any information to those who are disposed to undertake this task. The most ancient sages, who flourished prior to all the Greek philosophers that we know of, seem to have entertained this fixed opinion, that there are two souls in man, one the seat and residence of animal life, the senses and desires, or *sentient*, the other partaking of reason and intelligence, or *rational*: the latter of divine origin, and therefore immortal, the former of a far inferior nature, and consequently not incapable of utterly perishing: that they are both united in this life, and after the death of the body remain so united in most persons: but yet that they can be separated and in reality are so on the decease of great men. This opinion flowed to the multitude and common people; by whom, as generally happens, it was disfigured by so many foolish errors and opinions, as to be scarcely recognizable. And this corruption was in no slight degree contributed to by the poets, who by their fables, figures, fictions, and embellishments, have notoriously corrupted even the best doctrines, and rendered them contemptible in the eyes of wise men. Evident traces of this dogma are extant in the most ancient poet Homer, although, according to the poetic wont, he every where obscures its light, and does not always sufficiently clearly express its genuine sense and meaning. This has not altogether escaped the notice of the author of Homer's life, commonly said to be Plutarch, but according to others, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who, p. 345. ed. Th. Gale, contends that Homer, like the philosophers, assigned two parts to the soul, one rational, the other irrational, *τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον*. We shall demonstrate the same thing a little more plainly in the sequel, because, by ascertaining the doctrine of Homer, we at the same time will become acquainted with the opinion entertained by the more intelligent upon the same subject both before and after his time. The rational soul is called by Homer *φρὴν*, *φρένες*, and *νοῦς*: to this in many places he opposes *θυμὸς*; by which name he designates the animal, sensual, and concupiscent soul. In Iliad. lib. 1. v. 188. p. 17. tom. 1. ed. Barnesii, he thus speaks of the anger of Achilles:

Πηλείωνι δ' ἄχος γένετ', ἐν δὲ οἱ ἦτορ
Στήθεσσιν λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν,
Ἢ ὅγε φάσγανον ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ
Τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσειεν, ὁ δ' Ἀτρεΐδην ἐναρίξοι
Ἦὲ χόλον παύσειεν, ἐρητύσειέ τε ΘΥΜΟ'Ν·
Ὥς ὁ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε κατὰ ΦΡΕ'ΝΑ καὶ κατὰ ΘΥΜΟ'Ν,

"But in Pelides grief arose, and in his manly breast his heart fluctuated between two resolves, whether to draw his keen-edged sword from his side, and having removed the others, to slay the son of Atreus, or to curb his rage and restrain his fury. While he revolved these things in his mind and soul." In these verses the soul of Achilles, deliberating upon the course to be pursued, is distinguished from that in which anger and fury resided; and in the last verse *φρὴν* or *νοῦς*, as the ancient scholiast rightly expounds it, is opposed to *θυμὸς*, upon the restraining of which the soul is said in the preceding verse to have deliberated. I cannot but observe, by the way that this passage shows Homer to have placed the seat of the rational soul in the heart; to which undoubtedly it is owing that he very frequently calls it *φρένες* from its supposed place of abode. The ancient biographer of Homer is certainly mistaken, in supposing, p. 345.

that objection against the illocality and immobility of particular

as many philosophers have done, that this poet assigned the soul its place in the head. In Iliad Ξ. v. 294. p. 548. he thus sings of Jupiter beholding Juno most beautifully adorned:

Ὡς δ' ἴδεν, ὡς μὲν ἔρως πυκινὰς φρένας ἀμφεκάλυψεν,

"When he saw, immediately love enveloped his prudent mind." Here again, ἔρως, "love," or the concupiscent soul, and φρένες, the intelligent and rational mind, dwelling in the region of the heart, are opposed to each other: and the former is said to have subdued the latter. Penelope thus addresses her nurse, Odyss. lib. Ψ. v. 14. p. 596.

Πρίν δὲ ΦΡΕΝΑΣ αἰσίμη ἦσθα,
Τίπτε με λωβεύεις πολυπενθέα ΘΥΜΟΝ ἔχουσαν,

"Since before thou wast discreet in thy mind, why dost thou deride me having a much afflicted soul." Here also the distinction observed by Homer between φρένες and θυμὸς is sufficiently apparent. To the former he ascribes wisdom and reason, to the latter sorrow. Many more passages of the same kind will be met with by those who read his works; which, that I may not wander altogether from my purpose, I for the present pass over. I confess, however, that they do not prove him to have supposed these two souls to be of a different nature, and not to be so associated as to be incapable of being separated: but this will be made appear by other passages which I shall quote by and by. That after Homer's time an infinite multitude of philosophers and poets, Greek as well as Roman, professed this twofold soul in men, is too notorious to require being corroborated by testimonies. Even the names themselves by which these souls are designated were borrowed by them from Homer. Concerning Pythagoras, Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 30. p. 512. says: Τὴν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ψυχὴν διαιρεῖσθαι τριχῇ, εἰς τὸν νοῦν καὶ φρένας καὶ θυμόν, "He made a threefold division of the soul into mind, and soul, and sense." In Homer νοῦς and φρένες are not different: the rest are Homeric.

Sect. III. The ancients supposed the rational soul to descend to men from the gods, or to be of celestial origin, and a certain portion of purer ether sent down into mortal bodies. [For in the earliest ages, God himself was believed to be light and ether. So Zeno expressly declares, Cicero De Natur. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 2901. And Cleanthes, ibid. Deus æther, "God the ether." See Bouhier, Not. ad Cic. de Natur. Deor. p. 2902. who is mistaken in supposing fire and ether to be the same.] But according to Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 40. p. 3021. Æther est ultimus et a domiciliis nostris altissimus, omnia cingens et coërcens cœli complexus,———extrema ora et determinatio mundi: in quo cum admirabilitate maxima igneæ formæ cursus ordinatos definiunt, "Ether is the last and highest from where we dwell, surrounding all things and confining the compass of heaven,———the extreme margin and boundary of the world: in which the fiery forms most wonderfully define their appointed courses." This may be proved by innumerable passages of ancient authors, some of which only I shall adduce. [Cicero also applies the term ardorem cœli, "the heat or burning brightness of heaven," De Natur. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2899. On God considered as fire, see Beausobre, Hist. du Manich. p. 466.] Euripides, who received his discipline from the illustrious philosopher Anaxagoras, in a tragedy entitled Chrysippus, thus formerly sung:

Γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς αἰθὴρ,
Ὁ μὲν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν γενέτωρ
———————τίκτει θνατοὺς·
Χώρει δ' ὀπίσω τὰ μὲν ἐκ γαίας
Φύντ' εἰς γαῖαν· τὰ δ' ἀπ' αἰθερίου
Βλάστοντα γονῆς εἰς οὐράνιον
Πόλον ἦλθε πάλιν,

"The mighty earth, and the ether of Jove, the father of men and gods, generate the human race. What is produced from the earth, goes back again to earth, and that

finite spirits, demons or angels, and human souls; that these

which springs from ethereal seed returns to the celestial pole." See Hugonis Grotii Excerpta ex Antiquis Tragicis et Comicis, p. 416. These verses require no interpretation: for it is manifest from them that this tragedian supposed souls to come from the ether into the bodies of animals, and on the dissolution of the body to return again to ether. And every one must be aware that the tragedians and comedians of former times propounded on the stage the most popular and generally received opinions. I will add the very ancient comic writer, Pacuvius, who, according to Nonius Marcellus, De Proprietate Sermonum, cap. 2. in Dionysii Godofredi Auctoribus Linguæ Latinæ, p. 525. in Chryse, has left this on record: Mater est terra, ea parit corpus: *animam æther* adjugat, "Earth is the mother, she produces the body: ether adds the soul." Some manuscripts have the most corrupt and utterly unmeaning reading: anima mater adjungat. This opinion was adopted by Pythagoras, as were most of those which were diffused among the oriental nations; for he is said by Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 28. p. 509. to have taught, *εἶναι ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα αἰθέρος*, "that the soul is an avulsion or detached portion of ether." Nay, even the Jewish philosophers, the Essenes, did not hesitate to admit this ancient opinion among their doctrines, as Josephus informs us in these words, De Bello Judaico, lib. 2. cap. 8. sect. 2. p. 164. *Καὶ γὰρ ἐῤῥωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἥδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα——τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους ἀεὶ διαμένειν καὶ συμπλέκεσθαι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος τοῖς σώμασιν*, "For this opinion also prevails among them, that bodies are perishable, but that souls are immortal and everlasting, and come from the most subtle ether into connexion with the body." Many, I am aware, will consider this opinion to be remarkable, and contrary to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which these ancients professed. But I would again remind them, as I have already repeatedly done, that no wise man ought to judge of the precepts of the ancients from our own opinions. We indeed consider that every thing corporeal and consisting of matter is destitute of life, consists of parts, and therefore can be dissolved and perish. But most of the ancients thought differently, and were convinced that all matter is not capable of being dissipated, but that some is alive, indivisible, and eternal. The highest ether in particular was supposed by them to be endowed with life, devoid of all corruption, and even of the same nature as God himself. In Homer, the ether is called divine, Odyss. lib. T. v. 540:

——ὁ δ' ἐς αἰθέρα δῖαν ἀέρθη,

"But he was raised up into the divine ether." [Ovid. Metam. 1. ver. 68. 80.] Pythagoras clearly taught that the soul was immortal, because of the nature from which it is derived being immortal: *Ἀθάνατον δὲ εἶναι ψυχήν, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ ἀπέσπασται, ἀθάνατος ἐστί*, "That the soul is immortal, since that also from which it is plucked, is immortal," Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 28. p. 509. 510. For as we have already seen, he supposed the soul to be plucked from the ether, when it is joined to the body. Jamblichus, according to the opinion of the Egyptians, De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 1. cap. 17. p. 29. *Τὸ οὐράνιον σῶμα πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ συγγενέστατον· μιᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνης οὔσης, αὐτὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστιν, ἀμερίστου δὲ ἀδιαίρετον, καὶ ἀτρέπτου ὡσαύτως ἀναλλοίωτον*, "The celestial body is most closely allied to the incorporeal substance of the gods: for as that is one, so this is simple; as that is indivisible, so this is also indivisible; as that is immutable, so this is invariable." If more testimonies be required, add the Indian Brahmin, Jarchas, in Philostrati Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. 3. cap. 34. p. 125. Hieroeles, Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 228. where he calls ether *ἄϋλον καὶ ἀίδιον σῶμα*, "an immaterial and eternal body;" Apuleius, De Mundo, p. 58. &c. and others, to quote whose passages would be tedious and unnecessary.

Sect. IV. On the opinion of the antehomeric philosophers respecting the origin of the sentient soul, I can hazard nothing more than conjecture: for I have always considered it an unsafe and irrational course to estimate the doctrines of bygone ages from the opinions of later philosophers. Perhaps they supposed this soul to be a portion of that spirit which they believed to pervade the whole universe, and to animate all generated things. Of the nature and character they assigned to it, I am able to speak with more certainty. It was regarded by them as a certain corporeal spirit, which was diffused through the entire body, and therefore possessed the same form as the human body,

being all naturally incorporate, however in themselves and

and which was fed and nourished by the blood of a man as its own proper food. What I here state in respect to the nature and form of this soul will be made manifest from passages of the ancients which I purpose bringing forward by and by: for the present I shall merely say a few words on the subject of its aliment. That the earliest philosophers imagined the sentient souls to be fed by blood is put beyond all question even by the history of Ulysses in Homer. For when he has descended into the infernal regions, or the abode of souls divested of their earthly body, he is commanded to sacrifice beasts in order to propitiate these souls, and on their approach to offer them the blood to drink: nor are the souls able to speak the truth, and to tell of their own affairs, till they have quaffed the blood. See Odyss. Λ. p. 277. &c. tom. 2. This appetite for blood no one will ascribe to the rational soul, whose nature, according to the opinion of the ancients, being ethereal and allied to the gods, cannot be distracted by any desires of the kind. We are left to suppose, therefore, that the sentient souls which had hitherto been associated with the rational, as we shall see by and by, retained the recollection and love of their ancient nutriment, and unless refreshed by it were unable to develope all their energies, and to discourse with intelligence and aptitude. The doctrine concealed under this fable was well understood by the ancient author of Homer's Life, who p. 341. says: Καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ᾔδει, ὅτι τὸ αἷμα νομὴ καὶ τροφὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, "For he (Homer) knew that blood is the food and aliment of the spirit." He is in doubt whether it is the soul itself which requires this food, or its vehicle which is nothing more than what we call the sentient soul. But he would not have doubted, if he had been further removed from the discipline of the Platonists, who did violence to the ancient doctrine respecting souls, by bending it too much to a conformity with their own precepts. Diogenes Laërtius records of Pythagoras, lib. 8. segm. 31. p. 513. τρέφεσθαί τε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος, "He said that the soul is nourished by blood," that is, the sentient soul. Porphyry, speaking of the souls which, as the Platonists say, are ἐν τῇ γενέσει, "in generation," or united with the sentient souls, De Antro Nympharum, p. 257. says: αἷμα μὲν οὖν ταύταις καὶ ὁ δίνυγρος γόνος φίλος, "and for that reason these souls delight in blood and moist seed." Wherefore those who formerly boasted of being able to evoke the souls of the dead, as we are told by the same Porphyry and others, said that they were chiefly attracted by the effusion of blood.

Sect. V. These two souls, the rational and sentient, during the life of the body in which they dwell, are closely and intimately associated with each other, but yet, if we are to believe the ancients, not so as entirely to coalesce and combine into one nature, and to be incapable of separation. At the death of the generality of persons, indeed, both souls, as if bound and chained together, descend into the realms of Pluto. But some men, in whom there is greater virtue and mental vigour during life, can preserve themselves pure and uncontaminated by the influence and desires of the sentient soul, so that on the dissolution of the body the rational soul returns to the upper regions from whence it came, and leaves the sentient to descend alone into the lower world. Most of the later Greek and Latin philosophers, indeed, supposed the sentient soul to be merely a part or faculty of the rational: of whom Aristotle, as is well known, affirmed that the sentient exists in the rational in the same way as a quadrangle in a triangle: but the more ancient believed that these two souls can be entirely disconnected, and exist separately from each other. Should any one consider this to be scarcely credible, let him attentively examine the testimonies of Greek and Latin authors, which I shall now produce. The first is a saying of Euripides from the tragedy entitled Helen, ver. 1020. p. m. 578.

Ὁ νοῦς
Τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὐ, γνωμὴν δ' ἔχει
Ἀθάνατον, εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθέρ' ἐμπέσων.

"For the soul of the dead does not live, but yet possesses immortal reason, falling into the immortal ether." Euripides' opinion concerning God was singular, and unless it be known, the true force of these verses of his will not easily be understood. This poet supposed God to be a subtle, thin, and fiery nature, extended and diffused on all sides: or, in other words, believed the ether to be the same as God. This is shown by his well known verses, preserved by Stobæus and others, in which he says that ether is

directly immoveable, yet were capable of being in sense moved

God. Wherefore when he here says that souls are transferred into the immortal ether, he strictly means that at the death of the body they are again joined with or return to what he supposed to be the immortal and eternal God from whom they came. And yet, according to his opinion, they are not commingled with the divine nature after the death of the body, but remain as self-existent things, although they altogether change their state. For they no longer live, but have merely immortal γνωμή, or mind; the meaning of which words I conceive to be no other than this: that the vital and sentient part is detached and separated from the soul on its departure from the body, and the interior power of reason and mind alone ascends to the upper regions. Wherefore this passage completely proves that the ancients held it to be possible for the sentient soul to be severed and disconnected from that which possesses γνωμή and reason. But still, I own, it affords no evidence of the sentient soul being a nature which can subsist and remain by itself after the other has parted from it, and therefore we shall require more clear and conclusive testimonies. Among the great multitude of souls, which the Ulysses of Homer beholds in the infernal regions, is that also of Hercules, terrible indeed to all the rest of the shades, but of a far different kind. For the others are all whole and entire: but the soul of Hercules is deprived of its noblest part, namely the mind, which had flown to heaven, Odyss. Λ. ver. 600. p. 311.

Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βιὴν Ἡρακληείην,
Εἴδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
Τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς.

"After him I saw the strength of Hercules, his image: for he himself enjoys the banquets among the immortal gods." I am aware that Lucian is very facetious upon this passage of Homer, and makes this twofold Hercules, one dwelling in heaven and the other in the lower regions, the subject of severe satire and ridicule in his Dialogue of Diogenes and Hercules, tom. 1. p. 298. and that his example is followed by many ancient as well as modern authors, who consider it to be the most stupid and absurd of fictions. [Cicero De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 16. tom. 9. p. 3071. &c. has fallen into the same error.] And those grammarians and critics, who are admirers of Homer, torture themselves wonderfully in order to invent an explanation of this passage, which may satisfy the scruples of these cavillers. But Lucian, I consider, would have been more sparing of his ridicule if he had looked into the thing itself, divested of all figments, figures, and poetic integuments, and had been more deeply versed in the philosophy of antiquity. For in this fable lies concealed that ancient dogma, which with a slight variation, many of the Platonists afterwards adopted as their own: that the souls of heroes and great men are released by death from the bonds of the body, and of the sentient soul at the same time, and that the sentient and vital soul alone passes to the infernal realms, and there remains. Undoubtedly the εἴδωλον of Hercules introduced by Homer is his sentient soul: which is evident even from the fact that he designates it by the peculiar word βιὴν; "the strength of Hercules," while he calls the rest of the souls sojourning in the lower world ψυχαί. For courage and strength belong to the vital power of man, and not to his mind and reason; and therefore that soul only of Hercules, in which his βιὴ had resided, was saluted by Ulysses in the realms of Pluto. I shall add to this another passage of Homer, which many I am aware have considered to be even more explicit than the preceding one. To Achilles sleeping on the seashore the soul of Patroclus appears, perfectly representing the form which he possessed when living:

Πάντ' αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' εἰκυῖα
Καὶ φωνήν,

"Altogether resembling him in bulk and beautiful eyes and voice." Iliad, lib. Ψ. ver. 66. p. 851. And what kind of soul is this? It possesses sense and life, but is destitute of mind and reason. This is declared by Achilles after its departure in these words, ver. 104. p. 853.

Ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἐστὶ καὶ εἰν ἀΐδαο δόμοισι
Ψυχὴ καὶ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἔνι παμπαν,

"O wonderful! there is certainly therefore a soul and image in the mansions of Orcus, but mind is not in it." Grammarians dispute much as to what these

by accident, together with those bodies, respectively, which they

φρένες are which Achilles denies to be in souls, particularly in the soul of Patroclus. But let them cease their contentions, as the thing is sufficiently plain and clear. The term φρένες, as we have observed before, and as is shown by innumerable passages of this poet, is applied by him to the rational and intellectual soul, which he supposed to reside about the φρένες or midriff. For Patroclus being an illustrious man and a hero, his *ethereal sense*, or soul partaking of mind and reason, had on the death of the body immediately taken its flight to the gods: but the other, or sentient one, was supposed to have descended to the dominions of Pluto and the community of shades. Great men therefore, and those renowned for warlike prowess, who had despised the pleasures of sense, and had encountered the greatest dangers or met with their death in the defence of their country and fellow citizens, were believed in the remotest ages to enjoy this privilege, that their minds were released at the very point of death from the bonds of the sentient soul, and migrated to the gods. For it seemed just and reasonable that those who had renounced pleasures and the empire of the senses, when alive, and had made no account even of life itself, should at once be freed from all corporeal sense and animal life after death, and be united with purer minds. This opinion flowed to succeeding ages, and not only fixed itself in the minds of most heathen nations, but unfortunately reached the Christians also; who retained the doctrine itself, but substituted their own martyrs and confessors in lieu of heroes. [Irenæus, lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 48. Tertull. De Resurrectione Corporis. Origenes, Contra Celsum, lib. 7. p. 334. Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses, tom. 1.] But of these elsewhere: we are now treating of such as were strangers to the true religion. There are manifest traces of the opinion we speak of in the oration of Titus Vespasian to his soldiers, in Josephus, De Bello Judaico, lib. 6. cap. 1. sect. 5. p. 370. who doubtless recited the common opinion of the Romans: Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἐν παρατάξει ψυχὰς σιδήρῳ τῶν σαρκῶν ἀπολυθείσας, τὸ καθαρώτατον στοιχεῖον αἰθὴρ ξενοδοχῶν ἄστροις ἐγκαθιδρύει· δαίμονες δὲ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἥρωες εὐμενεῖς ἰδίοις ἐκγόνοις ἐμφανίζονται· τὰς δὲ ἐν νοσοῦσι τοῖς σώμασι, συντακείσας, κἂν τὰ μάλιστα κηλίδων ἢ μιασμάτων ὦσι καθαραὶ, νύξ ὑπόγειος ἀφανίζει καὶ λήθη βαθεῖα δέχεται, "For what brave man does not know that souls released from the bodies by the sword in battle are received by that purest element, the ether, and lodged among the stars; and that they appear as good demons and propitious heroes to their posterity: but that those which waste away along with the bodies in disease, although they may be free from all stain and pollution, disappear in subterranean night, and are buried in profound oblivion." And, to say nothing at present of other nations, the same opinion must have been entertained by the Alani, of whom Ammianus Marcellinus, Historiar. lib. 31. cap. 2. p. 620. says: "Among them he is accounted a *happy* man who has lost his life in battle." To these add a passage of Cicero, Tuscul. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2578. tom. 8. opp. wherein he expounds the opinion of the ancient Greeks and Romans on the state of the soul after the death of the body: Mors est quædam quasi migratio, commutatioque vitæ, quæ *in claris viris et fœminis* dux in cœlum solet esse: in ceteris humi et retinetur et permanet tamen, "Death is a certain migration as it were and change of life, which in the case of illustrious men and women is wont to be a guide to heaven: in the rest it is retained in the ground (that is, I suppose, descends into the regions beneath the earth) and nevertheless remains." Cicero afterwards adduces examples of heroes whose souls on departing from the body immediately ascended into heaven. [Add De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 5. on Castor and Pollux. On the Celts consult Pelloutier and on the Danes Bartholini.] Afterwards, when philosophers sprung up among the Greeks and sought to accommodate the popular opinions to their own precepts, they were unwilling to leave this glory to warriors alone, and persuaded their disciples that their own souls also, devoted wholly to contemplation, belong to the same class and after the death of the body are immediately transferred to the society of the gods. I shall prove this by a striking passage of Plato or rather Socrates, from the Phædo, p. 400. Οἳ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοι εἰσὶν οἱ τῶνδε μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερώμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι, ὥσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκιζόμενοι· τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθῃρμένοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἐπὶ τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦνται, "Those who are found to have lived a pre-eminently pious and holy life, being freed

are vitally united to. But as for that pretence, that these finite

and released from terrestrial places as from a prison, ascend upwards into a pure habitation and dwell above the earth: and among these whoever have been sufficiently purified by philosophy live altogether without bodies hereafter and obtain habitations even more beautiful than the others." This is a passage that deserves a somewhat more minute consideration. Plato makes mention in it of a twofold class, one of pious and good men, the other of philosophers. The souls of the pious, he tells us, do not pass into the infernal realms after death, but ascend to pure and delightful regions above the earth. But he adds that philosophers attain still greater felicity after the decease of the body: for in the first place they are assigned a more beautiful habitation than these, and secondly, will be entirely without bodies, *ἄνευ σωμάτων*. And what bodies, pray, are these? The earthy ones with which we are invested while living? By no means: for all men when they die, whether pious or impious, philosophers or illiterate, are alike stript of these bodies. The bodies he speaks of therefore must of necessity be the sentient souls, which the ancients supposed to be subtle bodies. The philosophers, according to Plato's opinion, are divested of these souls, because they were wholly devoted to contemplation during life, and abstracted their mind from the senses; but not so the rest of men, not even the pious and good, because these, although they lived a pure and spotless life, were nevertheless unable completely to withdraw themselves from the dominion of the senses. To this add another passage from the Phædo, p. 386.: *Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἄλλῳ ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ*, "No one is allowed to enter into the family of the gods (after death) but the lover of learning alone, who has devoted himself to philosophy and died perfectly pure." Compare the same in his Gorgias, p. 314. which passage I at present pass over for the sake of brevity. [The souls of great men were supposed by the ancients to ascend after death to the stars, and to reside in the milky way. See Leich, Ad Carmina Sepulcralia ex Anthologia, p. 2. 3. &c. Compare Sebast. Pauli Diss. de nomine Divus in Opuscoli Scientifici, tom. 15. p. 112. who disputes copiously concerning the vehicles and idol. Some passages of the kind occur also in Lafiteau, Mœurs des Sauvages Ameriquains, tom. 2. p. 425.]

Sect. VI. To these Greek witnesses I shall add some Latin ones, who imbibed the opinions and sentiments of the ancient Greeks, chiefly through the instrumentality of the poets. Let the first be Ennius, a shrewd reader and imitator of the Greek poets, of whose opinion Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 1. v. 121. p. 45. thus sings:

> Etsi præterea tamen esse Acherusia templa
> Ennius æternis exponit versibus, edens:
> Quo neque permanent animæ, neque corpora nostra:
> Sed quædam simulacra modis pallentia miris.

These simulacra or images, which Ennius distinguishes from body and soul, are nothing more than the *πνεύματα* of Homer, which Ulysses beheld in the lower regions, or spirits representing the form of the human body. But Ennius deviated from the tenets of the ancients, if as Lucretius records; he really inculcated that the images of all men were separated after death from mind and soul, and departed void and empty into the lower world. It is certain that not a few of the Platonists were of this opinion, from whom probably the poet borrowed it. But the earlier philosophy taught a different doctrine, as we have already seen, and held that great and illustrious men have the felicity of being at once freed from their images at the decease of the body, and that the minds of most men descend into the infernal realms along with the sentient souls for the purpose of purification. This may easily be learnt from Servius, who, in speaking of the same opinion, adds, that it is clearly and aptly handed down by philosophers, meaning beyond doubt the Platonists. "It is also," says he, "a subject of much controversy among philosophers, what this is that goes into the lower world. For we consist of three things: the soul, which is from above and returns to its source and origin; the body, which finally dissolves into earth; the shade, which Lucretius thus defines: Supra spoliatus lumine aër, 'air deprived of the light above.' The shade therefore, which is produced from the body, no doubt, perishes with it, nor is there any thing left of the man which can descend into the lower realms. But they discovered that there is a certain image, fashioned in resemblance of our body, which descends into these realms, a corporeal form or spectre, which is impalpable like the wind."

spirits or substances incorporeal, being unextended, and so having

Neither in these words nor in those which follow does Servius display any great knowledge of the ancient philosophy, not even the Platonic; but let others correct his errors; for me it is sufficient to have shown in him the seeds of the ancient dogma which I am here attempting to bring to light. It is much better expressed by Ovid, where he introduces Vesta speaking of Julius Cæsar, who is said by this goddess to have abandoned his image and ascended to the gods, Fastorum lib. 8. v. 699. &c. p. 210. 211. tom. 3. opp.

Meus fuit ille sacerdos,
Sacrilegæ telis me petiere manus.
Ipsa *virum* rapui, *simulacraque nuda* reliqui,
Quæ cecidit ferro, Cæsaris umbra fuit.
Ille quidem cœlo positus Jovis atria servat
Et tenet in magno templa dicata foro.

[Metam. lib. 12. p. 618. 619.] The learned annotators who have elucidated Ovid by their observations, have entirely passed over this remarkable passage, which in comparison with many others was deserving of their especial attention. For in it the poet speaks aptly and wisely according to the standard of the most ancient discipline. The sentient soul, the image of so great an emperor and hero as Cæsar, is said to have remained naked and to have passed into the infernal regions; the celestial soul had returned to the gods from whom it sprung. [Ovid. Trist. lib. 3. Eleg. 3. v. 58. 59. makes mention animarum suarum, " of his own souls," and declares that one is in the air; although he supposed the manes to descend into the lower regions. He seems to have thought, therefore, that his own soul, as of a poet, is dissevered from the sensitive soul after death ; but that his parent, a man of less authority and importance, was altogether in the lower realms, lib. 4. Eleg. 10. v. 85. &c. Horace, Odar. lib. 1. 24. Num vanæ redeat sanguis imagini, " Whether the blood returns to the empty image.' Hence arose the whole of the apotheosis of the Roman emperors, who were believed to ascend into heaven, leaving their εἴδωλον behind, and to be received into the society of the gods. See Aurelius Victor, De M. Antonio, p. 526.] Lucan, who sings the praises of Cæsar's enemy Pompey, attributes to him the same felicity and glory, Pharsal. lib. 9. v. 1. &c. p. 236. &c.

At non in Pharia manes jacuere favilla,
Nec cinis exiguus tantam compescuit umbram:
Prosiluit busto ; semiustaque membra relinquens,
Degeneremque rogum, sequitur convexa tonantis,
Qua niger astriferis connectitur axibus aër :
Quodque patet terras inter, lunæque meatus
Semi-Dei mânes habitant, quos *ignea virtus*
Innocuos vitæ patientes ætheris imi
Fecit, et æternos animam collegit in orbes.

The poet, I confess, does not here speak expressly of the shade or image of Pompey passing to the infernal regions, but records merely that his rational soul had proceeded to the council of the demi-gods. But as Lucan is evidently writing according to the popular opinion of the ancients, and this opinion inculcates that a portion even of the heroes themselves, Bacchus, Hercules, and the rest, descended into those regions, there can be no doubt of his having meant, though obscurely, that the shade of his own hero had gone to the same place. And these very verses are a proof that the poet distinguished between the rational and sentient soul of Pompey. For he supposes his mind to have flown up to the stars, and the highest ether from the funeral pile itself, and not till the body was half burnt. Whereas the life and sense of this illustrious man had already quitted the body before its members were laid upon the pile. Consequently the mind and celestial soul, the portion acceptable to the gods, remained in the body for some time after this was deprived of life, although in the mean while the sentient soul, as the ancients believed, had departed to the shades. [Nor was this opinion unknown to the Jews; see a passage from the Shalsheleth Hakkabala.]

Sect. VII. It is scarcely possible to express the confusion, doubt, and obscurity to which an ignorance of this ancient dogma has given rise in the lucubrations even of

in themselves no relation to any place, might therefore actuate

men who were eminent for their learning and for their profound acquaintance with matters of antiquity. For unless light and clearness be obtained from this source, there are many things in the rites and ceremonies of the Greeks and Romans which are altogether obscure, and many things in the disciplines of some philosophers which appear self-contradictory and almost inexplicable; a fact which I recollect having shown above by an example from the philosophy of Empedocles. The purpose of this disputation calls me to other matters, nor can I consume any time in illustrating what I have just stated; nevertheless, I shall adduce a specimen to prove how much assistance is afforded by this doctrine towards a full comprehension of the precepts of the ancients. It is well known that Pythagoras, Plato, Ennius, the ancient Egyptians, and others of the older philosophers, asserted the continual migration of departing souls into new bodies, and yet at the same time inculcated the doctrine of the punishment of souls in the infernal regions. It seems very difficult to reconcile these two tenets with each other. [See Bayle, Diction. voce Pythagoras, note f. 2317. and note m. p. 2320.] For if the soul, immediately on its departure, is subject to rewards or punishments in the lower regions, how can it enter into a new and different body? Many of the ancients, as it would require little labour to show, were already alarmed at this difficulty; and some therefore professed that minds do not enter into new bodies till they have passed a long period among the shades. This opinion was adopted by Virgil, not to speak now of others, who makes Anchises, Æneid. lib. 6. v. 650. say:

> Has omnes ubi mille rotam volvere per annos
> Lethæum ad flumen Deus evocat agmine magno,
> Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant
> Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti.

But it is hardly necessary to intimate that this is at variance with the ancient doctrine respecting the wanderings of souls. Others tried other ways of solving this difficulty, which for the present I pass over. Some more modern writers suppose, that the above-mentioned philosophers, when they discourse of the shades and the punishment of souls after death, are speaking merely according to the vulgar opinion, but that when they assert souls to be continually migrating into new bodies, they are declaring the genuine sentiments of their own mind. But this is conjecture and surmise rather than a clearing up of the difficulty by probable and satisfactory arguments. The whole question is got rid of by merely attending to the distinction which the ancients observed between the rational and sentient soul. The latter, which is alone susceptible of pain or pleasure, descends to the realms below according to these philosophers, and there either suffers punishment or is rewarded with delights. But the rational soul, to which neither pain nor pleasure belongs, does not go to the abode of the shades, but migrates into other men or beasts according to its various conditions, and performs a certain round, as it were, in its peregrinations. This was understood, though not to the full extent, by some of the junior Platonists, particularly Proclus and Syrianus, whom Æneas Gazæus names in his Theophrastus, p. 19. ed. Barthii; for they openly inculcated that the soul of a man, which migrates into beasts after the death of the body, is not that nature which formerly possessed sensation in the man; because a lion, eagle, or other animal is furnished with a peculiar sentient soul of its own; but that the rational soul alone was joined with the animate bodies of brutes on account of its having submitted too much to the senses and bodily desires; therefore that the fish in which Empedocles, according to his own confession, formerly resided, possessed a twofold soul, rational and sentient. Τὸν μὲν ἰκτῖνον λέγουσι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν ἔχειν τὴν ἄλογον, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπείαν ταύτῃ συνδεδέσθαι καὶ παραμένειν καὶ συμπέτεσθαι, "They say that the kite has its own irrational soul, and that the human is bound and connected with this, and remains fixed and flies about with it." Should any one pronounce all this to be foolish nonsense, I will not dissent from him; but still he must grant that it embraces some portion of the ancient discipline. The early doctrine of the transmigration of souls, let me add by the way, has been much corrupted and adulterated, first by Plato and afterwards by other philosophers, Greek as well as Roman, whose whole study was to make it conform and harmonize in some measure with the rest of their own precepts and tenets; and hence arose the great diversity and discrepancy of the opinions put forth by the ancients respecting the true

and inform the whole corporeal world at once, and take cogni-

nature and character of this doctrine. For each endeavoured to expound it so as to make it appear to be in accordance with his own views. I am not aware whether it is anywhere to be found at this day more pure and uncontaminated than among the Indians, whose precepts the Greeks, who might not improperly be called the corrupters of the earlier philosophy, had no opportunity of mixing up with any dogmas of their own. To this matter let those turn their attention, who devote themselves to the investigation of the true and genuine doctrines of ancient nations; for my own part I return to the subject from which I have somewhat digressed.

Sect. VIII. I come now to vulgar and plebeian souls, which afforded too ready an obedience to the incitements of the senses, and proceed to show the condition which the ancients assigned to these. The minds of the common multitude are so accustomed while in the mortal body to the society of the vital and sensitive souls, that on quitting the body they are not separated from those souls, nor are any longer capable of being separated, but descend with them into the lower world. This is evident from the passages of Homer and others, already quoted, and will be further corroborated by other testimonies which I shall produce by and by. The souls of Homer thirst for and are refreshed by blood; some are tormented with pains in the kingdom of Pluto, others are filled with pleasure and delight; and who, I ask, will deny these to be properties of the sentient soul? But the same souls reason, discourse, relate their own misfortunes, implore the aid of the living, and desire a better state; all which proclaim the presence of mind or the rational soul. According to the creed of the ancients, therefore, all that remains of a man, after the dissolution of this earthy body, is a thin and subtle image, or corporeal and airy spirit, which as appears from Homer, Iliad. Ψ. v. 199. &c. p. 853. and other places, gives way and seems to vanish like smoke, when the living attempt to lay hold of it:

Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.

But still it subsists and is endowed with the faculty of sensation, and moreover contains and includes the rational soul. In its form it is human, and a perfect resemblance of the body with which it was associated. And this is the less to be wondered at, as the ancients believed that the mind itself also, or the rational soul, divested of all sense, represented the human form: [Forma humana præstantissima, see Cicero De Natur. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 18. p. 2907.] of which we have an evidence, besides many others, in Thespesius mentioned by Plutarch, De His qui sero a Numine puniuntur, p. 564, tom. 2. opp. who was reported to have been for some time absent from the body and then to have returned to it. This man, besides many other matters relating to souls, in whose society he pretended to have been for some time, declared: "That the souls of the dying, when they ascend upwards, form a fiery bubble, and on this gradually bursting they come out τύπον ἔχουσαι ἀνθρωποειδῆ, 'having the human form,' and of a small bulk." And who is not aware that heroes, although their images, or εἴδωλα, were supposed to have descended to the shades, are nevertheless always represented in the writings of the poets as possessing the human form? Now, as is clear from passages of Homer and innumerable other early writers, those remains of the dead abovementioned were called by the ancient Greeks εἴδωλον, a word which the Platonists, always great admirers of ancient names and customs, afterwards adopted and retained. The Latin poets expressed this Greek term by the words *simulacrum*, *imago*, *umbra*, *manes*, as the sayings already adduced from them abundantly testify. [Pliny, Epist. 7. 27. p. 536. calls it *idolon*. Horace, lib. 1. od. 24. *vana imago*; on which consult Dacier, in his notes, tom. 2. p. 300. who sees a part but not the whole of the truth we have here expounded, for he supposes εἴδωλον to be the body without the soul.] Strictly and properly εἴδωλον denotes the body of the rational soul, or merely the sentient soul with which the mind itself is invested. This is shown by a remarkable passage of Plato, De Legibus, lib. 11. p. 693. wherein he states that the bodies of the dead are commonly called εἴδωλα: καὶ τελευτησάντων λέγεσθαι καλῶς ΕΙΔΩΛΑ εἶναι τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα, "The bodies of the dead we must suppose are rightly called images." Which bodies of the dead are nothing more that I know of than that subtle but corporeal spirit in which the ancients believed the minds of most men to be enveloped on their departure from this grosser body. This spirit, therefore, the Greeks formerly designated by the peculiar term εἴδωλον; to which νοῦς, or ψυχή, the name

zance of all things therein; their reply hereunto was, That

of the rational soul, is opposed in Plato and other writers. But a custom gradually grew up, as usually happens amongst mortals, of attaching a wider meaning to this word, and the whole of that which remains after the dissolution and extinction of the body came to be designated εἴδωλον, or image. This ought especially to be borne in mind by those who read Greek and Latin authors; with whom εἴδωλον sometimes denotes merely the vestment or corporeal image of the rational soul, and sometimes the two souls in conjunction and connexion with each other. The junior Platonists restored the ancient meaning to the word; in whose writings, as far as I remember, it always signifies the integument or aerial body of the departing soul, and never the whole of that which quits the body in death. The principles of the philosophy they professed did not permit this sect to follow the custom of poets, and to assign to the word a more extensive signification.

Sect. IX. I am not now disposed to enter into a long investigation of the opinion entertained by the ancients respecting the site or locality of the infernal regions: which most of them seem to have placed beneath the earth. For I can hardly persuade myself that this opinion, which was formerly common to the whole of the Greeks and Latins, emanated from the poets alone. But an inquiry into the condition of souls during their sojourn in these regions, will be more in accordance with our present purpose. All souls that proceed to the Plutonic realms are in a corrupt state, and polluted with various stains and impurities. While they were among mortals they suffered from the contagion of the body, and their connexion with the sentient and concupiscent soul: to the influence of which they so entirely submitted, as to be utterly incapable of being released from its bonds. That is, the depraved and perverse desires of the sentient soul flowed with such force into the purer and better mind, during its stay in the body, that they became as it were, properties of the mind itself: which is now therefore wholly connected and united with the sentient soul, and disquieted and agitated by the same passions. Hence, before these souls can be received into the society of the blessed, there is a necessity for purgation. For what brawls and tempests would not souls propense to vice, and addicted to depraved desires, excite in the celestial regions, from which all discord ought for ever to be absent! First of all, therefore, medicine is administered to them in the shades to purge them from inveterate stains, and entirely to draw them away from the communion of the sentient, irascible, libidinous, and concupiscent soul. In what manner the most ancient sages supposed souls to be cured and renovated in the lower world, or what physician they appointed to this office, I would not readily undertake to say. For what we read of in the poets and philosophers in regard to this purgation, is for the most figurative, as will be seen by and by, and borrowed from human customs and institutions. Most probably, however, they are not much mistaken who suppose that the ancients regarded that most subtle element fire, as best adapted for the cure and purification of ethereal souls, which are themselves closely allied to the nature of fire. To some souls this treatment is beneficial: a portion of which are sooner set free than another according to the nature of the vices and the inveteracy of the habit of crime. For the corporeal image or sentient soul gradually flows off, and leaves the mind free and emancipated from all affection and suffering. Those which have thus recovered their healthy state, are permitted to depart to the society of the better and purified souls, with which they live a life of endless felicity in the most delightful regions. But others have been so deeply imbued with vice and the love of sin, that that they are utterly incapable of being separated from the sentient soul, and restored to their pristine purity. These are doomed by the just and inexorable judge to eternal punishment, and are tortured in various ways according to the variety of crimes. There is therefore a threefold class of souls in the lower world, and this subterraneous and most ample dominion of the shades is divided into three departments. To the first class belong those which are curable, and are therefore located in a certain place, appointed by divine providence for their cure: another class consists of purified souls which have been released from their prison, and inhabit regions filled with every delight, and which the poets call *the Elysian fields*: the third class comprises those that remain connected with their images or shades, and suffer eternal puishment for their crimes in Tartarus: Virgil, Æneid, lib. 6. v, 441. &c.

Nox ruit, Æneа, nos flendo ducimus horas.
Hic locus est, partes ubi se via findit in ambas,

these being essentially but parts of the universe, and therefore

> Dextera, quæ Ditis magni sub mœnia tendit:
> Hac iter Elysium nobis: at læva malorum
> Exercet pœnas et ad impia Tartara mittit.

[On this descent of Æneas consult Warburton, in the Biblioth. Britan. tom. 12. par. 1. p. 1. &c.] This is the voice of the Sybil conducting Æneas to the lower regions. I have hitherto been explaining in plain and simple terms the doctrine of the ancients respecting the state of souls after death: and that I have here advanced nothing hastily, will be shown by the testimonies which I shall by and by bring forward. But the licence of the poets and their love of fiction have introduced so much darkness and fable into this simple discipline, that it can scarcely be recognized by those who are altogether inexperienced in matters of antiquity. Wherefore, the ornaments and figures with which the ancient bards have embellished or rather corrupted it, ought always to be carefully distinguished from the things and opinions concealed under these coverings: a task which will occasion very little difficulty to him who is moderately acquainted with the nature of the fables respecting the gods, and with the habits and customs of poets.

Sect. X. Among the evidences I intend to bring forward, I shall assign the first place to Plato, who, in his Gorgias, p. 313, gives a clear and intelligent account of the popular opinions of his own time. I shall not repeat, however, the whole of the fable which he there relates, but shall merely extract so much of it as is especially applicable to my present purpose. After saying that judges are appointed by Jupiter in the infernal regions to hear the causes of departed souls, he states that the souls bring with them certain marks to enable these judges to know, which have formerly lived a just and pious life, and which the contrary: Ἐνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τά τε τᾶς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφίκωνται παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ——— θεᾶται ἑκάστου τὴν ψυχήν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ——— κατεῖδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὂν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιορκιῶν καὶ ἀδικίας ἃ ἑκάστῳ ἡ πρᾶξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας, κ. τ. λ., "All things are visible in the soul when it is denuded of the body, both those of nature and the affections which a man has implanted in the soul by his pursuit of each particular object. When they come therefore before the judge——he inspects the soul of each, but knows not to whom it belongs: but oftentimes taking that of the great and potent king (of the Persians) he finds no soundness in it, but sees it lashed all over and full of scars through perjuries and injustice, such as the practice of each vice has impressed upon the soul, and all made crooked by falsehood and vanity, &c." According to this passage of the philosopher, when crimes and evil deeds are committed in this life, the soul is impressed with certain marks and spots, and these marks appear in the body in which the departed soul is invested, and disclose to the judge its internal nature. All this is borrowed from the poets, who had certain reasons for inventing this fiction, which I shall explain by and by. But the opinion entertained by the ancients is evident even from these shadows. They supposed namely, that the soul on departing from the earthly body, possesses another thin and subtle body, whose passions and internal state would not be easily discernible to a man less wise and sagacious than Minos and Rhadamanthus, whom the poets installed as judges of the lower world. Unless the ancients had fancied a certain image of the man or sentient soul to be present with the rational soul when it quits the body, the poets would never have sung of scars and marks imprinted upon the soul by crime. Let us follow Plato in his examination of the state of souls, affected in the way he has stated: Ἰδὼν δὲ (ὁ δικαστὴς) ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς, οὗ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλῆναι τὰ προσήκοντα πάθη, "The judge, therefore, having inspected the soul so affected, straightway commits it with ignominy into custody, where it is to undergo the merited punishment." And yet these souls which the judge has condemned as wicked and vicious, do not all remain for ever in this custody. Those which admit of being healed are discharged from thence, while the others which cannot be divested of their scars, are sent away to graver and eternal punishments. This is stated so clearly by Plato, as to leave not the least room for doubt: Εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων,

not comprehensive of the whole, finite or particular, and not

οὗτοι οἳ ἂν ἰάσιμά, ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτῶσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυνῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφέλεια καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν ᾅδου· οὐ γὰρ οἱόντε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι· οἳ δὲ ἂν ἀδικήσωσι, καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι γίνονται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὗτοι αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες· ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίνανται, οἱ τούτοις ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένοις ἐκεῖ ἐν ᾅδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ τοῖς ἀεὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα, "Those who profit by the punishment they suffer both among gods and men, as such as have committed remediable sins; who are benefited by pains and torments both here and in orcus: for it is impossible otherwise to be freed from injustice. But whoever are guilty of the worst of crimes, and by reason of such crimes become incurable, of these examples are made, and they no longer are benefited themselves, as being incurable: but others are benefited, who behold them suffering for their sins the greatest and most painful and most frightful punishments for everlasting, and held up there in their prison in hell, as examples, and spectacles, and warnings to the unjust that from time to time come thither." I pass over the rest that is to be met with in Plato to the same effect: for I have already quoted what will be sufficient to give an insight into the most ancient doctrine prevailing among the Greeks long prior to the time of this philosopher.

Sect. XI. To Plato I join Plutarch, who is well known to have been intimately versed in the doctrines and institutions of antiquity, and who with a few trifling exceptions, gives the same exposition of the fate and condition of disembodied souls, not omitting even that opinion of the poets which inculcates that indelible marks are impressed upon souls by crime. After saying that some souls suffer the punishment of their sins while they are yet in the body, he thus proceeds: Ὧν δὲ μεῖζον ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ περὶ τὴν κακίαν ἰατρεία, τούτους δίκη μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ὁ δαίμων παραδίδωσι· τοὺς δὲ πάμπαν ἀνιάτους ἀπωσαμένης τῆς δίκης, ἡ τρίτη καὶ ἀγριωτάτη τῶν Ἀδραστείας ὑπουργῶν Ἐρινὺς μεταθέουσα πλανωμένους καὶ περιφεύγοντας ἄλλον ἄλλως, οἰκτρῶς τε καὶ χαλεπῶς ἅπαντας ἠφάνισε καὶ κατέδυσιν εἰς τὸ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀόρατον, "But those (souls), whose wickedness requires more powerful and efficacious remedies, the demon delivers up to justice after death; and such as are altogether incurable, being repelled and driven away by justice, and wandering and fleeing up and down, are pursued by Erinnus, the third and most relentless of the ministers of Adrastea, and are all miserably and cruelly dispersed, and plunged into the place which is untold of and unseen." After this he describes the severity and cruelty of the punishments which souls polluted with vices undergo in the lower regions; which to avoid unnecessary prolixity, I for the present pass over. But I cannot omit what he subsequently records respecting the spots and marks of souls: Οὐλαὶ δέ, says he, καὶ μώλωπες ἐπὶ τῶν παθῶν ἑκάστου τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον ἐμμένουσι, τοῖς δὲ ἧσσον· ὁρᾶ δὲ τὰ ποικίλα ταῦτα καὶ παντοδαπὰ χρώματα τῶν ψυχῶν· τὸ μὲν δρφιον καὶ ῥυπαρὸν, ἀνελευθερίας ἀλοιφὴν καὶ πλεονεξίας· τὸ δὲ αἱματωπὸν καὶ διάπυρον ὠμότητος καὶ πικρίας· ὅπου δὲ τὸ γλαύκινόν ἐστιν, ἐντεῦθεν ἀκρασία τις περὶ ἡδονὰς ἐκτέτριπται μόλις, κακὸν οἷα δεινὸν οὖσα μετὰ φθόνου τοῦτ' τὸ ἰωδὲς καὶ ὕπουλον, ὥσπερ αἱ σηπίαι τὸ μέλαν, ἀφιησιν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἥ τε κακία τῆς ψυχῆς τρεπομένης ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν καὶ τρεπούσης τὸ σῶμα τὰς χρόας ἀναδίδωσιν, ἐνταῦθα δὲ καθαρμοῦ καὶ κολάσεως πέρας ἐστὶ· τούτων ἐκλειανθέντων παντάπασι, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐγοειδῆ καὶ σύγχρουν γίνεσθαι, "But the scars and seams remain from the several vices, in some greater, in some less. Now behold those various and diversified colours of souls. The dark and squalid are the taint of illiberality and avarice: the blood-red and fiery of cruelty and barbarity: the green of intemperance in pleasures: the violet-coloured and livid, like the ink of the cuttle-fish, of envy and malignity. For there the wickedness of the soul influenced by the passions, and influencing the body, produces the colours: here it is the end of the purification and punishment. When these colours are thoroughly purged away, the soul becomes bright and unsullied." In these words, Plutarch not only gives a more lucid explanation of the doctrine of the Greek poets on the ulcers and blotches of vicious souls, but also endeavours in some degree to reconcile it to the precepts of philosophy and reason: which probably he would have refrained from doing, had he taken the trouble to inquire into its true causes, which we shall presently explain. He pretends moreover, to have received all this, as well as the rest of what he there states respecting souls,

universal beings (as the three hypostases of the Platonic trinity

from the mouth of an individual called Thespesius, who quitted the body for a certain time, and lived among souls, and afterwards returned to the body, De Sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. 2. opp. p. 564. 565. This Thespesius, therefore, had furnished the living with no new information in consequence of his intercourse with souls, but had merely learnt that what had been handed down by poets and sages from the remotest times was in accordance with the truth.

Sect. XII. An attentive reader of the ninth book of Virgil's Æneid, and of the description given in it of the infernal regions, will find the same dogma propounded. We shall in this place merely quote and briefly illustrate those verses, which Dr. Cudworth adduced above to show the antiquity of the Platonic doctrine respecting the twofold body of souls, v. 637. &c.

> Quin et supremo cum lumine vita reliquit,
> Non tamen omne malum miseris, nec funditus omnes
> Corporeæ excedunt pestes: penitusque necesse est,
> Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
> Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumque malorum
> Supplicia expendunt: aliæ panduntur inanes
> Suspensæ ad ventos: aliis sub gurgite vasto
> Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni:
> Quisque suos patimur manes: exinde per amplum
> Mittimur Elysium et pauci læta arva tenemus,
> Donec, longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
> Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
> Æthereum sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem.

The learned Doctor supposes that these verses of Virgil are drawn from the middle philosophy, and contain a clear indication of that twofold body, ethereal and aerial, which the junior Platonists assigned to the soul. In both which suppositions I consider him to be mistaken. For it is evident from what we have hitherto stated that the poet is here expressing the popular, antiquated, and obsolete opinions which flourished long before Plato founded his own discipline, and instilled it into the minds of the Greeks. I do not deny, however, that Virgil there combines the vulgar opinions with the precepts of Pythagoras, and as it were, confounds the two with each other: and whether he has done this with sufficient skill and accuracy or not, I shall not now inquire. The account he gives of the various purgations of souls in the lower regions, savours of popular fables and poetic fictions rather than of the dogmas of the wise: but what he afterwards adds respecting the migration of souls into new bodies after the lapse of a certain space of time, is borrowed from the precepts of Pythagoras and others. Although I have read this over and over again, I have met with no trace of a twofold body of the soul. It is clear, I confess, from the first eight verses, that Virgil supposed the soul to be invested with a certain body on its departure to the shades, and that this body exhibits the traces of crimes and misdeeds committed during life. For how could a soul devoid of body undergo those punishments, by which souls, he tells us, are healed and purified? I own it to be evident also from the concluding verses, that the souls of Virgil are at length divested of that grosser body, which the ancients held to be marked with the imprints of vice. But I deny the truth of the learned Doctor's opinion, that the "ethereal sense and fire of simple air," which the poet tells us "is left pure," is another and different body, called by the Platonists ethereal. This ethereal sense is the soul itself, which the ancients, as we have before seen, supposed to be detached from the immortal ether, and in a certain measure corporeal. The sect of junior Platonists distinguished the ethereal portion from the nature of the soul itself; but in this they corrupted the doctrine entertained in earlier times: as is evident from the preceding verse, 632. in which the poet thus sings of the nature of souls:

> Igneus est ollis vigor et cœlestis origo.

From which we may easily learn that Virgil held souls to be of a fiery nature and portions of ether; celestial meaning the same as what he afterwards calls ethereal.

are), the sphere of their activity could not possibly extend any

Nevertheless, in these verses, Virgil does not preserve the ancient discipline pure and unadulterated, but tempers it with an alloy from the schools of philosophers, and probably also from his own peculiar opinions. The ancients imagine that souls are not transferred to the society of the blessed till they are thoroughly purified, and that they dwell in those delightful abodes for everlasting. Far otherwise Virgil: who, as these verses clearly show, supposed: That souls which are capable of being healed in the first instance, suffer lengthened tortures in the lower regions; but that as these tortures do not purge them from every blemish and corporeal stain, they are despatched to the Elysian plains, having been divested of their graver impurities: that in these plains the purgation after a long period is entirely completed, and the soul being restored to its perfectly pure and unsullied state, is inspired by providence with a desire to revisit the upper regions. Probably Virgil was indebted to some contemporary philosopher of the Platonic sect, for a portion of this discipline, which he himself amplified and enriched from the fables of the poets, and the opinions of the multitude.

Sect. XIII. The discipline of the ancients on the state of souls after their departure from the body being now presented in its naked form, and stript of the fictions of poetry, I shall proceed to say a few words respecting the ornaments and embellishments by which the poets recommended it to the favour of the public. But before I do so, I shall anticipate a doubt which I am aware may occur to the minds of attentive and intelligent readers. I stated before that according to the doctrine of the ancients, the image or sentient soul is utterly destroyed in the infernal regions, and removed from the ethereal soul, and that the latter is not permitted to proceed to the society of the blessed, until this soul, which is the seat of the sensual appetites and animal life, has been entirely dispersed and obliterated. But the passages of Plato and Plutarch warrant us in supposing the ancients to have meant, not that the image is totally annihilated, but merely that it is divested of its marks and vices, and in its purified state, accompanies the rational soul in its ascent to the happy mansions. There were some among the Platonists themselves who asserted this common flight of the εἴδωλον, or "corporeal image of man," and the mind to the celestial regions. And owing to the great darkness in which the affairs and doctrines of the ancients are involved, I own it is very difficult to say what were the real opinions entertained by the principal philosophers upon the subject. Perhaps there was some dissension among them, one portion attributing destruction, and another immortality to the sentient soul, and from this arose the obscurity and discrepancies of the early writers who have touched upon this dogma. Still I have not adopted the opinion above mentioned without reason; but on a due consideration of the matter, conceive it to be more probable that the images or shades of the dead were supposed by the first founders of this philosophy to be doomed to utter extinction. What in the first place leads me to this conclusion, is the nature of the souls themselves, which is such as to be incapable of holding out against the multiplicity of punishments and torments which the ancients supposed to be inflicted upon them. For the sentient soul is a thin, subtle, and corporeal spirit, resembling air and wind, which, as every body will admit, can be dispersed and dissipated. Moreover, according to the belief of the ancients, everything concrete and corporeal, with the exception of ether, which they held to be immortal, if acted upon by a superior force, perishes and returns to its primitive elements. Another argument for this opinion is furnished by that state of quiescence, tranquillity, and exemption from all perturbation, into which they supposed souls to enter after undergoing the tortures of hell. For how could they live so placidly, quietly, and chastely, if they were to enter that abode of supreme felicity in the society of a soul which is full of desires and animal sense, and retains the traces of its ancient propensities? Some one will object perhaps that it is divested of all these by the punishments of the lower world; but I beg him to remember that by destroying these appetites which constitute the very nature and essence of the sentient soul, the soul itself also is necessarily destroyed and annihilated. In this soul there exists a propensity to anger, an appetite for pleasure, a love and desire of the body: take away these, and you will take away the soul itself; which without them is altogether a nonentity. Lastly, I am not a little confirmed in this opinion, by a passage of Philostratus, respecting the soul of Ulysses, in his Heroic. cap. 18. sect. 3. p. 727. Ἐς Ἰθάκην, says he, πότε τὸν Ὅμηρον πλεῦσαι φησὶν, ἀκούσαντα ὡς πέπνυται ἔτι ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ ψυχαγωγίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὴν χρήσασθαι, "(Protesilaus) tells us that Homer once sailed to Ithaca, having heard

farther than to the quickening and enlivening of some certain

that the soul of Ulysses was still alive, and made use of charms for its evocation." The soul of Ulysses summoned from hell by Homer appears, and among other things declares that it suffers most grievous tortures for having slain Palamedes: Οἱ γὰρ, it says, δεμιστεύοντες ἐνταῦθα δεινοὶ, Ὅμηρε, καὶ τὰ ἐκ ποινῶν ἐγγύς, "For those who administer justice here are severe and rigid, O Homer, and the punishments quickly follow." Scarcely any thing more apposite could be said for the corroboration of our opinion. The soul of Ulysses is stated to be yet living in the lower world, and to be suffering the punishments to which it is sentenced by Rhadamanthus for a murder heretofore committed. Consequently, after the lapse of a certain interval, death and destruction await it. To understand these words as referring to the rational and ethereal soul would be in direct opposition not only to the sentiments of Philostratus and Homer, but also to the entire discipline of the ancients, which denies it to be possible for this soul to perish. It remains for us to suppose, therefore, that his sentient soul was punished and tormented till it ceased to exist, and the free and emancipated mind migrated to the heavenly abodes. I am aware that souls dismissed from the dominions of Pluto, and residing in the society of the happy, were supposed, according to the more ancient doctrine, not only to possess a certain body but even the human form and appearance; which might seem to be a proof that the sentient and aerial but purified soul never abandons the other soul with which it was associated during life. But this does not move me from my opinion; for it proceeds from the poets, who, as is the case also in sacred Writ, when discoursing of the souls and delights of the happy, adapt themselves to the popular comprehension, and borrow their forms and modes of expression from human things. Upon this subject Cicero most pertinently, Tusculan. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 16. p. 2584. tom. 8. opp. Animas per se viventes non poterant mente complecti: formam aliquam figuramque quærebant. Inde Homeri tota νεκυία. . . . Nihil enim animo videre poterant, ad oculos omnia referebant, "They could form no conception of souls living by themselves; they required some shape and figure. Hence the whole of Homer's νεκυία. . . . . For being able to perceive nothing mentally, they referred every thing to the eyes." I pass over what I have already intimated, that the human form was ascribed by the most ancient writers to the rational soul also; whose opinion so pervaded all nations that even Christian authors adopted it, as we may learn from Tertullian's book De Anima. Julian in his Cæsars tells us that all the heroes whom he represents as present at the banquet of the gods possessed the human form and a subtle body. Nor is it greatly to be wondered at when we consider that the ancients supposed souls to consist of most subtle ether. For where matter is, there of necessity must be some form also. And what form can be imagined more suitable to the soul than the human, with which the ancients firmly believed even the gods themselves to be endowed? But I shall dismiss these matters for the present, and proceed to the fictions of the poets.

Sect. XIV. It is notorious that those who embodied the dogmas of antiquity in verse, borrowed the colouring and embellishments, by which they sought to gain for them a readier access into the popular mind, from ancient history, and formed a certain discipline called in the present day *mythology*, compounded of the precepts of ancient philosophers and the legends of their own country. Hence they also obscured with the same ornaments and fictions the most simple doctrine of the state of souls after death, in order to beguile and conciliate the ears of the multitude, who held in firm remembrance the affairs and exploits of bygone ages as handed down from their ancestors. First of all the subterranean place itself in which disembodied souls were supposed to be confined was depicted by them in such a way as accorded with Grecian conceptions, and the manners of the times in which they lived. In the next place, being aware that that incredible multitude of souls could not possibly dispense with a leader and king, they selected Pluto out of ancient tradition, a certain king probably of Epirus or some other province, well known to the common people for his severity, and assigned to him the sovereignty of the shades. On him they bestowed all the concomitants with which the kings of their own times were accustomed to be surrounded, a palace, servants, wife, counsellors, lictors, executioners, porters, and the like. But as they had founded so dreadful and dismal a community, in order to express all these they were obliged to have recourse to the most hideous and horrible images. This is well known to the readers of Homer, Virgil, and the other poets. That in the re-

parts of matter and the world, allotted to them, and thereby of

motest ages dogs were chained to the doors of the rich and powerful for the purpose of deterring the approach of mendicants and thieves, is a fact which has long ago been demonstrated by learned men. The poets, therefore, considered it incumbent upon themselves to commit the custody of hell in like manner to a great and savage dog; which, to produce a more powerful impression upon the minds of the vulgar, they feigned to be triple-headed. For as the infernal dominions were divided into three parts, namely, Tartarus, the Elysian fields, and the abode of souls not yet purged and proved, and consequently the door and entrance of this gloomy realm was threefold, it was reasonable that the dog placed at the threshold of hell should be endowed with a threefold head, in order to be able to guard all the inlets. In Homer's time kings had already departed from the ancient simplicity, and no longer adjudicated on the causes of their subjects, but had delegated this office to others. It was therefore proper to exempt the king of hell also from this labour. Hence they selected from the ancient history of their country those men that had formerly enjoyed a high reputation for justice and rigour, and were commonly regarded as the first examples of most upright and just judges, namely, Rhadamanthus, Minos, and Æacus, whom they installed in that awful tribunal, and appointed as inquisitors of souls. And with respect to these judges they used the same expressions as though they perfectly resembled those whom they saw administering justice in their own times, either as regards the form of trial or any other characteristic by which a judge is usually distinguished from the rest of the people. As this region was believed to be situated underneath the earth, the road which led to it was necessarily described as rugged, dark, dreary, and unknown to mortals. Disembodied souls, therefore, would probably have missed their way, unless they had been furnished with a guide; probably also some of those which were weighed down by a consciousness of crime would have chosen to wander about on the earth for ever, rather than descend into a place which they foresaw was about to be most dreadful and fatal to themselves. Even this inconvenience was provided against by the poets; for they assigned Mercury as the guide and conductor of the dead, and taught the people that he not only points out the way to errant souls, but compels the reluctant to enter it. The rest I pass over; for I have no intention here of explaining the fables of the poets, or of trespassing upon the province of the philologer. Yet it perhaps will be worth while, and at the same time not foreign to our present purpose, to select from a great variety of matter certain points which in my opinion have not yet been sufficiently discussed, and to examine and illustrate them by the light of reason. For although the first authors and inventors of fables obeyed any thing rather than reason, still I am certain that their discipline is in a certain measure consistent and in keeping with itself, and that nothing has been handed down by them which is repugnant to its first principles.

Sect. XV. I shall speak first of all of the spots and blotches with which souls on their departure from the bodies are said by the poets to be marked and impressed owing to their former habitude of crime. The thing and doctrine itself is already understood from the passages of Plato and Plutarch above quoted. But none of the ancients, that I know of, has expounded it according to the vulgar and poetic sense more aptly than Lucian, whom it therefore will be of advantage to hear. In his Cataplus or Tyrannus, tom. 2. opp. p. 436. &c. he introduces three men who are placed before Rhadamanthus for examination in the lower regions, Cyniscus a philosopher, Mycisecus a cobbler, and lastly a tyrant infamous for the variety of his crimes during life. The philosopher is first placed before the judge, perfectly naked. He is considered by Rhadamanthus to be pure, but nevertheless has three or four marks of healed ulcers. On seeing these marks the judge asks how he managed to efface the imprints of crime. The philosopher replies: Πάλαι πονηρός δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν γενόμενος καὶ πολλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἐμπολήσας στίγματα, ἐπειδὴ τάχιστα φιλοσοφεῖν ἠρξάμην, κατ' ὀλίγον ἀπάσας τὰς κηλίδας ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπελούσάμην, "Having formerly become depraved and wicked through ignorance, and by that means marked with many spots, as soon as I began to philosophize, I gradually wiped away all stains from the soul." The ancients believed, therefore, that the study of philosophy and the love of virtue can heal and remove the leprosy which the bodies of souls contract from crimes. The cobbler next appears before the judge; but he is perfectly pure and devoid of spots, καθαρὸς ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἀνεπίγραφος, because he had led an innocent life. But the third, Megapenthes the tyrant, although he endeavours by all means to clear

becoming particular animals; it being peculiar to the Deity, or

himself before the judge, is found to be covered over with the foulest blotches: Ἀλλὰ καὶ, says the judge, p. 442. ἀπόδυθι τὴν πορφυρίδα, ἵνα καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἴδωμεν τῶν στιγμάτων· παπαὶ, ὅλος οὐτοσὶ πελιδνὸς καὶ κατάγραφος, μᾶλλον δὲ κνάνεος ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῶν στιγμάτων, "Put off the purple robe, that we may see the number of the spots. Why really this man is all over livid and spotted, nay, rather is black with spots." The criminal is consequently doomed by Rhadamanthus to a new and exquisite punishment. This passage does not require illustration; for it clearly shows what opinion was entertained by the poets as well as by the people, who derived their religion from the poets, on souls being marked with certain spots in consequence of vice. Hence Julian the emperor, when he wished to accommodate his satire entitled "the Cæsars," to the vulgar and popular opinions, judged it proper to avail himself also of this dogma. Thus Tiberius, whose life and reign had been most base and vicious, as soon as he appears in the company of the gods, is immediately perceived to be covered with foul marks: Ἐπιστραφέντος δὲ πρὸς τὴν καθέδραν ὤφθησαν ὠτειλαὶ κατὰ τὸν νῶτον μυρίαι, κάυτῆρές τινες καὶ ξέσματα καὶ πληγαὶ χαλεπαὶ καὶ μώλωπες ὑπό τε ἀκολασίας καὶ ὠμότητος, ψωραί τινες καὶ λειχῆνες, οἷον ἐγκεκαυμέναι, "When he turned to the chair thousands of scars were seen on his back, seams and scratches and severe gashes and wales, caused by intemperance and cruelty; scabs and blotches as though burnt into the skin." Juliani Cæsares, opp. p. 309. What is extraordinary in this passage is that Tiberius' back alone is said to be polluted with these marks, whereas the others have no part of the body free from this malady. But the imperial writer seems to me to have intended this as a silent sneer at the hypocrisy of Tiberius, who is known to have affected the greatest probity and decorum in his words and outward appearance, while in his heart he was an utter stranger to all shame and virtue. Now if any one should inquire the reason why the poets inculcated that marks are imprinted on the sentient soul by vice and crime and cannot be obliterated except by an amendment of life, I think it will be unnecessary to go far out of the way for an answer, nor do I agree with those who suppose the fiction to have originated from some dogma of philosophy. For over the administration of justice in the lower regions they had placed mortals, Minos, Æacus, and Rhadamanthus, who certainly were great, just, and illustrious, but still mortals, and therefore incapable of looking into the interior recesses of souls. It was therefore natural for them to devise certain external marks by which the judges might be enabled to ascertain without accusers and witnesses what actions the soul had committed during their association with the earthly bodies. Now it was a very ancient custom with moralists and wise men to compare the vices of mankind to filth and dirt, and metaphorically to designate sins or crimes as the spots and stains of the souls; which figurative expressions, as usually happens among men, the generality of the common people of former times, as at the present day, understood and interpreted in the strict and literal sense. Wherefore in conformity with the ancient form and usage of speech, and agreeably at the same time to the notions of the vulgar, to whose favour they were anxious to recommend their fables, they feigned that the soul is polluted by crimes, and that it always retains the traces of that contagion, and carries them down with it to the infernal tribunal. If they had referred this inquisition on the life and morals of men to God himself, from whom nothing is hidden and concealed, they would have been able to dispense with this ingenuity, and to give a more plain and easy solution of the whole matter.

Sect. XVI. From this most ancient doctrine of marks being impressed upon the body by the vices, flowed, in my opinion, the various lustrations and purgations of the ancients, especially those practised in the Mysteries, as also the Taurobolia and other sacrifices of that kind, which were formerly supposed to be of avail for the purification of men and the total expiation of crime: which customs first took their rise in Greece, and were afterwards transferred also to the Latins. Ovid, Fastorum, lib. 2. ver. 35. p. 76. tom. 3. opp.

Omne nefas, omnemque mali purgamina caussam
Credebant nostri tollere posse senes.
Græcia principium moris fuit: illa nocentes
Impia lustratos ponere facta putat.

that incorporeal substance, which is infinite, to quicken and actuate all things.

I am duly grateful to those learned men who in erudite works have investigated and thrown light upon the Grecian mysteries, lustrations, and other ancient superstitions of the kind, but still they seem to me to have explained the rites themselves more than their origin and causes. It is evident that those who first held it to be possible for men to be purified by sacred waters, blood, and the like, whether in or out of the Mysteries, believed that the souls derived some advantage and benefit from these ceremonies. For the body, which they supposed to be about to perish, was not an object of their solicitude. But they believed that guilt, and the punishment due to crimes, were to be expiated by the offering of victims and sacrifices: what benefit then could souls expect to derive from lustrations? For my own part I feel convinced that sacred waters, and other kinds of purgations, were supposed in the earliest ages to be efficacious for cleansing the soul from the filth and impurity contracted by the perpetration of crimes. As the philosophers of a later period, as we have just shown from Lucian, boasted that the wounds and ulcers of souls were healed by their precepts and dogmas; so, in the mysteries of old, crafty and designing priests professed the art of effacing the marks left imprinted on the soul in consequence of crimes and misdeeds, so that they should not be visible to the infernal judges; alleging that water consecrated by due formalities and other similar absurdities possess such great virtue and efficacy, that they penetrate through the body to the sensual soul, and thoroughly purge it of all traces of vice. As we are too far removed from the times in which these rites were instituted, and the writers from whom at this day we derive our knowledge of ancient matters are not always sufficiently plain and perspicuous, it is impossible to prove this by direct and express testimonies: but I consider the thing here speaks for itself, nor are we altogether without evidence from which it may be safely inferred. In the first place, the priests of the Mysteries, as we are told by grave authors, affirmed that those who were not duly initiated and purified would live in hell in mud and mire, while the initiated, after departing from the bodies, would at once be transferred to the mansions of the blessed. Plato in his Phædo, p. 380: Καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες, οὐ φαῦλοί τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι, ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς ᾅδου ἀφίκεται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται· ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει, "Wherefore those who instituted the Mysteries seem to be no contemptible men, but in reality to have darkly admonished us of old that whoever passes into the infernal regions uninitiated and unexpiated, will lie wallowing in mud: but that he who arrives thither purified and initiated will dwell with the gods." A kindred passage occurs in lib. 2. De Republica, p. 424. Aristides, in the oration called Eleusinian, in which he deplores the burning of the temple of Ceres, tom. 1. opp. ed. Sam. Jamb. p. 259. says as follows: Ἀλλὰ μὲν τότε· κέρδος τῆς παυηγύρεως οὐχ ὅσον ἡ παροῦσα εὐθυμία οὐδ' αἱ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ προτέρου χρόνου δυσκολιῶν λύσεις καὶ ἀπαλλαγαί. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ περὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ἡδίους ἔχειν τὰς ἐλπίδας ὡς ἀμεινον διάξοντας καὶ οὐκ ἐν σκότῳ τε καὶ βορβόρῳ κεισομένους, ἃ δὴ τοὺς ἀμυήτους ἀναμένει, "Nevertheless the advantage of this assembly consists not merely in present tranquillity of mind or in being released and freed from former troubles, but in our having better hopes in regard to death, as being about to live more happily, and not to lie in darkness and mire, a fate which awaits the uninitiated." In Diog. Laërtius the Athenians exhort Diogenes to get himself initiated into the Mysteries for the sake of the advantages accruing from thence to souls after this life, lib. 6. segm. 39. p. 334. 335. The philosopher replies: Γελοῖον εἰ Ἀγεσίλαος μὲν καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ διάξουσιν, ἀτελεῖς δέ τινες μεμυημένοι ἐν ταῖς μακάρων νήσοις ἔσονται, "It is ridiculous if Agesilaus and Epaminondas are to live in mud, and vile and worthless persons, that have been initiated, are to reside in the isles of the blessed." Add a quotation from Plutarch in Ægid. Menagius' notes on this passage, p. 240. and what is related by the same Laërtius respecting Antisthenes, lib. 6. segm. 4. p. 319. I will never believe that the priests who terrified the vulgar by this phraseology, meant that the souls of those who were not duly initiated and purified would live in hell in mud and filth. For apart from this not being a very severe punishment, the opinion is altogether at variance with the ancient doctrine of departed souls, nor has any thing of the kind been put forth by the poets, who have given an elaborate description of the infernal regions. I therefore take it to be a figurative mode of speech, such as was generally made use of by this

But it would be no impertinent digression here (as to the

class of persons, which was meant to imply that men not purified by consecrated waters and other ceremonies will carry with them the impurities contracted through vice and crime into the lower world, and will there have to endure a far more painful purgation than they were willing to undergo in the Mysteries, till they have been thoroughly divested of all marks and stains. Socrates certainly had some notion of this kind in Plato's Phædo, where he expounds this saying of the priests who presided over the Mysteries philosophically, and in reference to the necessity of purifying the mind. That is to say, according to the opinion of the ancients, a man contaminated with vice stands in need of purgation; and therefore it is necessary for him to undergo it either here or after he has quitted the body. The earliest philosophers, as we have already seen, asserted that the soul is not purified till after death: but subsequently those who had the charge of the religions, or rather superstitious, who in former times, as at the present day, turned the fear and levity of the people to their own profit, endeavoured to persuade the multitude that they knew of a method by which, if so disposed, they might escape that severe purgation in the lower world. And I regret to perceive, on reading the ancient Christian writers, that not a small portion of this absurd opinion found its way into the Christian community. What I have stated is greatly confirmed by the examples of the junior Platonists, Apollonius, Proclus, Jamblichus, and others, who are said to have travelled over a considerable part of the world and to have suffered themselves to be initiated into all the Mysteries, in order to give the soul greater freedom and aptitude for contemplation, and to purge it from all mortal contagion. In doing which they doubtless imitated the ancient discipline to which this sect was altogether devoted. For although they explained the meaning of this lustration and purgation practised in the Mysteries somewhat differently from the popular opinion and the traditions of the priests themselves, still this custom of theirs proves the antiquity and universal prevalence of the opinion, that mysteries and sacred purgations are beneficial to the soul, and divest it of all impure admixture, so that it departs pure and unsullied into the lower world. And what after all is that which ancient writers so often speak of, that a man expiated by taurobolium, lustration, or the mystic rites, *is born again?* Apuleius, Metamorphos. lib. 11. p. 267. says of the benefit of the Mysteries, into which he had himself been initiated: "Since when the mortal course is finished, and they are now placed on the very threshold of closing life, God is wont to select those to whom the great secrets of religion may safely be confided, and by his providence to place them, *born* again in a certain manner, in a new career." Those who had made the sacrifice of the taurobolium, and had imbibed the blood of the slain bull, through the whole of the body as it were, proclaimed that they were "born again for ever," or at least "for twenty years," as is shown by inscriptions and other passages collected by Ant. Van Dalen, in his Dissert. ad Antiquitates et Marmora, Diss. 1. p. 42. &c. p. 126. &c. But in performing these rites they neither felt nor supposed that new strength was added to the body: consequently they must necessarily have believed that the whole benefit pertained to the mind, and that the marks impressed upon it by vice were washed away by the blood of the sacred victim diffused through the entire body. It is not to be wondered at that this ancient opinion was somewhat obscurely propounded, and as it were interpolated by later writers. The same happened to almost all the dogmas and opinions of antiquity: which no sooner fell into the hands of philosophers, than they were remodelled and refined with such exquisite ingenuity as to lose much of their primitive form. If those who even at this day believe that a painful purgation awaits souls after death, possess one particle of sense or acquaintance with things, I fancy, when they read these remarks, they will entertain less magnificent notions of the first origin of this doctrine.

Sect. XVII. The poets assigned Mercury as the guide to souls in their progress to the lower world; the same that they supposed to be the messenger of the gods and the guardian and protector of the public ways. Now, learned antiquarians are wont to inquire very seriously what it was that led the ancients to invest Mercury with this twofold office, and the generality of them assign exceedingly abstruse, recondite, and ingenious reasons for this, borrowed for the most part from the junior grammarians and philosophers, who sought to divest the ancient fables of their deformity, and to reduce them to some rational standard. Those which have been suggested by learned men, to account for the care and custody of highways having been formerly entrusted to Mercury, have been carefully collected by the erudite Everard Otto in an excellent work

main scope of our present undertaking) should we briefly com-

De Tutela Viarum Publicarum, par. 1. cap. 9. p. 153. &c. To confess the truth, most of them seem to me to exhibit more subtlety and acumen than soundness and consistency. But those which have been put forth to prove that the troublesome office of conducting souls to the infernal regions was properly assigned to Mercury, are still more far-fetched. Phornutus, De Natura Deorum, cap. 16. p. 166. in Thom. Gale's Scriptor. Mytholog. fancied that Mercury is called ψυχόπομπος, "conductor of souls," because he "soothes the souls of men" by his eloquence, of which he supposes him to be the image and emblem. Very subtle certainly, if true: but he is far surpassed in industry and sagacity by others, not only of the sect of junior Platonists, but also of later writers, who do not hesitate to assert, upon what grounds I know not, that the fables of the poets are replete with recondite wisdom. Pet. Dan. Huet, in his Demonstratio Evangel. prop. 4. cap. 4. sect. 2. p. 161. who supposes Mercury to be the divine Moses, thinks he was called the ambassador of the shades, because Moses by his own authority caused Korah, Dathan, and Abiram to descend into hell. The intelligent, I doubt not, will smile at this notable interpretation of a poetic fiction: but they will scarcely repress their indignation when they hear that one Peter a Sarn has lately started forth, and in a specific Dissert. in the Biblioth. Bremensis. tom. 5. par. 2. p. 205. has dared to compare our blessed Saviour to Mercury, and to advance this as one of the principal arguments by which he attempts to bear out the comparison, sect. 33. p. 213, that Mercury is said by the poets to discharge the twofold function of dismissing souls to Tartarus and evoking them from thence. In these and other conjectures I commend the ingenuity of learned men: but I have for a long time been exceedingly careful not to follow in their footsteps: in which determination I am not a little confirmed by their admirable discord, which I hold to be a sure sign of an utter lack of solid arguments. I know not what unfortunate fatality has led men of the highest eminence for talent and erudition to suppose that any attention is to be paid to the later grammarians and philosophers, Stoics as well as Platonists, who have referred the fables of the ancients to philosophical and moral things: for they must have known that these men build upon no certain foundation, and were despised and laughed at by the wise of old, and especially by the first founders of Christianity. For my own part, on attentively reading the fables of the ancient poets, I am of opinion that the origin of most of their figments may be easily and conveniently derived and explained from the so called mythology itself, in conjunction with ancient history. But such is the constitution of human minds, that they despise the plain and open path, and follow the secret and rugged, in which they expect to acquire more fame and glory. To me Mercury presents very little difficulty either as guardian and god of highways or as guide and herald of souls. The ancient poets represented the gods as men, and subject to the same affections and infirmities as ourselves: they regarded the assembly of the gods no otherwise than as a senate deliberating and legislating upon the affairs of the human race. Hence as every council presiding over a state or community had its messenger who carried the laws and mandates of the magistrates to the citizens and communicated to them all their transactions, so they were obliged to assign a similar messenger to the council of the immortal gods. This they declared to be Mercury the son of Maia. Beyond all controversy a man of that name had lived in ancient Greece, and had acquired for himself a high reputation by swiftness of foot, eloquence, and other virtues or vices; and I have scarcely a doubt, that he held the office of public runner and messenger to Jupiter, an ancient king of Thessaly. The poets therefore, who mixed up the affairs of the gods with those of the ancient heroes, could select no one out of ancient history more qualified to discharge the embassies of the gods. But he who wishes to perform the functions of messenger, ought to be well acquainted with all the roads and avenues in that country which he is often compelled to traverse. The legate of the gods therefore could not possibly dispense with this knowledge. And as the empire of the immortals is bounded by the same limits as the course of the sun, it was necessary that the individual whom they supposed to be despatched by the gods to the people and nations of the whole world, should be represented as acquainted with all the roads and paths in the universe. You now, if I am not altogether mistaken, have the reason and cause why the ancient Greeks and Latins committed the care and guardianship of the public roads to Mercury. For to whom, I ask, could this office be entrusted more properly than to him whose business it was to know all roads, to undertake long and distant journeys at the behest of the celestial senate, and to be almost continually

pare the forementioned doctrine and cabala of the ancient

wandering over the surface of the globe? Neither should I look for any greater mystery in the fact that the ancients usually assign Mercury as the guide to souls in their transit to the shades. The descent of Avernus was difficult and the road to the infernal regions unknown, rugged, and trackless. Ennius in Cicero's Tuscul. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 16. tom. 8. opp. p. 2584.

> Adsum atque advenio Acheronte vix via alta atque ardua
> Per speluncas saxis structas asperis, pendentibus
> Maximis: ubi rigida constat crassa caligo inferum.

It was unworthy the clemency of the poets to suffer miserable souls to enter upon so dark, precipitous, and dangerous a road, without a guide. And whom could they supply in preference to Mercury? He not only, as is expressly recorded by Apollodorus, Biblioth. lib. 3. cap. 10. sect. 2. p. 196. was the messenger of Jupiter, but also of the θεοὶ ὑποχθόνιοι, "the subterranean and infernal gods." [See Ovid's Fast. lib. 5. ver. 665. 666.] It behoved him therefore, above all others, to be perfectly acquainted with the road leading from the upper to the lower regions, and the most convenient paths to be followed in the journey to the dominion of Pluto. I had intended to add something more and to state the opinion of the ancients on certain points pertaining to the infernal regions: but I perceive I have already digressed too far from my proposed object, and have almost lost sight of the junior Platonic school which first suggested these remarks. I return therefore to the Platonists.

Sect. XVIII. Those who read what we have brought hitherto forward from the records of antiquity, will I think perceive that learned men are mistaken in supposing this dogma respecting the body or *vehicle* of departing souls to be the invention of the Platonists, and devised by them for the purpose of more easily maintaining and defending other doctrines to which they were devoted. The opinion, or if you will the superstition, that there is in man besides the rational and ethereal soul a certain corporeal spirit, which in the case of most persons is utterly incapable of being disconnected from the soul after death, and is proof against every thing except certain punishments in hell, belongs to times of the remotest antiquity. This opinion the Platonists, who were fond of appearing as the guardians and preservers of the earliest philosophy, and who to a certain extent adopted all the popular superstitions, in some respects remodelled and refined, and according to their wont accommodated to the other precepts of their discipline. And yet they did not all enter upon this task in the same way: whence arose the variety of opinions formerly prevailing among them on the body of souls, the principal of which are enumerated by Proclus, Comm. in Timæum, Platonis, lib. 5. p. 311. 320. And even this dissension, if there were nothing else, would lead me to the conviction that the Platonists did not arrive at this dogma by reasoning and reflection, but having received it from others, endeavoured each according to his notion, to make it accord and harmonize with their own theories. Plato, as is every where apparent from his works, had already attempted something of the kind: but had accomplished nothing. Here therefore this junior school found something to do. But to remove all doubt that might possibly arise on the matter, I shall now prove this more clearly and specifically. The Platonists, then, held what was handed down from the ancients to be generally recognized and indisputable, that the soul of man is a particle of the celestial ether, but at the same time has in connection with it a shade, resembling the human body, with which it descends to the lower world after death, and lastly that unless purified by suitable remedies in this life it has to undergo purification after death: but these dogmas were variously modified by them and interpreted in accordance with their own precepts. The ancients had originally taught, as we have seen before, that the soul is a portion of the highest heaven or ether, or a most subtle and pure fire. But the Platonists declared the soul to be more noble and excellent than all matter, and to be a part and member of that world which they called νοητὸς, or "intelligible," in which there is no place for concretion, or rather of God himself. Consult, as one example for all, Plotinus in his book De Essentia Animæ, Ennead 4. lib. 1. p. 360. 361. In combining this opinion therefore with the ancient doctrine they asserted that the soul immediately on its issuing forth from the intelligible world was invested by God in heaven with a celestial and immortal body, which afterwards was utterly incapable of being separated from it:

Incorporealists (the Pythagoreans and Platonists) with that of

which body this school, as Boëtius for instance, calls the *chariot* of the soul. By this means they kept true to their own principles and at the same time to the reverence they entertained for antiquity. For if this dogma be adopted it will be possible to call the soul fire and *ethereal sense*, on account of the immortal body which God has associated with it: and yet to assert notwithstanding, that it is better and more excellent than all body. Plotinus in his first book, De Dubiis Animæ, Ennead 4. lib. 3. cap. 15. p. 383. says: Ἴασι δὲ ἐκκύψασαι τοῦ νοητοῦ, εἰς οὐρανὸν μὲν πρῶτον, καὶ σῶμα ἐκεῖ προσλαβοῦσαι, δι' αὐτοῦ ἤδη χωροῦσι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ γεωδέστερα σώματα, εἰς ὅσον ἂν εἰς μῆκος ἐκταθῶσι, "The souls declining from the intelligible world proceed first into heaven, and there receiving a body, now pass through it into the more earthy bodies, to whatever length they extend." Of this celestial body of the soul all the Platonists speak in most magnificent terms. This, say they, is placed out of γένεσις, or "generation," and yet accompanies souls descending to generation: this is pure, splendid, and devoid of all dross and concretion: this in short is connected with the soul by an eternal and indissoluble bond, and is wholly incapable of extinction. For according to their opinion, heaven itself from which, in concurrence with the above-mentioned most ancient sages, they supposed this body to be derived, is also body, not indeed concrete and divisible, but most pure and simple: which opinion, besides Jamblichus, whose passage I have already quoted, and others, Plotinus that prince of the Platonic school endeavours to confirm by many subtle arguments, in his book De Cœlo, Ennead. 2. lib. 1. p. 96. &c. I am not ignorant that some individuals of this class express themselves as though they supposed the nature of the soul itself to consist of celestial matter or to be nothing more than pure and unmixed fire. Porphyry in his Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, sect. 32. p. 233. Ὅταν δὲ μελετήσει ἀφίστασθαι φύσεως. αὐγὴ ξηρὰ γίνεται, ἄσκιος καὶ ἀνέφελος, "But when it (the soul) endeavours to withdraw from its nature, it becomes a dry splendour, without shadow or cloud." And probably there were some in this sect who were unable to reach so far by contemplation as to comprehend the real opinion of their masters and therefore adopted the ancient doctrine respecting the nature of the soul. But whoever attentively studies their principal leaders will readily perceive that in other passages they most clearly separate the soul itself from its ethereal body, and therefore that those who give any other interpretation to their opinion are manifestly in error. Some of them also occasionally assert that the soul is altogether destitute of all body: but they by no means differ from the rest in the matter itself, but only in the meaning of the word σῶμα, or "body." For they take the word in its stricter sense and merely of those things which consist of grosser matter: but from this grosser matter they except ether, which they consider too noble to be called σῶμα, or "body;" agreeably to which opinion they can pronounce the soul to be destitute of all body. Nevertheless there is some dissension among the Platonists with regard to the origin of this celestial body. For some suppose it to be associated with the soul by God himself. Of this opinion was Boëtius, who is well-known to have been a Platonist: in lib. 3. De Consolat. Philosoph. p. 69. he thus addresses God:

> Tu caussis animas paribus, vitasque minores
> Provehis et *levibus* sublimeis *curribus* aptans
> In cœlum, terramque seris.

But others assert that the soul of itself assumes this body: among whom rank Plotinus, in some passages, Porphyry, Sententiæ, p. 233. Theophrastus in Æneas Gazæus, in the Dialogue De Resurrectione, p. 64. and others, whose names it is unnecessary to enumerate. But this disagreement does not touch the main point of the question, nor has ever given rise to much contention and controversy.

Sect. XIX. These philosophers have much more frequent bickerings with each other on the subject of the other body or vestment of the soul. They all agree with the ancients that a certain other body besides the celestial and ethereal adheres to the rational soul, representing the human form and figure: and this body they not only designate by the Homeric name εἴδωλον, but also like the poets declare it to be a shade and similar to wind and vapour. The arguments above quoted from Philoponus, by which they substantiate this opinion, plainly show that reason did not compel them to adopt it, but rather superstition and an immoderate veneration for antiquity.

Christianity; and consider the agreement or disagreement that

Hence as soon as they are required to give a clearer exposition of their ideas upon the nature of this body, they generally fly off into as many opinions as they can number writers of any name and dignity among them. In the first place when it is asked, what is the cause and origin of this body and who unites it with the soul, they answer with one voice that the soul itself assumes and adopts it. For it is one of the leading precepts of this philosophy that the soul is endowed with the faculty of acquiring for itself a body out of every region that it passes through, out of air, fire, ether, earth. Theophrastus the Platonist, in Æneas Gazæus in the Dialogue entitled Theophrastus, p. 64. thus writes: *Τοιούτων καὶ τοσούτων ἡ ψυχὴ σωμάτων ἐμπίπλαται, δι' ὅσων καὶ οἵων χωρίων παρέρχεται,* "The soul is invested with such and so many bodies, as are the places it traverses." To him add Porphyry, Sententiæ ad Int. Ducent., sect. 32. p. 233. who explains this dogma more copiously, Plotinus, Proclus, and all whose writings have come down to us: *Ὡς γὰρ,* says Porphyry, *ἂν διετέθη, εὑρίσκει σῶμα, τάξει καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διωρισμένον,* "For as the soul is disposed and situated, so it finds a body suitable to its order and properties." This dogma, the force of which was not comprehended even by the Platonists themselves, as is manifest from the various explications of it which they every where put forth, is abstruse and difficult to be understood: but necessity compelled them to devise something of the kind. For they neither could attribute the fabrication of this body to God, whom they proclaimed to be most friendly to souls, and to be himself the best, nor to matter, of which this body consisted: wherefore nothing was left for them but to say, that the soul itself was its maker, although they could by no means explain the manner in which it performed this work. So far they are concordant: but proceed with your inquiries, and ask them for something more plain and explicit respecting the matter, form, and other things pertaining to this body, and you will no longer find any agreement or unanimity among them. For although this school in former times professed the greatest concord, and did not descend to public controversies and graver strife, still no sect of philosophers that I know of has been divided into so many discordant opinions and sentiments as these Platonists. Nor is this greatly to be wondered at: for they followed the imagination rather than reason as their guide in philosophizing, and those who do so cannot avoid being split up into various opinions. The chief of these opinions I shall forthwith proceed to enumerate: merely premising beforehand that this secondary body of the soul is not designated by all of them by the same name. Most of them call it *εἴδωλον*, a name which we have already shown to be most ancient: others, however, among whom are Porphyry and Hierocles, call it *φύσις*, others *πνεῦμα*, others *ψυχὴ πνευματική*, as Synesius, in his book, De Insomniis, p. 137. And from these names arose various forms of expression familiar to the Platonists, in the exposition of which any one will easily fall into error, unless he be acquainted with the names.

Sect. XX. The space from heaven, in which the Platonists tell us the soul first receives its immortal body, to this earth of ours, in which it is united to the earthly bodies, is immense, and distributed into various kinds of provinces and regions, according to the variety of bodies with which this interval is filled. Consult among others, Synesius, De Insomniis, p. 141. While the soul traverses these regions in its descent to the earth to *γένεσις*, as they say, it cannot help adopting a body from them. When it passes through the region of the sun, it assumes a body similar to the sun; when through the province of the moon, one kindred to the moon; and when it departs hence into the free and open air, it assumes an aerial body; as Porphyry, among others has expressly recorded in his Sententiæ ad Intelligibil. Ducent. sect. 32. p. 283. But what is the nature and material of this body, which the soul possesses in addition to its first and celestial one, when it is united with its earthy body? Is it compounded of all the elements of the regions through which the soul passes? or does the soul on entering a new province adopt a new body, having lost the former one, so that its exterior tunic is only of one kind, and of a simple material. This question is the subject of a grave and most intricate controversy in the schools of the Platonists, as appears from Proclus' lib. 1. Comm. in Timæum, Platonis, p. 311. 320. For many of this sect consider that it is compounded out of all the celestial orbs, and that a new body is always added to the soul on entering a new province, in the same way as a man successively puts on various vestments, which cover one body. See Porphyry, ibid. sect. 32. p. 237. where he calls this body, *πνεῦμα*, "a spirit," *ὃ ἐκ τῶν σφαιρῶν*

is betwixt them. First therefore, here is a plain agreement of

συνελίξατο, "which the soul collected from the spheres." Æneas Gazæus, in his Theophrastus, p. 65. *Σὺ δὲ σπουδάζεις, ὦ Θεόφραστε, καὶ οὐ γελοῖον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ τὸ ἀσώματον. ὂν οὕτως σώματι ῥᾳδίως συμπλέκεσθαι, καὶ ἐπισυνάπτειν καὶ συῤῥάπτειν, ἄλλο ἄλλῳ, καὶ πολλὰ ἅμα σώματα ἐπενδύεσθαι*, "But thou, O Theophrastus, seriously assertest these things, and dost not consider it absurd that the incorporeal should so easily be enveloped in body, and that they should be fitted and knitted to one another, and it should be invested with many bodies at the same time." But others seem to have been alarmed at the difficulties involved in such a doctrine, and therefore asserted this body to be of a simple nature and material; although these again are wonderfully at variance with one another, and cannot easily decide to what principle or element it is to be referred. It would be neither a pleasing nor profitable task to recount all the refined and subtle opinions of this insane sect: suffice it to observe that not one of them is supported by any species of argument, the whole of what they advance amounting to nothing more than mere idle surmise and conjecture. Nor could any thing better be expected from men who take upon them to adorn poetic fables and vulgar superstitions with the varnish of philosophy, and are indebted to the imagination for the aid which they ought to seek from reason alone.

Sect. XXI. If you now inquire as to the form of this body you will have the opportunity of becoming spectator, and, if you like, the arbiter of a new conflict. These sages agree that the body we speak of can be changed into various shapes at the will of the soul itself, and, as we have above seen from Philoponus, sect. 16. at one time assumes the appearance of a man, at another of a beast or other animal, although generally speaking it is regarded as possessing the human form. The earlier philosophers attributed the human form alone to this vestment of the soul, nor do I think it can be proved from any passage of ancient writers that in the more remote ages the soul was ever supposed to be capable of assuming the figure of a dog, lion, wolf, or other animal. But the Platonists rejected none of the rumours and fables of the credulous multitude, and therefore as they knew that stories were every where afloat of spectres going about in the form of wolves or other animals, and doing violence to men, they considered that these, in like manner, were by no means to be repudiated by them, but so tempered and modified as not to militate against their own precepts. Hence they taught that the exterior form of the soul always corresponds to its interior state: that most souls represent the human form: but yet that some more corrupt and prone to evil desires than the rest appear in the resemblance of those beasts the vices of which they imitated in this life: the cruel and tyrannical bearing the image of the lion, the intemperate and voracious of the wolf, the libidinous of the goat. Whether all the philosophers of this sect, however, were addicted to this opinion, I would not undertake to say. They agree also with each other as to the cause and origin of this form. For they all admit that the soul itself impresses it upon the body by its own inherent faculty of imagination: that is, that the soul is excited by the love of bodies: that this love causes it copiously to attract a humid spirit: that by this grosser spirit it becomes visible: and, lastly, that the imagination of the soul intervenes and confers upon the body such a form as corresponds to its own interior affection. In recounting these opinions I am aware I shall appear to be detailing the most monstrous and improbable absurdities to those who admit of nothing except what they see supported by reasoning and argument: but that I am attributing nothing to this sect which is foreign to their discipline may be proved by innumerable testimonies from their works. Let those who are sceptical upon the matter consult the passages of Philoponus quoted by Dr. Cudworth, and compare them with Porphyry, in his Sententiæ, sect. 32. p. 233. and De Antro Nymphar. p. 257. in the latter of which passages he says amongst other things: *Καὶ τάς γε φιλοσωμάτους ὑγρὸν τὸ πνεῦμα ἐφέλκομένας παχύνειν τοῦτο ὡς νέφος· ὑγρὸν γὰρ ἐν ἀέρι παχυνθὲν νέφος συνίσταται· παχυνθέντος δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς τοῦ ὑγροῦ πλεονασμῷ, ὁρατὰς γίνεσθαι*, "Cherishing a love of bodies and attracting to themselves a humid spirit, they condense this like a cloud: for moisture in the air by condensation forms a cloud: and the spirit in them being in like manner condensed through a redundance of moisture, they become visible." With respect to the time, however, when the soul receives the faculty of thus forming the aerial body it is invested with, there is some disagreement among these philosophers. Some suppose the soul to be always in possession of this virtue, and therefore to be capable of assuming various forms even previously to its conjunction

these best, and most religious philosophers, with Christianity, in

with this earthy and mortal body. Among these must be ranked Porphyry, to say nothing now of others, as is evident from the passages above indicated. But others maintain that the soul does not acquire this faculty till it is associated with the earthy body; in which having contracted various impurities and corporeal propensities, and having attained a stronger and more vigorous power of imagination, it then becomes qualified to adopt whatever forms it pleases. As far as the obscure phraseology employed by these masters will enable me to judge, the great majority of this sect espoused the latter opinion. From this dissension flowed another controversy, upon which I shall say only a word or two, respecting spectres wandering about the sepulchres of the dead. For some held these spectres to be the souls of dead men, or rather their images: while others, on the contrary, asserted that they were of a twofold kind, one belonging to the order of demons or souls not yet associated with bodies, the other to souls already released from the body. Nay, some were bold enough to declare that this twofold description of spectres could be distinguished from each other by certain marks or signs. So true it is, that there is nothing which superstition leaves unattempted.

Sect. XXII. The state of the aerial body after the dissolution of the earthy and concrete body, and the fate of the soul which it invests, are also the subjects of many knotty, intricate, and subtle questions among these philosophers: as cannot but be well known to every one conversant with the affairs and institutions of the Christian community in the earlier ages. One of the most important of these is the following: whether or not the so-called images or aerial bodies are capable of being separated from the soul, so that it can depart free and unshackled to the pure ether. The principal masters of this school, Plotinus, Porphyry, Hierocles, and many others inculcate that a wise man has the power of destroying the bond of the celestial and aerial body by various exercises and purgations, and of so releasing the soul, that on the extinction of the mortal body, it also divests itself of this other body, and clothed in that splendid body alone with which it was formerly united in heaven, proceeds to the mansions of the blessed. As one example for all I shall bring forward Hierocles, Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 227. especially as I perceive this passage of his is not at all understood by his interpreters: Πυθαγορικῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ πέρας, ὅλους δι' ὅλων ὑποπτέρους γενέσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν μετάληψιν, ἵν' ὅταν ὁ τοῦ θανάτου καιρὸς ἐνστῇ, καταλιπόντες ἐπὶ γῆς τὸ θνητὸν σῶμα, ΚΑΤ' ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΝ ἀποδυσάμενοι, πρὸς τὴν οὐρανίαν πορείαν ὦσιν εὔζωνοι οἱ τῶν φιλοσοφίας ἀγώνων ἀθληταί, "The end of the Pythagorean discipline is to become wholly winged for the reception and participation of divine goods, that when the period of death arrives, the champions of philosophical contest, having left the mortal body on the earth, and put off *its nature*, may be ready for the heavenly journey." In these words, it ought to be observed first of all, that Hierocles declares that a wise man, when he dies, not only puts off the *mortal body*, but also its φύσις, or *nature*. But this name is employed both by him and the rest of the Platonists to designate the aerial body, which according to their doctrine, the soul assumes from the air, prior to its descent into the mortal body, or ὀστρεῶδες περίβλημα, "shell-like covering," as Synesius calls it, De Insomniis, p. 137. And this opinion, I confess, approaches very closely to the most ancient discipline, which as we have already seen, taught that the souls of heroes and great men abandon the shade or image in the infernal regions, and straightway ascend to the council of the celestials. The same idea was entertained by this sect in respect to the souls of ordinary mortals, which like the ancients they doomed to a painful purgation in the lower world after death, and imagined that such souls were not released from their infernal prison till all concretion contracted from the air and other elements was dissipated and removed from them. And in this matter again they follow the ancients, whose opinions have been inquired into above. But from these main props and pillars of the Platonic school, and their followers, not a few dissented, for example Jamblichus, Proclus, Syrianus, and others, who held that this image is never cast off by the soul, but after being purified and divested of all vice and stain, accompanies it in its flight to the blessed abodes. In the time of Plotinus a controversy was already engaged in on this matter, as is manifest from his book, Quod Ens unum idemque simul totum est ubique, Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 16, p. 659. I have not met with one of these philosophers who has attempted to set forth and defend this dogma more copiously and elaborately than Synesius, and therefore I shall appeal to this

this; That the most consummate happiness, and highest per-

author in particular for testimonies confirmatory of what I have just stated. Synesius, then, does not absolutely deny it to be possible for the soul on its departure to the upper regions to lay aside all corporeal concretion: on the contrary he admits that this boon may perhaps have been granted to one or two by the blessing of God and through the influence of sacred exercises. Καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἑνὶ καὶ δευτέρῳ δῶρον ἂν γένοιτο τελετῆς καὶ θεοῦ, De Insomniis, p. 13. But he denies notwithstanding that any one can look forward to such felicity, since the image, according to his opinion, cleaves to the soul in its ascent, and remains its inseparable companion, p. 140. Οὐ γὰρ μόνην εἰς τὰς σφαίρας ἀνάγειν ἔοικε τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἡκούσαν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ εἴ τι καὶ τῆς πυρὸς καὶ τῆς ἀέρος ἀκρότητος εἰς τὴν εἰδωλικὴν φύσιν ἕσπασε κατιοῦσα, πρὶν τὸ γῆϊνον ἀμφιέσασθαι κέλυφος, "For it appears to carry up to the celestial spheres not only the nature which comes from thence, but also whatever it attracted to this image-nature from the extremity of fire and air in its descent, before it was clothed in its earthy shell." This opinion he first proves by a twofold argument: first by a certain oracle from those called the Chaldaic or Zoroaster's, which were always of immense authority in this school. We give the verses themselves:

Οὐ τῷ τῆς ὕλης κρημνῷ σκύβαλον καταλείψει,
Ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰδώλῳ μερὶς εἰς τόπον ἀμφιφάοντα.

Nec jam materiæ fœcem in prærupta relinquas,
Quin pars idolo splendenti in sede relicta est.

For he does not doubt but that τόπος in these words means the celestial habitation to which all well-constituted souls are destined to go. He then brings forward an argument to confirm what I have stated, alleging it to be most consistent with truth, that those things which come into a communion of the same nature, enter into an indissoluble association, especially if they are allied and kindred to that nature: Καὶ λόγον δ' ἂν ἔχει τὰ κοινωνήσαντα φύσεως, καὶ εἰς ἓν συντελέσαντα, μήτοι παντάπασιν ἄσχετα εἶναι καὶ μάλιστα οἷς ἐκ γειτόνων ἡ χώρα· καθάπερ πῦρ ἐφεξῆς ἐστὶ τῷ κύκλῳ σώματι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γῆ τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἔσχατον, "For it stands with reason that those things which come into a participation of the same nature and coalesce into one, are not destitute of all habitude and relation towards each other, especially those which are neighbouring in place; in the same way as fire is next adjoining to circumfused body, and not as earth the lowest of all things." Now if it should be objected that upon this hypothesis corporeal dross and impurity are admitted into that place from which all impurity ought to be absent, our philosopher replies that nothing of the kind is to be feared, for whatever is of a worse condition in the body of the soul, provided only it obeys the better part, acquires a more excellent nature and becomes similar to ether. After this exposition he concludes that he has no wish to obtrude this opinion upon others: but yet that all must admit it to be unquestionable that the celestial body which the soul brings from ether returns thither with it: Καὶ ἀπιστεῖν ἔξεστι καὶ πιστεύειν· τὴν δὲ ἐκεῖθεν ἡκουσαν σωματικὴν οὐσίαν, οὐδεμία μηχανὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνιούσης ψυχῆς, μὴ οὐ συνεξάραι τοῦ πτώματος ἀναστᾶσαν καὶ ταῖς σφαίραις ἐναρμοσθῆναι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ὥσπερ ἀναχθῆναι, "This may be believed or disbelieved: but as to that corporeal substance which comes from thence, it is impossible but that when the soul agreeably to its nature returns upwards; arising from its fall it ascends along with it and is united with the celestial spheres, that is, is restored to its own nature." These passages show what was strictly and properly meant by those who held the image or body of the soul to accompany it in its ascent to heaven. They supposed that this body is compounded of the various elements, air, fire, earth, &c. and therefore that a distinction is to be made in it between the matter which is kindred to ether, such as air and fire, and the grosser matter such as earth and all that encompasses the earth: that the nobler matter is so intimately associated with the celestial body of the soul, as to put on its nature and to be henceforward incapable of separation from it, but that the remaining dross or ὕλη, the heavier and denser matter, is separable and ought to be removed by severe contemplation and expiations during life, as otherwise the soul will be deprived of its celestial habitation and felicity and doomed to undergo the most exquisite tortures after death.

fection, that human nature is capable of, consisteth not in a

Sect. XXIII. It is the constant and concordant opinion of antiquity, that souls released from the bonds of the earthy body depart into ᾅδης, or the lower world: that the minds of wise men and heroes put off the image itself together with the mortal body and after death are immediately transferred to the gods, although the image or sentient soul descends to the dominions of Pluto: but that the ordinary and vulgar souls proceed along with the image to this subterranean abode, where those which are curable are subjected to various kinds of torments for their purification, while the rest, being too deeply criminal and imbued with inveterate and ineradicable sin are tortured with everlasting punishments: on the whole of which matters we have largely commented above. The Platonists, ever anxious to appear as the strict and rigid preservers of the ancient dogmas and traditions, did not venture to controvert any part of this creed; as is evident from the passages of Philoponus cited by Dr. Cudworth, and if the subject required, or the present opportunity would permit, might easily be confirmed from Plotinus, Synesius, and many others. But the diversity of their opinions upon other matters relating to the soul gave rise to some discord among them even in respect to this subject: and moreover, the philosophy they professed did not allow of their assenting to every thing that had been handed down from antiquity, especially by the poets: hence it became requisite for them to exercise their ingenuity in remodelling the ancient opinions and expounding them agreeably to their own discipline. I am not disposed to go into endless detail and repeat all that I have met with in their writings on these matters, but shall content myself with a few points bearing more closely than the rest upon our present inquiry. On the souls of those who had neglected purgation in this life, there was no great difference of opinion among them: for they all agreed that these are despatched into a dark and dismal region, where such as have moderately sinned are purged and purified, while the rest, as having exceeded all bounds in transgression, endure the most severe and dreadful punishments. This doctrine indeed seemed to clash with that precept of their school which denies the possibility of the soul's being in place, and consequently of its locomotion: but they fancied they sufficiently met this difficulty by declaring that the soul is said to be in hell by reason of its presiding over the image which resides there. Porphyry, Sententiæ ad Intelligibil. Ducent. sect. 32. p. 232. Οὕτω καὶ ἐν ᾅδου εἶναι ἐστὶ ψυχῇ, ὅταν προεστήκει εἰδώλου, φύσιν μὲν ἔχοντος εἶναι ἐν τόπῳ, "So also to be in hades is asserted of the soul, when it presides over the idol or image, which is of such a nature as to exist in place." Add Plotinus, Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 659. And in interpreting this descent of the soul into the lower world and the punishments there awaiting it according to the principles of their own philosophy, the disciples of the Platonic school display considerable subtlety. They maintain that the soul, on emerging from the body, is encumbered with many humid and heavy vapours, which are carried by their own gravity to the earth and subterraneous places: that in these places the hades of the ancients must be supposed to be situated: and consequently that the soul, being bound and united to its image, of necessity descends into this infernal abode along with it: see Porphyry, ibid. p. 232. and compare the same author in his De Antro Nymphar. p. 257. 258. Ἐπεὶ δὲ, says he in the former passage, διήκει τὸ βαρὺ πνεῦμα καὶ ἔνυγρον ἀχρὶ τῶν ὑπογείων τόπων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λέγεται χωρεῖν ὑπὸ γῆν, "Since the heavy and moist spirit reaches the subterranean places, the soul itself is thus said to descend under the earth." The manner in which they attempted to explain the nature of the punishments to which polluted souls are exposed in the lower regions, is evident from the passages of Philoponus adduced by Dr. Cudworth, sect. 16. On this subject the dissension among these philosophers is very trifling, and all arises out of their disagreement respecting the nature of the image or the body derived from the air and stars. For those who held this image or at least a portion of it to be so intimately connected with the ethereal body of the soul as to be wholly incapable of separation from it, supposed that souls on the completion of their term of purgation, carry this image with them to the habitations of the blessed: whereas the others who believed it to be possible for the aerial to be disconnected from the ethereal body, maintained that the image either remains in the lower world or wanders up and down on the earth and especially about the tombs of the dead, till it is finally dissolved and annihilated. But when the question came to the souls of great men and in particular of philosophers, this sect was agitated by somewhat graver dissensions. The ancients indeed, as we have already seen, although they supposed the

separate state of souls, stripped naked from all body, and having no manner of commerce with matter, as some high-flown persons

minds of heroes and illustrious men to be immediately received into heaven, inculcated nevertheless that their sentient souls become denizens of the subterranean community. In this opinion there was something which the junior Platonists, if they wished to remain true to the principles of their own discipline, could not wholly adopt. Hence they were obliged to devise some method of reconciling themselves with the ancients. The assertors of the possibility of the soul's separation from its image or aerial body, found this task comparatively easy: for they declared that the soul of a wise man ascends to heaven, but that its image proceeds to the lower regions: which indeed approximates very closely to the ancient doctrine. But a greater difficulty presented itself to those who maintained that the image is altogether incapable of being detached from the soul: hence they had recourse to the signification of the word ἅδης, and borrowed from philology the aid which philosophy denied them: ἅδης, said they, is the same as ἀειδὴς, "obscure," and therefore when a wise man's soul is stated to be ἐν ἅδου, it means "that it exists separately or in a manner unknown to us." Both these opinions are touched upon by Plotinus, among others, Ennead. 6. lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 659. Τὸ δὲ εἰς ἅδου γίνεσθαι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ χωρὶς λέγεται, "If the name of hades means something hidden, to go into hades is nothing more than to be apart,—εἰ δὲ παντελῶς λύσειε φιλοσοφία τὸ εἴδωλον καὶ ἀπέλθοι τὸ εἴδωλον εἰς τὸν χείρω τόπον μόνον, αὐτὴ δὲ καθαρῶς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, οὐδένος ἐξῃρημένου αὐτῆς, "but if philosophy altogether dissolves the image, this proceeds to the worse place alone, but the soul itself lives in the intelligible world, nothing being taken away from it." This derivation of the word ἅδης from ἀειδὴς is frequently met with among the ancients, and we are informed by Methodius in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 234. p. 923. that it was also adopted by Origen. This passage of Plotinus led Dr. Cudworth to say above, sect. 15. that this philosopher in asserting it to be possible for the soul to be divested of all body, dissents from the rest of the Platonists and especially from Porphyry. But on carefully comparing Plotinus, Porphyry, and the other masters of this sect with each other, it will easily be perceived that their difference lies in the words alone. For Plotinus does not affirm that the soul on quitting this earthy body loses all body, but speaks expressly of the εἴδωλον only: which the whole sect of Platonists is accustomed to distinguish from the celestial and ethereal vestment of the soul. Besides, he lays down nothing positively, but withholds his assent and merely points out a way by which the difficulty started among the Platonists on the subject of the soul's descent into hell may be got rid of, whatever opinions they may entertain with regard to its state after the dissolution of the body. I own, indeed, he places the soul of the wise man on its departure from the body in what the Platonists call the νοητὸς, or "intelligible" world, to which these philosophers deny all access to bodies. But setting aside that they do not always employ the word νοητὸς in the same sense, but sometimes attach to it a wider and sometimes a more restricted signification, and that the whole of Plotinus' doctrine on the subject is obscure and almost inexplicable; this philosopher does not seem to take away all body from the inhabitants of this rational world. For, Ennead. 6. lib. 7. cap 10. p. 702. he gravely argues that the animals living in it are not destitute of horns, nails, and other members of the kind: which certainly would be very amusing and more worthy of a simpleton than a philosopher if he had believed these animals to be devoid of all body and nothing but empty shadows or notions. Still I will not on that account deny that there ever was a Platonist who supposed it possible for the soul to be gradually divested even of its celestial body: for I know this school abounds with men who indulge in the wildest theories, and talk with the utmost confidence upon matters of which they have not the slightest comprehension. But I do maintain, that if any one of them ever thought in this wise, he deviated from the common opinion of his order, and professed a doctrine altogether repugnant to the fundamental precepts of Platonism on the nature of the soul. That Plotinus entertained no such notion is shown by his words, Ennead. 4. lib. 9. cap. 7. p. 455. where he declares it to be necessary for the soul always τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν, "to partake of the sensible nature."

Sect. XXIV. The precepts of these philosophers upon the mode of purging the soul during its connexion with the mortal body and upon the effect of this purgation, are again so numerous and diversified as not to admit of being comprised in a few pages. Porphyry, according to the testimony of St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. cap.

in all ages have been apt to conceit. For such amongst the philosophers (and Platonists too) was Plotinus;[5] the unevenness

32. p. 204. tom. 7. opp. recorded at the close of his first book, On the Return of the Soul, "that no one opinion had yet been received, containing a universal method of freeing the soul, either by any most true philosophy, or by the customs and discipline of the Indians, or the system of the Chaldæans, or by any other method, and that no such method had come to his knowledge from historical inquiry." This is said with the greatest truth: nor does he indeed except the very sect to which he himself belonged. For although all the masters of this school proclaim that the soul is to be purified and constantly exhort their disciples to commence and complete this purgation, lest they should descend into hades after the death of the body, still it is incredible how much they disagree when they come to seek for the means most adapted for the furtherance of this object. I have no intention of enumerating their various opinions, but shall content myself with observing, that some enjoin one and others two kinds of purgation: which dissension is chiefly owing to the fact, that some maintain and others deny the possibility of the separation of the image from the soul. The former merely require of their followers to purge the celestial soul and to present it free and pure from the contagion of the image: while the latter decide that in the first place the celestial body and afterwards the aerial body or image is to be purified: and as these two bodies are of a different nature, they are obliged to prescribe a twofold description of purgation.

Sect. XXV. There are a great many other points still remaining, which might be dwelt upon in relation to these matters; especially if I were disposed to compare the tenets of the ancient Christians with the precepts of the Platonists and to point out the degree of affinity between them. But I fear I have already digressed so far from my main object as to have exhausted the patience of many of my readers. I shall therefore merely add a few words upon what I consider to be the chief advantages to be derived by them from these copious remarks. In the first place, I fancy, they will show that those Platonic philosophers who flourished in the early ages of Christianity are not such men as many suppose them to be, ingenious, wise, subtle, and acute, with whom sound argument is every thing, and fancy and rash conjecture nothing. For who can entertain a very high conception of philosophers who recklessly adopt all the opinions of the vulgar, and then tax their ingenuity to devise the means of combining the most absurd superstitions and conceits with their own doctrines. For my own part, as I avowed at the very outset, so far from regarding these Platonists as discreet and considerate men, I hold them to be superstitious, trifling, credulous, and fanatical, who fancied themselves qualified to reconcile old wives' fables with the dogmas of the ancient philosophers and to establish a sort of concord between the absurd religions of the common people and the Platonic precepts. And as to their discipline itself, although it contains some things not altogether deserving of contempt, for even the Phrygians do not always rave, I should pronounce it to be nothing more than a jumble of heterogeneous opinions compiled from the dogmas of Plato and Pythagoras, the precepts of the ancient oriental philosophers, and the delusive vagaries of misguided and distempered minds. In the second place, I consider it to be evident from these remarks, that the earliest Christian fathers did not derive all that they are commonly said to have derived from the schools of the Platonists. I agree with those who charge the major portion of these fathers with too great a partiality for the Platonic philosophy: but I deny that they are all guilty of this fault, nor can I believe that every thing which they have in common with the Platonists is Platonic and transferred from the Academy to the Christians. For many things which are regarded as Platonic in their books and opinions, belong to the ancient popular traditions which were diffused among the Greeks and Romans long before the birth of our Saviour, and were retained by the Christians as far as was consistent with the holier discipline they had adopted. For as the Platonists endeavoured to amalgamate whatever had been formerly handed down by the poets and received by the multitude, with the precepts of philosophy; so the Christians also rejected none of the public opinions of the people among whom they lived that were not openly repugnant to their own principles, but combined them to the best of their power with the new religion. No nation embraced the Christian rites in so pure and chaste a form as not to retain some admixture of ancestral superstitions and fictions. Of the other advantages to be derived from these remarks I shall not speak, as they cannot but be obvious to the intelligent reader.

[5] We have seen in the preceding note, sect. 18, that injustice is here done to

and unsafeness of whose temper may sufficiently appear from hence, that as he conceived human souls might possibly ascend to so high a pitch, as quite to shake off commerce with all body; so did he on the other hand again imagine, that they might also descend and sink down so low, as to animate not only the bodies of brutes, but even of trees and plants too; two inconsistent paradoxes; the latter whereof is a most prodigious extravagancy, which yet Empedocles (though otherwise a great wit) seems to have been guilty of also, from those verses of his in Athenæus:[6]

Ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμην κούρη τε κόρος τε,
Θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ εἰν ἁλὶ ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

And among the Jews, the famous Maimonides was also of this persuasion, it being a known aphorism of his, in his great work משנה תורה: "That in the world to come (or state of consummate happiness) there shall be nothing at all of body, but pure incorporeity." Upon which account, being accused as a denier of the resurrection (an article as well of the Jewish as of the Christian faith) he wrote that book entitled, Iggereth Teman,[7] purposely to purge himself, and to reconcile those two assertions together, which he doth after such a manner, as that there should be indeed a resurrection, at the first coming of the Jewish Messias, of some certain persons, to live here a while upon the earth, eat and drink, marry and be given in marriage, and then die again; after which, in the world to come, they

Plotinus. But even if he had entertained this opinion, and at the same time supposed it possible for souls to migrate into the bodies of beasts and plants, he would not, as far as I can judge, have believed in things that are incompatible with, and contradictory to each other, as the learned Doctor supposes. For I see no reason why a man may not defend them both, and yet not be inconsistent with himself. The migration of souls into the bodies of beasts and plants is treated of by Plotinus in Ennead 3. lib. 4. cap 1. 2. p. 283. 284.

[6] Deipnosoph. lib. 8. at the end, p. 510. But Athenæus is not the only one who has preserved these verses of Empedocles from oblivion, as they are also to be met with in many other ancient writers. See Aldobrandinus, Not. ad Diogen. Laërt. tom. 1. p. 539. and Ægidius Menagius, Comm. ad Diogen. p. 384. tom. 2. who comments very learnedly on the various reading of the latter verse in the ancient books. Dr. Cudworth himself, though he would seem to have copied them from Athenæus, has expressed the reading of Clemens Alexandr. in the second verse, Stromat. lib 6. p. 750. For in this author we read ἔλλοπος, whereas in Athenæus it is ἔμπνοος. Compare, besides Casaubon on this passage of Athenæus, Dr. Potter on Clemens Alexandr. p. 750. and P. Petitus, Miscellan. Observat. cap. 11. p. 66. who proposes the reading ἔμπυρος.

[7] The learned Doctor's memory has deceived him. In the epistle or book which Maimonides has entitled אִגֶּרֶת תֵּימָן, and which is extant in Latin in W. Hen. Vorst's Notes to Zemach David, p. 393. and elsewhere, he does not declare his opinion respecting the resurrection of the dead, but discourses of very different matters. But there is another work of his called אִגֶּרֶת תְּחִיַּת הַמֵּתִים, or "Epistle concerning the Resurrection of the Dead," where he more copiously and clearly explains his views on the resurrection than in any other place. The editions of both these books are enumerated by J. Christoph. Wolf, Biblioth. Hebraic. tom. 1. p. 860, 861. Maimonides' opinion is refuted by Manassah Ben Israel in his book De Resurrectione Mortuorum, lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 339.

should for ever continue pure souls, ununited to any body. In which it may be well suspected that the design Maimonides drove at was against Christianity; which, notwithstanding, as to this particular, hath the concurrent suffrages of the best philosophers, that the most genuine and perfect state of the human soul, which in its own nature is immortal, is to continue for ever, not without, but with a body: and yet our high-flown enthusiasts generally (however calling themselves Christians) are such great Spiritualists, and so much for the inward resurrection (which we deny not to be a Scripture notion also; as in that of St. Paul, "If ye be risen with Christ,"[8] &c. And again, "If by any means I might attain to the resurrection of the dead"[9]) as that they quite allegorize away, together with the other parts of Christianity, the outward resurrection of the body; and indeed will scarcely acknowledge any future immortality, or life to come, after death, their spirituality thus ending in Sadducism and infidelity, if not at length in downright atheism and sensuality.[10]

[8] Col. iii. 1. [9] Phil. iii. 2.

[10] It is notorious that among the fanatics of every age there have existed men foolish and silly enough to contend that every thing recorded in the sacred volumes respecting the resurrection of the dead is figurative, and ought to be understood of the regeneration and purification of the mind. And in Dr. Cudworth's time not a few of the sect called Quakers and other fanatics had espoused this opinion. Rob. Barclay, indeed, a most learned Quaker, endeavours to acquit his friends of so pernicious an error, and asserts that it is unjustly attributed to them. In the conclusion of his Apology for the True Christian Divinity: "Hence," says he, "because we tell them, when they are talking and determining about the resurrection, that they have more need to know the Just One, whom they have slain, raised in themselves, and to be sure that they are made partakers of the first resurrection: hence they say, that we deny the resurrection of the body." But granting that all the members of this sect were not contaminated with this impious doctrine, it is nevertheless beyond all question that many of them both entertained and publicly professed it. And perhaps it has not a few supporters even at this day in that community; although if questioned upon the subject they are either wholly silent or betake themselves to various subterfuges, in order to avoid declaring the sentiments of their mind and exposing themselves to contempt and ill will. Probably they became more cautious in consequence of the secession of Geo. Keith, a most eminent teacher of this sect, who was so much offended with this doctrine as to renounce all further connexion with Quakerism. Of this we are informed by Gerh. Crœsius in his History of Quakers, lib. 3. p. 449. whose words I quote for the purpose of showing that no false charge is brought by Dr. Cudworth and others against them: "With respect to the state of souls after death, there were some who asserted that all the faithful and pious enter straightway into a state of perfect joy and felicity, but that the unbelieving and impious immediately after death undergo all the punishment that awaits them, and that in this consists the whole of resurrection. Which was the same as asserting that properly there will be no resurrection of the body, and that the body, after it is turned into dust, will henceforward be nowhere and nothing, and that there will be no final day of judgment. Others affirmed that resurrection and the entire state of glory was consummated and finished in this life, because of the death of Christ and the happy and glorious life which he led. They attached the same meaning to their words, as if they were to say that there is no heaven or hell, except such as is in men's own breasts. These dogmas were noticed by Keith in the sermons and discourses of these men." For my own part I consider it to be hardly possible for the Quakers to teach otherwise, if they wish to inculcate

But, besides this, there is yet a further correspondence of Christianity with the forementioned philosophic cabala, in that the former also supposes the highest perfection of our human souls, not to consist in being eternally conjoined with such gross bodies, as these we now have, unchanged and unaltered: for as the Pythagoreans and Platonists have always complained of these terrestrial bodies, as prisons, or living sepulchres of the soul; so does Christianity seem to run much upon the same strain, in these Scripture expressions, "In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven:"[1] and again, "We that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened, not for that we would be unclothed (that is, stripped quite naked of all body) but so clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life:"[2] and lastly, "Ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption (sonship or inheritance) namely, the redemption of our bodies;"[3] that is, the freedom of them from all those evils and maladies of theirs, which we here lie oppressed under. Wherefore we cannot think, that the same heavy load and luggage, which the souls of good men being here burdened with, do so much groan to be delivered from, shall, at the general resurrection, be laid upon them again, and bound fast to them, to all eternity; for, of such a resurrection as this, Plotinus[4] (though perhaps mistaking it for the true Christian resurrection) might have some cause to affirm, that it would be but ἀνάστασις εἰς ἄλλον ὕπνον, "a resurrection to another sleep;" the soul seeming not to be thoroughly awake here, but, as it were, soporated with the dull steams and opiatic vapours of this gross body. For thus the author of the Book of Wisdom:[5] "The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind, that museth upon many things." But the same will further appear, from that

what is consistent with the first principles of their own discipline. For there is scarcely any thing which they more earnestly impress upon their followers than this: That the letter of Scripture is to be disregarded and the pith and marrow alone to be attended to; that the history of our blessed Saviour, all the acts of holy men, nay the whole of the sacred volume itself, ought to be understood and explained *mystically*, or, as they call it, in the *spiritual* sense; from which precept the inference to be drawn is manifest. Before the origin of this sect Henr. Nicolai, who in the 16th century agitated Belgium with his fanatical opinions is said to have partaken of the same most grievous error; who according to Jo. Hornbeeck, Summa Controvers. lib. 6. p. 397. taught: "That there will be no resurrection of bodies after death, but that all resurrection happens in this life, and is no other than that from sin."

[1] 2 Cor. v. 2. [2] 2 Cor. v. 4. [3] Rom. viii. 23.

[4] I have been unable to meet with this passage of Plotinus, after spending considerable time in searching for it. The learned Doctor's memory, I fear, has deceived him, and he has supplied Plotinus with the words rather than found them in that author. But I will not be positive; as, after all, it is possible for the mistake to be on my own side.

[5] Chap. ix. 15.

account, which the Scripture itself giveth us of the resurrection: and first, in general, when St. Paul, answering that query of the philosophic infidel,[6] "How are the dead raised, or with what body do they come?" replieth in this manner: "Thou fool (that is, thou, who thinkest to puzzle or baffle the Christian article of the resurrection, which thou understandest not) that which thou sowest, is not quickened (to the production of any thing) except it first die to what it was. And thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain," as of wheat, or of barley, or the like; "but God (in the ordinary course of nature) "giveth it a body, as it hath pleased him" (that is, a stalk, and an ear, having many grains with husks in it, and therefore neither in quantity nor quality the same with that which was sowed under ground); nor does he give to all seeds one and the same kind of body neither, but to every seed its own correspondent body; as to wheat one kind of ear, and to barley another. As if he should have said: Know that this present body of ours is to be looked upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it. Besides which general account, the particular oppositions which the scripture makes betwixt the present and future body, seem very agreeable to those of the philosophic cabala: for, first, the present body is said to be sowed in "corruption,"[7] but the future raised in "incorruption." For the "children of the resurrection cannot die any more."[8] And then "mortality shall be swallowed up of life."[9] Wherefore the Christian resurrection-body, as well as that of the philosophic cabala, is σῶμα ἀθάνατον, and ἀΐδιον too, (2 Cor. v. 1), "an immortal" and "eternal body." Again, the body sowed is said[10] to be a "dishonourable, ignominious," and "inglorious body;" and therefore called also by St. Paul,[1] Τὸ σῶμα τῆς ταπεινώσεως ἡμῶν, "The body of our humility," or "humiliation;" a body agreeable to this lapsed state of the soul, but the body which shall be raised shall be a glorious body; and σύμμορφον τῷ σώματι τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, "conformable to that glorious body of Christ;" who, when he was but externally transfigured, his face did "shine as the sun," and his "raiment was white as the light." The glory of a body consisteth only in the comeliness of its proportion, and the splendour thereof: thus is there[2] "one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars," that is, a different splendour of them. Wherefore the future body of the righteous, according to the scripture also, as well as the philosophic cabala, will be σῶμα φωτεινὸν, and σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, and σῶμα ἀστροειδὲς, a "glorious, splendid, luciform,"

[6] 1 Cor. xv. 36, &c. [7] 1 Cor. xv. 42. [8] Luke xx. 36.
[9] 1 Cor. xv. 54. [10] 1 Cor. xv. 43. [1] Phil. iii. 21. [2] 1 Cor. xv. 41.

and "star-like body," Wisdom iii. 7. Ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἐκλάμψουσι, "The righteous, in the time of their visitation, shall shine forth." Daniel xii. 2, 3, "They that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever." And Matt. xiii. 43, "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their father." And therefore probably this future glorious resurrection-body is that "inheritance of the saints in light,"[3] which the scripture speaks of, Col. i. 12. Moreover,

[3] I cannot prevail upon myself to assent to this interpretation of St. Paul's words: Εὐχαριστοῦντες, says the holy apostle, τῷ πατρὶ τῷ ἱκανώσαντι ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν μερίδα τοῦ κληροῦ τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τῷ φωτί, "Giving thanks unto the Father, who has rendered us meet to become partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light." According to Dr. Cudworth's opinion the meaning of these words is as follows: "We ought to give thanks to God, because instead of this concrete and heavy body we shall acquire another splendid and shining body." But if I am not mistaken this will be considered by every one as too flat and jejune, and unworthy of the divine writer. In the first place, St. Paul would have expressed himself exceedingly obscurely, and in a style remote from the vulgar usage. For who, I ask, without the aid of an interpreter, would understand μερὶς τοῦ κληροῦ τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τῷ φωτὶ to be the same as σῶμα φωτεινόν? Again, of all the benefits conferred upon us by Christ, and of the heavenly gifts which we shall be made partakers of through him, why should the apostle have selected that bodily felicity alone which we shall attain to after the resurrection, and declared that for *this in* particular we are to give thanks unto God? This splendour of the body which we look forward to, holds the lowest place among the privileges and joys of the blessed; therefore why did he not rather enjoin us to praise God for the gifts with which the mind shall be adorned when received into heaven, and for the other portions of eternal felicity? Lastly, this exposition is at variance with the entire context of the discourse; from which it is manifest, that all the good things, secured to mankind by the death and sufferings of Christ, are comprehended by the apostle in the expression κληρὸς τῶν ἁγίων. And those who are accustomed to his phraseology will easily perceive that these words contain an image and figure drawn from the distribution of the Holy Land among the Israelites. No slight benefit, says he, did they receive from God, to whom Joshua formerly assigned a portion in the land of Canaan, which was the inheritance and possession of the people of God; but a much greater felicity falls to our lot, who through faith in Jesus receive a portion in the kingdom of heaven among the saints of God, and become entitled to those future benefits which are promised after this life to the true followers of Christ. The words ἐν τῷ φωτὶ, although variously expounded, as I am aware, seem to me to denote that by which the saints are made fit to obtain this happiness. But this is the heavenly doctrine revealed to men by Christ, which we embrace by faith. For, as is well known in Scripture, this salutary doctrine is called φῶς or *light*, and the ancient ignorance and wicked superstition of nations opposed to it under the name of σκότος, or *darkness*; as is also done in this very place. And everybody acquainted with the subject is aware that the particle ἐν is put for διὰ in innumerable passages of the New Testament. Wherefore I consider the whole passage is to be understood thus: "We ought to give praise to God, who by the light of the gospel which we have received, has rendered us meet to become partakers of the heavenly kingdom on this earth, and hereafter to obtain those blessings which are destined for the saints in heaven." This interpretation is admirably confirmed by a similar passage occurring in Acts xxvi. 18. wherein St. Paul is said to be sent "to turn the Gentiles from darkness (the pernicious superstitions and errors of antiquity) to light (the true knowledge of the supreme Being), that they may receive forgiveness of sins, καὶ κληρὸν ἐν τοῖς ἁγιασμένοις πίστει τῇ εἰς Χριστον, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in Christ." The latter words plainly correspond to those the sense of which we are here inquiring into. What St. Paul in the present passage calls φῶς is there termed πίστις εἰς Χριστὸν; which alone has obtained for us the privileges of the heavenly community and a portion in the inheritance of the saints.

there is another difference betwixt this present and that future body of the righteous, wherein St. Paul[4] and Hierocles[5] do well agree; the first being called by both of them σῶμα ψυχικὸν, "an animal body," the second σῶμα πνευματικὸν, "a spiritual body." Which latter expression, in scripture, does not only denote the subtilty and tenuity thereof; but also as this present body is called an "animal body," because it is suitable and agreeable to that animal life which men have common with brutes, so is that future called "spiritual," as bearing a fit proportion and correspondency to souls renewed in the spirit of their mind, or in whom the divine Spirit dwelleth and acteth, exercising its dominion. [6] "There is an animal body, and there is a spiritual body." And "The first Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam a quickening spirit." And thus are ψυχικοὶ, in the scripture, taken for οἱ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες, "they who have not the Spirit." And[7] Ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ, "The animal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God." Which Spirit is also said in scripture to be "the earnest of that our future inheritance," Ephes. i. 14.-and the earnest of this spiritual and heavenly body, 2 Cor. v. 5. It is also said to be that by which (efficiently) these mortal bodies shall be quickened, Rom. viii. 11, "If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you; he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit, that dwelleth in you." Neither doth Hierocles fall much short of this scripture-notion of a spiritual body, when he describes it to be that[8] δ τῇ νοερᾷ τελειότητι τῆς ψυχῆς συνάπτεται, "which is agreeable to the intellectual perfection of the soul." This spiritual body is that which the ancient Hebrews called, כנפי הנשר "eagles' wings;" we reading thus in the Gemara of the Sanhedrin (cap. 11. fol. 92. col. 2) אם תאמר אותן שנים שעמיר תקבת לחדש בהן את העולם צדיקים מה הן עושן תקבה עושה להן כנפים כנשרין על פני המים "If you ask, What shall become of the righteous, when God shall renew the world? the answer is, God shall make them wings like eagles', whereby they shall fly upon the face of the waters." Again, as this present body is called in scripture an "earthly body, so is the future body of the righteous styled by

[4] 1 Cor. xv. 44.

[5] Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 214. See the remarks made above on this passage of Hierocles.

[6] 1 Cor. xv. 45. [7] 1 Cor. ii. 14.

[8] Comm. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 214. The philosopher's meaning will be better understood if the passage be transcribed entire. He is there discoursing upon the benefit to be derived by the celestial body of the soul from the purgation which he had prescribed: Διὰ γὰρ τούτων, says he, ἀναβιώσκεται τρόπον τινὰ καὶ συλλέγεται, καὶ θείου πληροῦται τόνου, καὶ τῇ νοερᾷ τελειότητι τῆς ψυχῆς συνάπτεται, "For by means of these (purgations) it (the lucid vehicle of the soul) receives in a manner new life and strength, and is filled with divine vigour, and united with the intellectual perfection of the soul."

St. Paul, as well as the Pythagoreans, a "heavenly body," and they who shall then be possessors thereof, ἐπουράνιοι ἄνθρωποι, "heavenly men," 1 Cor. xv. "As is the heavenly, such are they that are heavenly." Besides which, as philosophers supposed both demons (or angels) and men, to have one and the same σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, οὐράνιον and αἰθέριον, or a like lucid, heavenly, and ethereal body; so from that of our Saviour, when he affirmeth, that they who[9] "shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, will neither marry, nor be given in marriage; nor can die any more; for they are ἰσάγγελοι, equal to the angels." From hence, I say, we may venture to call this resurrection-body of the just also an "angelical" or "isangelical body;"[10] and the rather because the

[9] Luke xx. 36.

[10] For my own part, however, I think we ought not to do this till we are satisfied of the truth of the assumption, that the angels have bodies similar to those glorious bodies, which the blessed shall put on at the last day. For how can the bodies of the saints be called *angelic*, if it be evident that the holy beings called angels are destitute of body? The saying of our Saviour, in which he declares that the saints shall hereafter resemble the angels, is here improperly appealed to, as we have already shown in another place. For Christ does not compare the righteous who are to be partakers of future life with angels in respect to the bodies in which they shall be clothed, but in reference to immortality and to those things which follow from immortality. The authority of the ancient Hebrews, and of Tertullian, is of little or no weight in this matter. The former, indeed, as the learned are well aware, drew largely from the fountains of Platonism; while the latter adopted what was almost the common opinion of the ancient fathers, which attributed bodies to angels; and it is not surprising, therefore, that holding such a notion he should also ascribe flesh to them, and believe that the righteous will be endowed with the same bodies as those of the angels. Not having Nachmanides' book in my possession, I am unable to give an opinion upon the sense of the passage here referred to; but the passage of Tertullian, which occurs in his book De Carnis Resurrectione, cap. 26. p. 214. runs as follows: "Thus also in Isaiah, Bona terræ edetis, the good things of the flesh are meant, which await it in the kingdom of God, when it shall be reformed and angelified, and obtain what the eye has not seen, nor the ear heard." The passage of St. Augustine quoted by the learned Doctor in the margin, is doubtless the following, which is extant in his book De Diversis Quæstionibus Octoginta Tribus, quæst. 47. p. 14. tom. 6. opp. "The question is frequently asked, how we shall be able to see our thoughts after the resurrection and change of the body which is promised to the saints? A conjecture therefore must be formed from that part of our body which has a greater degree of light; since angelic bodies, such as we hope to possess, must be supposed to be most lucid and ethereal; if therefore many motions of our minds are now discovered in the eyes, it is probable that no motion of the mind will remain concealed when the body shall have become wholly ethereal, in comparison with which those eyes are flesh." St Augustine was afraid lest some might interpret this passage as though he had believed that the bodies which the righteous are hereafter to receive will be destitute of all members and flesh; and therefore gives a sort of correction of it in his Retractat. lib. 1. cap. 26. tom. 1. opp. p. 28. where he thus expresses himself: "When I said that the angelic bodies, such as we hope to possess, must be supposed to be most lucid and ethereal, if this be understood of being without the members which we now have, and without the substance of incorruptible flesh, it is wrong." I shall add another passage nearly to the same effect from his Serm. 363. de Cantico Exodi, sect. 30. p. 1002. tom. 5. opp. "In this life of the saints, therefore, their bodies also being changed into a *heavenly and angelic* state shall be so filled and freshened with immortal vigour that no corruption of necessity shall turn and call them away from the most blessed contemplation and praise of truth." But what I stated with respect to Tertullian will apply also to St. Augustine. For this great man was favourable to those

ancient Hebrews (as we learn from Nachmonides, in Shaar Haggemul) styled it, לבושת הנפש המלאכותי "the angelical clothing of the soul;" and Tertullian himself, angelificatam carnem, "angelified flesh." But, lastly, St. Paul is not only positive in his doctrine here, but also negative:[1] "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption."* Which place being undoubtedly not to be allegorized, it may be from thence inferred, that the happy resurrection-body shall not be this foul and gross body of ours only varnished and gilded over on the outside of it, it remaining still nasty, sluttish, and ruinous within, and having all the same seeds of corruption and mortality in its nature which it had before, though by perpetual miracle kept off, it being as it were by violence defended from being seized upon and devoured by the jaws of death; but that it shall be so inwardly changed in its nature as that the possessors thereof cannot die any more. But all this, which hath been said of the resurrection-body, is not so to be understood, as if it belonged universally to all that shall be raised up at the last day, or made to appear upon the earth in their own persons at that great and general assizes; that they shall have all alike (wicked as well as good) such glorious, spiritual, and celestial bodies; but it is only a description of the *ἀνάστασις τῆς ζωῆς*, the "resurrection of life;" which is emphatically called also by our Saviour Christ,[2] *ἀνάστασις ἡ ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*, "the resurrection from the dead," or to a happy immortality; as they, who shall be thought worthy thereof, are likewise styled by him *υἱοὶ ἀναστάσεως*, "the children

who formerly held the angels to be endowed with most thin and subtle bodies, as has been abundantly proved from many passages of his by Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theologicor. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis, cap. 2. sect. 9. p. 5. &c. But I think the learned Jesuit ought to have added, that St. Augustine was not so wedded to this opinion as to be perfectly satisfied of its truth. At any rate, in his *Epist.* 95. tom. 2. opp. p. 197. where he is professedly treating of this question: "Whether the angels have bodies or are only spirits," he first of all indeed brings forward certain reasons which he considers make it probable that the angels have bodies; nevertheless, having stated thus much, he leaves the whole matter undecided: "But," says he, "whether the angels have bodies, or it can be shown by any one that they may perform all these things and yet be devoid of body, still in that community of saints," &c. From which it is evident that St. Augustine, although supposing the opinion of those who ascribed bodies to the angels to be the more probable one, did not however consider it to be so true and certain as to be altogether incapable of refutation. Nevertheless, holding it to be probable that the angels are clothed in bodies, and wishing to illustrate the nature of those bodies which the blessed are hereafter to receive by some comparison, he could hardly have applied a more apt example than the bodies of angels. To these great authors let me add Methodius in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 234. p. 923. Πᾶν τὸ *ἐκ καθαροῦ ἀέρος καὶ καθαροῦ πυρὸς συνιστάμενον σύγκριμα καὶ τοῖς ἀγγελικοῖς ὁμοούσιον ὑπάρχον, οὐ δύναται γῆς ἔχειν ποιότητα*, "Whatever is compounded of pure air and pure fire, and is of the same substance as the angelic natures, cannot have the quality of earth." He is speaking of the resurrection-body. Other passages that might be produced of the same kind I pass over.

* Thus St. Austin, Corpora Angelica; and Qualia sunt Angelorum.

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 50. [2] Luke xx. 25.

of the resurrection." Of which resurrection only it is that St. Paul treateth, in that fifteenth chapter of his to the Corinthians. And we say that this Christian resurrection of life is the vesting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly, and immortal bodies. The complete happiness of a man and all the good that can be desired by him, was by the heathen poet thus summed up, Ut sit mens sana in corpore sano, "That there be a sound mind in a sound body:" and the Christian happiness seems to be all comprised in these two things; first, in being inwardly regenerated and renewed in the spirit of their mind, cleansed from all pollution of flesh and spirit, and made partakers of the divine life and nature; and then, secondly, in being outwardly clothed with glorious, spiritual, celestial, and incorruptible bodies. The Scripture plainly declareth, that our souls are not at home here, in this terrestrial body and these earthly mansions, but that they are strangers and pilgrims therein; which the patriarchs also confessing, plainly declared, that they sought a country, not that which they came out from, but a heavenly one. From which passages of Scripture some indeed would infer, that souls being at first created by God pure, pre-existed, before this their terrene nativity, in celestial bodies; but afterwards straggled and wandered down hither, as Philo for one:[3] Ἀπολιποῦσα μὲν γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸν οὐράνιον τόπον,

[3] De Agricultura, p. 197. Compare the same also in his book Quis Divinarum Rerum Hæres, p. 519. and other places. But it is notorious that this Jew was smitten with such a partiality for the Platonic precepts, which at that time were publicly taught at Alexandria, that he does not hesitate on every occasion to drag in Moses as entertaining the opinion of Plato. But if those who maintain that souls existed before the bodies, can adduce nothing else from scripture in proof of this doctrine of theirs than those sayings in which righteous men are declared to be strangers and pilgrims on this earth, and to seek a better country, there is certainly an end of their cause. For in all these passages there is a metaphor borrowed from human things; namely, a comparison of this life with the life which a man lends in a foreign land, destitute of friends and relations, and of heavenly glory with the sweet and pleasant life which a man lives among his friends in the place where he is bred and born. But who is not aware that figurative passages of this kind are not to be too closely pressed, and that no argument can be drawn from them either in proof or refutation of any doctrine? In every similitude, as every body knows, we ought to look solely to that point from which the comparison is chiefly drawn, and not to carry the thought further. Now it is manifest that heaven is called one's own country by the divine writers simply on account of the pleasant and happy life we there look forward to, and this earth a place of exile because of the troubles which we are obliged to undergo in it. Whoever wishes to enlarge the limits of this comparison, will both err himself and afford occasion to others of adding fallacy to fallacy. For what reply would you return to a man reasoning thus: heaven is our native country: in one's native country are one's parents, relatives, and friends: therefore the soul also leaves family, ancestors, parents, relations, brothers, sisters, &c., in its heavenly country? If those who deny the existence of souls before bodies were disposed to adopt the same line of argument, they might in their turn easily find texts to answer their purpose. Celestial happiness, for instance, is every where compared by the sacred writers to a feast, as also to an inheritance, and other things. But he who is invited to a feast is invited to delights which he has hitherto been a stranger to, and he who comes into an inheritance acquires some good which he had not possessed before. It will therefore follow from these images that souls when

καθάπερ εἰς ξένην χώραν ἦλθε τὸ σῶμα, "Our soul (saith he) having left its heavenly mansion, came down into this earthly body, as a strange place." But thus much is certain, that our human souls were at first intended and designed by God Almighty, the maker of them, for other bodies and other regions, as their proper home and country, and their eternal resting place: however, to us, that "be not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual." Now, though some, from that of St. Paul,[4] where he calls this happy resurrection-body, οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, "that house of ours, that is from heaven," or which "cometh out of heaven," would infer, that therefore it will not be taken out of graves and charnel houses; they conceiving also, that the individuation and sameness of men's persons does not necessarily depend upon the numerical identity of all the parts of matter, because we never continue thus the same, our bodies always flowing like a river, and passing away by insensible transpiration; and it is certain, that we have not all the same numerical matter, and neither more nor less, both in infancy and in old age, though we be for all that the self-same persons; yet, nevertheless, according to the best philosophy, which acknowledges no essential or specifical difference of matter, the foulest and grossest body that is, merely by motion may not only be crystallized, but also brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether. And undoubtedly, that same numerical body of our Saviour Christ, which lay in the sepulchre, was after his resurrection thus transformed into a spiritual and heavenly body; the subtlety and tenuity whereof appeared from his entering in when the doors were shut, and his vanishing out of sight; however its glory were for the time suspended, partly for the better convincing his disciples of the truth of his resurrection, and partly, because they were not then able to bear the splendour of it. We conclude, therefore, that the Christian mystery of the resurrection of life, consisteth not in the soul's being re-united to these vile rags of mortality, these gross bodies of ours, (such as now they are;) but in having them changed into the likeness of Christ's glorious body, and in this mortal's putting on immortality.

Hitherto have we seen the agreement that is betwixt Chris-

they depart hence to heaven are to go to delights and joys not previously known to them, and are made partakers of good things of which they had before been destitute: which is plainly at variance with the doctrine of those who maintain that souls existed before they were united with bodies. Not to mention that David altogether, both body and soul, complains of his being a stranger and sojourner here, and that not only the minds of the saints, but the saints altogether, are said to seek their own country. *Wherefore if these passages are a proof that souls descended into this world from heavenly places, they necessarily prove that the bodies also came from thence, and were turned out of a better state into this miserable and wretched one.

[4] 2 Cor. v. 1.

tianity and the old philosophic cabala, concerning the soul, in these two things: First, that the highest happiness and perfection of the human soul consisteth not in a state of pure separation from all body; and secondly, that it does not consist neither in an eternal union with such gross terrestrial bodies as these unchanged; the soul being not at home, but a stranger and pilgrim in them, and oppressed with the load of them: but that at last, the souls of good men shall arrive at glorious, spiritual, heavenly, and immortal bodies. But now as to that point, whether human souls be always united to some body or other, and consequently, when by death they put off this gross terrestrial body, they are not thereby quite divested and stripped naked of all body, but have a certain subtle and spirituous body still adhering to them and accompanying them? or else, whether all souls that have departed out of this life, from the very beginning of the world, have ever since continued in a state of separation from all body, and shall so continue forwards till the day of judgment or general resurrection? we must confess that this is a thing not so explicitly determined, or expressly decided in Christianity, either way. Nevertheless, it is first of all certain from scripture, that souls departed out of these terrestrial bodies are therefore neither dead nor asleep,* till the last trump and general resurrection, but still alive and awake; our Saviour Christ affirming, that "they all live unto God;" the meaning whereof seems to be this, that they who are said to be dead, are dead only unto men here upon earth; but neither dead unto themselves, nor yet unto God, their life being not extinct, but only disappearing to us, and withdrawn from our sight; forasmuch as they are gone off this stage, which we still continue to act upon. And thus is it said also of our Saviour Christ himself, and that after his resurrection too, "that he liveth unto God," Rom. vi. 10. From whence it is evident that they who are said to live to God, are not therefore supposed to be less alive, than they were, when they lived unto men. Now, it seemeth to be a privilege or prerogative proper to the Deity only, to live and act alone, without vital union or conjunction with any body. Quærendum, saith Origen,† si possibile est, penitus incorporeas remanere rationabiles creaturas, cùm ad summum sanctitatis ac beatitudinis venerent? An necesse est eas semper conjunctas esse corporibus? "It is worth our inquiry, whether it be possible for rational creatures to remain perfectly incorporeal and separate from all body, when they are arrived to the highest degree of holiness and happiness? or whether they be always of necessity conjoined with some

* Death, called sleep in scripture, only κατ' εὐφημισμόν.

† Περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. 2. [Cap. 2. p. 69. opp.]

bodies;" and afterwards he plainly affirmeth it to be impossible: Vivere præter corpus ullam aliam naturam, præter Patrem et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum: "For any other nature besides the Father, and the Son, and Holy Ghost, to live quite without a body."[5] Indeed, if this were most natural to the human soul, and most perfective of it, to continue separate from all body, then doubtless, (as Origen implied) should the souls of good men rather after the day of judgment, continue in such a state of separation, to all eternity.[6] But on the contrary, if it be natural to souls to enliven and inform some body or other, (though not always a terrestrial one) as our inward sense inclines us to think, then can it not seem so probable that they should, by a kind of violence, be kept so long in an unnatural or preternatural state of nakedness and separation from all body, some of them even from Adam till the day of judgment.[7]

[5] [The disciples of Leibnitz think so at this day. See Leibnitii Epist. 203. 207. Elsewhere, and tom. 2. p. 437.] This opinion, that God alone possessed the privilege of living and acting without any body, was formerly entertained not only by Origen, but by most of the fathers in the first ages of Christianity. And even Origen's adversaries themselves found nothing to reprehend in this opinion. As one example for all take Methodius, who is well known to have confuted Origen; and who in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 234. p. 931. says as follows: Ἡγοῦν ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀνενδεὴς καὶ ἀκάματος φύσις ὁ Θεὸς μόνος ἕδεται, ἀσώματος ὤν, διὰ καὶ ἀόρατος, "Therefore God alone is proclaimed to be a nature ungenerated, without deficiency and unwearied, who being incorporeal is therefore also invisible." Even as late as the fifth century, when many held this doctrine to be false and dangerous, Faustus Rhegiensis did not shrink from defending it. See his sixteenth Epistle, published by Henr. Canisius, Antiquarum Lectionum, tom. 1. p. 363. &c. of the new edition. In it he says he speaks according to the opinion of the elder saints: which is true. Afterwards, p. 364. he thus discourses: "For although we declare that there are some spiritual natures, as are the angels, archangels, and the other powers, as also our own soul itself, or at least that subtle air: still they are by no means to be accounted incorporeal. For they have about them a body by which they subsist, although incomparably more thin and subtle than our bodies, according to the opinion of the apostle, who says, 'bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial.' From which it is clearly shown that *nothing is incorporeal but God alone.*" And this opinion he then endeavours to support by many arguments from Sacred Writ. But he was confuted by Claudianus Mamertus, in his book De Statu Animæ, published separately by Casp. Barth. To these add Gennadius Massiliensis, De Ecclesiast. Dogmatibus, lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 8. and Geverh. Elemenhorst on this passage, p. 128.

[6] [Origen proves that the body adheres to the soul after death by the example of Samuel and Lazarus. See tom. 1. p. 35. of his works.]

[7] The learned Doctor in his zeal for the fathers, as they are called, and his partiality for the Platonic philosophy here openly adopts the opinion of those who hold that a certain body, or as the Platonists say, *ethereal vehicle*, is always present with the soul, although considered in itself it is devoid of all matter and corporeal concretion. It would seem indeed from the closing words of the disputation that he wishes to appear as leaving the matter undecided, and allowing every one to entertain his own ideas upon it: but the entire tone of his remarks, and the arguments by which he endeavours to substantiate this opinion, show him to have belonged to a class of men at that time, as at this day, very numerous in Great Britain, who boldly maintained it. I do not consider that a man is to be excluded from the Christian community or charged with a capital and most pernicious error on account of this dogma, provided his notions regarding the nature of the soul are correct in other respects, and he does not embrace the other opinions which were formerly coupled with it. I am aware that among men eminent at the present day as philosophers, and at the same time as pious Christians,

Again, the Scripture also intimates, that souls departed out of this life, have a knowledge of one another, and are also capable of the punishment of sense or pain: "Fear him, (saith our

there are not wanting those who consider the doctrine that no spirit is ever without a body to be probable, nay, true and indisputable: whose arguments were collected not long ago by a learned writer who assumed the name of H. C. Trichorius, in a singular dissertation entitled Ochematologia, and published in the Museum Bremense Philologico-Theologicum, tom. 1. par. 1. p. 114. I fancy, however, I have the gravest of reasons for not concurring in their views. And to confess the truth, since the scriptures make no mention of such a body of souls, which even the most erudite Trichorius himself does not deny, and a matter so recondite and abstruse cannot be settled by surmises and conjectures of our own, I regret that these excellent men were not content with what God has revealed to us, and less bold and free in their decisions; and that they did not decline entering into matters so far out of the reach of human inquiry rather than attempt to explain them by opinions which others might be disposed to contemn and repudiate. It cannot be denied that the assertors of a subtle and inseparable body of the soul have something to offer in the shape of a reply to those who ask in what manner the soul lives, subsists, feels, and is rendered susceptible of pleasure and pain. But I am afraid the remedy they resort to for the purpose of curing men of their scepticism will prove worse than the disease, and expose them to other objections which they never will be able to get over unless they at once cut the knot by confessing their own ignorance. And even if this opinion be adopted, how many questions still remain respecting the nature and condition of the soul which no one will satisfactorily answer, while he resides here among mortals? For my own part what in the first place dissuades me from admitting it, is the exceptionable source from which it sprung. We have already shown it to be of the highest antiquity, and of plebeian rather than philosophical origin. It was not invented by wise men under the guidance of intellect and reason: but adopted into the schools of later philosophers from the poets and common people, and adorned and embellished by them so that it should not appear too absurd and irrational. Lactantius tells us that some of the ancient Christians supposed the poets to be the authors of those opinions which at that time prevailed respecting the state of the soul after death. "Some," says he, Instit. Divinar. lib. 7. cap. 22. p. 863. "imagine that these are the fictions of poets, not knowing whence the poets received them, and deny their truth." And, although he himself opposes them, and maintains that the poets received all these things from divine revelation, a portion of which had come down to them by tradition and hearsay, nevertheless these Christians seem to me to have been tolerably shrewd and clear-sighted, nor does Lactantius, as far as I can see, bring forward any thing that should induce a sane man to forego this opinion. If any one should inquire what first led the most ancient poets and others to attribute a body and human form to souls, he will find that they were influenced chiefly by two causes: first, the common report that souls had often appeared in the human form, especially about the tombs of the dead; and, secondly, their utter inability to comprehend a nature perfectly simple and entirely destitute of body. The former of which reasons is altogether uncertain and fallacious. For the truth of such apparitions ought first of all to be placed beyond controversy, before any deductions can be drawn from them. And even if it were certain that some souls had appeared in the way stated, this would be no satisfactory proof that the soul is always united and associated with a body. The other reason will weigh with no one who has ever entered into close communion with himself, and attentively examined the powers and faculties of his own mind. The authority even of the ancient philosophers and Platonists themselves will not be regarded, I should imagine, among the props and supports of this doctrine. For if any great dependence is to be placed upon this authority, we shall be compelled to believe many things which at the present day would be too gross for the credulity even of children or old women.

In the next place, the advocates of this doctrine of an immortal body of the soul seem to me greatly to assist the cause of those who either deny the soul to be a self-existent nature, or hold it to be wholly corporeal. For a nature which never is nor can be without body, is something imperfect, and having no independent existence; a part, or if you please, a faculty of the body which it animates. Is the body then more perfect than the soul? For while the soul according to this hypothesis cannot exist

Saviour) who after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell," Luke xii. And the soul of the rich man is said to be immediately after death in torments, before the day of judgment; as

independently of body, the body, on the contrary, is complete and perfect although altogether destitute of soul. However magnificently, therefore, these worthy supporters of this doctrine may speak in respect to the powers, nature, and faculties of the soul, declaring it to be simple, devoid of concretion, and eternal; still I am afraid if the whole matter be more minutely inquired into, they will be driven to the confession that it is nothing more than a certain energy or vital faculty animating the body that invests it. And for my own part I consider theirs to be on the whole a somewhat wiser course who assert that the soul is altogether corporeal, or consists of incorruptible matter: which opinion the most ancient philosophers entertained. For in taking this view they still suppose the soul to be a nature in itself perfect and independent, and requiring no external aid for the discharge of its own functions: which the former deny. But if it should be said, that assuming this opinion to be right, it will be altogether impossible to explain how the soul can think, inasmuch as matter is incapable of cogitation; a ready answer is at hand. For if God, as they themselves believe, could create immortal and most simple matter, and unite it by an indissoluble bond with immaterial mind, there is no reason for believing that he could not endow this eternal and most subtle matter with the faculty of cogitation. To draw conclusions from this grosser matter of our own in reference to that celestial and indestructible matter which is unknown to us, would certainly be rash and unsafe, and wholly unworthy of a philosopher. But perhaps they will tell us that their opinion is misunderstood, and that they by no means deny the soul to be capable of existing apart from the body, and to be a self-existent nature; what they do maintain being simply that it cannot feel and perceive without body, and therefore that God has furnished it with an imperishable body to qualify it for sensation and perception. But who taught these learned persons that the soul is unable to feel and perceive unless it be associated with body, and that there is no other faculty of sensation except that with which we ourselves are endowed? For my part, I firmly believe that God, whose power is infinite, can render the soul susceptible of pleasure and pain without connecting it with body; nor can I see any necessity for supposing that it is incapable of perceiving external things unless it be endowed with eyes, ears, and other members. Has so intimate a knowledge of souls living out of the mortal body been vouchsafed to us, that we can confidently decide upon such matters, and undertake to lay down a code of belief to others?

Lastly, certain corollaries, I perceive, may be drawn from this dogma which tend in a certain measure to the subversion of the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. For if souls are furnished with a natural body of their own, and on their departure hence, take it away with them into heaven, there appears to be no reason why they should again receive the mortal body, purified and endowed with new qualities, at the final day of this world. For by the intervention of that other body, the souls of the good as well as the wicked are made capable of perceiving pleasure and pain, although destitute of this concrete body. This difficulty has already been raised by J. Le Clere, Bibliotheque Choisie, tom. 7. p. 81. who expresses himself as follows: "To this dogma it may be objected that if the soul after the death of the body has another ethereal body, such as those of angels whom we shall be made to resemble after we rise again from the grave, there would be no necessity for the resurrection of the body: for the soul, according to this opinion, already possesses its own body, which it is to have for everlasting. All that can be adduced in answer to this objection is: that at the last day the soul will receive from the earth certain particles of its earthly body, which being united with the one it already possessed before the resurrection, will constitute that body with which it is to be invested through all eternity." I shall now briefly examine into the arguments which the learned Doctor has here brought forward in proof of the dogma in question.

I. What he first of all endeavours to establish, that souls departed out of the terrestrial bodies are really alive and awake, and not dead or asleep, as some, both of the ancients and moderns have supposed, will not for a moment be questioned by any one who does not disregard the authority of sacred writ. But I cannot see what this has to do with the present matter. For who would reason in this manner: "Souls live after the death of the body: therefore they are endowed with bodies?" As if nothing

likewise to have known Abraham and Lazarus. And it seems neither agreeable to our common notions, nor yet to piety, to conclude, that the souls of wicked men, departing out of this

can live except it be associated with body. II. His observation that probably no nature but the supreme Deity alone, can live and act without body, is wholly incapable of being substantiated by arguments, if we except the authority of Origen and other ancient fathers which on this question is altogether vain and worthless. Neither reason nor divine revelation supplies anything in the slightest degree tending to support such an opinion. III. The learned Doctor syllogizes as follows: It is repugnant to the nature and perfection of souls to be without body: therefore, it is incredible that God would suffer them to remain so long a time in an unnatural and imperfect state. But in this reasoning he assumes what every one would require him to prove: namely, that it is repugnant to the nature and perfection of souls to be without body. Whence did he obtain it? Nay, it is sufficiently evident, he will reply, from this, that God will hereafter re-unite souls with bodies, for he would not do so if they could be in their natural and perfect state, when divested of bodies. But it is surprising so acute a man could be prevented by his partiality for a hastily received opinion, from perceiving that this argument is altogether fallacious. In the first place, it proves more than is necessary. For if it be more closely pressed, it will enable others to contend that this gross mortal and perishable body cannot be separated from the soul, but ought immediately to be restored to it. The learned Doctor lays down these two positions as a foundation: That God cannot suffer the soul to remain long in a state contrary to its nature: that the use of the body is indispensable to the soul's natural state: the latter of which he proves by saying that God will hereafter restore the body to the soul. In reasoning thus he openly concedes that prior to their being connected with these bodies again at the last day, they live in a state foreign to their nature and perfection. For unless something were wanting towards their complete felicity, God would not hereafter restore to them this concrete body. But our worthy author insists that God cannot suffer the soul to live long in an unnatural state. Therefore, this frail and mortal body itself ought at once to be restored to the soul, to enable it to enjoy a more happy and perfect life. Again, the whole argument seems to me to be weak and futile. How do you know that the soul when released from the mortal body, is clothed in an ethereal and subtle body? Because its nature and perfection require it. And how have you learnt that the nature of the soul necessarily requires body? Because God will hereafter endow it again with this mortal body. This is the same as if we were to reason thus: Souls already have a body, because divine providence will hereafter restore to them this frail and earthly body: than which nothing can be more absurd and illogical. Lastly, the learned Doctor involves himself by this reasoning in inextricable difficulties, and overthrows his own arguments. Souls clothed in a subtle and ethereal body are either already perfect, or are lacking of perfection till they hereafter receive the other body also. If the former be true, there is an end to the doctrine of the resurrection of mortal bodies. For what necessity is there for adding a new body to a soul already perfect? If the other be preferred, what Dr. Cudworth urges falls to the ground, that it is inconsistent with God to leave the soul so long in a state contrary to the perfection of its nature. For my part, although I think we ought to speak cautiously and circumspectly on matters in respect to which sacred writers are silent, still I hold God to be able by his infinite power to cause the soul to be affected by the same pleasures and pains out of the body as it is when associated with body. And not to speak of other reasons, I consider that the design of God in again uniting this terrestrial body with the soul, to be, that it may receive its reward or punishment through that instrument by which it performed good or wicked deeds in this life. But supposing the learned Doctor's assumption to be true, that the soul living out of the body is not in its perfect and natural state, not even so will his argument be a valid one. For there is no reason why God should not for the wisest purposes permit the soul to pass some time in a less perfect state. Is it repugnant to the divine virtues to lead the soul gradually to extreme and consummate happiness, and not fill it at once with all the pleasure of which it is destined to become the partaker? But as I said before, upon matters of this kind, which divine wisdom has not thought meet to reveal to us, we ought to speak only with humility and modesty, and to put off subjects, the knowledge of which is denied to us mortals, to that day when all darkness shall be removed from our minds.

life, from the beginning of the world in their several ages, till the day of judgment, have all of them no manner of punishment inflicted on them, save only that of remorse of conscience, and future expectation. Now, it is not conceivable how souls after death should know and be knowable, and converse with one another, and have any punishment of sense or pain inflicted on them, were they not vitally united to some bodies. And thus did Tertullian reason long ago:* Dolet apud inferos anima cujusdam, et punitur in flamma, et cruciatur in linguâ, et de digito animæ felicioris implorat solatium roris. Imaginem existimas, exitum illum pauperis lætantis, et divitis mœrentis. Et quid illic Lazari nomen, si non in veritate res est? Sed etsi imago credenda est, testimonium erit veritatis. Si enim non habet anima corpus, non caperet imaginem corporis. Nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant. Quid est autem illud, quod ad inferna transfertur post divortium corporis? quod detinetur, et in diem judicii reservatur? Ad quod et Christus moriendo descendit? puto ad animas patriarcharum? Incorporalitas animæ ab omni genere custodiæ libera est; immunis à pœna et à fovela. Per quod enim punitur aut fovetur, hoc erit corpus. Igitur si quid tormenti sive solatii anima præcerpit in carcere, vel diversorio inferûm, in igni vel in sinu Abrahæ, probata erit corporalitas animæ. Incorporalitas enim nihil patitur, non habens per quod pati possit: aut si habet, hoc erit corpus. In quantum enim omne corporale passibile est; in tantum quod passibile est, corporale est, "We read in Scripture of a soul tormented in hell, punished with flames, and desirous of a drop of water to cool his tongue. You will say, perhaps, that this is parabolical and fictitious. What then does the name of Lazarus signify there, if it were no real thing? But if it be a parable never so much, yet must it, notwithstanding, as to the main, speak agreeably to truth. For if the soul (after death) have no body at all, then can it not have any corporeal image, shape, or figure. Nor can it be thought that the Scripture would lie concerning corporeal members, if there were none. But what is that, which after its separation from this body, is carried down into hell, and there detained prisoner, and reserved till the day of judgment? And what is that, which Christ dying descended down unto? I suppose to the souls of the patriarchs. But incorporality is free from all custody or imprisonment, as also devoid of pain and pleasure. Wherefore, if souls be sensible of pain after death, and tormented with fire, then must they needs have some corporeity; for incorporality suffers nothing. And as every corporeal thing is passive or patible, so again whatsoever is passive is corporeal." Tertullian[8] would also confirm

* De An. p. 309. Rigal. [Cap. 7. p. 165.]

[8] Ubi supra, cap. 9. p. 166.

this from a vision or revelation of a certain sister-prophet, (miracles and prophecy being said by him not to be then altogether extinct,) Inter cætera ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, et spiritus videbatur, tenera et lucida, et aërii coloris, et formæ per omnia humanæ, "There was (said she) amongst other things, a soul corporally exhibited to my view, and it was tender and lucid, and of an aereal colour, and every way of human form." Agreeably to which, Tertullian himself addeth: Effigiem non aliam animæ humanæ deputandam præter humanam, et quidem ejus corporis, quod unaquæque circumtulit, "There is no other shape to be assigned to a human soul, but human; and indeed, that of the body, which is before carried about." It is true indeed, that Tertullian here drives the business so far, as to make the soul itself to be corporeal, figurative, and colorate, and after death to have the very same shape which its respective body had before in this life; he being one of those who were not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, and therefore being a religionist, concluded God himself to be a certain body also. But the reasons which he here insisteth on will indeed extend no further than to prove that the soul hath after death some body vitally united to it, by means whereof it is both capable of converse and sensible of pain, forasmuch as body alone can have no sense of any thing.[1]

[1] The argument here brought forward by Dr. Cudworth in support of his opinion on the body of souls, is capable of as easy a refutation as the preceding one.

I. He reasons in this manner: Souls divested of their earthly bodies know and converse with each other, and can feel pleasure and pain: but nothing of this kind can take place without corporeal members: therefore, souls are connected with a thin and ethereal body which adapts and qualifies them for all these things. In this argumentation the learned Doctor assumes what pure reason tells us is inadmissible, that no one can know and converse with another, unless he has eyes, a tongue, and other bodily members. We know that God sees, perceives, knows, and discerns all things, although he is wholly destitute of eyes, ears, and all members. Why, therefore, may not souls also, when released from the body, be able by some means unknown and incomprehensible to us, to perceive external things and know one another, and disclose their thoughts by certain signs? The same may be said of sense. For who will deny it to be possible for the divine power to cause simple spirits divested of all body to participate in joy or sorrow? The fact that we ourselves, during this life, have no sensation or perception except through the body, is no proof in my opinion that there is no different mode of perception in another state. To confess the truth, I have always considered those to judge too hastily who suppose that we are to draw our own conclusions as to the possibility or impossibility of a thing from what happens here among us mortals.

II. The authority of Tertullian, which Dr. Cudworth next appeals to, is in itself very slight: we shall, therefore, merely consider the arguments he brings forward. These are two-fold; one drawn from the history related by our Saviour of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke xvi.; the other from a vision which appeared to a certain woman. Neither of which is of any great weight. Granting that in Tertullian's time, divine visions had not yet ceased among Christians, still, it is unquestionable that many at that time passed off false visions and mere illusions of a fertile imagination as true, and that even the best of men were grossly deceived in this matter. Tertullian, it is notorious was too ready and prone to receive every idle dream as a divine appearance. Besides, he wrote his book, De Anima, after he had already gone over to the Montanists. Wherefore, the woman to whom he tells us this vision appeared, was doubtless

And this is that which Irenæus from the same Scripture gathereth; not that the soul is a body, but that it hath a body after death conjoined with it, and that of the same form and

some fanatic of this sect, which abounded in women of the kind. Our Saviour's narrative respecting the souls of the rich man and beggar, Luke xvi. was considered by other ancient fathers besides Tertullian to be of great importance in this question, as Methodius in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 234. p. 931. Faustus Rhegiensis in Henr. Canisius' Lectiones Antiquæ, tom. 1. p. 364. Irenæus, Adversus Hæreses, lib. 2. cap. 34. p. 168. and others. But who does not see that in this narrative, whether it is altogether fictitious and parabolical, or contains some historical truth, our Saviour is depicting futurity by images drawn from the things of this world; which he also frequently does elsewhere, in order to be better understood by the less informed and intelligent. But every body is aware that narratives of this kind are not to be pressed too closely. If it be right to reason thus: Christ attributes to the souls of the rich glutton and Lazarus a tongue, hands, and feet; therefore souls that have departed from this terrestrial body, still live in connexion with certain bodies: the following also will be admissible logic: Christ represents Lazarus as sitting and feasting in Abraham's bosom: therefore, in heavenly glory we shall be really refreshed and fed with meat and drink. Besides, this parable will be of equal avail to those who suppose the soul to be wholly corporeal, as to those who hold it to be connected with a certain subtle body. For there is nothing in it from which you can infer that Lazarus consisted of two parts, soul and body. Lastly, if the souls of the dead have a tongue, feet, and the other members, as the ancient fathers infer from this narrative of Christ, what becomes of the resurrection of the body? What necessity is there for the former bodies to be hereafter restored to souls, if they are already supplied with bodies? Or is it, that happy souls require a twofold tongue and a double share of hands and feet?

III. But as Dr. Cudworth in the sequel again appeals to the testimony of the ancient Christian fathers, it may be worth while to give a brief exposition of their sentiments generally on the nature of the soul. Not one of them entertained the same opinion as the majority of Christians do at the present day, that it is perfectly simple, and entirely destitute of all body, figure, form, and extension. On the contrary, they all acknowledge it to contain something corporeal, although of a different kind and nature from the bodies of this mortal sphere. But yet they are divided into two opinions. For some contend that there are two things in the soul, spirit and a very thin and subtle body in which this spirit is clothed: while others hold it to be altogether corporeal, and nothing more than a certain subtle and aerial body. I am aware that some of them pronounce the soul to be a mere *spirit:* but it is a mistake to understand them as using this word in the sense attached to it at the present day. For spirit which they sometimes oppose to body, according to their idea is nothing but a thin and subtle body, such as air or ether: as might be proved if necessary, from many of their sayings. Consult Tertullian, for example, in his book, De Anima, cap. 11. p. 167. There are very learned men who have given most erroneous interpretations of the dogmas of antiquity, in consequence of their ignorance of this fact. This difference of opinion existing, as I have stated, among the ancient fathers, arises not only from the diversity of their intellectual powers, but also from their study of philosophy. For those who follow Plato and the Platonists, for example Clement, Origen, and their disciples, adopt the Platonic doctrine respecting the soul also, and pronounce it to be most simple in itself, but yet always invested with a subtle body. But the others who keep farther aloof from Plato, and consider his philosophy to be prejudicial to Christian principles, repudiate this doctrine of his as well, and maintain that the soul altogether is nothing more than a most subtle body. To these belong Tertullian, Arnobius, Methodius, and several others, whose writings abound with passages condemnatory of Plato, and holding him forth as the prince and founder of the heretics of their own time. They very frequently assail the Platonists with bitter invectives, for inculcating that the soul is a nature most simple in itself, and devoid of all concretion. Arnobius, lib. 2. Adversus Gentes, writes thus: "Wherefore, there is no reason why we should be deceived and buoyed up with false hopes, when some well known extravagant admirers of themselves, tell us that souls are immortal, and next in dignity to God the first of things, that they are sprung from that parent and father, and are divine, wise, learned, and exempt from all contagion of body." He must be very little versed

figure with that body which it had before here in this life;* Plenissimè autem Dominus docuit, non solum perseverare, non de corpore in corpus transgredientes animas, sed et characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem; et meminisse eas operum, quæ egerunt hic, et à quibus cessaverunt; in enarratione, quæ scribitur de Divite et de Lazaro, qui refrigerabatur in sinu Abrahæ; in qua ait Divitem cognoscere Lazarum post mortem; et manere in suo ordine unumquemque ipsorum. "Our Lord hath most plainly taught us, that souls do not only continue after death, without passing out of one body into another, but also, that they keep the character of body wherein they are then also adapted, the same which they had before; as likewise, that they remember the actions and omissions of their life past; in that enarration which is written concerning the rich man and Lazarus, who was refreshed in Abraham's bosom; wherein he affirmeth the rich man to have known both

in the affairs of Platonism, who does not at once see that these words are named at that school. Read also Tertullian, in his De Anima, cap. 17. p. 165. where he says: "These things are agitated by the Platonists with more sutlety than truth." [God is both body and spirit according to Tertullian, Beausobre Hist. du Manich. p. 474.] But those again who suppose the soul to be body, are not of one and the same opinion: for some, in explaining what they mean by this word, express themselves in such a way as clearly to make it appear that they give the name of body generally to every thing which is bounded by a certain limit and place, and has a circumscribed substance, or by which any thing is what it is. Tertullian himself, in some passages which have been collected by Jac. Pamelius, in his Paradoxes of Tertullian, sect. 15. p. 9. expressly owns that by the name *body* he means that by which any thing subsists. Those who entertain this notion, although they call the soul corporeal, and affirm it to be extended, and moved, and included in place, which is repugnant to the doctrine of later Christians, properly speaking, however, attach no meaning to the word *body*, and as it were, tacitly confess their ignorance of the nature of the soul. Wherefore they differ least of all from the modern opinions concerning it. But the others do not hesitate to tell us what is the nature of the soul they call corporeal, and declare that its body consists of pure air and fire, or ether: to which number belong Methodius and others. And yet many of these think this amounts to no reason why they should not pronounce the soul to be immortal and eternal: in which they follow the opinion of the ancients, who, as I have already more than once stated, held the most pure and subtle ether and fire to be wholly indestructible. Theirs was a graver error, who while they pronounced the soul to be corporeal, and all body to be perishable, supposed that the soul also is by no means immortal, but capable of dissolution and extinction. Among these are to be ranked Arnobius, lib. 2. Adversus Gentes, p. 66. the author of the Clementines, homil. 3. sect. 6. p. 641. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. and some others who are mentioned by Desid. Heraldus and J. Bapt. Cotelerius, in their annotations on these writers. There is also some slight discrepancy among the supporters of this opinion, which I am not now disposed to dwell upon: generally however they all agree that souls are of an intermediate nature, that is, can perish, and on the other hand, if God so wills, become immortal: that the souls of those who have embraced the Christian doctrine, are rescued from the peril of mortality by baptism or some other means: but that the souls of wicked men who reject the discipline of Christ remain mortal, and being sent down to the abode of the shades, are there tormented by fire, till they are finally dissolved and annihilated. Persons not unacquainted with the transactions of the learned of our own times, are aware that not long ago Henry Dodwell, a man eminent for his erudition in other respects, revived this doctrine to a certain extent, and wrote some books in which he displays more zeal than skill in its defence.

* Lib. 2. cap. 62. [Cap. 34. p. 168. edit. Massueti.]

Lazarus and Abraham after death, as also each of them to remain in their own order." And thus again in the following chapter:* Per hæc manifestissimè declaratum est, et perseverare animas; et non de corpore in corpus exire; et habere hominis figuram; (ut etiam cognoscantur) et meminisse eorum, quæ hic sint; et dignam habitationem unamquamque gentem percipere, etiam antè judicium, "By these things it is most manifestly declared, that souls do both persevere after death, and that they do not transmigrate out of one body into another, and that they have a human figure or shape, (whereby they may be known;) as also that they remember the things here upon the earth, and their own actions; and lastly, that each kind of good and bad have their distinct and suitable habitations assigned them, even before the judgment." Now, that Irenæus did not here mean that souls are themselves bodily substances, and consequently have a certain character, form, and figure of their own, but only that they have certain bodies conjoined with them, which are figurate, is first of all evident from the words themselves, characterem corporis, in quo etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem; the natural sense whereof is this, that they "keep the character of body (wherein they are then also adapted after death) the same with that which these bodies before had here in this life." And it is further manifest from hence, because he elsewhere plainly declareth souls themselves to be incorporeal; as in his fifth book and seventh chapter:† Flatus autem vitæ incorporalis est, "but the breath of life is incorporeal."[2]

* Cap. 63. [Cap. 34. p. 168.] † Page 300.

[2] The learned Doctor is mistaken in his exposition of Irenæus' doctrine concerning the soul: I shall therefore explain it somewhat minutely.

I. Irenæus supposes man to consist by nature of two parts, body and soul. Nevertheless, he also speaks in some places of *spirit*, which he tells us is joined to the body and soul; but in what sense he does so, will be made appear by and by. They are certainly deceived, who imagine this holy father to have entertained the opinion that man consists by nature of three parts—body, soul, and spirit; and Joshua Barnes, in his Notes to Homer. tom. 2. p. 311. is also in error when he makes the doctrine of Homer and Irenæus respecting the soul, to have been one and the same.

II. Again, he did not distribute the soul into two parts, as Dr. Cudworth supposes, namely into the soul itself, and the body connected with it, but held the soul to be wholly corporeal, or composed of a most subtle matter. I am aware that he called souls incorporeal in some places, and in others pronounced them to be spirit. But we ought not to look to Irenæus' words, but to the power attached to them, and not to estimate the significations of the terms he employs according to our own notions. The sense in which he called the soul incorporeal is manifest from what he says lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 300. "Souls are incorporeal in comparison with mortal bodies." Therefore he did not suppose them to be absolutely devoid of body, but comparatively only, that is, in respect to the grosser body with which we are now invested. The same is evident also from the fact that a little afterwards, when he assigns the reasons why neither the soul nor spirit can die, he declares that spirit is utterly incapable of extinction, because of its being simple and separate from all body, and that the soul is so because it is the breath of life: "Death happens neither to the soul, for it is the breath of life: nor spirit, for it is simple and uncompounded, and cannot be dissolved." If Irenæus had believed the soul to be simple and uncompounded, like spirit, he certainly would have

Furthermore, Origen was not only of the same persuasion, that souls after death had certain subtle bodies united to them, and that those bodies of theirs had the same εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον,

stated this very simplicity of the soul to be the reason why it cannot perish. But as he assigns a very different cause, he undoubtedly gives us to understand that he did not hold the soul to be simple. Hence Renat. Massuetus himself, who in other respects is a wonderful admirer of Irenæus, is compelled frankly to confess that this father supposed human souls to be compounded of a most subtle matter like the angels, Diss. in Irenæum artic. 11. sect. 120. p. 161.

III. But although Irenæus belonged to that class of persons who held the soul to be altogether corporeal, he nevertheless believed it to be immortal; as has been shown by Massuetus, ibid. artic. 10. sect. 104. p. 153. 154. But he seeks the cause and origin of this immortality, not in the nature of the soul itself, but in the divine will. This opinion he discusses at great length, lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 300. where having admitted that all generated things are liable to perish, and therefore that the soul also is by its own nature mortal, he adds that the divine will causes it to continue in existence: "As heaven, and the sun, and the moon——continue for a long time agreeably to the will of God; so also we shall not be wrong in thinking the same of souls and spirits, and in short all created things: since all things which are made have a beginning of their making, they continue so long as God wills them to exist and continue." Consequently he supposed souls to be preserved by God from gradually dissolving and perishing in the same way as the rest of bodies. And from the words just quoted, it appears to me, we may glean his opinion respecting the kind and nature of the soul. For he compares it with the sun, heaven, moon, and stars; which, if I am not mistaken, is a proof that he held it to be composed of the same matter as the ether and stars: a notion which a very great number of the ancients entertained.

IV. The saying of Irenæus, that "souls on their departure from the body keep the character of the body, and have the human figure," is most correctly interpreted by Dr. Cudworth to mean that when separated from the body, they are of the human shape and preserve the form of the body which they had here in this life. Renat. Massuetus, in his notes on Irenæus, p. 167. has attempted to purge him from this doctrine: but he has wholly failed in this attempt. He supposes that the holy father's words ought to be understood "of certain characters or marks, by which they are distinguished from other spirits that are not destined to animate and inform body, and which determine them to be human souls rather than angels, it being necessary that in human minds, even living in heaven, there should be certain definite characters, and a certain disposition for body, by which they may be distinguished from other spirits." I fancy, Nicol. Gallasius, a Genevese theologian, first suggested this interpretation to Massuetus. For in his notes on the passage he in like manner affirms that Irenæus' words are to be understood of certain marks, by which souls can be distinguished from each other, although of a different kind from those of Massuetus. It is necessary, he tells us, that the souls of the dead should be distinguished by certain signs in the other life, so that any one may ascertain which is the soul of Paul, of Peter, or of Lazarus, and it is of these signs that Irenæus speaks: "His object was to show that each man has his own proper soul assigned to him by God, so that even after death the souls can be distinguished from one another, and by their proper and peculiar marks, can as easily be recognized when separate from the bodies, as when they were clothed in them." But these most learned men would have acted more wisely if they had been less ingenious in expounding this passage. For both interpretations are far-fetched, and by no means correspond to the words of Irenæus. What the holy father meant by saying that the soul preserves the character and figure of the body, will be best understood from the passage of Scripture which he adduces in proof of this doctrine. Now this passage is our Saviour's narrative of the rich man and Lazarus, recorded in the gospel of St. Luke. In this narrative not the least mention is made of any marks such as Gallasius and Massuetus dream of, by which human souls are distinguishable either from the angels or from each other. But the soul both of Lazarus and the rich man is represented as endowed with human figure and body: from which we may infer Irenæus to have simply meant that the souls of men retain the figure and appearance of their own bodies after death. And this is placed beyond all doubt by another passage of his, where he expressly declares that the soul has the figure of its body, in

"characterizing form," which these their terrestrial bodies before had; but also thinks, that this, together with the soul's immortality, may be sufficiently proved from the frequent apparitions of ghosts or departed souls; in way of opposition to Celsus, endeavouring to invalidate the Scripture testimonies concerning the apparitions of our Saviour Christ, and imputing them either to magical imposture, or fanatic phrenzy, or the disciples mistaking their own dreams and fancies for visions and sensations, after the Epicurean way :[3] Τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατασκευαστικὸν

the same way that water put into a vessel, assumes the shape of the vessel, lib. 2. cap. 19. sect. 6. p. 143. "For it will not have the likeness and image of angels, but of the body in which it was formed; as water put into a vessel will have the form of the vessel, and if it be congealed in it, will take the shape of the vessel in which it is congealed, so souls have the form of the body; for they are adapted to the vessel itself in the manner we have stated."

V. This holy man's opinion concerning spirit is a peculiar and remarkable one. He supposed that spirit is added to a man as a third part after he has devoted himself to Christ, and that this perfects, preserves, and unites him with God. By this name, however, he unquestionably meant the Holy Ghost. "But a perfect man," says he, lib. 5. cap. 6. p. 299. "is a commixture and union of the soul, assuming the spirit of the Father, and mixed with that flesh which is fashioned according to the image of God. On which account the apostle also says, 'We speak wisdom amongst the perfect;' calling those perfect who have received the Spirit of God." In which place he follows up this doctrine at great length. In lib. 5. cap. 9. p. 302. he thus expresses himself: "There are three things of which a perfect man (that is, a Christian) consists, flesh, soul and spirit; the spirit being that which preserves and forms, the flesh that which is united and formed, and the soul being between these two." I shall add what he says a little afterwards, from which it is manifest that Irenæus denied this spirit to men who are strangers to Christ, and therefore did not, as some suppose, reckon it among the natural portions of a man: "As many, therefore, as have not that which preserves and forms and this unity, will consequently be and be called flesh and blood; seeing that they have not the Spirit of God in them. For which reason such men are also called dead by our Lord." The pious father seems to have regarded the Holy Spirit as a certain divine nature every where diffused, a portion of which is received by all who espoused the faith in Jesus Christ. This is manifest even from the words which Dr. Cudworth adduces from him a little afterwards. I have already shown in another place, that not a few of the ancient fathers were tinctured with this heresy, and believed the Holy Ghost to be the soul of the world, pervading the whole nature of things. Irenæus, therefore, conceived the souls of the wicked and unchristian to be corporeal spirits, which are preserved from perishing and made immortal by the divine power; but the minds of the holy and pious were supposed by him to be composed of two parts, a body or soul, and a spirit inhabiting and governing that soul. And he believed that the souls of the blessed carry this spirit along with them into heaven, and retain it to all eternity. I subjoin a remarkable passage of his, which makes all this plain and clear, lib. 2. cap. 33. p. 168. Πάντες οἱ ἐγγραφέντες εἰς ζωὴν ἀναστήσονται, ἴδια ἔχοντες σώματα καὶ ἰδίας ψυχὰς καὶ ἴδια πνεύματα ἐν οἷς εὐηρέστησαν τῷ Θεῷ. Οἱ δὲ τῆς κολάσεως ἀξιοι, ἀπελεύσονται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἰδίας ἔχοντες ψυχὰς, καὶ ἴδια σώματα, ἐν οἷς ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ χάριτος, "All that are registered unto life will rise again, having their own *bodies* and *souls* and *spirits*, in which they were well pleasing to God. But those who are deserving of punishment will depart unto the same, having also their own *souls* and *bodies*, in which they withheld themselves from the grace of God." In this opinion Irenæus had some associates, whose names it is not necessary now to repeat.

[3] Lib. 2. adv. Celsum. p. 97. But Origen is not singular in thus proving this dogma of the bodies of souls from their apparitions about sepulchres. The followers of this opinion have scarcely any thing better to advance in support of it than this argument; of the full value of which I leave all candid judges to form their own estimate.

ἐστιν ἀναγκαίου δόγματος, ὡς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ὑφέστηκε τῶν ἀποθανόντων· καὶ οὐ μάτην πεπίστευκε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ὁ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα ἀνειληφώς· ὡς καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς λέγει, σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα περὶ μνημεῖα τισὶ γεγονέναι τῶν ἤδη τεθνηκότων, "Though this might seem to have been smartly opposed by Celsus, yet are those very apparitions of ghosts, notwithstanding, a sufficient argument or proof of a certain necessary opinion, that souls do subsist after death. Neither did Plato vainly conclude the immortality and permanency of the soul, besides other things, from those shadow-like phantasms of the dead, that have appeared to many about graves and monuments." Whereupon he giveth this further account of these apparitions: Τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμεμα περὶ ψυχῆς τεθνηκότων φαντάσματα ἀπό τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑφεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ Αὐγοειδεῖ Σώματι ψυχὴν, "For these apparitions of the dead are not mere groundless imaginations, but they proceed from souls themselves, really remaining and surviving after death, and subsisting in that which is called a luciform body." Where, notwithstanding Origen takes this Αὐγοειδὲς Σῶμα, or "luciform body," in a larger sense, than the Greek philosophers were wont to do; namely, so as to comprehend under it that airy or vaporous body also, which belongeth to unpurged souls, who do therein most frequently appear after death; whereas it is thought proper to the purged souls to be clothed with the luciform body only.[4] Besides which, the same Origen tells us, that the thing which St. Thomas the apostle disbelieved, was not our Saviour's appearing after death, as if he had thought it impossible for ghosts or souls departed visibly to appear, but only his rising and appearing in that same solid body, which had been before crucified, and was laid in the sepulchre: Συγκατετίθειτο μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος τῇ φασκούσῃ αὐτὸν ἑωρακέναι, ὡς οὐκ ἀδυνάτου ὄντος, τοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ τεθνηκότος ὀφθῆναι· οὐκέτι δ' ἐνόμιζεν

[4] There is no necessity for supposing that Origen here attached a wider signification than was commonly done to the word *αὐγοειδὴς*. We have already shown that not a small portion of the Platonists attributed only one body to the soul, namely, the heavenly and ethereal, and supposed that the remaining aerial matter, of which, according to the others, the *εἴδωλον*, or second body of the soul, was composed, could be dissolved by philosophy and contemplation, and therefore removed from the soul on its departure from this body. Doubtless Origen preferred this to the other doctrine, which denied the *φύσις*, as they called it, of the soul to be altogether incapable of dissolution. That Origen is reasoning here entirely upon Platonic principles is manifest even from what Theophrastus, the Platonist, in Æneas Gazæus, Dialog. de Resurrectione Mortuorum, p. 65. argues according to the prescript of his own school. This mode of disputation prevailed for some time among the Christians, namely, so long as the authority of Origen and his followers had any weight. But when this ceased to be the case the Christians took a different view of these apparitions of the dead about sepulchres, and did not hesitate to contend that evil demons assume the form and figure of departed men, and deceive the eyes of mortals. See Æneas Gazæus, ibid. p. 65. 66. For which opinion they adduced this argument, that at the rising of the sun these spectral images dissolve and vanish.

εἶναι τὸ ἐν σώματι αὐτὸν ἀντιτύπῳ ἐγηγέρθαι, " Thomas also, as well as the other apostles, assented to the woman affirming that she had seen Jesus; as not thinking it at all impossible for the soul of a dead man to be seen: but he did not believe him to have risen and appeared in that self-same solid body, which before he lived in; for which cause he said, not only, 'unless I see him;' but added also, 'And unless I shall put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe.'" Where again Origen subjoins: Ταῦτα δ' ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ τοῦ Θωμᾶ, κρίνοντος ὅτι δύναται Ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰσθητοῖς φανῆναι ψυχῆς Σῶμα πάντα τῷ προτέρῳ εἴδει, ... μέγεθός τε, καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' ἐοικυίης, καὶ φωνὴν,

Πολλάκι δὲ καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῖ εἵματ' ἐχούσης.

" These things were said by Thomas, not as doubting at all, but that the body of a soul departed (to wit, condensed) might be seen with the eyes of sense, every way resembling that form which it had before in this life, both in respect of bigness, figure, colour, and voice; and oftentimes also in the same customary garments." Wherefore, according to Origen, the Jews were at that time generally possessed with this opinion, that souls after death had certain bodies united to them, wherein they might visibly appear; neither is that of any great moment to the contrary, which a learned critic[5] objecteth, that Josephus, writing of their opinions, maketh no mention hereof; he omitting, besides this, other considerable dogmata of theirs also, as that of the resurrection. However, this at least is certain from hence, that Origen himself took it for granted, that human souls departed were not altogether naked or unclothed, but clothed with a certain subtle body, wherein they could also visibly appear, and that in their pristine form.

Moreover, it might be here observed also, that when upon our Saviour's first apparition to his disciples, it is said, that theyw ere affrighted, as supposing they had seen a spirit; our Saviour does not tell them, that a spirit or ghost had no body at all wherein

[5] Who this was I know not; nor have I considered it necessary to try to find out his name. Origen is not at all mistaken in supposing that neither St. Thomas nor the other disciples of our Saviour thought it impossible for the souls of the dead to appear in the human form and figure. For this is evident from Luke xxiv. 37, where they are said to have supposed, when Christ exhibited himself before them, that they had seen his πνεῦμα, or spirit. But how this can be taken as a proof that not only these disciples, but all the Jews as well, believed that departed souls are always clothed in a thin and subtle body, I am at a loss to comprehend. Do all those who believe in the frequent apparition of ghosts and spectres imagine these spectres to have always a subtle body united to them? To say nothing at present of other things, why might not the Jews have entertained the opinion espoused by many both of modern and ancient times, that spirits can assume to themselves bodies from the air, and retain them for a certain time.

it could visibly appear; but, (as rather taking that for granted*) that a spirit had no flesh and bones (no σῶμα ἀντίτυπον) no such solid body as they might find him to have: bidding them therefore handle him, to remove that scruple of theirs. As if he should have said, Though spirits or ghosts, and souls departed, have bodies (or vehicles) which may by them be so far condensed, as sometimes to make a visible appearance to the eyes of men, yet have they not any such solid bodies as those of flesh and bone; and therefore by feeling and handling may you satisfy yourselves that I am not a mere spirit, ghost, or soul, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a miracle; but that I appear in that very same solid body, wherein I was crucified by the Jews, by miraculous divine power, raised out of the sepulchre, and now to be found no more there. Agreeable to which of our Saviour Christ is that of Apollonius in Philostratus:[6] Λαβοῦ μοι, ἔφη, κἂν μὲν διαφύγω σε, εἴδωλον εἰμί· εἰ δὲ ὑπομείναιμι ἁπτόμενος, πεῖσε καὶ ζῶντέ με, καὶ μὴ ἀποβεβληκέναι τὸ σῶμα, "Touch me and handle me, and if you find me to avoid the touch, then may you conclude me to be a spirit or ghost (that is, a soul departed); but if I firmly resist the same, then believe me really to live, and not yet to have cast off the body." And indeed though spirits or ghosts had certain subtle bodies, which they could so far condense as to make them sometimes visible to men, yet is it reasonable enough to think, that they could not constipate or fix them into such a firmness, grossness, and solidity as that of flesh and bone is, to continue therein; or at least not without such difficulty and pain as would hinder them from attempting the same. Notwithstanding which, it is not denied, but that they may possibly sometimes make use of other solid bodies, moving and acting them, as in that famous story of Phlegon's,[7] where the body vanished not, as other ghosts used to do, but was left a dead carcase behind. Now, as for our Saviour Christ's body, after his resurrection, and before his ascension; which notwithstanding its solidity in handling, yet sometimes vanished also out of his disciples' sight; this probably, as Origen conceived, was purposely conserved for a time, in a certain middle state, betwixt the crassities of a mortal body, and the spirituality of a perfectly glorified, heavenly, and ethereal body.[8]

* Luke xxiv. 37.

[6] In Vita Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. 9. cap. 12. p. 355. The same passage of Philostratus was cited not long ago in illustration of these words of our Saviour by the most erudite Jac. Elsner, Observat. Sacr. in N. T. Libros, tom. 1. p. 287.

[7] He means Trallianus, whose book De Rebus Mirabilibus, cap. 1. may be consulted in Jac. Gronovius' Thesaurus Antiquitatum Græcar. tom. 8. p. 2694· &c. The entire story is too long to be repeated here; neither does the matter in hand require it.

[8] These arguments also fail in making me believe what the learned Doctor considers to be probable, that souls have a certain body united to them which they bring with them into this world, and again take away at their departure.

I. The interpretation here given of the words of Christ, Luke xxiv. 37. although I

But there is a place of Scripture, which, as it hath been interpreted by the generality of the ancient fathers, would naturally imply, even the soul of our Saviour Christ himself, after his

am aware of its having occurred also to the minds of others, to confess the truth, seems to me to be altogether fallacious, and to have no foundation to support it. Dr. Cudworth makes our blessed Saviour speak like a philosopher of the later Platonic school; but by what right he does so I cannot tell. For my own part I think we ought to be exceedingly cautious not to attribute to our Lord and God any thing that we do not see expressed by him in clear and perspicuous words. But we must bear with this in one adorned in other respects with such eminent virtues, and consider that we are but men, whose minds are exposed to many snares in this mortal life. Let us examine a little into the force of this argument drawn from the words of Christ: "Our Saviour says: A spirit has not flesh and bones; therefore spirits have a subtle body united to them, which they never cast off." Is this argument, or is it mere conjecture and surmise? Does it follow from Christ's denying spirits to have a solid body that they possess some other body, not solid, but resembling ether or air? Our Saviour, it must be confessed, does not deny souls to have a subtle body; and therefore I cannot agree with those who consider it to be evident from this passage that souls are altogether destitute of all body. For no one, I imagine, would syllogize in this manner: Souls have no solid and concrete body; therefore they have no body at all. But those are equally illogical in their reasoning who hold this saying to be a proof that souls always possess a subtle body thinner and lighter than these of ours. As if the following mode of argumentation were correct and legitimate: Peter says, he has neither silver nor gold, Acts iii. 6. therefore this holy apostle had brass or copper money. I shall add two other considerations, which will thoroughly demolish this argument. In the first place, those who make use of it ought to abandon the other one drawn from our Saviour's parable of the rich man and Lazarus. For it is proved from these words of Christ, that spirits are destitute of a solid and concrete body, or of flesh and bones, but if the narrative concerning Lazarus be pressed and insisted upon, it will be necessary to grant that souls have flesh and bones. For the rich man's tongue is burning hot, and he asks for water: and Lazarus has fingers wherewith to take up the water and pour it into his mouth. Are not these signs and proofs of a solid body? They must either confess, therefore, that our Saviour's words concerning Lazarus and the rich man are figurative, and therefore have no demonstrative weight in this question; or otherwise must admit, although Christ denies it, that souls have flesh and bones. In the second place I fear, if our Saviour's words be explained in this manner, they will lead others to attribute a subtle body, such as the Platonists assign to souls, to the supreme Being himself. For our blessed Saviour positively affirms every nature which is πνεῦμα, or spirit, to be destitute of a solid body. But in John iv. 24. he pronounces God to be πνεῦμα. Therefore, if in Luke xxiv. 34. he means that spirits have not a gross and crass but a thin and subtle body, it will be correct to apply this to God also as being πνεῦμα, and to suppose him to be furnished, not indeed with human members, but with a thin and subtle vehicle.

II. What the learned Doctor, after the example of the Platonists, here states, that souls have the power of condensing the particles of their ethereal body so as to become visible, and again expanding and dilating them so as to vanish from human sight, as far as I am able to understand it, involves a doctrine entirely subversive of the precepts of the Platonists themselves on this body of souls. For they held that subtle body to be immortal and incapable of perishing, unless by the will of God. Let them explain to me, therefore, how that can be indissoluble and immortal, which admits of condension and expansion. For my own part, I consider every thing that can be condensed and expanded to consist of parts not so intimately united and connected with each other as to be utterly incapable of being dissolved. I pass over other difficulties involved in this opinion, from which the Platonists will never be able to extricate themselves, unless they make up their minds to abandon the beaten path of almost all philosophers, and to reject truths which scarcely any one has ever yet called into question.

III. I fear Dr. Cudworth attributed to Origen an opinion which was foreign to him, when he makes him to have supposed that our Saviour Christ's body after the resurrection and before the ascension was conserved by God in a certain intermediate state. I am aware of its having been Origen's belief that Christ's resurrection-body was

death, and before his resurrection, not to have been quite naked from all body, but to have had a certain subtle or spirituous clothing, and it is this of St. Peter:* Θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε. Which being understood by those ancients of our Saviour Christ's descending into Hades or hell, is accordingly thus rendered in the vulgar Latin,† "Put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit: in which (spirit) also he went

aerial or of a certain middle nature between the mortal body which he had before possessed and the disembodied soul: Καὶ ἦν γε, says he, [lib. 2. adv. Celsum, p. 98. κατὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν αὐτοῦ ὡσπερεὶ ἐν μεθορίῳ τινὶ τῆς παχύτητος τῆς πρὸ τοῦ πάθους σώματος, καὶ τοῦ γυμνὴν τοιούτου σώματος φαίνεσθαι ψυχήν, "He had after the resurrection a certain middle body between the crassitude of the mortal body before the passion and the soul divested of such body." Butwhe re he has declared that this body, which Christ wore for forty days, was preserved by God in that middle state till his ascension into heaven, and afterwards assumed another form and nature, I am altogether at a loss to know. I am either thoroughly deceived, or Origen supposed that this middle and aerial body, which according to his conception Christ received at the resurrection, was not only preserved by God in that state during the forty days which he passed with his disciples, but also carried with him into heaven never again to be laid aside. Probably our worthy author borrowed this interpretation of Origen's opinion from Hugo Grotius; who Comment. ad Luc. 24. 31. p. 839. in like manner imagines this intermediate state of Christ's body to have lasted only forty days. It is easy to fall into errors of the kind; but I am much more surprised that the learned Doctor should have prevailed upon himself to approve of what he supposes to have been Origen's opinion concerning the body of Christ. In the first place I see nothing whatever to sustain it. For the Scriptures, the authority of which alone is to be relied upon in such matters, are wholly silent in respect to this miracle. Christ, says the learned Doctor, sometimes vanished, therefore he must have possessed an aerial body, such as could at one time be condensed so as to appear, and at another expanded so as to disappear. But this I consider to be mere trifling. Christ's suddenly vanishing out of the sight of his disciples is certainly a proof that his body had acquired new properties and laid aside its pristine gravity, or had been made a glorious body, but it by no means shows that resurrection-body to have been aerial and of a certain intermediate nature. It is unnecessary to mention that what the Platonists inculcate respecting the nature of aerial bodies, which they suppose to be capable of condension and expansion, is too slippery and uncertain to be readily admitted by those who receive nothing without proof and argument. But what need of many words? This opinion, in the next place, is at variance with the clear and express words of the sacred writer, or rather of Christ. Our blessed Saviour declares that he has flesh and bones, Luke xxiv. 39.; he also tells Thomas to put his finger into the print of the nails, and to thrust his hand into his side, John xx. 27. Are these not a proof of Christ's having recovered the body which had been deposited in the sepulchre? Do bodies which are aerial and of a middle nature consist of flesh and bones? Or do they retain the marks of the wounds inflicted upon the mortal body, so that the fingers and hands can feel those scars? I am not disposed to combat this opinion by much more that is at hand for its refutation, but I am sorry that our eminent author should have been so far influenced by his partiality for Origen and the Platonic philosophy as to have hastily adopted it. Although it is beyond all controversy that the bodies of the blessed at the resurrection will be glorious and endowed with new virtues, still none of us have such a knowledge of those immortal bodies as to be able to tell what can and what cannot be done by them. Why then do we sometimes dispute with each other as though we were already in possession of such a lucid and glorious body, and were perfectly acquainted with all the affections which are proper and peculiar to it?

* 1 Pet. iii. 18. 19.

† Of this St. Austin, in his 12th Book, De Gen. ad Lit. cap. 33. Et Christi quidem animam venisse usque ad ea loca, in quibus peccatores cruciantur, ut eos solveret, quos esse solvendos occulta nobis sua justitia judicabat, non immeritò creditur.

and preached to those spirits that were in prison," &c. So that the word πνεύματι, or "spirit," here, according to this interpretation, is to be taken for a spirituous body; the sense being this: "That when our Saviour Christ was put to death in the flesh, or the fleshly body, he was quickened in the spirit, or a spirituous body: in which (spirituous body) also, he went and preached to those spirits which were in prison," &c. And doubtless it would be said, by the assertors of this interpretation, that the word "spirit" could not here be taken for the soul of our Saviour Christ, because this being naturally immortal, could not properly be said to be quickened and made alive. Nor could he, that is our Saviour Christ's soul, be so well said to go, in this spirit neither, that is in itself, the soul in the soul, to preach to the spirits in prison. They would add also, that spirit here could not be taken for the divine Spirit neither, which was the efficient cause of the vivification of our Saviour's body at his resurrection; because then there would be no direct opposition betwixt being put to death in the flesh, and quickened in the spirit; unless they be taken both alike materially. As also the following verse is thus to be understood; that our Saviour Christ went in that spirit, wherein he was quickened, when he was put to death in the flesh, and therein preached to the spirits in prison. By which spirits in prison also would be meant, not pure incorporeal substances, or naked souls, but souls clothed with subtle spirituous bodies; as that word may be often understood elsewhere in Scripture.[9] But thus much we are unques-

[9] Various as are the opinions and conjectures of commentators upon this passage of St. Peter, which all allow to be obscure, I have seen no interpretation, however, more violent and more remote from all appearance of truth than the one here put forward by Dr. Cudworth. Can the minds even of those, whose keen and vigorous intellect in other respects has raised them above the rest of men, be so beset with mist and darkness, when they are embued with preconceived opinions?

I. The worthy Doctor supposes the word πνεῦμα here to mean the ethereal body of the soul. But upon what ground does he do so? By what passage of holy writ does he support this interpretation? For my own part I see nothing advanced by him in favour of it. The truth is, his love of Platonism led him to expound the passage in this manner. For with them the word πνεῦμα denotes that vehicle of the soul; and therefore as he entertained no doubt in respect to the doctrine itself, he did not hesitate to transfer this Platonic notion to the saying of St. Peter.

II. But this interpretation is not only destitute of all foundation, but at variance also with the holy apostle's words. Our Saviour is said by him to be θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωοποηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, the meaning of which words the learned Doctor supposes to be as follows: "He was put to death in this fleshly or grosser body; but was quickened in the spirituous or subtle body, which is natural to souls." On the interpretation of the former member there is now no controversy between us; but that of the latter seems to me to be as remote from the truth as it possibly can be. On the power of the word ζωόποιέω, also, I suppose we are agreed. For its constant usage in the books of the New Testament shows that it means "to restore to life," and ζωοποιεῖσθαι, "to be restored to life." Nor does this passage admit of any other signification; in which, as must be evident to every body, our blessed Saviour's death and resurrection are opposed to each other. Let us inquire, therefore, into the matter itself. When our Saviour is said to be quickened or restored to life, this unquestionably is to be understood of his body which alone can die. For to suppose that the soul of

tionably certain of from the Scripture, that not only Elias, whose terrestrial body seems to have been, in part at least, spiritualized, in his ascent in that fiery chariot, but also Moses appeared visibly to our Saviour Christ and his disciples upon the mount, and therefore (since piety will not permit us to think this a mere prestigious thing) in real bodies; which bodies also seem to have been Αὐγοειδῆ, "luciform," or "lucid," like to our Saviour's then transfigured body.

Again, there are sundry places of Scripture which affirm, that the regenerate and renewed have here in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance; which is their spiritual or heavenly body; as also the quickening [of their mortal bodies is

Christ could die is impious, and to impute death to the divine nature would be downright insanity. Therefore, if we adopt Dr. Cudworth's interpretation of St. Peter's words, we shall have this meaning: "But the body of Christ, which before had perished, was restored to life in the subtle body of the soul, or through that subtle body." But who is so stupid as not to see that such a sense is both absurd in itself and wholly repugnant to Dr. Cudworth's own principles? If the soul of Christ had died and returned to life there would have been some slight show of truth in this interpretation; but as the body alone perished and was restored again, the least we can say of it is that it is a most surprising one. Perhaps the admirers of this exposition will reply, that St. Peter's words are to be understood thus: "But the soul of Christ returned again to the body clothed in a subtle body of its own. But I ask these persons first of all: What necessity was there for St. Peter to declare that the soul of Christ underwent no change, but returned to the body clothed in its natural vehicle? Again, I request them to prove even by one passage of Scripture, that ζωοποιεῖσθαι signifies "to return to," or "be united again with the body." If we allow ourselves to abandon the constant and uniform significations of words, and to invent new ones at pleasure, there will be nothing so certain or sacred as not to admit of being subjected to cavil and controversy. Lastly, I leave all rational men to judge whether this exposition of St. Peter's words is to be tolerated: "Christ's solid body suffered death, but his soul afterwards returned to this solid body, clothed in its own subtle body."

III. In my own opinion St. Peter either says nothing that is intelligible or he means by the word πνεῦμα the efficient cause of Christ's resurrection. And as this cause is not Christ's soul but his divine nature, I do not hesitate to concur with those who hold πνεῦμα to signify in this passage the divinity of Christ. Dr. Cudworth certainly has something to oppose to this commonly received opinion. But I confess myself to be unable to see clearly what he means by stating that if this opinion be adopted there will then be no direct opposition between "being put to death in the flesh and quickened in the spirit." On the contrary, I think this direct opposition is wanting in his own interpretation: for the solid body of Christ and the Platonic vehicle of the soul cannot very aptly be compared and contrasted with each other.

IV. Lastly, when Dr. Cudworth tells us at the very outset that the generality of the ancient fathers interpreted this passage of St. Peter, in such a way as would naturally imply the doctrine he is himself defending, he must not be understood as though these ancient fathers supposed like himself that πνεῦμα there denotes the vehicle of our Saviour Christ's soul. I have not met with one of them who attached such a sense to it. The great majority of them understand this word of Christ's soul itself, and imagine it to have descended while his body was in the grave, into the lower world, in which souls according to their notion are detained. The learned Doctor's meaning therefore is simply, that those who follow this opinion of the ancient fathers may by an easy transition arrive at the interpretation which he himself prefers to all others. Probably the name of *the fathers*, which is known to be of great weight, was put forward by him for the mere purpose of more successfully evading the charge of novelty. What he adds respecting Moses and Elias is wholly irrelevant to the present question.

therein attributed to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in them. Which is a thing that hath been taken notice of by some of the ancients, as Irenæus:* Nunc autem partem aliquam spiritus ejus sumimus, ad perfectionem et præparationem incorruptelæ, paulatim assuescentes capere et portare Deum. Quod et pignus dixit apostolus; hoc est, partem ejus honoris, qui à Deo nobis promissus est. . . . . Si ergo pignus hoc habitans in nobis jam spirituales effecit, et absorbetur mortale ab immortalitate, "Now have we a part of that spirit, for the preparation and perfection of incorruption; we being accustomed by little and little to receive and bear God. Which also the apostle hath called an earnest; that is, a part of that honour which is promised to us from God. If therefore this earnest (or pledge) dwelling in us hath made us already spiritual, the mortal is also swallowed up by immortality." And Novatian:[10] Spiritus Sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad æternitatem et ad resurrectionem immortalitatis corpora nostra perducat, dum illa in se assuefacit cum cœlesti virtute misceri, "This is that, which the Holy Spirit doth in us, namely, to bring and lead on our bodies to eternity, and the resurrection of immortality; whilst in itself it accustometh us to be mingled with the heavenly virtue." Moreover, there are some places also which seem to imply, that good men shall, after death, have a further inchoation of their heavenly body, the full completion whereof is not to be expected before the resurrection or day of judgment. We know, that "if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan earnestly."† And verse 5, "He that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given us the earnest of the Spirit." Now how these preludiums and prelibations of an immortal body can consist with the soul's continuance, after death, in a perfect separation from all manner of body, till the day of judgment, is not so easily conceivable.[1]

* Lib. 5. cap. 8. [Page 301. Edit. Massueti.]

[10] In his book, De Trinitate, cap. 29. p. 450. appended to the Works of Tertullian.

† 2 Cor. v. 1.

[1] The learned Doctor, I am confident would have said nothing of this kind, if his mental vision had not been darkened by a too great admiration of Platonic precepts. Observing that the Platonists very often employ the word πνεῦμα to designate the spiritual or ethereal body of the soul, he therefore entertains no doubt of the same notion being sometimes attached to it in the scriptures; and approaching the sacred volumes with this impression, what to others is clear and evident, is to him obscure, abstruse, and recondite; and passages which manifestly treat of the Holy Spirit, are all to be referred to the Platonic vehicle of the soul. So great is the weakness of the human mind, that if cramped and clouded by preconceived errors, it is unable to see light itself! Let us enter into a brief examination of his argument.

I. The scriptures he tells us affirm in sundry places that the regenerate and renewed have in this life a certain earnest of their future inheritance, namely, the spirit, or πνεῦμα: and this earnest or spirit, according to him, is the celestial body of

Lastly, it is not at all to be doubted, but that Irenæus, Origen, and those other ancients, who entertained that opinion, of souls being clothed after death with a certain thin and subtle body,

the soul. He alludes unquestionably to 2 Cor. i. 22. 2 Cor. v. 5. Ephes. i. 13, iv. 30. and other similar passages. But whoever finds any difficulty in understanding these passages as referring to the Holy Ghost and his gifts to mankind, must be dull indeed, and lamentably warped and fettered by other opinions. Certainly the sense of these sayings would be amazingly absurd, if πνεῦμα denoted in them the celestial body of the soul. St. Paul, 2 Cor. i. 22. says that God "has given the earnest of the Spirit in the hearts of those who have believed." Do the regenerate, then, acquire the celestial body in their hearts, ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις? The same apostle, Ephes. iv. 30. exhorts the Ephesians "not to grieve the Spirit of God, whereby they are sealed." Does the heavenly and ethereal body, therefore, mourn and lament over our sins, and is it on that account capable of being grieved by us? I pass over the other sayings of the same kind. But the learned Doctor acknowledges that none but the holy and regenerate receive this earnest or spirit. Consequently, if the spirit be the subtle body or vehicle of the soul, none possess this vehicle except the sons of God, to whom it is granted on their entering into the communion of our blessed Saviour. How little does all this agree with those principles of Platonism imbibed by the learned Doctor himself? For the Platonists hold all souls, whether inhabiting the bodies of the good or the bad, to be alike clothed with this vehicle, and to bring it along with them in their descent to generation. He must either deny therefore that these passages treat of this vehicle, or invent some entirely new discipline, different from the Platonic, and maintain that none but the pious are invested with this spiritual and heavenly body. I speak not of its being very difficult to understand how a certain thin and subtle body can be an earnest to us of future glory; but that the Holy Ghost and his gifts can assure us of the future possession of heavenly blessings, is plain even to the comprehension of children.

II. He remarks that the resurrection of bodies is sometimes attributed by the divine writers to the efficiency of the spirit dwelling in the pious and good; alluding no doubt to the passage of St. Paul, which occurs Rom. viii. 11. "But if the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies, διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα ἐν ὑμῖν, by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." For my own part I have never entertained any doubt with respect to this passage. I consider in concurrence with the best commentators, that the Spirit dwelling in the saints, is represented here not as the efficient cause of the quickening of dead bodies, but as the moving and inciting cause, and that the meaning of the passage is this: "God will raise up your bodies from the dead, because you have been the abodes and temples of the Holy Spirit in this life." But even supposing the interpretation of those who affirm that the resurrection is here called the work of the Spirit dwelling in the saints to be the preferable one, what bearing will it have upon the present question? Does the worthy Doctor mean to assert that the spirit said to dwell in the saints is the celestial body or vehicle of the soul? Does this vehicle cause bodies to rise again from the dead? And does God use this vehicle as an instrument to restore the terrestrial and grosser bodies to life? In whatever point of view I consider this interpretation, I can find nothing in it to satisfy any reasonable man. Either Dr. Cudworth had in his mind some peculiar opinion in respect to the *spirit* and the body of souls which I am unable to fathom, or he ought himself to have rejected such an exposition. The passages of Irenæus and Novatian are dragged into this question in utter disregard of the real meaning of the authors. What Irenæus understood by the word spirit, and the opinion he entertained respecting it, have already been shown by us above, in speaking of his doctrine regarding the soul. Spirit, according to Irenæus, is the third person of the divine nature, called in scripture the Holy Spirit. Of this Holy Spirit he supposes the pious to receive a portion when they are converted to God: "Our substance," says he, lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 301. "that is, the union of soul and body, receives the Spirit of God, and perfects the spiritual man." And the same is also manifest from the words here quoted: in which, if he were speaking of the spiritual body of the soul, how could he say that "by the indwelling of the Spirit the holy and pious are gradually accustomed to receive and bear God?" Nor is any other sense to be attached to the words of Novatian, as is evident from

suspected it not in the least to be inconsistent with that of the future resurrection; as it is in no way inconsistent for one, who hath only a shirt or waistcoat on, to put on a suit of clothes, or exterior upper-garment. Which will also seem the less strange, if it be considered, that even here in this life, our body is, as it were, twofold, exterior and interior; we having, besides the grossly tangible bulk of our outward body, another interior spirituous body, the soul's immediate instrument, both of sense and motion; which latter is not put into the grave with the

those which immediately follow: "Whilst in itself it accustoms them to be mingled with the heavenly virtue, and to be associated with the *divine eternity of the Holy Spirit*." Who but a madman would understand these words of the Platonic *spirit* of the soul? But the meaning of Irenæus and Novatian when they say that "the spirit perfects our bodies, and lends them to immortality, incorruption, and the resurrection," is sufficiently aptly explained by Novatian himself in these words: "For our bodies are taught in it (the Spirit) and by it to go forward to immortality, while they learn to control and govern themselves according to its decrees." Neither of them, therefore, had any thought of the celestial body of the soul, when speaking of the Spirit and its fruits.

III. It would appear, he adds, from some places of scripture, and especially from 2 Cor. v. 1—5. that the heavenly bodies of good men are after the dissolution of the solid body rendered gradually more perfect, but that they do not arrive at full perfection, till the resurrection or day of judgment. But here the learned Doctor assumes the very point in dispute, that the souls of pious men have heavenly vehicles or bodies. Dismissing this, however, let us inquire merely whether the passages quoted from St. Paul warrant the inference that the heavenly bodies on the extinction of this earthly body are gradually perfected. The holy apostle says, he knows that although this frail and mortal body were to die and perish, the same nevertheless will be restored to him, but made glorious, immortal, and imperishable: that he earnestly desires this glorious and celestial body: but that God has given him the earnest of the Spirit, which testifies to his mind that his hope is not fallacious. Now, whoever can perceive the least mention in this discourse of a celestial body of souls, or discover the dogma which Dr. Cudworth considers it to imply, that the vehicles of souls are gradually perfected after death, must unquestionably surpass a soothsayer in keen-sightedness. I am afraid any one who reads the words of St. Paul with attention, will entirely forget the Platonic vehicle. For the divine writer declares that he is inflamed with an earnest desire for the heavenly body we are speaking of, verse 2. consequently at that time he did not yet possess that heavenly body: which is plainly opposed to the doctrine of the Platonists, who hold the vehicles of souls to be natural.

IV. The worthy Doctor subjoins in the last place that "it is inconceivable how good men can have a preludium and prelibation of a heavenly body, if they live destitute of all body, till the day of judgment." I confess that here as well as in some other places, his words are somewhat obscure to myself; and on carefully examining the whole, I am inclined to think that he was unwilling to declare the whole of his opinion clearly and openly, and suppressed no small portion of it, to avoid incurring reprehension and ill-will. If I rightly apprehend his meaning, his words contain the following argument: "Souls have now an anticipation of a heavenly body, or know for a certainty that they shall hereafter receive a glorious body: therefore, they already possess a heavenly and ethereal body: for no one can form even by anticipation any notion of that which he does not possess." This reasoning to speak candidly, is so thoroughly foolish and absurd, that I should consider it a useless waste of time to say any thing in opposition to it. I am willing therefore to suppose that I do not fully understand his meaning, rather than attribute to him a line of argument, so grossly fallacious and illogical. The way in which the pious and good are assured that God will hereafter restore their bodies to them much more splendid and excellent than before, is clearly indicated by St. Paul, v. 5. The Holy Spirit and his testimony and gifts, which they are endowed with, preclude all possibility of doubt on this matter.

other, nor imprisoned under the cold sods.[2] Notwithstanding all which, that hath been suggested by us, we shall not ourselves venture to determine any thing in so great a point, but sceptically leave it undecided.[3]

[2] We have already shown how very injurious this Platonic dogma of the body or vehicle of souls is to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. The fact of the ancient fathers having supposed it to be consistent with this doctrine is no proof of such being the case. Many men are so obtuse as not to perceive the pernicious inferences deducible from their own opinions, although they do not escape the eyes of others. The rest that is here advanced respecting a twofold body even in this life is assumed by the learned Doctor, not proved: and therefore it is unnecessary for us to take the trouble of examining into it. We should be able to prove any thing that we pleased, if we were at liberty thus to beg the question, and to lay down the very point in controversy as the groundwork of the disputation.

[3] This digression upon the body of souls exposed Dr. Cudworth to the severe reprehension of his countrymen, some of whom charged him with having impugned the most holy doctrine of the resurrection. The various points of accusation have been collected by Thomas Wise in the Introduction to his Abridgment of Dr. Cudworth's work, p. 125. where he has at the same time pointed out what may be said on the opposite side. I shall therefore extract from this Introduction, as faithfully as I can, both the charges brought against this eminent man and the points to be alleged in his exculpation. My own sentiments on the matter I shall merely briefly intimate at the end of the disputation: for I have already declared in several places, and at considerable length, that I disapprove of some portion of his opinions, and have adduced the reasons of my dissent. In this digression Dr. Cudworth is considered by many persons to have, if not openly denied, at least covertly attacked and called in question the resurrection of the body. Let us see by what arguments they prove this.

I. In a previous part of this section he interprets St. Paul's comparison, 1 Cor. xv. 36. of a dead body with a grain of wheat, as though it were altogether complete and perfect, and in no respect lame and halt, as the logicians say. He himself confesses that the body which springs from grain committed to the earth, is not the same either in quantity or quality with the body which was sown. Therefore our resurrection-body if it altogether resemble an ear of corn, which springs from seed, will not be the same body that we now possess. And that this was his meaning is evident from these words by which he there explains St. Paul's opinion: "Know that this present body of ours is to be looked upon but as a kind of seed of the resurrection-body, which therefore is accordingly in some sense the same, and in some sense not the same with it."

II. He contends that the account given in scripture of the glorious bodies of those who shall rise again to a life of happiness is not different from what the Platonic philosophers inculcated respecting the splendid and ethereal body of souls. But if this be true, this body with which the soul is now associated will not be restored to us, but either a body entirely new and different from this mortal body, or at least one not solid and fleshly, but subtle and ethereal. For such the Platonists supposed those bodies to be, which were said by them to be united with souls. Nor does the learned Doctor make any secret of this being his view. "The future body," says he, "of the righteous, according to the scripture as well as the philosophic cabala, will be σῶμα φωτεινὸν, and σῶμα αὐγοειδὲς, and σῶμα ἀστροειδὲς, a *glorious, splendid, luciform,* and *star-like body.*"

III. St. Paul, Col. i. 12. speaks of the inheritance of the saints in light. Dr. Cudworth thinks these words are to be understood of the lucid body which the righteous are to receive at the resurrection. But if this lucid and glorious body be an inheritance, it is different from our mortal body. For an inheritance is properly a good which a man has not possessed before.

IV. He affirms that the future bodies of the righteous will be like those of the angels. But the bodies of the angels he holds to consist of ether, and to be most thin and subtle. Therefore he supposed the bodies of the righteous also to be of the same nature and condition, and not to be composed of flesh and blood.

V. What St. Paul says, 1 Cor. xv. 50. "that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," is to be taken, he argues, in a thoroughly proper, and not figurative

The third and last thing in the forementioned philosophic or

sense: contrary to the opinion of all sounder theologians, who suppose the words to mean: that vicious affection and turbulent passions of the mind which in scripture are designated by the terms *flesh* and *blood*, will have no place in the resurrection-body. According to his opinion, therefore, the same body will not be raised up, but a far different one. For these bodies of ours are compounded of flesh and blood.

VI. The resurrection so often mentioned in the books of the New Testament he pronounces to be the same as the ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν spoken of by our Saviour Luke xx. 35. But in that passage our Saviour is not alluding to the resurrection of the mortal body, but showing generally that we shall survive after this life, and be immortal. And yet Dr. Cudworth subjoins that the resurrection of which Christ is speaking is alone treated of by St. Paul in the fifteenth chapter of his first epistle to the Corinthians; nay, he declares his opinion more explicitly in these words: "And we say that this Christian resurrection of life is the resting and settling of the souls of good men in their glorious, spiritual, heavenly, and immortal bodies."

VII. When the scripture declares that we are strangers and pilgrims in this gross and terrestrial body, the meaning is merely that these bodies look forward to greater perfection. But Dr. Cudworth seems to interpret the words in so wide a sense as to make the divine writers say, that we are hereafter to obtain celestial bodies altogether different and distinct from these terrestrial bodies.

VIII. God Almighty, he tells us, at first intended that our souls should inhabit far other bodies than those in which we are now clothed. But he also plainly intimates that the resurrection-body will be like those which God first designed for our souls. Therefore the resurrection-body will be of a far different kind and nature from these bodies of ours, and will not consist of flesh and blood.

These are the grounds upon which Dr. Cudworth is charged by learned men with denying the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body which we are invested with in this life. Let us now see in what way Mr. Wise attempts to repel the charge. He confesses that he cannot clear him of all suspicion: grants, p. 125. that he was too much led away by his partiality for the Platonists: and, p. 130. declares that he followed in the footsteps of Origen, whose notions on the resurrection of bodies were notoriously unsound and unscriptural. But yet he considers him not to be entirely without the means of defence. Therefore although it cannot be denied that he sometimes spoke too boldly and inconsiderately respecting the bodies of those that rise again, he observes that there are notwithstanding other sayings of his on this subject, than which nothing can be more sound and excellent. That he repudiates such as assert that the resurrection-body will in no respect be allied and akin to this mortal body, and refutes them in these words: "Yet nevertheless, according to the best philosophy, which acknowledges no essential or specifical difference of matter, the foulest and grossest body that is, merely by motion, may not only be crystalized, but also brought into the purity and tenuity of the finest ether." That other remarks follow in the same place, which no man would deny to be consistent with truth and the purer doctrine. That in another passage, in his Discourse on 1 Cor. xv. 57. p. 88. appended to the Intellectual System, he discourses in such a manner as not even the most strenuous defender of orthodoxy can find fault with: "Although we are taught by the doctrine of the church that the bodies of those that rise again will be the same in kind and number as these of ours; still the scripture declares that these bodies will be so changed in respect to qualities and affections, that they may be said to be different from our bodies." From these the learned writer thinks it may be proved that Dr. Cudworth is not justly chargeable with error, so much as inconsistency, in explaining the doctrine of the resurrection, nor with wickedness of purpose, but merely carelessness and negligence. The discourse he alludes to on 1 Cor. xv. 57. I have had no opportunity of seeing, nor is it appended to my copy of the Intellectual System. But if those English friends whose kindness I have bespoken in the matter should happen to forward it to me in time, I will add a Latin version of it to this volume, together with the other minor works of the learned Doctor. But still some will say, this very inconsistency and variety of expression is no slight fault, and pretty clearly shows that he was not thoroughly convinced of the truth of this grave and holy doctrine. Mr. Wise replies: That Dr. Cudworth is accustomed throughout the whole of his work, whenever he wishes to propound any thing contrary to received doctrines, to speak in the person of some one else, and having adduced the strongest arguments in support of

Pythagoric cabala is concerning those beings superior to men,

the opinion put forth, eventually to leave the whole matter undecided: that it is therefore almost impossible to ascertain his real opinion, much less to attribute to him those doctrines which he every where defends in the words of others. And if any one should now ask the reason why the illustrious man acted in this manner and did not candidly and frankly avow the sentiments of his mind, that he has no answer to make, being deterred by his reverence for so great a name from hazarding surmise and conjecture: still that he is willing to confess, that perverse teachers and propagntors of error are in the habit of fighting under his shadow and of attempting to defend their own absurd theories by his authority and arguments. This is as much as saying, that Dr. Cudworth would have done more wisely, if he had been more unreserved and open in his disputations, and had spoken out his mind on many subjects with frankness and sincerity.

I shall now briefly subjoin what appears to myself, after a careful consideration of this matter, to be not very far from the truth. First of all it is unquestionable that Dr. Cudworth is not always sufficiently guarded in speaking of the bodies of those that rise again, and makes use of phrases which are calculated to give just cause of suspicion to orthodox believers. But in the next place the arguments brought against him are not all of them such as I should consider entitled to much attention. Certainly those who read his adversaries' reasons, as above enumerated, will easily perceive that they were solicitous about their number rather than their weight. The second is exceedingly weak, and the third utterly worthless. For who would think much of this reasoning: He who considers the resurrection-body to be called in scripture an *inheritance*, denies that the same body numerically will be raised from the dead? Arguments drawn from metaphorical expressions are held in very little estimation by those who reason upon right principles. Of the other points urged against him I have not a much better opinion; and with the exception of the first, which I own to be of some weight, I think it will require little trouble to dispose of the whole of them. The sixth argument especially will be repudiated, I am confident, by every one possessing the least pretensions to common fairness and equity. For who would approve of this argumentation: Dr. Cudworth asserts the resurrection treated of by St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. to be the same as that which Christ, Luke xx. calls ἀνάστασις ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν: therefore he denied that the same body which our soul now inhabits will be restored to us? For my part I think Dr. Cudworth was right, nor can I agree at all with those who suppose Christ to be speaking not of the resurrection of bodies but merely of immortality and eternal life, although I am aware that such is the opinion of interpreters of high eminence. The express words of Christ and St. Luke, as well as the opinions of the Sadducees whom our Saviour is convicting, forbid us from assenting to this exposition. Thus happens it among mortals: Those who publicly accuse others of heresy in the heavenly doctrine are sometimes so carried away by their zeal as to rank the best of sentiments among flagrant and heinous errors. I do not make these remarks however for the purpose of exculpating Dr. Cudworth, or of showing that he held no opinion adverse and repugnant to the common tenets of Christians. On the contrary I am convinced that he considered the received doctrine of the resurrection of the body to be either doubtful or altogether false: and in this I fancy I shall have the concurrence of all who attentively examine what has hitherto been argued by himself and remarked by us. His opinion, if he did entertain any fixed one upon the subject, is very doubtful and uncertain. For as I have already observed above, he has nowhere so laid open his mind as to admit of our seeing into all its recesses. But if he arrived at no certain conclusion, but merely doubted and hesitated as to which opinion he should in preference adopt, he probably derived this taint from the later Academy, of which he was a devoted admirer, and from Plotinus whose guidance he chiefly followed in philosophizing. For although the junior Platonists ought to be classed among dogmatists rather than Academics, still they dispute on both sides of many questions without deciding upon any thing. As to the rest, I cannot understand why Mr. Wise was unwilling to point out the reason of Dr. Cudworth's great caution and hesitancy. To myself they seem easy to be accounted for; nor do I suppose I shall do any injustice to the great man's memory, by saying that his prudence and love of tranquillity so far influenced him as to induce him to suppress a portion of his opinions rather than state them in clear and perspicuous language. If I am not mistaken, the times in which he lived did not yet allow full liberty to Englishmen freely and openly to avow what sentiments they pleased, regardless of the ill-will and animosity of others. Burnet, in

commonly called by the Greeks demons (which Philo[4] tells us are the same with angels amongst the Jews, and accordingly are those words demons and angels, by Hierocles and Simplicius, and other of the latter pagan writers, sometimes used indifferently as synonymous[5]) viz. That these demons or angels are not pure, abstract, incorporeal substances, devoid of vital union with any matter; but that they consist of something incorporeal and something corporeal, joined together: so that, as Hierocles writeth of them:[6] Τὸ μὲν ἄνω αὐτῶν ἀσώματος οὐσία, τὸ δὲ κάτω σωματική, "They have a superior and an inferior part in them; and their superior part is an incorporeal substance; their inferior corporeal." In a word, that they all, as well as men, consist of soul and body, united together, there being only this difference betwixt them, that the souls of these demons or angels never descend down to such gross and terrestrial bodies as human souls do; but are always clothed either with aërial or ethereal ones.[7] And indeed this Pythagoric cabala was universal, con-

his History of his own Times, an. 1667. p. 187. records of Dr. Cudworth as follows: "He was a man of singular prudence and great circumspection: and this his enemies made a pretext for falsely charging him with dissimulation and fraud."

[4] De Insomniis, p. 586. Philo follows the opinion of the most eminent of the Platonists, who suppose demons to be souls more excellent and noble than the rest, which have never been smitten with a love of bodies, and consequently have never wished to descend into them. Having put forth this opinion he thus proceeds: Τούτας δαίμονας μὲν οἱ ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι, ὁ δὲ ἱερὸς λόγος ἀγγέλους εἴωθε καλεῖν, "These philosophers are accustomed to call demons, and scripture angels." There is a great difference between what Philo calls demons and those natures which the divine writers denominate angels: but Philo had nothing more at heart than to accommodate the whole of scripture to the precepts of the philosophy he had himself imbibed, and in spite of all truth to interpret the sacred texts agreeably to the dogmas of the Alexandrine school.

[5] It is, as the learned Doctor states: the junior Platonists, who borrowed many other words from the Christians, in the third century adopted the term ἄγγελος also, and applied it to those natures which they had heretofore called demons. For they thought there was little or no difference between the demons of philosophers and the angels of Christians: in which opinion they were much confirmed by the Christians themselves. But if we impartially compare what philosophers say of their demons with the scriptural account respecting angels, we shall easily perceive no slight discrepancy between them, although they are associated by a certain similitude. It is worth while however to observe, that demons or genii were not all called angels by the whole of the Platonists. For some of them distribute them into three classes, *demons, angels*, and *heroes*: of which those are angels that live nearest the heavenly places. See Hierocles, In Aurea Carmina, p. 36. Porphyry, Περὶ ἀποχῆς, lib. 2. sect. 38. p. 82. and others. But many of them use these words indiscriminately.

[6] Comm. in Aurea Carmina, sect. 67. p. 210. The learned Doctor is wrong in supposing these words of Hierocles to relate to demons. Unquestionably this philosopher, like the rest of the Platonists, ascribed a body to those natures which they called demons: but in these words he is explaining the nature not of demons but of the stars and heavenly bodies. A little lower down he says the same of the sun, which he makes to consist of something *corporeal* and something *incorporeal*. With these heavenly bodies however he afterwards compares men and heroes; and defines the nature of heroes in these words, p. 212. Ἥρως ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωτεινοῦ σώματος, "A hero is a rational soul with a lucid body." It is well known that heroes are a kind of demons.

[7] The Platonists disagree among themselves upon this as well as upon innumerable

cerning all understanding beings besides the supreme Deity, or Trinity of divine hypostaecs; that is, concerning all the pagan inferior gods; that they are no other than souls vitally united to some bodies, and so made up of incorporeal and corporeal substance, joined together. For thus Hierocles plainly expresseth himself in the forecited place:* Ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία παρὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι οὕτω παρῆλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν, μήτε ἄνευ σώματος, &c. "The rational nature (in general) was so produced by God, as that it neither is body, nor yet without body; but an incorporeal substance, having a cognate or congenite body." Which same thing was elsewhere also thus declared by him:† Ἔστι γὰρ πᾶς μὲν ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος μετὰ τοῦ συμπεφυκότος αὐτῷ ἀφθάρτου σώματος, εἴκων ὅλου τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, "The whole rational order, or rank of being, with its congenite immortal body, is the image of the whole Deity, the maker thereof." Where, by Hierocles' rational nature or essence, and by the whole rational order, is plainly meant all understanding beings created, of which he acknowledgeth only these three kinds and degrees; first, the immortal gods, which are to him the animated stars; secondly, demons, angels, or heroes; and thirdly, men, called also by him καταχθόνιοι δαίμονες, "terrestrial demons;" he pronouncing of them all, that they are alike incorporeal substances, together with a congenite immortal body; and that there is no other understanding nature than such, besides the supreme Deity, which is complete in itself, without the conjunction of any body. So that, according to Hierocles, the ancient Pythagoric cabala acknowledged no such entities at all as those Intelligencies of Aristotle and the Noes of some high-flown Platonists (that is, perfectly unbodied minds); and much less any rank of Henades or unities, superior to these Noes. And indeed such particular created beings as these could neither have sense or cognizance of any corporeal thing existing without them (sense, as Aristotle hath observed, resulting from a complication of soul and body, as weaving results from a complication of the weaver and weaving instruments): nor yet could they act upon any part of the corporeal universe. So that these immoveable beings would be but like adamantine statues, and things unconnected with the rest of the world, having no commerce with any thing at all but the Deity; a kind of insignificant metaphysical gazers, or contemplators. Whereas the Deity,

other subjects. Thus some do not hesitate to inculcate that demons can become men, or that a demon can arrive at such a pitch of levity as to descend into a gross and solid body: but the others deny this, and suppose the souls called demons to be by their own nature possessed of such constancy that they never can be smitten with an insane love of bodies. A volume of no contemptible size might be written on the entire doctrine of this sect concerning demons and their various contentions on the subject.

* Page 210. † Page 17. [Page 19.]

though it be not properly ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, a "mundane soul," such as, together with the corporeal world, as its body, makes up one complete and entire animal; yet because the whole world proceeded from it, and perpetually dependeth on it, therefore must it needs take cognizance of all, and act upon all in it; upon which account it hath been styled by these Pythagoreans, ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος (not a mundane, but) a supra-mundane soul. Wherefore this ancient Pythagoric cabala seems to be agreeable to reason also, that God should be the only incorporeal being in this sense, such whose essence is complete, and life entire within itself, without the conjunction or appendage of any body; but that all other incorporeal substances created should be completed and made up by a vital union with matter, so that the whole of them is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but a complication of both; and all the highest and divinest things in the universe, next to the supreme Deity, are animals consisting of soul and body united together. And after this manner did the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, decline that absurdity objected against them, of the illocality of all finite created spirits, that these being incorporeal substances, vitally clothed with some body, may, by reason of the locality and mobility of their respective bodies, truly be said to be here and there, and to move from place to place.[8]

[8] He therefore plainly and openly approves of the opinion of those who like the Platonists of former times maintain that all genii and demons are endowed with a natural body. But the arguments here adduced by him in support of this doctrine have already been met by us above, when treating of the bodies of souls. The whole reasoning amounts to this: No one can feel without body, or move any thing except by means of body: but the angels feel and see, and also move other bodies: therefore they are unquestionably furnished with body. Here, however, a transition is made from what takes place and is done here, to what is possible to take place: which mode of argumentation I have always considered to have less weight in it than many suppose. This will at once be made evident if the argument be reduced into that form in which it ought to be exhibited. Thus then do those learned men reason who agree with Dr. Cudworth: Whatever takes place in this visible world takes place every where; nor has God subjected the invisible world to any other laws than those of the visible; nay he was unable to subject it to any other: but in this sensible world no one feels without the intervention of body, or moves any thing except by body: therefore neither in the other world which is removed from our senses can any nature feel or move any thing, unless it be conjoined with body. Let those who syllogize in this manner take care that they do not either form too high an opinion of themselves and the compass of their own intellect, or foolishly attempt to prescribe limits to the boundless power of God. For my own part a consciousness of my own weakness and the majesty of Omnipotence deter me from following in their footsteps. These worthy men themselves confess that the supreme Deity can feel and perceive all things and impart motion to all without the conjunction or appendage of body. Therefore sense and motion without body are at least ranked by them amongst things that are possible. Now I want to have it shown to me by solid and satisfactory arguments, that God is utterly incapable of communicating this power which he himself possesses to other natures. Perhaps they will appeal to the infinite and supreme perfections of God and to the weakness and infirmity of created things. But granting all they say respecting God and created things to be most true, still it is not sufficient to make me believe that God cannot impart some slight portion of his own supreme perfections to inferior natures. To my

Wherefore we are here also to show what agreement or disagreement there is betwixt this part of the Pythagoric cabala and the Christian philosophy. And first, it hath been already intimated, that the very same doctrine with this of the ancient Pythagoreans was plainly asserted by Origen. Thus, in his first book, Peri Archon, cap. 6. Solius Dei (saith he) id est Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, naturæ id proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ullâ corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere, "It is proper to the nature of God only, that is, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to subsist without material substance; or the society of any corporeal adjection." Again, lib. 2. cap. 2. Materialem substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solum separari, à naturis rationalibus, et pro ipsis vel post ipsas effectam videri; sed nunquam sine ipsa eas vel vixisse, vel vivere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea vita existere rectè putabitur, "Material substance in rational natures is indeed separable from them in conception and understanding, it seeming to be made for them, and in order of nature after them; but it is not really and actually separable from the same; nor did they ever, or can they, live without it: for a life perfectly incorporeal is rightly deemed to belong to the Trinity only." So also, in his fourth book, and his Anacephalæosis: Semper erunt rationabiles naturæ, quæ indigent indumento corporeo. Semper ergo erit natura corporea, cujus indumentis uti necesse est rationabiles creaturas. Nisi quis putet se posse ostendere, quod natura rationabilis absque ullo corpore vitam degere possit. Sed quam difficile id sit, et quam propè impossibile intellectui nostro, in superioribus ostendimus, "There always will be rational natures, which stand in need of a corporeal indument. Wherefore there will be always corporeal nature, as a necessary indument or clothing for these rational creatures. Unless any one could show, that it is possible for the rational nature to live without a body. Which how difficult and almost impossible it is to our understanding, hath been already de-

mind those have always appeared to be the wisest men who suffer the consciousness of their own wretchedness and ignorance to lead them devoutly to adopt what is recorded by the divine writers of the acts, functions, and offices of angels, and either to keep entirely aloof from all subtle questions respecting their nature, or to handle them with moderation and caution. What estimation, pray, are we forming of ourselves, when we lay down the few things that are known to us as the rule and standard by which to measure the infinity of others that are unknown. Are we sufficiently mindful of our being mortals made of mud and clay, born yesterday and perhaps gone to-morrow? I do not wish to detract from the ability or acumen of any one: on the contrary, I commend the endeavours of those who attempt to throw light upon most abstruse subjects, for the purpose of enhancing the glory of God among men: but yet I would have all of them to consider that in grave and arduous questions nothing is more becoming than modesty to a frail and perishable creature whose mind is enveloped in no inconsiderable darkness.

clared." Aquinas affirmeth[9] Origen, in this doctrine of his, to have followed the opinion of certain ancient philosophers; and undoubtedly it was the old Pythagoric cabala which the learned Origen here adhered to; that ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία, as it is in Hierocles, and πᾶς ὁ λογικὸς διάκοσμος, "the rational nature made by God;" that is, all created understanding beings are neither body nor yet without body, but have always a cognate or congenite body, as their vehicle or indument. So that angels or demons, as well according to Origen as Hierocles, are all of them incorporeal substances, not naked and abstract, but clothed with certain subtle bodies, or animals compounded and made up of soul and body together.

Wherefore Huëtius,[10] and other learned men, seem not well to have understood Origen here, but to have confounded two different opinions together, when they suppose him to have asserted angels, and all understanding creatures, not to have bodies, but to be bodies, and nothing else; and consequently, that there is no incorporeal substance at all besides the Deity: whereas Origen only affirmeth, that nothing besides the Trinity could subsist and live alone, absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, "without the society of any corporeal adjection;" and that the material nature is only a necessary indument or clothing of all rational or understanding creatures. And in this sense is it, that an incorporeal life is said by him to be proper only to the Trinity; because all other understanding beings are animals compounded of soul and body together. But that Origen acknowledged even our human soul itself to be incorporeal, as also that there is something in angels incorporeal, might be made evident from sundry passages in his writings; as this particularly in his sixth book against Celsus: Ἡμεῖς ἀσώματον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἔσμεν ἐκπυρουμένην, οὐδ' εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυομένην τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν, ἢ τὴν ἀγγέλων ἢ θρόνων, &c. ὑπόστασιν, "We do not think an incorporeal substance to be combustible, nor that the soul of man can be resolved into fire, or the substance of angels, thrones, dominions, principalities, or powers." Where, by the "substance of angels," he doubtless meant the souls of them.[1]

[9] In Summa Theolog. par. 1 quæst. 51. n. 1. "Origen, in saying this of God, and denying it of others, followed the opinions of other men: as he was also deceived in many other matters by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers."

[10] In Origenianis, lib. 2. quæst. 5. p. 63. &c.

[1] The learned Doctor will hardly make it generally believed that the name ὑπόστασις in this passage was intended by Origen to designate the soul of angels. I should rather suppose it to imply the whole of their nature: nor have I any recollection of Origen or any one else ever calling the soul of any thing by this name. But these words of his are preceded by some others from which it would appear to be more probable that he held the angels to be natures partaking of body and soul. He censures the Stoics for making every thing corporeal, not excepting even αἱ ἀρχαὶ, or the *principalities*. Σωματικὰς λέγονται εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντα φθείρονταϛ, κινδυνεύοντας δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν φθεῖραι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, εἰ μὴ πάνυ ἀνεμφαῖνον

Origen's sense being thus declared by St. Jerome,[2] in libris περὶ ἀρχῶν, angelos, et thronos, et dominationes, et potestates, et rectores mundi et tenebrarum, et omne nomen quod nominatur, dicit, animas esse eorum corporum, quæ vel desiderio vel ministerio susceperint: that "in his book of principles he affirmeth, angels, and thrones, and dominions, and powers, and the governors of the darkness of this world, and every name that is named (in St. Paul) to be all of them the souls of certain bodies; such as either by their own desire and inclination, or the divine allotment, they have received." Now there can be no question made, but that he who supposed the souls of men to be incorporeal, in a strict philosophic sense, and such as could not suffer any thing from fire, did also acknowledge something incorporeal in angels. And thus doth he somewhere declare himself, in that book Peri Archon:[3] Per Christum creata dixit (Paulus) omnia visibilia et invisibilia; per quod declaratur, esse etiam in creaturis quasdam invisibiles, secundum proprietatem suam, substantias; sed hæ, quamvis ipsæ non sunt corporeæ, utuntur tamen corporibus, licet ipsæ sunt corporeâ substantiâ meliores. Illa vero substantia trinitatis neque corpus, neque in corpore, esse credenda est; sed in totâ incorporea, "When Paul affirmeth all things, visible and invisible, to have been created by Christ, or the Λόγος, he intimated, that even amongst the creatures, there are some properly invisible substances. Which invisible substances created, though they be not bodies, yet do they use bodies, themselves being better than corporeal substance. But the substance of the Trinity is neither body, nor yet in body, but altogether incorporeal." Wherefore angelical and human souls are not, as Huetius supposeth, called incorporeal by Origen, only as subtle bodies sometimes are by the more simple and unskilful, but in a strict philosophic sense; only he supposed them to differ from the Deity in this, that though they be not

τοῦτ' αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει τυγχάνειν, "The Stoics assert that the principalities are corporeal and therefore corruptible, so that if the thing did not appear too absurd, the supreme God himself would not be exempt from the danger of corruption." Αἱ ἀρχαὶ in these words are undoubtedly the angels, by which name Origen, after St. Paul's example, frequently designates them. At any rate nobody will believe that the principles or elements of things are meant by this word: since these were regarded as corporeal not only by the Stoics but by all philosophers. If Origen therefore found fault with the Stoics for supposing the principalities or angels and the gods themselves to be corporeal, he himself unquestionably believed that there is something simple and incorporeal in them. But to confess the truth, not even this passage in my opinion is free from all exception. For it is manifest from an infinity of passages of Origen and other writers, that in calling any thing ἀσώματος or incorporeal, they merely speak comparatively and in reference to heavier and solid bodies. We have already shown this by the example of Irenæus: and we shall quote in the sequel a passage from Origen himself, from which it is clear and manifest.

[2] Epist. 61. ad Pammachium de Erroribus Johannes Hierosolymitani, tom. 2. opp. p. 115.

[3] Lib. 4. cap. 2.

bodies, yet they are always in bodies, or clothed with bodies; whereas the Deity is in both senses incorporeal, it having not so much as any corporeal indument. So that there is here no contradiction at all to be found in Origen, he constantly asserting angels to have something incorporeal in them as their superior part, and not in that vulgar sense of a subtle body, but in the philosophic; nevertheless, to have also a corporeal indument or clothing, as their outside or lower part, and in that regard only he calling them corporeal.[4]

It is true indeed, that there were, amongst the ancient fathers, some, who were so far from supposing angels to be altogether incorporeal, that they ran into the other extreme, and concluded them to have nothing at all incorporeal in them, but to be mere bodies.[5] But these either asserted that there was no such thing at all as any incorporeal substance; and that not only angels, and human souls, but also God himself was a body: or at least they concluded that nothing created was incorporeal; and that God, though himself incorporeal, yet could create nothing but bodies. These are here the two extremes; one, that angels have nothing corporeal at all belonging to them; the other, that they are altogether corporeal, or have nothing incorporeal in them: a middle betwixt both which is the Origenic hypothesis, the same with the Pythagoric, that in angels there is a complication of incorporeal and corporeal substance both together, or that they are animals consisting of soul and body. We shall now make it

[4] Huet does not positively deny that Origen assigned a body and soul to angels, but ibid. sect. 6. p. 70. cites some passages of his, from which he candidly confesses it to be deducible that "he was not content with attributing a corporeal nature to angels, but ascribed a soul to them as well." The learned ecclesiastic supposes indeed that this tenet is at variance with Origen's other precepts; but in this, as might easily be shown if necessary, he is undoubtedly mistaken. Huet, let it be observed by the way, was less conversant with the notions and precepts of the ancient philosophers than with other subjects of antiquity: from which it happens that he sometimes attributes opinions both in his Origeniana and Quæstiones Alnetanæ to the early Christians and sages which they themselves would have repudiated. In such subjects it is easy to fall into error: and therefore we ought not hastily to impute it to any one as crime, that he has not clearly understood the full force of a particular phrase or doctrine of antiquity. But to return to Origen. In this dogma, as on many other topics, he is not always sufficiently consistent with himself. There are many passages of his, from which we might infer with Dr. Cudworth, that he held angels to be natures consisting of body and soul. But in others he doubts whether angels have a soul or not. See lib. 2. cap. 8. and Huet, ibid. sect. 6. p. 70. From which it appears that he did not altogether spurn the opinion of those who consider angels to be wholly corporeal. He therefore is to be considered as having doubted and hesitated, to which side he should give the preference: but still there are numerous sayings of his which put it beyond all question that of the two he held the opinion of the contemporary Platonists to be the more probable one, who ascribed a body and soul to demons the same as to men.

[5] See the testimonies of ancient writers collected by Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theol. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis, cap. 2. p. 3. &c. and Pet. Dan. Huet, Origenian. lib. 2. quæst. 5. sect. 8. p. 71. and Not. ad Origenem. p. 85. Some of these testimonies, however, admit of a sufficiently apt explanation agreeably to the opinion of those who ascribe to angels not only a body but a simple soul also.

appear, that the greater part of the ancient fathers were for neither of the two forementioned extremes, either that angels were wholly incorporeal, or that they were wholly corporeal; but rather for the middle hypothesis, that they had bodies, and yet were not bodies, but, as other terrestrial animals, spirits or souls, clothed with ethereal or aërial bodies. And that the generality of the ancient and most learned fathers did not conceive angels to be mere unbodied spirits, is unquestionably evident from hence, because they agreed with the Greek philosophers in that conceit, that evil demons, or devils, were therefore delighted with the blood and nidours of sacrifices, as having their more gross, airy, and vaporous bodies nourished and refreshed with those vapours, which they did as it were luxuriate and gluttonize in. For thus does Porphyrius write concerning them, in his book De Abstinentia:[6] Οὗτοι οἱ χαίροντες λοιβῇ τε, κνίσσῃ τε, δι' ὧν αὐτῶν τὸ σωματικὸν[7] καὶ πνευματικὸν πιαίνεται: ζῇ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀτμοῖς καὶ ἀναθυμιάμασι, "These are they who take pleasure in the incense, fumes, and nidours of sacrifices, wherewith their corporeal and spirituous part is as it were pinguified; for this lives, and is nourished, by vapours and fumigations." And that, before Porphyrius, many other pagan philosophers had been of the same opinion, appeareth from this of Celsus:* Χρὴ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἳ δή φασι, διότι τῶν μὲν περιγείων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον γενέσει συντετηκὸς καὶ προσηλωμένον αἵματι καὶ κνίσσῃ, &c. "We ought to give credit to wise men, who affirm that most of these lower and circumterraneous demons are delighted with geniture, blood, and nidour, and such like things, and much gratified therewith; though they be not able to do any thing more in way of recompense, than sometimes perhaps to cure the body, or to foretel good and evil fortunes to men and cities." Upon which account himself, though a zealous pagan, persuadeth men to moderation in the use of these sacrifices, as principally gratifying the inferior and worser demons only. In like manner Origen† frequently insisteth upon the same thing, he affirming that devils were not only delighted with the idolatry of the Pagans in their sacrifices, but also ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν ἀναθυμιάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ ὁλοκαυτωμάτων ἀποφοραῖς τρέφεσθαι τὰ σώματα φιληδονούντων τοῖς τοιούτοις, "That their very bodies were nourished by the vapours and fumes arising from them, and that these evil demons therefore did as it were deliciate and Epicurize in them." And before Origen, most of the ancient fathers, as Justin Mar-

[6] Lib. 2. sect. 43. p. 86.

[7] This word is not found in Porphyry, and has been inserted, I suppose, by Dr. Cudworth for the sake of perspicuity. But they who are acquainted with the phraseology of the Platonists, and who know that a subtle and thin body is called by them πνεῦμα and πνευματικὸν, have no need of this explanatory word.

* Origen, lib. 8. [Page 417.] † Contra Celsus, lib. 7. p. 334.

tyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Tertullian, &c. and also many others after him endeavour to disparage those material and bloody sacrifices upon the same account, as things whereby evil demons were principally gratified. We shall only cite one passage to this purpose out of St. Basil,[8] or who ever were the author of that Commentary upon Isaiah, because there is something philosophic in it: Δαίμοσι διὰ τὸ φιλήδονον καὶ ἐμπαθὲς, αἱ θυσίαι φέρουσί τινα ἡδονὴν καὶ χρείαν ἐκθυμιώμεναι, διὰ τῆς καύσεως ἐξατμιζομένου τοῦ αἵματος, καὶ οὕτω διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης λεπτοποιήσεως, εἰς τὴν σύστασιν αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβανομένου· ὅλοι γὰρ δι' ὅλων τρέφονται τοῖς ἀτμοῖς, οὐ διὰ μασσήσεως καὶ κοιλίας, ἀλλ' ὡς αἱ τρίχες πάντων ζώων καὶ ὄνυχες, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα εἰς ὅλην ἑαυτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν, τὴν τροφὴν καταδέχεται, "Sacrifices are things of no small pleasure and advantage to demons;[9] because the blood, being evaporated by fire, and so attenuated, is taken into the compages and substances of their bodies: the whole of which is throughout nourished with vapours, not by eating, and stomachs, or suchlike organs, but as the hairs and nails of all animals, and whatsoever other things receive nourishment into their whole substance." And thus do we see it undeniably manifest, that many of the ancient fathers supposed devils to have bodies; neither can it at all be doubted, but that they concluded the same of angels too, these being both of the same kind, and differing but as good and evil men. And though they do not affirm this of good angels, but of devils only, that they were thus delighted and nourished with the fumes and vapours of sacrifices, and that they Epicurized in them; yet was not the reason hereof, because they conceived them to be altogether incorporeal, but to have pure ethereal or heavenly bodies; it being proper to those gross and vaporous bodies of demons only to be nourished and refreshed after that manner. And now, that all these ancient fathers did not suppose either angels or devils to be altogether corporeal, or to have nothing but body in them, may be concluded from hence, because many of them plainly declared the souls of men to be incorporeal; and therefore it cannot be imagined that they should so far degrade angels below men, as not to acknowledge them to have any thing at all incorporeal.[9]

[8] Cap. 1. sect. 25. p. 898. tom. 1. Operum Basilii Magni in Appendice. The recent editor of Basil, Julian Garner, a learned Benedictine monk, in the preface to tom. 1. sect. 10. p. 47. 48. is at much pains to show that this Commentary upon Isaiah is unworthy of St. Basil, and yet p. 48. he does not deny its being the work of some contemporary presbyter. And to me the arguments by which he supports this opinion appear to possess very great weight.

[9] Here also, if I am not mistaken, there are some things which require illustration and if I may be allowed to add, correction.

I. It is a very old opinion of the Greeks and other nations that the immortal gods feed upon the vapours and fumes of victims and sacrifices: on which account it was the custom of those who offered sacrifices to invite the gods to them as to a banquet. See Ælian among others, Variæ Histor. lib. 9. cap. 15. p. 599. They who require

But we shall now instance in some few, amongst many of these ancients, who plainly asserted both devils and angels to be spirits incorporate, and not to be mere bodies, but only to have bodies; that is, to consist of soul and body, or corporeal and incorporeal substance joined together. That angels themselves

testimonies of the antiquity of this notion, may consult the numerous ones collected by Gisb. Cuper, Observat. lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 76. Ezek. Spanheim in his French Notes ad Juliani Cæsares, p. 256. and dans les Preuves, p. 112. Lud. Kuster, Historia Critica Homeri, sect. 2. sect. 3. p. 16. and Sig. Havercamp, Ad Tertulliani Apologetic. p. 218. Nor, as we may learn from passages of Lucian, St. Chrysostom and many others, had this foolish opinion ceased to exist among nations even after the time of our Saviour. It had its origin, I have no doubt, in the ignorance of those who presided over the public sacrifices and cæremonies; who when persons more curious and inquisitive than others about the reasons of the sacred rites frequently asked them what necessity there was for offering sacrifices to the gods, who lived a happy life and wanted nothing to complete their felicity, could scarcely find any thing else to reply, than that the gods were refreshed, nourished, and strengthened by the blood and vapours of victims. Nor could this answer appear absurd at a time when it was generally supposed that the gods possessed subtle bodies, and fed upon nectar and ambrosia in the heavenly mansions. Hence this opinion spread itself through various nations, and, like many other absurdities, was embellished and propagated by the poets. But the doctrine that, not the gods, but the inferior and worse cast of demons only delighted in this food, is of a much more recent date. Its first foundations I conceive to have been laid by Pythagoras, who as is well known repudiated the immolation of victims, and taught his disciples that bloodless offerings were alone worthy of God. But the junior Platonists, whose custom it was to retain the ancient dogmas, if possible, and to correct and remodel them, if too absurd to be retained, professedly confirmed and established it. For these philosophers, whose notions respecting the Deity were more sound and wise than those of others, easily perceived that so foolish an opinion respecting the gods was not to be entertained, and yet they were unwilling altogether to abandon it on account of its very great antiquity. They therefore reformed and corrected it, substituting malignant or inferior demons in place of the gods. And when the Christian writers, who in the second and third century, defended the truth and excellence of their own religion chiefly against the philosophers, saw that this philosophic opinion was every where received, although the common people still adhered to the ancient doctrine, they did not hesitate to convert it to their use, nay even to adopt it as their own. For the Christians admitted of no sacrifices; and for that reason were held in bad repute among the vulgar. And what, I ask, was better calculated to put an end to the popular odium than their adoption of this dogma publicly propounded by the Platonists that victims were not acceptable to the gods, but to the evil genii alone? If this doctrine had been universally received, it would unquestionably have put an end to all the sacrifices and public religions, the extinction of which was so ardently desired by the Christians. Wherefore it is not at all to be wondered at that it is approved of and inculcated in almost all their Apologies. But the Platonists at last perceived that the doctrine was doing their cause more hurm than good: consequently they rejected and repudiated it. See Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægypt. sect. 5. cap. 10. p. 125. &c. who, in opposition to Porphyry gives a copious refutation of this opinion.

II. The learned Doctor is right in considering it to be manifest from this dogma that the ancient fathers supposed devils to have subtle bodies. But when he wishes it to be understood from the same that they also attributed bodies to good angels, I think he goes further out of the way than is necessary. For my own part if we could find nothing else in their writings except what is here said of evil demons, from which it could be proved that they regarded good angels also as partakers of body, I should consider myself to have just cause for doubts upon the subject. For I should be afraid lest they might have supposed demons to have had a body assigned them by God merely by way of punishment. It is at least notorious that of the modern Roman Catholic theologians Cajetanus and Eugubinus attributed a body to demons but maintained that the angels are destitute of it. There are, however, so many other passages of theirs to be met with from which this is manifest, that there was no necessity for

have bodies, is every where[10] declared by St. Austin* in his writings; he affirming that the bodies of good men, after the resurrection, shall be qualia sunt angelorum corpora, "such as are the bodies of angels;" and that they shall be corpora angelica, in societate angelorum,† "angelical bodies, fit for society and converse with angels;" and declaring the difference betwixt the bodies of angels and of devils in this manner:[1] Dæmones, antequam transgrederentur, cœlestia corpora gerebant, quæ conversa sint ex pœna in aëream qualitatem, ut jam possint ab igne

the learned Doctor to look about him for a proof. I pass over those that have already been brought forward by Dr. Cudworth himself and others, and shall merely notice one, which is so relevant to the matter in hand, that I am surprised it did not occur to a man so intimately acquainted with the records of the ancients. As the early fathers generally supposed demons to be nourished by certain viands, so some of them believed also that the angels in heaven eat some description of food: to which they referred the saying of David in Psalm lxxviii. 25. wherein he calls manna angels' food. Justin Martyr, Dialog. cum Tryphone, p. 279. opp. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, ὅῆλόν ἐστι ἡμῖν, τρεφόμενοι κἂν μὴ ὁμοίαν τροφὴν ἥπερ οἱ ἄνθρωποι χρώμεθα, τρέφονται: περὶ γὰρ τῆς τροφῆς τοῦ μάννα, ἣν ἐτράφησαν οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ, ἡ γραφὴ οὕτω λέγει, ὅτι ἄρτον ἀγγέλων ἔφαγον, "In heaven also, as is manifest to us, the angels are nourished, although not with the same food as we men use: for of the food manna, which your fathers did eat in the wilderness, the scripture saith, they did eat angels' food." Of the same opinion are Clemens Alexandr. Pædagogi. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 122. Tertullian, Adv. Judæos, cap. 3. p. 221. and De Carne Christi, cap. 6. p. 249. and others.

III. I readily admit that many of the ancient fathers, whose writings have come down to us, suppose the angels to be animals consisting of body and soul: but I deny, in the first place, that this opinion was entertained, as the learned Doctor seems to imagine, by all those who affirmed demons to possess bodies requiring some sort of aliment. Tertullian, to say nothing of the rest, unquestionably held the angels to be wholly corporeal; and yet in his Apologeticum and elsewhere he adopts that opinion concerning demons. In the next place, I deny that there is any great force in the argument by which he considers it may be proved that they assigned souls as well as bodies to angels. His reasoning is this: "The fathers held human souls to be incorporeal: therefore they believed genii or angels, which are more excellent than human souls, to be also in themselves incorporeal." But I can see no reason why a man who affirms the human soul to be simple, ought also to decide that angels are in themselves simple and incorporeal. Besides, it must be well known to every one who has paid any attention to ancient authors, that those who call the soul incorporeal, do not at all regard it as a nature altogether simple and distinct from all body. The word *incorporeal* with most of them is used only comparatively, and natures which are said to be incorporeal are called so merely in respect to our body. And as we have before shown, there are not a few among them who suppose the soul to be a thin body, which on account of its subtlety ought to be designated by the name of spirit.

* In Psalm lxxxv.

[10] Some of the passages have already been given on sect. 23. But the learned Doctor here points out two others from the Enarrat. in Psalm lxxxv. sect. 17. p. 686. and in Psalm cxlv. sect. 3. p. 1212. I shall therefore add these to the rest. In the former St. Augustine writes as follows: "Our body certainly possesses life, and yet in comparison with that future body, *such as are the bodies of angels*, the body of man is found to be dead, although yet having life." In the latter he says: "But when our body shall have become such, a celestial and spiritual body, *an angelical body in the society of angels*, not even so will it give counsel to the soul." Add lib. 4. De Genesi ad Literam, cap. 5. p. 124. tom. 3. opp.

† In Psalm clxv.

[1] On this subject the same opinion as St. Augustine's was entertained both by Minucius Felix and Origen, as has already been observed by Pet. Dan. Huet, in his Origeniana, lib. 2. quæst. 5. sect. 7. and 8. p. 71. 72.

pati,* "That though devils, before the transgression, had celestial bodies, as angels now have, yet might these afterwards, in way of punishment, be changed into aerial ones, and such as now may suffer by fire." Moreover, the same St. Austin somewhere[2] calleth good angels by the name of animæ beatæ atque sanctæ, "happy and holy souls." And though it be true, that in his Retractations† he recalleth and correcteth this, yet was this only a scrupulosity in that pious father concerning the mere word, because he nowhere found in scripture angels called by the name of souls; it being far from his meaning, even there to deny them to be incorporeal spirits joined with bodies. And certainly he, who every where concludes human souls to be incorporeal, cannot be thought to have supposed angels to have nothing at all but body in them. Again, Claudianus Mamertus,[3] writing against

* De Gen. ad Lit. lib. 3. cap. 10. [Sect. 15. p. 114. tom. 3.]

[2] De Musica, lib. 6. cap. 17. sect. 59. p. 401. tom. 1. opp. where he makes use of these words: "The rational and intellectual choirs of happy and holy souls receiving the law of God itself, without which a leaf does not fall from the tree, and in which our hairs are numbered, with no nature intervening, transmit it to the terrestrial and infernal tribunals." This passage, lib. 1. Retract. (not lib. 2. as here indicated in the margin) cap. 11. p. 13 tom. 1. opp. is thus interpreted and at the same time corrected by St. Augustine: "Whereas I meant to be understood merely of the holy angels, of whom I nowhere recollect to have read in the divine canonical books, as possessing souls." He repeats nearly the same, cap. 16. p. 19. From these words it is evident that Dr. Cudworth is mistaken in saying that St. Augustine does not deny the thing itself, but merely doubts whether he ought to use the word soul when speaking of angels. For he openly declares that he has nowhere read in scripture that *angels have souls:* which at least proves him not to have doubted "whether angels can be called souls, or not," but "whether they have souls or not." His scrupulosity therefore referred to the thing itself, not the word. But in this the learned Doctor followed Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis. cap. 2. sect. 14. p. 7. who discourses in exactly the same strain. There are, I acknowledge, many passages in St. Augustine, from which we may learn that he supposed souls to be compounded of soul and body. And these led Theophilus Alethinus or J. Le Clerc in his Notes, ad Petavii Dogmata Theol. p. 6. to believe that the holy father, when he denies angels to have souls, meant the vital and sentient souls. But this interpretation is at variance with the very passage which St. Augustine corrects in his Retractations, it being clear from the beginning of this passage that he is speaking of *rational* souls: "The rational and intellectual choirs," says he, "of happy souls." Such being the case, I consider those to take the most correct view, who suppose that St. Augustine, whose frequent self-contradictions are well known, was unable to make up his mind as to the nature of angels, and sometimes inclined to one sometimes to another opinion as the more probable. There are sayings of his to be met with from which it might be inferred that he approved of the opinion of those who held souls to be wholly corporeal: while others again go to show that he regarded them either as pure spirits or as consisting of body and soul. We have already produced a passage from his Epist. 95. p. 197. tom. 2. opp. wherein he leaves the question "whether angels have bodies or not," undecided. And in his books of Retractations, as we have seen, he doubts "whether a soul can be attributed to angels." There is nothing left for us, therefore, but to confess that he arrived at no fixed conclusion respecting angels, but sometimes preferred one and sometimes another opinion, and that in his latter days he was not far removed from those who supposed them to be wholly corporeal.

† Lib. cap. 11.

[3] De Statu Animæ, lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 173. ed Barthii. Where the former passage is not read in the words here given, although the sentiment is the same: "It cannot be denied," says Claudianus, "that the devil also made of the corporeal and incorporeal

Faustus, who made angels to be mere bodies without souls, or any thing incorporeal, maintaineth, in way of opposition, not that they are mere incorporeal spirits, without bodies (which is the other extreme) but that they consist of corporeal and incorporeal, soul and body joined together; he writing thus of devils, Diabolus ex duplici diversaque substantia constat; et corporeus est et incorporeus, "The devil consisteth of a double and different substance; he is corporeal, and he is also incorporeal. And again of angels,* Patet beatos angelos utriusque substantiæ, et incorporeos esse in ea sui parte, qua ipsis visibilis Deus; et in ea itidem parte corporeos, qua hominibus sunt ipsi visibiles, "It is manifest that the blessed angels are of a two-fold substance; that they are incorporeal in that part of theirs, wherein God is visible to them, and again corporeal, in that other part, wherein themselves are visible to men." Moreover, Fulgentius writeth concerning angels in this manner:† Planè ex duplici eos esse substantia asserunt magni et docti viri. Id est, ex spiritu incorporeo, quo à Dei contemplatione nunquam recedunt; et ex corpore, per quod ex tempore hominibus apparent. Corpora vero ætherea, id est, igneæ, eos dicunt habere; dæmones vero corpus aëreum, "Great and learned men affirm angels to consist of a double substance; that is, of a spirit incorporeal, whereby they contemplate God; and of a body whereby they are sometimes visible to men: as also, that they have ethereal or fiery bodies, but devils aerial." And perhaps this might be the meaning of Joannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read and approved of in the seventh council, and therefore the meaning of that council itself too, when it thus declared: Νοεροὺς μὲν αὐτοὺς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, οὐ μὴν ἀσωμάτους πάντη καὶ ἀοράτους, λεπτοσωμάτους δὲ, καὶ ἀερώδεις, ἢ πυρώδεις, &c., "That the catholic church acknowledges angels to be intellectual, but not altogether incorporeal and invisible; but to have certain subtle bodies, either aiery or fiery." For it being there only denied that they were altogether incorporeal, one would think the meaning should not be, that they were altogether corporeal; nor indeed could such an opinion be fastened upon the catholic church; but that they were partly incorporeal, and partly corporeal; this being also sufficient in order to that design, which was driven at in that council.[4] How-

———is of a twofold substance." We there meet with many other sayings to the same purport, but they rest on very weak and slender foundations.

* Lib. 3. † Lib. 3. De Trin. [P. 119. opp. Edit. Sirmondi.]

[4] The words here quoted are not the decree of the whole of the seventh, or second Nicene, council, but taken from the disputation of Joannes Thessalonicensis, which was publicly read therein, act. 5. see J. Harduinus, Concilior. tom. 4. p. 293. Nevertheless, the entire council seems to have approved of this opinion, because, on Joannes' book being read, they found nothing in it deserving of reprehension. At any rate, the patriarch Tarasius attaches much importance to the authority of Johannes,

ever Psellus,[5] who was a curious inquirer into the nature of spirits, declares it not only as his own opinion, but also as agreeable to the sense of the ancient fathers, ὡς οὐκ ἀσώματον τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστι φῦλον, μετὰ σώματος δέ γε, "that the demoniac or angelic kind of beings is not altogether incorporeal, or bodiless, but that they are conjoined with bodies, or have cognate bodies belonging to them." Who there also further declares the difference betwixt the bodies of good angels and of evil demons, after this manner:* Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀγγελικὸν, αὐγάς τινας ἐξανίσχον ξένας, τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὀφθαλμοις ἐστὶν ἀφόρητόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόστατον· τὸ δαιμόνιον δὲ, εἰ μὲν τοιοῦτον δῆποτε ἦν, οὐκ οἶδα εἰπεῖν, ἔοικεν δ' οὖν, ἐωσφόρον Ἡσαίου τὸν ἐκπεσόντα κατονομάζοντος· νῦν δὲ ἀλλὰ ζοφῶδες οἷον καὶ ἀμαυρόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῖς ὄμμασι λυπηρὸν, γυμνωθὲν τοῦ συζύγου φωτός· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀγγελικὸν παντάπασιν ἐστὶν ἄϋλον· διὸ καὶ διὰ πάντα ἐστὶ στερεοῦ διαδύνον καὶ διϊὸν, καὶ τῆς ἡλιακῆς ἀκτῖνος ὂν ἀπαθέστερον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ διὰ σωμάτων διαφανῶν ἰοῦσαν, ἀποστέγει τὰ γεώδη καὶ ἀλαμπῆ ὡς καὶ κλᾶσιν ὑπομένειν, ἅτε δὴ ἔνυλον ἔχουσαν· τῷ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρόσαντες, οἷα μηδεμίαν ἔχοντι πρὸς μηδὲν ἀντίθεσιν· τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σώματα, κἂν ὑπὸ λεπτότητος ἀφανῆ καθέστηκεν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔνυλά πη, καὶ ἐμπαθῆ, καὶ μάλισθ' ὅσα τοὺς ὑπὸ γῆν ὑποδέδυκε τόπους· ταῦτα γὰρ τοσαύτην ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν, ὡς καὶ ἁφαῖς ὑποπίπτειν, καὶ πληττόμενα ὀδυνᾶσθαι, καὶ πυρὶ προσομιλήσαντα καίεσθαι, "The angelical body sending forth rays and splendours,

and affirms it to be manifest from him, "that it is proper to paint angels, since they are circumscribed, and have appeared to many in the form of men:" and this opinion of Tarasius, the whole council adopts as its own, exclaiming, ναὶ δέσποτα, "even so, master." But this is difficult of digestion to the Roman Catholic theologians; who, at this day, holding the angels to be mere spirits, and therefore abandoning the opinions of the ancient doctors, and yet considering the decrees of the general councils as sacred and inviolable, have recourse to all sorts of expedients, and put various interpretations upon the words of the council, in order that it may not appear to be at variance with the modern doctrines of their church. I shall not touch upon all their subtleties, most of which carry with them their own refutation; but shall merely notice the opinion of Dion. Petavius, who seems to have struck out a better path than the others. He supposes, Dogmat. Theol. tom. 3. lib. 1. cap. 2. sect. 7. p. 5. that Tarasius and the council do not follow and commend the whole of Joannes' doctrine, but adopt out of his book merely this one thing: "that angels are circumscribed, and have appeared in the human form, and therefore may be painted:" consequently that those who ascribe bodies to angels cannot rely upon the authority of this council. Ingenious enough certainly: but even this does not in my opinion get rid of the whole difficulty in which those are involved who patronize the councils, and at the same time deny bodies to angels. For the fact of the council acknowledging angels to be περίγραπτοι, "circumscribed in place," clearly shows that it did not hold them to be mere spirits, according to the present papal doctrine. It ought to be observed also that no part of Joannes' opinion is rejected by the fathers, which silence of theirs must be admitted to be no contemptible argument for supposing that they held the whole of his doctrine concerning angels to be sound and probable. For my part, I think Dr. Cudworth has given a true exposition of the opinion of the council. Let the catholic theologians consider whether they had better retain the dogma professed by them at the present day, or obey the authority of the council by abandoning it.

[5] Dialog. de Operationibus Dæmonum, p. 44.

* P. 33. [P. 48.]

such as would dazzle mortal eyes, and cannot be borne by them; but the demoniac body, though it seemeth to have been once such also, (from Isaias' calling him, that fell from heaven, Lucifer) yet is it now dark and obscure, foul and squalid, and grievous to behold, it being deprived of its cognate light and beauty. Again, the angelical body is so devoid of gross matter, that it can pass through any solid thing, it being indeed more impassable than the sun-beams; for though these can permeate pellucid bodies, yet are they hindered by earthy and opaque, and refracted by them: whereas the angelical body is such, as that there is nothing so imporous or solid that can resist or exclude it. But the demoniac bodies, though, by reason of their tenuity, they commonly escape our sight, yet have they notwithstanding gross matter in them, and are patible, especially those of them which inhabit the subterraneous places; for these are of so gross a consistency and solidity, as that they sometimes fall also under touch, and being strucken, have a sense of pain, and are capable of being burnt with fire." To which purpose, the Thracian there addeth more afterwards from the information of Marcus the monk, a person formerly initiated in the diabolical mysteries, and of great curiosity:* Τὸ δαιμόνιον ἄρα πνεῦμα διόλου ὂν κατὰ φύσιν αἰσθητικὸν κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ μέρος, ἀμέσως ὁρᾷ τε καὶ ἀκούει, καὶ τὰ τῆς ἁφῆς ὑπομένει πάθη, διαιρούμενον ὀδυνᾶται κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ στερεά· ταύτῃ τούτων διενεγκὸν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν διαιρεθέντων, μόλις ἢ οὐδαμῶς οὐλοῦται· τὸ δὲ διαιρούμενον εὐθὺς συμφύεται, καθάπερ ἀέρος ἢ καὶ ὕδατος μόρια μεταξύ τινος ἐμπίπτοντα στερεοῦ· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ θᾶττον ἢ λόγος τουτὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συμφύεται, πλὴν ἀνιᾶται κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν, "The demoniac spirit or subtle body, being in every part of it capable of sense, does immediately see and hear, and is also obnoxious to the affections of touch; insomuch that being suddenly divided or cut in two, it hath a sense of pain, as the solid bodies of other animals have; it differing from them only in this, that those other bodies being once discontinued, are not easily consolidated together again; whereas the demoniac body, being divided, is quickly redintegrated by coalescence, as air or water: nevertheless, it is not without a sense of pain at that time, when it is thus divided," &c. Moreover, the same Marcus affirmeth the bodies of these demons to be nourished also, though in a different manner from ours: Τρέφονται οἱ μὲν δι' εἰσπνοῆς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρτηρίαις καὶ ἐν νεύροις πνεῦμα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὑγρότητος ἀλλ' οὐ στόματι καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σπόγγοι καὶ ὀστρακόδερμα, σπῶντες μὲν τῆς παρακειμένης ὑγρότητος ἔξωθεν, "There are some of them nourished by inspiration, as the spirit contained in the nerves and arteries; others by sucking in the adjacent

* P. 94. [P. 142.]

moisture, not as we do, by mouths, but as sponges and testaceous fishes." And now we may venture to conclude, that this opinion of angels being not mere abstract incorporeal substances, and unbodied minds, but consisting of something incorporeal, and something corporeal, that is, of soul or spirit, and body joined together, is not only more agreeable to reason, but hath also had more suffrages amongst the ancient fathers, and those of greater weight too, than either of those two other extremes, viz., That angels are mere bodies, and have nothing at all incorporeal in them; or else, that they are altogether incorporeal, without any bodily indument or clothing.[6]

Notwithstanding which, this latter opinion hath indeed prevailed most in these latter ages; time being rightly compared to a river, which quickly sinks the more weighty and solid things, and bears up only the lighter and more superficial. Though there may be other reasons given for this also; as partly because the Aristotelic philosophy, when generally introduced into Christianity, brought in its abstract intelligencies along with it; and partly because some spurious Platonists, talking so much of their Henades and Noes, their simple monads and immoveable unbodied minds, as the chief of their generated and created gods; probably some Christians might have a mind to vie their angels with them: and lastly, because

[6] I have read and carefully weighed all the arguments hitherto brought forward by the learned Doctor in confirmation of the opinion, that angels are animals compounded of body and soul; and yet I cannot bring myself to believe that it is more consistent with reason, and fortified by stronger authorities than the opposite one which entirely divests them of body. Should any one think proper to call this obstinacy and stupidity in me, I must bear with the imputation; but I shall do so the more easily from the consciousness that I have spared no pains in order to get the better of this affection of the mind, which he chooses to designate by so harsh a name. The arguments borrowed from reason and philosophy in support of this doctrine of the bodies of angels, we have already examined in the preceding. I shall now say a few words upon the authorities of the ancients. Great is my reverence for the names of those who lived in the first ages of the rising church, and strengthened the Christian cause by their talents and virtues; and yet if they advance any thing which is neither supported by the open testimony of scripture, nor by perspicuous arguments, I consider we ought not to put faith in them. If the question is to rest upon authorities, the greater number, if I mistake not, will be found to be on the side of those who suppose angels to be nothing but mere bodies or corporeal spirits: nor will the learned Doctor easily persuade any one conversant with the records of the first four centuries, that the majority of the ancient fathers believed them to be natures partaking both of body and soul. Psellus, if I possess the faculty of judging, ought not to have been included in the number of those to whose dignity and excellence we are to pay any regard or reverence. For the account he gives of demons and their nature, besides being incredible in itself, and amply refuted by the observations of later writers, rests chiefly upon the faith of a monk: and every sensible man is aware how much credit ought to be attached to this class. I grant that Psellus, or the Thracian and the monk Marcus, whose opinions he recites, might be taken as fair evidence of the opinions prevailing at their own time among the Syrians, Chaldeans, and other oriental nations, in regard to genii and demons: and in this respect I consider his book to be highly useful: but when the question is, not what was believed in former ages, but what we ought to believe, I require more grave and weighty authorities than Psellus.

angels are not only called in scripture *spirits*, but also by several of the ancients said to be incorporeal; whilst this, in the mean time, was meant only either in respect of that incorporeal part, soul or mind, which they supposed to be in them, or else of the tenuity and subtlety of their bodies or vehicles. For this account does Psellus give hereof:* Καὶ τοῖς ἡμετέροις καὶ τοῖς θύραθεν, εἰωθός ἐστι, τὰ παχύτερα τῶν σωμάτων σωματώδη λέγειν· ὃ δὲ λεπτομερές ἐστι καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφυγάνον καὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ἀσώματον, οὐ μόνον οἱ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξιοῦσι λέγειν, "It is usual both with Christian writers, and Pagans too, to call the grosser bodies corporeal, and those which by reason of their subtlety, avoid both our sight and touch, incorporeal." And before Psellus, Joannes Thessalonicensis, in his dialogue, approved in the seventh Council:[7] Εἰ δέ που εὕροις ἀσωμάτους καλουμένους τοὺς ἀγγέλους, ἢ δαίμονας, ἢ ψυχὰς, ὡς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ συμπλέξεως τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων, καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχέα καὶ ἀντίτυπα, οἷα ἡμεῖς περικείμεθα, οὕτως αὐτοὺς προσηγόρευσαν, "If you find angels, or demons, or separate souls called sometimes incorporeal, you must understand this in respect of the tenuity of their bodies only; as not consisting of the grosser elements, nor being so solid and antitypous as those which we are now imprisoned in." And before them both, Origen, in the proeme of his Peri Archon, where, citing a passage out of an ancient book, intituled, "The doctrine of Peter," wherein our Saviour Christ is said to have told his disciples, that he was not δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον, an "incorporeal demon," though rejecting the authority of that book, he thus interprets those words: Non idem sensus ex isto sermone ἀσωμάτου indicatur, qui Græcis vel Gentilibus auctoribus ostenditur, quum de incorporeâ naturâ à philosophis disputatur. In hoc enim libello, incorporeum dæmonium dixit, pro eo, quod ipse ille, quicunque est, habitus vel circumscriptio dæmonici corporis, non est similis huic nostro crassiori, vel visibili corpori; sed secundum sensum ejus, qui composuit illam Scripturam, intelligendum est, quod dixit; non esse tale corpus, quale habent dæmones, quod est naturaliter subtile, et velut aura tenue; et propter hoc vel imputatur à multis, vel dicitur incorporeum; sed habere se corpus solidum et palpabile, "The word ἀσώματον, or incorporeal, is not to be taken here in that sense wherein it is used by the Greek and Gentile writers, when they philosophized concerning the incorporeal nature. But a demon is here said to be incorporeal, because of the disposition of the demoniac body, not like to this gross and visible body of ours.

* P. 30. 33. [P. 47.]

[7] In Actis Concilii 7. Œcum. seu Nicæni 2. Actione 5. p. 293. tom. 4. Concilior. Jo. Harduini.

So that the sense is, as if Christ should have said, I have not such a body as the demons have, which is naturally subtle, thin, and soft as the air, and therefore is either supposed to be by many, or at least called incorporeal; but the body, which I now have, is solid and palpable." Where we see plainly, that angels, though supposed to have bodies, may, notwithstanding, be called incorporeal, by reason of the tenuity and subtility of those bodies, comparatively with the grossness and solidity of these our terrestrial bodies. But that indeed which now most of all inclineth some to this persuasion, that angels have nothing at all corporeal hanging about them, is a religious regard to the authority of the third Lateran council having passed its approbation upon this doctrine; as if the seventh Œcumenical (so called) or second Nicene, wherein the contrary was before owned and allowed, were not of equal force, at least to counterbalance the other.[8]

[8] It is scarcely necessary to observe, that what the learned Doctor here advances respecting the causes why the ancient doctrine of the bodies of angels was discarded, and its place supplied by the opinion of those who held them to be divested of all body, is not all equally sound and well founded, but that some portion of it is to be regarded as little better than ingenious conjecture.

I. That the philosophy of Aristotle, after its introduction into Christianity, contributed to the overthrow of the ancient dogma of the corporeity of angels I can easily believe: but I should not be so ready to admit that the whole of the opposite doctrine was framed in imitation of his intelligences.

II. Much less can I agree in what Dr. Cudworth subjoins of the subtle follies of certain Platonists being emulated by the Christians. For at the period when the modern doctrine concerning angels was most prevalent, the commentaries of the Platonists were no longer read in the western regions, nor did the general ignorance of the Greek language admit of their being read by many. At that time, the less enlightened and informed derived their information almost exclusively from the translations of Greek writers. But of Proclus, to whom the νόες and ἑναδες chiefly owed their origin, there was formerly no Latin version extant.

III. What afterwards follows respecting the signification of the words σώματος, ἀσώματος, "corporeal" and "incorporeal," in the ancient Christian writers, is most true, and may be proved by many other testimonies from their works. Indeed, whoever neglects this observation, will egregiously fail in his interpretation of the fathers, and will sometimes suppose them to contradict themselves, when their doctrine is perfectly consistent. The learned Doctor himself, as we have seen above, did not always guard himself against error, nor sufficiently keep in view this meaning which is so frequently attached to the word incorporeal. But granting that some persons put a wrong interpretation upon those passages of the fathers in which angels are called incorporeal, still I should consider this error to have operated to the confirmation rather than to the first concoction of this doctrine of their incorporeity.

IV. The whole of the Catholic theologians, when they deny that bodies are to be attributed to angels, appeal to the decree of the Lateran council, which condemned this opinion. But many of them are very inaccurate, when they do so; some quote the Lateran council generally, although it is notorious that there are many councils of this name: others add the number, but the wrong one. This law was passed in the Lateran Council, which is the fourth of the Œcumenical councils convened in the Lateran palace, and was held by Pope Innocent III. in the year 1215. The words of this law in Joh. Harduinus, Concilior. tom. 7. cap. 1. Decretor. p. 15. 16. run as follows: "The Creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, who by his own omnipotent power from the very beginning of time created both natures out of nothing, the spiritual and corporeal, that is, the angelical and mundane: and afterwards the human, as a common nature consisting of spirit and body." The mode in which

But though this doctrine of angels, or all created understanding beings superior to men, having a corporeal indument or clothing, does so exactly agree with the old Pythagoric cabala; yet have we reason to think, that it was not therefore merely borrowed or derived from thence by the ancient fathers; but that they were led into it by the scripture itself. For first, the historic phenomena of angels in the scripture are such as cannot well be otherwise solved, than by supposing them to have bodies; and then not to lay any stress upon those words of the Psalmist,[9] "who maketh his angels spirits, and ministers a flame of fire," (though, with good reason, by the ancient fathers interpreted in this sense) because they may possibly be understood otherwise, as sometimes they are by rabbinical commentators; nor to insist upon those passages of St. Paul,[10] where he speaks of the tongues of angels, and of the voice of an archangel, and such like; there are several other places in scripture which seem plainly to confirm this opinion. As first, that of our Saviour before mentioned to this purpose, Luke xx. 35, "They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels." For were angels utterly devoid of all bodies, then would the souls of good men, in a state of separation, and without any resurrection, be rather equal to angels, than after a resurrection of their bodies. Wherefore the natural meaning of these words seem to be this, (as St. Austin hath interpreted them) that the souls of good men, after the resurrection, shall

the popish theologians prove from this decree that the church rejected the doctrine which ascribes bodies to angels, will be apparent from the words of Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theol. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis, cap. 3. sect. 9. p. 10. where he says: "As it opposes the spiritual to the corporeal, and holds it to be of the same nature as the soul of man, it is manifest that angels are neither bodies nor enveloped in bodies." When these learned doctors insist that this law proscribed the opinion which maintained the corporeity of angels, for my own part I am quite ready to admit it; but still I think those who choose to take a different view will not be unprepared with an answer. For setting aside that in the Romish church itself there are not wanting those who hold this council in no very high estimation, and consider that nothing was decreed in it, and that the laws usually attributed to it were written by Innocent alone, on which, consult Natalis Alexander, Selecta Histor. Eccles. Capita. sæc. 13. diss. 1. artic. 2. p. 325. &c.; the force of this law will be much weakened, if it be contended that the words *spiritual* and *corporeal* are used in it in the sense of the holy fathers. I have already more than once intimated that in the fathers *spiritual* means that which consists of a most subtle matter; *corporeal*, that which is allied and similar to these grosser bodies of ours; and lastly, *spirit*, a nature not indeed solid, but still not entirely destitute of all matter. Transfer these notions to the Lateran law, and you will give the Roman Catholic, who scarcely knows of any thing more sacred than the name of the fathers, much more trouble than he will be able to get over. My opinion is that the cause of those who hold the angels to be mere spirits derives very little support from this decree: and that it is better sustained by the authority of St. Thomas, who, Summæ par. 1. quæst. 51. n. 1. denies bodies to angels.

[9] Psalm civ. 4.

[10] 1 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Thess. iv. 16.

* De Gen. ad Lit. lib. 3.

have corpora angelica, "angelical bodies," and qualia sunt angelorum corpora, "such bodies as those of angels are." Wherein it is supposed that angels also have bodies, but of a very different kind from those of ours here.[1] Again, that of St. Jude, where he writeth thus of the devils: "the angels, which kept not their first estate (or rather, according to the vulgar Latin, suum principatum, 'their own principality,') but left their proper habitation (or dwelling-house) hath he reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." In which words it is first implied, that the devils were created by God pure, as well as the other angels, but that they kept not τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν, their "own principality," that is, their lordly power and dominion over their worser and inferior part, they having also a certain duplicity in their nature, of a better and worser principle, of a superior part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferior, which ought to be governed: nor is it indeed otherwise easily conceivable how they should be capable of sinning. And this inferior part in angels seems to have a respect to something that is corporeal or bodily in them also, as well as it hath in men. But then in the next place, St. Jude addeth, as the immediate result and natural consequence of these angels sinning, that they thereby left or lost, τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον, suum proprium domicilium; that is, not only "their dwelling-place" at large, those ethereal countries, and heavenly regions above, but also their proper dwelling-house, or immediate mansion; to wit, their heavenly body. Forasmuch as that heavenly body, which good men expect after

[1] The learned Doctor is right in not insisting upon the passages Psalm civ. 4. 1 Cor. xiii. 1. 1 Thess. iv. 16. in this question, and in acknowledging that they admit of a different exposition from the one given both by the ancient fathers and some modern writers, who fancy they clearly establish the corporeity of angels. Indeed, I am surprised that those who attribute such great force to these passages, do not avail themselves of that saying of our Saviour, wherein he declares that trumpets will be sounded at the last day, Matt. xxiv. 31. compare 1 Cor. xv. 52. and 1 Thess. iv. 16. For who can sound a trumpet without possessing a body, mouth, and lungs? But dismissing these passages upon which Dr. Cudworth himself does not think proper to lay any stress, let us speak only of those which he regards as affording unquestionable evidence that angels have bodies. Of these, the first is that celebrated saying of our Saviour, Luke xx. 35. wherein he tells us that those who shall be accounted worthy to obtain the resurrection from the dead, will be like the angels. I have already over and over again discussed the meaning of this saying, and therefore shall at present but briefly touch upon it. Christ it is evident does not say that the men who rise again will altogether resemble the angels, but only in a certain respect. After showing that there will be no marriages in heaven, and assigning as the reason of this that death will no longer prevail over them, he subjoins these words: ἰσάγγελοι γάρ εἰσι, "for they are equal unto the angels." Now, who does not perceive from these words that our Saviour compares the holy men who shall rise again from the dead with the angels, in respect only of immortality, and of the things which necessarily result from immortality? Those therefore either of the ancients or moderns who conclude from this passage that the bodies of good men after the resurrection will be the same as those of angels, carry this comparison beyond its proper limit: a course which is always erroneous, and in expositions of the divine oracles more especially baneful and mischievous.

the resurrection, is thus called by St. Paul,[2] τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, "Our habitation or dwelling house that is from heaven." The heavenly body is the proper house or dwelling, clothing or indument, both of angelical and human souls; and this is that which makes them fit inhabitants for the heavenly regions. This, I say, was the natural consequence of these angels sinning, their leaving, or losing their pure and heavenly body, which became thereupon forthwith obscured and incrassated; the bodies of spirits incorporate always bearing a correspondent purity or impurity to the different disposition of their mind or soul. But then again, in the last place, that which was thus in part the natural result of their sin, was also, by the just judgment of God, converted into their punishment; for their ethereal bodies being thus changed into gross, aerial, feculent and vaporous ones, themselves were immediately hereupon, as St. Peter in the parallel passage expresseth it,[3] ταρταρωθέντες, "cast down into Tartarus," and there imprisoned or "reserved in chains under darkness, until the judgment of the great day." Where it is observable, that the word ταρταροῦν, used by St. Peter, is the very same that Apollodorus and other Greek writers frequently make use of in a like case, when they speak of the Titans being cast down from heaven; which seems to have been really nothing else but this fall of angels poetically mythologized. And by Tartarus here, in all probability, is meant this lower caliginous air, or atmosphere of the earth, according to that of St. Austin,* concerning these angels: Post peccatum in hanc sunt detrusi caliginem, ubi tamen et aër, "That after their sin, they were thrust down into the misty darkness of this lower air." And here are they, as it were chained and fettered also by that same weight of their gross and heavy bodies, which first sunk them down hither; this not suffering them to reascend up, or return back to those bright ethereal regions above. And being thus for the present imprisoned in this lower Tartarus, or caliginous air or atmosphere, they are indeed here kept and reserved in custody, unto the judgment of the great day, and general assizes; however they may, notwithstanding, in the mean time seem to domineer and lord it for a while here.[4] And, lastly, our Saviour's, "Go ye

[2] 2 Cor. vi. 1. [3] 2 Pet. ii. 4.

* De Gen. ad Lit. lib. 3. cap. 10. [Page 114. tom. 3. opp.]

[4] This is a novel and altogether singular exposition of the passage of St. Jude ver. 6, but one of which it will be easy for us to prove the fallacy. Before doing which,

I. I consider it worth while to observe that this saying, as must be admitted even by those who may agree with Dr. Cudworth, is involved in very great obscurity, not indeed as regards the meaning, which is sufficiently clear, but in respect to the words and phrases in which it is expressed, and consequently that it can be variously expounded. Wherefore, if this explication were even such as altogether to defy refutation, still it would not assist those who attribute bodies to angels. For all rational men are agreed

cursed into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," seems to be a clear confirmation of devils being bodied; because, first, to allegorize this fire into nothing but remorse of conscience,

that no doctrine can be satisfactorily proved from obscure passages, admitting of different interpretations; unless there be other clear and evident sayings in which it is contained and inculcated.

II. The passage itself consists of two parts, in one of which is described the offence committed by the devils against God, and in the other the punishment inflicted upon them for this offence. The crime itself is comprised by the divine writer in these words: Ἀγγέλους τε τοὺς μὴ τηρήσαντας τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ ἀπολιπόντας τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον, "The angels, which kept not their first estate, or their own principality, but left their own habitation." The rest declare their punishment. There are some interpreters, I am aware, who consider the words ἀπολιπόντας τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον ought to be referred not to the sin but to the punishment of the wicked angels; and Dr. Cudworth seems here to accord with them for the sake of more easily defending the opinion he has adopted. But the word ἀλλὰ manifestly makes against this opinion, as it shows that the divine writer is proceeding in the explanation of one and the same thing, and that the words which follow are opposed to those which he had said before, or that the same thing is stated by him for the sake of perspicuity in a twofold manner, first *positively* or *affirmatively*, as they say, and afterwards *negatively*. Besides, it is evident that the word ἀπολιπόντας denotes some action of the wicked angels, and not of God himself. But the punishment with which they are visited after the commission of the crime is the act of God and not of the delinquent angels. Others suppose these words to pertain both to the crime and punishment; with whom, if they mean merely that punishment was the natural result of this abandonment of their dwelling-place, I am not disposed to enter into any contention; but if they more than this, they may easily be refuted by the same argument as the others. No one, I imagine, who attentively examines the words themselves, will hesitate to agree with me in my opinion. But as regards the meaning itself of this former member of the sentence, it is easier to show Dr. Cudworth's interpretation to be wrong than to demonstrate the true signification of Jude's words. The learned Doctor considers the phrase μὴ τηρεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν to mean, "Not to keep their lordly power and dominion over the worse and inferior part of the mind, in which the appetites reside, but to obey the turbulent passions." For he supposes the soul of angels, like that of men, to consist of two parts, one rational, the other the seat of the passions and allied and contiguous to a certain body; which precept concerning the soul, as every body knows, belongs to the discipline of the Platonists. But to say nothing of this doctrine of the souls of angels, which most men will consider Dr. Cudworth to have been more bold than he ought in assuming, who does not see that this interpretation is too subtle and far-fetched, and therefore altogether repugnant to the simplicity of St. Jude's discourse. Nor has he either produced or been able to produce a single passage from sacred or profane records in which this phrase, put absolutely, signifies, "to abandon the dominion over the desires and affections of the mind." Any person abounding in ingenuity, and willing to give play to it in expounding the sayings of sacred writ, will, with very little trouble, find whatever he pleases in them; but reason forbids that we should attach to the words of the divine writers a sense foreign to their common and received meanings, unless we are supported by usage and the examples of approved authors. Still less admissible is his explication of the following words, wherein he makes οἰκητήριον signify the *celestial body* of angels; so as to give this sense, "The angels lost or rather corrupted their ethereal body by crime. The learned Doctor does not prove that οἰκητήριον ἴδιον is any where used of such a celestial body. For the passage quoted by him from St. Paul, who, 2 Cor. v. 2. calls the body which the saints expect τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, "our house which is from heaven," is entirely foreign to the purpose. There is a great difference between τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον and τὸ οἰκητήριον τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. And who, I should like to know, will tolerate this argumentation: "St. Paul calls the body which will be restored to the saints after the resurrection a *celestial habitation*; therefore the proper habitation of angels spoken of by St. Jude is their natural body in which they are always clothed." I am aware that our body is sometimes figuratively denominated our house, or our soul's house, but it would be wrong to conclude from hence that whenever the word οἰκητήριον, or house, is figu-

would endanger the rendering of other points of our religion uncertain also; but to say, that incorporeal substances, ununited to bodies, can be tormented with fire, is, as much as in us lieth,

ratively attributed to any one, it signifies his body. Again, the word ἀπολείπω, which St. Jude makes use of, is opposed to this opinion. The common meaning of this word is "to abandon," or "leave a thing, to lay it aside," or "put it away" But according to Dr. Cudworth, the celestial body which the devils have by nature was not cast off by them after their transgression, but was merely polluted and contaminated by various impurities, or merely lost its lightness and splendour. How, therefore, could the divine writer affirm that the wicked angels left or abandoned this body? Lastly, this loss of the celestial habitation which the angels underwent when they sinned, is regarded by Dr. Cudworth as a punishment inflicted by God. But we have already shown that the words of St. Jude in question are not speaking of what God did, but what the angels committed. Although if the passage were even understood in Dr. Cudworth's sense, this loss would not properly be a punishment. A punishment, strictly speaking, is an evil inflicted by one having the right of dominion upon another who has disobeyed his laws. But this corruption or dereliction of the celestial body would not be a punishment inflicted by divine omnipotence upon the angels for their transgression, but a calamity naturally resulting from it. For the learned Doctor supposes, with the Platonists, that the body is affected in the same way as the soul which resides in it. Consequently, when the souls of the angels were viciously inclined, and no longer controlled their desires, the necessary result was that their body was corrupted, and instead of light and ethereal became solid, heavy and incrassated; and this change having taken place, they naturally fell from the supreme and happy regions of heaven into the lower air, and their fixed there perpetual abode. According to this, therefore, it was not divine justice that punished the transgression of the angels, but they brought the entire evil upon themselves, contrary to God's will, as drunken and libidinous men are wont to bring various diseases upon themselves by their vices. Let all candid and liberal judges say whether this opinion is in accordance with the words of St. Jude, who propounds this example of the angels for the purpose of showing the severity of the Supreme and the rigour of avenging justice.

III. For my part, I am satisfied that St. Jude's words are less obscure and abstruse than many suppose; and although I do not wish to obtrude my opinion upon any one as unquestionably true, still I doubt not but that it will recommend itself to many persons by its simplicity. I have already observed above, that the sacred writer, in speaking of the angels' transgression, describes one and the same thing in a twofold manner; from which it follows that these two phrases, "not to keep their principality," and "to leave their proper habitation," correspond to each other, and are nearly equivalent in meaning. That μὴ τηρεῖν and ἀπολιπεῖν do not differ in signification will, I imagine, be admitted by every one; it remains therefore for us to inquire respecting the words ἀρχὴ and οἰκητήριον. The meaning of ἀρχὴ in this passage I consider to be *office, dignity*. The word often occurs in this sense in the Septuagint version, which I have long considered to be of more use towards a right understanding of the books of the Old and New Testaments than almost all the Greek writers put together. To give one example, we find in it the following words respecting Pharaoh's butler, who was restored to his former office, Gen. xl. 21.: Καὶ ἀποκατέστησε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ, which ought to be translated thus: "And restored him to his former office or dignity." The same I consider to be the meaning of the word οἰκητήριον in this passage. For as the Latins put *locus, statio*, and *provincia* for the office and dignity held by any one, so οἰκητήριον in my opinion here figuratively denotes the same thing. I cannot indeed at present recollect a passage of a Greek writer where the noun οἰκία or οἰκητήριον is employed in this sense, nor have I leisure sufficient to seek for passages of the kind, but as the meaning is neither altogether unusual nor absurd in itself, and as it moreover accords sufficiently well with the subject, I do not hesitate to consider this as a probable interpretation, leaving to others, however, the full liberty of thinking otherwise if they like. Wherefore, I hold this to be the plain and simple sense of St. Jude's words: "The angels did not keep the office and dignity in which they had been placed by God, but coveting greater and more important offices they rashly abandoned the station assigned to them." Should any one, however, prefer understanding the word οἰκητήριον in a proper sense and of a certain

to expose Christianity and the Scripture, to the scorn and contempt of all philosophers and philosophic wits. Wherefore Psellus lays no small stress upon this place:* Εἰμὶ μὲν παρὰ τῶν

place and abode which the wicked angels abandoned, I have no great objections to offer, as it will not materially interfere with the interpretation I have put upon the passage. For those who preside over a certain office or department are also usually assigned a certain abode and habitation.

IV. Of the succeeding words wherein the punishment of the wicked angels is described, these only: δεσμοῖς ἀϊδίοις ὑπὸ ζόφον τετήρηκεν, require explanation. Dr. Cudworth suppose them to contain this meaning: "The devils forasmuch as by their transgression they made for themselves another heaven, and more solid body in lieu of the heavenly and ethereal one, are therefore chained and fettered down by the weight and bulk of this body in this atmosphere of ours or lowest region of caliginous air, so as to be unable to reascend to the bright ethereal regions." But this interpretation we have already in a great measure overthrown, by making it plain that οἰκητήριον cannot possibly denote the heavenly body of angels in this passage of St. Jude. Neither is it in accordance with the words themselves; as he expressly declares that the wicked angels are detained in darkness by the power of God and not by the weight and inertness of the body which they wear. If the learned Doctor's opinion were correct, the angels would have fettered and bound themselves in everlasting chains; but both here and 2 Pet. ii. 4. this work is attributed to divine justice. The *everlasting chains* in which St. Jude tells us the wicked angels are bound, as well as the σειραὶ ζόφου spoken of by St. Peter, 2 Pet. ii. 4. are undoubtedly figurative chains. The meaning of the divine writers is, that those wretched beings are detained by the divine power in that dreadful place, just as though they had been bound in chains, so that they are utterly unable to depart thence unless God permits. Compare Luke xvi. 26. And a lucid passage of Lucian's now occurs to me, admirably corroborative of this opinion, in his book De Luctu, p. 300. tom. 2. opp. where he thus speaks of souls sent down to the realms of Pluto: Καταδεξάμενον δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ παραλαβόντα, κατέχειν δεσμοῖς ἀφύκτοις, "having taken and received the souls, he confines them in chains not to be escaped from." And what he wishes to be understood by these chains he immediately explains in these words: Οὐδενὶ τὸ παράπαν τῆς ἀνόδου ὑφιέμενον, πλὴν ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ αἰῶνος πάνυ ὀλίγων ἐπὶ μεγίσταις αἰτίαις, "permitting no one whatever to return except a very few throughout the whole of time, and that for the gravest reasons." The word ζόφος in like manner I consider to be here used figuratively. For as light is a designation in Scripture for all joy and felicity, so darkness signifies every kind of calamity and misery both in this and in other places. This explication is not a little supported by the fact of St. Peter's joining the noun ζόφος to σειραῖς, and saying that the wicked angels are delivered into the *chains of darkness*. For what are *chains of darkness* but unhappy chains? and what is *being bound in chains of darkness* but to be confined for everlasting in a place replete with all misery?

V. The view here put forth by the learned Doctor respecting Tartarus is the one taken not only by St. Augustine, whom he quotes, and some other ancients, but by some of the moderns also: among whom I mention J. Windet in particular, who in his book On the State of the Dead, published in London in 1663 in 4to. p. 12. gives a very erudite exposition of this opinion. But I cannot be induced to concur with these learned men. For I do not recollect the word τάρταρος being used by any Greek writer of the lowest air: on the contrary, I observe they all call it either generally the subterraneous place in which the dead reside, or that place in particular in which those are tormented who incur the divine displeasure. See Hesiod, Theogon. ver. 720. p. 108. Lucian, De Luctu, tom. 2. opp. p. 299. 300. and others cited by Lamb. Bos in his Diss. de Etymologia Græca, p. 41. Wherefore ταρταρόω, according to the common usage of the Greeks, is nothing more than "to cast or thrust down into hell." That St. Peter used the word in a new and hitherto unheard of sense, seems to me to be wholly incredible. I consider those, therefore, to interpret the divine writer more correctly who suppose him to have said simply that God pre-

* Page 37. [Page 52.]

τοῦ Σωτῆρος λόγων πεπεισμένος ταῦτα, πυρὶ κολασθήσεσθαι φασκόντων τοὺς δαίμονας· ὃ πῶς οἷον παθεῖν ἀσωμάτους ὄντας; τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον ἀμήχανον παθεῖν ὑπὸ σώματος· ἀνάγκη γοῦν σώμασιν αὐτούς τὴν κόλασιν ὑποδέχεσθαι πεφυκόσι πάσχειν, "I am also convinced of this, that demons have bodies, from the words of our Saviour, affirming that they shall be punished with fire: which how could it be were they altogether incorporeal? it being impossible for that which is both itself incorporeal and vitally ununited to any body, to suffer from a body. Wherefore of necessity it must be granted, by us Christians, that devils shall receive punishment of sense and pain hereafter, in bodies capable of suffering.[5]

cipitated the delinquent angels into hell, or thrust them down from heaven into a place, wherever it may be, full of pain and misery. What he observes in passing respecting the use of the word ταρταρόω and the Titans, has been noticed also by others. Apollodorus, Bibliothecæ, lib. 1. cap. 1. sect. 3. p. 3. and cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 4. employs the word καταταρταρόω in speaking of Jupiter hurling the Titans down into Tartarus.

[5] Even this last argument seems to me to be relied upon with more confidence than it deserves by the ancients as well as moderns, who hold the angels to be enveloped in bodies. In the first place, I am at a loss to conceive the reason why they are to be considered as grievously in error, who suppose our Saviour to be theatening the wicked angels not with corporeal and sensible fire, but with mental pains and tortures. This was formerly the opinion of grave and eminent men among the Christian fathers, of whom Dion. Petavius makes mention in his Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 3. lib. 3. de Angelis, cap. 5. p. 103. And not a few of the moderns also, who are wholly removed from all suspicion of pernicious errors, firmly maintain the same doctrine. As our Saviour frequently compares the joys of heaven to a feast, I do not see why it is to be considered dangerous to the divine truth to suppose that he also spoke figuratively of the punishments of hell, and in order to demonstrate more vividly and clearly the dreadful sufferings which wicked angels and men will have to undergo, borrowed an image from the most exquisite of torments inflicted upon human malefactors. For my own part I conceive no greater injury is done to the Christian religion by supposing the fire with which the rich glutton is tormented to be figurative than by regarding the feast, at which Lazarus is said to be present along with Abraham, as an image and emblem of supreme felicity. But even granting the opinion which interprets hell-fire of the torture and misery of the mind to be inadmissible, still this will not much benefit the cause of those who ascribe eternal and natural bodies to angels. For the utmost that can be inferred from these sayings of our Saviour will be this, that the wicked angels alone are clothed in these bodies, and that not always, but only while they are tortured and tormented in hell. They will be no proof therefore that the good as well as bad angels have their respective bodies, nor even that the bodies which the wicked angels possess during their punishment in hell, are natural to them. For there is nothing to hinder those who hold the contrary doctrine from saying that the Supreme Being gives these angels a certain body by way of punishment, to render them susceptible of greater suffering, and to subject them to the action of fire. A notion very similar to this was entertained by Lactantius, who affirms that the souls of wicked men contract a certain dross or contagion in the body, by means of which they can hereafter be tormented and made to feel the force of hell-fire, Institut. Divinar. lib. 7. cap. 20. p. 560. "Forasmuch as the wicked have polluted themselves by evil desires, they bear a sort of intermediate nature between the immortal and mortal, and have a certain imbecility from the contagion of the flesh: to whose desires and lusts the souls being addicted, contract a certain indelible stain and earthy taint: and when this has become thoroughly ingrained in them by length of time, the souls acquire such a nature that although incapable of being wholly extinguished, as being derived from God, they nevertheless become susceptible of torture through the blemish of the body, which is impressed by crimes, and gives the sense of pain." Lastly, to confess the candid

Now if angels in general, that is, all created beings superior to men, be substances incorporeal, or souls vitally united to bodies, though not always the same, but sometimes of one kind,

truth, those persons seem to me to speak somewhat more boldly than the circumscribed nature of our knowledge will warrant, when they deny that a spirit is altogether incapable of being affected by fire. Who can take upon himself to decide that it is beyond the power of God to produce such fire as shall be able to cause pain and torment even to spirits? For my part I own myself much pleased with the modesty and wisdom of those who assume this one thing from our Saviour's words, namely, that the rebellious angels as well as wicked souls will be punished with the most exquisite torments in hell, and on that account lead such a life as may not subject them hereafter to the visitation of the divine avenging justice: but either leave all other questions on the nature of this fire and the infernal punishments altogether untouched or at least handle them with becoming diffidence and caution.

The ancient doctrine of the bodies of genii, which was first entertained by the Platonists, and subsequently by the Jews and principal Christian fathers, after being assailed and apparently altogether demolished by the scholastic doctors in the middle ages, gradually acquired new strength from the period of the reformation. Probably the first to revive it was Michaël Servetus, a man beyond measure addicted to strange and novel opinions; of whose thirty Epistles to John Calvin, subjoined to what he calls the Restitutio Christianismi, the fourth, p. 583. &c. is wholly taken up in the defence of this doctrine. At the commencement of this epistle he thus expresses himself: "You consider this gross heresy in me——that I attribute something visible or perceptible to *spirits and angels*. This gross faith was embraced by the rude disciples of old, and is embraced by true Christians in the present day, although sublime mathematicians and metaphysicians ridicule it." A little afterwards he proceeds in this manner: "The ancient theologians attributed a certain matter susceptible of divine light and a certain substantial body to spirits and angels: and the same is affirmed by St. Basil the Great and St. Augustine himself, of whom you boast as your support and patron. He himself has said De Genesi, that this light of the sun is a substance and a penetrable body. Such is the body of an angel, penetrable from without, a spiritual body, an ethereal substance.——They have their own proper substance, which we shall hereafter sensibly perceive, and would now perceive, if our senses were sufficiently exquisite.——Celestial creatures under the form of angel we call visible, under the form of spirit invisible to us but yet truly visible in themselves. These, with David, we call breaths of air and flames of fire, that is supercelementary, not having flesh and earthy bones, as Christ saith." He then argues that the bodies of angels, like those of men, differ from each other in excellence and agility. "As among men, so among those spirits, some rule over others, and are more excellent, more acute, having more agility, tenuity, and splendour." In the sequel he defends the well-known opinion of Josephus and many others, which supposes demons to have formerly consorted with women, and afterwards to have been hurled down by God into Tartarus along with the giants. As this man had an amazing number of followers, this opinion also was most probably received by many of his contemporaries. In the Romish church itself, as I recollect having noticed before, Thom. Cajetanus and some others contended that bodies are at least to be assigned to evil demons. Nor are there wanting among the professors of the better doctrine men who hold it to be more probable that angels have bodies: out of whom I merely mention Huld. Zanchius, De Operibus sex Dierum, lib. 2. cap. 3. But this doctrine found a much greater number of admirers and patrons in the following century; whose names it would be too tedious to enumerate: and that even in our own time both philosophers and theologians of the highest eminence are favourable to it, is too well known to require being dwelt upon. And yet they have not all been led into it in the same way. Some adopted it out of reverence for the ancient fathers of the Christian church: others were influenced by the principles of the philosophy they were devoted to; while many have no other cause for preferring it to the common opinion than that it seems to be more easy of comprehension to the human intellect. In our own times the learned professor J. Christ. Loërsius wrote a work professedly to prove, that angels have their own bodies, Diss. de Angelorum Corporibus, Duesberg, 1719. in 4to. But he was opposed by the illustrious Steph. Vitus, in his Schediasma, inserted in the Biblioth. Bremens.

and sometimes of another, and never quite separate from all body; it may seem probable from hence, that though there be other incorporeal substances besides the Deity, yet vita incor-

Theol. Philol. tom. 6. par. 3. p. 418. wherein he stoutly and learnedly defends the vulgar opinion. In these two publications we have brought before us with great ingenuity almost every thing that can be suggested in corroboration of the respective opinions: wherefore I fancy I shall do an acceptable service to most of my readers by giving a short digest of the arguments made use of on both sides, and interspersing where I deem it necessary an occasional remark of my own.

The proofs adduced by Loërsius to show that genii as well as men are united to certain bodies, may conveniently be divided into three classes: The first class is borrowed from authorities: the second consists of arguments drawn from philosophy: the third comprises the sayings of holy writ. He assigns the first place to the testimonies and authorities of the Jews and of the ancient fathers of the Christian church, some of whom as is well known, supposed the angels to be wholly corporeal, while others regarded them as compounded of soul and body, sect. 3—5. This constant doctrine of the early Christians was first corrupted, as he supposes, by the idle subtleties of schoolmen, who were led by a blind admiration of Aristotle to consider the angels as perfectly resembling his intelligences. "If the doctrine of the fathers," says he, sect. 6. p. 6. "had been preserved, angels at this day would be held to be endowed with bodies: but it was by degrees neglected and obscured: there followed the times in which——the authority of Aristotle began to prevail, who was received as an authority into the church itself; when the follies and subtleties of the schoolmen rose to the greatest height——who blinded by their admiration of Aristotle followed him as their sole guide and leader: and as he had pronounced the δαίμονες to be simple and abstract intelligences, they were obliged in accordance with him to assert that angels are spirits devoid of all natural body." We have already seen that Dr. Cudworth agrees with Loërsius: and there are not a few others by whom the same conjecture, or, if you please, opinion, is adopted.

What his adversary advances in reply to all this, may in a great measure be easily conjectured. 1. He denies first of all that the authority of the ancient Jews and Christian fathers is such as to warrant our giving credence to them without reason and argument: seeing that these men were credulous and unthinking enough to adopt many of the precepts of the ancient Chaldeans and Platonists without exercising the slightest judgment of their own. 2. A considerable number, he observes, of the ancient fathers, who are cited by Loërsius as favourable to himself, held angels to be wholly corporeal rather than compounded of body and soul, and therefore are of very little weight towards confirming his opinion, sect. 11. p. 442. 3. He contends that it is altogether wrong to say that the opinion of those who divest angels of all corporeity was derived from the philosophy of Aristotle: that there were patrons of this doctrine before Aristotle's discipline was received among Christians: nay that there were men who asserted angels to be incorporeal before Aristotle existed, sect. 12. p. 446. in short, that Aristotle himself is more favourable to those who attribute than to those who deny bodies to angels: for his intelligences live united to the celestial orbs, as to their proper bodies, and are altogether inseparable from them: see his Metaphys. lib. 5. cap. 8. lib. 14. cap. 8. To whom may be added Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. 4. Lastly, he produces a long array of those of the ancient fathers, who supposed angels to be simple spirits and wholly abstracted from all body: for he considers this to have been the opinion of Clemens Alexandrinus, Hippolytus, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Gregorius Nazianzenus, Methodius, Eusebius, Lactantius, Theodoret, and many others, whose names it is at present unnecessary to enumerate, sect. 9. p. 437. &c.

Most part of this I approve of, as well and truly observed; neither do I altogether reject what he says respecting the intelligences of Aristotle, from which many suppose the schoolmen's notion of angels to be derived. As I have already declared before, I consider the precepts of the Peripatetic philosophy to have afforded not a little assistance to those who wished to abrogate the ancient doctrine respecting the bodies of angels: but still there is a great difference between Aristotle's intelligences and angels as they are represented by modern theologians. The learned writer's assertion however, that not a few of the ancient fathers entirely abstracted angels from all body, as we do at the present day, I can hardly believe to be true. Before him Gerh. Jo.

porea, "a life perfectly incorporeal," in the forementioned Origenic sense, or sine corporeæ adjectionis societate vivere, "to live altogether without the society of any corporeal adjection,"

Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 17. Geverh. Elmenhorstius, Notæ ad Gennadum Massiliensem, cap. 12. p. 128. and especially Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theol. tom. 3. lib. 1. de Angelis, cap. 3. p. 7. have already named many fathers who, as they suppose, held angels to be wholly incorporeal. But on attentively examining all these passages, I do not find one so certain and clear as to put it beyond controversy that its author entirely deprived them of all body: wherefore I almost come to the conclusion, that in the first ages of Christianity there was hardly one who did so. The principal passages usually brought forward as proofs of angels being regarded as mere spirits by some of the ancient fathers, may be conveniently distributed into three classes. Some said that angels are nothing but πνεύματα, or "spirits," and that πνεῦμα is ἄϋλος or destitute of matter: others called them ἀσώματοι or "incorporeal:" lastly, others termed them νόες, that is, "minds," and νοητοὶ and νοεροὶ, "intelligible" and "intelligent." But if I am not altogether mistaken, these words possess much less weight than learned men suppose, towards confirming the opinion adopted by them.

I. In the first place, if the word πνεῦμα were used by the ancients in the sense in which it is usually understood at the present day, the question would be completely settled, and those who called the angels πνεύματα would unquestionably be to be regarded as having divested them of all body. But I have already more than once remarked, that this word in ancient authors frequently means not what we call *spirit*, but a thin, subtle nature resembling a shadow rather than body, and yet consisting of a certain matter. [Origen, Περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. 1. cap. 1. sect. 1. p. 49. tom. 1. opp. expressly declares *spirit* to be *body*. Add sect. 2. p. 50.] Neither is it of any moment in this question, that others call πνεῦμα or "spirit," ἄϋλος or "devoid of matter." For by the word ὕλη the ancients understand the grosser matter of which visible bodies consist: to which they are every where accustomed to oppose another of a nobler and better nature. Wherefore those who call spirits ἄϋλοι mean merely that they are destitute of such matter as the bodies of ourselves and other animals are composed of. Besides, if it were certain that they attached the same signification to the word πνεῦμα as it usually bears at the present day, it still would remain a question, whether or not those who call angels spirits applied this name to them in reference to their other and more excellent part, namely the soul. Men, who consist of two natures, body and soul, are frequently named from one of them, either ψυχαὶ or σώματα, and yet no one would conclude from this, that they are either mere spirits or mere bodies. Nor are those of the ancients who suppose the angels to be compounded of soul and body, accustomed to speak differently of them, as might easily be proved even from various passages of St. Augustine alone. For although he for the most part inclines to the side of those who assign a twofold nature to angels, nevertheless he is accustomed sometimes to call them simply spirits, and sometimes again *corporeal* from their other nature. I will illustrate what I say by the example of Clemens Alexandrinus, who is ranked by Vitus and others in the number of those who divested angels of all corporeity. [Compare Beausobre, Hist. du Manich. Not. p. 484.] This Clemens in many parts of his works called angels πνεύματα or spirits, nor could he do otherwise, as they are styled so in scripture: but the way in which he defined spirit we learn from Jo. Veccus, in his book, De Processione Spiritus Sancti in Leon. Allatius' Græcia Orthodoxa tom. 1. p. 248. who gives this definition of spirit: Πνεῦμα μέν ἐστι λεπτὴ καὶ ἄϋλος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ἐκπορευτικὴ ὕπαρξις, "Spirit is a most subtle substance devoid of all matter and form." Who that reads this would not suppose Clemens to be altogether averse to the doctrine of those who invest the angels with body? And yet the same Clemens, Pædagog. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 122. tells us that the good angels feed upon a certain food, namely manna, which was formerly given from heaven to the Jews in the desert, and in another passage, Stromat. lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 538. he assigns as the reason of the wicked angels being turned out of heaven, that they had given themselves up to lusts and had consorted with women. For who can either eat or have illicit intercourse with women without possessing body? Clemens therefore either supposed the angels to be wholly corporeal, although he had no doubt of their being πνεύματα, or at least held them to be associated with body. Wherefore if learned men will take my advice on this question, they will cease to appeal to those passages in which angels are called πνεύματα and λεπτοὶ and ἄϋλοι.

is a privilege properly belonging to the holy Trinity only; and consequently therefore, that human souls, when by death they are divested of these gross earthly bodies, they do not then live

II. Again, those who called the angels "incorporeal" and *ἀσώματοι*, can with still much less reason be said to have supposed them to be divested of all body. For as I have already shown above, it is manifest from innumerable passages of the ancients, that they call that *ἀσώματον* and "incorporeal," which is destitute of solid and concrete matter, nor are these names employed by them in an absolute but only in a comparative sense, unless the discourse be of God. [This is clearly inculcated by Origen, Præf. *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, sect. 8. p. 49. tom. 1. opp.] Which I shall again exemplify by a passage bearing upon the present question. Jo. Damascenus, the father of the Greek schoolmen, is ranked by most men among those who held angels to be without body. They are led to do so by the following passage, occurring in his De Orthodoxa Fide, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 155. &c. tom. 1. opp. *Ἄγγελος τοίνυν ἐστὶν οὐσία νοερὰ, ἀεὶ κινητὸς——ἀσώματος*, "An angel is an intelligent substance, in perpetual motion——devoid of body." The erudite Mich. Lequienius, who has published an accurate and neat edition of Damascenus, in a note subjoined to this passage, considers it to be a clear evidence that the author entertained more correct views than those who hold angels to be either wholly corporeal or united to bodies. And I would willingly concur in this opinion myself, if Damascenus had left nothing else on record respecting the nature of angels besides these words. But I am restrained by what follows a little after: *Ἀσώματος δὲ λέγεται, καὶ ἄϋλος, ὅσον παρ' ἡμᾶς. Πᾶν γὰρ συγκρινόμενον πρὸς Θεὸν, τὸν μόνον ἀσύγκριτον, παχύ τε καὶ ὑλικὸν εὑρίσκεται, μόνον γὰρ ὄντως ἄϋλον τὸ Θεῖον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀσώματον*, "But it is called incorporeal and immaterial, in reference to ourselves. For in comparison with God, who alone is uncompounded, every thing is found to be compound, and gross, and material; the divine nature alone being immaterial and incorporeal." Who does not perceive from this that Damascenus by no means supposed the angels to be perfectly simple and divested of all body, but called them incorporeal comparatively only and in respect to mankind? But he declares his opinion more explicitly even below, cap. 12. p. 179. which passage of his I shall not scruple to transcribe, the more clearly to show that the words and phrases of ancient writers are not to be estimated according to our own notions, and that those who think proper to avail themselves of the authority of the fathers, ought first of all to make themselves acquainted with their phraseology. Damascenus distinguishes *ἀσώματα, ἀόρατα*, and *ἀσχημάτιστα*, "incorporeal, invisible, and formless things," into those which are such *κατ' οὐσίαν*, "by their own essence," and those *κατὰ χάριν*, "according to grace;" as also into those which are so called *φύσει*, "by their own nature," and those *πρὸς τὴν τῆς ὕλης παχύτητα*, "compared with the crassitude of matter." He then goes on as follows; *Ἐπὶ Θεοῦ μὲν οὖν φύσει· ἐπὶ δὲ ἀγγέλων καὶ δαιμόνων καὶ ψυχῶν χάριτι, καὶ ΩΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΥΛΗΣ ΠΑΧΥΤΗΤΑ, λέγεται ἀσώματον*, "To be incorporeal therefore belongs to God by nature; but to angels and demons and souls according to grace, and *in respect to the crassitude of matter.*" Consequently, according to Damascenus' doctrine, the angels consist of matter, but of such as is far more subtle than this gross and palpable matter of ours.

III. Those ancient fathers seem to come nearest to the doctrine of angels being entirely without bodies, who term the angels *νόες*, "minds," and *νοεροὶ* and *νοητοὶ*: as is done by Dionysius the Areopagite and many others whose sayings are collected by Petavius. For my own part, however, I would not place much confidence even in these passages. Not to speak of other things, it ought to be seen first of all whether in calling the angels *νόες* they meant to express the whole of their nature or borrowed this word only from their better and more excellent part. For we can also call a man *νοῦς* or mind, from mind or reason being his nobler part, although nobody doubts that he is at the same time endowed with body. Gregorius Nazianzenus is among those who style the angels *νόες*. See Orat. 35. p. 560. and Carm. de Virginit. p. 43. tom 1. opp. But in the former of the passages here alluded to he himself shows that he does not mean this word to be taken in a sense to signify a nature altogether devoid of body. For he openly acknowledges his ignorance, whether angels are incorporeal or not, although in a certain sense they may be called *νοεραὶ δυνάμεις*, and *νόες*: *πλὴν ἡμῖν γε ἀσώματος ἔστω, ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα*, "but to us at least let them be incorporeal,

and act completely, without the conjunction of any body, and so continue till the resurrection or day of judgment; this being a privilege, which not so much as the angels themselves, and

or as nearly so as possible." He repeats the same doctrine more clearly, Orat. 38. p. 617. Nay in another passage he very frankly declares it to be more probable in his opinion that nothing is simple and devoid of all body except God. Thus having said that men are compounded, Orat. 37. p. 601. he subjoins as follows: Οὐκ οἶδα δὲ, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἄγγελοι καὶ πᾶσα φύσις ἡ ἄνω καὶ μετὰ τὴν τριάδα· κἂν ἁπλοί τινες ὦσι καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν παγιώτεροι, "But I do not know whether the same may not be said of the angels and every celestial nature except the Trinity: although in other respects they are endowed with a certain simple nature, and are more firmly constituted for good." In these words we may perceive Nazianzenus is disposed to concur with those who hold nothing to be simple and open but God, and nevertheless asserts the angels to be in a certain respect simple: which evidently shows, how very uncertain those ancient fathers who reckon simplicity among the properties of angels, are as evidences in this question. I come now to the words νοερὸς and νοητὸς, made use of by many of the ancients in describing the nature of angels, which they frequently term φύσεις or δυνάμεις νοεραὶ and νοηταί. The meanings of these words in the Platonists are various and uncertain: but the most common is that which Maximus in his Scholia ad cap 9. Dionysii Areopagitæ De Divinis Nominibus, p. 818. tom. 1. opp. Dionysii, has expressed in these words: Ἰστέον, ὅτι νοητὸν μὲν ἐστι τὸ τῇ αἰσθήσει οὐχ ὑποπίπτον, οὔτε τὸ νοερὸν ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ——νοερὸν δὲ τὸ ἁπλᾶς καὶ ἀπολύτους ἔχον τὰς νοήσεις, ὡς ἄγγελοι, "Be it known, that the intelligible is that which does not fall under the senses, nor has intelligence in itself——but the intelligent, that which has simple and free intellections in itself, as the angels." Therefore when the angels are called νοητοὶ, it means that they are natures not falling under the senses, and perceptible to the mind alone; and when they are termed νοεροὶ, that they do not understand and know like ourselves, who perceive and comprehend objects by the help of the senses, but in a different manner, simply, freely, and without matter. But neither of these names seems to me to be such that he who calls angels either by one or the other of them is to be considered as having divested them of all body. That which does not fall under the senses and is cognizable only to the mind and thought is not necessarily on that account to be considered as devoid of body. And most of those who hold the angels to be either wholly corporeal or at least invested with body, at the same time suppose their bodies to be of such tenuity that they escape our senses by their very nature. I will admit it to follow from the other name, that those who applied it to angels, denied to them the possession of senses and members like our own: but I deny that it proves them to have deprived these celestial beings of all body also. For it is possible for that which is without the senses and members of grosser matter to be, as Cicero says, De Finib. Bonor. et Malor. lib. 4. cap. 14. p. 2483. tom. 8. opp. in aliquo tamen genere corporis, "in some kind of body nevertheless," and to consist of a certain sort of matter far different from that which we know. What man conversant with the things and opinions of antiquity is not aware that some of the most eminent of the ancient philosophers, although they discard from the soul the faculty of sensation and deny that it possesses any thing in common with our body, suppose it nevertheless to be compounded of a certain matter? These maintain that the soul when separated from the body is νοερὸς, that is, perceives and knows without the aid of the senses, and yet is in a certain measure corporeal. Besides the ancients themselves who call angels δυνάμεις νοεραὶ and νοητοὶ, speak of them in such terms as must convince every intelligent person that they did not regard them as perfectly simple natures. Damascenus, as we have already shown, declares the angel to be an οὐσία νοερὰ, and yet does not hesitate to affirm that it is exempt from body, not in itself but in reference to men only. To him add Joannes Thessalonicensis, whose words are particularly explicit, Acta Concilii Nicæni, 2. tom. 4. Concilior. p. 293. 294. ΝΟΕΡΟΥΣ μὲν αὐτοὺς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, οὐ μὲν ἀσωμάτους πάντη καὶ ἀοράτους, "The catholic church acknowledges them to be intelligible, but yet not wholly incorporeal and invisible." It is unnecessary to add more authors. Wherefore without wishing to detract from the learning and erudition of those great and eminent men who suppose that a considerable number of the earliest Christian fathers held angels to be mere spirits, I cannot but frankly confess my conviction, that it is impos-

therefore no created finite being, is capable of; the imperfection of whose nature necessarily requires the conjunction of some body with them, to make them up complete: without which, it

sible to produce a single one during the first four centuries, who openly professed this doctrine.

"I come now to the second class of arguments, by which the erudite Loërsius fancied he would be able to prove to the satisfaction of every one, that angels are invested with body: this is the philosophic. As one of the principles of the entire demonstration he lays it down, sect. 7. p. 7. that soul and body are two things, totally distinct from and opposed to each other; that the nature of the soul is perfected by cogitation alone, but that of the body by extension; from which he afterwards concludes, "that there can be no communication between body and mind in themselves; that no body can be moved by finite mind through any power of its own; and that no mind, inasmuch as it has no surface, can be affected by body." This being established he proceeds, sect. 8. p. 9. to the end the Deity may have had in view in creating his works, which he supposes to have been simply "that he might manifest himself and all his perfections and glory in the most illustrious manner, that is, might show himself to be glorious and wonderful." Upon this end he discourses at much length and with great elegance and ingenuity, principally for the purpose of proving that such a motive, so far from being repugnant to the divine nature, is entirely in accordance with it; he next insists upon its being evident from this end, "that it behoved God to create not minds alone, but minds united to body:" which he undertakes to prove more clearly in the sequel. God, says the learned writer, is of such infinite power, that he could have displayed and made known his glory in minds alone, without all corporeal things. But this he was unwilling to do, as the thing itself declares. For he created this corporeal universe, and revealed his majesty and glory in it in the most wonderful manner. Therefore he wishes to be known from and praised for his works, sect. 9. p. 11—13. Hence to obtain this end it was necessary to create minds, "because bodies alone neither know nor comprehend what God wishes to be known; which minds should be adapted both by their own nature and by all the faculties they are endowed with for the contemplation and celebration of the glory of God," sect. 10. p. 13. But for the same reason those minds were necessarily to be united with body. For if they had existed alone without body, the whole theatre of divine glory which we behold would have been useless; since minds, alone and ununited to body, can neither see, nor feel, nor move things consisting of matter, nor be affected by them; also without body they are unable to enjoy the society and friendship of other minds. But who will deny it to be within the province of angels to know, celebrate, and proclaim the majesty of God? Whereas, if they had been destitute of body, "this vast and magnificent theatre of the divine glory would have been built in vain as regards the angels, who would have had no share in it, as they neither could have sustained the part of actors nor spectators," sect. 11. p. 15—17. This constitutes the first argument, as it were, of the learned writer; which, although stated somewhat differently and circuitously by himself, and adorned with much elegant colouring, may nevertheless be comprehended in a few words. The substance of the whole demonstration is as follows: Whatever natures were created to know and understand the glory and majesty of the supreme Being from his works, must necessarily be endowed with body; for mind alone neither feels, nor sees, nor knows any thing corporeal; but angels were created by God for the purpose of being witnesses and spectators of all his glory; therefore we are to suppose that angels partake of body.

It is evident from this argument, that the whole disputation is reduced to this one question: whether mind, alone and having no body associated with it, can neither perceive, nor feel, nor affect corporeal things. The learned writer who contends that angels are united with bodies, takes this for granted; and in doing so I am inclined to think he assumes more than he has a right to do. [The same was assumed by the Epicureans, according to Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2897. &c. and cap. 13. 2899.] He who maintains that minds alone are incapable of seeing, feeling, or affecting material things, ought to possess an accurate knowledge of minds, and to be thoroughly acquainted with their entire nature. For how will it be possible for us to determine what any thing can or cannot do, unless we perfectly comprehend its entire nature and character? But for my part I very much doubt whether any mortal

is inconceivable, how they should either have sense or imagination.. And thus doth Origen, consentaneously to his own principles, conclude:* Ἡ τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει ἀσώματος καὶ ἀόρατος

can with justice arrogate to himself any such knowledge. We know certain properties and affections of our own minds, but their interior nature has not been disclosed to us either by reason or divine revelation; which clearly shows us in what estimation we ought to hold this argument, so greatly relied upon by the learned writer. But conceding it to be the case, as he supposes, that mere spirit is altogether incapable of perceiving and knowing any thing corporeal, even then he will not be able to carry his point. He doubtless will admit that the glory and majesty of the Creator may be understood from the clear and perspicuous notions and forms of created things, as well as from the contemplation of the same by the eyes and senses. A man born blind is enabled, by the instruction of others in possession of their eyesight, to form in his mind clear and evident conceptions and images of this universe of things, and to draw from them matter of praise to God as solid as that which others derive from the contemplation of the objects themselves. Why therefore may we not say that God imprinted clear and distinct forms and images of his works upon the minds of his angels, so that although unable to see the world with eyes, they nevertheless have it ever present to their mind and thoughts? In that case will they be disqualified by their want of body for the comprehension of the majesty of their supreme Creator and Parent, and the contemplation of his perfection? No one, I imagine, will assert as much. But ceasing all disputation, let us come rather to what the illustrious Vitus brings forward in refutation of this argument. The purpose of this note does not require us to repeat all that he has said upon the point. I shall therefore omit his remarks upon the difference between mind and body, upon the end which the Deity proposed to himself in creating this world, and upon other matters connected therewith, as not altogether relevant to the present question; and shall confine myself to that portion more immediately bearing upon the argument itself. The whole controversy, says he, turns upon this, "Whether bodies can become known to angels, although they are themselves destitute of body." But my opponent founds the whole of his argumentation upon this principle: That owing to the great difference between mind and body, there can be no communication between them, and body cannot be moved by a finite mind by virtue of its own proper power; and on the other hand, mind cannot be affected by body. This is of itself sufficient to demolish the whole of his demonstration. For it follows thence, that it is utterly impossible either for mind to act upon body or body upon mind; and if this be true, it is also unquestionable, that minds cannot derive from body any knowledge of other bodies or any notions and images of things, and that all our knowledge of bodies is to be ascribed solely to God himself. The question therefore is, How does God impart a knowledge of bodies to souls and angels? sect. 14. p. 455—457. Four or five modes suggest themselves, which for the sake of brevity I now pass over. But my opponent denies this to be possible without the intervention of a body of their own. For my part, I consider this to be both absurd in itself and repugnant to his own principles. He himself perceives that bodies and minds are of such an opposite nature as to admit of no communication between them. Therefore all communication of the kind, according to his opinion, ought to be referred solely to the omnipotence of the divine will, and body of itself therefore contributes nothing towards our knowledge. But to the infinite power it will be as easy a task to produce in us the notions of bodies by some other means as by a certain proper body. Indeed I should prefer as more worthy of God, who always follows the most simple course, the doctrine of those who explain the communication between body and mind from the laws of a *preordained harmony*, and affirm that they are so linked together by the divine power, that on the body being moved or affected in a certain way certain corresponding notions arise also in the mind. But if such be the case, this conjunction of our mind with body seems to conduce to the variety and adornment of the world rather than to the knowledge of external bodies. Be this as it may, I consider it to be highly reprehensible in my adversary to suppose that God is unable to produce impressions on angels in any other

* Cont. Cels. lib. 7. p. 353.

ψυχὴ, ἐν παντὶ σωματικῷ τόπῳ τυγχάνουσα, δέεται σώματος οἰκείου τῇ φύσει τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου· ὅπερ ὅπου μὲν φορεῖ, ἀπεκδυσαμένη πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, πέρισσον δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὰ

way than that in which they are produced in ourselves. It is also derogatory to the Deity to assert that the notions of our minds cannot be communicated to other minds, except through the medium of body. "This seems to me to be the same as supposing that bodies cannot move other bodies except by the intervention of certain finite minds. Bodies by their own nature are as incapable of moving other bodies, as pure minds are of acting upon other minds. By the same rule, therefore, that God has laid down laws by which one body can move another, so was he able to prescribe other laws by which pure minds can communicate their own ideas, and the determinations of the will to one another." This is a brief summary of the somewhat copious argumentation of Vitus, sect. 16. 17. p. 455—464. I have omitted nothing that is at all illustrative of the question at issue. Return we now to Loërsius.

He pursues his argument thus, sect. 12. p. 17. Angels are principal actors in this theatre of God which we call the world. They are his perpetual ambassadors, and execute all his behests, now scattering and discomfiting his enemies, now affording support and assistance to the good. And how can they perform all this if they be mere spirits entirely destitute of body, and unable to do any thing but think? The force of the argument is self-evident: Those who perform things that cannot be done without the intervention of body, must necessarily be partakers of body: the angels are often commissioned to perform and do perform such things: therefore, &c. To this argument Vitus replies, sect. 18. p. 464: "that it is possible for a certain connexion to have been established by God between angels and external bodies, *or such a preordained harmony as exists between soul and body*, that both angels can act upon bodies, and bodies upon angels." And such a connexion being admitted, the angels will not only be able to think, but to act and move also, and may as justly be said to be the causes of all the motions they seem to produce, as our minds are of those which they excite in our bodies. I am afraid this answer will appear to many to be somewhat too obscure; I shall therefore add a few words to it in explanation. The whole gist of the argument he is opposing, lies in this precept: That which is pure spirit and destitute of body, cannot excite, destroy, or in any other way affect other bodies. I should ask first of all how learned men ascertained the truth of this precept. If I am not altogether mistaken, before we can determine that spirit is incapable of exciting and affecting other bodies except through the medium of body, we ought to be thoroughly acquainted with the nature of spirit. For my part, I am by no means the man to suppose that I possess so accurate a knowledge of spirits; let others see whether they can say more of themselves. But I dismiss all this, and freely assert that pure spirit is capable of exciting other bodies even without the intervention of body, and that this is evidenced both in the case of God and of our own souls. No wise man will deny the Deity to be most simple minded, and yet it is beyond all controversy that all motion of bodies proceeds from him. But some will tell us, perhaps, that there is a great difference between God and an angel, and that what is applicable to the former, ought by no means to be ascribed to the latter. Certainly, the difference between God and the angels is as great as that between finite and infinite; but this has nothing to do with the present question. The point at issue is simply whether or not simple spirit can excite body. And how great soever may be the disparity between God and the angels, which I acknowledge to be infinite, still, it is always manifest from the example of the supreme Being, that this does not belong to the class of things which are incompatible and impossible. For if the proposition, "spirit moves body," were so self-repugnant that one notion did away with the other, not even the Deity himself would be able to move bodies, as almost all philosophers deny that he can perform what are termed *contradictories*. But if it be possible for naked spirit to move bodies, who is to decide positively that angels are unable to do the same? Perhaps some one not contented with this, will again appeal to the infinity of God and the finitude of angels; but I ask of him accurately to define to me the limits where the power of a finite spirit begins, and where it ends: what comes within the compass of its capabilities, and on the other hand, what surpasses them: and if he is unable to do this, he will pardon me if I consider all that he says to have little bearing upon the matter. The example borrowed from the human soul is of itself sufficient to determine this question. I am

δεύτερα· ὅπου δὲ ἐπενδυσαμένη ᾧ πρότερον εἶχε, δεομένῳ κρείττονος ἐνδύματος εἰς τοὺς καθαρωτέρους καὶ αἰθερίους καὶ οὐρανίους τόπους, "Our soul, which in its own nature is incorporeal and

aware that philosophers are much divided in opinion when they come to discuss the connexion of body and soul, and attempt to explain how it happens that certain motions of the body are immediately consequent upon certain thoughts and motions of the soul. But as far as regards our present subject, I hold it not to be of the slightest moment which of these opinions is preferred to the others. For whatever may be the way in which body is caused to move at the will and pleasure of the soul, this one thing is at least clear from thence, that it is possible for bodies to be moved and turned at the impulse of incorporeal spirit. Should any one attempt to elude this argument by adopting the doctrine of the Platonists, who assert that souls are clothed in certain subtle vehicles or bodies, and are enabled by the intervention of these vehicles, to act upon the solid and concrete body we are invested with, he still will not get rid of the difficulty. For we shall merely ascend a little higher and again ask him, by what means a soul which is destitute of body can incite and move this vehicle as they call it. Whatever reply he may return to this question, it will admit of being made use of for the refutation of those who maintain that simple spirit is utterly incapable of affecting body. I might, if so disposed, go a little farther even, and concede what learned men assume, that no body can be affected except by body. For granting this, it still might become a matter of question whether it is altogether absurd to suppose that an angel, on being commissioned to perform certain actions which require a body, either assumes a certain body to himself, or receives one from God. But I think sufficient has been said to shake the confidence of those who accuse others of gross and childish error for holding angels to be devoid of bodies.

I now produce the third argument of Loërsius. If angels were minds destitute of all body, they would not be completely happy and perfect. For they would be deaf, blind, and dumb, and wholly incapable of being affected by other things: since without body, no one sees, hears, speaks, or feels. This he illustrates by the example of happy souls living in heaven, which, while they are without body, are supposed to be very far from perfection and felicity, sect. 13. p. 15—23. His opponent returns a twofold answer, sect. 19. p. 566. First: Those only are called blind, dumb, or deaf, to whom it is natural to see, speak, and hear; but this is not natural to angels; therefore they cannot properly be called blind, dumb, or deaf. Secondly: The less the angels require the aid of the senses, the more nearly they approach the perfection of divine knowledge: it is not a proof of infirmity but of supreme power in God, that they neither hear, nor see, nor speak. To this I shall add nothing, as I have not only touched upon the subject above, but also have treated of this question: whether souls divested of body are less happy. That the supreme Being, who is certainly devoid of all body, nevertheless perceives, hears, and sees, is a proof of its being possible for simple spirit to see, hear, and perceive without body. And this is sufficient for the overthrow of this argument.

After putting forth these arguments, the learned writer, sect. 14. p. 23. begins a long disputation against those who assert a certain bond of connexion between the mind of angels and external things, by virtue of which all those things are performed which cannot otherwise take place without body. He himself is satisfied that it is impossible to imagine any connexion of the kind, either *universal* or *particular*, without at the same time being involved in the most foolish and absurd opinions. But all this, ingenious though it be, and advanced with no little confidence, falls to the ground of itself, when the reasoning and arguments upon which his opinion rests are overthrown, and may also be easily confuted from what has already been brought forward on the subject. Wherefore, that I may not spin out this note to too great a length, I recommend the curious about these matters to consult the learned author himself, and to compare his remarks with the replies of Vitus, sect. 20. 21. p. 469—477.

111. There now remain the passages of sacred writ, which the erudite Loërsius considers to be in support and confirmation of his opinion. First of all he cites those passages, Psalm ciii. 20. 2 Thess. i. 7. wherein either the angels are described as powerful and mighty heroes, or their great achievements recorded, sect. 16. p. 33. He then appeals to the celebrated saying of our Saviour, in which he declares that those who rise again shall be like the angels, Luke xx. 34. &c. Compare Matt. xxii. 24.

invisible, in whatsoever corporeal place it existeth, doth always stand in need of a body, suitable to the nature of that place respectively: which body it sometimes beareth, having put off that, which before was necessary, but is now superfluous for the following state; and sometimes again putting on something to what before it had, now standing in need of some better clothing, to fit it for those more pure, ethereal, and heavenly places." But, in what there follows, we conceive that Origen's sense having not been rightly understood, his words have been altered and perverted; and that the whole place ought to be read thus: Καὶ ἐνεδύσατο μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῇδε γένεσιν ἐρχομένη τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ ὑστέρᾳ τῆς κυούσης, ἕως ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ· ἐνεδύσατο δὲ ὑπ' ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ἐπὶ γῆς μέλλοντι διαζῆν· εἶτα πάλιν

Mark xii. 24. He next quotes the words of Christ, Luke xxiv. 39. in which he denies that angels have flesh and bones. He also has recourse to St. Paul as favourable to his argument, who 1 Cor. xiii. 1. attributes a tongue to angels. Lastly, nothing he considers is more strongly corroborative of his opinion than the fact, that whenever the angels have exhibited themselves to the sight of mortals, they have always appeared endowed with bodies.

The last of these arguments is left altogether untouched by his opponent. Of the rest he gives a brief refutation. For my own part, I have already said in reference to these passages, Luke xx. 34. and xxiv. 39. what will be sufficient as an answer to those who consider them to prove that angels have their own bodies. The remaining three arguments, which I have not yet touched upon, may in very few words be stripped of all the weight they are supposed to possess. 1. Angels are called mighty and powerful in Scripture, and are said to have achieved great things. Can no one then be called strong and mighty, or be the author of great exploits, unless he be clothed in body? Who pray, is not aware, that God is destitute of all body, and yet is called most potent and mighty? 2. St. Paul seems to ascribe a tongue to angels, because he speaks of their discourse, 1 Cor. xiii. 1. The exceeding weakness of this argument I leave others to judge of from the following syllogism: He to whom a tongue and other members are attributed in sacred writ, must necessarily be endowed with these members: but a mouth, hands, feet, and other members, are assigned to God; therefore God is furnished with these members. For my part, I should consider the phrase made use of by St. Paul to be borrowed from the Jewish proverbs of that time, from which no one is ever accustomed to prove any doctrine. 3. When angels have been seen, they appear to be clothed in body: therefore they have body. Too rashly concluded, to say the least of it, most learned disputant! For God also has sometimes exhibited himself in the human form, and yet that has not led any man of sane mind to ascribe to him a body similar to our own. Are we gifted with sufficient sagacity to be able to decide with certainty that the body which angels have appeared clothed in, is natural and proper to them, and not an adventitious and merely temporary vestment?

Besides these, there are some other matters in Loërsius' Dissertation, upon which I might say a few words if I were disposed to carry this note to greater length. He discusses sect. 17. p. 38. the nature of the body which in his opinion angels possess, and supposes it to be composed of a most rare and subtle matter, and not to consist of all the members of our bodies, but of those only which "are required for a perfect stature." In particular he deprives them of belly, stomach, and the generative parts. Probably he held the same opinion in respect to the bodies of good men after the resurrection: and to me indeed he seems pretty plainly to hint as much. He then refutes, sect. 18. p. 41. what he supposes may be advanced in opposition to his opinion. Lastly, sect 19. p. 46. he contends that this doctrine is calculated to remove many difficulties, and to throw greater light upon several important truths. The whole of which is canvassed in detail by Steph. Vitus. For myself, I have bestowed more time than was requisite upon an argument, which certainly supplies most ample matter for disputation to the curious and sagacious, but contributes little to the promotion of piety, holiness, and true religion.

ὄντος τινὸς σκήνους, καὶ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας που τῷ σκήνει, καταλύεσθαι μέν φασιν οἱ λόγοι τὴν ἐπίγειον οἰκίαν τοῦ σκήνους, τὸ δὲ σκῆνος ἐπενδύσασθαι οἰκίαν ἀχειροποίητον, αἰώνιον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· λέγουσι δὲ οἱ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι, τὸ μὲν φθαρτὸν ἐνδύσασθαι αὐτὸ ἀφθαρσίαν. The sense whereof is this: "The soul descending hither into generation, put on first that body which was useful for it whilst to continue in the womb; and then again afterwards such a body as was necessary for it to live here upon the earth in. Again, it having here a two-fold kind of body, the one of which is called σκῆνος, by St. Paul (being a more subtle body, which it had before), the other the superinduced earthly house, necessarily subservient to this skenos here; the scripture oracles affirm that the earthly house of this skenos shall be corrupted or dissolved, but the skenos itself, superindue or put on a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens: the same declaring that the corruptible shall put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality."[6] Where it is

[6] Dr. Cudworth's exposition of this passage of Origen, which, like many others, has been very obscurely translated by Sigismundus Gelenius, is most correct, and his emendation a felicitous one. In the published edition the Greek words to which the learned Doctor has been the first to apply the hand of correction, read as follows: Εἶτα πάλιν ὄντως τινὸς σκήνους ἐπιγείου, οἰκίας ἀναγκαίας που τῷ σκήνει, being altogether confused and unintelligible. In the first place, it is clear that ἐπιγείου is improperly connected with the noun σκήνους and ought rather to be referred to the following word, οἰκίας. For almost immediately afterwards Origen again mentions ἐπίγειον οἰκίαν, and distinguishes it from that which he calls σκῆνος. Therefore Dr. Cudworth has rightly excluded the comma that separates the words ἐπιγείου and οἰκίας. Again, Origen is evidently speaking of two distinct things in these words, an *earthly house* and a *tabernacle*. Hence the learned Doctor has rightly placed the particle καὶ between σκήνους and ἐπιγείου, to show that the discourse is of two different things. This particle is extant in the Greek copy, but in an improper place, namely between the words σκήνει and καταλύεσθαι: from which it has been correctly transferred to the one more suitable for it. I am not aware whether El. Bouhier, the French translator, ever read this emendation and exposition of Dr. Cudworth's: and yet in the Notes and Conjectures on Origen's text, p. 401. subjoined to his version, he corrects the passage in the same way, and in the version itself expresses its sense as here given. But I do not equally approve of our author's substitution of the verb ἐνέδύσατο for ἀπεξεδύσατο, at the beginning of this passage. To a certain extent he had already the example of Gelenius, who thus renders it, in conformity neither with the words nor the sense: "The soul about to be born received a body suitable for it while inhabiting the womb." For my part I consider this emendation unnecessary, nor can I see any reason why the passage may not be translated as follows: "The soul on descending into generation, or on coming forth from the womb, puts off the body which was suitable and useful for it while it remained in the womb, and assumes another such as is necessary for the new life which it is entering upon among men." I am satisfied that the phrase εἰς γένεσιν ἔρχεσθαι, which is frequently made use of in the Platonic schools, induced the learned Doctor to attempt the emendation we are speaking of. He supposed, no doubt, that these words always signify with the Platonists the descent of the soul into the womb: and certainly if such were their sense in this place, the word ἀπεξεδύσατο would be altogether inadmissible. For what sort of sentence would this be: "The soul descending hither into the womb, puts off the body, which is necessary for it while in the womb?" But conversant as he is in other respects with Platonic matters, he did not recollect that although it often occurs in the sense in which he supposed Origen to have here used it, it nevertheless not infrequently signifies in the leading Platonic writers, "to be born, to begin to live among men, to issue from the womb."

plain that Origen takes that σκῆνος, in St. Paul (1 Cor. v. 1), for a subtle body, which the soul had before its terrene nativity, and which continues with it after death; but in good men will, at last, superindue, or put on (without death) the clothing of immortality. Neither can there be a better commentary upon this place of Origen, than those Excerpta out of Methodius the Martyr, in Photius,[7] though seeming to be vitiated also; where, as we conceive, the sense of Origen and his followers is first contained in those words:* "Ετερον τὸ σκῆνος, καὶ τοῦ σκήνους ἡ οἰκία, καὶ ἕτερον ἡμεῖς ὤν ἐστὶ τὸ σκῆνος, "That in St. Paul the τὸ σκῆνος is one thing, and the earthly house of this σκῆνος another thing; and we, that is our souls, a third thing, distinct from both." And then it is further declared in this that follows: Τῆς ζωῆς καταλυθείσης τῆς ὠκυμόρου τὴν πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἕξουσιν οἱ κησιν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, ἕως ἂν ἀνακαινοποιηθεῖσαν ἡμῖν ἄπτωτον ἀναλάβωμεν τὴν οἰκίαν· ὅθεν καὶ στενάζομεν μὴ θέλοντες τὸ σῶμα ἀπεκδύσασθαι ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὴν λοιπὴν ἐπενδύσασθαι ζωήν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκητήριον τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, ὃ ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν, ἡ ἀθανασία, "That this short life of our earthly body being destroyed, our soul shall then have, before the resurrection, a dwelling from God, until we shall at last receive it renewed, restored, and so made an incorruptible house. Wherefore in this we groan, desirous not to put off all body, but to put on life or immortality upon the body which we shall then have. For that house, which is from heaven, that we desire to put on, is immortality."[8] Moreover, that the soul is not altogether naked after death, the same Origen[9] endeavours to confirm further from that of our Saviour concerning the rich man and Lazarus: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ κολαζόμενος πλούσιος, καὶ ὁ ἐν κόλποις Ἀβραὰμ πένης ἀναπανόμενος, πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ σωτῆρος, καὶ πρὸ τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἀναστάσεως, διδάσκουσιν ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σώματι χρῆται ἡ ψυχή, "The rich man punished, and the poor man refreshed in Abraham's bosom, before the coming of our Saviour, and before the end of the world, and therefore before the resurrection, plainly teaches that even now also after death, the soul useth a

[7] Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 919.

* Thus Origen plainly, in his fifth book (p. 244): that there is διαφορὰ ἐπιγείου οἰκίας ἐν ᾗ ἐστὶ τὸ Σκῆνος καταλυομένης, καὶ Σκήνους, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ὄντες δίκαιοι στενάζουσι βαρούμενοι, μὴ ἀπεκδύσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ Σκήνει ἐπενδύσασθαι, "a difference betwixt the earthly house, in which the Σκῆνος is, that will be dissolved; and the Σκῆνος itself, wherein good men groan, being burdened, not that they would put it off, but put an immortality upon it."

[8] I can hardly believe these words to be explanatory and illustrative of the former ones. For in them souls are not said to dwell with God, clothed in a certain body, but merely to have a habitation with God: which would not be denied even by those who maintain that souls on being released from this earthly body are associated with no other body whatever.

[9] In Photius, Biblioth. cod. 224. p. 930.

body." He thinketh the same also to be further proved from the visible apparition of Samuel's ghost: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαμουὴλ φαινόμενος, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ὁρατὸς ὢν, παρίστησιν ὅτι σῶμα περιέκειτο, "Samuel also visibly appearing after death, maketh it manifest that his soul was then clothed with a body." To which he adds in Photius: Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅμα τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σχῆμα, ὁμοειδὲς τῷ παχεῖ καὶ γηΐνῳ σώματι, &c. "That the exterior form and figure of the soul's body after death doth resemble that of the gross terrestrial body here in this life; all the histories of apparitions making ghosts, or the souls of the dead, to appear in the same form which their bodies had before." This, therefore, as was observed, is that which Origen understands by τὸ σκῆνος in St. Paul; not this gross terrestrial body, but a certain middle body betwixt it and the heavenly, which the soul after death carries away with it.[10] Now, this opinion of the learned Origen's was never reckoned up by the ancient fathers, or his greatest adversaries, in the catalogue of his errors; nor does Methodius the martyr, who was so great an anti-Origenist, where he mentions this Origenic opinion in Photius, seem to tax it otherwise than as Platonical, implying the soul to be incorporeal. Methodius himself, on the contrary, contending, not that the soul hath a body conjoined with it after death, as a distinct thing from it, but that itself is a body: Ὁ θεὸς μόνος ἄδεται ἀσώματος ὢν, αἱ δὲ ψυχαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς

[10] The learned Doctor is perfectly right in stating that Origen in his exposition of St. Paul's words, 2 Cor. v. 1. distinguishes the ἐπίγειος οἰκία from that which is called σκῆνος, and makes the latter signify the ethereal body of the soul, and the former the solid and mortal body, which were as if St. Paul meant to say, "We know that if this earthly house, or earthly body, in which the σκῆνος, or tabernacle, or vehicle of the soul is enclosed, were dissolved, we shall receive a celestial body." But this explication is so much at variance with the apostle's words, and so forced, and I may say unwarrantable, that it is surprising that any one could be found to approve of it. Let the *fourth verse* be compared with *the first*, and its fallacy will at once be apparent. St. Paul says, ver. 4. that while we are ἐκ τῷ σκήνει, "in this tabernacle," we groan, being burdened; not that we are desirous to put off this tabernacle, but rather to be clothed upon with the celestial body which is promised to us. From these words it is evident that what he calls σκῆνος, is a burden rather than a comfort to us, and will hereafter be assuredly put off and abandoned. But how can these words be understood of that body of the soul imagined by Origen and the Platonists, which the souls bring with them from heaven, and on being released from the earthly bodies again take away with them? Can this body cause the soul to groan and grieve? Can souls clothed with this vehicle or body in heaven be said to be burdened and pressed down as it were with a load and encumbrance? In short, can this vehicle be put off so that the soul should desire not to be *unclothed*, but to be *clothed upon*? All this is most true if we regard the word σκῆνος as implying this frail and miserable mortal body; which is unquestionably the case: but on the other hand is devoid of all appearance of truth, if we suppose it to signify a certain middle and ethereal body of the soul. Thus frequently the most powerful minds, if warped by a partiality for pre-conceived opinions, fall into such interpretations of scripture as could hardly be expected even from men of the humblest pretensions. I pass over the argument drawn by Origen from the example of Samuel's ghost. For every body knows that commentators are at issue with each other on the nature of this apparition, and I have already stated my own views respecting it in another place.

τῶν ὅλων, σώματα νοερὰ ὑπάρχουσαι, εἰς λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μέλη διακεκόσμηνται, ταύτην λαβοῦσαι τὴν διατύπωσιν· ὅθεν καὶ ἐν τῷ Ἅιδῃ, καὶ γλῶσσαν, καὶ δάκτυλον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μέλη ἱστοροῦνται ἔχειν· οὐχ ὡς σώματος ἑτέρου συνυπάρχοντος αὐταῖς ἀειδοῦς· ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐταὶ φύσει αἱ ψυχαὶ παντὸς ἀπογυμνωθεῖσαι περιβλήματος τοιαῦται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσι, "God alone is praised as incorporeal and invisible;[1] but souls are made by him (who is the Father of all things) intellectual bodies, ornamentally branched out (as it were) into members distinguishable by reason, and having the same form and signature with the outward body. Whence it is, that in Hades (or hell) we read of a tongue, and a finger, and other members; not as if there then were another invisible body co-existing with these souls, but because the souls themselves are in their own nature (when stript naked of all clothing) according to their very essence such." We say therefore, if one of these two opinions must needs be entertained, that either the soul itself is a body, or else that it hath a body after death; the latter of them, which was Origen's, ought certainly much to be preferred before the former, whether held in Tertullian's sense, that all substance, and consequently God himself, is body; or else in that of Methodius, that all created substance is such, God alone being incorporeal.

But we have already showed, that Origen was not singular in this opinion, Irenæus before him having asserted the same thing, that souls after death are adapted to certain bodies (where the word in the Greek probably was προσάπτονται), which have the same character with these terrestrial ones;[2] and Philoponus after him, who was no Pagan, but a Christian philosopher, dogmatizing in like manner. We might here add, that Johannes Thessalonicensis, in that dialogue of his, read in the seventh Synod,[3] seemeth to have been of the same persuasion also, when he affirmeth of souls, as well as angels and demons, that they were ὁραθέντες παρὰ πλειόνων αἰσθητῶς πλεονάκις, τῷ εἴδει τῶν οἰκείων αὐτῶν σωμάτων, "often seen by many sensibly, in the

[1] [Archelaus in like manner asserts that God alone is invisible, Acta Desp. cum Manete, p. 54. 55. ed. Zaccagn.]

[2] We have already shown on sect. 27. that Dr. Cudworth is mistaken in respect to Irenæus. The passages of Philoponus are quoted above.

[3] See Concilior. Joann. Harduini. tom. 4. p. 293. 294. Joannes Thessalonicensis is again erroneously classed among those who held human minds and angels to consist of two parts, soul and body. His opinion was rather that they are both wholly corporeal, as is manifest from the following passage of his: Εἰ δὲ ποῦ εὕροις ἀσωμάτους καλουμένους τοὺς ἀγγέλους, ἢ ψυχὰς, ὡς μὴ ὄντας ἐκ τῆς συμμίξεως τῶν ὑλικῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων καὶ τοιαῦτα σώματα παχέα καὶ ἀντίτυπα, οἷα ἡμεῖς περικείμεθα, "Moreover if you any where find the angels or human souls called incorporeal, know that they are so called as not consisting of a commixture of the four material elements, or being gross bodies similar to those with which we are invested." He does not say that they are endowed with bodies, but that they are bodies, although not such as our own perishable ones. And he previously asserts this to be the opinion of the whole *catholic church*: an assertion in which the council found nothing to reprehend.

form of their own bodies." However, it is a thing which Psellus took for granted, where, speaking of devils insinuating their temptations into men's souls, by affecting immediately the phantastic spirit, he writeth after this manner:* Ὁ λέγων, πόῤῥωθεν μὲν ὢν, ἰσχυροτέρας δεῖται κραυγῆς, ἀγχοῦ δὲ γενόμενος, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀκούοντος οὖς ψιθυρίζων ὑποφωνεῖ· καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν αὐτῷ συνεγγίσαι πνεύματι τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἐδεήθη ψόφου, ἀλλ' ἦν ὁ κατὰ βούλησιν λόγος ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ πρὸς τὸ δεχόμενον ἐγγινόμενος, ὅ φασι κἀν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐξιούσαις τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτας ἀπλήκτως ὁμιλεῖν ἀλλήλαις, "When one man speaks to another from afar off, he must (if he would be heard) make a loud cry or noise; whereas, if he stood near to him, he might softly whisper into his ear. But could he immediately approach to the spirit (or subtle body of the soul), he should not then need so much as to make a whisper, but might silently and without noise, communicate whatsoever thoughts of his own to him, by motions made thereupon. And this is said to be the way that souls, going out of these bodies, converse together; they communicating their thoughts to one another without any noise." For Psellus here plainly supposeth souls after death to have πνεῦμα, that is, a certain subtle body, adhering to them, by motions upon which they may silently converse with each other.[4] It is true indeed, that St. Austin,† in his twelfth book De Genesi ad Literam, does not himself close with this opinion, of the soul's having a body after death, but much less of its being a body: nevertheless does he seem to leave every man to his own liberty therein, in these words: "Si autem quæritur, dum anima de corpore exierit, utrum ad aliqua loca corporalia feratur, an ad incorporalia corporalibus similia; an verò nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud, quod et corporibus et similitudinibus corporum est excellentius; citò quidem responderim; ad corporalia loca

* Page 94. [Page 72.]

[4] The learned Doctor, I fancy, makes Psellus wiser than he really was; it being evident from the whole of the dialogue from which these words are taken, that he did not regard the soul as a simple nature clothed with a subtle body, but imagined it to be wholly corporeal, and consisting of a most subtle matter. Certainly the passage here quoted will never induce me to forego this opinion, which is in perfect accordance with his crude and clumsy philosophy. He attributes a certain πνεῦμα to the soul: but he does not understand a subtle body by this term, as the Platonists sometimes do. What his πνεῦμα means, is evident from the preceding, where he says of demons that they τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν φανταστικῷ ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙ συνεγγίσαι, "approach to the fantastic or imaginative *spirit* which is in us." Of this πνεῦμα Psellus is speaking when he afterwards adds, that he "who could approach to the spirit of the soul, might silently communicate his own thoughts to the mind." The meaning of which words is this: If any one could reach the imagination of another by his spirit, and as it were immediately approach it, he would be able to reveal his thoughts to him without language. To which he subjoins, that according to the vulgar belief spirits separated from body are endowed with that faculty of affecting one another in this way, and of exciting the imagination of other spirits without the intervention of any thing else. There is nothing in this passage therefore about the body of souls.

† De Genesi ad Literam, cap. 32. [Page 239. tom. 3. opp.]

eam vel non ferri nisi cum aliquo corpore, vel non localiter ferri. Jam utrum habeat aliquod corpus, ostendat, qui potest; ego autem non puto. Spiritalem enim arbitror esse, non corporalem; ad spiritalia vero pro meritis fertur, aut ad loca pœnalia similia corporibus, "But if it be demanded, when the soul goes out of this body, whether it be carried into any corporal places, or to incorporals like to corporals, or else to neither, but to that which is more excellent than both bodies, and the likenesses of bodies? the answer is ready; that it cannot be carried to corporal places, or not locally carried any whither, without a body. Now whether the soul have some body, when it goes out of this body, let them, that can, show: but, for my part, I think otherwise. For I suppose the soul to be spiritual, and not corporal; and that, after death, it is either carried to spiritual things, or else to penal places, like to bodies, such as have been represented to some in extasies," &c. Where St. Austin himself seems to think the punishment of souls, after death, and before the resurrection, to be fantastical, or only in imagination: whereas there could not be then so much as fantastic punishments neither, nor any imagination at all in souls, without a body, if that doctrine of Aristotle's[5] be true, that fancy or imagination is nothing else but a weaker sense; that is, a thing which results from a complication of soul and body both together. But it is observable, that in the fore-cited place that, which St. Austin chiefly opposed, was the soul's being a body, as Tertullian, Methodius, and others had asserted; but as for its having a body, he saith only this, ostendat qui potest, "let him that can show it;" he granting, in the mean time, that the soul cannot be locally carried any whither at all after death, nor indeed be in any place without a body. However, the same St. Austin, as he elsewhere condemneth the opinion of those who would take the fire of hell metaphorically, acknowledging it to be real or corporeal; so does he somewhere think it not improbable, but after death, and before the resurrection, the souls of men may suffer from a certain fire, for the consuming and burning up of their dross:* Post istius sanè corporis mortem, donec ad illum veniatur, qui post resurrectionem corporum futurus est damnationis et remunerationis ultimus dies; si hoc temporis intervallo, ejusmodi ignem dicuntur perpeti, quem non sentiant illi, qui non habuerint tales mores et amores in hujus corporis vitâ, ut eorum ligna, et fœnum, et stipula consumantur; alii vero sentiunt, qui ejusmodi secum ædificia portaverunt, &c. non redarguo, quia forsitan verum est, "If in this interval of time, betwixt the death of the body and the resurrection or day of judgment, the souls of the dead be said to suffer such a fire as can do no execution upon

[5] De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 53. &c. tom. 2. opp.
* De Civ. Dei. lib. 21. cap. 26 [Sect. 4. p. 490. tom. 7. opp.]

those who have no wood, hay, nor stubble to burn up, but shall be felt by such as have made such buildings or superstructures, &c., I reprehend it not, because perhaps it is true." The opinion here mentioned is thus expressed by Origen,* in his fifth book against Celsus, which very place St. Austin[6] seems to have had respect to: Οὐ συνιδὼν ὅτι ὥσπερ Ἑλλήνων τισὶν ἔδοξε, τὸ πῦρ καθάρσιον ἐπάγεται τῷ κόσμῳ· εἰκὸς δ' ὅτι καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν δεομένων τῆς διὰ τοῦ πυρὸς δίκης καίοντος μὲν καὶ οὐ κατακαίοντος τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας ὕλην διομένην ἀναλύεσθαι ὑπ' ἐκείνου τοῦ πυρός· καίοντος δὲ καὶ κατακαίοντος τοὺς ἐν τῇ διὰ τῶν πράξεων καὶ λόγων καὶ νοημάτων τροπικῶς λεγομένῃ οἰκοδομῇ ξύλα, χόρτον, ἢ καλάμην οἰκοδομήσαντας, "Celsus did not understand that this fire, as well according to the Hebrews and Christians, as to some of the Greeks, will be purgatory to the world; as also to every one of those persons who stand in need of such punishment and remedy by fire: which fire can do no execution upon those who have no combustible matter in them, but will be felt by such as in the moral structure of their thoughts, words, and actions, have built up wood, hay, and stubble." Now since souls cannot suffer from fire, nor any thing else in way of sense and pain, without being vitally united to some body, we may conclude, that St. Austin, when he wrote this, was not altogether abhorrent from souls having bodies after death.[7]

Hitherto have we declared how the ancient assertors of incorporeal substance, as unextended, did repel the assaults of Athe-

* Contra Celsus, lib. 5. p. 240.

[6] I cannot agree with the learned Doctor, who here confounds two opinions totally remote and distinct from each other. Origen, in the passage quoted, is speaking of the fire which will consume this world, and every thing therein, at the last day, and tells us that this fire according to the opinion of some, will also serve as a purgatory to persons not yet sufficiently healed and purged from their vices, so that they may enter the heavenly mansion entirely pure and spotless. For most of the ancient Christian fathers believed that at the day of judgment all men will be destroyed by the fire that extinguishes the world, but that the good will be purified by the same fire, and freed from all remaining stains of former vices: which learned men have long since proved from numerous testimonies of theirs. See Joh. Dallæus, De Vero Usu Patrum, lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 292. and others. This opinion Origen is expressing in the words quoted. Consult Pet. Dan. Huet, in his Origeniana, lib. 2. quæst. 11. p. 139. &c. who discourses upon this dogma with great copiousness and erudition. Nor is Origen mistaken in saying that this opinion was entertained by some of the Greeks and Hebrews prior to the timeof our Saviour: for that the Platonists and Hebrews were not altogether opposed to it, has been shown not long ago by the erudite J. Elsner, Observat. in Novum Testam. tom. 2. p. 79. &c. But this dogma has scarcely any thing in common with the one that St. Augustine says he is not altogether disposed to reject; which brings us much nearer to the purgatorial fire as they call it, and maintains that souls are tormented and purified by a certain fire in the interval between death and the resurrection or day of judgment.

[7] Let us confess the truth rather, and say that in his precepts upon the nature of the soul and angels, and upon the punishments of hell and other doctrines connected therewith, as well as in many other matters, St. Augustine is any thing but consistent with himself, and being uncertain what course to follow sometimes inclines to one and sometimes to another opinion; nor does he always reflect upon the inferences deducible from the various dogmas he upholds.

ists and Corporealists, made against it; but especially how they quitted themselves of that absurdity, of the illocality and immobility of finite created spirits, by supposing them always to be vitally united to some bodies, and consequently, by the locality of those their respective bodies, determined to here and there; according to that of Origen:* Ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν δέεται σώματος διὰ τὰς τοπικὰς μεταβάσεις, "Our soul stands in need of a body in order to local motions." We shall in the next place declare what grounds of reason there were, which induced those ancients to assert and maintain a thing so repugnant to sense and imagination, and consequently to all vulgar apprehension, as a substance in itself unextended, indistant, and indivisible, or devoid of magnitude and parts, Wherein we shall only represent the sense of these ancient Incorporealists, so far as we can, to the best advantage, in order to their vindication against Atheists and Materialists; ourselves in the mean time not asserting any thing, but leaving every one, that can, to make his own judgment; and so either to close with this, or that other following hypothesis, of extended incorporeals.

Now it is here observable, that it was a thing formerly taken for granted on both sides, as well by the assertors as the deniers of incorporeal substance, that there is but one kind of extension only; and consequently, that whatsoever hath magnitude and parts, or one thing without another, is not only intellectually and logically, but also really and physically divisible or discerpible, as likewise antitypous and impenetrable; so that it cannot co-exist with a body in the same place: from whence it follows, that whatsoever arguments do evince that there is some other substance besides body, the same do therefore demonstrate, according to the sense of these ancients (as well Corporealists as Incorporealists), that there is something unextended, it being supposed by them, both alike, that whatsoever is extended, is body. Nevertheless we shall here principally propound such considerations of theirs as tend directly to prove that there is something unextendedly incorporeal; and that an unextended Deity is no impossible idea; to wit, from hence, because there is something unextended even in our very selves. Where, not to repeat the forementioned ratiocination of Simplicius, that whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, cannot possibly be extended, nor have parts distant from one another;

* Contra Celsus, lib. 5. p. 244.

[a] In this Dr. Cudworth acts wisely. For at that time, as at the present day, philosophers of the highest eminence, both in England and other countries, were disputing with each other upon the subject. [Dr. Clarke defends the extension of the Deity, On the Being and Attributes of God, p. 247. 248. See also Beausobre Hist. du Manich. p. 484.]

Plotinus first argues after this manner:* Τί τοίνυν φήσουσιν, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι λέγοντες, πρῶτον μὲν περὶ ἑκάστου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ σώματι, πότερον ἕκαστον ψυχὴν, οἷα ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ὅλη; καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέρους τὸ μέρος; οὐδὲν ἄρα τὸ μέγεθος συνεβάλλετο τῇ οὐσίᾳ αὐτῆς· καίτοι ἔδει γε ποσοῦ τινος ὄντος· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλον πολλαχὴ, ὅπερ σώμασι παρεῖναι ἀδύνατον, ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν, οὐ ψυχὴν φήσουσιν, ἐξ ἀψύχων ψυχὴ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξει, "What then will they say, who contend that the soul is a body (or extended) whether or no will they grant concerning every part of the soul in the same body (as that of it which is in the foot, and that in the hand, and that in the brain, &c.), and again every part of those parts, that each of them is soul, such as the whole? If this be consented to, then it is plain that magnitude, or such a quantity, would confer nothing at all to the essence of the soul, as it would do were it an extended thing; but the whole would be in many parts or places, which is a thing that cannot possibly belong to body; that the same whole should be in more, and that a part should be what the whole is. But if they will not grant every part of their extended soul to be soul, then, according to them, must the soul be made up, and compounded of soulless things." Which argument is elsewhere thus propounded by him:[9] Εἰ δὲ ἕκαστον ζωὴν ἔχοι, καὶ ἓν ἀρκεῖ· εἰ δὲ μηδενὸς αὐτῶν ζωὴν ἔχοντος ἡ σύνοδος πεποίηκε ζωὴν, ἄτοπον· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδύνατον συμφόρησιν σωμάτων ζωὴν ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ νοῦν γεννᾷν τὰ ἀνόητα, "If every one of the parts of this extended soul or mind have life in it, then would any one of them alone be sufficient. But to say, that though none of the parts alone have life in them, yet the conjunction of them altogether maketh life, is absurd; it being impossible that life and soul should result from a congeries of lifeless and soulless things, or that mindless things put together should beget mind." The sum of this argumentation is this, that either every part of an extended soul is soul, and of an extended mind, mind; or not. Now if no part of a soul, as supposed to be extended alone, be soul, or have life and mind in it, then is it certain that the whole, resulting from all the parts, could have no life or mind, because nothing can (causally) come from nothing. It is true indeed, that corporeal qualities and forms, according to the atomic physiology, result from a composition and contexture of atoms or parts, each of which, taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that quality or form in them:

* Page 460. [Ennead 4. lib. 7. cap. 5.]

[9] The learned Doctor slightly varies the order of Plotinus' words. For those which are here placed at the beginning: εἰ δὲ——ἀρκεῖ stand after ἄτοποι in Plotinus.

† Ennead 4. lib. 7. cap. 2. [Page 457.]

Ne ex albis alba rearis;
Aut ea, quæ nigrant, nigro de semine nata,[10]

"You are not to think, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black;" but the reason of the difference here is plain, because these qualities and forms are not entities really distinct from the magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts, but only such a composition of them as cause different fancies in us; but life and understanding, soul and mind, are entities really distant from magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts; they are neither mere fancies, nor syllables of things, but simple and uncompounded realities. But if every supposed part of a soul be soul, and of a mind, mind, then would all the rest of it besides any one part be superfluous; or indeed every supposed part thereof would be the same with the whole: from whence it follows, that it could not be extended, or have any real parts at all, since no part of an extended thing can possibly be the same with the whole.

Again, the same philosopher endeavours further to prove, that the human soul itself is unextended and indivisible, from its energies and operations, and that as well those of sensation as of intellection. First, therefore, from external sensations, he reasons in this manner:* Εἶτι μέλλει αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος ἓν αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ παντὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ εἰ διὰ πολλῶν αἰσθητηρίων πλείω τὰ εἰσιόντα, ἢ πολλαὶ περὶ ἓν ποίοτητες, κἂν δι' ἑνὸς ποικίλου, οἷον πρόσωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο μὲν ῥινὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἀλλὰ ταυτὸν ὁμοῦ πάντων· καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν δι' ὀμμάτων τὸ δὲ δι' ἀκοῆς, ἓν τι δεῖ εἶναι εἰς ὃ ἄμφω· ἢ πῶς ἂν εἴποι ὅτι ἕτερα ταῦτα, μὴ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοῦ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐλθόντων, "That which perceiveth in us must of necessity be one thing, and by one and the same indivisible perceive all; and that, whether they be more things, entering through several organs of sense, as the many qualities of one substance, or one various and multiform thing, entering through the same organ, as the countenance or picture of a man. For it is not one thing in us that perceives the nose, another thing the eyes, and another thing the mouth; but it is one and the self-same thing that perceiveth all. And when one thing enters through the eye, another through the ear, these also must of necessity come all at last to one indivisible, or else they could not be compared together, nor one of them affirmed to be different from another; the several sentiments of them meeting nowhere together in one. He concludes therefore, that this one thing in us that sensibly perceives all things, may be resembled to the centre of a circle, and the several senses to lines drawn from the circumference, which all meet in that one

[10] Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. ver. 730. 732. p. 390.
* Page 461. [Cap. VI.]

centre. Wherefore that which perceives and apprehends all things in us must needs be really one and the very same; that is, unextended and indivisible." Which argument is yet further pursued by him, more particularly thus: "If that which sensibly perceiveth in us be extended, so as to have distant parts one without another, then one of these three things must needs be affirmed, that either every part of this extended substance of the soul perceives a part of the object only, or every part of it the whole object, or else all comes to some one point, which alone perceives both the several parts of the object and the whole, all the other being but as circumferential lines leading to this centre." Now of the former of these three, Plotinus thus: *Μεγέθει ὄντι τούτῳ, ζυμμερίζοιτο ἂν· ὥστε ἄλλο ἄλλου μέρος, καὶ μηδένα ἡμῶν ὅλου τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἀντιλῆψιν ἔχειν· ὥσπερ*[1] *ἂν εἰ ἐγὼ μὲν ἄλλου· σὺ δὲ ἄλλου αἴσθοιο*, "If the soul be a magnitude, then must it be divided together with the sensible object, so that one part of the soul must perceive one part of the object, and another, another; and nothing in it, the whole sensible: just as if I should have the sense of one thing, and you of another." Whereas it is plain by our internal sense, that it is one and the self-same thing in us, which perceives both the parts and the whole. And of the second he writeth in this manner: *Εἰ δὲ ὁτιοῦν παντὸς αἰσθήσεται· εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ μεγέθους πεφυκότος, ἀπείρους καὶ αἰσθήσεις καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητὸν συμβήσεται γίγνεσθαι ἑκάστῳ οἷον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀπείρους ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονοῦντι ἡμῶν εἰκόνας*, "But if every part of the extended soul perceive the whole sensible object, since magnitude is infinitely divisible, there must be in every man infinite sensations and images of one and the same object." Whereas we are intimately conscious to ourselves, that we have but only one sensation of one object at the same time. And as for the third and last part of this disjunction, that what sensibly perceives in every one, is but one single point, either mathematical or physical; it is certain, first, that a mathematical point, having neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity, is no body nor substance, but only a notion of our own mind, or a mode of conceiving in us. And then, as for a physical point or minimum, a body so little that there cannot possibly be any less, Plotinus asserting the infinite divisibility of body, here explodes the thing itself. However he further intimates, that if there were any such physical minimum, or absolutely least body or extensum, this could not possibly receive upon it a distinct representation and delineation of all the several parts of a whole visible object at once, as of the eyes, nose, mouth, &c., in a man's face or picture, or of the particularities

[1] These words are not joined with the preceding ones in Plotinus, as here, but stand at some distance before them.

of an edifice; nor could such a parvitude or atom as this be the cause of all animal motions. And this was one of Aristotle's[2] arguments, whereby he would prove unextended incorporeals: Πῶς τῷ ἀμερεῖ τὸ μεριστόν; "If the soul were indivisible as a point, how could it perceive that which is divisible?" that is, take notice of all the distinct parts of an extended object, and have a description of the whole of them at once upon itself? The sum of the whole argumentation is this, that if the soul be an extended substance, then must it of necessity be either a physical point or minimum, the least extensum, that can possibly be (if there be any such least, and body or extension be not infinitely divisible), or else it must consist of more such physical points, joined together. As for the former of these, it hath been already declared to be impossible, that one single atom, or smallest point of extension, should be able distinctly to perceive all the variety of things: to which might be added, that to suppose every soul to be but one physical minimum, or smallest extensum, is to imply such an essential difference in matter or extension, as that some of the points thereof should be naturally devoid of all life, sense, and understanding, and others again naturally sensitive and rational. Which absurdity, though it should be admitted, yet would it be utterly inconceivable, how there should come to be one such sensitive and rational atom in every man and no more, and how this should constantly remain the same, from infancy to old age, whilst other parts of matter transpire perpetually. But as for the latter, if souls be extended substances, consisting of more points, one without another, all concurring in every sensation; then must every one of those points either perceive a point and part of the object only, or else the whole. Now, if every point of the extended soul perceive only a point of the object, then is there no one thing in us that perceives the whole, or which can compare one part with another. But if every point of the extended soul perceive the whole object at once, consisting of many parts, then would there be innumerable perceptions of the same object in every sensation; as many as there are points in the extended soul. And from both those suppositions, it would alike follow, that no man is one single percipient or person, but that there are innumerable distinct percipients and persons in every man. Neither can there be any other supposition made, besides those three forementioned; as, that the whole extended soul should perceive both the whole sensible object, and all its several parts, no part of this soul in the mean time having any perception at all by itself; because the whole of an extended being is nothing but all the parts taken together; and if none of those parts have any life, sense, or

[2] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 10. tom. 2. opp.

perception in them, it is impossible that there should be any in the whole. But, in very truth, to say that the whole soul perceiveth all, and no part of it any thing, is to acknowledge it not to be extended, but to be indivisible, which is the thing that Plotinus contends for.

And that philosopher here further insists upon internal sensations also, and that *συμπάθεια*, or *ὁμοπάθεια*, that "sympathy," or "homopathy," which is in all animals, to the same purpose: it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives pain, in the most distant extremities of the body, as in the sole of the foot, and in the crown of the head; and which moves one part to succour and relieve another labouring under it, which could not possibly be by traduction of all to one physical point, as the centre, for divers reasons.* *Εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ διάδοσιν οὐχ οἱόντε τὴν αἴσθησιν τοῦ τοιούτου γίγνεσθαι, μὴ δὲ σώματος ὄγκου ὄντος, ἄλλου παθόντος, ἄλλο γνῶσιν ἔχειν (παντὸς γὰρ μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ἐστὶ) δεῖ τοιοῦτον τίθεσθαι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, οἷον πανταχοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ σώματι ποιεῖν προσήκει*, "Since therefore these sympathetic senses cannot possibly be made by traduction at last to one thing; and body being bulky or out-swelling extension, one part thereof suffering, another cannot perceive it (for in all magnitude, this is one thing, and that another), it followeth, that what perceives in us must be every where, and in all the parts of the body, one and the same thing with itself. Which therefore cannot be itself body, but must of necessity be some other entity or substance incorporeal." The conclusion is, that in men and animals there is one thing indivisibly the same, that comprehendeth the whole outside of them, perceiveth both the parts and the whole of sensible objects, and all transmitted through several senses, sympathizeth with all the distant parts of the body, and acteth entirely upon all. And this is properly called, "I myself," not the extended bulk of the body, which is not one but many substances, but an unextended and indivisible unity, wherein all lines meet and concentre, not as a mathematical point or least extensum, but as one self-active, living power, substantial or inside being, that containeth, holdeth, and connecteth all together.

Lastly, the forementioned philosopher endeavours yet further to prove the human soul to be unextended and devoid of magnitude, and indivisible, from its rational energies or operations, its *νοητῶν νοήσεις*, and *ἀμεγέθων ἀντιλήψεις*, "intellections of intelligibles," and "apprehensions of things devoid of magnitude:" *Πῶς γὰρ μέγεθος ὂν τὸ μὴ μέγεθος νοήσει; καὶ τῷ μεριστῷ τὸ μὴ μεριστὸν*, "For how could the soul (saith he) if it were a magni-

* Page 462.

tude, understand that which hath no magnitude? and with that which is divisible conceive what is indivisible? Now it is certain, that we have notions of many things which are ἀφάνταστα, altogether unimaginable, and therefore have nothing of length, breadth, and thickness in them, as virtue, vice, &c.: Ἀμεγεθὲς δὲ οἶμαι καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ ἡ τούτων ἄρα νοήσις· ὥστε καὶ προσιόντα καὶ τῷ ἀμερεῖ αὐτῆς ὑποδέξεται, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμερεῖ κείσεται,* "Justice and honesty, and the like, are things devoid of magnitude, and therefore must the intellections of them needs be such too. So that the soul must receive these by what is indivisible, and lodge them in that which is divisible." We have also a notion not only of mere latitude or breadth, indivisible as to thickness; and of longitude or a line, indivisible both as to breadth and thickness; but also of a mathematical point, that is every way indivisible, as to length, breadth, and thickness. We have a conception of the intention of powers and virtues, wherein there is nothing of extension or magnitude. And indeed all the abstract essences of things (or the αὐτοέκαστα) which are the first objects of intellection, are indivisible: Εἰ δὲ τῶν ἐν ὕλῃ εἰδῶν τὰς νοήσεις φήσουσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ χωριζομένων γε γίγνονται τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ σαρκῶν, &c., "And though we apprehend forms, that are in matter too, yet do we apprehend them as separated and abstracted from the same; there being nothing of flesh in our conception of a man," &c. Nay, the soul conceives extended things themselves, unextendedly and indivisibly; for as the distance of a whole hemisphere is contracted into a narrow compass in the pupil of the eye, so are all distances yet more contracted in the soul itself, and there understood indistantly; for the thought of a mile distance, or of ten thousand miles, or semidiameters of the earth, takes up no more room in the soul, nor stretches it any more, than does the thought of a foot, or inch, or indeed of a mathematical point. Were that which perceiveth in us a magnitude, then could it not be ἴσον παντὶ αἰσθητῷ, "equal to every sensible," and alike perceive both lesser and greater magnitudes than itself: but least of all could it perceive such things as have no magnitude at all. And this was the other part of Aristotle's argumentation, to prove the soul and mind to be unextended and indivisible:[3] Πῶς γὰρ νοήσει τὸ ἄμερες μεριστῷ, "For how could it perceive that which is indivisible by what is divisible?" He having before demanded, how it could apprehend things divisible, and of a great extension, by a mere point, or absolute parvitude. Where the soul, or that which perceives and understands, is, according to Aristotle, neither divisible, as a continued quantity, nor yet indivisible, either as a mathematical, or as a physical

* Plotinus, p. 463.

[3] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 10. tom. 2. opp.

point, and absolute parvitude; but as that which hath in itself no out-swelling distance, nor relation to any place, otherwise than as it is vitally united to a body, which (wherever it be) it always sympathizes with and acts upon.

Besides which, these ancient assertors of unextended incorporeals would, in all probability, confirm that opinion from hence, because we cannot only conceive extension without cogitation, and again cogitation without extension; from whence it may be inferred, that they are entities really distinct and separable from one another (we having no other rule to judge of the real distinction and separability of things than from our conceptions) but also are not able to conceive cogitation with extension. We cannot conceive a thought to be of such a certain length, breadth, and thickness, mensurable by inches and feet, and by solid measures. We cannot conceive half, or a third part, or a twentieth part of a thought, much less of the thought of an indivisible thing; neither can we conceive every thought to be of some certain determinate figure, either round or angular; spherical, cubical, or cylindrical, or the like. Whereas, if whatsoever is unextended be nothing, thoughts must either be mere nonentities, or else extended too into length, breadth, and thickness; divisible into parts, and mensurable; and also (where finite) of a certain figure. And consequently all verities in us (they being but complex axiomatical thoughts) must of necessity be long, broad, and thick, and either spherically or angularly figurate. And the same must be affirmed of volitions likewise, and appetites or passions, as fear and hope, love and hatred, grief and joy; and of all other things belonging to cogitative beings (souls and minds) as knowledge and ignorance, wisdom and folly, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, &c., that these are either all of them absolute non-entities, or else extended into three divisions of length, breadth, and profundity, and mensurable not only by inches and feet, but also by solid measures, as pints and quarts; and last of all (where they are finite as in men) figurate. But if this be absurd, and these things belonging to soul and mind (though doubtless as great realities at least as the things which belong to bodies) be unextended, then must the substances of souls and minds themselves be unextended also. Thus Plotinus of mind: Νοῦς οὐ διαστὰς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, "Mind is not distant from itself:" and indeed were it so, it could not be one thing (as it is) but many; every conceivable part of distant and unextended substance being a substance by itself. And the same is to be said of the human soul, though it act upon distant parts of that body, which it is united to, that itself, notwithstanding, is not scattered out into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, nor infinitely divisible; because then it would not be one single substance, or monad, but a heap of

substances. Soul is no more divisible than life; of which the forementioned philosopher thus: Ἄραγε τὴν ζωὴν μεριεῖς; ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ πᾶν ἦν ζωή, τὸ μέρος ζωὴ οὐκ ἔσται, "Will you divide a life into two? then the whole of it being but a life, the half thereof cannot be a life." Lastly, if soul and mind, and the things belonging to them, as life and cogitation, understanding and wisdom, &c., be outspread into distance, having one part without another; then can there be no good reason given, why they should not be as well really and physically, as intellectually divisible; and one part of them separable from another: since, as Plotinus: Παντὸς μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, "In all magnitude or extension, this is one thing, and that another." At least, no Theist ought to deny, but that the divine power could cleave or divide a thought, together with the soul, wherein it is, into many pieces; and remove them to the greatest distances from one another (forasmuch as this implies no manner of contradiction, and whatsoever is conceivable by us may be done by infinite power) in which case, neither of them alone would be soul or mind, life or thought, but all put together make up one entire mind, soul, life, and thought.

Wherefore, the sense of the ancient Incorporealists seems to have been as follows: That there are in nature two kinds of substances specifically differing from one another; the first, Ὄγκοι, "bulks," or "tumours," a mere passive thing; the second, Δυνάμεις, "self-active powers" or "virtues," or φύσις δραστήριος, the "energetic nature." The former of these is nothing else but magnitude or extension, not as an abstract notion of the mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is called res extensa, the meaning is not, as if the res were one thing and the extension thereof another, but that it is extension, or distance, really existing, or the thing thereof (without the mind) and not the notion. Now, this in the nature of it is nothing but aliud extra aliud, "one thing without another," and therefore perfect alterity, disunity, and divisibility. So that no extensum whatsoever, of any sensible bigness, is truly and really one substance, but a multitude or heap of substances, as many as there are parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover, one part of this magnitude always standing without another, it is an essential property thereof to be antitypous or impenetrable; that is, to jostle or shoulder out all other extended substance from penetrating into it, and co-existing with it, so as to possess and take up the same room and space. One yard of distance, or of length, breadth, and thickness, cannot possibly be added to another, without making the whole extension double to what it was before, since one of them must of necessity stand without the other. One magnitude cannot imbibe or swallow up another, nor can there be any penetration of dimensions. Moreover,

magnitude or extension, as such, is mere outside or outwardness; it hath nothing within, no self-active power or virtue; all its activity being either keeping out, or hindering, any other extended thing, from penetrating into it (which yet it doth merely by its being extended, and therefore not so much by any physical efficiency as a logical necessity): or else local motion, to which it is also but passive; no body, or extension, as such, being able to move itself or act upon itself.

Wherefore, were there no other substance in the world besides this magnitude or extension, there could be no motion or action at all in it; no life, cogitation, consciousness; no intellection, appetite, or volition (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the universe), but all would be a dead heap or lump; nor could any one substance penetrate another, and co-exist in the same place with it. From whence it follows of necessity, that besides this outside bulky extension, and tumourous magnitude, there must be another kind of entity, whose essential attribute or character is life, self-activity, or cogitation. Which first, that it is not a mere mode or accident of magnitude and extension, is plain from hence, because cogitation may be as well conceived without extension, as extension without cogitation; whereas no mode of any thing can be conceived without that, whereof it is a mode. And since there is unquestionably much more of entity in life and cogitation than there is in mere extension or magnitude, which is the lowest of all being, and next to nothing; it must needs be imputed to the mere delusion and imposture of imagination, that men are so prone to think this extension or magnitude to be only substance, and all other things besides the mere accidents thereof, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it. For though that secondary and participated life (as it is called) in the bodies of animals be indeed a mere accident, and such as may be present or absent without the destruction of its subject; yet can there be no reason given why the primary and original life itself should not be as well a substantial thing, as mere extension and magnitude. Again, that extension and life, or cogitation, are not two inadequate conceptions neither, of one and the self-same substance, considered brokenly and by piece-meal; as if either all extension had life and cogitation essentially belonging to it (as the Hylozoists conclude) or at least all life and cogitation had extension; and consequently all souls and minds, and even the Deity itself, were either extended life and cogitation, or living and thinking extension (there being nothing in nature unextended, but extension the only entity; so that whatsoever is devoid thereof, is, ipso facto, absolutely nothing): This, I say, will also appear from hence, because, as hath been already declared, we cannot conceive a life, or mind, or thought, nor any thing at all belonging to a

cogitative being, as such (as wisdom, folly, virtue, vice, &c.), to be extended into length, breadth, and thickness, and to be mensurable by inches, feet, and yards. From whence it may be concluded, that extension, and life or cogitation, are no inadequate conceptions of one and the self-same thing, since they cannot be complicated together into one, but that they are distinct substances from each other. Lives and minds are such tight and compact things in themselves, and have such a self-unity in their nature, as that they cannot be lodged in that, which is wholly scattered out from itself into distance, and dispersed into infinite multiplicity; nor be spread all over the same, as co-extended with it. Nor is it conceivable how all the several parts of an extended magnitude, should jointly concur and contribute to the production of one and the same single and indivisible cogitation; or how that whole heap or bundle of things should be one thinker. A thinker is a monad, or one single substance, and not a heap of substances; whereas no body or extended thing is one but many substances; every conceivable or smallest part thereof being a real substance by itself.

But this will yet further appear, if we consider what kind of action cogitation is. The action of an extended thing, as such, is nothing but local motion, change of distance, or translation from place to place, a mere outside and superficial thing; but it is certain that cogitation (fancy, intellection, and volition) are no local motions; nor the mere fridging up and down of the parts of an extended substance, changing their place and distance; but it is unquestionably an internal energy; that is, such an energy as is within the very substance or essence of that which thinketh, or in the inside of it. From which two kinds of energies we may now conclude that there are also two kinds of entity or substance in nature; the one mere outside, and which hath nothing within it; the other such a kind of entity as hath an eternal energy; acteth from itself, and within itself, and upon itself; an inside thing, whose action is within the very essence or substance thereof; it being plain, that the cogitative or thinking nature is such a thing as hath an essential inside or profundity. Now, this inside of cogitative beings, wherein they thus act or think internally within themselves, cannot have any length, breadth, or thickness in it, because if it had it would be again a mere outside thing. Wherefore had all cogitative beings (souls and minds) extension and magnitude never so much belonging to them, as some suppose them to have, yet could this, for all that, be nothing but the mere outside of their being; besides which, they must of necessity have also an unextended inside, that hath no outswelling tumour, and is not scattered into distance, nor dispersed into multiplicity, which therefore could not possibly exist a part in a part of the supposed extension, as

if one half of a mind or thought were in one half of that extension, and another in another; but must of necessity be all undividedly, both in the whole of it, and in every part. For had every twentieth or hundredth part of this extensum not the whole of a life or mind in it, but only the twentieth or hundredth part thereof, then could none of them have any true life or mind at all, nor consequently the whole have any. Nor indeed is it otherwise conceivable how a whole quantity of extended substance should be one thing, and have one personality, one *I myself* in it all, were there not one indivisible thing presiding over it, which held it altogether, and diffused itself through all. And thus do we see how this whole in the whole and in every part (do men what they can) will, like a ghost, still haunt them, and follow them every where. But now it is impossible that one and the self-same substance should be both extended and unextended. Wherefore in this hypothesis of extended understanding spirits, having one part without another, there is an undiscerned complication of two distinct substances, extended and unextended, or corporeal and incorporeal, both together; and a confusion of them into one. Where, notwithstanding, we must acknowledge that there is so much of truth aimed at, as that all finite incorporeal substances are always naturally united to some bodies; so that the whole of these created animals is completed and made up of both these together, an extended inside, and an unextended outside, both of them substances indeed really distinct, but yet vitally united each to other.

The sum of all is, that there are two kinds of substances in nature, the first extension or magnitude, really existing without the mind, which is a thing that hath no self-unity at all in it, but is infinite alterity and divisibility, as it is also mere outside and outwardness, it having nothing within, nor any other action belonging to it, but only locally to move when it is moved. The second, life and mind, or the self-active cogitative nature, an inside being, whose action is not local motion, but an internal energy, within the substance or essence of the thinker himself, or in the inside of him; which therefore, though unextended, yet hath a certain inward recess, Βάθος, or essential profundity. And this is a thing which can act all of it entirely upon either a greater or lesser quantity of extended substance or body, and its several parts, penetrating into it, and co-existing in the same place with it. Wherefore it is not to be looked upon either as a mathematical or as a physical point, as an absolute parvitude, or the least extensum possible, it having not only such an essential inside, bathos, or profundity in it, wherein it acteth and thinketh within itself, but also a certain amplitude of active power ad extra, or a sphere of activity upon body. Upon which account it was before affirmed by Plotinus, that an unextended incorporeal is a

thing bigger than body, because body cannot exist otherwise than a point of it in a point of space; whereas this one and the same indivisible can at once both comprehend a whole extensum within it, and be all of it in every part thereof. And lastly, all finite incorporeals are always naturally to some body or other; from both which together is completed and made up in every created understanding being one entire animal, consisting of soul and body, and having something incorporeal, and something corporeal in it, an unextended inside, and an extended outside, by means whereof it is determined to *here* and *there*, and capable of moving locally, or changing place.

Thus have we represented the sense of the ancient unextended Incorporealists to the best advantage that we could, in way of answer to the premised atheistic argument against incorporeal substance, and in order to the vindication of them from the contempt of Atheists; and we do affirm, that the fore-mentioned argumentations of theirs do evince, that there is some other substance besides body, which therefore, according to the principles of these Atheists themselves, must be acknowledged to be unextended, it being concluded by them, that whatsoever is extended is body. But whether they do also absolutely prove that there is οὐσια ἀμεγεθὴς, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμερὴς, and ἀδιαίρετος, "a substance devoid of magnitude, indistant, without parts, and indivisible;" this we shall leave others to make a judgment of. However, it is certain that Atheists who maintain the contrary must needs assert, that every thought, and whatsoever belongeth to soul, mind (as knowledge, virtue, &c.), is not only mentally and mathematically divisible, so that there may be half, a third part, or a quarter of a thought, and the rest supposed; but also physically separable, or discerpible, together with the soul, wherein it is. They must also deny that there is an internal energy at all, or any other action besides that outside superficial action of local motion, and consequently make all cogitation nothing but local motion or translation. And lastly, they must maintain that no substance can co-exist with any other substance (as soul with body) otherwise than by juxta-position only, and by possessing the pores, or filling up the intervals thereof, as a net with the water.

And this is the first answer to the forementioned atheistic argument against incorporeal substance; that though whatsoever is extended be body, yet every thing is not extended; but that life, or mind and cogitation, are an unextended, indistant, and indivisible nature. But, as we have already intimated, there are other learned assertors of incorporeal substance, who, lest God and spirits, being thus made unextended, should quite vanish into nothing, answer that atheistic argumentation after a different manner, by granting to these Atheists that proposition, "that whatsoever is,

is extended; and what is unextended, is nothing;" but then denying that other of theirs, "that whatsoever is extended, is body;" they asserting another extension, specifically differing from that of bodies: for, whereas corporeal extension is not only impenetrable, so as that no one part thereof can enter into another, but also both mentally and really divisible, one part being in its nature separable from another; they affirm, that there is another incorporeal extension, which is both penetrable, and also indiscerpible, so that no one part thereof can possibly be separated from another, or the whole; and that to such an incorporeal extension as this belongeth life, cogitation, and understanding, the Deity having such an infinite extension, but all created spirits a finite and limited one, which also is in them supposed to be contractible and dilatable.[4] Now it is not our part here to oppose Theists, but Atheists: wherefore we shall leave these two sorts of Incorporealists to dispute it out friendly amongst themselves; and indeed therefore with the more moderation, equanimity, and toleration of dissent mutually, because it seemeth that some are in a manner fatally inclined to think one way in this controversy, and some another. And whatever the truth of the case be, it must be acknowledged that this latter hypothesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some in theism, who can by no means admit of a Deity, or any thing else, unextended; though, perhaps, there will not be wanting others also, who would go in a middle way betwixt these two, or compound them together, by supposing the Deity to be indeed altogether unextended, and all of it every where; but finite incorporeals, or created spirits, to have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension, whereby they are determined to a place, yet so as to be all in every part thereof; which outward extension is therefore not to be accounted body, because penetrable, contractible, and dilatable, and because no one part thereof is separable from the rest, by the rushing or incursion of any incorporeal thing upon them.[5] And thus is the Atheists' arguments against in-

[4] I have already shown in different places that not a few both of ancient and modern theologians and philosophers were devoted to this opinion.

[5] But I am afraid both parties will complain of this middle opinion being too obscure to be understood by those who consider that we ought to attend to the meanings of words rather than to the words themselves. I know not whether I possess intellect and perspicacity sufficient to comprehend matters so abstruse and intricate, but I freely confess myself at a loss to understand what the learned Doctor means when he tells us that "incorporeal natures have an unextended inside, a life or mind, diffusing itself into a certain amplitude of outward extension." The words are grand and magnificent enough; but I seek in vain for their meaning. To myself, indeed, any thing that possesses the power of expanding, dilating, and extending itself, seems to be in a certain measure corporeal, and to resemble those vehicles with which the Platonists are wont to invest the soul: but how that which is incorporeal, and nothing more than life or mind, can be the cause of its own extension, I am wholly at a loss to

corporeal substance answered two manner of ways; first, that there is something unextended; and, secondly, that if there were none, yet must there of necessity be a substance otherwise extended than body is, so as to be neither antitypous nor discerpible. And ourselves would not be understood here dogmatically to assert any thing in this point, save only what all Incorporealists do agree in, to wit, that besides body, which is impenetrably and divisibly extended, there is in nature another substance that is both penetrable of body and indiscerpible, or which doth not consist of parts separable from one another. And that there is at least such a substance as this, is unquestionably manifest from what hath been already declared.

But the Atheist will, in the next place, give an account of the original of this error (as he calls it) of incorporeal substance, and undertake to show from what mistake it proceeded, which is yet another pretended confutation thereof; namely, that it sprung partly from the abuse of abstract names and notions, men making substances of them; and partly from the scholastic essences, distinct from the things themselves, and said to be eternal. From both which delusions and dotages together the Atheists conceive that men have been first of all much confirmed in the belief of ghosts and spirits, demons and devils, invisible beings called by several names. Which belief had also another original, men's mistaking their own fancies for realities. The chief of all which affrightful ghosts and spectres, according to these Atheists, is the Deity, the Oberon, or prince of fairies and fancies. But then, whereas men, by their natural reason, could not conceive otherwise of these ghosts and spirits, than that they were a kind of thin, aërial bodies, their understandings have been so enchanted by these abstract names (which are indeed the names of nothing), and those separate essences and quiddities of scholastics, as that they have made incorporeal substances of them; the atheistic conclusion is, that they, who assert an incorporeal Deity, do really but make a scholastic separate essence, or the mere abstract notion of an accident, a

conceive. Do incorporeal souls resemble the nature of spiders, which we know are able out of themselves to surround themselves with an extended web? But I leave this to those whose minds are accustomed to the investigation of subjects so far above the vulgar comprehension; and should they ridicule my ignorance and stupidity, I will patiently bear with it, provided they will show me how these things which seem to me so contradictory, can be reconciled with each other. I leave the same parties to handle and determine the whole of this question, whether or not God and simple souls are in a certain way extended. Each side of it is involved in difficulties which no mortal is capable of solving. But yet many of those who contend so fiercely upon these subjects seem to me to be much less opposed to each other than they imagine. For the generality of those who hold the Deity and spirits to be extensible, when they come to explain this doctrine, and to show what extension they attribute to spirits, fortify their opinion by so many distinctions as to make it plainly appear that they differ but little from their adversaries.

substantial thing, and a ghost or spirit presiding over the whole world.[6]

To which our reply in general first of all is, that all this is nothing but idle romantic fiction; the belief of a Deity, and substance incorporeal, standing upon none of those imaginary foundations. And then, as for that impudent atheistic pretence, that the Deity is nothing but a figment or creature of men's fear and imagination, and therefore the prince of fairies and fancies; this hath been already sufficiently confuted in our answer to the first atheistic argumentation,* where we have also over and above showed, that there is not only a natural prolepsis or anticipation of a God in the minds of men, but also that the belief thereof is supported by the strongest and most substantial reason, his existence being indeed demonstrable, with mathematical evidence, to such as are capable, and not blinded with prejudice, nor enchanted with the witchcraft of vice and wickedness, to the debauching of their understandings. It hath been also showed that the opinion of other ghosts and spirits, besides the Deity, sprung not merely from fear and fancy neither, as children's bugbears, but from real phenomena; true sensible apparitions, with the histories of them in all ages, without which the belief of such things could never have held up so generally and constantly in the world. As likewise, that there is no repugnancy at all to reason, but that there may be as well aërial and ethereal, as there are terrestrial animals; and that the dull and earthy stupidity of men's minds is the only thing which makes them so prone to think that there is no understanding nature superior to mankind, but that in the world all is dead about us; and to disbelieve the existence of any thing, which themselves cannot either see or feel. Assuredly the Deity is no fancy, but the greatest reality in the world, and that, without which there could be nothing at all real, it being the only necessary existent; and consequently atheism is either mere sottishness, or else a strange kind of irreligious fanaticism.

We now further add, that the belief of ghosts and spirits incorporeal, and consequently of an incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridiculous mistake of the abstract names and notions of mere accidents for substances, nor from the scholastic

[6] This is aimed at Hobbes, who, as I have already intimated elsewhere, seems to have been not very far from supposing that the doctrine of incorporeal ghosts and spirits sprung in a great measure from the use of abstract names and words, and the forms and notions of things. But yet this philosopher nowhere transfers this opinion to an attack upon the divine nature: nor if he were alive would he own to all the corollaries that are charged upon him. The man was an enemy to all religion and piety, and assailed both publicly and in private the ministers of religion, and all their acts and institutions: hence it naturally followed that they suspected him of every wickedness, and imagined his opinions to have more impiety and poison in them than the words in which they were conveyed would seem to indicate.

* From p. 608 to 615. vol. 2.

essences, said to be eternal. For, as for the latter, none of those scholastics ever dreamed that there was any universal man, or universal horse, existing alone by itself, and separate from all singulars; nor that the abstract metaphysical essences of men, after they were dead, subsisting by themselves, did walk up and down amongst graves, in airy bodies: it being absolutely impossible that the real essence of any thing should be separable from the thing itself, or eternal, when that is not so. And were the essences of all things looked upon by these scholastics as substances incorporeal, then must they have made all things (even body itself) to be ghosts, and spirits, and incorporeal; and accidents also (they having their essences too) to be substantial. But in very truth, these scholastic essences, said to be eternal, are nothing but the intelligible essences of things, or their natures as conceivable, and objects of the mind. And in this sense it is an acknowledged truth, that the essences of things (as for example, of a sphere or triangle) are eternal, and such as were never made; because there could not otherwise be eternal verities concerning them. So that the true meaning of these eternal essences is indeed no other than this, that knowledge is eternal; or that there is an eternal mind that comprehendeth the intelligible natures and ideas of all things, whether actually existing or possible only, their necessary relations to one another, and all the immutable verities belonging to them. Wherefore, though these eternal essences themselves be no ghosts nor spirits, nor substances incorporeal, they being nothing but objective entities of the mind, or Noemata, and ideas; yet does it plainly follow from the necessary supposition of them (as was before declared), that there is one eternal unmade Mind and perfect incorporeal Deity, a real and substantial Ghost or Spirit, which comprehending itself, and all the extent of its own power, the possibility of things, and their intelligible natures, together with an exemplar or platform of the whole world, produced the same accordingly.[7]

But our atheistic argumentator yet further urges, that those scholastics and metaphysicians, who, because life or congitation can be considered alone abstractedly, without the consideration of body, therefore conclude it not to be the accident or action of a body, but a substance by itself (and which also, after men are dead, can walk amongst the graves), that these (I say) do so far abuse those abstract names and notions of mere accidents, as plainly to make substances incorporeal of them. To which therefore we reply also, that were the abstract notions of acci-

[7] The subject of essences, as they are called, and of their stability and eternity, is discussed by Dr. Cudworth more copiously and eruditely in his Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, book 4. cap. 3. 4. 5.

dents in general made incorporeal substances, by those philosophers aimed at, then must they have supposed all the qualities or affections of bodies, such as whiteness and blackness, heat and cold, and the like, to have been substances incorporeal also; a thing yet never heard, or thought of. But the case is far otherwise as to conscious life or cogitation, though it be an abstract also; because this is no accident of body, as the Atheist (serving his own hypothesis) securely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing else, but an essential attribute of another substance, distinct from body (or incorporeal), after the same manner as extension or magnitude is the essential attribute of body, and not a mere accident.

And now having so copiously confuted all the most considerable atheistic grounds, we are necessitated to dispatch those that follow, being of lesser moment, with all possible brevity and compendiousness. The four next, which are the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth atheistic argumentations, pretend to no more than only this, to disprove a corporeal Deity; or from the supposition that there is no other substance in the world besides body, to infer the impossibility of a God; that is, of an eternal unmade Mind, the maker and governor of the whole world: all which therefore signify nothing at all to the assertors of a Deity incorporeal, who are the only genuine Theists. Nevertheless, though none but Stoics, and such other Corporealists, as are notwithstanding Theists, be directly concerned in answer to them, yet shall we, first, so far consider the principles of the atheistic corporealism, contained in those two heads, the fifth and sixth, as from the absolute impossibility of these hypotheses to demonstrate a necessity of incorporeal substance, from whence a Deity will also follow.

Here, therefore, are these two atheistic hypotheses, founded upon the supposition that all is body: the first, in the way of qualities, generable and corruptible, which we call the Hylopathian; the second, in the way of unqualified atoms, which is the Atomic, Corporealism, and Atheism. The former of these was the most ancient, and the first sciography, or rude delineation of atheism. For Aristotle[8] tells us, that the most ancient Atheists were those who supposed matter or body, that is, bulky extension, to be the only substance, and unmade thing, that, out of which all things were made, and into which all things are again resolved; whatsoever is else in the world being nothing but the passions, qualities, and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, or producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again. From whence the necessary consequence is, that there

[8] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 264. tom. 4. opp. But on this and the following clause consult what we have remarked at great length on chap. 3. in reference to these matters.

is no eternal unmade life or understanding, or that mind is no god, or principle in the universe, but essentially a creature.

And this Hylopathian atheism, which supposeth whatsoever is in the universe to be either the substance of matter and bulk, or else the qualities and accidents thereof, generable and corruptible, hath been called also by us Anaximandrian. Though we deny not but that there might be formerly some difference amongst the Atheists of this kind; nor are we ignorant that Simplicius and others conceive Anaximander to have asserted, besides matter, qualities also eternal and unmade, or an homœomery, and similar atomology, just in the same manner as Anaxagoras afterwards did, save only that he would not acknowledge any unmade mind or life; Anaximander supposing all life and understanding whatsoever, all soul and mind, to have risen up and been generated from a fortuitous commixture of those similar atoms, or the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, and the like, contempered together. And we confess, that there is some probability for this opinion. Notwithstanding which, because there is no absolute certainty thereof, and because all these ancient Atheists agreed in this, that life and understanding are either first and primary, or else secondary qualities of body, generable and corruptible; therefore did we not think fit to multiply forms of atheism, but rather to make but one kind of atheism of all this, calling it indifferently, Hylopathian or Anaximandrian.

The second atheistic hypothesis is that form of atheism described under the sixth head, which likewise supposing body to be the only substance; and the principles thereof devoid of life and understanding, does reject all real qualities, according to the vulgar notion of them, and generate all things whatsoever, besides matter, merely from the combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or the contextures of unqualified atoms, life and understanding not excepted: which therefore, according to them, being no simple primitive and primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative, the mere creature of matter and motion, could not possibly be a God or first principle in the universe. This is that atomic atheism called Democritical; Leucippus and Democritus being the first founders thereof. For though there was, before them, another atomology, which made unqualified atoms the principles of all bodies, it supposing, besides body, substance incorporeal; yet were these, as Laertius[9] declareth, the first that ever made ἀρχας τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, "senseless atoms the principles of all things whatsoever, even of life and understanding, soul and mind."

[9] Lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573.

Indeed it cannot be denied, but that from these two things granted, that all is body, and that the principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no corporeal Deity. Wherefore the Stoics, who professed to acknowledge no other substance besides body, and yet nevertheless had a strong persuasion of the existence of a God, or an eternal unmade Mind, the Maker of the whole world, denied that other proposition of the atheistic Corporealists, that the principles of all bodies were devoid of life and understanding, they asserting an intellectual fire, eternal and unmade, the Maker of the whole mundane system; which postulatum, of a living intellectual body eternal, were it granted to these Stoics, yet could not this their corporeal god, notwithstanding, be absolutely incorruptible, as Origen often inculcateth;* Ὁ Θεὸς τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἐστὶ σῶμα, οὐκ αἰδουμένοις λέγειν αὐτὸν τρεπτὸν, καὶ δι' ὅλων ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς δυνάμενον φθαρῆναι, παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ φθεῖρον αὐτὸν, "God to the Stoics is a body, and therefore mutable, alterable, and changeable; and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible were there any other body to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he wants a corrupter or destroyer." And thus much was therefore rightly urged by the atheistic argumentator, that no corporeal Deity could be absolutely in its own nature incorruptible, nor otherwise than by accident only immortal, because of its divisibility. For were there any other matter without this world, to make inroads and incursions upon it, or to disunite the parts thereof, the life and unity of the Stoical corporeal God must needs be scattered and destroyed. And therefore of this Stoical God does the same Origen thus further write:† Ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν Θεὸς, ἅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων, ὁτὲ μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν, ὅταν ἡ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ· ὁτὲ δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεται αὐτῆς, ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις· οὐδὲ γὰρ δεδύνηνται οὗτοι τρανῶσαι τὴν φυσικὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔννοιαν, ὡς πάντῃ ἀφθάρτου καὶ ἁπλοῦ, καὶ ἀσυνθέτου, καὶ ἀδιαιρέτου, "The God of the Stoics being a body, hath sometimes the whole for its hegemonic in the conflagration; and sometimes only a part of the mundane matter. For these men were not able to reach to a clear notion of the Deity, as a being every way incorruptible, simple, uncompounded, and indivisible." Notwithstanding which, these Stoics were not therefore to be ranked amongst the Atheists, but far to be preferred before them, and accounted only a kind of imperfect Theists.[10]

* Lib. 1. Contra Cels. p. 17. † Page 169.

[10] I recollect having already spoken upon this subject elsewhere. What Origen objects against the Stoics is very probable and seems to follow from the first principles of their discipline. In my opinion however this sect, which is well known to have contained many very acute and talented men, would have had an answer to give to

But we shall now make it evident, that in both these atheistic corporealisms (agreeing in those two things, that body is the only substance, and that the principles of body are not vital) there is an absolute impossibility; not only because, as Aristotle[1] objecteth, they supposed no active principle; but also because their bringing of life and understanding (being real entities) out of dead and senseless matter is also the bringing of something out of nothing. And indeed the atomic Atheist is here of the two rather the more absurd and unreasonable, forasmuch as he, discarding all real qualities, and that for this very reason, because nothing can come out of nothing, doth himself notwithstanding, produce life, sense, and understanding (unquestionable realities) out of mere magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, that is, indeed out of nothing. Wherefore there being an absolute impossibility of both these atheistic hypotheses (neither of which is able to solve the phenomenon of life and understanding) from that confessed principle of theirs, that matter, as such, hath no life nor understanding belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there must be some other substance besides body or matter which is essentially vital and intellectual: Οὐ γὰρ πάντα χρῆται ἐπακτῷ ζωῇ,[2] "because all things cannot possibly have a peregrine, adventitious, and borrowed life," but something in the universe must needs have life naturally and originally. All life cannot be merely accidental, generable, and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again, but there must of necessity be some substantial life, which point (that all life is not a mere accident, but that there is life substantial) hath been of late, with much reason and judgment, insisted upon, and urged by the writer of "The Life of Nature." Neither must there be only such a substantial life, as is naturally immortal for the future, but only such as is eternal, and was never made; all other lives and minds whatsoever (none of which could possibly be generated out of matter) being derived from this eternal unmade fountain of life and understanding.

Which thing the hylozoic Atheists being well aware of, namely, that there must of necessity be both substantial and eternal unmade life, but supposing also matter to be the only substance, thought themselves necessitated to attribute to all matter as such, life and understanding, though not animalish and conscious, but natural only; they conceiving that, from the modification thereof alone by organization, all other animalish life,

Origen, especially at the time when many were in the habit of distributing matter into the dissoluble and indissoluble.

[1] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 265. tom. 4. opp. and elsewhere. The subject here treated of has already been expounded and illustrated in different places before.

[2] These words I am aware are from Plotinus, but in what part of this philosopher's works they are to be found I have neither leisure nor is it of much consequence to ascertain.

not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, was derived. But this hylozoic atheism, thus bringing all conscious and reflexive life or animality, out of a supposed senseless, stupid, and inconscious life of nature in matter, and that merely from a different accidental modification thereof, or contexture of parts, does again plainly bring something out of nothing, which is an absolute impossibility. Moreover, this hylozoic atheism was long since, and in the first emersion thereof, solidly confuted by the atomic Atheists, after this manner: If matter, as such, had life, perception, and understanding belonging to it, then of necessity must every atom, or smallest particle thereof be a distinct percipient by itself; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be any such men and animals as now are, compounded out of them, but every man and animal would be a heap of innumerable percipients and have innumerable perceptions and intellections; whereas it is plain, that there is but one life and understanding, one soul or mind, one perceiver or thinker in every one. And to say, that these innumerable particles of matter do all confederate together; that is, to make every man and animal to be a multitude or commonwealth of percipients, and persons, as it were, clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder the hylozoists should not rather choose to recant that their fundamental error of the life of matter, than endeavour to seek shelter and sanctuary for the same, under such a pretence. For though voluntary agents and persons may many of them resign up their wills to one, and by that means have all but as it were one artificial will, yet can they not possibly resign up their sense and understanding too, so as to have all but one artificial life, sense, and understanding; much less could this be done by senseless atoms, or particles of matter supposed to be devoid of all consciousness or animality. Besides which, there have been other arguments already suggested, which do sufficiently evince, that sense and understanding cannot possibly belong to matter any way, either originally or secondarily, to which more may be added elsewhere.

And now from these two things, that life and understanding do not essentially belong to matter as such, and that they cannot be generated out of dead and senseless matter, it is demonstratively certain, that there must be some other substance, besides body or matter. However, the Anaxamandrian and Democritic Atheists taking it for granted, that the first principles of body are devoid of all life and understanding, must either acknowledge a necessity of some other substance besides body, or else deny the truth of that axiom, so much made use of by themselves, that "nothing can come out of nothing." And this was our second undertaking, to show, that from the very principles of

the atheistic corporealism, represented in the fifth and sixth heads, incorporeal substance is against those Atheists themselves demonstrable.

Our third and last was this, that there being undeniably substance incorporeal, the two next following atheistic argumentations, built upon the contrary supposition, are therefore altogether insignificant also, and do no execution at all. The first of which (being the seventh) impugning only such a soul of the world, as is generated out of matter, is not properly directed against theism neither, but only such a form of atheism (sometime before mentioned) as indeed cometh nearest to theism. Which, though concluding all things to have sprung originally from senseless matter, Night and Chaos, yet supposes things from thence to have ascended gradually to higher and higher perfection; first, inanimate bodies, as the elements, then birds and other brute animals (according to the forementioned Aristophanic tradition, with which agreeth this of Lucretius,[3]

Principio genus alituum, variæque volucres),

afterward men, and in the last place gods; and that not only the animated stars, but Jupiter, or a soul of the world, generated also out of Night and Chaos, as well as all other things. We grant indeed, that the true and real Theists amongst the ancient Pagans also held the world's animation, and whosoever denied the same, were therefore accounted absolute Atheists. But the world's animation, in a larger sense, signifies no more than this, that all things are not dead about us, but that there is a living sentient and understanding nature eternal, that first framed the world, and still presideth over it: and it is certain, that in this sense all Theists whatsoever must hold the world's animation. But the generality of Pagan Theists held the world's animation also in a stricter sense; as if the world were truly and properly an animal, and therefore a god, completed and made up of soul and body together, as other animals are. Which soul of this great world-animal was to some of them the highest or supreme Deity, but to others only a secondary god, they supposing an abstract mind superior to it. But God's being the soul of the world in this latter Paganic sense, and the world's being an animal or a god, are things absolutely disclaimed and renounced by us. However, this seventh atheistic argument is not directed against the soul of the world in the sense of the Paganic Theists neither (this being, as they think, already confuted), but in the sense of the atheistic Theogonists; not an eternal unmade soul or mind, but a native or generated one only, such as resulted from the disposition of matter, and contexture of atoms, the off-

[3] De Rerum Natura, lib. 5. ver. 797. p. 333.

spring of night and chaos: the Atheists here pretending, after their confutation of the true and genuine theism, to take away all shadows thereof also, and so to free men from all manner of fear of being obnoxious to any understanding being, superior to themselves. Wherefore we might here omit the confutation of this argument, without any detriment at all to the cause of theism: nevertheless, because this in general is an atheistic assertion, that there is no life and understanding presiding over the whole world, we shall briefly examine the supposed grounds thereof, which alone will be a sufficient confutation of it. The first of them therefore is this, that there is no other substance in the world besides body; the second, that the principles of bodies are devoid of all life and understanding; and the last, that life and understanding are but accidents of bodies resulting from such a composition or contexture of atoms, as produceth soft flesh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, and of human form. From all which the conclusion is, that there can be no life and understanding in the whole, because it is not of human form, and organized, and hath no blood and brains. But neither is body the only substance, nor are life and understanding accidents resulting from any modification of dead and lifeless matter; nor is blood or brains that which understandeth in us, but an incorporeal soul or mind, vitally united to a terrestrial organized body; which will then understand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be clothed with a pure, spiritual, and heavenly one. But there is in the universe also a higher kind of intellectual animals, which, though consisting of soul and body likewise, yet have neither flesh, nor blood, nor brains, nor parts so organized as ours are.[4] And the most perfect mind and intellect of all is not the soul of any body, but complete in itself, without such vital union and sympathy with matter. We conclude therefore, that this passage of a modern writer:[5] "We worms cannot conceive, how God can understand without brains," is vox pecudis, the "language and philosophy" rather of worms or brute animals than of men.

The next, which is the eighth atheistic argument, is briefly this: that whereas the Deity by Theists is generally supposed to be a living Being perfectly happy, and immortal or incorruptible; there can be no such living being immortal, and consequently none perfectly happy. Because all living beings whatsoever are concretions of atoms, which as they were at first generated, so are they again liable to death and corruption; life being no simple primitive nature, nor substantial thing, but a mere accidental modification of compounded bodies only, which upon the

[4] He means the angels whom he before attempted to prove by many arguments to be corporeal or composed of body and soul.

[5] Hobbes. Consult our remarks above on chap. 5. sect. 6. § 26. p. 785.

disunion of their parts, or the disordering of their contexture, vanisheth again into nothing. And there being no life immortal, happiness must needs be a mere insignificant word, and but a romantic fiction. Where first, this is well, that the Atheists will confess, that according to their principles there can be no such thing at all as happiness, because no security of future permanency; all life perpetually coming out of nothing, and whirling back into nothing again. But this atheistic argument is likewise founded upon the former error, that body is the only substance, the first principles whereof are devoid of all life and understanding; whereas it is certain, that life cannot possibly result from any composition of dead and lifeless things; and therefore must needs be a simple and primitive nature. It is true, indeed, that the participated life in the bodies of animals (which yet is but improperly called life, it being nothing but their being actuated by a living soul) is a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible; since that body, which is now vitally united to a living soul, may be disunited again from it, and thereby become a dead and lifeless carcase; but the primary or original life itself is substantial, nor can there be any dead carcase of a human soul. That which hath life essentially belonging to the substance of it, must needs be naturally immortal, because no substance can of itself perish, or vanish into nothing. Besides which, there must be also some, not only substantial, but also eternal unmade Life, whose existence is necessary, and which is absolutely unannihilable by any thing else; which therefore must needs have perfect security of its own future happiness; and this is an incorporeal Deity. And this is a brief confutation of the eighth atheistic argument.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION IV.

1. The Epicurean Atheists further endeavour to disprove a God, from the phenomena of motion and cogitation. From motion thus; that, "Nothing can move itself, but whatsoever is moved, is moved by another," it will follow, that there can be no first cause, and unmoved mover, but one thing moved another, from eternity infinitely; because nothing could move another, which was not itself first moved by something else. 2. Answer: The meaning of this axiom; not that nothing can act from itself, as the Atheist supposes; he taking it for granted, that every thing is body, and that all action is local motion; but that no body resting could ever locally move itself. A false supposition of the Atheists and some Cartesians, that were there but once motion in the matter, this would of itself continue to all eternity. True, that of Aristotle; that to make an infinite progress in the causes of motion, and no first mover, is all one as to say, that there is no cause at all thereof. Wherefore from this principle, that no body can move itself, it follows, that there is some other substance in the world besides body, that hath an active power of moving body. 3. Another corollary from the same principle; that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and which is not heterokinesy, but autokinesy. All local motion caused originally by cogitation. Thus the ninth atheistic argument from motion confuted; and from hence, that no body can move itself demonstrated, that there is something incorporeal the first cause of local motion, by cogitation. 4. But the Atheists further pretend to prove, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of some other external agent upon him; because nothing taketh beginning from itself; and no cogitation can rise of itself, without a cause. That therefore thinking beings themselves are machines, and cogitation local motion. And, no understanding being a first cause, nor perfectly happy; because dependent upon something else. 5. Answer. True, that no substance beginning from itself; as also, that no action causeth itself. But false, that no action taketh beginning from the immediate agent; or, that nothing can act otherwise than as acted upon by something else. 6. True also, that our human cogitations are frequently occasioned from external objects, and that the concatenations of thoughts and phantasms often depend upon mechanic causes. But false, that all cogitations are obtruded upon us from without; and that no transition in our thoughts, which was not before in sense. The human soul a principle of actions, and therefore also of cogitations. This a bubbling fountain of thoughts. 7. This a prodigious paradox, and falsity of Atheists; that cogitation, local motion; and thinking beings, machines. Here a change of our opinion of what we wrote before; that not only a modern writer, but also the ancient Atomists, did conclude cogitation to be really nothing else but local motion. Nevertheless, these men troubled with the fancy of cogitation; which because they cannot make local motion, they would persuade us to be no reality. Atheists aware, that if there be

any action besides local motion, there must then be some other substance acknowledged besides body. They, who make cogitation local motion, and men machines, no more to be disputed with. 8. To affirm, that no understanding being can be happy, nor a God, because dependent upon something without it, all one as to affirm, that senseless matter is the most perfect of all things; and that knowledge, as such, speaking imperfection, is but a fantastic thing. Thus the tenth atheistic argument confuted. 9. Another atheistic argument, from the nature of knowledge and understanding. That the world could not be made by an understanding Being, because there was no knowledge before things, which are the objects of it; and the only things are sensibles, which knowledge a passion from. Therefore all mind, as such, a creature, and none a creator. 10. This already fully answered. Where proved, that singular bodies are not the only things, and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its intelligibles within itself. And that knowledge is archetypal to the world, and the maker of all. So the existence of a God demonstrable from the nature of knowledge and understanding. 11. That the Atheists can no more solve the phenomenon of cogitation, than that of local motion, evident from their many hallucinations concerning it. First, that all life and understanding a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, and no life nor mind substantial or essential. This before confuted. 12. Again, that life and mind no simple and primitive natures, but compounded syllables of things; and therefore none immortal nor incorruptible. Answer; that life and understanding are active powers, and could never result from mere passive bulk; nor can any composition of senseless matter possibly beget life. Though no necessity, that there should be any eternal unmade red or green; nor that there should be eternal motion; nor that there should be any eternal unmade matter: yet an absolute necessity of eternal unmade life and mind; because had there been once none, there could never have been any. 13. Another Atheistic hallucination, that there is nothing of self-activity in cogitation; nor any thing could act otherwise, than as it is made to act by something else. This to bring all action from nothing, or to suppose it without a cause. 14. Another madness of theirs already mentioned, that cogitation, local motion, and thinking beings, machines. 15. Another paradox of the Epicurean and Democritic Atheists, that mental cogitation, as well as sensation, the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without him; some of them supposing thoughts to be caused by certain finer images than sensations; others, that they are the remainders of the motions of sense, formerly made. Answer; that sensation itself is not a mere corporeal passion, but the perception of a passion, in a way of fancy; much less mental cogitations such; and least of all volitions. 16. But consentaneously hereunto, these Atheists determine all knowledge and understanding to be really the same thing with sense. From whence follow two absurdities; first, That there can be no such thing as error, because all passion is true passion, and all sense, true sense. This absurdity owned by Protagoras. Epicurus endeavoured to avoid this, but contradictiously to his own principles. 17. A second absurdity consequent thereupon; that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, but all knowledge private and relative, and nothing but opinion. This freely owned likewise by Protagoras. Sometimes also by Democritus. 18. Another atheistic error; that singular bodies are the only objects of mental conception as well as of sensation. This imputed by Aristotle to Democritus and Protagoras. But sufficiently before confuted. 19. The better to maintain

this paradox, added by a modern Atheistic writer, as his own invention; that universals are nothing else but names by which many singular bodies are called; axioms or propositions, the addition and substraction of names; and syllogistic reasoning, the reckoning the consequences of them: and that we know nothing at all of any thing, but only the names by which it is called. 20. That the Atheists endeavour to depreciate knowledge and understanding, as that which speaks no higher perfection than is in senseless matter. Thus the Atheists in Plato make it but a ludicrous thing. Their design in this, to take away the scale of entities. 21. All the grounds of this again briefly confuted, and particularly that opinion that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, out of Boetius. Just and unjust greater realities in nature than hard and soft, &c. Unquestionably a scale of entities; and therefore certain that the order of things must be in way of descent from higher perfection to lower; and not of ascent. The steps of this ladder not infinite; the foot thereof inanimate matter; the head, a perfect omnipotent being, comprehending in itself all possibilities of things. 22. The reason why we so much insist upon this; because Atheists pretend not only to solve the phenomenon of cogitation without a God, but also from thence to demonstrate the impossibility of his existence. The controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists thus stated by *Plato*; whether Soul and Mind junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof; or else substantial things, and in order of nature before it. Accordingly Plato confuteth Atheism no otherwise than by proving Soul not to be junior to inanimate matter, and generated out of the same. Those professed Christians who generate rational souls out of senseless matter, plain betrayers of the cause of Theism. Nor is the case much different as to others; who, though they professedly generate only sensitive souls, yet making the rational but mere blanks, and so knowledge in its own nature, junior to sense and sensibles; highly gratifying the Atheists hereby. 23. If any life may be generated out of senseless matter, then can no good reason be given why all should not be. Life not partly accidental, party substantial; but either all conscious life, generable and corruptible; or else none at all. 24. The doctrine of real qualities generable and corruptible, favourable to Atheism also. And, though the Atomists explode all the other qualities, because *nothing can come from nothing*; yet, contradicting themselves again, do they make life and understanding real qualities generated out of matter, or caused by nothing. 25. There being a scale of entities in nature, to produce a higher rank of beings out of a lower; as life and cogitation out of matter and magnitude is to invert the order of this scale from downwards to upwards, and so to lay a foundation for atheism. 26. The grand objection against the substantiality of sensitive souls, from that consequence of their permanent subsistence after death. Cartesius so sensible thereof, that he would rather make brutes to be senseless machines, than allow them substantial souls; which he granted they must have, if thinking beings. What clearly demonstrable by reason, not to be abandoned, because attended with some difficulties. 27. The Pythagoric hypothesis; that souls all created by God, not in the generation of animals, but in the Cosmogonia. These therefore first clothed with subtle bodies, aerial or ethereal Ochemata, wherein they subsist, both before their ingress into terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. Thus Boetius, Proclus, and Ammonius. Since the first creation, no new substantial thing made or destroyed, and therefore no life. That the Pythagoreans would endeavour to gain some countenance for this

hypothesis from the scripture. 28. But if these aerial vehicles of brutish souls be exploded, and none but terrestrial bodies allowed to them; though after death they will not vanish into nothing, yet must they needs remain in a state of insensibility, till re-united to other terrestrial bodies. Wherefore these in one sense mortal, though in another immortal. Silkworms dying, and reviving in the form of butterflies, made an emblem of the resurrection by Christian theologers. 29. But no absolute necessity that the souls of brutes should have a permanent subsistence after death, because whatsoever created by God may possibly by him be annihilated. The substantiality only of the rational soul demonstrable by reason; or that it will not of itself vanish into nothing; but not that it is absolutely impossible for it to be annihilated. Porphyrius' assertion, that brutish souls are resolved into the life of the universe. The whole answer to this objection against the substantiality of brutish souls: that they may, notwithstanding, possibly be annihilated in the deaths of animals, as well as they were created in their generations: but if they do subsist, they must remain in a state of inactivity. 30. That this doctrine of the ancient Pagan theologers, that no life generated out of senseless matter; but all produced by the Deity, as well as matter, proved out of Virgil. 31. The Hylozoic Atheists themselves so sensible thereof, that there must be some substantial and unmade life, that they attribute the same to matter; and conclude that though the modificated lives of animals and men be accidental, generated, and corrupted, yet the fundamental life of them is incorruptible. 32. This Hylozoic Atheism again confuted. Absurd to suppose knowledge and understanding without consciousness; as also that the substantial life of men and other animals should never perish, and yet their souls vanish into nothing. That no organization can produce consciousness. These Atheists not able possibly to give an account whence the intelligible objects and ideas of this their knowledge of matter, should spring. This Hylozoic atheism nothing but the crumbling of the Deity into matter. 33. Concluded, that the phenomenon of mind and understanding can no way possibly be solved by Atheists without a God; but affordeth a solid demonstration of his existence.

BUT the Democritic Atheist proceeds, endeavouring further to disprove a God from the phenomena of motion and cogitation, in the three following argumentations. First therefore, whereas Theists commonly bring an argument from motion, to prove a God, or first unmoved mover, the Atheists contend, on the contrary, that, from the very nature of motion, the impossibility of any such first unmoved mover is clearly demonstrable. For, it being an axiom of undoubted truth concerning motion, that "whatsoever is moved, is moved by some other thing;" or, that "nothing can move itself;" it follows from thence unavoidably, that there is no æternum Immobile, no "eternal unmoved Mover;" but on the contrary, that there was æternum Motum, an "eternal Moved;" or, that one thing was moved by another, from eternity infinitely, without any first mover or cause, because as nothing could move itself, so could nothing ever move another, but what was itself before moved by something else.[1]

[1] Compare this with our remarks above on chap. 2. sect. 13. But if this argument

To which we reply, That this axiom, "whatsoever is moved, is moved by another, and not by itself," was, by Aristotle, and those other philosophers, who made so much use thereof, restrained to the local motion of bodies only; that no body locally moved was ever moved originally from itself, but from something else. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore nihil movetur nisi à moto, "that no body was ever moved, but by some other body," that was also before moved by something else; or, that of necessity one body was moved by another body, and that by another, and so backwards, infinitely, without any first unmoved or self-moving and self-active mover, as the Democritic Atheist fondly conceits; for the motion of bodies might proceed (as unquestionably it did) from something else, which is not body, and was not before moved. Moreover, the Democritic Atheist here also, without any ground, imagines that were there but one push once given to the world, and no more, this motion would from thenceforward always continue in it, one body still moving another to all eternity. For though this be indeed a part of the Cartesian hypothesis, that, according to the laws of nature, a body moving will as well continue in motion as a body resting in rest, until that motion be communicated and transferred to some other body; yet is the case different here, where it is supposed not only one push to have been given to the world at first, but also the same quantity of motion or agitation to be constantly conserved and maintained. But to let this pass, because it is something a subtle point, and not so rightly understood by many of the Cartesians themselves, we say, that it is a thing utterly impossible that one body should be moved by another infinitely, without any first cause or mover, which was self-active, and that not from the authority of Aristotle[2] only,

were as strong and powerful as it is weak and idle, still it would not disprove the being of a God, but merely tell against those who assert such a God as right reason and the scriptures teach us to believe in. In the first place, this argument is of no avail against those who hold the world to be eternal and at the same time acknowledge an immaterial God: an opinion formerly entertained it is well known by philosophers of no ordinary rank. Again it cannot touch those who erroneously suppose the Deity to be corporeal: to whose number belong many of the ancient Christian fathers. Lastly, to say nothing now of others, it has no weight against such as believe that God is a certain most subtle spirit diffused through the whole nature of things.

[2] Physicar. Auscult. lib. 8. cap. 5. p. 537. tom. 1. opp. With all due deference however to our worthy author, I would not venture to avail myself of the precepts of Aristotle on the beginning and causes of motion for the refutation of Atheists. For they seem to me to aid and support rather than refute this impious class of men, and to be much at variance with the opinion of Christian philosophers on the origin of motion. Aristotle, it must be owned, in the last book of his Metaphysics and in lib. 8. Physicar. Auscult. speaks in most magnificent terms of a first cause of motion, which is itself devoid of all external motion; and some have been led by these words of his to contend that the man entertained sentiments worthy of a Christian: but on examining the whole it will appear that what he gives with one hand he takes away again with the other. He asserts motion to have a beginning: but not in respect of time: for he endeavours to prove by many arguments, lib. 8. Physicar. cap. 1. 2. p. 576. &c. that

pronouncing οὔτε δυνατὸν ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον, &c. "that in the causes of motion there could not possibly be an infinite progress;" but from the reason there subjoined by Aristotle, because, εἴπερ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, "if there were no first unmoved mover, there could be no cause of motion at all." For were all the motion, that is in the world, a passion from something else, and no first unmoved active mover, then must it be a passion from no agent, or without an action, and consequently proceed from nothing, and either cause itself, or be made without a cause. Now the ground of the Atheist's error here is only from hence, because he taketh it for granted, that there is no other substance besides body, nor any other action but local motion; from whence it comes to pass, that to him this proposition, "No body can move itself," is one and the same with this, "Nothing can act from itself, or be self-active."

And thus is the atheistic pretended demonstration against a God, or first cause, from motion, abundantly confuted; we having made it manifest, that there is no consequence at all in this argument, that because no body can move itself, therefore there can be no first unmoved mover; as also having discovered the ground of the Atheist's error here, their taking it for granted, that there is nothing but body; and lastly, having plainly showed, that it implies a contradiction there should be action and motion in the world, and yet nothing self-moving or self-active: so that it is demonstratively certain from motion, that there is a first cause, or unmoved mover. We shall now further add, that from the principle acknowledged by the Democritic Atheists themselves, "That no body can move itself," it follows also undeniably, that there is some other substance besides body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmoved mover of the heavens or world. For if no body from eternity was ever able to move itself, and yet there must of necessity be some active cause of that motion, which is in the world (since it could not cause itself) then is there unquestionably some other substance besides body, which having a power of moving matter, was the first cause of motion, itself being unmoved.

motion is eternal and without all beginning: therefore in respect of cause only. But this is sheer nonsense. For my part I consider this proposition: The motion of matter is eternal and yet produced by some cause, to be self-repugnant and absurd. For if the motion of matter is eternal and never had a beginning, it is also without a cause: but if it has a cause, in my opinion, it cannot properly be said to be eternal. I do not envy those who pretend that eternity of motion, coupled with an eternal cause, is a thing which they can easily comprehend: but I freely confess my own inability to understand it, and suppose that Aristotle by defending its eternity discards its cause, and by maintaining its cause and beginning, in reality does away with its eternity. I should say the same of the junior Platonists who follow in Aristotle's footsteps, and assert the world to be eternal and yet at the same time created by God.

Moreover, it is certain from hence also, that there is another species of action, distinct from local motion, and such as is not heterokinesy, but autokinesy, or self-activity. For since the local motion of body is essentially heterokinesy, not caused by the substance itself moving, but by something else acting upon it, that action, by which local motion is first caused, cannot be itself local motion, but must be autokinesy, or "self-activity, that which is not a passion from any other agent," but springs from the immediate agent itself, which species of action is called "cogitation." All the local motion, that is in the world, was first caused by some cogitative or thinking being, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all locally moved, but only mentally, is the immoveable mover of the heaven, or vortices. So that "cogitation" is, in order of nature, before "local motion," and "incorporeal" before "corporeal substance," the former having a natural imperium upon the latter. And now have we not only confuted the ninth atheistic argument from motion, but also demonstrated against the Democritic Atheists from their own principle, that there is an incorporeal and cogitative substance, the first immoveable mover of the heavens and vortices; that is, an incorporeal Deity.

But the Democritic Atheist will yet make a further attempt to prove, that there can be nothing self-moving or self-active, and that no thinking being could be a first cause; he laying his foundation in this principle, that "nothing taketh its beginning from itself," but from the action of some other agent without it. From whence he would infer, that cogitation itself is heterokinesy, the passion of the thinker, and the action of something without it, no cogitation ever rising up of itself without a cause; and that cogitation is indeed nothing but local motion or mechanism, and all living understanding beings machines, moved from without; and then make this conclusion, that therefore no understanding being could possibly be a first cause: he further adding also, that no understanding being as such, can be perfectly happy neither, as the Deity is supposed to be, because dependent upon something without it: and this is the tenth atheistic argumentation.

Where we shall first consider that, which the Democritic Atheist makes his fundamental principle, or common notion to disprove all autokinesy or self-activity by, that "Nothing taketh beginning from itself," but "from the action of some other thing without it." Which axiom, if it be understood of substantial things, then is it indeed acknowledged by us to be unquestionably true, it being the same with this, "That no substance, which once was not, could ever possibly cause itself, or bring itself into being; but must take its beginning from the action of something else:" but then it will make nothing at all against

theism. As it is likewise true, that no action whatsoever (and therefore no cogitation) taketh beginning from itself, or causeth itself to be, but is always produced by some substantial agent; but this will no way advantage the Atheist neither. Wherefore, if he would direct his force against theism, he ought to understand this proposition thus, that no action whatsoever taketh beginning from the immediate agent (which is the subject of it), but from the action of some other thing without it; or, that nothing can move or act otherwise, than as it is moved and acted upon by something else. But this is only to beg the question, or to prove the thing in dispute, identically, that nothing is self-active, because nothing can act from itself. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not possibly be any motion or action at all in the universe, were there not something self-moving or self-active, for as much as otherwise all that motion or action would be a passion from nothing, and be made without a cause.

And whereas the Atheists would further prove, that no cogitation taketh its beginning from the thinker, but always from the action of some other thing without it, after this manner; because it is not conceivable why this cogitation, rather than that, should start up at any time, were there not some cause for it, without the thinker: here, in the first place, we freely grant, that our human cogitations are indeed commonly occasioned by the incursions of sensible objects upon us; as also, that the concatenations of those thoughts and phantasms in us, which are distinguished from sensations (whether we be asleep or awake) do many times depend upon corporeal and mechanical causes in the brain. Notwithstanding which, that all our cogitations are obtruded and imposed upon us from without; and that there is no transition in our thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in sense (which the Democritic Atheist avers); this is a thing which we absolutely deny. For, had we no mastery at all over our thoughts, but they were all like tennis-balls, bandied, and struck upon us, as it were, by rackets from without, then could we not steadily and constantly carry on any designs and purposes of life. But on the contrary, that of Aristotle[3] is most true (as will be elsewhere further proved), that man, and all rational beings, are in some sense, ἀρχὴ πράξεων, "a principle of actions," subordinate to the Deity; which they could not possibly be were they not also a principle of cogitations, and had some com-

[3] See lib. 3. Eth. ad Nicomachum, cap. 3. p. 37. tom. 3. and Magnor. Moral. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 202. 204. Δῆλον οὖν, says he, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν πράξεων ἐστὶ γεννητικὸς, "It is manifest that man is the cause of his own actions:" and a little afterwards: Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐστὶ πράξεως καὶ σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, προαίρεσις καὶ βούλησις, καὶ τὸ κατὰ λόγον πᾶν, "The deliberate choice and will and every thing pertaining to reason are a principle of action both good and bad."

mand over them; but these were all as much determined by causes without, as the motions of the weathercock are. The rational soul is itself an active and bubbling fountain of thoughts; that perpetual and restless desire, which is as natural and essential to us as our very life, continually raising up and protruding new and new ones in us, which are as it were offered to us. Besides which, we have also a further self-recollective power, and a power of determining and fixing our mind and intention upon some certain objects, and of ranging our thoughts accordingly. But the Atheist is here also to be taught yet a further lesson, that an absolutely perfect mind (such as the Deity is supposed to be), doth not (as Aristotle[4] writeth of it) ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν, "sometimes understand, and sometime not understand:" it being ignorant of nothing, nor syllogizing about any thing but comprehending all intelligibles with their relations and verities at once within itself; and its essence and energy being the same. Which notion, if it be above the dull capacity of Atheists, who measure all perfection by their own scantling, this is a thing that we cannot help.

But as for that prodigious paradox of Atheists, that cogitation itself is nothing but local motion or mechanism, we could not have thought it possible that ever any man should have given entertainment to such a conceit, but that this was rather a mere slander raised upon Atheists; were it not certain from the records of antiquity, that whereas the old religious atomists did, upon good reason, reduce all corporeal action (as generation, augmentation, and alteration) to local motion, or translation from place to place (there being no other motion besides this conceivable in bodies); the ancient Atheizers of that philosophy (Leucippus and Democritus) not contented herewith, did really carry the business still on further, so as to make cogitation itself also nothing but local motion. As it is also certain that a modern atheistic pretender to wit[5] hath publicly owned this same conclusion, that "mind is nothing else but local motion in the organic parts of man's body." These men have been sometimes indeed a little troubled with the fancy, apparition, or seeming of cogitation that is, the consciousness of it, as knowing not well what to make thereof; but then they put it off again, and satisfy themselves worshipfully with this, that fancy is but fancy, but the reality of cogitation nothing but local motion; as if there were not as much reality in fancy and consciousness as there is in local motion. That which inclined these men so

[4] On the passage of Aristotle which contains the few words here adduced by the learned Doctor by way of illustration, I have already offered some remarks in the preceding.

[5] It is scarcely necessary to observe that he is alluding to Hobbes, whose passages in defence of this opinion I have already quoted on chap. 2.

much to this opinion, was only because they were sensible and aware of this, that if there were any other action, besides local motion admitted, there must needs be some other substance acknowledged, besides body. Cartesius indeed undertook to defend brute animals to be nothing else but machines; but then he supposed that there was nothing at all of cogitation in them, and consequently nothing of true animality or life, no more than is in an artificial automaton, as a wooden eagle, or the like: nevertheless, this was justly thought to be paradox enough. But that cogitation itself should be local motion, and men nothing but machines, this is such a paradox, as none but either a stupid and besotted, or else an enthusiastic, bigotical, or fanatic Atheist could possibly give entertainment to. Nor are such men as these fit to be disputed with any more than a machine is.

But whereas the Atheistic objector adds also, over and above, in the last place, that no understanding Being can be perfectly happy neither, and therefore not a God, because essentially dependent upon something else without it; this is all one, as if he should say, that there is no such thing as happiness at all in nature; because it is certain, that without consciousness or understanding nothing can be happy (since it could not have any fruition of itself), and if no understanding Being can be happy neither, then must the conclusion needs be that of the Cyrenaics,[6] that *εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον*, "happiness is a mere chimera," a fantastic notion or fiction of men's minds; a thing which hath no existence in nature. These are the men who afterwards argue from interest also against a God and religion; notwithstanding that they confess their own principles to be so far from promising happiness to any, as that they absolutely cut off all hopes thereof. It may be further observed also in the last place, that there is another of the Atheists dark mysteries here likewise couched, that there is no scale or ladder of entity and perfection in nature, one above another; the whole universe, from top to bottom, being nothing but one and the same senseless matter, diversely modified. As also that understanding, as such, rather

[6] I am not aware of the source from which Dr. Cudworth obtained what he here states respecting the Cyrenaics: but I know that it is not strictly true. The sect of philosophers called Cyrenaic did not discard all *εὐδαιμονία*, or happiness, but ranked it among the pleasures of the body. Diogenes Laërtius, De Vita Philos. lib. 2. sect. 37. p. 131. says: *Εὐδαιμονίαν δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, αἷς συναριθμοῦνται καὶ παρῳχηκυῖαι καὶ μέλλουσαι.* "A happy life or felicity is supposed by them to consist of an aggregation of particular pleasures, comprising both those past and those to come." Sextus Empiricus, lib. 7. adv. Mathematicos, sect. 2. p. 372. tells us that the Cyrenaics despise the study of natural things and the art of reasoning, *ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα*, "as contributing nothing towards a happy life." Consequently they both acknowledged that there is such a thing as happiness, and supposed it to be the part of a wise man to try to obtain it. But the learned Doctor probably understood the word *εὐδαιμονία* here in a narrower sense as referring to the felicity of the mind, in which case he was right in saying that the Cyrenaics would not admit of the existence of felicity.

speaks imperfection; it being but a mere whiffling, evanid, and fantastic thing; so that the most absolutely perfect of all things in the universe is grave, solid, and substantial senseless matter: of which more afterwards. And thus is the tenth atheistic argumentation also confuted.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will make yet a further assault from the nature of knowledge, understanding, after this manner; if the world were made by a God, or an antecedent mind and understanding, having in itself an exemplar or platform thereof, before it was made, then must there be actual knowledge both in order of nature and time, before things; whereas things, which are the objects of knowledge and understanding, are unquestionably in order of nature before knowledge; this being but the signature of them, and a passion from them. Now, the only things are singular sensibles or bodies. From whence it follows, that mind is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the world; or that the world was before knowledge, and the conception of any mind; and no knowledge or mind before the world as its cause. Which is the eleventh atheistic argumentation.

But we have prevented ourselves here in the answer to this argument (which would make all knowledge, mind, and understanding junior to the world, and the very creature of sensibles), having already fully confuted it; and clearly proved that singular bodies are not the only things and objects of the mind, but that it containeth its immediate intelligibles within itself; which intelligibles also are eternal, and that mind is no fantastic image of sensibles, nor the stamp and signature of them, but archetypal to them; the first mind being that of a perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or the possibilities of all things. So that knowledge is older than all sensible things; mind senior to the world, and the architect thereof. Wherefore we shall refer the reader for an answer to this argument, to vol. 3. page 59, and so onwards, where the existence of a God (that is, a mind before the world) is demonstrated also from this very topic, viz. the nature of knowledge and understanding.

We shall in this place only add, that as the Atheists can no way solve the phenomenon of motion, so can they much less that of cogitation, or life and understanding. To make which yet the more evident, we shall briefly represent a syllabus or catalogue of the many atheistic hallucinations or delirations concerning it. As first, that senseless matter being the only substance, and all things else but accidental modifications thereof; life and mind is all a mere accidental thing, generable and corruptible, producible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and that there is no substantial life or mind any where. In opposition

to which, we have before proved, that there must of necessity be some substantial life, and that human souls being lives substantial, and not mere accidental modifications of matter, they are consequently in their own nature immortal, since no substance of itself ever vanisheth into nothing.

Again, the Democritics, and other Atheists conclude, that life and mind are no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and compounded things; they resulting from certain concretions and contextures of matter, and either the commixtures and contemporations of qualities, or else the combinations of those simple elements of magnitude, figure, site, and motion; and so being made up of that which hath nothing of life or mind in it. For as flesh is not made out of fleshy particles, nor bone out of bony (as Anaxagoras of old dreamed), so may life, as they conceive, be as well made out of lifeless principles, and mind out of that which hath no mind or understanding at all in it: just as syllables pronounceable do result from combinations of letters, some of which are mutes, and cannot by themselves be pronounced at all, others but semi-vocal. And from hence do these Atheists infer, that there could be no eternal unmade life or mind, nor any that is immortal or incorruptible; since upon the dissolution of that compages or contexture of matter, from whence they result, they must needs vanish into nothing. Wherefore according to them, there hath probably sometime heretofore been no life nor understanding at all in the universe, and there may possibly be none again. From whence the conclusion is, that mind and understanding is no God, or principle in the universe; it being essentially factitious, native, and corruptible; or, as they express it in Plato,[7] θνητὸς ἐκ θνητῶν, "mortal from mortal things:" as also, that the souls of men cannot subsist separately after death, and walk up and down in airy bodies; no more than the form of a house or tree, after the dissolution thereof, can subsist by itself separately, or appear in some other body. But all this foolery of Atheists hath been already confuted, we having before showed that life and understanding are active powers, vigours, and perfections, that could never possibly result from mere passive bulk, or dead and senseless matter, however modified and compounded; because nothing can come effectively from nothing. Neither is there any consequence at all in this, that because flesh is not made out of fleshy principles, nor bone out of bony, red out of red things, nor green out of green; therefore life and understanding may as well be compounded of things dead and senseless: because these are no syllables or complexions, as the others are, nor can either the qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry; or else magnitudes,

[7] De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 666.

figures, sites, and motions, however combined together, as letters spell them out, and make them up; but they are simple and primitive things. And accordingly it hath been proved, that there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind. For though there be no necessity that there should be any eternal unmade red, or green, because red and green may be made out of things not red nor green, they, and all other corporeal qualities (so called) being but several contextures of matter, or combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, causing those several fancies in us: and though there be no necessity that there should be eternal motion, because, if there were once no motion at all in matter, but all bodies rested, yet might motion have been produced by a self-moving or self-active principle: and lastly, though there be no necessity that there should be eternal unmade matter or body neither, because had there been once no body at all, yet might it be made or produced by a perfect omnipotent incorporeal being: nevertheless, is there an absolute necessity that there should be eternal unmade life, and mind, because were there once no life nor mind at all, these could never have been produced out of matter altogether lifeless and mindless. And though the form of a house cannot possibly exist separately from the matter and substance thereof, it being a mere accidental thing, resulting from such a compages of stone, timber, and mortar, yet are human souls and minds no such accidental forms of compounded matter, but active substantial things, that may therefore subsist separately from these bodies, and enliven other bodies of a different contexture. And however some, that are no Atheists, be over prone to conceive life, sense, cogitation, and consciousness in brutes, to be generated out of dead, senseless, and unthinking matter (they being disposed thereunto by certain mistaken principles and ill methods of philosophy), nevertheless is this unquestionably in itself a seed of atheism; because if any life, cogitation, and consciousness may be produced out of dead and senseless matter, then can no philosophy hinder, but that all might have been so.

But the Democritic Atheists will yet venture further to deny that there is any thing in nature self-moving or self-active, but that whatsoever moveth and acteth, was before moved by something else, and made to act thereby; and again, that from some other thing, and so backward infinitely; from whence it would follow, that there is no first in the order of causes, but an endless retro-infinity. But as this is all one as to affirm that there is no such thing at all as life in the world, but that the universe is a compages of dead and stupid matter, so has this infinity in the order of causes been already exploded for an absolute impossibility.

Nevertheless, the Atheists will here advance yet an higher paradox; that all action whatsoever, and therefore cogitation, fancy, and consciousness itself, is really nothing else but local motion; and consequently not only brute animals, but also men themselves mere machines, which is an equal, either sottishness or impudence, as to assert a triangle to be a square, or a sphere, a cube, number to be figure, or any thing else to be any thing: and it is really all one as to affirm, that there is indeed no such thing in ourselves as cogitation; there being no other action in nature but local motion and mechanism.

Furthermore, the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists universally agree in this, that not only sensations, but also all the cogitations of the mind, as the mere passions of the thinker, and the actions of bodies existing without upon him; though they do not all declare themselves after the same manner herein. For first, the Democritics conclude that sense is caused by certain grosser corporeal effluvia, streaming from the surfaces of bodies continually, and entering through the nerves; but that all other cogitations of the mind, and men's either sleeping or waking imaginations, proceed from another sort of simulachra, idols, and images of a more fine and subtle contexture, coming into the brain, not through those open tubes or channels of the nerves, but immediately through all the smaller pores of the body: so that, as we never have sense of anything but by means of those grosser corporeal images, obtruding themselves upon the nerves, so have we not the least cogitation at any time in our mind neither, which was not caused by those finer corporeal images and exuvious membranes, or effluvia, rushing upon the brain or contexture of the soul.[8] Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος τὴν Αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν Νόησιν Εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προϊόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος, "Leucippus and Democritus determined, that as well Noesis as Aisthesis, mental cogitation as external sensation, was caused by certain corporeal idols coming from bodies without; since neither sensation nor cogitation could otherwise possibly be produced." And thus does Laërtius[9] also represent the sense of these atheistic philosophers, that the effluvia from bodies called idols were the only causes, τῶν κατὰ ψυχὴν κινημάτων καὶ βουλημάτων ἑκάστων καὶ ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν, "of all the motions, passions, and affections, and even the very volitions of the soul." So that as we could not have the least

[8] These are Plutarch's words, De Placitis Philos. lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 899. tom. 2. opp. On the images or idols which Leucippus and Democritus believed in, I have already commented at some length.

[9] The learned Doctor's memory has here deceived him. Laërtius has recorded nothing of the kind with regard to Leucippus: but it is true that he attributes this opinion to Democritus, lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573. Whether the Greek words which follow are Dr. Cudworth's own, he being frequently in the habit of explaining his own opinion in Greek, or taken from some ancient Greek writer, I am unable to say.

sensation, imagination, nor conception of any thing otherwise than from those corporeal effluvia, rushing upon us from bodies without, and begetting the same in us, at such a time; so neither could we have any passion, appetite, or volition, which we were not in like manner corporeally passive to. And this was the ground of the Democritic fate or necessity of all human actions, maintained by them, in opposition to the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or "liberty of will," which cannot be conceived without self-activity and something of contingency; they supposing human volitions also, as well as all the other cogitations, to be mechanically caused and necessitated from those effluvious images of bodies coming in upon the willers. And, however Epicurus sometime pretended to assert liberty of will against Democritus, yet, forgetting himself, did he also here securely philosophize after the very same manner:*

> Nunc age, quæ moveant animum res, accipe paucis;
> Quæ veniunt, veniant in mentem, percipe paucis.
> Principiò hoc dico, rerum simulacra vagari, &c.

But others there are amongst the ancient Atomists, who could not conceive sensations themselves to be thus caused by corporeal effluvia, or exuvious membranes streaming from bodies continually, and that for divers reasons alleged by them; but only by a pressure from them upon the optic nerve, by reason of a tension of the intermedious air, or ether, (being that, which is called light;) whereby the distant object is touched and felt, οἷον διὰ βακτηρίας,[10] "as it were by a staff." Which hypothesis concerning the corporeal part of sense is indeed much more ingenious and agreeable to reason than the former. But the atheizers of this atomology, as they supposed sense to be nothing else but such a pressure from bodies without; so did they conclude imagination and mental cogitation to be but the relics and remainders of those motions of sense formerly made, and conserved afterwards in the brain, (like the tremulous vibrations of a clock or bell, after the striking of the hammer, or the rolling of the waves, after that the wind is ceased;) melting, fading, and decaying insensibly by degrees. So that, according to these, knowledge and understanding is nothing but failing and decaying sense, and all our volitions but mechanic motions, caused from the actions or trusions of bodies upon us. Now, though it be true that in sensation there is always a passion antecedent made upon the body of the sentient from without; yet is not sensation itself this very passion, but a perception of that passion: much

* Lucretius, lib. 4. p. 358. 360. [Verse 726.]

[10] See Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 4. cap. 15. p. 911. tom. 2. opp. and Diogenes Laërtius, De Vit. Philosoph. lib. 7. segm. 157. p. 466.

less can mental conception be said to be the action of bodies without, and the mere passion of the thinker; and least of all volitions such, there being plainly here something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, "in our own power," (by means whereof we become a principle of actions, accordingly deserving commendation, or blame,) that is, something of self-activity.

Again, according to the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists, all knowledge and understanding is really the same thing with sense; the difference between these two, to some of them, being only this, that what is commonly called sense, is primary and original knowledge, and knowledge but secondary, or fading and decaying sense; but to others, that sense is caused by those more vigorous idols or effluvia from bodies, intromitted through the nerves; but understanding and knowledge by those more weak and thin, umbratile and evanid ones, that penetrate the other smaller pores of the body; so that both ways understanding and knowledge will be but a weaker sense. Now, from this doctrine of the atheistic Atomists, that all conception and cogitation of the mind whatsoever is nothing else but sense and passion from bodies without, this absurdity first of all follows unavoidably; that there cannot possibly be any error or false judgment, because it is certain that all passion is true passion, and all sense or seeming, and appearance, true seeming and appearance. Wherefore, though some sense and passion may be more obscure than other, yet can there be none false, itself being the very essence of truth. And thus Protagoras, one of these atheistic Atomists, having first asserted that, "knowledge is nothing else but sense," did thereupon admit this as a necessary consequence, that πᾶσα δόξα ἀληθὴς,[1] "every opinion is true;"

[1] See Plato, in Theæteto, p. 118. and Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 51. p. 576. where this opinion is attributed to Protagoras. He who wishes to know how the modern Atheists defend this doctrine, and accommodate it to their own principles, may consult Count Boulainvillier's exposition and interpretation of the doctrine of Spinoza, or as it is falsely entitled in the published work: Refutation des Erreurs de Spinoza, sect. 1. 90. Bruxell. 1730. 12. For my own part, on reading this book, I admired the author's ingenuity and skill in explaining and illustrating what appears scarcely to admit of explanation, much less of illustration: but at the same time I detested his audacity and utter want of principle. For although he wishes us to suppose in his preface that his only motive for giving us a clearer exposition of this doctrine than we have been favoured with by Spinoza himself, is to render it more easy of refutation to others; yet I never can think well of a man who employs the whole force of his wit and eloquence, in explaining, illustrating, and refining a discipline which he himself calls absurd. But still, in this instance, his attempt at undermining all religion will be utterly unavailing with the wise and intelligent. While his work was yet unpublished, and to be found only in manuscript among those who delight in such impious books as lend a sanction to their own vicious lusts and propensities, nothing, we were often told, could be more subtle, more pernicious, or more powerfully calculated to shake religion to its very foundations. And I for one believing this to be in some measure true, was anxious it should never be made public, as I knew from experience that minds already tainted, and to a certain extent estranged from religion, are capable of being thoroughly corrupted and depraved by even the very slightest

because it is nothing but seeming and appearance, and every "seeming and appearance is truly such; and because it is not possible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwise than he suffers." Wherefore Epicurus, being sensible of this inconvenience, endeavoured to solve this phenomenon of error and false opinion, or judgment, consistently with his own principles, after this manner: that though all knowledge be sense, and all sense true, yet may error arise notwithstanding ex animi opinatu,[2] from "the opination of the mind, adding something of its own, over and above, to the passion and fancy of sense." But herein he shamefully contradicts himself; for if the mind in judging and opining, can superadd any thing of its own, over and above to what it suffers, then is it not a mere passive thing, but must needs have a self-active power of its own and consequently will prove also incorporeal; because no body can act otherwise than it suffers, or is made to act by something

show of truth. But all my apprehension vanished as soon as I read the book myself Nothing indeed can be more weak and contemptible than it is. We have no con clusive and connected reasoning: no explication of an infinity of things which ough nevertheless to be accounted for by one who discards God and religion: in short nothing simple, clear, and probable, such as could recommend itself to the mind of wise and thinking men. I seemed to myself to be reading a fable, neither in geniously devised, nor aptly and skilfully arranged, nor consistent and in keeping with itself. Whenever I looked into Spinoza's Ethics, the man always appeared to have something in him: for the geometrical laws which he affects in his book, conceal a no inconsiderable portion of its defects. But on reading his ingenious interpreter, who would fain appear to have divested his master's precepts of all their darkness, the low estimation in which I began to hold him is almost incredible. Thus frequently, thing which to many persons seem great, sublime, and subtle, immediately lose all their dignity as soon as they are explained in popular language. I will add one more remark which I fancy will not be unprofitable to my readers. The partisans of Spinoza complain that his adversaries, and especially Bayle, who as is well known has attacked this man in his Dictionary, *voce* Spinoza, have either wilfully perverted or egregiously misunderstood his meaning. And his new expositor repeats this complaint in his preface: although his book will convince all those who possess any knowledge of such matters, that most of this Atheist's opponents had a tolerably accurate conception of his meaning. All the absurd and monstrous corollaries in particular which Bayle charges upon the Spinozian discipline, are deduced from them with admirable neatness in Boulainvillier's exposition. If I am not mistaken, Spinoza's friends were annoyed at finding his foul and flagitious doctrines expounded and set forth so lucidly and perspicuously: and therefore, to save the reputation of the man, deemed it prudent to accuse his interpreter of ignorance. But the present is not a fitting opportunity for enlarging upon this subject: and yet in a book written professedly to expose the folly of atheism, it will not appear altogether irrelevant that we should briefly glance at the deformity of one whom the Atheists of this day are accustomed to regard with such profound reverence. It is a pity that an acute and perspicacious man like Boulainvillier, who was capable of much better things, should have thrown away so much time and labour upon the elucidation and embellishment of a mass of intricate absurdities.

[2] Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 4. v. 464. &c. p. 74. 75. tom. 2.

> Cætera de genere hoc mirando multa videmus,
> Quæ violare fidem quasi sensibus omnia quærunt,
> Nequidquam: quoniam pars horum maxima fallit
> Propter opinatus animi, quos addimus ipsi,
> Pro visis ut sint, quæ non sunt sensibus visa.
> Nam nihil egregius, quam res secernere apertas
> A dubiis, animus quas ab se protinus addit.

else without it. We conclude therefore, that since there is such a thing as error or false judgment, all cogitations of the mind cannot be mere passions; but there must be something of self-activity in the soul itself, by means whereof it can give its assent to things not clearly perceived, and so err.

Again, from this atheistic opinion, That all knowledge is nothing else but sense, either primary or secondary, it follows also, that there is no absolute truth nor falsehood, and that knowledge is of a private nature, relative and fantastical only, or mere seeming, that is, nothing but opinion; because sense is plainly seeming, phantasy, and appearance; a private thing, and relative to the sentient only. And here also did Protagoras, according to his wonted freedom, admit this consequence, that knowledge being sense, there was no absoluteness at all therein; and that nothing was true otherwise, than τούτῳ καὶ τινὶ, "to this and to that man so thinking;" that every man did but τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν, "opine only his own things," that πάντων χρημάτων μέτροῦ ἄνθρωπος, "every man was the measure of things and truth to himself;" and lastly, τὸ φαινόμενον ἑκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι ᾧ φαίνεται, "that whatsoever seemed to every one, was true to him to whom it seemed."[3] Neither could Democritus himself, though a man of more discretion than Protagoras, dissemble this consequence from the same principle asserted by him, that understanding is fantastical, and knowledge but opinion; he owning it sometimes before he was aware, as in these words of his:[4] Γιγνώσκειν χρὴ ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι, ὅτι αἰτίης ἀπήλλακται, "We ought to know man according to this rule, that he is such a thing as hath nothing to do with absolute truth." And again, αἰτίῃ (or ἐτεῇ) οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενὸς, ἀλλ' ἐπιρυσμίη ἑκάστοισιν ἡ δόξις, "We know nothing absolutely concerning any thing; and all our knowledge is opinion." Agreeably to which, he determined that men's knowledge was diversified by the temper of their bodies, and the things without them.[5] And Aristotle judiciously observing both these doctrines, That there is no error or false

[3] All these phrases are taken from Plato's Theætetus, p. 116. 119. 122. 126. 129. in which dialogue the opinions of Protagoras are copiously expounded and ingeniously refuted by Socrates. From the same treatise the learned Doctor has borrowed much of what he here advances against the class of men who determine that all knowledge springs from sense, or is nothing else but sense.

[4] These and the following words of Democritus, are from his book, De Ideis, and have been preserved by Sextus Empiricus, lib. 7. advers. Mathematicos or 1. adv. Logicos, sect. 137. p. 399. 400. In the same place there are extant other sayings of Democritus, in which the same opinion is put forth more clearly than in these passages.

[5] He alludes, I have no doubt, to this maxim of his which occurs in the same Sextus, ibid. p. 399: Ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ μὲν ἐόντι, οὐδὲν ἀτρεκὲς συνίεμεν, μεταπίπτον δὲ κατά τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπεισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων, "But we ourselves in reality know nothing of truth, but what offers itself according to the affection of the body, and of the things which enter into or are opposed to it."

judgment, but every opinion true; and again, That nothing is absolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the same, imputeth them both together to Democritus, in these words of his:[6] Οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές· ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναι, "Democritus held, that there was nothing absolutely true; but because he thought knowledge or understanding to be sense, therefore did he conclude that whatsoever seemed according to sense, must of necessity be true (not absolutely, but relatively) to whom it so seemed." These gross absurdities did the atheistic Atomists plunge themselves into, whilst they endeavoured to solve the phenomenon of cogitation, mind, or understanding, agreeably to their own hypothesis. And it is certain that all of them, Democritus himself not excepted, were but mere blunderers in that atomic physiology which they so much pretended to, and never rightly understood the same; forasmuch as that, with equal clearness, teaches these two things at once, that sense indeed is fantastical and relative to the sentient: but that there is a higher faculty of understanding and reason in us, which thus discovers the phantastry of sense, and reaches to the absoluteness of truth, or is the criterion thereof.

But the Democritic and Epicurean Atheists will further conclude that the only things or objects of the mind are singular sensibles, or bodies existing without it; which therefore must needs be, in order of nature, before all knowledge, mind, and understanding whatsoever, this being but a fantastic image or representation of them. From whence they infer, that the corporeal world, and these sensible things, could not possibly be made by any mind or understanding, because essentially junior to them, and the very image and creature of them. Thus does Aristotle observe,[7] concerning both Democritus and Protagoras, that they did ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ ὄντα μόνον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητά, "suppose the only things or objects of the mind to be sensibles; and that this was the reason why they made knowledge to be sense, and therefore relative and fantastical." But we have already proved that mind and understanding is not the fantastic image of sensibles or bodies, and that it is in its own nature not ectypal, but archetypal and architectonical of all; that it is senior to the world and all sensible things, it not looking abroad for its objects any where without, but containing them within itself; the first original mind being an absolutely

[6] Aristot. Metaphysicor. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 312. tom. 4. opp. Dr. Cudworth, however, has here omitted some portion of Aristotle's words, considering them to have no bearing upon the matter in hand.

[7] Metaphysicor. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 313. tom. 4. opp. But what Dr. Cudworth here gives in English as Aristotle's, is not all extant in that author, but only so much as corresponds to the Greek words quoted.

perfect being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own omnipotence, or all possibilities of things, together with the best platform of the whole, and producing the same accordingly.

But it being plain that there are besides singulars, other objects of the mind universal, from whence it seems to follow that sensibles are not the only things; some modern atheistic wits[8] have therefore invented this further device to maintain the cause and carry the business on, that universals are nothing else but names or words by which singular bodies are called; and consequently that in all axioms and propositions, sententious affirmations and negations (in which the predicate at least is universal) we do but add or substract, affirm or deny, names of singular bodies; and that reason or syllogism is nothing but the reckoning or computing the consequences of these names or words. Neither do they want the impudence to affirm that besides those passions or fancies which we have from things by sense, we know nothing at all of any thing but only the names by which it is called; than which there cannot be a greater sottishness or madness: for if geometry were nothing but the knowledge of names, by which singular bodies are called, as itself could not deserve that name of a science, so neither could its truths be the same in Greek and in Latin; and geometricians, in all the several distant ages and places of the world, must be supposed to have had the same singular bodies before them, of which they affirmed and denied those universal names.

In the last place, the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, agreeably to the premised principles, and the tenor of their hypothesis, do both of them endeavour to depreciate and undervalue knowledge or understanding, as a thing which hath not any higher degree of perfection or entity in it than is in dead and senseless matter; it being, according to them, but a passion from singular bodies existing without, and therefore both junior and inferior to them; a tumult raised in the brain by motions made upon it from the objects of sense; that which essentially

[8] He means Hobbes principally, who, in part 1. chap. 2. p. 10. of his Logic, says: "A universal name, therefore, is the name, not of a thing existing in the nature of things, nor of an idea or phantasm formed in the mind of any one, but always of a word or name. And consequently, in order to understand the force of a universal, there is no need of any other faculty than the imaginative, by which we remember that such words excited sometimes one, sometimes another thing in the mind." The same writer, chap. 3. sect. 2. p. 17. thus defines a proposition: "A proposition is a speech consisting of two names copulated, by which he that speaks signifies he conceives the latter name to be the name of the same thing whereof the former is the name." On reasoning he writes as follows, cap. 1. p. 2. "To reason, therefore, is the same as to add and subtract; or if any one should join thereto, to multiply and divide, I shall not object, since multiplication is the same as the addition of equals, and division the same as the subtraction of equals, so often as it can be done. Therefore, all reasoning is reducible to two operations of the mind, addition and subtraction." A little afterwards he says: "Now, such things as we add and subtract, that is, which we put into an account, we are said to consider in Greek, λογίζεσθαι, in which language also συλλογίζεσθαι, signifies to compute, reckon, or reason."

includeth in it dependence upon something else; at best but a thin and evanid image of sensibles, or rather an image of those images of sense, a mere whiffling and fantastic thing; upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that which is the first root and source of all things, which therefore is to them no other than grave and solid senseless matter, the only substantial, self-existent, independent thing, and consequently the most perfect and divine. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are to them no simple and primitive natures, but secondary and derivative, or syllables and complexions of things, which sprung up afterwards, from certain combinations of magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions, or contemperations of qualities, contextures either of similar or dissimilar atoms. And as themselves are juniors to senseless matter and motion, and to those inanimate elements, fire, water, air, and earth, the first and most real productions of nature and chance, so are their effects, and the things that belong to them, comparatively with those other real things of nature, but slight, ludicrous, and umbratile, as landscape in picture, compared with the real prospect of high mountains, and low valleys, winding or meandrous rivers, towering steeples, and the shady tops of trees and groves; as they are, accordingly, commonly disparaged under those names of notional and artificial.[9] And thus was the sense of the ancient Atheists represented by Plato:* Φασὶ τὰ μὲν Μέγιστα καὶ Κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι Φύσιν καὶ Τύχην, τὰ δὲ Σμικρότερα Τέχνην· ἣν δὴ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν, τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων, πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ προσαγορεύομεν, "They say, that the greatest and most excellent things of all were made by senseless nature and chance; but all the smaller and more inconsiderable, by art, mind, and understanding; which taking from nature those first and greater things as its ground-work to act upon, doth frame and fabricate all the other lesser things, which are therefore commonly called artificial." And the mind of these Atheists is there also further declared by that philosopher after this manner: "The first, most real, solid and substantial things in the whole world are those elements, fire, water, air, and earth, made by senseless nature and chance, without any art, mind, or understanding: and next to these the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, and this terrestrial globe, produced out of the foresaid inanimate elements, by unknowing nature or chance likewise, without any art, mind, or God." The fortuitous concourse of similar or dissimilar atoms begetting this whole system and com-

[9] The opinions and dogmas here enumerated and exposed are chiefly Hobbes', of which we have already spoken in chap. 2. of this work. But the learned Doctor intersperses some things which it would be difficult to find in that author.

* De Leg. lib. 10. p. 889. [Page 665. 666.]

pages of heaven and earth:[10] Τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, αὐτὴν ϑνητὴν ἐκ ϑνητων, ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδιὰς τινὰς ἀληϑείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἴδωλ' ἄττα ξυγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν, οἷον ἡ γραφικὴ, καὶ τὰ ἑζῆς, "But that afterwards art or mind, and understanding, being generated also in the last place out of those same senseless and inanimate bodies or elements (it rising up in certain smaller pieces of the universe, and particular concretions of matter called animals) mortal from mortal things, did produce certain other ludicrous things, which partake little of truth and reality, but are mere images, umbrages, and imitations, as picture and landscape," &c.[1] "but above all, those moral differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, the mere figments of political art, and slight umbratile things, compared with good and evil natural, that consist in nothing but agreement and disagreement with sense and appetite:" Τὰ γὰρ καλὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα νόμῳ δὲ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δίκαια οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν φύσει, "For, as for things good and honest, those that are such by nature differ from those which are such by law; but as for just and unjust, there is by nature no such thing at all." The upshot and conclusion of all is, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature as Theists and Metaphysicians suppose, no degrees of real perfection and entity one above another, as of life and sense above inanimate matter, of reason and understanding above sense; from whence it would be inferred, that the order of things in nature was in way of descent from higher and greater perfection, downward to lesser and lower, which is indeed to introduce a God. And that there is no such scale or ladder of perfection and entity, they endeavour further to prove from hence, because, according to that hypothesis, it would follow, that every the smallest and most contemptible animal, that could see the sun, had a higher degree of entity and perfection in it than the sun itself; a thing ridiculously absurd; or else, according to Cotta's[2] instance: Idcircò formicam anteponendam esse huic pulcherrimæ urbi, quòd in urbe sensus sit nullus, in formica non modo sensus, sed etiam mens, ratio, memoria, "That therefore every ant or pismire were far to be preferred before this most beautiful city of Rome, because in the city there is no sense; whereas an ant hath not only sense, but also mind, reason, and memory;" that is, a

[10] Such is Dr. Cudworth's interpretation of the opinion of those philosophers whose doctrines Plato is expounding: but for my part I have strong doubts of its correctness. For there is nothing in Plato to show that they agreed with Democritus and Epicurus in supposing the universe to have been produced by the fortuitous concourse of atoms. Plato has not explained the discipline of this sect so plainly and clearly as to enable us to decide with certainty in what way they imagined the nature of things to have been generated out of formless matter.

[1] In what follows Dr. Cudworth does not cite Plato's words, but merely expresses that philosopher's meaning in his own language.

[2] In Cicero, De Natura Deorum, lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 3061. tom. 9.

certain sagacity superior to sense. Wherefore they conclude, that there is no such scale or ladder in nature, no such climbing stairs of entity and perfection, one above another, but that the whole universe is one flat and level, it being indeed all nothing but the same uniform matter, under several forms, dresses, and disguises; or variegated by diversity of accidental modifications; one of which is that of such beings as have fancy in them, commonly called animals; which are but some of sportful or wanton natures, more trimly artificial and finer Gamaieus or pretty toys; but by reason of this fancy they have no higher degree of entity and perfection in them, than is in senseless matter: as they will also be all of them quickly transformed again into other seemingly dull, unthinking, and inanimate shapes. Hitherto the sense of Atheists.

But the pretended grounds of this atheistic doctrine (or rather madness) have been already also confuted, over and over again. Knowledge and understanding is not a mere passion from the thing known, existing without the knower, because to know and understand, as Anaxagoras[3] of old determined, is κρατεῖν, to "master" and "conquer" the thing known, and consequently not merely to suffer from it, or passively to lie under it, this being κρατεῖσθαι, to be "mastered" and "conquered" by it. The knowledge of universal theorems in sciences is not from the force of the thing known existing without the knower, but from the active power and exerted vigour or strength of that which knows. Thus Severinus Boethius:* Videsne, ut in cognoscendo, cuncta suâ potiùs facultate, quàm eorum, quæ cognoscuntur, utantur? Neque id injuria, nam cum omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est, ut suam quisque operam, non ex alienâ, sed ex propriâ potestate perficiat, "See you not how all things, in knowing, use their own power and faculty, rather than that of the thing known? For since judgment is the action of that which judgeth, every thing must of necessity perform its own action, by its own power, strength, and faculty, and not by that of another." Sense itself is not a mere passion, or reception of the motion from bodies without the sentient, for if it were so, then would a looking-glass and other dead things see; but it is a perception of a passion made upon the body of the sentient, and therefore hath something of the soul's own self-activity in it. But understanding, and the knowledge of abstract sciences is neither primary sense, nor yet the fading and decaying remainders of the motions thereof, but a perception of another kind, and more inward than that of sense; not sympathetical, but unpassionate, the Noemata of the mind being things distinct

[3] In Aristotle, De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 48. tom. 2. opp.
* Cons. lib. 5. Pro. 4. [Lib. 5. p. 132.]

from the phantasmata of sense and imagination; which are but a kind of confused cogitations. And though the objects of sense be only singular bodies, existing without the sentient, yet are not these sensibles therefore the only things and cogitables; but there are other objects of science, or intelligibles, which the mind containeth within itself. That dark philosophy of some, tending so directly to atheism, that there is nothing in the mind or understanding, which was not first in corporeal sense, and derived in way of passion from matter, was both elegantly and solidly confuted by Boethius' Philosophic Muse, after this manner:*

Quondam porticus attulit,
Qui sensus et imagines
Credant mentibus imprimi;
Mos est æquore paginæ
Pressas figere literas.
Nihil motibus explicat,
Notis subdita corporum,
Rerum reddit imagines,
Cernens omnia notio?
Aut quæ cognita dividit?
Alternumque legens iter,
Nunc decidit in infima;
Veris falsa redarguit?
Longe causa potentior
Impressas patitur notas.
Et vires animi movens,
Cum vel lux oculos ferit,
Tum mentis vigor excitus,
Ad motus similes vocans,
Obscuros nimium senes,
E corporibus extimis,
Ut quondam celeri stylo
Quæ nullas habeat notas,
Sed mens si propriis vigens
Sed tantum patiens jacet
Cassasque in speculi vicem
Unde hæc sic animis viget,
Quæ vis singula prospicit?
Quæ divisa recolligit?
Nunc summis caput inserit,
Tum sese referens sibi
Hæc est efficiens magis,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Præcedit tamen excitans
Vivo in corpore passio.
Vel vox auribus instrepit:
Quas intus species tenet,
Notis applicat exteris.[4]

It is true indeed, that the Νοητὸν, or "thing understood," is, in order of nature, before the intellection and conception of it; and from hence was it, that the Pythagoreans and Platonists concluded, that Νοῦς, "Mind," or "Intellect," was not the very first and highest thing in the scale of the universe, but that there was another divine hypostasis, in order of nature before it, called by them, Ἓν and Τ' ἀγαθὸν, "One" and "the good," as the Νοητὸν or "Intelligible" thereof. But as those three archical hypostases of the Platonists and Pythagoreans are all of them really but one Θεῖον, or "divinity," and the first of those three (superior to that which is properly called by them, Mind or intellect) is not supposed therefore to be ignorant of itself; so is the first Mind or Understanding no other, than that of a perfect Being, infinitely good, fecund, and powerful, and virtually containing all things; comprehending itself and the extent of its own goodness, fecundity, virtue, and power; that is, all possibi-

* Boethius, Cons. lib. 5. m. 4. [Page 132.]

[4] On this passage of Boethius it will be worth while to consult Ren. Vallinus' Annotations, p. 92. The argument here briefly touched upon by the learned Doctor is handled much more copiously by him in his treatise On Eternal and Immutable Morality, book 4. chap. 2. 3. 4.

lities of things, their relations to one another, and veritics; a Mind before sense, and sensible things. An omnipotent understanding Being, which is itself its own intelligible, is the first original of all things. Again, that there must of necessity be some other substance besides body or matter, and which, in the scale of nature, is superior to it, is evident from hence, because otherwise there could be no motion at all therein, no body being ever able to move itself. There must be something self-active and hylarchical, something that can act both from itself and upon matter, as having a natural imperium, or command over it. Cogitation is, in order of nature, before local motion. Life and understanding, soul and mind, are no syllables or complexions of things, secondary and derivative, which might therefore be made out of things devoid of life and understanding; but simple, primitive, and uncompounded natures; there are no qualities or accidental modifications of matter, but substantial things. For which cause souls or minds can no more be generated out of matter, than matter itself can be generated out of something else: and therefore are they both alike (in some sense) principles, naturally ingenerable and incorruptible, though both matter, and all imperfect souls and minds, were at first created by one perfect, omnipotent, understanding Being. Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and understanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere senseless matter or bulky extension. And consequently, the things, which belong to souls and minds, to rational and intellectual beings as such, must not have less, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and soft, hot and cold, moist and dry. He that does not perceive any higher degree of perfection in a man than in an oyster, nay, than in a clod of earth or lump of ice, in a piece of paste or piecrust, hath not the reason or understanding of a man in him. There is unquestionably a scale or ladder of nature, and degrees of perfection and entity one above another, as of life, sense, and cogitation, above dead, senseless, and unthinking matter; of reason and understanding above sense, &c. And if the sun be nothing but a mass of fire, or inanimate subtle matter agitated, then hath the most contemptible animal, that can see the sun, and hath consciousness and self-enjoyment, a higher degree of entity and perfection in it than that whole fiery globe; as also than the materials (stone, timber, brick and mortar) of the most stately structure or city. Notwithstanding which, the sun in other regards, and as its vastly extended light and heat hath so great an influence upon the good of the whole world, plants and animals, may be said to be a far more noble

and useful thing in the universe, than any one particular animal whatsoever. Wherefore there being plainly a scale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unquestionably, in way of descent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impossible for a greater perfection to be produced from a lesser, as for something to be caused by nothing. Neither are the steps or degrees of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or lowest round thereof is stupid and senseless matter, devoid of all life and understanding, so is the head, top, and summity of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things. A perfect understanding Being is the beginning and head of the scale of entity; from whence things gradually descend downward, lower and lower, till they end in senseless matter. Νοῦς πάντων προγενέστατος, "Mind is the oldest of all things," senior to the elements, and the whole corporeal world; and likewise, according to the same ancient Theists, it is Κύριός κατὰ φύσιν, "by nature lord over all," or hath a natural imperium and dominion over all, it being the most hegemonical thing. And thus was it also affirmed by Anaxagoras: Νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς, "that mind is the sovereign king of heaven and earth."[b]

We have now made it evident, that the Epicurean and Anaximandrian Atheists, who derive the original of all things from senseless matter, devoid of all manner of life, can no way solve the phenomenon of cogitation (life and understanding, soul and mind) no more than they can that of local motion. And the reason why we have insisted so much upon this point is, because these Atheists do not only pretend to solve this phenomenon of cogitation without a God, and so to take away the argument for a Deity from thence, but also to demonstrate the impossibility of its existence, from the very nature of knowledge, mind, and understanding. For if knowledge be, in its own nature, nothing but a passion from singular bodies existing without the knower; and if life and understanding, soul and mind, be junior to body, and generated out of senseless matter, then could no mind or understanding being possibly be a God, that is, a first principle, and the maker of all things. And though modern writers take little or no notice of this, yet did Plato anciently make the very state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists principally to consist of this very thing, viz. Whether life and understanding, soul and mind, were juniors to body, and sprung out of senseless matter, as accidental

[b] See the sayings of the ancients collected by Ægidius Menagius on Diogenes Laërtius, p. 72. Add the following passage from Plato's Cratylus, p. 269: Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει νοῦν αὐτοκράτορα ὄντα αὐτὸν, καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, "Anaxagoras says that mind is by nature sovereign, and being without admixture orders and disposes all things, passing through all."

modifications thereof, or elsewhere substantial things, and in order of nature before it. For after the passages before cited, he thus concludeth:* Κινδυνεύει ὁ λέγων ταῦτα, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτὰ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον· ἔοικε δὲ οὐ κινδυνεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὄντως σημαίνειν ταῦτα ἡμῖν τῷ λύγῳ. Ἀρ οὖν πρὸς Διὸς οἷον πηγὴν τινὰ ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων, ὁπόσοι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων, "These men seem to suppose fire, water, air and earth, to be the very first things in the universe, and the principles of all, calling them only nature; but soul and mind to have sprung up afterwards out of them. Nay, they do not only seem to suppose this, but also in express words declare the same. And thus (by Jupiter) have we discovered the very fountain of that atheistic madness of the ancient physiologers, to wit, their making inanimate bodies senior to soul and mind." And accordingly that philosopher addresses himself, to the confutation of atheism, no otherwise than thus, by proving soul not to be junior to senseless body, or inanimate matter, and generated out of it: Ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς, οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι· ὃ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον· ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας ψυχὴν· ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες, οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει· τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς περὶ καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως, ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ, σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς πάσης ἄρχει, "That which is the first cause of the generation and corruption of all things, the atheistic doctrine supposes not to have been first made; but what is indeed the last thing to be the first. And hence is it, that they err concerning the essence of the gods. For they are ignorant what kind of thing soul is, and what power it hath, as also especially concerning its generation and production, that it was first of all made before body, it being that which governs the motions, changes, and transformations thereof.[6] But if soul be first in order of nature before body, then must those things which are cognate to soul, be also before the things which appertain to body; and so mind and understanding, art and law, be before hard and soft, heavy and light; and that which these Atheists call nature (the motion of inanimate bodies) junior to art and mind, it being governed by the same." Now that soul is in order of nature before body, this philosopher demonstrates only from the topic or head of motion, because it is impossible that one body should move another infinitely, without any first cause or mover; but there must of

* Plato, lib. 10. De Leg. [Page 666.]

[6] The portion which follows as coming from Plato expresses his meaning rather than his very words.

necessity be something self-moving and self-active, or which had a power of changing itself, that was the first cause of all local motion in bodies. And this being the very notion of soul, that it is such a thing as can move or change itself (in which also the essence of life consisteth) he thus inferreth: Ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάντων πρεσβυτάτη γενομένη τε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, "It is therefore sufficiently demonstrated from hence, that soul is the oldest of all things in the corporeal world, it being the principle of all the motion and generation in it." And his conclusion is: Ὀρθῶς ἄρα εἰρηκότες ἂν ἥμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος ἡμῖν, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν, "It hath been therefore rightly affirmed by us, that soul is older than body, and was made before it, and body younger and junior to soul; soul being that which ruleth, and body that which is ruled.[7] From whence it follows, that the things of soul also are older than the things of body; and therefore cogitation, intellection, volition, and appetite, in order of nature before length, breadth, and profundity." Now it is evident, that Plato in all this understood, not only the mundane soul, or his third divine hypostasis, the original of that motion, that is in the heavens and the whole corporeal universe, but also all other particular lives and souls whatsoever, or that whole rank of beings called soul; he supposing it all to have been at first made before the corporeal system, or at least to have been in order of nature senior to it, as superior and more excellent (that which ruleth being superior to that which is ruled) and no soul or life whatsoever, to be generated out of senseless matter.

Wherefore we must needs here condemn that doctrine of some professed Theists and Christians of latter times, who generate all souls, not only the sensitive in brutes, but also the rational in men, out of matter; for as much as hereby, not only that argument for the existence of a God, from souls, is quite taken away, and nothing could hinder, but that senseless matter might be the original of all things, if life and understanding, soul and mind, sprung out of it; but also the Atheist will have an advantage to prove the impossibility of a God from hence; because if life and understanding, in their own nature, be factitious, and generable out of matter, then are they no substantial things, but accidental only; from whence it will plainly follow, that no mind could possibly be a God, or first cause of all things, it being not so much as able to subsist by itself. Moreover, if mind, as such, be generable, and educible out of nothing, then must it needs be in its own nature corruptible also, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an unmade and incorruptible being. So that there could not possibly be, ac-

[7] Here again we have the sense but not the very words of Plato.

cording to this hypothesis, any other God, than such a Jupiter, or soul of the world, as the atheistic Theogonists acknowledged, that sprung out of Night, Chaos, and Nonentity, and may be again swallowed up into that dark abyss. Senseless matter therefore, being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the fountain of all things, even of life and understanding, it must needs be acknowledged to be the only real Numen.

Neither will the case be much different, as to some others, who, though indeed they do not professedly generate the rational, but only the sensitive soul, both in men and brutes, yet do nevertheless maintain the human soul itself to be but a mere blank, or white sheet of paper, that hath nothing at all in it, but what was scribbled upon it by the objects of sense; and knowledge, or understanding, to be nothing but the result of sense, and so a passion from sensible bodies existing without the knower. For hereby, as they plainly make knowledge and understanding to be, in its own nature, junior to sense, and the very creature of sensibles; so do they also imply the rational soul, and mind itself, to be as well generated as the sensitive, wherein it is virtually contained; or to be nothing but a higher modification of matter, agreeably to that Leviathan doctrine, that men differ no otherwise from brute animals, than only in their organization, and the use of speech or words.

In very truth, whoever maintaineth that any life or soul, any cogitation or consciousness, self-perception and self-activity, can spring out of dead, senseless and unactive matter, the same can never possibly have any rational assurance, but that his own soul had also a like original, and consequently is mortal and corruptible. For if any life and cogitation can be thus generated, then is there no reason, but that all lives may be so, they being but higher degrees in the same kind; and neither life, nor any thing else, can be in its own nature indifferent to be either substance or accident, and sometimes one and sometimes the other; but either all life, cogitation and consciousness, is accidental, generable and corruptible; or else none at all.[8]

[8] Dr. Cudworth is in my opinion a little too severe in his censures upon those who hold the soul to be by nature a mere blank sheet, but yet endowed with the faculty of acquiring certain fixed and permanent ideas by the contemplation of external things. I am not disposed to take part with this class of philosophers; nevertheless, as there are among them many grave and respectable men, who are well affected towards God and religion, I am sorry when I find them accused of a leaning to impiety and atheism. If my own judgment does not fail me there seems to be nothing to hinder a man from defending this opinion, and at the same time maintaining the soul to be self-existent incorporeal, and immortal. But, says the learned Doctor,

I. Those who think thus, make knowledge to be junior to sense. And it is as he says: they affirm this of human knowledge, but not also of the knowledge of God and of minds disconnected from body. This doctrine does not appear to me to be so very pernicious that no one can possibly entertain it without being disposed at the same time to discard God and the soul's immortality. For my part I should call a man mad

That which hath inclined so many to think the sensitive life, at least, to be nothing but a quality, or accident of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible into it, is that strange Protean transformation of matter into so many seemingly unaccountable forms and shapes, together with the scholastic opinion thereupon of real qualities; that is, entities distinct from the substance of body, and its modifications, but yet generable out of it, and corruptible into it; they concluding, that as light and colours, heat and cold, &c. according to those fancies which we have of them, are real qualities of matter, distinct from its substance and modifications; so may life, sense and cogitation be in like manner qualities of matter also, generable and corruptible. But these real qualities of body, in the sense declared, are things that were long since justly exploded by the ancient Atomists, and expunged out of the catalogue of entities, of whom Laërtius[9] hath recorded, that they did ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας, "quite cashier and banish qualities out of their philosophy:" they resolving all corporeal phenomena, and therefore those of heat and cold, light and colours, fire and flame, &c. intelligibly, into nothing but the different modifications of extended substance, viz. more or less magnitude of parts, figure, site, motion or rest (or the combinations of them), and those different fancies caused in us by them. Indeed there is no other entity, but substance and its modifications. Wherefore the Democritics and Epicureans did most shamefully contradict themselves, when, pretending to reject and explode all those entities of real qualities, themselves nevertheless made life and understanding such real qua-

who reasoned in this way: The ideas of the soul are adventitious, and proceed from sense; therefore the soul is by nature corporeal: therefore there is no God.

II. He considers it to follow from this dogma, that the soul is nothing more than a certain modification of matter. But I see nothing to warrant such an inference, neither can I perceive the force of this reasoning: The rational soul is nothing but a modification of matter: for all forms and ideas that are in the mind, come to it from without. We all know that a mirror in itself contains neither forms nor images, and that all the forms of things which are seen in it arise from external bodies. And yet what man would conclude from hence, that a mirror is not in its own nature distinct and different from those bodies, the forms of which are represented in it? In like manner I can never bring myself to regard those as so very wicked and atheistical who determine the sentient souls in beasts to be a certain modification of matter. The learned Doctor here assumes that life and sense differ from reason and mind only in degree; and if such were the case, there certainly would be some grounds for his accusation; but the advocates of the doctrine he is repudiating will never admit this. On the contrary, they will contend that reason and sense are altogether different from each other in their very nature, and consequently that although sense and life may be said to spring from a certain constitution of matter, still it does not thence follow that reason, mind, and cogitation belong to the same class, and are generated in the same manner. I would recommend those that dispute upon topics like these, which owing to the weakness of our own minds are involved in much obscurity, to be mutually more gentle and forbearing, and not to charge each other with heinous crimes except for the most weighty reasons. But I remember having already made several allusions to this subject.

[9] De Epicuro, lib. 10. segm. 44. p. 621. Compare the copious remarks on chap. I.

lities of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it.[10]

There is nothing in body or matter, but magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest: now it is mathematically certain, that these, however combined together, can never possibly compound, or make up life or cogitation; which therefore cannot be an accident of matter, but must of necessity be a substantial thing. We speak not here of that life (improperly so called) which is, in vulgar speech, attributed to the bodies of men and animals; for it is plainly accidental to a body to be vitally united to a soul, or not. Therefore is this life of the compound corruptible and destroyable, without the destruction of any real entity; there being nothing destroyed, nor lost to the universe, in the deaths of men and animals, as such, but only a disunion, or separation made of those two substances, soul and body, one from another. But we speak here of the original life of the soul itself, that this is substantial, neither generable nor corruptible, but only creatable and annihilable by the Deity. And it is strange, that any men should persuade themselves that that, which rules and commands in the bodies of animals, moving them up and down, and hath sense and perception in it, should not be as substantial, as that stupid and senseless matter, that is ruled by it. Neither can matter (which is also but a mere passive thing) efficiently produce soul, any more than soul matter; no finite, imperfect substance being able to produce another substance out of nothing. Much less can such a substance, as hath a lower degree of entity and perfection in it, create that which hath a higher. There is a scale, or ladder of entities and perfections in the universe, one above another, and the production of things cannot possibly be in way of ascent from lower to higher, but must of necessity be in way of descent from higher to lower. Now to produce any

[10] I. Probably it would be better to take a more simple view of the thing and to say, that the doctrine of life and sense being a certain modification of matter arose chiefly from the consideration of brute animals. For most men denied the existence of a soul, properly so called, in beasts, and yet they observed them to feel, move, and live. They therefore fell into the opinion that life and sense can be produced by a certain modification and disposition of matter.

II. When the learned Doctor charges the Democritics and Epicureans with making life and understanding to be qualities of matter, he must not be understood as saying that they asserted as much in express words. For a genuine follower of these philosophers, so far from ranking life and reason among the qualities of matter, imagines, on the contrary, that they result from atoms which are devoid of all quality but in a certain way connected and associated with each other. But Dr. Cudworth fights them with the law of logical inference, and simply means it to be deducible from the principles of these men that life and understanding are qualities of matter. That is, his argument, as is evident from his previous remarks, is as follows: Life and sense cannot spring from lifeless and senseless matter; for out of nothing comes nothing; therefore neither can atoms, which are destitute of life and sense, produce reason and cogitation; consequently the Democritics, who hold all things to be made from atoms, must either decide that reason and sense are produced from nothing, or that life, sense, and reason are inherent as qualities in matter.

one higher rank of being from the lower, as cogitation from magnitude and body, is plainly to invert this order in the scale of the universe from downwards to upwards, and therefore is it atheistical; and by the same reason, that one higher rank or degree in this scale is thus unnaturally produced from a lower, may all the rest be so produced also. Wherefore we have great reason to stand upon our guard here, and to defend this post against the Atheists; that no life, or cogitation, can either materially or efficiently result from dead and senseless body; or that souls, being all substantial and immaterial things, can neither be generated out of matter, nor corrupted into the same, but only created or annihilated by the Deity.

The grand objection against this substantiality of souls sensitive, as well as rational, is from that consequence, which will be from thence inferred, of their permanent subsistence after death, their perpetuity, or immortality. This seeming very absurd, that the souls of brutes also should be immortal, or subsist after the deaths of the respective animals: but especially to two sorts of men; first, such as scarcely in good earnest believe their own soul's immortality; and secondly, such religionists as conclude that if irrational, or sensitive souls subsist after death, then must they needs go presently either into heaven or hell. And R. Cartesius was so sensible of the offensiveness of this opinion, that though he were fully convinced of the necessity of this disjunction, that either brutes have nothing of sense or cogitation at all, or else they must have some other substance in them, besides matter, he chose rather to make them mere senseless machines, than to allow them substantial souls. Wherein, avoiding a lesser absurdity or paradox, he plainly plunged himself into a greater; scarcely any thing being more generally received, than the sense of brutes. Though in truth all those who deny the substantiality of sensitive souls, and will have brutes to have nothing but matter in them, ought consequently, according to reason, to do as Cartesius did, deprive them of all sense. But, on the contrary, if it be evident from the phenomena, that brutes are not mere senseless machines or automata, and only like clocks or watches, then ought not popular opinion and vulgar prejudice so far to prevail with us, as to hinder our assent to that which sound reason and philosophy clearly dictates, that therefore they must have something more than matter in them. Neither ought we, when we clearly conceive any thing to be true, as this, that life and cogitation cannot possibly rise out of dead and senseless matter, to abandon it, or deny our assent thereunto, because we find it attended with some difficulty not easily extricable by us, or cannot free all the consequences thereof from some inconvenience or absurdity, such as seems to be in the permanent subsistence of brutish souls.

For the giving an account of which, notwithstanding, Plato and the ancient Pythagoreans proposed this following hypothesis; that souls, as well sensitive as rational, being all substantial, but not self-existent (because there is but one fountain and principle of all things), were therefore produced or caused by the Deity. But this, not in the generations of the respective animals; it being indecorous that this divine, miraculous, creative power should constantly lackey by and attend upon natural generations; as also incongruous, that souls should be so much juniors to every atom of dust that is in the whole world;[1] but either all of them from eternity, according to those who denied the novity of the world; or rather, according to others,

[1] Both these arguments by which the Pythagoreans formerly proved, we are told, that souls existed before all bodies, admit of very easy refutation.

I. It is unworthy of God, say they, to attend and wait upon each natural generation for the purpose of creating a soul suitable for the body which is generated. But I am very much afraid that those who are satisfied with this argument have themselves not a sufficiently exalted opinion of God. For they fancy the Deity to be like a man presiding over a certain office and government, who anxiously looks about and watches till something shall take place which requires his presence and authority. But is this opinion worthy of an omnipotent God? He who sees and discerns all things at once, who is every where present, and who possesses infinite power, is too great to admit of the slightest portion of this doctrine being applied to him. If he produces souls at the time when bodies are generated, he neither attends upon nature nor watches and waits till a generation takes place, but at one and the same moment beholds every thing that occurs in any part of the world, and performs his operations without the least trouble or solicitude. But even if there were any difficulty here, it is not removed by those who suppose souls to have been created before all bodies. Granting that all souls existed from the beginning of this world, still it will be necessary that the Deity, according to the language of Dr. Cudworth and the Platonists, should lackey nature, and attend upon each generation: for it behoves him to unite and associate a soul with the generated body. Therefore with respect to what is considered to be derogatory to the divine Majesty, both parties in reality agree with each other: for those who suppose God to have formerly produced the whole choir of souls at once, and the others who maintain that each is created at the time of the generation of a new body, alike acknowledge that he is present at the respective generations; the former asserting that he then inserts a soul into the body, and the latter that he makes and creates it. Both also allow the two to be equally easy to the Deity. But they differ upon the question whether it is more suitable to the divine Majesty to create souls all at once or separately. And what mortal will undertake to determine this controversy? Are we qualified to decide what is and what is not becoming to the divine nature in such matters? Probably those who make souls to have existed from the beginning of the world will here reply that they are not united with bodies by God, but come to them of themselves, and are compelled by a certain law of nature to descend and glide down into bodies. Thus they will repeat to us the old Platonic fable, which they must excuse us for despising till it is fortified by the authority either of reason or divine revelation.

II. It is repugnant, they tell us, to the order of nature that souls, which are more excellent than all matter, should nevertheless be junior to all bodies. But let them take care that they are able to prove the truth of this proposition: "Whatever is prior in nature and dignity ought to be prior also in time." The body of our Saviour Christ was unquestionably far more noble and excellent than other bodies, and yet it was posterior in time to an infinity of others. God created Adam on the sixth day, after all the rest of created things. But as man unquestionably far excels beasts and all other things consisting of matter, he would have been created at once on the first day if the divine Wisdom had held this rule in the same estimation as the learned Doctor's friends, the Platonists.

who asserted the cosmogonia, in the first beginning of the world's creation. Wherefore, it being also natural to souls, as such, to actuate and enliven some body, or to be, as it were, clothed therewith; these, as soon as created, were immediately invested with certain thin and subtle bodies, or put into light ethereal or aërial chariots and vehicles; wherein they subsist, both before their entrance into other gross terrestrial bodies, and after their egress out of them. So that the souls, not only of men, but also of other animals, have sometimes a thicker, and sometimes a thinner indument or clothing. And thus do we understand Boethius, not only of the rational, but also of the other inferior sensitive souls, in these verses of his:[2]

> Tu causis animas paribus vitasque minores
> Provehis, et levibus sublimes curribus aptans,
> In cœlum terramque seris.

Where his light chariots, which all lives or souls, at their very first creation by God, are placed in, and in which being wafted, they are both together, as it were, sowed into the gross terrestrial matter, are thin, aërial, and ethereal bodies. But this is plainly declared by Proclus upon the Timæus, after he had spoken of the souls of demons and men, in this manner:* Καὶ γὰρ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πρὸ τῶν θνητῶν σωμάτων, ἀϊδίοις καὶ εὐκινήτοις τισὶ χρῆσθαι σώμασιν, ὡς κατ' οὐσίαν ἔχουσαν τὸ κινεῖν, "And every soul must of necessity have, before these mortal bodies, certain eternal and easily moveable bodies, it being essential to them to move." There is indeed mention made by the same Proclus, and others, of an opinion of ἄλογοι δαίμονες, "irrational" or "brutish demons," or "demoniac aërial" brutes; of which he sometimes speaks doubtfully, as† εἴπερ γάρ εἰσιν ἄλογοι δαίμονες, ὡς οἱ θεουργοὶ, "if there be any irrational

[2] De Consolatione Philosophiæ, lib. 3. cap: 69. But Dr. Cudworth seems to me to give a wrong interpretation of this passage of Boethius, in supposing that it treats of the souls not only of men but of brutes also. He evidently imagines the minores vitas, "minor lives," spoken of by Boethius to be the souls of beasts. But the meaning of this philosopher, who in other respects was a warm admirer of Plato, is much more correctly expounded by those who understand the word animæ of the minds of angels and demons, and vitas minores of the souls of men. For, as is manifest from Proclus and others, the Platonists are accustomed to make a great distinction between celestial souls, which are never smitten with the love of frail and earthly things, and the human which are subject to the desire of bodies. And this explication is admirably confirmed by the words which follow: In cœlum terramque seris, "thou sowest in heaven and earth:" which show that Boethius is speaking of minds which remain in heaven, or the more exalted portion of ether, and of souls that either through their own corruptness or by the command of God, descend to the lower parts of the universe. The former he calls souls, the latter minor lives. But the learned Doctor seems to have forgotten that he has already commented at great length before on these *vehicles* or subtle bodies of souls: from which it would appear that the portions of this volume or the sections of this chapter, were written at different times, and not in uninterrupted order.

* Lib. 5. p. 290. † Lib. 4. p. 288.

demons, as the Theurgists affirm." But the dispute, doubt, or controversy here only was, whether there were any such irrational demons immortal, or no. For thus we learn from these words of Ammonius upon the Porphyrian Isagoge: Οἱ μὲν γάρ φασιν εἶναί τι δαιμονίων ἀλόγων γένος ἀθάνατον, οἱ δέ φασι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος θνητὸν εἶναι, "Some affirm, that there is a certain kind of irrational demons immortal;" but others, that all these "irrational, or brutish demons are mortal." Where, by "irrational demons immortal," seem to be understood such as never descend into terrestrial bodies (and these are there disclaimed by Ammonius), but the mortal ones, such as act also upon gross terrestrial bodies, obnoxious to death and corruption. As if Ammonius should have said, there are no other brutish, or irrational demons, than only the souls of such brute animals as are here amongst us, sometimes acting only aërial bodies.[3] Thus,

[3] I cannot conceive the reason why Dr. Cudworth here touches upon this controversy of the Platonists. In my opinion the disputation he has here entered into did not require any allusion to this subject. But his extensive knowledge of an infinite variety of subjects often causes him to wander from his purpose, and to mix up very learned but yet irrelevant matter, with topics immediately bearing upon the question. Be this as it may, he has neither given us Ammonius' meaning nor correctly stated the point at issue among the Platonists respecting irrational or brutish demons. In Ammonius' words he sees what probably no one besides himself will be able to discover; and attaches to the words ἀθάνατος and θνητὸς a singular and altogether unheard of signification. For he supposes ἀθάνατος to be said of that which never animates a mortal and earthly body, and θνητὸς of that which descends into a mortal body. But a cursory inspection of Ammonius will at once convince any one that this is wholly at variance with his opinion. Worn out myself with long and most toilsome labour, I am not disposed to enter into a new and tedious comment on this subject, or to give from the obscure volumes of the Platonists a detailed explication of their absurd notions respecting demons and their nature: but yet I cannot refrain from adducing with all possible brevity just so much as will be sufficient to explain what is here advanced by Dr. Cudworth. The most ancient of the Greek and oriental nations believed genii and demons to be corporeal, and supposed that there is no more difference between God and a demon, than between a solid and concrete and a simple and subtle body. But whatever is corporeal is liable to be dissolved. Therefore although others held a different opinion, there were many who conceived it to be possible for demons to die, and after the lapse of a long interval of time to perish and become extinct. On this doctrine Plutarch discourses at much length in his treatise De Oraculorum Defectu, and observes that Hesiod among others was devoted to it, p. 415. tom. 2. opp. Ὁ δὲ Ἡσίοδος οἴεται καὶ περιόδοις τισὶ χρόνων γινέσθαι τοῖς δαίμοσι τὰς τελευτάς, "But Hesiod imagines that death befalls demons after certain periods of time." He there quotes Hesiod's verses in proof of this, and also makes Æmilianus, whom he introduces as speaker, repeat some examples confirmatory of the same opinion: of which the one borrowed from the death of the great Pan has already been examined by us in another place. But this opinion found no favour with the Platonists, who philosophized much more subtly respecting demons, and held them to be portions or rays of the divine nature itself: although the whole of this sect were not bold enough to assert that this ancient opinion was altogether false. For, as I have frequently intimated, this school entertained a remarkable reverence for ancient opinions and popular doctrines. Therefore some of them adopted a middle opinion, that is, decided that demons neither all die nor have all an immortal life. And in supporting this opinion they were much assisted by those who boasted that they surpassed all others, both learned and unlearned, in their knowledge of the nature of demons, namely the Theurgists: a vain, deceitful, superstitious, and crafty class of men, who pretended to be armed with the power of evoking demons to a colloquy, and

according to the ancient Pythagoric hypothesis, there is neither any new substantial thing now made, which was not before, nor yet any real entity destroyed into nothing; not only no matter, but also no soul nor life; God, after the first creation, neither making any new substance, nor yet annihilating any thing made. He then creating nothing, that was not fit to be conserved in being, and which could not be well used and placed in the universe; and afterwards never repenting him of what he had before done. And natural generations and corruptions being nothing but accidental mutations, concretions, and secretions, or anagrammatical transpositions of pre and post-existing things, the same souls and lives being sometimes united to one body, and sometimes to another; sometimes in thicker, and sometimes in thinner clothing; and sometimes in the visible, sometimes in the invisible (they having aërial, as well as terrestrial vehicles); and never any soul quite naked of all body. And thus does Proclus complain of some, as spurious Platonists: Οἱ φθείροντες τὸ ὄχημα ἀναγκάζονται ποτὲ παντὸς σώματος ἔξω ποιεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν,* "Who, destroying the thinner vehicles of souls, were therefore necessitated sometimes to leave them in a state of separation from all body, or without any corporeal indument." Which cabala, probably derived from the Egyptians by Pythagoras, was before fully represented by us out of Ovid; though that transmigration of human souls there, into serine bodies,

of making use of them in whatever matters they pleased. These triflers gave out that there were various kinds of demons, as there are of men, and that some of them are perfectly brutish, stupid, irrational, and wholly devoted to lusts. I will explain this in the words of Plutarch, De Oraculorum Defectu, p. 417. tom. 2. opp. on the remaining kinds of demons I refer the curious to Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægyptiorum, and other writers of that class: Εἰσὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ, καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου, τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀμαυρὸν ἔτι λείψανον, ὥσπερ περίττωμα, τοῖς δὲ πολὺ καὶ δυσκατάβεστον ἐνεστιν, "For as among men so among demons also there are grades and distinctions of virtue and of a nature subject to the passions and irrational; in some the remains are faint and weak, like excrement, in others copious and difficult of extinction." Those Platonists, therefore, who held it to be unsafe to repudiate the whole of the ancient discipline respecting these natures, maintained that this brutish and irrational class of demons are capable of and eventually subject to annihilation. For that which is destitute of reason and obeys the motions of the body alone, was considered by them to be likely to perish in the same way as the body. But the whole of the disciples of this sect did not fall into this opinion, and hence arose the controversy, whether or not some demons, particularly those which the Theurgists declared to be ἄλογοι, or irrational, could die. Porphyry, in his well known epistle to Anebo the Egyptian seer, fragments of whose works are extant in Eusebius, Præparat. Evangelica, and others, avows pretty clearly his own leaning to the opinion of such as subjected some demons to death: but these, to whose number Ammonius also belongs, are opposed by Jamblichus, De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 3. cap. 22. p. 88. &c. Some, like Proclus, left the matter undecided, and allowed every one the liberty to come to what conclusion he pleased upon it. Questions indeed of this kind are calculated to afford fertile matter for endless strife and contention, especially if they be handled by men who follow the shadow and image of wisdom rather than true wisdom itself, and fearlessly obey the delusive vagaries of their own minds.

* In Timæus, p. 330.

hath not been by all acknowledged as a genuine part thereof.[4] And the same was likewise insisted upon by Virgil, Georg. lib. 4. as also owned and confirmed by Macrobius for a great truth;* Constat secundum veræ rationis assertionem, quam nec Cicero nescit, nec Virgilius ignorat, dicendo,

Nec morti esse locum;[5]——

Constat, inquam, nihil intra vivum mundum perire, sed eorum, quæ interire videntur, solam mutari speciem, "It is manifest, according to reason and true philosophy, which neither Cicero nor Virgil were unacquainted with (the latter of these affirming that there is no place at all left for death), I say, it is manifest that none of those things, that to us seem to die, do absolutely perish within the living world, but only their forms are changed."

Now, how extravagant soever this hypothesis seem to be, yet is there no question but that a Pythagorean would endeavour to find some countenance and shelter for it in the scripture; especially that place which hath so puzzled and nonplused interpreters, Rom. viii. 19: "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestations of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject unto vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope. Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, into the glorious liberty of the children of God. For we know,

[4] On this subject it will be worth while to consult those who have professedly treated of the transmigration of souls into various bodies, the chief of whom are enumerated by J. Alb. Fabricius in his Delectus Argumentor. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 18. p. 447.

* Somn. Scip. lib. 2. cap. 12. [Page 161.]

[5] Georg. lib. 4. ver. 221.

Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum:
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri
Omnia: nec morti esse locum, sed viva volare
Sideris in numerum atque alto succedere cœlo.

To me, however, these verses of Virgil seem not exactly to accord with the opinion which the learned Doctor tells us was entertained by the Pythagoreans. For there is no mention in them of corporeal things, or of the vehicles of souls, or their transmigrations through various bodies, or of some other opinions which are here attributed to these philosophers. The poet speaks of souls only: which, both in the case of men and brute animals, are derived, according to the doctrine of some, he says, from the divine nature itself diffused through the whole universe, and on the dissolution of the bodies return to it again, and consequently never perish, but live for ever in the highest region of ether. He seems to have incautiously followed Macrobius when he asserts that Virgil approved of the whole of this Pythagorean dogma as he calls it. But Macrobius being immoderately attached to Platonic precepts, every where adheres to the custom of his sect, and drags in as confirmatory of his own opinion many sayings of the ancients, which nevertheless bear a far different sense.

that the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, even the redemption of our bodies." Where it is first of all evident, that the κτίσις, "creature," or "creation," spoken of, is not the very same with the τέκνα or υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, "the children or sons of God," but something distinct from them. Wherefore, in the next place, the Pythagorean will add, that it must of necessity be understood either of the inanimate creature only, or of the lower animal creation, or else of both these together. Now, though it be readily acknowledged that there is a prosopopœia here, yet cannot all those expressions, for all that, without difficulty and violence, be understood of the inanimate creation only, or senseless matter; viz. that this hath ἀποκαραδοκίαν, "an earnest expectation" of some future good to itself; that it is now made subject ματαιότητι, "to vanity," frustration, and disappointment of desire; and φθορᾷ, "to corruption" and death; and that οὐχ ἑκοῦσα, "not willingly," but reluctantly; and yet ἐπ' ἐλπίδι too, "in hope," notwithstanding, of some further good to follow afterward; and that it doth in the mean time συστενάζειν and συνωδίνειν, "groan" and "travail" in pain together, till it be at length delivered from the "bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." Moreover, in the generations and corruptions of senseless bodies, as of minerals and vegetables, or when, for example, oil is turned into flame, flame into smoke, water into vapour, vapour into snow or hail, grass into milk, milk into blood and bones, and the like; there is, I say, in all this, no hurt done to any thing, nor any real entity destroyed, all the substance of matter still remaining entirely the same, without the least diminution, and only accidental transformations thereof made. All this is really nothing but local motion; and there is no more toil nor labour to an inanimate body in motion, than in rest; it being altogether as natural for a body to be moved by something else, as of itself to rest. It is all nothing but change of figure, distance, site, and magnitude of parts, causing several sensations, fancies, and apparitions in us. And they, who would have the meaning of this place to be, that all such like mutations, and alternate vicissitudes in inanimate bodies, shall at length quite cease; these groaning in the mean time, and travelling in pain, to be delivered from the toilsome labour of such restless motion, and to be at ease and quiet; by taking away all motion thus, out of a fond regard to the ease and quiet of senseless matter, they would thereby, ipso facto, petrify the whole corporeal universe, and consequently the bodies of good men also after the resurrection, and congeal all into rocky marble or adamant. And as vain is that other conceit of some, that the whole terrestrial

globe shall at last be vitrified, or turned into transparent crystal, as if it also groaned in the mean time for this. For whatsoever change shall be made of the world in the new heaven and the new earth to come, it is reasonable to think that it will not be made for the sake of the senseless matter, or the inanimate bodies themselves, to which all is alike; but only for the sake of men and animals, the living spectators and inhabitants thereof, that it may be fitter, both for their use and delight. Neither indeed can those words, for the creature "itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," be understood of any other than animals; forasmuch as this liberty of the children of God, here meant, is their being clothed, instead of mortal, with immortal bodies; of which no other creatures are capable, but only such as consist of soul and body. And that πᾶσα κτίσις, that "whole creation," which is said afterwards to groan and travail in pain together, may be well understood of all that of the creation, which can groan, or be sensible of evil or misery. Wherefore, the Pythagorean would interpret this place of the lower animal creation only, which is sensible of good and evil; that as this was unwillingly, or against its own inclination (after the fall of man, or lapse of souls) made subject to vanity, and the bondage of corruption, pain, misery, and death, in those gross terrestrial bodies; in the manifestation of the sons of God, when they, instead of these mortal bodies, shall be clothed with celestial and immortal ones, then shall this creature also have its certain share in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in some measure of such a liberty, by being freed in like manner from these their gross terrestrial bodies, and now living only in thin aërial and immortal ones; and so a period put to all their miseries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleasure in the destruction of the living, but created whatsoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itself. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; because the πᾶσα κτίσις, "the whole creation," will not suffer that: and therefore a Pythagorist would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of scripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutish animals below men shall not be utterly annihilated in the consummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite stript of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it; but that there shall be a continuation of this species or rank of being. And not only so neither; as if there should still be a constant succession of such alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but also, that the individuals themselves shall continue the same, forasmuch as otherwise there would be none at all delivered from

the bondage of corruption. And lastly, that these very souls of brutes, which at this time groan and travail in pain, shall themselves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; since otherwise they should be with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themselves, but others.[5] But enough.

[5] This new Pythagorean interpreter of St. Paul is I confess a bold one, as Dr. Cudworth himself seems to admit: but he proves by his own example that fortune does not always favour the bold. For if this explication be stript of all the pomp and ornament of words, by which the learned Doctor recommends it to our favour, there will be nothing left that can sustain itself or withstand the first assault of any rational opponent. What this exposition assumes in the first place, that κτίσις differs from υἱοὶ or τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ; few will be found willing to grant. Neither is there any thing in this passage of the holy apostle that should compel us to do so: as has been proved long ago by those who suppose the word κτίσις to designate holy and regenerate men. The nineteenth verse may be most conveniently expounded thus: "The earnest expectation of the regenerate waiteth for that day in which it will be made manifest, who are the true and genuine sons of God:" and the twenty-first, in which κτίσις and τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ seem again to be distinguished, will admit of the following interpretation: "For holy men who embrace Christ by true faith will be delivered into that liberty which was promised to the sons of God or to those who become sons of God by faith in Christ." There is here no necessity therefore for supposing that υἱοὶ and τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ are the celestials or saints already placed in heaven: as some eminent men are of opinion: see Salom. Dreyling's Observat. Sacr. par. 1. observ. 37. sect. 10. p. 156. although I am not much disposed to contend with these either. But if our Pythagorean considered υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ to imply pious and holy men, which seems probable, not even his own exposition here put forth will admit of κτίσις and υἱοὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ being distinguished. For as will presently be made apparent, he takes κτίσις in so wide a sense as to make it denote the whole of mankind.

But I shall now touch upon the interpretation itself. Κτίσις, if I am not wholly mistaken, according to our Pythagorean, is the entire order of inferior souls, whether they be shut up in human bodies, or concealed in those of beasts: for he sufficiently clearly excepts the souls of angels. These souls, if we are to believe him, are said by St. Paul to be oppressed with gross terrestrial bodies, and to be earnestly desirous of liberty: and the apostle likewise declares that they shall hereafter be freed and having quitted their grosser bodies shall be clothed in thin and subtle ones. Now I ask of this man,

I. To show that the word κτίσις was ever used by any writer sacred or profane of the entire order of souls living on the earth. Common sense would dissuade us from receiving so new and unusual a signification of this word without authority: for we might prove any thing that we liked to be true and certain, if we were at liberty to give such meanings to words as we ourselves considered to be convenient for our own arguments and opinions. He will reply perhaps: that κτίσις is put for all the men that inhabit this world, Mark xvi. 15. but the preferable part of these men is the soul: therefore the whole is here put and the part understood; which kind of expressions are every where to be found in the best writers. I will grant there is some show of reason in this: but if we accept this interpretation, what will become of the souls of beasts, which he supposes to be implied by this name as well as those of men? Our Pythagorean will not escape out of this dilemma, till he can show us some passages, in which all animals whether men or beasts are expressly called κτίσις. For we shall not be content with those wherein this word denotes the whole universe of things.

II. But dismissing this grammatical difficulty, let us come to more important knots in the interpretation itself, which our Pythagorean, ingenious though he be, will never be able to untie. Grant that κτίσις denotes all souls: therefore all souls of the good as well as the wicked earnestly wait for the manifestation of the sons of God: therefore the minds of the wicked also were subject unto vanity contrary to their will and have the hope of being delivered from this state of bondage: therefore all souls, whether good or bad, shall be delivered into the glorious liberty of the sons of God: therefore no soul shall ever suffer torture and punishment; for all souls on quitting this grosser body shall be clothed in celestial vehicles and enjoy eternal felicity. I never can believe that any Pythagorean, however adverse he might be to the Christian

of this Pythagoric hypothesis, which supposing all manner of souls, sensitive as well as rational, to be substantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their distinct natures, allows them certain thin aërial Ochemata, or vehicles, to subsist in, when these gross terrestrial ones shall fail them.

But let these aërial vehicles of the souls of brutes go for a whimsey or mere figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other than terrestrial bodies only, by means whereof they must needs be, immediately after death, quite destitute of all body; they subsisting nevertheless, and not vanishing into nothing, because they are not mere accidents, but substantial things: we say, that in this case, though the substances of them remain, yet must they needs continue in a state of insensibility and inactivity, unless perhaps they be again afterwards united to some other terrestrial bodies. Because though intellection be the energy of the rational soul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the sensitive always conjoined with it;

religion, would approve of all these absurd corollaries, which are nevertheless inseparable from this exposition of St. Paul's words. The greatest portion of souls shut up in mortal bodies fear rather than earnestly wait for that day, in which holy and pious minds shall be restored to their bodies; and not unwillingly but willingly obey their desires and the vanity of human things: nor, lastly, shall they be delivered into the liberty of the sons of God, but shall suffer the eternal punishments of divine justice. But even if any Pythagorean heathen were so foolish and inexperienced as to hold all this to be true, still the law of reason itself would require of this man not to attribute to the words of a Christian writer a meaning altogether repugnant to the first and fundamental principles of the Christian religion.

III. But this Pythagorean is altogether amusing when he also without any hesitation refers these words of the divine writer to the souls of beasts. He is induced to do so by the word πᾶσα. For as St. Paul says that πᾶσα κτίσις will be delivered into liberty, he excludes no souls from the glory of the sons of God: therefore the souls of beasts also will be partakers of this salvation. Very clever certainly! But the good man forgets that he here assumes what is a matter of dispute, namely, that there are souls in beasts. His reasoning is as follows: It is certain that beasts have souls endowed with reason: but St. Paul speaks of all souls: therefore he promises eternal glory and happiness to the souls of beasts also. The whole of this argumentation tumbles to the ground if you deny that beasts have souls. Indeed beasts ought to feel much obliged to this Pythagorean for so notable a discovery; for he has endeavoured to deserve well of them: from reasonable men he will reap little if any thanks. There was no reason why the learned Doctor should adorn so insane an opinion with his ingenuity and eloquence: except perhaps that he was unwilling to pass it over, lest he should be said to have omitted any thing which the advocates of the Pythagoric dogma consider to be favourable to their cause.

Of all the explications of these words of St. Paul, that one seems to me to be the best and most probable which supposes the word κτίσις to denote pious and holy men, or rather their souls. For although this also has certain difficulties connected with it, yet the others labour under much greater, and involve their advocates in inextricable perplexities. Hence this opinion was adopted also by the learned Th. Ittig, who defended it in a specific dissertation extant in his Enneas Exercitationum Theologicar. p. 440. &c. Sal. Dreyling, Observationum Sacrar. par. 1. observ. 37. p. 147. Frid. Adolp. Lampius, Comment. in Psalmum 45. p. 567—584. and very recently by the eminent Christ. Stock in his Observat. Philolog. ad N. T. p. 1023, as also by many others. In my judgment the following passage of St. James, chap. 1. ver. 18. is admirably confirmatory of this opinion: Βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχήν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων, which all will very easily understand who compare it carefully and impartially with these words of St. Paul.

sense being, as Aristotle[6] hath rightly determined, a complication of soul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving instruments. Wherefore we say, that if the irrational and sensitive souls in brutes, being substantial things also, be after death quite destitute of all body, then can they neither have sense of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but must continue for so long a time in a state of insensibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the less impossible, because no man can be certain that his own soul in sleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, &c. hath always an uninterrupted consciousness of itself; and that it was never without thoughts even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reason to doubt but that the sensitive souls of such animals as lie dead or asleep all the winter, and revive or awake again at the approaching warmth of summer, do for that time continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Upon which account, though these souls of brutes may be said in one sense to be immortal, because the substance of them, and the root of life in them, still remains; yet may they, in another sense, be said also to be mortal, as having the exercise of that life, for a time at least, quite suspended. From whence it appears that there is no reason at all for that fear and suspicion of some, that if the souls of brutes be substantial, and continue in being after death, they must therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that supposed possibility of their awakening again afterwards in some other terrestrial bodies, this seemeth to be no more than what is found by daily experience in the course of nature, when the silkworm and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reason to doubt but that the same soul which before acted the body of the silkworm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly; upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Christian theologers an emblem of the resurrection.

Hitherto have we declared two several opinions concerning the substantial souls of brutes, supposed therefore to have a permanent subsistence after death; one of Plato's and the Pythagoreans, that when they are divested of these gross terrestrial bodies, they live and have a sense of themselves, in thin aërial ones; the other of such, as exploding these aërial vehicles of brutes, and allowing them none but terrestrial bodies, affirm the substances of them, surviving death, to continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility, sleep, silence, or stupor. But now, to say the truth, there is no absolute necessity that these souls of brutes, because substantial, should therefore have a permanent subsistence after death to all eternity; because though it be

[6] De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 27. tom. 2. opp.

true that no substance once created by God will of itself ever vanish into nothing, yet is it true also, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing, may possibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is said, that the immortality of the human soul is demonstrable by natural reason, the meaning hereof is no more than this, that its substantiality is so demonstrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more perish or vanish into nothing, than the substance of matter itself: and not that it is impossible either for it, or matter, by the divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the assurance that we have of our own soul's immortality, must depend upon something else besides their substantiality, namely, a faith also in the divine goodness, that he will conserve in being, or not annihilate, all such substances created by him, whose permanent subsistence is neither inconsistent with his own attributes, nor the good of the universe, as this of rational souls unquestionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and punishments, and consequently fit objects for the divine justice to display itself upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the case may be otherwise as to the souls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liberty of will, and therefore uncapable of reward and punishment; that though they will not naturally of themselves vanish into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the respective animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be absolutely the best, then doubtless is it so. And to this seemeth agreeable the opinion of Porphyrius,[7] amongst the philosophers, when he

[7] See his Sententiæ ad Intelligibilia Ducentes, par. 1. sect. 22. p. 227. sect. 24. p. 228. and elsewhere. But Dr. Cudworth is wrong in transferring this dogma to the souls of brute animals, respecting which Porphyry's sentiments were very different from what they are here represented to be. For this philosopher throughout the whole of lib. 3. of his De Abstinentia a Carnibus labours strenuously to show that the souls of beasts are of the same nature as those of men, and endowed not only with the faculty of sense, but also with reason, judgment, and intelligence: from which it is evident, that he must have thought much the same of the state of ferine souls after death as of those of men, and ascribed immortality to both, although he does not expressly avow this doctrine. The whole of the opinions of ancient as well as modern philosophers on the souls of beasts have been most carefully collected and eruditely canvassed by the illustrious scholar Georg. Hen. Ribovius in his copious and able Dissertatio Historico-philosophica de Anima Brutorum, which he has subjoined to Hieron. Rorarius' two treatises, Quod Animalia Bruta sæpe Ratione melius utantur, quam Homines, edited by him, with his own observations, Helmstadii, 1728. And he also, cap. 15. sect. 120. 128. p. 642. gives us an accurate exposition of Porphyry's doctrine respecting the souls of beasts. This has always appeared to myself to be one of those questions which may afford very ample matter for discussion and conjecture to the ingenious, but can excite little interest in those who delight only in certainties. Let us be satisfied with the sure conviction that our own souls are immortal and will be rewarded or punished after the dissolution of the body: and let our discussions on the future fate of the souls of beasts or the amount of virtue they are endowed with, be conducted in a spirit of prudence, temper, and moderation.

affirmed every irrational power or soul to be resolved into the life of the whole; that is, retracted and resumed into the Deity, and so annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though possibly there may be another interpretation of that philosopher's meaning here, viz., that all the sensitive souls of brutes are really but one and the same mundane soul, as it were, outflowing and variously displaying itself, and acting upon all the several parts of matter that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itself. But we have sufficiently retunded the force of that objection against the ingenerability of all souls, and the substantiality of those of brutes also, from their consequent permanence after death; we having shown, that notwithstanding this their substantiality, their is no absolute necessity of their perpetuity after death, and permanency to all eternity, or else, that if they do continue to subsist, (God annihilating no substance) unless they have aërial vehicles to act, they must remain in a state of inactivity and insensibility, silence or sleep.

Now therefore, if no souls, no life, nor cogitation, could possibly be ever generated out of dead and senseless matter, they being not mere accidents but substantial things, which must in this case have come from nothing; then either all souls existed of themselves from eternity, or else there must of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all the other lives and minds were derived. And that this was the doctrine of the ancient Theists, That no soul or mind, no life or understanding, was ever generated out of matter, but all produced by the Deity, the sole fountain of life and understanding, might be here proved, were it needful, at large, by sundry testimonies; but it may sufficiently appear from those verses of Virgil, first in his sixth Æneid, where, after he had spoken of God, as a Spirit and Mind diffused throughout the world, he addeth,

> Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,
> Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus,*

That "from thence are the lives of all men and beasts, birds flying in the air, and monsters swimming in the sea." And again in his Georgics, where, after these words:

> Deum namque ire per omnes
> Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum,†

That "God passeth through all tracts of the earth, seas, and heavens," he subjoineth:

> Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
> Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
> Scilicet huc reddi deinde et resoluta referri
> Omnia, nec morti esse locum.

* Verse 728. † Lib. 4. verse 221.

"And from hence, not only men, but also all manner of brute animals and beasts, when produced into this world, do every one derive their lives or souls, as also at their deaths they render the same back again to him, in whose hand or custody they remain undestroyed; so that there is no place any where in the world left for death." This was therefore undoubtedly the genuine doctrine of the ancient Theists, however some of late have deviated and swerved from it; that no life was generated out of matter, but all created by the Deity, or derived from it, the sole fountain of lives and souls.

And it is a truth so evident, that life being substantial, and not a mere accidental thing generated and corrupted, there must therefore of necessity be some eternal unmade life and mind, from whence all other lives and minds are derived, that the Hylozoic Atheists themselves (in this far wiser than the Atomics) were fully convinced thereof; nevertheless, being strongly possessed with that atheistic prejudice, that there is no other substance besides body, they attribute this first original unmade life and understanding to all matter as such (but without animal consciousness) as an essential part thereof, or inadequate conception of it. From which fundamental life of nature in matter, modified by organization, they fancy the lives of all animals and men to have proceeded. So that though the modificated lives of animals and men, as such, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produced out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again; yet this fundamental life of matter, which is the basis upon which they stand, being substantial, is also eternal and incorruptible. These Hylozoists therefore, to avoid a Deity, suppose every atom of senseless matter to have been, from all eternity, infallibly omniscient, that is, to know all things without either error or ignorance, and to have a knowledge before sense, and underived from sensibles (quite contrary to the doctrine of the atomic Atheists, who make all knowledge, sense, or the product thereof) though without any animal consciousness and self-perception.

But as nothing can be more prodigiously absurd than thus to attribute infallible omniscience to every atom of matter; so is it also directly contradictious to suppose perfect knowledge, wisdom, or understanding without any consciousness or self-perception, consciousness being essential to cogitation: as also, that the substantial and fundamental life in men and other animals should never perish, and yet notwithstanding their souls and personalities in death utterly vanish into nothing. Moreover, this hypothesis can never possibly solve the phenomenon of men and animals neither; not only because no organization or modification of matter whatsoever could ever produce consciousness and self-perception in what was before inconscious; but also because

every smallest atom thereof being supposed to be a percipient by itself, and to have a perfect life and understanding of its own, there must be in every one man and animal, not one, but a heap, or commonwealth of innumerable percipients. Lastly, whereas these Hylozoic Atheists make every atom of matter omniscient, but nothing at all omnipotent, or assert perfect knowledge, without any perfect power, a knowledge without sense, and underived from sensibles; we demand of them where the intelligibles or objects of this knowledge are? and whence the ideas thereof are derived? For since they proceed not in a way of passion from sensibles existing without, nor could result from those atoms neither, as comprehending themselves, they must needs come from nothing, and many of them at least, be the conceptions of nothing. There cannot possibly be any other original, by the wit of man devised, of knowledge and understanding, than from an absolutely perfect and omnipotent being, comprehending itself and the extent of its own infinite power, or all possibilities of things, that is, all intelligibles. But there can be but one such omnipotent being, and therefore no more than one original and eternal unmade mind, from whence all the other minds are derived. Wherefore this hylozoic atheism is nothing but the breaking and crumbling of the simple Deity, one perfect understanding Being into matter, and all the several atoms of it.

And now have we made it manifest that these Atheists are so far from being able to disprove a God from this topic of cogitation, knowledge, or understanding, that they cannot possibly solve the phenomenon thereof, without a God; it indeed affording invincible arguments of his existence. For, first, if no life or cogitation, soul or mind, can possibly spring out of matter or body, devoid of life and understanding, and which is nothing but a thing extended into length, breadth, and thickness; then is it so far from being true that all life and understanding is junior to senseless matter, and the offspring thereof, that of necessity either all lives and souls were self-existent from eternity, or else there must be one perfect unmade life and mind, from whence all other imperfect ones were derived: there must be an eternal knowledge before sense and sensibles; which is that that hath printed the stamps and signatures of itself upon the matter of the whole world. Indeed nothing can be more certain than this, that all knowledge and understanding in ourselves is not a mere passion from singular sensibles or bodies existing without us, as the forementioned Atheists also conclude; (from whence they would again infer, that knowledge as such, is in its own nature junior to sensibles, and the mere creature of them, and consequently no creator;) there being nothing which comes to us from the objects of sense without, but only local motion and pressure, and there being other objects of

the mind, besides singular sensibles; not only all universals, but also such intelligibles as never were nor can be in sense. Now, if our human knowledge and understanding be not a passion from things existing without us, then can it have no other original than in way of participation from a perfect mind, the mind of an infinitely fecund and powerful being, comprehending itself, and in itself all things; all the possibilities of things before they were made, their respects and the verities belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent being, together with the possibilities of things contained in it is the first Νοητὸν, "intelligible," or "object of mind and understanding," by which all other singulars are understood. And were there no such perfect, infinitely fecund, and powerful Being, there could have been no mind or understanding at all. As also, were there no perfect mind, viz., that of an omnipotent Being comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things virtually contained in it; all the knowledge and intelligible ideas of our imperfect minds, must needs have sprung from nothing. And thus is the existence of a God again demonstrated from that phenomenon of knowledge or understanding.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION V.

1. THERE now remaining only the Atheistic objections against Providence, their queries and arguments from interests; their first objection, because things are ill made, that therefore not made by a God. This directed against the ancient theologers: that God being a perfect mind, therefore made the world after the best manner. Some modern theologers deviating from this. The controversy whether matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, be the original of all things. God to Celsus the head or president of the righteous nature. This not only the sense of Origen, but of the ancient Christians. The Deity not servilely bound to do the best; but this the perfection of its nature. No Atheists able to prove, the world to be ill made. 2. Not to be concluded, that whatsoever we cannot find out the use of, is therefore ineptly made. For example; the intestinum cæcum, which the generality of anatomists give little account of. 3. The first atheistic instance of the faultiness of things; in the disposition of the equator and ecliptic intersecting each other in such an angle, whereby the terrestrial globe rendered not so habitable as it might have been. This objection founded upon a false supposition, that the torrid zone is uninhabitable. 4. Atheists would prove against some Theists, that all things not made for the sake of man. This at first but the doctrine of Stoics only; recommended afterwards by men's self-love. Whereas Plato's doctrine, that the whole not made for any part; but the parts for the whole. Nevertheless, things in the lower world made principally (though not only) for man. Atheists no judges of the well or ill-making of worlds. 5. Evils in general from the necessity of imperfect beings, and incompossibility of things. Men afflicted more from their own fancies, than reality of things. Pain often linked with pleasure. This not the evil of the whole man, but of the outside only. Serviceable, to free men from the greater evils of the mind. Death, according to the atheistic hypothesis, an absolute extinction of all life; but, according to genuine Theism, only a putting off the terrestrial clothing. The dead live to God. Christian faith gives assurance of a heavenly body hereafter. This the confutation of the twelfth atheistic argument. 6. The thirteenth; but second objection against Providence, as to human affairs; because all things fall alike to all; and sometimes irreligious persons most prosperous. Granted, that this consideration hath too much staggered weak minds. Some concluding from thence, that there is no God, but that blind chance steereth all. 7. Unreasonable to require, that God should miraculously interpose at every turn. That which steers the whole world, no fond and passionate, but an impartial nature. Yet, that there want not instances of an extraordinary providence. Good reasons for the slowness of divine vengeance. 8. The sometimes impunity of wicked persons so far from staggering good men, as to Providence, that it confirms them in their belief of a judgment after death. The evolution of human affairs a kind of dramatic poem. A geometrical distribution of rewards and punishments. 9. That there ought to be a cloudy state of things, for the exercise of faith. Had there been no monsters to subdue, there could have been no Hercules.

Here we to live by faith, and not by sight. 10. Some few considerations to be propounded, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as satisfaction of Theists, sometimes apt to call in question the divine goodness, though the very foundation of our Christian faith. First, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves, but in order to the whole. Were nothing made but the best, there could have been no harmony, for want of variety. Secondly, that we ought not to confine God's creation to the narrowness of vulgar opinion, which extends the universe but little beyond the clouds. The world incapable of infinity of magnitude, as well as of time. Nevertheless, as the sun is much bigger than we can imagine it, so much more may the world be. Not reasonable to think, that all this immense vastness should be uninhabited. Thirdly, that we cannot make a right judgment of the ways of Providence, without looking both forwards upon what is future, and backwards upon what is past, as well as upon the present. The Platonists and Pythagoreans solved many phenomena, from the τὰ προβεβιωμένα, "things done in a pre-existent state." Christianity supposeth but a kind of imputative pre-existence, to solve the pravity of mankind, and the evils of this state. The different conditions of men in this life to be resolved into a just, though occult providence. 11. The third objection against Providence, or fourteenth atheistic argument; that it is impossible for any one being to order all things; and, if it were possible, that it would be distractious. Moreover, that an irresistibly powerful and happy being would not concern itself in the welfare of others; benevolence arising only from imbecility. 12. The reply; that because ourselves have but a narrow sphere of activity; to measure the Deity accordingly, is but an idol of the cave or den. Certain, that were there nothing, but what we could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Had the sun-life, equally co-extended with its rays, it would perceive every thing touched by them. Creatures but the rays of the Deity. Men able to manage affairs, in distant places without distraction. 13. But for the easing the minds of weak mortals, already suggested, that there is no necessity, God should himself immediately do all things; he having ministers under him, as, an artificial, plastic nature (for this reason, partly before insisted on); instincts also in animals, a part of that divine fate, which is the servant of Providence. Above which, other knowing ministers of the Deity, appointed to preside over human affairs. But all overlooked by the eye of God. 14. No need to confine Providence to a few greater things only. Small things not neglected by it. The chief employment of Providence by Plato reduced to this compendium; the translating of them into better or worse states, according to their demeanours. 15. But that all benevolence arises from imbecility, and that what is perfectly happy, would be troubled with no business; idols of the Atheists' den. 16. The atheistic queries next answered. The first query: If there were a God, who was perfectly happy in himself, why would he go about to make a world? Answer. The reason of God's making the world was from his overflowing goodness, that there might be other beings happy. This consistent with God's making the world, for his own glory. The reason why Plotinus would explode that. The Atheists further demand, What hurt would it have been for us, never to have been made? Answer. We never could have enjoyed good, nor been capable of happiness. If no hurt not to have been made, then none to be annihilated. 17. The second atheistic query: If God's goodness were the cause of his making the world, why then was it not made sooner? This question capable of a double sense: First, Why was not the world from eternity? The reply; This not from any defect in

the divine goodness, but because there is an impossibility of the thing itself; the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindering it. No place left for atheistic cavils; as if God must have slept from eternity. Another sense of the question; Why, though the world could not be from eternity, yet was it not made sooner? Answer. The world could not possibly have so been made in time, as that it should not have been once but a day old; and also once, no more than five or six thousand years old. 18. The third atheistic query: How could God move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? Answer. That all things being derived from the Deity, and essentially depending on him, they must needs be commandable by him, and obsequious to him. And since no body can move itself, that, which first moved the matter, must be incorporeal, and not move it by machines and engines, but by cogitation or will only. 19. The last atheistic argumentation, from interest. First; that it is the interest of particular persons, there should be no being infinitely powerful, who hath no law but his own will. The first reply; wishing is no proving. Nor will any man's thinking make things otherwise than they are. 20. But secondly, this wish of Atheists founded upon a mistaken notion of God, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. God's will not mere will, but law and equity. Nor does justice in God clash with goodness; but is a particular modification thereof. The interest of none, there should be no God, unless perhaps of such as are irreclaimably wicked. To be without God, to be without hope. No faith nor hope in senseless matter. To believe a God, to believe the existence of all good and perfection; and that things are all made and governed as they should be. Peccability from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings. Infinite hopes from a being infinitely good and powerful. Democritus and Epicurus infatuated sophists. 21. The last atheistic argumentation, that theism or religion is inconsistent with the interest of civil sovereigns. Their first pretence for this, that the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore there must be no power nor fear greater than that of the Leviathan. In answer to this, the atheistic ethics and politics to be unravelled. Their foundation laid in the villanizing of human nature. That there is no natural justice, equity, nor charity. That every man by nature hath a right to every thing, even to other men's bodies and lives. That nature hath brought men into the world without any shackles of duty and obligation. Lastly, that nature absolutely dissociates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of appetites, and private good. 22. But in the next place, they add, that though this state of nature, which is lawless freedom to every thing, be in itself the best, yet by reason of men's imbecility, does it prove the worst. Wherefore, when men had been weary of hewing and slashing, they then bethought themselves at length of helping nature by art. 23. Where these Atheists first slander human nature, and then debase justice and civil authority; a lesser evil submitted to out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater. According to which atheistic hypothesis, no man is willingly just. This no new invention of the writer De Cive, but the old atheistic generation of justice and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty (before Plato's time); it being fully described in his second book of a commonwealth. The same hypothesis also, concerning justice, as a factitious thing, that sprung only from fear and imbecility, and was chosen but as a lesser evil, insisted on by Epicurus. 24. The vain attempts of our modern atheistic politicians, to make justice by art, when there is none by nature. First, by renouncing and transferring men's right, by will and words. The ridiculous conceit of these atheistic politicians, that injustice,

is nothing but *dati repetitio*, and such an absurdity in life, as is in disputation when a man denies a proposition he had before granted; no real evil in the man, but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. Again, these justice-makers and authority-makers pretend to derive their factitious justice from pacts and covenants. But pacts and covenants, without natural justice, nothing but words and breath; and therefore can have no force to oblige. They ridiculously dance round in a circle, when they derive the obligation of civil laws from covenants; of covenants from laws of nature; and of laws of nature again, from civil laws. Their vain attempt, by art to consociate what nature hath dissociated, like tying knots in the wind or water. 25. These artificial justice-makers therefore fly at last from art, to force and power; making their sovereign to reign only in fear. This the true meaning of that opinion, that all obligation is derived from law. If civil sovereigns reign only in fear, then is their authority nothing but force; and power would justify rebellion. Lastly, if civil right or authority nothing but force and violence, then could it not last long. 26. Wherefore since civil authority and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial, nor yet violent things, there must be some natural vinculum, to hold them together, such as will both oblige subjects to obey the commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns to seek the good of their subjects. Sovereignty no creature of the people, and of men's wills; but hath a stamp of divinity upon it. Had not God made a city, men, neither by art, nor political enchantment, could have made any. The whole world one city, of God and rational beings. The civil sovereign no Leviathan; but a God. He reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and the authority of God himself. 27. The second atheistic pretence, to make religion inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it limits that which ought to be infinite. The reply; That the Atheists' infinite right and authority of civil sovereigns is nothing but belluine liberty: but true right and authority is essentially founded in natural justice. The first original obligation not from will, but nature. The error of those Theists, who derive all obligation to moral things, from the will and positive command of God, as threatening punishments, and promising rewards. Justice a different species of good from that of private utility. Infinite injustice as absurd as an infinite rule or measure. God's own authority bounded by justice: his will ruled by justice, and not justice by his will. Atheists, under a pretence of giving civil sovereigns infinite right, really divest them of all right and authority. 28. The last atheistic pretence for the inconsistency of religion with civil power, because conscience is private judgment of good and evil. Answer. That not religion, but atheism, introduceth such private judgment, as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, it acknowledging nothing in nature, that tends to public good, but making private appetite the only rule of good, and utility of justice. The desperate consequence from hence, that private utility may justify rebellion and parricide. The Atheists' professed assertion, that they, who have once rebelled, may justly defend themselves afterward by force. Though private persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves, yet is the rule of conscience not private but public. Religion and conscience oblige subjects, in all lawful things, actively to obey the sovereign powers; in unlawful, not to resist. 29. The conclusion of the whole Book; That all the atheistic grounds being fully confuted, and the impossibility of atheism demonstrated; it is certain that the original of all things is no inconscious nature, but a perfect understanding being, who hath made all that was fit to be made, and after the best manner, and exerciseth a just providence over all.

HAVING quite routed and vanquished the Atheists' main body, we shall now blow away the remainder of their weaker and scattered forces, viz., their objections against Providence, their queries, and their arguments from interest, with a breath or two. Their first objection is against providence, as to the fabric of the world, from the faultiness of the mundane system, intellectually considered, and in order to ends; Quia tantâ stat prædita culpâ,[1] That "because it is so ill-made," therefore it could not be made by a God. Where the Atheist takes it for granted that whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does therefore ipso facto, suppose all things to be well made, and as they should be. And this doubtless was the sense of all the ancient theologers, however some modern Theists deviate therefrom; these concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such as have a superior over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely indifferent to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself. And this is supposed by them to be the liberty, sovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. Wherefore, such Theists as these would think themselves altogether unconcerned in these atheistic objections against providence, or in defending the fabric of the world as faultless, they being as ready as the Atheists themselves to acknowledge that the world might really have been much better made than it now is; only that it must be said to be well, because so made, but pretending nevertheless that this is no impeachment at all of the existence of a God, Quià Deus non tenetur ad optimum, "because God is no way bound or obliged to the best;" he being indeed, according to them, nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent. But what do these Theists here else, than whilst they deny the fortuitous motion of senseless matter to be the first original of all things, themselves in the meantime enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all? So that the controversy betwixt the Atheists and these Theists seem to be no other than this, whether senseless matter fortuitously moved, or a fortuitous will omnipotent, such as is altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, be the sovereign Numen, and original of all things. Certainly, we

[1] The words of Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 2. v. 183. p. 297.

mortals could have little better ground for our faith and hope, in such an omnipotent arbitrary will as this, than we could have in the motions of senseless atoms furiously agitated, or of a rapid whirlwind. Nay, one would think, that of the two it should be more desirable to be under the empire of senseless atoms, fortuitously moved, than of a will altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, armed with omnipotence; because the former could harbour no hurtful or mischievous designs against any, as the latter might.[2] But this irrational will, altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, is so far from being the highest liberty, sovereignty, and dominion, the greatest perfection, and the divinest thing of all, that it is indeed nothing else but weakness and impotency itself, or brutish folly and madness. And therefore those ancients who affirmed that Mind was Lord over all, and the supreme King of heaven and earth, held at the same time, that Good was the sovereign monarch of the universe, Good reigning in Mind, and together with it, because Mind is that which orders all things for the sake of Good; and whatsoever doth otherwise, was, according to them, not Νοῦς, but Ἄνοια, not Mens, but Dementia, and consequently no God. And thus does Celsus, in Origen, declare the nature of God:* "Οὐ γὰρ τῆς πλημμελοῦς ὀρέξεως, οὐδὲ τῆς πεπλανημένης ἀκοσμίας, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας φύσεως Θεὸς ἐστὶν ἀρχηγέτης, "God is not the president or head of irregular and irrational lust or appetite, and of loose erratic disorderliness, but of the just and righteous nature." And though this were there misapplied by him against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection (not understood) yet is the passage highly approved by Origen; he adding further, in confirmation thereof, and that as the general sense of Christians too:† Φαμὲν ὅτι οὐ δύναται αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς, ἐπεὶ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς

[2] Dr. Cudworth's detestation of those who maintain that God can do whatever he wills and is guided by no goodness or justice, appears here to have carried him a little too far. For indivisible corpuscles, although devoid of sense and reason, might in a certain way cause many evils to mankind: from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, as well as from a fortuitous will omnipotent, infinite calamities and mischiefs might arise, which no mortals would be able to dissipate. In this respect, therefore, between a God destitute of all goodness and atoms there would seem to be no other difference than that the former purposely afflicts and harasses mortals, while the latter visits them with evils by mere chance, and without any deliberation or counsel: to men themselves the danger would be equal from both. Nevertheless, the learned doctor's conclusion, that it would be more desirable to be subject to the empire of senseless atoms, than to live under a God altogether undetermined by goodness, justice, and wisdom, is not entirely devoid of truth. For 1. Atoms could occasion to mortals only certain and definite kinds of evils, and such as afflict the body chiefly: but a God infinitely powerful, can torment them in an infinity of ways, and cause incalculable mischiefs and tortures both to body and mind. 2. The miseries arising from atoms are determined by life and sense; and on the body being deprived of these, the power of atoms would cease; but God can visit souls with eternal punishments even after the death of the body. This opinion, however, of those who separate from God all natural justice and goodness is more copiously discussed by Dr. Cudworth in his treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality.

* Page 240. † Page 246.

δυνάμενος μὴ εἶναι Θεὸς, εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ Θεὸς, οὐκ ἔστι Θεὸς, "We Christians (who hold the resurrection) say as well as you, that God can do nothing which is in itself evil, inept, or absurd; no more than he is able not to be God. For if God do any evil, he is no God." And again,* Οὐδὲν μὴ πρέπον ἑαυτῷ ὁ Θεὸς βούλεται, ἀναιρετικὸν τυγχάνον τοῦ εἶναι αὐτὸν Θεὸν, "God willeth nothing unbecoming himself, or what is truly indecorous; forasmuch as this is inconsistent with his godship." And to the same purpose Plotinus:[3] Ποιεῖ τὸ Θεῖον ὡς πέφυκε, πέφυκε δὲ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ οὐσίαν, ἣ τὸ καλὸν ἐν ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συνεκφέρει, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐκεῖ ταῦτα, ποῦ ἂν εἴη, "The Deity acteth according to its own nature and essence; and its nature and essence displayeth goodness and justice: For if these things be not there, where should they else be found?" And again, elsewhere:[4] Θεὸς ὅπερ ἐχρῆ εἶναι, οὐ τοίνυν οὕτω συνέβη, ἀλλ' ἔδει οὕτω· τὸ δ' ἔδει τοῦτο, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει, "God is essentially that, which ought to be; and therefore he did not happen to be such as he is: and this first ought to be is the principle of all things whatsoever that ought to be." Wherefore the Deity is not to be conceived as mere arbitrariness, humour, or irrational will and appetite omnipotent, (which would indeed be but omnipotent chance) but as an overflowing fountain of love and goodness, justly and wisely dispensing itself, and omnipotently reaching all things. The will of God is goodness, justice, and wisdom; or decorousness, fitness, and ought itself, willing; so that the Τὸ Βέλτιστον, that, which is absolutely the best, is νόμος ἀπαράβατος "an indispensable law to it, because its very essence." God is μέτρον πάντων, an "impartial balance," lying even equal and indifferent to all things, and weighing out heaven and earth, and all the things therein, in the most just and exact proportions, and not a grain too much or too little of any thing. Nor is the Deity therefore bound or obliged to do the best, in any way of servility, (as men fondly imagine this to be con-

* So likewise p. 247. Ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν οἷός τε παράλογον οὔτε παρ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργάσασθαί ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, "According to us also, God can do nothing that is absurd, or besides reason."

[3] De Providentia Dei, ennead 3. lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 265.

[4] De Libertate et Voluntate Unius, ennead 6. lib. 8. cap. 9. p. 748. The word Θεὸς, with which Dr. Cudworth begins this passage, is not extant in Plotinus: nevertheless it may be inferred from the entire context that he is discoursing of God. Still I consider these words not to have the meaning our author attributes to them. For this philosopher does not say that the will of God is always governed by justice and goodness, or which is the same thing, that God can do nothing inconsistent with the eternal laws of holiness and justice, but undertakes to prove merely what Ficinus has expressed in the argument of the chapter: "That that which is now the principle of all things did not happen to be such by accident, as if it could have happened that there should be another and a differently affected principle." The meaning of the words here quoted therefore amounts to this, that God is such as he is by the very necessity of his own nature, and that it is impossible to imagine a God differently affected even in thought.

trary to his liberty) much less by the law and command of any superior (which is a contradiction) but only by the perfection of its own nature, which it cannot possibly deviate from, no more than ungod itself. In conclusion, therefore, we acknowledge the Atheist's argument to be thus far good; that if there be a God, then of necessity must all things be well-made, and as they should be; et vice versâ. But no Atheist will ever be able to prove that either the whole system of the world, could have been better made, or that so much as any one thing therein is made ineptly.

There are indeed many things in the frame of nature, which we cannot reach to the reasons of, they being made by a knowledge far superior and transcendent to that of ours, and our experience and ratiocination, but slowly discovering the intrigues and contrivances of providence therein; witness the circulation of the blood, the milky and lymphatic vessels, and other things, (without which the mechanic structure of the bodies of animals cannot be understood) all but so lately brought to light; wherefore we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, or the use, that it serveth to, is therefore ineptly made. We shall give one instance of this; the intestinum cœcum, in the bodies of men and other animals, seems, at first sight, to be but a mere botch or bungle of nature, and an odd impertinent appendix; neither do we know that any anatomist or physiologer hath given a rational account thereof, or discovered its use: and yet there being a valve at the entrance of it, these two both together are a most artificial contrivance of nature, and of great advantage for animals, to hinder the regurgitation of the fæces upward towards the ventricle.[5]

The first atheistic influence of the faultiness of things in the frame of nature, is from the constitution of the heavens, and the disposition of the equator and ecliptic, intersecting each other in an angle of three and twenty degrees and upwards; whereby, as they pretend, the terrestrial globe is rendered much more uninhabitable than otherwise it might be.[6] But this is built upon a

[5] Our author here speaks briefly and concisely, and does not express his meaning with sufficient clearness. He seems to mean that the great utility of the intestinum cœcum is apparent from its entrance and valve: the entrance showing the intestine to be aptly contrived for receiving matter sometimes discharged too copiously into it from the stomach; and the valve preventing the matter which this intestine has received from returning again into the stomach. On the thing itself let the anatomist and physiologer decide.

[6] So Lucretius formerly, De Rerum Natura, lib. 5. v. 201. p. 251:

> Principio quantum cœli tegit impetus ingens
> Inde avidam partem, montes sylvæque ferarum
> Possedere . . . . . .
> Inde duas porro prope partes fervidus ardor
> Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert.

false supposition of the ancients, that the torrid zone, or all between the tropics, was utterly uninhabitable by reason of the extremity of heat.[7] And it is certain that there is nothing which doth more demonstrate a Providence than this very thing, it being the most convenient site or disposition that could be devised, as will appear, if the conveniences of other dispositions be considered, especially these three; first, If the axes of those circles should be parallel, and their plains coincident; secondly, If they should intersect each other in right angles; and thirdly, (which is a middle betwixt both) If they should cut one another in an angle of forty-five degrees. For it is evident that each of these dispositions would be attended with far greater inconveniences to the terrestrial inhabitants, in respect of the length of days and nights, heat and cold. And that these two circles should continue thus to keep the same angular intersection, when physical and mechanic causes would bring them still nearer together; this is a farther eviction of a providence also.[8]

In the next place the Atheist supposes, that, according to the general persuasion of Theists, the world and all things therein were created only for the sake of man,[9] he thinking to make some advantage for his cause from hence. But this seemeth, at first, to have been an opinion only of some strait-laced Stoics, though afterward indeed recommended to others also, by their own self-love, their over-weening and puffy conceit of themselves.[10]

[7] This opinion of the ancient philosophers is elegantly expounded by Cicero in his Somnium Scipionis, cap. 6. p. 3983. tom. 10. opp. Cernis eamdem terram, quasi quibusdam redimitam et circumdatam cingulis; e quibus duos maxime inter se diversos et cœli verticibus ipsis ex utraque parte subnixos, obriguisse pruina vides: medium autem illum et maximum solis ardore torreri. Duo sunt habitabiles, quorum australis ille, in quo qui insistunt, adversa vobis urgent vestigia, nihil ad vestrum genus; Hic autem alter subjectus aquiloni, quem incolitis, cerne, quam tenui vos parte contingat, "You behold the same earth, bound and encompassed as it were with certain belts: of which two the most distant from each other, and lying respectively under the very poles of heaven, you perceive, are rigid with perpetual frost: and the middle and largest parched up by the heat of the sun. Two are habitable, whereof the one to the south, the inhabitants of which imprint footsteps opposite to you, has nothing to do with your race; but of this other, lying to the north and inhabited by you, see how small a portion is occupied by you." Compare Strabo, Geograph. lib. 2. p. 87. 88. 89.

[8] If Dr. Cudworth had seen what has been written since his time by eminent philosophers, especially of his own country, on the state and constitution of the heavens, he would have been able to dilate much more copiously upon this demonstration. A more full and complete answer was given to this atheistic exception by the most acute and learned Rich. Bentley, in his Folly of Atheism, par. 1. serm. 8. sect. 7. Compare W. Derham, Theological Astronomy, lib. 7. cap. 2. p. 200. &c., and others, a vast number of whom, as is well known, have demonstrated the existence of a supreme and all-ruling God from the structure of this world.

[9] So Lucretius, De Rerum Nat. lib. 2. v. 174. 175. p. 296.

[10] I. Although the Stoics were more industrious than all other philosophers in proving the dogma, "that this world and all things therein were created for the sake of man alone," as is evident even from those few passages collected by Justus Lipsius, in his Manuductio in Physiolog. Stoicor. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 71. &c. to which many more might be added: still I would not undertake to assert that they were the first authors of this opinion. For as after their time many who followed the guidance of

And so fleas and lice, had they understanding, might conclude the bodies of other greater animals, and men also, to have been made only for them. But the whole was not properly made for any part, but the parts for the whole, and the whole for the maker

reason alone, and had nothing in common with Stoicism in other respects, adopted this opinion; so it is quite possible for many to have fallen into it prior to the existence of this sect, who nevertheless were far from entertaining the other doctrines afterwards professed by the Stoics. And we every where find traces of this opinion before their time in Aristotle and other writers; which it is at present unnecessary to point out. Besides, the Stoics did not say absolutely that the world was created for the sake of men; but always associated gods with men. Cicero, lib. 2. De Natura Deor. cap. 62. p. 3043. tom. 9. opp. according to the Stoical sense. Principio ipse mundus Deorum hominumque caussa factus. Est enim mundus quasi communis Deorum atque hominum domus, "In the beginning the world itself was made for the sake of gods and men. For the world is the common domicile as it were of gods and men." II. In like manner, I can hardly bring myself to believe that those who besides the Stoics asserted the world to have been created for the sake of men, were actuated by their own arrogance and over-weening self-conceit. For I know that this opinion was entertained by good and pious men, eminent for their support of Christian principles, both in ancient and modern times, against whom I should be afraid to bring so grave and serious an accusation. Lactantius, in his book, De Ira Dei, cap. 13. p. 936. defends it at great length, and begins his disputation with these words: "If any one considers the whole administration of the world, he will assuredly become convinced of the truth of the Stoical doctrine that the world was created for our sake." Add Gregorius Nyssenus, De Opificio Hominis, cap. 2. p. 50. tom. 1. opp. to say nothing now of others. The author of the Clementines Homil. 3. sect. 36. p. 648. tom. 1. Patr. Apostolic. espoused the same opinion: "Ὁμως ἐάν τις τὸ πᾶν ἀκριβῶς λογισμῷ συνείδῃ, εὑρήσει δι' ἄνθρωπον τὸν θεὸν πεποιηκότα, "Whoever accurately considers the universe will find that it was made by God for the sake of man." This opinion led the same ancient fathers to conclude that on the lapse of man into sin, created things also fell from the state in which they were first created by God, and became much deteriorated. See Theophilus Antioch. lib. 2. ad Autolychum, sect. 27. p. 156. 157. For it seemed to them to be unreasonable that man in his sinful state should have the use of the same things that he ought to have used, if he had remained good and guiltless. For they reasoned in this way: "All things were made by God for man's sake: therefore they ought always to be such as are suitable for him for whose sake they were created; for it is not right that sinful man should enjoy good things: wherefore, as man had become wicked by his own fault, it was requisite that the whole universe which was created on account of him, should be reduced to a worse state than that in which it had left the hands of the Creator. This opinion, it is unnecessary to observe, enabled those early theologians to account for the numerous misfortunes and evils which beset the life of mortals. This is obvious to all who are able to see what follows as a necessary consequence from a thing, or what is repugnant to and incompatible with it; neither is it my intention here to explain the ancient discipline concerning the creation and constitution of the world, although few at the present day seem to understand it. III. It behoves those who take part in this controversy: "whether or not God constructed this world for the sake of man only," to guard themselves against being so far deceived by the ambiguity of words as to fight about shadows, and charge their adversaries with sentiments that were altogether foreign to them. For, as everybody must be aware, "the world," and "to make a thing for the sake of any one," belong to a class of expressions which do not commonly bear one and the same meaning. For my own part, I am well nigh convinced that if this ambiguity of words be removed, and the matter discussed among good and considerate men, the controversy may be settled without much difficulty. Probably, the meaning of the theologians of the present day who maintain that this world was made for the sake of men, is nothing more than that here expressed by Dr. Cudworth, namely, that the things of this lower world were made principally for man. Mons. Bayle has already attempted to decide this dispute between theologians and philosophers, and has shown that both opinions are in a certain measure admissible, Continuation des Pensées diverses écrites a l' occasion d' une Comete, tom. 1. sect. 56. p. 260. nor are his remarks undeserving of a very attentive perusal. IV. I cannot but avail myself of this occa-

thereof. And yet may the things of this lower world be well said to have been made principally, (though not only) for man.* For we ought not to monopolize the divine goodness to ourselves, there being other animals superior to us, that are not altogether unconcerned neither in this visible creation; and it being reasonable to think that even the lower animals likewise, and whatsoever hath conscious life, was made partly also to enjoy itself. But Atheists can be no fit judges of worlds, being made well or ill, either in general, or respectively to mankind; they having no standing measure for well or ill, without a God and morality, nor any true knowledge of themselves, and what their own good or evil consisteth in. That was at first but a froward speech of some sullen discontented persons, when things falling not out agreeably to their own private, selfish, and partial appetites, they would revenge themselves by railing upon nature (that is, providence) and calling her a step-mother only to mankind, whilst she was a fond, partial, and indulgent mother to other animals;[11] and though this be

sion to observe that some of the ancient Christian fathers circumscribed this dogma within even narrower limits than the Stoics, and asserted the world to have been created for the sake of *the Church*, or the followers of our Saviour Jesus Christ. Hermas, a most ancient Christian writer, in his Pastor, lib. 1. vis. 2. sect. 4. p. 78. tom. 1. Patr. Apostolic. thus writes: "What is it then, Lord? And he said to me: It is the Church of God. And I said unto him: Why then is it old? It is old, said he, because it was created before all things: *and because of it the world was made.*" In which he was followed by others whose names and passages, to avoid digressing too far from my purpose, I now pass over. I confess this doctrine may be so explained as to render it less offensive than it appears at the first view: and yet from being imperfectly understood, it produced, in my opinion, that pernicious dogma which was afterwards maintained by St. Augustine and some other ancient Christian fathers: "That the saints or church by divine right, are the possessors of the whole of this world, and the wicked and impious are the unjust usurpers of the goods they make use of, and not the lawful possessors." For if all things were created simply and absolutely for the sake of the church and saints, it necessarily follows that all things belong to the saints, and that those who are out of the pale of the church, unjustly arrogate to themselves whatever they possess; consequently that the saints by dispossessing the wicked of these goods, will not violate the divine law. This doctrine of St. Augustine has been copiously expounded, and its turpitude at the same time exposed by the great and most erudite J. Berbeyrac, Traité de la Morale des Peres, cap. 16. sect. 14. &c. p. 291. &c. But he has not pointed out the source it emanated from, nor shown that other ancient fathers besides St. Augustine, were also infected with it. In our times, N. Malebranche has not hesitated to maintain that all things were made by God for men, and especially for the church, Traité de la Nature et de la Grace, par. 1. sect. 3. p. 8. 9. &c. "Everything," says he, "was made for man, man for Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ for God," and p. 10. amongst other things: "God," says he, "made the world solely for the elect." But the sense in which he intended this dogma to be understood, is evident from the very commencement of his work, p. 3. "God being unable to act except for his own glory, and being unable to find it except in himself, can have had no other design in the creation than the establishment of the church."

* Thus Plato, Μέρος μὴν ἕνεκα ὅλου, καὶ οὐχ ὅλον μέρους ἕνεκα, De Leg p. 903.

[11] In writing this our worthy author no doubt had in his mind the following words of Pliny, which appear in his Proœmium to lib. 7. Hist. Naturalis: Cujus (hominis) caussa videtur cuncta alia genuisse natura, magna et sæva mercede contra tanta sua munera; ut non sit satis æstimare, parens melior homini, an tristior noverca fuerit. Ante omnia unum animantium cunctorum alienis velat opibus: ceteris varie tegumenta tribuit, testas, cortices, coria, spinas, villos, setas, pilos, plumam, pennas, squamas,

elegantly set off by Lucretius,[1] yet is there nothing but poetic flourish in it all, without any philosophic truth; the advantages of mankind being so notoriously conspicuous above those of brutes.

But as for evils in general, from whence the Atheist would conclude the God of the Theist to be either impotent or envious;[2] it hath been already declared, that the true original of them is from the necessity of imperfect beings, and the incompossibility of things; but that the divine art and skill most of all appeareth in bonifying these evils, and making them, like discords in music, to contribute to the harmony of the whole, and the good of particular persons.

Moreover, a great part of those evils, which men are afflicted with, is not from the reality of things, but only from their own fancy and opinions, according to that of the moralist:[3] Ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα, "It is not things themselves that disturb men, but only their own opinions concerning things." And therefore it being much in our own power to be freed from these, Providence is not to be blamed upon the account of them. Pain is many times nearly linked with pleasure, according to that Socratic fable,[4] That when God could not reconcile their contrary natures (as he would) he tied them head and tail together. And good men know, that pain is not the evil of the man, but only of the

vellera. Truncos etiam arboresque cortice, interdum gemino, a frigoribus et calore tutata est. Hominem tantum nudum et in nuda humo natali die abjicit, ad vagitus statim et ploratum, nullumque tot animalium aliud ad lacrymas et has protinus vitæ principio, "For whose (man's) sake nature appears to have generated all other things, exacting a great and cruel price for such important benefits: so that it is hard to judge whether she has been a kind and indulgent parent, or a severe stepmother. First of all, he alone of all animals is clothed by her with the riches of others: on the rest she bestows various integuments, shells, hides, skins, prickles, quills, fur, bristles, hairs, feathers, wings, scales, fleeces. The very trunks and stems of trees also are protected from cold and heat by bark, and that sometimes double. Man alone she casts forth naked on the bare ground at the day of his birth, at once to wailing and weeping, and of so many animals no other but him to tears, and these too at the very commencement of life." But this complaint has long ago been admirably repressed by Gregorius Nyssenus of the Christians, De Opificio Hominis, cap. 7. p. 56. tom. 1. opp. and of the Stoics, by Seneca, De Beneficiis, lib. 2. cap. 29. p. 389. tom. 1. opp. not to speak now of later authors, who have thought proper to do the same.

[1] De Rerum Natura, lib. 5. v. 223. p. 254. The verses themselves are quoted above, chap. 2. sect. 16. p. 169.

[2] Herewith compare cap. 2. sect. 17. p. 171. &c. where the argument itself, conveyed in these words, is discussed and expounded.

[3] Namely, Epictetus in his Enchiridion, cap. 5. p. 10. Compare M. Antoninus, lib. 4. Ad Seipsum, sec. 3. p. 97. and lib. 5. sect. 19. p. 159. All the Stoics display great subtlety in the inculcation of this doctrine, as do also the Christian writers. Consult in particular Pet. Molinæus, De la paix de l' ame, lib. 2. throughout, p. 167. tom. 1. ed. nov. Genev.

[4] In Plato's Phædo, p. 376. where, however, Socrates does not relate a fable, as the learned Doctor seems to insinuate, but merely says that if Æsop had observed this he would have embodied it in some fable or other.

part so affected (as Socrates also):[5] Τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει μένει, "It goes no further than the leg where it is." But this is many times very serviceable to free us from the greater evils of the mind, upon which all our happiness dependeth. To the Atheists, who acknowledge no malum culpæ, "no evil of fault" (turpitude, or dishonesty), death is the greatest and most tragical of all evils. But though this, according to their forlorn hypothesis, be nothing less than an absolute extinction of life; yet, according to the doctrine of the genuine Theists, which makes all souls substantial, no life of itself (without divine annihilation) will ever quite vanish into nothing, any more than the substance of matter doth. And the ancient Pythagoreans and Platonists have been here so kind, even to the souls of brutes also, as that they might not be left in a state of inactivity and insensibility after death, as to bestow upon them certain subtle bodies, which they may then continue to act in. Nor can we think otherwise, but that Aristotle, from this fountain, derived that doctrine of his in his second book, De Gen. Ann. c. 3.[6] where, after he had declared the sensitive soul to be inseparable from body, he addeth, Πάσης οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων· ὡς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσις, "All souls therefore seem to have another body, and diviner than that of the elements; and as themselves differ in dignity and nobility, so do these bodies of theirs differ from one another." And afterwards calling this subtle body πνεῦμα, or a spirit, he affirmeth it to be, ἀνάλογον τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, "analogous to the element of the stars." Only as Galen, and St. Austin, and others, have conceived, Aristotle deviated here from the Pythagoreans in this, that he supposed the sensitive soul itself to be really nothing else, but this very subtle and star-like body, and not a distinct substance from it, using it only as a vehicle. Nevertheless, he there plainly affirmeth the mind or rational soul to be really distinct from the body, and to come into it from without pre-existing; and consequently should acknowledge

[5] Dr. Cudworth seems to have written this from memory; for it is neither expressed in the same words by Socrates, nor with the design of deriving any support from it against pain. Socrates is not philosophizing, but merely relating what happened to himself on being released from his fetters. Behold his very words from Plato's Phædo, p. 376. After having said that pleasure is nearly allied to pain, he thus proceeds: Ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεδμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεῖν, ἐκεῖνῳ δὴ φαίνεται ἑπακολουθεῖν τὸ ἡδύ, "So indeed it appears also to myself; since just now there was pain in the leg from the chain, and now pleasure seems to follow this."

[6] I see nothing strange and wonderful in this doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platonists. For most of them held the souls of beasts and men in the same rank, and supposed them to pass by a perpetual migration from men into the bodies of beasts, and from beasts again into those of men. Wherefore, as they assigned a certain body to the souls of men, it was necessary for them to entertain the same idea respecting those of beasts.

also its after-immortality.[7] But whatsoever Aristotle's judgment were (which is not very material) it is certain, that dying to the rational or human soul is nothing but a withdrawing into the

[7] If there were no other passage extant in Aristotle, except this one, to prove that he held souls to be altogether incapable of perishing, there certainly would be an end of the matter. See what we have remarked above, chap. 1. p. 68. on the question: Whether or not the founder of the Peripatetics assigned immortality to souls. This passage, which is supposed by Dr. Cudworth to contain the Platonic and Pythagorean dogma of the perpetual body of souls, is involved in great obscurity, and in consequence is expounded by all of them in the same manner. In the first place, Aristotle acknowledges νοῦς, or "mind," to come to the body *from without*, and to be alone divine; from which he concludes that the δύναμις ψυχῆς, "power of the soul," partakes of some body; but adds, that souls differ from one another. These words are quoted by Dr. Cudworth. He goes on and declares, that there is in seed a certain vital principle, ζωτικὴ ἀρχὴ, which is neither fire nor any thing else like fire, but πνεῦμα, "spirit;" that in this spirit there is another nature analogous to the stars: Καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, ἀναλόγως οὖσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ. Now there is nothing plain and clear in all this; on the contrary, it seems to be altogether obscure, confused and mystified. The philosopher names four things, νοῦς, "mind," ψυχὴ, "soul," πνεῦμα, "spirit," and lastly, φύσις, or "nature," residing in the spirit. But he neither tells us in what manner these four things differ from each other, nor what is their nature and character; but, on the contrary, according to his peculiar wont, discourses as though all men were related to the Pythian priestess, and possessed the faculty of divination. Hence he has opened a wide field for controversy to those who make it their business to investigate the opinions and doctrines of a man who was sometimes unwilling to be understood. Although there are various points of difference among those who have attempted to explain this passage of Aristotle, and at the same time to expound his doctrine concerning the soul; nevertheless, interpreters are chiefly divided into two opinions. Some suppose the body which Aristotle attributes to the soul to be different from the soul or mind itself: among these rank Dr. Cudworth, as also Galen and others, who fancy that this body is the sentient soul. But others maintain that what this philosopher here calls body, and more divine than all the elements, constitutes the rational soul itself. To myself, indeed, the latter opinion seems to be the more correct of the two; nor have I any doubt that it will be so considered by all who examine Aristotle with attention and impartiality. I will try whether I can make this plain and evident; for it will not be altogether a fruitless labour, as it will serve to confirm what we have remarked above, cap. 1. p. 68. First of all it is manifest that Aristotle distinguishes between νοῦς and ψυχὴ in this passage. Νοῦς, he tells us, comes to the body of man from without; but he educes ψυχὴ from the seed itself, in which resides a certain θερμὸν, "warmth," and ζωτικὴ ἀρχὴ, "vital principle," that is, the origin and source of life. Unquestionably νοῦς is the rational soul, and ψυχὴ the life of the body, or that soul which possesses the faculty of sensation and animates the body. After saying that mind or νοῦς comes to man from without, he infers from thence: πάσης μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς κ. τ. λ. which words ought to be rendered so as to make it appear that Aristotle is deducing something from what goes before. The philosopher is speaking of ψυχὴ, not of νοῦς, or "mind;" and having laid down the position that mind comes into the body from without, he demonstrates from this that the sentient soul or life has a certain other body united to it, more divine and excellent than all the elements; which of itself is a proof that this body which is united to the sentient soul is the mind, or νοῦς itself, which he tells us consists of body more excellent than the rest of the elements. This is made still more apparent from what follows; since he moreover declares that this body, or νοῦς, consisting of a celestial body, is not the same in all men, which daily experience sufficiently confirms. For all mortals are not equally gifted with the faculty of reason and perception. The reason of this difference, he tells us, lies in the ψυχὴ, or "sentient soul," which is better in some than in others; and hence it happens that the νοῦς also, which he here and elsewhere calls φύσις, as consisting of a certain peculiar nature, is different in different individuals. His object being to show what this difference in souls arises from, he goes on and adds, although in somewhat obscure terms, that they differ because their virtue lies concealed in the seed which notoriously varies according to the different habit and

tyring-house, and putting off the clothing of this terrestrial body. So that it will still continue after death to live to God, whether in a body or without it. Though according to Plato's

constitution of bodies. In the seed he tells us there is a certain generative power or vital principle, ζωτικὴ ἀρχή, a certain θερμὸν, from which springs the sentient soul, or ψυχὴ, and yet is not such heat as we detect in fire, but of a peculiar nature; and finding no better word for expressing this nature, he calls it πνεῦμα, or "spirit." With this πνεῦμα, he proceeds, the φύσις or νοῦς, that is mind consisting of that celestial φύσις, is associated, or the rational mind is lodged and domiciled in the ψυχὴ that springs from seed on the sentient soul; whence it comes to pass that the rational minds are of various kinds, since this πνεῦμα or spirit in which they are clothed differs exceedingly according to the state and constitution of men. In Aristotle, therefore, the expressions, νοῦς, φύσις, and σῶμα ἀνάλογον τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, signify one and the same thing, namely, the rational soul; and, on the other hand, ψυχὴ, θερμὸν, and πνεῦμα, are here synonymous terms, and imply the sentient soul or life. Such being the case, we have here clear evidence of the truth of what was remarked above on chap. 1. p. 68. that the rational soul with Aristotle is nothing more than a portion of a certain celestial and ethereal nature, diffused through the entire universe, which is received in the seed of every man, and on the dissolution of the body returns to its own element. Nor on the whole do those of the ancients, who carefully investigated the Stagirite's doctrines, seem to have interpreted his words and opinion differently, since they expressly declare the soul of Aristotle to be a *fifth element*, or a body consisting of that celestial nature which he adds to the four elements. Cicero, Tusculanar. Disput. lib. 1. cap. 10, p. 2573. tom. 8. opp. Aristotelis longe omnibus præstans et ingenio et diligentia, quum quatuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, equibus omnia orirentur, quintam quamdam naturam censet esse, e qua fit mens. Cogitare enim et providere in horum quatuor generum nullo inesse putat. Quintum genus adlibet, vacuus nomine, "Aristotle, who far surpasses them all in intellect and diligence, having adopted those well-known four kinds of principles from which all things are deduced, supposes there is a certain fifth nature, from which comes mind. For cogitation and forethought, he thinks, cannot exist in any one of these four kinds. Hence he adds a fifth kind without giving it a name." St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 22. cap. 11. sect. 2. p. 809. tom. 7. opp. "Aristotle asserted the soul to be a *fifth body*, and Plato not body at all. If it were a fifth body it certainly would be superior to the rest; but since it is not body at all it surpasses them all so much the more." But to relieve those who are desirous of becoming acquainted with Aristotle's doctrines and opinions of all labour and trouble, I shall transcribe the entire passage itself, which has puzzled so many interpreters, and give a paraphrastic interpretation of its meaning. This will make it plain and clear to every one that we have not done violence to his words, but that if our exposition be adopted they are all perfectly consistent and in keeping with each other: Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια· πάσης μέν οὖν ψυχῆς δύναμις, ἑτέρου σώματος ἔοικε κεκοινωνηκέναι, καὶ θειοτέρου τῶν καλουμένων στοιχείων, ὡς δὲ διαφέρουσι τιμιότητι αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ ἀλλήλων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη διαφέρει φύσις· πάντων μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἐνυπάρχει, ὅπερ ποιεῖ γόνιμα εἶναι τὰ σπέρματα, τὸ καλούμενον θερμόν· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ πῦρ, οὐδὲ τοιαύτη δύναμίς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενον ἐν τῷ σπέρματι, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀφρῷδει πνεῦμα, καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, ἀναλόγως οὖσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ. Let us see whether we can render the words so as to make their meaning intelligible to every one: "These things being so, it remains for us to decide that the rational soul is not produced from the four elements of which the human body consists, and generated in the body itself, but comes to and enters the human body from elsewhere, and therefore is more closely allied to the divine nature, than are the elements of things, or the human body which is compounded of them. For not one of the soul's faculties needs the assistance of the body for its operation. It cogitates, forecasts, reasons, deliberates, determines by its own innate power, nor requires the aid of a body for the performance of these functions. Wherefore undoubtedly our other soul, the seat of the vital and sensitive power, is associated and conjoined, not only with this gross body which is composed of the four elements, but also with a much more excellent and subtle one, namely, that

express doctrine,[8] the soul is never quite naked of all body, he writing thus: Ἀεὶ ψυχὴ ἐπιτεταγμένη σώματι, τοτὲ μὲν ἄλλῳ,

from which the rational soul was taken, and which surpasses all the elements and is more akin to the divine nature than any other thing. The condition of the mind or rational soul, however, is not the same in all men; but in some its perception is more clear and acute, while in others it meets with greater restraints and impediments in the exercise of its power. This difference in the state of the rational soul arises from the different nature of the sentient soul it is allied with, which in some is more noble, active, and excellent, in others more debased and ignoble, and consequently can variously affect the rational soul. Now if it be asked what causes the sentient souls to be so diversified in their kind and nature, I answer that it is owing to their being produced from seed and transfused by seed into the man who is generated; which seed, as every one knows, is various and not of the same excellence in all. For there is innate in all seed a certain animating and vivifying power, which may be called heat, as it approaches more closely to the nature of fire than to any thing else. Still it must not be supposed that this fiery virtue which we ascribe to seed can be compared to our natural fire, or to any thing of the kind, for properly speaking it is not fire, but much more subtle than fire. For my own part, indeed, I should consider spirit to be a more suitable appellation for this power of animating and of producing life and the sentient soul, which resides in seed and its frothy body. And this spirit, this life and soul, that springs from seed and is latent in seed prior to generation, as soon as a man is begotten and has a sentient soul, becomes the seat and abode of the mind or rational soul, which as I have before stated is plucked and detached from a body more divine than all the elements and analogous to the stars." From this interpretation of a most obscure passage of Aristotle, which few I apprehend will deny to be in strict accordance with his words, my readers may learn in the first place the sentiments entertained by this philosopher respecting the two souls, sentient and rational, and secondly, the value that is to be attached to the remarks here put forth by the learned Doctor.

I. This opinion of Aristotle, so far from agreeing with the Platonic and Pythagorean doctrine of a celestial body of the soul, is on the contrary wholly at variance with it. For what the Stagirite here calls body is the rational soul itself, which is supposed to be sprung from the fifth body.

II. Neither the soul nor the body of the soul is here called πνεῦμα, "a spirit," by Aristotle, as he applies this name to the animating and vivifying power which he asserts to be in all seed, and of which the sentient soul is either a portion or an effect. I am aware that the Platonists and Pythagoreans are accustomed to designate the body of the soul, which it assumes to itself from the elements, by the name πνεῦμα, but they have nothing in common with Aristotle.

III. Whether Galen and St. Augustine have censured Aristotle for deviating from the Pythagoreans, as Dr. Cudworth here states, I am unable to say; as I could not prevail upon myself to encounter the task of again looking through the bulky volumes of these writers, being already wearied with the immense labour occasioned me by the learned Doctor's habit of quoting ancient authors without indicating the passages. I should be inclined to deny that St. Augustine has left on record any thing of the kind, having more than once very carefully perused all that he has written in relation to the ancient philosophers; still I will not speak positively. If any such thing did escape Galen and St. Augustine, they certainly were in error and misapprehended the meaning of Aristotle.

IV. Those who rank Aristotle among the assertors of the soul's immortality can look for no support whatever from this passage. I should say rather that it proves their opinion to be fallacious.

[8] Dr. Cudworth is wrong in supposing it to be evident from these words of Plato, that this philosopher held the soul to be clothed in another more subtle body on quitting this gross and earthly one. For in the place from which these words are extracted Plato seems to be speaking merely of the μετεμψύχωσις, or transmigration of souls into new bodies, a doctrine which he is well known to have inculcated. The meaning therefore of this passage is as follows: The soul as long as it remains in this world passes from one body into another, and has sometimes a better and sometimes a worse domicile. "The better morals," he immediately subjoins, "are transferred by God εἰς βελτίω τόπον, into a better place, χείρον δὲ, εἰς τὸν χείρονα, but the worse into a worse."

τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλῳ,* "The soul is always conjoined with a body, but sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another;" which many Christian doctors also, as is before declared, have thought highly probable. However, our Christian faith assures us, that the souls of good men shall at length be clothed with spiritual and heavenly bodies, such as are, in Aristotle's language, ἀνάλογα τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ, "analogous to the element of the stars." Which Christian resurrection therefore, to life and immortality, is far from being, as Celsus[9] reproached it, σκωλήκων ἐλπὶς, "the mere hope of worms." And thus much shall suffice, in way of confutation, of the first atheistic objection against Providence, which is the twelfth argumentation propounded in the second chapter.

The thirteenth atheistic argument, or second objection against Providence, is from the seeming confusion of human affairs; that all things fall alike to all; the innocent and the nocent, the pious and the impious, the religious and the profane: nay, that many times the worser causes and men prevail against the better, as is intimated in that passage of the poet,[10] though in the person of a Theist,

Victrix causa Deo placuit, sed victa Catoni;

And that the unjust and ungodly often flow in all kind of prosperity, whilst the innocent and devout worshippers of the Deity, all their lives long, conflict with adversity. Whereas, were there a God and Providence, as they conceive, profane and irreligious persons would be presently thunder-struck from heaven, or otherwise made remarkable objects of divine vengeance, as also the pious miraculously protected and rescued from evil and harms.

Now we grant indeed, that this consideration hath too much puzzled and staggered weak minds in all ages. Because "sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil."[11] And the Psalmist himself[12] was sometimes much perplexed with this

* De Leg. 10. p. 903. [Page 672.]

[9] In Origen, Adv. Celsum, lib. 5. p. 240. Dr. Cudworth justly insinuates that Celsus did not even understand the meaning of our doctrine of the resurrection of bodies. For he assumes it to be the Christian belief that the putrid and worm-eaten body will hereafter be restored to the soul; and upon the strength of this error he most foolishly exclaims that the hope of Christians is more worthy of worms than of men. For worms delight in putrid flesh which men abhor. Hence he adds: Ποία γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ποθήσειε ἔτι σῶμα σεσηπός, "For what man's soul would be desirous of a body already putrid? Ridiculous enough certainly. As if the very meanest Christian ever supposed that the soul will be conjoined with flesh reduced by dissolution into its primitive elements.

[10] Lucan, Pharsal. lib. 1. v. 131.

[11] These are the words of Solomon, Eccles. viii. 11.

[12] David or Asaph in Psalm lxxiii.

phenomenon, the prosperity of the ungodly, who "set their mouths against heaven, and whose tongue walketh through the earth;[3] so that he was tempted to think, "he had cleansed his heart in vain, and washed his hands in innocency[4] (till at length, entering into the sanctuary of God, his mind became illuminated, and his soul fixed in a firm trust and confidence upon divine providence; "Whom have I in heaven but thee," &c. "My flesh and my heart faileth, but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever").[5] For as some will from hence be apt to infer, That there is no God at all, but that blind chance and fortune steer all (the fool hath said in his heart there is no God[6]); so will others conclude, That though there be a God, yet he either does not know things done here below (how does God know? and is there knowledge in the Most High?[7]*) or else will not so far humble himself, or disturb his own ease and quiet, as to concern himself in our low human affairs.

First of all therefore, we here say, that it is altogether unreasonable to require, that divine Providence should miraculously interpose upon every turn in punishing the ungodly, and preserving the pious, and thus perpetually interrupt the course of nature (which would look but like a botch or bungle, and a violent business), but rather carry things on ἀψόφῳ κελεύθῳ, in a still and silent path, and show his art and skill in making things of themselves fairly unwind, and clear up at last into a satisfactory close. Passion and self-interest is blind, or short-sighted; but that which steers the whole world is no fond, pettish, impatient and passionate thing, but an impartial, disinterested and uncaptivated nature. Nevertheless, it is certain, that sometimes we have not wanted instances, in cases extraordinary, of a Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, "God appearing, as it were, miraculously upon the stage," and manifesting himself in taking immediate vengeance upon notorious malefactors, or delivering his faithful servants from imminent dangers or evils threatened; as the same is often done also by a secret and undiscerned overruling of the things of nature. But it must be granted, that it is not always thus, but the periods of divine Providence here in this world are commonly longer, and the evolutions thereof slower; according to that of Euripides,[8] which yet has a tang of profaneness in the expression,

Μέλλει· τὸ θεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον φύσει,

[3] Psalm lxxiii. 9. [4] Verse 13. [5] Verse 25.
[6] Psalm xiv. 1. [7] Psalm lxxiii. 11.

* Thus did some in Plato from hence conclude, Εἶναι μὲν Θεοὺς, τῶν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμελεῖν πραγματων, De Leg. 10. [Page 664.]

[8] In Oreste, v. 420. p. 258. Where Menelaus asks Orestes whether Apollo afforded him any assistance in his calamities. To which he replies that "the Deity is slow and dilatory; for such is his nature." But I cannot see why the learned Doctor should

"The Deity is slow or dilatory, and this is the nature of it." For it is not from slackness and remissness in the Deity, but either from his patience and long-suffering, he willing, that men should repent, or else to teach us patience by his example (as Plutarch[9] suggesteth) or that all things may be carried on with more pomp and solemnity; or lastly, for other particular reasons, as Plutarch[10] ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for Dionysius the tyrant, though so profane and irreligious a

accuse this saying of Euripides of a certain profane tendency. The poet is speaking according to the popular opinion of his own times, which ascribed to the gods delay and tardiness both in their rewards and punishments. There are certainly many more aphorisms of this kind to be found in ancient authors, whom no one would think of charging with impiety towards the gods; from which it would appear that this opinion concerning the gods was current among the people. Valerius Maximus, Dictor. et Factor. Memorabil. lib. 1. cap. 3. Lento gradu ad vindictam sui divina procedit ira, "Divine anger proceeds to vengeance with slow step." Juvenal, Satyr. 13. v. 100.

Ut sit magna, tamen certe lenta ira Deorum est.

Plutarch especially ought to be consulted in his specific and elegant treatise: *Περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου βραδέως τιμωρουμένων*, "On those who are tardily punished by the Deity," p. 548. tom. 2. opp. in which he professedly discusses this subject, and according to his custom brings forward certain sayings and examples of the ancients by way of illustration. For the ancient Epicureans assailed divine Providence by this very argument, that according to the confession of the Theists themselves their gods were very slow in punishing crimes. It is this sect, therefore, that Plutarch is confuting in his treatise, and that too by arguments which every wise and sensible man will acknowledge to be sound and powerful. Indeed he has reached as far by mere dint of reason in this matter as a man can reach who is destitute of the light of the gospel and divine revelation. To return to Euripides, that he meant nothing profane or impious when he declared Apollo to be slow and dilatory, agreeably to the custom of the gods, is sufficiently shown by another passage of his, wherein he devoutly worships Jupiter, and yet at the same time confesses that he is slow to bring succour, Heraclid. v. 869. 870. p. 514.

Ὦ Ζεῦ, χρόνῳ μὲν τάμ' ἐπεσκέψω κακά,
Χάριν δέ ὁμῶς σοι τῶν πεπραγμένων ἔχω,

"O Jupiter, thou hast been long in regarding my wrongs; nevertheless, I give thee thanks for the things that are done." Dr. Cudworth seems to have been one of those who suspect this celebrated tragedian of being unfavourably disposed towards God and religion. But the fallacy of such a supposition has, I consider, been satisfactorily exposed by that great ornament of the university of Cambridge, Joshua Barnes, in the Life of Euripides, prefixed to his edition, Cantabr. 1694. fol. If I have any judgment in these matters, a much more favourable opinion would be formed of Euripides and some others of the ancients, if their sayings respecting God and religion were judged of by reference to the opinions and phraseology of the times in which they lived. [See Zimmermann, De Theolog. Euripidis, in the Mus. Helvet. tom. 4. p. 1.] But I know not how it happens that some men, eminent for their learning and intelligence in other respects, estimate the piety of the ancients according to our own notions and forms of expression; as if their conceptions and views of things had been the same as ours, and the inferences deducible from certain opinions had been equally evident to them as they are to us at this day.

[9] De Sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. 2. opp. 550. *Διὸ καὶ τοῖς πονηροῖς ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ σχολαίως τὴν δικὴν ἐπιτίθησιν . . . ἵνα ἡμῶν τὸ περὶ τὰς τιμωρίας θηριῶδες, καὶ λαβρὸν ἀφαίρων, κ.τ.λ.* "God inflicts punishment upon the wicked tardily, and after long delay . . . . that by his example he may divest us of all ferocity and violence in our revenge."

[10] Ibid. p. 557.

person, to have been cut off suddenly. But wicked and ungodly persons oftentimes fail not to be met withal at last, and at the long-run, here in this life, and either in themselves or posterity, to be notoriously branded with the marks of divine displeasure; according to that of the poet:[1] Raro antecedentem scelestum, &c. "It is seldom that wickedness altogether scapes punishment, though it come slowly after, limping with a lame foot; and those proverbial speeches amongst the Pagans,[2]

Ὀψὲ θεῶν ἁλεοῦσι μύλοι, ἁλεοῦσι δὲ λεπτά,

Mills of the gods do slowly wind,
But they at length to powder grind.

and, "Divine justice steals on softly with woollen feet, but strikes at last with iron hands."

Nevertheless we cannot say, that it is always thus neither, but that wicked persons may possibly sometimes have an uninterrupted prosperity here in this life, and no visible marks of divine displeasure upon them; but as the generously virtuous will not envy them upon this account, nor repine at their own condition, they knowing, that[3] οὐδὲν κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθόν, "There is neither any thing truly evil to the good, nor good to the evil;" so are they so far from being staggered herewith in their belief of a God and Providence, that they are rather the more confirmed in their persuasions of a future immortality and judgment after death, when all things shall be set straight and right, and rewards and punishments impartially dispensed. That of Plutarch[4] therefore is most true here: Εἷς οὖν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιροῦντα θάτερον, "That there is a necessary connexion betwixt those two things, divine Providence, and the permanence or immortality of human souls, one and the same reason confirming them both; neither can one of these be taken alone without the other." But they, who, because judgment is not presently executed upon the ungodly, blame the management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, are like such spectators of a dramatic poem, as when wicked and injurious persons are brought upon the stage, for a while swaggering and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the dramatist, and presently condemn the plot; whereas, if they would but expect the winding up of

[1] Horace, Od. lib. 3. od. 2.
[2] These are cursorily touched upon by Plutarch, De Sera Numinis Vindicta, tom. 2. p. 548.
[3] Read the admirable discourse of Socrates in Plato's Apologia Socratis, p. 369. and Plato, De Republica, lib 10. p. 518. to say nothing of the Stoics and others, who inculcated the same doctrine.
[4] De Sera Numinis Vindicta, p. 560. tom. 2.

things, and stay till the last close, they should then see them come off with shame and sufficient punishment.[5] The evolution of the world, as Plotinus calls it,[6] is ἀληθέστερον ποίημα, a "truer poem;" and we men histrionical actors upon the stage, who, notwithstanding, insert something of our own into the poem too; but God Almighty is that skilful dramatist, who always connecteth that of ours, which went before, with what of his follows after, into good coherent sense, and will at last make it appear, that a thread of exact justice did run through all, and that rewards and punishments are measured out in geometrical proportion.

Lastly, it is in itself fit, that there should be somewhere a doubtful and cloudy state of things, for the better exercise of virtue and faith. For as there could have been no Hercules, had there not been monsters to subdue; so were there no such difficulties to encounter with, no puzzles and entanglements of things, no temptations and trials to assault us, virtue would grow languid, and that excellent grace of faith want due occasions and objects to exercise itself upon. Here have we therefore such a state of things, and this world is, as it were, a stage erected for the more difficult part of virtue to act upon, and where we are to live by "faith," and not by "sight;" that faith, which is "the substance of things to be hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen;"[7] a belief in the goodness, power, and wisdom of God, when all things are dark and cloudy round about us. "The just shall live by his faith."

We have now sufficiently confuted the second atheistic objection also, against Providence, as to the conduct and economy of human affairs. Nevertheless this is a large field, and much more might be said in defence of Providence, both as to these and other instances, had we room here to expatiate in. Wherefore, for a supplement of what remains, we shall refer the reader to the writings of others, who have professedly undertaken apologies for Providence, both as to the fabric and economy of the world; but especially the learned and ingenious author[8] of the Divine Dialogues. Only we shall here add some few considerations, not so much for the confutation of Atheists, as for the better satisfaction of such Religionists, who, too easily concluding, that all things might have been much better than they are, are thereupon apt to call in question the divine attribute of

[5] The learned Doctor borrows this comparison from Plutarch, ibid. p. 554. to whom he is indebted for most of what he here brings forward.

[6] Ennead. 3. lib. 2. cap. 16. p. 267. opp.

[7] Heb. xi. 1.

[8] The eminent theologian and philosopher, Dr. Henry More, whose Divine Dialogues are appended to the first volume of his philosophical works, published at London, 1679. fol. To him, besides others enumerated by J. Alb. Fabricius in his Delectus Argumentorum pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 17. p. 409. add in particular Dr. Sherlock in his ingenious and admirable work on Providence.

goodness in its full extent, which yet is the only foundation of our Christian faith.

First therefore we say, that in judging of the works of God, we ought not to consider the parts of the world alone by themselves; and then, because we could fancy much finer things, thereupon blame the Maker of the whole. As if one should attend only to this earth, which is but the lowest and most dreggy part of the universe; or blame plants, because they have not sense; brutes, because they have not reason; men, because they are not demons or angels; and angels, because they are not gods, or want divine perfection. Upon which account, God should either have made nothing at all, since there can be nothing besides himself absolutely perfect, or else nothing but the higher rank of angelic beings, free from mortality, and all those other evils that attend mankind, or such fine things as Epicurus' gods were feigned to be, living in certain delicious regions,[9] where there was neither blustering winds, nor any lowering clouds, nor nipping frosts, nor scorching heat, nor night, nor shadow, but the calm and unclouded ether, always smiling with gentle serenity, whereas were there but one kind of thing (the best) thus made, there could have been no music nor harmony at all, in the world, for want of variety. But we ought, in the first place, to consider the whole, whether that be not the best that could be made, having all that belongeth to it; and then the parts in reference to the whole, whether they be not, in their several degrees and ranks, congruous and agreeable thereunto. But this is a thing which hath been so well insisted upon by Plotinus,* that we cannot speak better to it than in his words: Ὅλον γὰρ τὶ ἐποίησε πάγκαλον, καὶ αὔταρκες, καὶ φίλον αὑτῷ, καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ, τοῖς τε κυριωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττοσιν ὡσάυτως προσφόροις· ὁ τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον αἰτιώμενος, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη τῆς αἰτίας· τά τε γὰρ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἁρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸ ὅλον σκοπούμενον, μὴ πρὸς μέρη ἄττα μικρὰ βλέπειν· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τὸν κόσμον αἰτιωμένου ἀλλά τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ χωρὶς λαβόντα, οἷον εἰ, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "God made the whole most beautiful, entire, complete, and sufficient; all agreeing friendly with itself and its parts; both the nobler and the meaner of them being alike congruous thereunto. Whosoever therefore, from the parts thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and unjust censurer. For we ought to

[9] Dr. Cudworth here gives the substance of the following verses of Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, lib. 3. v. 19. &c.

Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis
Adspergunt, neque nix acri concreta pruina
Cana cadens violat, semperque innubilus æther
Integit et large diffuso lumine ridet.

* Page 256. [Lib. 2. de Providentiâ, Ennead. 3. lib. 2. cap. 3.]

consider the parts, not alone by themselves, but in reference to the whole, whether they be harmonious and agreeable to the same. Otherwise we shall not blame the universe, but some of its parts only taken by themselves; as if one should blame the hair or toes of a man, taking no notice at all of his divine visage and countenance; or omitting all other animals, one should attend only to the most contemptible of them; or, lastly, overlooking all other men, consider only the most deformed Thersites. But that which God made was the whole as one thing; which he that attends to, may hear it speaking to him after this manner: God Almighty hath made me, and from thence came I, perfect and complete, and standing in need of nothing, because in me are contained all things; plants, and animals, and good souls, and men happy with virtue, and innumerable demons, and many gods. Nor is the earth alone in me adorned with all manner of plants and variety of animals; or does the power of soul extend at most no further than to the seas; as if the whole air and ether, and heaven, in the meantime, were quite devoid of soul, and altogether unadorned with living inhabitants. Moreover, all things in me desire good, and every thing reaches to it, according to its power and nature. For the whole depends upon that first and highest good, the gods themselves, who reign in my several parts, and all animals, and plants, and whatsoever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things in me partake only of being, some of life also, some of sense, some of reason, and some of intellect above reason. But no man ought to require equal things from unequal; nor that the finger should see, but the eye; it being enough for the finger to be a finger, and to perform its own office." And again, afterwards: "Ὥσπερ τεχνίτης οὐ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ ζώῳ ὀφθαλμοὺς ποιεῖ, οὕτως οὐ δ' ὁ λόγος πάντα θεοὺς εἰργάζεται· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν θεοὺς, τὰ δὲ δαίμονας δευτέραν φύσιν, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ζῶα ἐφεξῆς, οὐ φθόνῳ, ἀλλὰ λογῳ ποικιλίαν γοερὰν ἔχοντι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄπειροι γραφικῆς τέχνης αἰτιῶνται, ὡς οὐ καλὰ τὰ χρώματα πανταχοῦ, ὁ δ' ἆρα τὰ προσήκοντα ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ, ἢ εἴτις δρᾶμα μέμφοιτο, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ἥρωες ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "As an artificer would not make all things in an animal to be eyes, so neither has the divine λόγος, or spermatic reason of the world, made all things gods; but some gods, and some demons, and some men, and some lower animals; not out of envy, but to display its own variety and fecundity. But we are like unskilful spectators of a picture, who condemn the limner, because he hath not put bright colours every where; whereas he had suited his colours to every part respectively, giving to each such as belonged to it. Or else are we like those who would blame a comedy or tragedy, because they were not all kings or heroes that acted in it, but some servants and rustic clowns introduced also, talking after their rude fashion. Whereas

the dramatic poem would neither be complete, nor elegant and delightful, were all those worser parts taken out of it."

Again, we cannot certainly conclude that the works of God and his creation do not transcend those narrow limits which vulgar opinion and imagination sets them, that commonly terminates the universe, but a little above the clouds, or at most supposes the fixed stars, being all fastened in one solid sphere, to be the utmost wall, or arched roof, and rolling circumference thereof. Much less ought we, upon such groundless suppositions, to infer, that the world might therefore have been made much better than it is, because it might have been much more roomy and capacious. We explode the atheistic infinity of distant worlds; nor can we admit that Cartesian, seemingly more modest, indefinite extension of one corporeal universe, which yet really, according to that philosopher's meaning, hath nullos fines, "no bounds nor limits at all." For we persuade ourselves that the corporeal world is as uncapable of a positive infinity of magnitude, as it is of time: there being no magnitude so great, but that more still might be added to it.[10] Nevertheless, as we cannot possibly imagine the sun to be a quarter, or an hundredth part so big as we know it to be; so much more may the whole corporeal universe far transcend those narrow bounds which our imagination would circumscribe it in. The new celestial phenomena, and the late improvements of astronomy and philosophy made thereupon, render it so probable, that even this dull earth of ours is a planet, and the sun a fixed star in the centre of that vortex, wherein it moves, that many have shrewdly suspected, that there are other habitable globes besides this earth of ours, (which may be sailed round about in a year or two) as also more suns, with their respective planets, than one. However, the distance of all the fixed stars from us being so vast that the diameter of the great orb makes no discernible parallax in the site of them; from whence it is also probable that the other fixed stars are likewise vastly distant from one another:[1] this, I say, widens the corporeal universe to us, and makes those flammantia mœnia mundi, as Lucretius[2] calls them,

[10] These subjects are copiously treated of above, where the learned Doctor is professedly discussing the nature of infinity.

[1] Those who are desirous of obtaining a more accurate knowledge of these matters, which are here glanced at rather than explained, may consult the more recent astronomers, especially of England, Sir Isaac Newton, David Gregory, and others, as also W. Derham, in his Astronomical Theology, a work which will be of great service to such as are not initiated in these mysteries.

[2] He thus sings of Epicurus, De Rerum Natura, lib. 1. verse 73. 74. p. 30.

> Ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra
> Processit longe flammantia mœnia mundi.

Where it is clear that these "flaming walls of the world" are heaven adorned with shining stars and fiery orbs. The poet's meaning is, that Epicurus, whom he followed as his

"those flaming walls of the world," to fly away before us. Now, it is not reasonable to think that all this immense vastness should lie waste, desert, or uninhabited, and have nothing in it that could praise the Creator thereof, save only this one small spot of earth. "In my Father's house," (saith our Saviour) "are many mansions."[3] And Baruch, (chap. iii. appointed by our

only guide in philosophizing, carried himself in thought beyond this visible universe, and well knew that there are innumerable other worlds besides the one we inhabit, and that heaven does not, as the vulgar erroneously suppose, form the extreme boundary of the whole nature of things.

[3] If, as appears to be the case, Dr. Cudworth understood this passage of St. John, chap. xiv. 2. as though our Saviour meant to say that there are more and probably better worlds than this of ours, I for one cannot agree with him, although I am aware that this opinion has not been without its advocates in ancient as well as in modern times. Our blessed Lord is comforting the minds of his disciples against the tribulation that overwhelms them at the thought of his approaching departure. But how, I ask, can the knowledge that there are many worlds, and that some of them are better and more excellent than ours, contribute towards dispelling this tribulation? [This interpretation is disputed by Christ. Wollius, Hermeneutica, N. T. p. 172.] It is not my intention either to enumerate or refute the opinions of other interpreters on the meaning of this passage. They are to be found in Fr. Adolph. Lamp's Comm. in Johannem. tom. 3. p. 100. &c. And Jo. Christoph. Wolf's Curæ Philologicæ in quatuor Evangelica et Actus Apostolor. p. 441. Most of them, to confess the truth, seem to display more ingenuity than simplicity and clearness. I will avail myself of this opportunity of declaring my own sentiments respecting this somewhat obscure passage. I consider our Saviour's words to contain the simple meaning: "My father is a great and most powerful King, who will receive you all as his servants into the place where he himself dwells, full of all felicity." And that this meaning does not at once occur to the mind of every one, is owing to the fact that our Saviour has clothed it in a certain proverb, which seems to have been current at the time among the Jews and other oriental nations. The power and magnificence of kings in the ages of antiquity, was estimated principally from the size, beauty, and dignity of their palaces. Hence, Homer, when he wishes to show the wealth and importance of Alcinous, the king of the Phæncians, gives a copious and elegant description of the splendour, excellence, and structure of the mansion which he inhabited, Odyss. lib. 7. verse 86. &c. Now, in these mansions of the ancient kings, there was a necessity for many habitations. For it was the custom of that age that the nobles of the land, together with all the king's servants and ministers, and in short, all his family, should be lodged in the same house as himself. In Homer, we find that not only Alcinous' sons, ibid. v. 4. &c. but the Phæncian princes also, v. 88. &c. dwell together in the royal mansion. In Priam's gorgeous palace, as the same poet informs us, Iliad, lib. 7. verse 244. there were fifty bed-chambers occupied by his sons and their wives, and the same number appropriated to his daughters and their husbands: from which it is manifest that this palace must have been most spacious, and provided with many apartments and domiciles. It is unnecessary to adduce other passages of ancient authors testifying the same thing. Consequently, the greater and more powerful a king was, the more μοναὶ or habitations were required to afford accommodation to his whole family and household. And hence I suspect arose the custom, of describing the power, splendour, and greatness of a sovereign, by saying that he possessed a most spacious mansion, divided into numerous habitations, or in other words, maintained a great number of servants and ministers. Wherefore, when Christ declares that in his father's house there are many mansions, he seems to me to mean this: "Be not afraid: but put all your trust in God and me: for although you may be exposed to calamities in this life, my Father, whose ministers and servants you are, is the Lord, who has a most spacious and splendid house, that is, possesses infinite riches and power, and therefore, in that house will amply recompense his servants for what they lose here. For as the kings of this world receive those whose labour and counsels they make use of into their magnificent palaces, and there supply them with a commodious and honourable habitation, so you also shall hereafter enter into that everlasting abode of my father. And I now go thither to prepare a place for you."

church to be read publicly) "O Israel, how great is the house of God, and how large is the place of his possession? Great and hath no end, high and unmeasurable." Which yet we understand not of an absolute infinity, but only such an immense vastness as far transcends vulgar opinion and imagination.

We shall add but one thing more, that, to make a right judgment of the ways of providence, and the justice thereof, as to the economy of mankind, we must look both forwards and backwards, or besides the present, not only upon the future, but also the past time. Which rule is likewise thus set down by Plotinus:* Οὐδ' ἐκεῖνον ἀποβλητέον τὸν λόγον, ὃς οὐ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστοτε φησὶ βλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς πρόσθεν περιόδους, καὶ αὖ τὸ μέλλον, "Neither is that doctrine of the ancients to be neglected, that, to give an account of providence, we ought to look back upon former periods, as well as forward to what is future." Indeed he, and those other philosophers, who were religious, understood this so as to conclude a pre-existent state of all particular souls, wherein they were first created by God pure, but by the abuse of their own liberty degenerated, to be a necessary hypothesis, for the solving that phenomenon of the depraved state of mankind in general here in this life. And not only so, but they endeavoured in like manner to give an account also of those different conditions of particular persons as to morality, from their infancy, and their other different fates here, deriving them all, ἐκ τῶν προβεβιωμένων, "from their several demeanours heretofore in a pre-existent state." And there have not wanted Christian doctors, who have complied with these philosophers in both.[4] But our common Christianity only agrees thus far, as to suppose a kind of imputative pre-existence in Adam, in whom all were created pure, and so consequently involved in his after miscarriage, to solve the pravity of human nature; upon which account we are all said to be, φύσει τέκνα ὀργῆς,[5] "by nature children of wrath." But as for the different

In some other passages, let it be observed in passing, in our Saviour's last discourses to his disciples, he openly alludes to this practice common to Eastern kings of appropriating μοναὶ, or abodes, to their ministers in their own houses, John xii. 26. Καὶ ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ, ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ διάκονος ὁ ἐμὸς ἔσται, "and where I am, there shall also my servant be:" and a little after the words which we have here attempted to interpret, John xiv. 3. Παραλήψομαι ὑμᾶς πρὸς ἐμαυτόν· ἵνα ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἦτε, "I will receive you unto myself, that where I am, there ye may be also;" which I consider to be somewhat confirmatory of our exposition. In like manner, the passage of Baruch, chap. iii. verse 24. 25. also quoted here by Dr. Cudworth, ought by no means to be understood of a multitude of worlds: for it is manifest from what follows that the poet is speaking solely of the world which we now inhabit.

* Page 264. [Ennead. 3. lib. 2. cap. 13.]

[4] The principal ancient Christian fathers, who besides Origen approved of this doctrine of the existence of souls before bodies, are named by Pet. Dan. Huet in his Origeniana, lib. 2. quæst. 6. sect. 10. p. 97.

[5] Ephes. ii. 3.

conditions of persons, and their several fates, more disadvantageous to some than others, this indeed the generality of Christian doctors have been content to resolve only into an occult, but just providence.* And thus does Origen himself sometimes modestly pass it over, as in his third book against Celsus:† Πολλοῖς καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀνατροφῆς τοιούτως γεγένηται, ὡς μηδὲ φαντασίαν ἐπιτραπῆναι τῶν κρειττόνων λαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἐκ πρώτης ἡλικίας ἤτοι ἐν παιδικοῖς εἶναι ἀκολάστων ἀνδρῶν, ἢ δεσποτῶν, ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ τινὶ κωλυούσῃ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναβλέπειν κακοδαιμονίᾳ· τὰς δὲ περὶ τούτων αἰτίας πάντως μὲν εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἐν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας λόγοις· πίπτειν δὲ αὐτὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ εὐχερές, "It happeneth to many, so to have been brought up from their very childhood, as that, by one means or other, they could have no opportunity at all of thinking of the better things, &c. And it is very probable, that there are causes of these things in the reasons of providence, though they do not easily fall under human notice."

But there is yet a third atheistic objection against providence behind, That "it is impossible any one Being should animadvert and order all things in the distant places of the world at once; and, were this possible, yet would such infinite negotiosity be very uneasy and distractious to it, and altogether inconsistent with happiness. Nor would a being irresistibly powerful, concern itself in the good or welfare of any thing else, it standing in need of nothing, and all benevolence and good will arising from indigency and imbecility. Wherefore, such a being would wholly be taken up in the enjoyment of itself and its own happiness, utterly regardless of all other things."

To which the reply is, first, That though ourselves and all created beings have but a finite animadversion and narrow sphere of activity; yet does it not therefore follow, that the case must be the same with the Deity, supposed to be a Being infinitely perfect, ἀπειροδύναμος, "that hath no manner of defect," either of knowledge or power in it. But this is a mere idolum specus, "an idol of the cave or den;" men measuring the Deity by their own scantling and narrowness. And indeed, were there nothing at all but what we ourselves could fully comprehend, there could be no God. Were the sun an animal, and had life co-extended with its rays and light, it would see and perceive every atom of matter that its outstretched beams reached to and touched. Now all created beings are themselves, in some sense, but the rays of the Deity, which therefore cannot but feel and sensibly perceive all these its own effluxes and emanations. Men themselves can order and manage affairs in several distant places at once, without any disturbance; and we have innumerable

* Thus Hierocles: Οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ὁ ἀγαθὸς νῦν γινόμενος, κἂν παλαιῶν μηνιμάτων ἐφέλκηται στίγματα, p. 157. † Page 134.

notions of things in our own mind, that lie there easily together, without crowding one another, or causing any distraction to us.[6]

Nevertheless, the minds of weak mortals may here be somewhat eased and helped by considering what hath been before suggested; that there is no necessity God Almighty should *αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα*, "do all things himself immediately and drudgingly;" but he may have his inferior ministers and executioners under him, to discharge him of that supposed encumberment. As first of all, an artificial plastic nature, which, without knowledge and animal consciousness, disposes the matter of the universe according to the platform or idea of a perfect mind, and forms the bodies of all animals. And this was one reason why we did before insist so much upon this artificial, regular, and methodical nature, namely, that divine providence might neither be excluded from having an influence upon all things in this lower world, as resulting only from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, unguided by any mind; nor yet the Deity be supposed to do every thing itself immediately and miraculously, without the subservient ministry of any natural causes, which would seem to us mortals, to be not only a violent, but also an operose, cumbersome, and moliminous business.[7] And thus did Plato[8] acknowledge that there were, *ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι αἷς ὑπηρετούσαις χρῆται ὁ Θεός*, "certain causes of a prudent, that is, artificial and orderly nature, which God makes use of as subservient to himself in the mundane economy." Besides which, those instincts also impressed upon animals, and which they are passive to, directing them to act for ends either not understood, or not attended to by them, in order to their own good and the good of the universe, are another part of that divine fate which inserted into things themselves, is the servant and execu-

[6] Socrates philosophizes in a somewhat similar manner in Xenophon, De Dictis et Factis Socratis Memorabil. lib. 1. p. 575. where he admirably defends divine providence and religion against a certain Aristodemus: *Κατάμαθε ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα ὅπως βουλέται μεταχειρίζεται· οἴεσθαι οὖν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως ἂν αὐτῷ ἡδὺ ᾖ οὕτω τίθεσθαι· καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν· μηδὲ τὴν σὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ἐν Σικελίᾳ δύνασθαι φροντίζειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ φρόνησιν μὴ ἱκανὴν εἶναι ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*, "Observe that thy mind, while it is in thy body, governs it at will. Wherefore, we must suppose also that that wisdom which is in the universe, rules all things in such a way as seems good to it; neither must it be imagined that thy eye is able to reach to a distance of many stadia, and that the eye of God is unable to see all things at once, or that thy mind can meditate upon matters both here, and in Egypt and in Sicily, and that the wisdom of God cannot at one and the same time attend to and overlook all things."

[7] I have already explicitly declared my own opinion upon all these subjects above, in my remarks on a *plastic nature*.

[8] This passage occurs in the Timæus, sect. 36. p. 256. But it is not written by Plato in the same words as those here quoted, neither does it relate to a plastic nature. See the remarks above on the Digression concerning a plastic nature, sect. 6. note 5. p. 227. 228.

tioner of providence. Above all which, there are yet other knowing and understanding ministers of the Deity, as its eyes and hands, demoniac or angelic beings, appointed to preside over mankind, all mundane affairs, and the things of nature; they having their several distinct offices and provinces assigned them. Of which also Plato thus:[9] Τούτοις εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες προστεταγμένοι ἑκάστοις, ἐπὶ τὸ σμικρώτατον ἀεὶ πάθης καὶ πράξεως. "There are certain rulers or presidents appointed by the supreme God who governs the whole world, over all the several things and parts therein, even to the smallest distribution of them." All which inferior causes are constantly overlooked and supervised by the watchful eye of God Almighty himself, who may also sometimes extraordinarily interpose.

We need not, therefore, restrain and confine divine Providence to a few greater things only, as some do, that we may thereby consult the ease of the Deity, and its freedom from distraction; but may and ought to extend it to all things whatsoever, small as well as great. And indeed, the great things of the world cannot well be ordered neither, without some regard to the small and little:[10] Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εὖ κεῖσθαι, "as architects affirm that great stones cannot be well placed together in a building without little." Neither can generals of armies, nor governors of families, nor masters of ships, nor mechanic artificers, discharge their several functions, and do their works respectively as they ought, did they not mind small things also, as well the great. Μὴ τοίνυν (saith the forementioned philosopher,[1]) τόνγε Θεὸν ἀξιώσομέν ποτε ὑφ' ἡμῶν δημιουργῶν φαυλότερον, οἳ τὰ προσήκοντα αὐτοῖς ἔργα, ὅσῳπερ ἂν ἀμείνους ὦσι, τόσῳ ἀκριβέστερα καὶ τελεώτερα μιᾷ τέχνῃ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀπεργάζονται. "Let us not therefore make God Almighty inferior to mortal opificers, who, by one and the same art, can order small things as well as great; and so suppose him to be supine and negligent." Nevertheless, the chief concernment and employment of divine Providence in the world is the economy of souls, or government of rational beings, which is by Plato contracted into this compendium:[2] Οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔργον τῷ πεττευτῇ λείπεται πλὴν μετατιθέναι τὸ μὲν ἄμεινον γινόμενον ἦθος εἰς βελτίω τόπον χεῖρον δὲ εἰς τὸν χείρονα, &c. "There is no other work left for the supreme Governor of all than only to translate better souls into better places and conditions, and worser into worser;" or, as he after addeth, to dispose of every one in the world in such a manner as might best render νικῶσαν

[9] De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 671.

[10] The words of Plato, ibid. p. 671. from whom the most of what is here brought forward is borrowed. For Plato is arguing against those who suppose that God concerns himself about great things only, and neglects the small.

[1] Ibid. p. 671. [2] Ibid. p. 672.

ἀρετὴν, ἡττωμένην δὲ κακίαν, "virtue victorious and triumphant over vice." And thus may the slow and imperfect wits of mortals be satisfied, that Providence to the Deity is no moliminous, laborious, and distractious thing.

But that there is no higher spring of life in rational animals than contracted self-love, and that all good will and benevolence arises only from indigency and imbecility, and that no being whatsoever is concerned in the welfare of any other thing, but only what itself stands in need of; and lastly therefore, that what is irresistibly powerful, and needs nothing, would have no manner of benevolence, nor concern itself in the good and welfare of any thing whatsoever; this is but another idol of the Atheists' den, and only argues their bad nature, low-sunk minds, and gross immorality. And the same is to be said also of that other maxim of theirs:[3] That what is perfectly happy would have nothing at all to do, but only enjoy its own ease and quiet; whereas there is nothing more troublesome to ourselves than this ἀπραξία, "this having nothing to do;" and the activity of the Deity, or a perfect Being, is altogether as easy to it as its essence.

The atheistic queries come next to be answered; which, being but three, are naturally to be disposed in this order: First, "If there were a God, or perfect Being, who therefore was sufficiently happy in the enjoyment of himself, why would he go about to make a world? Secondly, if he must needs make a world, why did he not make it sooner? this late production therefore looking as if he had but newly awaked out of a long sleep throughout infinite past ages, or else had in length of time contracted a satiety of his solitude. Thirdly and lastly, What tools or instruments? what machines or engines had he? Or how could he move the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal? because then he would run through all things, and could not lay hold, nor fasten upon any thing."

To the first therefore we say, That the reason why God made the world, was from his own overflowing and communicative goodness, that there might be other beings also happy besides him, and enjoy themselves. Nor does this at all clash with God's making of the world for his own glory and honour; though Plotinus[4] were so shy of that: Γελοῖον, ἵνα τιμῶται, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα, "It is ridiculous to say, that God made the world that he might be honoured; this being to transfer the affections of human artificers and statuaries upon him." But the chief reason of his saying so was,

[3] In the Κυρίαι Δόξαι of Epicurus, the following, as is well known, is laid down as a fundamental principle: "That which is happy has neither any employment or business of its own, nor causes any to others." See Diog. Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 139. p. 661.

[4] Contra Gnosticos, ennead. 2. lib. 9. cap. 4. p 202.

because that philosopher conceived the world to have proceeded, not so much from the will of the Deity, as the necessity of its nature. Though this be true also, that God did not make the world merely to ostentate his skill and power, but to communicate his goodness, which is chiefly and properly his glory, as the light and splendour of the sun is the glory of it.[5] But the Atheist

[5] As to the question here touched upon by Dr. Cudworth: "Whether or not God can be truly said to have created this world for his own glory and honour," has again been mooted among theologians and philosophers even in our own times, it may be worth while to offer a few remarks upon it, in the way of elucidation.

I. Almost all the Platonists formerly inculcated that God made the world and its inhabitants for the sake of having other beings to whom he might impart his own goodness and supreme felicity. This opinion they had derived from Plato himself, who, discoursing in his Timæus, sect. 14. p. 237. on the Deity's motive for creating the world, thus expresses himself: Ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδένος οὐδέποτε ἐγγίνεται φθόνος, "He was good, and the good never feels envy towards any one: therefore he created all things like unto himself." Plato borrowed this, as well as most of his opinions concerning the creation, from Timæus Locrus, an ancient Pythagorean, whose book, De Anima Mundi, p. 545. ed. Th. Gale, my readers will do well to consult. There is, however, no inconsiderable discrepancy between the opinion of Plato himself and that of his junior disciples on this subject, although they make use of the same words. For Plato supposed the Deity to have proceeded voluntarily to the arrangement and disposition of matter, heretofore rude and unformed; and therefore, could truly and properly determine that he was led by his native goodness to undertake the fabrication of the universe. But his later disciples held the world to have existed along with God from all eternity, and to have been a necessary emanation and efflux of the divine nature itself. Wherefore, when they say that God was moved by his goodness to create the world, they mean simply that he communicated his goodness to others from all eternity. Nor was this doctrine unpalatable to the ancient Christian doctors. Zacharius Mitylenæus, a Christian philosopher, in his Dialogue, De Opificio Mundi contra Platonicos, p. 182. says: Ἡ οὐκ οἴεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἀλλὰ μόνη ἀγαθότης τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ ποιήσεως τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς καθηγήσατο, καὶ προστατεῖ καὶ ἡγεμονεύει, καὶ εἰ βούλει ἄκουε, καὶ τοῦ ὑμετέρου Πλάτωνος ταύτην καὶ μόνην αἰτίαν εἶναι λέγοντος τῆς τῶν ὅλων συστάσεως, ὡς τὸν Τίμαιον σπντιθεὶς, ὧδε φησί, κ. τ. λ., "Dost thou not know that it is not necessity, but his goodness alone that first originated the fabrication and production of this universe, and presides over and rules it; and hear, if thou wilt, your Plato himself asserting this to be the only cause of the construction of all things, as in his Timæus he thus speaks, &c." See also Athenagoras, De Resurrectione, cap. 11. p. 174. where he discourses of the causes for which God made men, and among other things, p. 178. says: Εὔδηλον ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον καὶ κοινότερον λόγον δι' ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς δημιουργίας θεωρουμένην ΑΓΑΘΟΤΗΤΑ καὶ σοφίαν ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, "It is very manifest that God made man according to first and universal reason, on account of himself and his own goodness and wisdom, which are seen in the whole workmanship." Add St. Augustine, Confessiones, lib. 13. cap. 2. &c. p. 170. tom. 1. opp. and De Civitate Dei, lib. 11. cap. 22. p. 219. tom. 7.

II. But in course of time theologians fell gradually into the habit of saying that God created the world for his own glory: which doctrine, if rightly understood and explained, has neither any thing offensive in it, as we shall see by and by, nor for a considerable time gave any offence. It was only in the last century that objections began to be entertained against it, and in the present one it has been openly opposed and repudiated. Dr. W. King, in his ingenious work, on the Origin of Evil, cap. 1. sect. 3. p. 44. thus writes: "I know 'tis commonly said that the world was made for the glory of God: but this after the manner of men. For desire of glory is attributed to God in the same way as anger, love, revenge, eyes and hands. When therefore the Scripture teaches us that the world was created for the glory of God, 'tis to be understood that the divine attributes, namely, power, goodness and wisdom shine forth as clearly in his works as if he had no other intent in making them beside the ostentation of these attributes, nor could they have answered that end more fully if they had been designed

demands, What hurt "had it been for us never to have been made?" and the answer is easy, We should then never have enjoyed any good, or been capable of happiness; and had there

for glory." This is a tolerably fair explication of the common and received opinion, and yet it does not exhaust the whole sense of the dogma that God framed this world for his own glory: neither does Dr. Cudworth's interpretation leave nothing to be added. But Mons. Bayle, who was mightily fond of novel subjects and doctrines, when he took upon himself to digest, correct, and illustrate this book of King's and the opinions contained in it, eagerly embraced this opportunity of assailing the received tenets of theologians, and contended that God cannot on any account be said to have had regard to his own glory in the fabrication of this world: although, he subjoins, if the Scriptures say this, we ought not to listen to the voice of reason, but obey rather the divine authority, Response aux Questions d'un Provincial, tom. 2. cap. 74. p. 71—84. He argues that God is in want of nothing whatever, neither is his happiness capable of being increased or diminished; but that he that undertakes a thing for the sake of his own glory, desires either the increase or preservation of his felicity and glory: that the desire of glory is wicked even in men, and therefore, much more unbecoming the supreme Deity: consequently, that we ought to abandon this doctrine altogether, lest we offend against the majesty and perfection of God. And as this opinion of his seemed to tend to the establishment of God's glory amongst men, it found its way into the minds even of those who were otherwise no great admirers of the rest of his principles. The theologians, on the other hand, ceased not to defend the received doctrine in their schools, and maintained it to be strictly in accordance with reason no less than with truth, to suppose that God created this universe for the sake of his own glory. But yet, in doing so they did not all follow the same course as will at once be apparent on comparing the arguments brought forward upon this subject by the eminent scholars, J. Christoph. Wolf, Manichæismus ante Manichæos, sect. 3. sect. 12. p. 348. &c. Christ. Eberh. Weismann, Diss. secunda de Providentia Dei circa Malum, sect. 12. p. 49. and Fr. Simon Lœfler, Explanatio Parabolæ de Operariis in Vinea, sect. 111. p. 284. I shall now pass over what has already been observed by others, and confine myself to a brief exposition of my own opinion on this question.

III. Those who assert that God created the world for his own glory, are in no lack either of authority or arguments. The chief authority, as others have already remarked, is supplied to them by St. Paul, who Ephes. i. 12. 14. and elsewhere declares that men were long ago predestined by God to salvation, *εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ*. Why may it not be said also in imitation of this saying: that the world was made *εἰς ἔπαινον δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ*, "to the praise of the glory of God?" That arguments are not wanting to those who speak of the end of creation in this manner, will immediately be made apparent, by pointing out the force and meaning which the Christian fathers attached to their own words. The advocates of the doctrine, that God created the world for his own glory, are not so vain and foolish as to imagine that the Deity is actuated by the mere love of praise and glory, and that such was the motive which impelled him to the performance of this work. Bayle indeed understood this to be their meaning, but he did so in opposition to all wise men, into whose minds nothing of the kind ever entered. That man would deserve to be banished for ever from the Christian community who could entertain so abject a conception of God as to suppose him to be capable of doing anything solely for the purpose of gaining a host of encomiasts and admirers. Most of the theologians, on the contrary, explain the dogma in question in these words: "God made the world for his own glory, that is, for the sake of revealing his own wisdom, goodness, and power." See Gerh. Joh. Vossius, Theses Theolog. et Hist. diss. 1. de Creatione, p. 12. From which it is evident that the word *glory* implies those perfections of God from which his glory arises, and consequently that in this proposition, agreeably to the usage of all languages, the *effect* is *put* for the *cause*. For the necessary effect of a knowledge of the divine virtues, is the honour and glory of the supreme Being. Those therefore, that are unwilling to admit this precept, ought to show that God did not create the universe for the sake of implanting in men's minds notions of his own supreme perfections, and not to raise idle disputes about the word glory and enter into useless squabbles about terms. But that the received doctrine of theologians respecting the end or object of the creation of this world, is capable of a sense altogether unobjectionable and eminently worthy of the supreme Being, will perhaps be more clearly understood from what we are now about to offer.

been no rational creatures at all made, it must have been either from impotent sterility in the Deity, or else from an invidious, narrow, and contracted selfishness, or want of benignity, and

IV. God created men and rational beings chiefly for the purpose of having those to whom he might impart the treasures of his own goodness, and whom he might render happy both in this life and hereafter. But rational beings, as it would require little labour to show, cannot become partakers of true felicity either in this or in a future life unless they know their author and creator, and worship and reverence him in such a way as is consistent with his perfections. Subjects are only then called happy when they are fully cognizant of the wisdom and glory of their sovereign, and obey the laws which he has wisely and justly enacted; so neither is the salvation and happiness of mankind complete, till they both see the perfections of God and are led by them to pay him reverence and honour. Wherefore, when God designed the salvation of mankind, he necessarily demanded and exacted of them that they should strive to know and duly worship him; consequently he is rightly and truly said to have made men for his own glory, that is, to have created them for the sake of receiving their worship and homage. For from his exceeding love towards them he cannot but will them to be imbued with a right knowledge of himself and to pay to him due worship and honours: from which results the true salvation of mankind. And the same may be justly asserted of the final object of the creation. God formed the world that men might live happily in it and prepare themselves for a better life after the dissolution of the body. But without a right knowledge of God no one can either live happily here nor be assured of his future felicity. And again, no one can truly know God without at the same time praising and honouring him in mind, word, and deed. It therefore behoved the supreme Being so to frame and construct the world that its inhabitants on beholding it might be able at once to understand the majesty and perfections of the Creator: by doing which he at the same time made the world for his own glory, which is inseparably connected with a knowledge of himself. This explication is admirably confirmed by St. Paul, Rom. i. 19. &c. God, says he, made known his perfections to the nations: for, ver. 20. from the contemplation of this visible world his δύναμις καὶ θειότης, "power and godhead," or "wisdom," as I think the latter word ought to be rendered, could be clearly understood by them. This knowledge, he immediately subjoins, ought to have led to the praise and glorification of God: but the people were unmindful of their duty, ver. 21. διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν, οὐκ ὡς θεὸν ἐδόξασαν, ἢ εὐχαρίστησαν· ἀλλ' ἐματαιώθησαν, "because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations." A just and wise king who perceives it to be greatly to the interest of the commonwealth that his subjects should entertain a high opinion of himself and his affairs ought to do the utmost in his power in order to instil this opinion into their minds. In like manner, it behoved the Divine Creator, who knew the salvation of men to be always conjoined with his own glory, so to frame and dispose the universe that his virtue and majesty might be made manifest to all. He desires not glory amongst men on his own account, nor does he need or covet our praises and worship: but for the sake of our salvation, guided solely by his own goodness and love, he so rules and governs all things that his glory cannot but be displayed. Such being the case, the two propositions, that "God created the world for the sake of communicating the fruits of his goodness to others,"-and that "he created it for his own glory," so far from being repugnant, are in perfect accordance with and mutually support each other. God in creating men and the world for the sake of having those whom he might benefit, at the same time established his own glory; and in displaying and manifesting his glory in the world, he at the same time provided for the salvation of mankind.

V. This if I mistake not does not differ much from the view adopted by J. Le Clerc in his explanation of the present passage of Dr. Cudworth, Biblioth. Choisic, tom. 9. p. 69. "Strictly and properly speaking," says he, "God created other natures solely that he might act agreeably to his own nature, which is most perfect. This is the principle to which all the acts of God ought to be referred. For as nothing can compel him to do any thing contrary to his own perfections, so neither can any thing prevent him from operating agreeably to those perfections. Nevertheless the scripture tells us, that God sometimes acts and has acted for his own glory: which is not to be

communicative goodness; both which are inconsistent with a perfect Being. But the argument may be thus retorted upon these Atheists: What hurt would it be for us to cease to be, or become nothing? And why then are these Atheists, as well as others, so unwilling to die?

But then in the next place they urge; Why was not the world made sooner, since this goodness of God was without date, and from everlasting? But this question may be taken in two different senses; either, "Why was not the world from eternity, as God and his goodness are eternal?" or else, secondly, "If the world could not be from eternity, yet, notwithstanding, why was it not sooner, but so lately made?" In both which queries the atomic Atheists take it for granted, that the system of the world was not from eternity, but had a beginning. Now we say, that the reason why the world was not made from eternity, was not from any defect of goodness in the divine will, but because there is an absolute impossibility in the thing itself; or because the necessity and incapacity of such an imperfect being hindered. For we must confess that, for our parts, we are prone to believe, that could the world have been from eternity, it should certainly have been so.* [6] And just thus does Philoponus, in his confutation of Proclus' arguments for the world's eternity, declare himself, and no otherwise: Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἄρα μὴ

understood as though the acquisition of the praise and admiration of created things were his primary motive: for this is what they call the glory of God among men: but the meaning of scripture is, that when he has his own end in view, or which is the same thing, acts agreeably to his own perfections, he necessarily gains the praise and admiration of all intelligent beings that make a right use of their reason. Moreover, God exacts from men his own glorification and praise as a necessary duty: not as though he needed their praises or his happiness could be increased by the praises of others, but in order that men may do what the reason he has endowed them with requires, and by that means be made happy themselves. For, as might easily be proved if necessary, no man or community of men can attain to true felicity unless they render to God the honours that are due to him. Consequently, to act for his own glory and to act in order that others may become partakers of the divine goodness, are two ends, which are not at all in contradiction with each other." Those who think fit to censure the doctrines of theologians ought first of all to inquire into their meaning, and to accustom themselves to their phraseology. But now-a-days none are more bold and violent in their attacks upon received opinions than those who are ignorant even of the true signification of the words which we employ.

* Page 4. [Edit. Trincavell]

[6] The learned Doctor, I conceive, does not express his opinion sufficiently clearly: I shall therefore give a brief explication of it. He seems to me to reason thus: "Whatever is eternal and without beginning must at the same time be most perfect. For it is impossible to conceive any cause why that which existed from all eternity should not partake of all perfections. That which is most perfect, must necessarily be without bounds, and in every respect infinite. For whatever is circumscribed within certain bounds is confined by a greater and more powerful cause, and is not absolutely perfect. But the world cannot be infinite, its very nature being against such a supposition: for no magnitude can become so great as not to admit of something being added to it. Therefore neither can the world be eternal. For if it were eternal it would also be infinite, which is repugnant to its nature, and at the same time most perfect, which is manifestly false."

εἶναι τὸν κόσμον ἀΐδιον ὑποτιθέμενοι, οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρούμεθα, οὔτε ἀσθένειαν τῆς δημιουργικῆς αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῦμεν δυνάμεως· ἀλλὰ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀεὶ εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δι' αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ γινομένου φύσιν ὑποτιθέμεθα, "Ourselves also supposing the world not to have been eternal, do neither ascribe this to any defect either of goodness or of power in the Deity, but only to the impossibility of the thing itself." Where, in the following words, he gives a twofold account of this impossibility of the world's eternity: Ὅτι τε τὸ ἄπειρον κατ' ἐνέργειαν ὑποστῆναι, ἢ διεξίτητον εἶναι, ἀδύνατον ἦν· καὶ ὅτι συναΐδιον εἶναι τῷ ποιοῦντι τὸ γινόμενον φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει, "First, because there can be nothing actually infinite, and yet run through, as all the past duration of the world hath been; and secondly, because that which is made, or brought into being by another, as a distinct thing from it, cannot be co-eternal with its maker." Where it is probable that Philoponus, being a Christian, designed not to oppose the eternal generation of the Son of God, but only to assert that nothing, which was properly made or created by God, and nothing, which was not itself God, could be from eternity, or without beginning. And now we see, how those atheistic exceptions against the novity of the divine creation, as if God must therefore either have slept from eternity, or else have at length contracted a satiety of his former solitude, and the like, do of themselves quite vanish into nothing. But then, as to the second sense of the question, "Why the world, though it could not possibly be from eternity, yet was no sooner, but so lately made? We say, that this is an absurd question; both because time was made together with the world, and there was no "sooner" or "later" before time; and also because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a day old. Wherefore the world could not possibly have been so made by God in time, as not to be once but five or six thousand years old, and no more; as now it is.[7]

[7] This answer is based upon the doctrine, which has already been defended by the learned Doctor and supported also by ourselves, that eternity is devoid of all succession, and fixed, stable and immoveable. Most assuredly, if an atheist were to admit this to be the nature of eternity and yet should go on and ask, why God did not make the world sooner, he would manifestly betray his own ignorance and show that he did not rightly comprehend the dogma we are speaking of. For since there is no order of time in eternity, it is silly and foolish to inquire why the universe was not constructed at one time rather than another. For he that asks for such an explanation, properly speaking, is desirous of being told the reason, why time was not before it was: which is evidently absurd and ridiculous. This question has been answered in nearly the same way in our own times by the illustrious G. Wil. Leibnitz, in his Responsions to Dr. Samuel Clarke, Recueil de Diverses Pieces sur la Philosophie, par Leibnitz, Clark, Newton, tom. I. p. 115. But since, as we have shown above, there are many friends as well as enemies of God who do not approve of this doctrine of eternity, although in my opinion it is most true, and moreover since none of us is so constituted in mind that he can divest the notion of eternity of all succession, I have no doubt that not a few will regard this answer as not removing the whole of the difficulty. The

And as for the third and last query; "How God could move and command the matter of the whole world, especially if incorporeal?" we reply; first, that all other things being derived from God, as their only fountain and original, and essentially depending on him, who, by his absolute power also, could annihilate whatsoever he created; he must needs have a despotic power over all; and every thing whatsoever be naturally subject and obsequious to him. And since no body can possibly move itself, that, which first moved matter must of necessity be incorporeal; nor could it move it by local motion, as one body moves another, or as engines and machines move by trusion or pulsion, they being before moved, but must do it by another kind of

weakness of the generality of men is surprising, when things removed from the senses are treated of: and therefore popular answers are oftentimes held by them in higher estimation than philosophic reasons, however sound and well-founded. Hence J. Le Clerc, who disapproved of this doctrine of an eternity without succession, which was repudiated by the founders of the Arminian sect, struck out another method of solving this question, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 9. p. 72. &c. He supposes it may be assumed in this controversy that innumerable worlds already existed before this world: at least that no atheist can show the contrary: and that this being assumed, the mind will be overwhelmed as it were with the notion of infinity, and will cease to inquire the cause, why God did not create this world sooner. To myself, however, this reason does not appear to be sufficiently solid or adapted to meet all the atheistic exceptions. I should therefore hold it to be the best course to return this simple answer to any man who raises a controversy upon this subject, that this question is wholly absurd and altogether unworthy the character of a wise man, such as the atheist always wishes to be considered. For it is either certain that this world was created by God, or uncertain, or positively false. Whichever of these three the atheist chooses to adopt, he may in a few words be convicted of folly. If he maintains the falsehood of our doctrine, that the world was created by God, he ought to prove his opinion by reason and argument; since it is foolish and ridiculous for him to contend with others about the causes of a thing, which he himself holds to be false. If he supposes the creation of the world to be uncertain, it will be proper that we dispute about the thing itself before we come to its causes. For what man is so insane as to inquire into the virtues of a thing, and to ask why it is endowed with these instead of other properties, before he knows whether this thing really exists or is fictitious and imaginary. Fancy to yourself a man propounding certain subtle questions respecting the nature of demons, and inquiring for example why they are devoid of all body, who confesses notwithstanding that he does not know whether demons exist. Will such a man appear to obey reason or to be merely trifling. But if a disputant of the kind entertains no doubt in regard to the creation of the world and yet is anxious to know why God did not undertake this work sooner, I should pity him for his want of sagacity. For, for a man indeed to acknowledge a God, that is an infinitely wise Being, and at the same time to suppose that he himself, a mere weak mortal, is capable of investigating the causes why infinite wisdom did not make the world either sooner or later, is certainly a symptom of no very refined or intelligent mind. Every body must be aware that this is one of those things that no mortal ever could know without an especial divine revelation. But God is silent and vouchsafes not to make us privy to his counsels in this matter. Why therefore are we not content to know that the whole visible world is the work of divine power; and to remain in ignorance of other matters, probably above our comprehension, till it shall please God to dispel the darkness which here besets our minds? The words of St. Augustine in which he represses such importunate querists seem to me to be apt and pertinent, De Diversis Quæstionibus, tom. 6. opp. p. 6. quæst. 28. "He who asks why God willed to create the world, asks the cause of the will of God. But every cause is efficient. And every thing which effects is greater than that which is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore its cause ought not to be inquired after."

action, such as is not local motion, nor heterokinesy, but autokinesy; that is, by cogitation. Wherefore, that conceit of the Atheists, that an incorporeal Deity could not possibly move the matter of the world, because it would run through it, and could not fasten or lay hold thereupon, is absurd, because this moves matter not mechanically, but vitally, and by cogitation only. And that a cogitative being, as such, hath a natural imperium over matter, and power of moving it, without any engines or machines, is unquestionably certain, even from our own souls; which move our bodies, and command them every way, merely by will and thought. And a perfect mind, presiding over the matter of the whole world, could much more irresistibly, and with infinitely more ease, move the whole corporeal universe, merely by will and cogitation, than we can our bodies.[8]

The last head of atheistic argumentation is from interest. And first, the Atheists would persuade, that it is the "interest of mankind in general, and of every particular person, that there should be no God, that is, no Being infinitely powerful, that hath no law, but its own will; and therefore may punish whom he pleases eternally after death."

To which our first reply is, that if there be a God, and souls be immortal, then is it not any man's thinking otherwise that will alter the case, nor afford the Atheists any relief against those two imagined evils of theirs. For things are sullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think them, or wish them to be; and men will at last discover their error, when perhaps it may be too late. Wishing is no proving; and therefore this

[8] All this goes to show that the thing itself cannot be called in question by any sensible man, but that the way and manner of it surpass all mortal comprehension and capacity. And such is really the case. Though we tax our intellect to the utmost in order to comprehend how God educed matter out of nothing, still we shall always find that we are mentally unequal to the task. As is beautifully and excellently observed by our worthy author: God excites matter and impels and leads it where he pleases by thought alone, just as our mind bends and excites the body at its will and pleasure. But if we go on and inquire in what way this is done, or what is the bond of connexion between thought and matter, so that one can move the other, then human knowledge and experience entirely fail us. The ancient philosophers who asserted the simultaneous existence of God and matter from all eternity were able to enter into some sort of explanation of this. For not to speak of those who dreamt about a certain undefined connexion between God and eternal matter, an opinion which many entertained, most of them supposed God to be light or a nature resembling the brightest and purest light. Therefore as the sun excites the necessary motions in matter by its rays: so the Deity, they could say, by his incomparable splendour and divine light, far more subtle and efficacious than the rays of the sun, conquered the inertness of matter and reduced it into a certain form. Although this answer was not one that could entirely satisfy those who look deeper into things than others; still it was accommodated to the capacity of most men. But to us who rightly hold God to be altogether devoid of body and to have produced matter out of nothing, a similar course is not open. Let us therefore confess, that the manner in which God excites, compels, and moves matter, will be unknown and incomprehensible to us, so long as we shall be ignorant of the way in which the infinite power of the Deity called into sudden existence things which did not exist before.

atheistic argument from interest is no argument at all against the existence of a God, it being nothing but the ignorant wish and vain desire of besotted Atheists.

In the next place, this wish of Atheists is altogether founded upon a mistaken notion of God Almighty too, that he is nothing but arbitrary will omnipotent; which indeed is not the most desirable thing. But as it hath been often declared, the will of God is the will of goodness, justice, and wisdom itself omnipotent. His will is not mere will, such as hath no other reason besides itself; but it is law, equity, and chancery; it is the τὸ δέον, or "Ought itself," decreeing, willing, and acting. Neither does God punish any, out of a delight in punishment, or in the evil and suffering of the persons punished; but to those who are not ἀνίατοι, "altogether incurable," δίκη ἰατρεία, "his punishment is physic," in order to their recovery and amendment; so that the source and fountain thereof is goodness to the persons themselves punished. But to such as are incurable, the punishment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the whole. So that this attribute of justice in God doth not at all clash with the attribute of goodness, it being but a branch thereof, or particular modification of the same. Goodness and justice in God are always complicated together; neither his goodness being fondness, nor his justice cruelty; but he being both good in punishing, and just in rewarding and dispensing benefits. Wherefore, it can be the interest of none, that there should be no God nor immortality, unless perhaps of such desperately and incurably wicked persons who, abandoning their true interest of being good, have thereupon no other interest now left them, than not to be, or become nothing.

To be without a God is to be without hope in the world; for Atheists can have neither faith nor hope in senseless matter, and the fortuitous motions thereof. And though an understanding being have never so much enjoyment of itself for the present, yet could it not possibly be happy without immortality, and security of the future continuance thereof. But the Atheists conclude, that there is nothing immortal, and that all life perishes and vanishes into nothing; and consequently also, that εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον, happiness is a thing that hath no existence in nature, a mere figment and chimera, of idle wish and vain dream of mortals. Wherefore it cannot be the interest of mankind, that this hypothesis should be true, which thus plainly cuts off all hope from men, and leaves them in an utter impossibility of being ever happy.

God is such a being, as if he could be supposed not to be, there is nothing, which any, who are not desperately engaged in wickedness, no not Atheists themselves, could possibly more wish for or desire. To believe a God, is to believe the existence

of all possible good and perfection in the universe; it is to believe, that things are as they should be, and that the world is so well framed and governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly have been better. For peccability arises from the necessity of imperfect free-willed beings, left to themselves, and therefore could not by omnipotence itself have been excluded; and though sin actual might perhaps have been kept out by force and violence, yet, all things computed, it was doubtless most for the good of the whole that it should not be thus forcibly hindered. There is nothing which cannot be hoped for, by a good man, from the Deity; whatsoever happiness his being is capable of, "and such things, as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor can now enter into the heart of man to conceive." Infinite hopes lie before us, from the existence of a Being infinitely good and powerful, and our own souls' immortality; and nothing can hinder or obstruct these hopes, but our own wickedness of life. To believe a God, and do well, are two the most hopeful, cheerful, and comfortable things that possibly can be. And to this purpose is that of Linus,[9]

Ἐλπίσθαι χρὴ πανθ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστ' οὐδὲν Ἄελπτον·
Ῥᾴδια πάντα θεῷ τελέσαι, καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν.

Wherefore, as for Democritus and Epicurus, whose encomiums the Atheists here so loudly sing forth, we say, that however they have made so great a noise in the world, and have been so much cried up of late, yet were they really no better than a couple of infatuated sophists, or witty fools, and debauchers of mankind.

And now come we to the last atheistic argumentation, wherein they endeavour to recommend their doctrine to civil sovereigns, and to persuade them, that theism or religion is absolutely inconsistent with their interest; their reasons for which are these three following. First, because the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the power and fear of the Leviathan, civil authority can signify little. Secondly, because sovereignty is in its own nature absolutely indivisible, and must be either infinite, or none at all; so that divine laws (natural and revealed) superior to it, circumscribing it, would consequently destroy it. Wherefore religion and theism must of necessity be displaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the Leviathan to roll and tumble in.

[9] These verses are found in Jamblichus, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 27. p. 117. 118. who tells us that they are the commencement of a heroic poem ascribed by the Pythagoreans to Linus, but of which he considers it to be more probable that the Pythagoreans themselves were the authors. In the ancient edition of Jamblichus, published by Jo. Arcerius, the reading of these verses was very corrupt and mutilated. But they are here exhibited in a corrected form by Dr. Cudworth, whose emendation has been adopted by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 97. 98. and by the recent editor L. Kuster.

Thirdly and lastly, private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, is also contradictious to the very being of a body politic; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reason, judgment and will, ruling over the whole. But conscience, which religion introduceth, is private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, and therefore altogether inconsistent with true politics; that can admit of no private consciences, but only one public conscience of the law.[10]

In way of answer to the first of which, we must here briefly unravel the atheistic ethics and politics. The foundation whereof is first laid in the villanizing of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds, either of politicalness or ethicalness at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, save what resulteth from fear, imbecility, and indigency); nothing of public and common concern, but all private and selfish; appetite and utility, or the desires of sensual pleasure, and honour, dominion, and precellency before others, being the only measures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally just or unjust, nothing in itself sinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath jus ad omnia, "a right to every thing," whatsoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himself judgeth profitable; even to other men's bodies and lives. Si occidere cupis, jus habes, "if thou desirest to kill, thou hast then naturally a right thereunto;" that is, a liberty to kill without any sin or injustice. For jus and lex, or justitia, "right" and "law," or "justice," in the language of these atheistic politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being a belluine liberty, not made, or left by justice, but such as is founded in a supposition of its absolute non-existence. Should therefore a son not only murder his own parents, who had tenderly brought him up, but also exquisitely torture them, taking pleasure in beholding their rueful looks, and hearing their lamentable shrieks and outcries, there would be nothing of sin or injustice at all in this, nor in any thing else; because justice is no nature, but a mere factitious and artificial thing, made only by men and civil laws. And, according to these men's apprehensions, nature has been very kind and indulgent to mankind herein, that it hath thus brought us into the world, without any fetters or shackles upon us, free from all duty and obligation, justice and morality, these being to them nothing but restraints and hindrances of true liberty. From all which it follows, that nature absolutely dissociates and segregates men from one another, by reason of the inconsistency of those appetites of

[10] Compare our remarks above on chap. 2. sect. 21. p. 136.

theirs, that are all carried out only to private good, and consequently, that every man is, by nature, in a state of war and hostility against every man.

In the next place, therefore, these atheistic politicians further add, that though this their state of nature, which is a liberty from all justice and obligation, and a lawless, loose, or belluine right to every thing, be in itself absolutely the best; yet nevertheless by reason of men's imbecility, and the equality of their strengths, and inconsistency of their appetites, it proves by accident the worst; this war with every one making men's right or liberty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no security of their lives, much less of the comfortable enjoyment of them. For as it is not possible that all men should have dominion (which were indeed the most desirable thing, according to these principles), so the generality must needs be sensible of more evil in such a state of liberty with an universal war against all, than of good. Wherefore, when men had been a good while hewing, and slashing, and justling against one another, they became at length all weary hereof, and conceived it necessary by art to help the defect of their own power here, and to choose a lesser evil, for the avoiding of a greater; that is, to make a voluntary abatement of this their infinite right, and to submit to terms of equality with one another, in order to a sociable and peaceable cohabitation: and not only so, but also for the security of all, that others should observe such rules as well as themselves, to put their necks under the yoke of a common coercive power, whose will being the will of them all, should be the very rule, and law, and measure of justice to them.

Here therefore these atheistic politicians, as they first of all slander human nature, and make a villain of it; so do they, in the next place, reproach justice and civil sovereignty also, making it to be nothing but an ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or else a lesser evil, submitted to merely out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with every one, by reason of men's natural imbecility. So that according to this hypothesis, justice and civil government are plainly things not good in themselves, nor desirable (they being a hindrance of liberty, and nothing but shackles and fetters), but by accident only, as necessary evils: and thus do these politicians themselves sometimes distinguish betwixt good and just, that bonum amatur per se, justum per accidens, "good is that, which is loved for itself, but just by accident." From whence it follows unavoidably, that all men must of necessity be ἄκοντες δίκαιοι, "unwillingly just," or not with a full and perfect, but mixed will only; just being a thing, that is not sincerely good, but such as hath a great dash or dose of evil blended with it. And this was

the old atheistic generation of justice, and of a body politic, civil society, and sovereignty. For though a modern writer affirm this hypothesis (which he looks upon as the only true scheme of politics) to be a new invention, as the circulation of the blood, and no older than the book de Cive,[1] yet is it certain, that it was the commonly received doctrine of the atheistic politicians and philosophers before Plato's time; who represents their sense concerning the original of justice and civil society in this manner:* Ὁ πρῶτον ἔφην περὶ τούτου ἄκουε, τί τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅθεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη· πεφυκέναι γὰρ δή φασι τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀγαθὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖσθαι κακόν. πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὥστε ἐπειδὰν ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται, καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις τὸ μὲν ἐκφεύγειν, τὸ δὲ αἱρεῖν, δοκεῖ λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι ἀλλήλοις, μήτ' ἀδικεῖν, μήτ' ἀδικεῖσθαι· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἄρξασθαι νόμους τίθεσθαι, καὶ ὀνομάσαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, "I am to declare first what justice is, according to the sense of these philosophers, and from whence it was generated. They say therefore, that by nature, lawless liberty, and to do that which is now called injustice, and injury to other men, is good; but to suffer it from others, is evil. But of the two, there is more of evil in suffering it, than of good in doing it: whereupon when men had clashed a good while, doing and suffering injury, the greater part, who by reason of their imbecility were not able to take the former without the latter, at length compounded the business amongst themselves, and agreed together by pacts and covenants, neither to do nor suffer injury, but to submit to rules of equality, and make laws by compact, in order to their peaceable cohabitation, they calling that, which was required in those laws, by the name of just." And then is it added: Καὶ εἶναι ταύτην γένεσίν τε καὶ οὐσίαν δικαιοσύνης, μεταξὺ οὖσαν τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου ὄντος, ἐὰν ἀδικῶν μὴ διδῷ δίκην, τοῦ δὲ κακίστου, ἐὰν ἀδικούμενος τιμωρεῖσθαι ἀδύνατος ᾖ· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἐν μέσῳ ὂν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, ἀγαπᾶσθαι οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀρρωστία τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τιμώμενον, "And this is, according to these philosophers, the generation and essence of justice, as a certain middle thing betwixt the best and the worst. The best, to exercise a lawless liberty of doing whatsoever one please to other men without suffering any inconvenience from it; and the worst to suffer evil from others, without being able to revenge it. Justice therefore, being a middle thing betwixt both these, is loved, not as that which is good in itself, but only by reason of men's imbecility, and their inability to do injustice. Forasmuch as he, that had sufficient power, would never enter

[1] A well-known work written by Thom. Hobbes.

* De Rep. lib. 2. p. 358. 359. [Page 442. Edit. Ficini.]

into such compacts, and submit to equality and subjection. As for example, if a man had Gyges' magical ring, that he could do whatsoever he listed, and not be seen or taken notice of by any, such a one would certainly never enter into covenants, nor submit to laws of equality and subjection." Agreeably whereunto, it hath been concluded also by some of the old atheistic philosophers, that justice was ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν, "Not properly and directly one's own good, the good of him, that is just, but another man's good, partly of the fellow-citizens, but chiefly of the ruler, whose vassal he is." And it is well known, that after Plato's time, this hypothesis concerning justice, that it was a mere factitious thing, and sprung only from men's fear and imbecility, as a lesser evil, was much insisted on by Epicurus also.

But let us in the next place see, how our modern atheistic philosophers and politicians, will manage and carry on this hypothesis, so as to consociate men by art into a body politic, that are naturally dissociated from one another, as also make justice and obligation artificial, when there is none in nature. First of all therefore, these artificial justice-makers, city-makers, and authority-makers, tell us that though men have an infinite right by nature, yet may they alienate this right, or part thereof, from themselves, and either simply renounce it, or transfer the same upon some other person; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themselves afterwards to make use thereof. Thus a late writer,[2] men "may by signs declare," Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore, certum aliquid facere, quod jure anteà fecisse poterant, "That it is their will, it shall no longer be lawful for them to do something, which before they had a right to do;" and this is called by him, a simple renunciation of right. And further, saith he, they "may declare again," Velle se non licitum sibi amplius fore alicui resistere, &c. "That it is their will, it shall be no longer lawful for them to resist this or that particular person, whom before they might lawfully have resisted;" and this is called a translation of right. But if there be nothing in its own nature unlawful, then cannot this be unlawful for a man afterwards, to make use of such liberty, as he had before in words renounced or abandoned. Nor can any man, by his mere will, make any thing unlawful to him, which was not so in itself; but

[2] Hobbes, Element. de Cive, cap. 2. sect. 4. p. 10. I shall quote his words entire, so that a clearer judgment may be formed of his opinion. After saying that a man offends against the right of nature who does not cede his own right which he has to every thing, he thus proceeds: "But he is said to part with his right, who either absolutely renounceth it, or conveys it to another. He absolutely renounceth it who by some sufficient sign or meet tokens declares, that he is willing that it shall never be lawful for him to do that again which before by right he might have done; but he conveys it to another who, by some sufficient sign or meet tokens, declares to that other, that he is willing it should be unlawful for him to resist him in going about to do somewhat, in the performance whereof he might before, with right, have resisted him."

only suspend the exercise of so much of his liberty as he thought good. But however, could a man by his will oblige himself, or make any thing unlawful to him, there would be nothing got by this, because then might he, by his will, disoblige himself again, and make the same lawful as before. For what is made merely by will, may be destroyed by will. Wherefore, these politicians will yet urge the business further, and tell us, that no man can be obliged but by his own act, and that the essence of injustice is nothing else but dati repetitio,[3] the "taking away of that which one had before given." To which we again reply, that were a man naturally unobliged to any thing, then could he no way be obliged to stand to his own act, so that it should be really unjust and unlawful for him, at any time, upon second thoughts, voluntarily to undo what he had before voluntarily done. But the Atheists here plainly render injustice a mere ludicrous thing, when they tell us,[4] that it is nothing but such an absurdity in life, as it is in disputation, when a man denies a proposition that he had before granted; which is no real evil in him as a man, but only a thing called an absurdity, as a disputant. That is, injustice is no absolute evil of the man; but only a relative incongruity in him as a citizen. As when a man speaking Latin observes not the laws of grammar, this is a kind of injustice in him as a Latinist or grammarian; so when one, who lives in civil society, observes not the laws and conditions thereof, this is, as it were, the false Latin of a citizen, and nothing else. According to which notion of injustice, there is no such real evil or hurt in it, as can any way withstand the force of appetite and private utility, and oblige men to civil obedience, when it is contrary to the same. But these political jugglers and enchanters will here cast yet a further mist before men's eyes with their pacts and covenants. For men by their covenants, say they, may unquestionably oblige themselves, and make things unjust and unlawful to them that were not so before. Wherefore, injustice is again defined by them, and that with

[3] Hobbes, Element. de Cive, cap. 3. sect. 3. p. 17. "The breaking of a bargain, as also the *taking back of a gift* (which ever consists in some action or omission) is called an *injury:* But that action or omission, is called unjust, insomuch as an injury, and an unjust action or omission, signify the same thing, and both are the same with a breach of trust."

[4] This is an admirable refutation of the words of Hobbes, which occur ibid. cap. 3. sect. 3. p. 17. "And there is some likeness between that which in the common course of life we call injury, and that which in the schools is usually called absurd. For even as he who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he first maintained, is said to be brought to an absurdity; in like manner he who through weakness of mind does or omits that which before he had by contract promised not to do or omit, commits an injury, and falls into no less contradiction than he who in the schools is reduced to an absurdity. For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done, which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation."

more speciousness, to be the breach of covenants.[5] But though it be true, that if there be natural justice, covenants will oblige; yet, upon the contrary supposition, that there is nothing naturally unjust, this cannot be unjust neither, to break covenants. Covenants, without natural justice, are nothing but mere words and breath, (as indeed these atheistic politicians themselves, agreeably to their own hypothesis, call them); and therefore can they have no force to oblige. Wherefore, these justice-makers are themselves at last necessitated to fly to laws of nature, and to pretend this to be a law of nature, that men should stand to their pacts and covenants.[6] Which is plainly to contradict their main fundamental principle, that by nature nothing is unjust or unlawful; for if it be so, then can there be no laws of nature; and if there be laws of nature, then must there be something naturally unjust and unlawful. So that this is not to make justice, but clearly to unmake their own hypothesis, and to suppose justice to have been already made by nature, or to be in nature; which is a gross absurdity in disputation, to affirm what one had before denied. But these their laws of nature are indeed nothing but juggling equivocation, and a mere mockery; themselves again acknowledging them to be no laws, because law is nothing but the word of him who hath command over others; but only conclusions or theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation and defence of themselves, upon the principle of fear; that is, indeed the laws of their own timorous and cowardly complexion; for they, who have courage and generosity in them, according to this hypothesis, would never submit to such sneaking terms of equality and subjection, but venture for dominion; and resolve either to win the saddle or lose the horse. Here, therefore, do our atheistic politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they first deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants from the laws of nature; and lastly,

[5] The words in which Hobbes gives this definition of injustice, have been already quoted a little above. I shall add another saying of this philosopher upon the same subject, from his Element. de Cive, cap. 3. sect. 4. p. 18. "From these grounds it follows, that an injury can be done to no man but him with whom we enter into covenant, or to whom somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somewhat is promised by way of a bargain, and therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoined; for if a master command his servant, who hath promised to obey him, to pay a sum of money, or carry some present to a third man, the servant, if he do it not, hath indeed damaged this third party, but he injured his master only. So also in a civil government, if any man offend another, with whom he hath made no contract, he damages him to whom the evil is done, but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs; for if he who receives the hurt should expostulate the mischief, and he that did it should answer thus, What art thou to me? Why should I rather do according to yours than mine own will, since I do not hinder but you may do your own and not my mind? In which speech, when there hath no manner of precontract passed, I see not, I confess, what is reprehensible."

[6] Ibid. cap. 3. sect. 1. p. 17. He has left this on record: "Another law of nature is to perform contracts or to keep trusts."

the obligation both of these laws of nature, and of covenants themselves, again, from the law, command, and sanction of the civil sovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige.[7] And thus is it manifest, how vain the attempts of these

[7] These remarks of Dr. Cudworth are just and excellent. Indeed the whole of Hobbes' discipline, the moral and civil especially, is on the one hand so foul and hideous in itself, and so calculated to sow the seeds of endless controversies, and to sap the very foundations of religion, and on the other so replete with contradictory opinions, which destroy and overthrow each other, that I often wonder how it happens that men who arrogate to themselves the character, I will not say of piety, but of a pre-eminent attachment to sound reason and argument, can sometimes venture to recommend it to us on the score of its ingenuity and consistency. As the learned Doctor has consulted brevity by abstaining from quoting the passages which make it manifest that this philosopher is altogether at variance with himself in the very elements of his philosophy, and that he overthrows his own fundamental principles, and is perpetually carried round as it were in a circle, I fancy I shall perform a not unprofitable labour if I show that all that is here advanced against him is just and well founded, and that nothing is said at random, or for the mere purpose of bringing him into contempt and odium. Probably this will have some effect towards checking the forwardness of those who even at the present day confidently accuse theologians of an incapacity to comprehend the whole of this man's acuteness and recondite subtlety. In the first place there can be no question of the following being one of the primary elements of Hobbes' philosophy: "That nothing is just or unjust, honest or dishonest by nature, but that all justice and injustice are derived from compacts and from the judgment and will of the civil magistrate." This is evident from some of the passages already quoted, as well as from many others. Element. de Cive, lib. 1. sect. 10. "Nature has given to every one a right to all (that is, it was lawful for every man in the bare state of nature, or before such time as men had engaged themselves by any covenants or bonds, to do what he would and against whom he thought fit, and to possess, use, and enjoy all that he would or could get. . . . . Nature hath given all to all." Leviathan, cap. 13. p. 65. "The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from these passions, till they know a law that forbids them; which till laws be made they cannot know; nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it." And a little lower down: "Justice and injustice are none of the faculties, neither of the body or mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude." Elementa de Cive, cap. 12. sect. 1. "It hath been shown that the civil laws are the rules of good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the legislator commands must be held for good, and what he forbids for evil." And a little afterwards: "Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature only being relative to some command, and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just or unjust proceeds from the right of the magistrate. Legitimate kings, therefore, make the things they command just by commanding them, and those which they forbid unjust by forbidding them." Hence he inculcates that it is not by nature unjust to seize hold of others' goods, to commit adultery, to pay no respect to parents, but that all these become just and right only by the will of the magistrates. Ibid. cap. 17. sect. 10. p. 145. "It follows, therefore, that by those terms, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, Honour thy father and mother, nothing else was commanded by our Saviour, but that subjects and citizens should absolutely obey their princes in all questions concerning meum and tuum, 'their own and others' right.'" To quote more sayings of the same kind from the man would be superfluous. If these things are true, therefore, there is no such thing as right and justice, no law of nature, neither is a man bound to the performance of any action till he has subjected himself to the authority of a civil sovereign, but can do or neglect to do whatever he pleases. It was necessary for Hobbes to inculcate this doctrine in order to establish that which was the leading object of his new philosophy: "That the power of chief magistrates is circumscribed by no laws, either human or divine, but is altogether absolute and infinite." For if he had conceded the existence of a certain law of nature, inscribed in the minds of all by the founder of the human race, he would have been compelled to admit that the power of

politicians are, to make justice artificially, when there is no such thing naturally (which is indeed no less than to make something out of nothing); and by art to consociate into bodies politic

sovereigns is defined and limited by this law of nature, and that they cannot make laws in opposition to the divine law.

If Hobbes had lived among men who were destitute of all religion, and had had any other object than the one he proposed to himself, he would never have departed from this primary precept of his own discipline, but in accordance therewith would have openly maintained that all the right and authority of the civil power is to be derived from superior might, and that that man is the king and prince of a people who so far excels the others in power that he can reduce them to subjection, and bind them down by his laws. Certain it is that there are extant throughout his writings sufficiently clear traces of such having been the man's real opinion, and whatever he says in opposition to it was invented for the sole purpose of mystifying others, and at the will and dictation of the court to which he had attached himself. For he was not so senseless as not to know, in the first place, that men imbued with Christian precepts, among which number he wished himself to be ranked, would hold the doctrine, that there is no such thing as natural right to be wicked, scandalous, and abominable; for the necessary conclusion from this is, that there is no natural religion and reverence towards God, and that no one is bound by nature to succour his parents, and the like, but that all these things are established by the civil law alone. Therefore in order not entirely to forfeit the good will of sane and thinking men he every where departs from the first rule of his discipline, and affirms that certain things are enjoined by the law of nature itself, apart from all civil laws. See his book De Homine, cap. 14. p. 78. &c. where he craftily declares that there is a certain natural piety, which depends upon private individuals themselves, and not upon the civil sovereign. He says among other things: "Whether God is to be honoured, loved, feared, worshipped, cannot be made matter of dispute; for these are common to the religions of all nations," Element. de Cive, cap. 6. sect. 13. p. 45. "In like manner if the chief ruler command any man to kill himself, he is not tied to do it because it cannot be conceived that he made any such covenant; nor if he command to execute a parent, whether he be innocent or guilty, and condemned by the law. . . . . There are many other cases in which, since the commands are shameful to be done by some and not by others, obedience may by right be performed by these, and refused by others." A little afterwards he openly declares that magistrates who kill such as refuse to execute wicked and unjust things, sin against the law of nature and God. "But they who thus kill men, although by right given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that right otherwise than right reason requires, they sin against the laws of nature, that is, against God." Consequently there is a certain reason and law of nature, prior and superior to all compact and civil power. Let the friends of Hobbes, then, exercise their ingenuity, and oblige me by reconciling these two propositions with each other: "Every man is by nature at liberty to do whatever he pleases, and all justice and injustice arises from compacts and covenants;" and, "We are commanded by the law of nature and right reason to love, fear, and honour God, and are forbidden to kill a magistrate or parent, or to inflict punishment upon men who refuse to do unjust things." For my own part I see a manifest discordance between them.

Secondly, if in conformity with the fundamental principles of his own discipline he had derived the supreme power from superior might, he would have injured the interests of those whom he was doing all in his power to uphold. His books on the civil power were written in the first instance in support of the cause of Charles I. and II. but afterwards in subserviency to the times he accommodated it to the defence of the power of the English people, or rather of Cromwell: see G. Burnet's History of his own Times, 1661. p. 187. But by these precepts he would have consulted the interests of neither party; for he neither would have shown that Cromwell had acted unjustly by dethroning the legitimate kings and usurping the sovereignty by force, nor would have fortified the power of Cromwell against all future seditions and popular outbreaks. Wherefore he saw the necessity of deriving all civil power from compact, and of teaching the English that nations are obliged by nature herself to enter into covenants with kings, and that when the compact is once made, whatever may be the acts of the king, no nation is at liberty to depart from it and to resist the sovereign power. But how was this to be done consistently with that primary precept of his

those, whom nature had dissociated from one another; a thing as impossible as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a stately palace or castle out of sand. Indeed the ligaments,

philosophy: "Man in his natural state has a right to every thing and can do whatever he pleases?" For if a man is born free from every law of nature and perfectly unfettered, what should compel him to enter into a compact with another against his own will, or strictly to keep and adhere to a compact which he may happen to have made, provided he sees that the violation of it will be useful to himself? Take away natural justice and injustice, and whence, I ask, will flow the law of compacts? Therefore, Hobbes, lest he should fail in his purpose, again departs from his own principles, and flies for refuge to the laws of nature, which he elsewhere tramples upon and despises. Although even in this part of the argument he is again so variable and inconsistent as to make it clear and evident that the man was not aware he was contradicting himself and overthrowing the very positions which he had previously laid down. "Therefore true reason is a certain law, which (since it is no less a part of human nature than any other faculty or affection of the mind) is also termed natural. Therefore the law of nature, that I may define it, is the dictate of right reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members as much as in us lies." From this law of nature he afterwards derives other laws; of which the first is, "that peace is to be sought after where it may be found:" the second, "that the right of all men to all things ought not to be retained, but that some rights ought to be transferred and relinquished." If all this be true, therefore, there is a certain eternal and immutable law which is antecedent and superior to all compacts and all civil power, and consequently the precept put forth by this philosopher at the outset, that every man by nature has a right to do as he pleases, must be acknowledged to be false. For if men are bound to preserve themselves, to make covenants in order to this self-preservation, and lastly to adhere to the covenants they have made, they certainly are not at liberty to do as they like in their natural state, nor has every one a right to every thing. But after enumerating what he considers to be the laws of nature, he seems to entertain misgivings that this doctrine will not materially aid his own arguments; and therefore tells us that these laws of nature are not properly speaking laws but conclusions only such as those of logicians, De Cive, chap. 3. sect. 33. p. 27. "But those which we call the laws of nature (since they are nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason of things to be done and omitted; but a law to speak properly and accurately is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to others to be done or omitted) are not (in propriety of speech) laws, as they proceed from nature." Beautiful and ingenious truly! Therefore not being laws they will have no obligatory force; nor will any one be compelled by them to renounce his own right and subject himself to the power of the civil sovereign. Hobbes does not deny this; but replies that they are made laws by sacred writ: "Yet as they are delivered by God in the holy scriptures they are most properly called by the name of laws: for the sacred scripture is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest right." Consequently the entire law of nature is again abrogated. For all obligation to form civil societies and to keep the covenants entered into with magistrates arises from scripture. What necessity then was there to give so copious an explication of the laws of nature and to inculcate the social duties that flow out of them? And what is to become of those who have no knowledge of scripture? Is it incumbent upon Christians alone to renounce the right which they have by nature to all things? By no means. A little afterwards Hobbes again turns round upon himself, and does not hesitate to assert that reason is the true law laid down by God to men, chap. 4. sect. 1. p. 28. "The same law which is natural and moral is also wont to be called divine, nor undeservedly; as well because reason which is the law of nature is given by God to every man for the rule of his actions; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived, are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine majesty, for the laws of his heavenly kingdom, by our Lord Jesus Christ and his holy prophets and apostles." Whoever saw a man more inconsistent than this? At one time he positively denies the existence of natural justice; at another, when he finds it suitable to his purpose, he praises and extols it. Now he tells us that the laws of nature are destitute of all obligatory power, and now again contends that reason is the true law given by God to the human race. When his object is to show that the power of sovereigns is bounded and circumscribed by no laws either divine or human, he

by which these politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man together, are not so good as cobwebs; they being really nothing but mere will and words: for if

rejects all natural justice and maintains that in a state of nature all men have a right to every thing: and sovereigns according to his account are in a state of nature. But on the other hand when he is labouring to confirm men in their obedience and to fortify the sovereign authority against all onslaughts, he derives his whole support from the laws of nature. But yet it seems excellent and pious in him to appeal to scripture and to declare that this ought to be the rule of life to all men. So indeed it does, but let no man trust to appearances. For in other places he boldly and shamelessly asserts that all the authority of scripture depends upon the will and decision of the civil magistrate, and possesses no force without his will. Read his Leviathan, chap. 22. p. 242. &c. "The apostles themselves could not cause their doctrine to have the force of laws without the will of those who possessed the supreme power in their several states. Therefore the New Testament is a law in those places only where it is made so by the supreme civil power." I omit other sayings of the same kind, more atrocious and detestable even than these. We are merely mocked by this flagitious man, who is nowhere consistent but is perpetually contradicting himself, the more easily to elude the attacks of his adversaries. If you ask him: Whence springs the right of magistrates? He replies, from compact. And whence the right of compact? From the law of nature. What is the law of nature? Right reason. But is this obligatory of itself? By no means. From whence therefore does the law of nature derive its authority? From scripture. And whence does scripture receive the force of law? From the civil magistrate. The clear and evident meaning of which is;—that civil magistrates derive all their power from themselves. O pious and subtle philosopher! worthy to be held up as a pattern to those who defend the rights of magistrates; rights that this sagacious reasoner, by taking away all natural and divine right, entirely undermines and destroys.

If I were disposed to amplify what is here briefly put forward by the learned Doctor against the civil and moral discipline of Hobbes, I should have little difficulty in showing that the entire frame-work of his system hangs exceedingly loosely together, and is too weak and frail to be relied upon for support by any sensible ruler. But as this has already been done by others, far superior to me in intellectual ability and erudition, I shall content myself with a few observations which I hope will convince every one that the precepts of Hobbes tend to the destruction of public tranquillity and to the total subversion of the rights of sovereigns. According to his doctrine, the first precept of the law of nature, out of which all the rest flow and to which all duties ought to be referred, is this: Every man ought to do all in his power to preserve himself, his life and limbs. But no man can preserve himself unless he be at peace with other men who have the power of endangering his safety. Therefore another immutable law of nature is: that "Peace is to be sought for where it can be had; and if it cannot be had, war is to be resorted to." But peace will never be obtained, as long as men are in a state of nature, and the natural right of all men to every thing remains entire and inviolate. For this right must necessarily give rise to perpetual wars; which will hinder this self-preservation and bring destruction upon an infinite multitude. Consequently the law of nature requires of all that in order to preserve themselves and their own lives they renounce this right and transfer it to certain men by compact, and that they never rescind these compacts when once made, but implicitly obey the sovereigns to whom they have entrusted their rights in every thing that they decree and decide upon; see Leviathan, chap. 14. p. 66. &c. I am not inclined to exceed my proposed limits by going on any farther in the exposition of this doctrine. Turn which way you will, there are wounds and ulcers, which bid defiance to all attempts at a cure. But these have already been touched upon by others: for myself it will be sufficient to show that the primary elements of the whole of Hobbes' civil philosophy, greatly as it is admired by many persons, are vain and futile.

In the first place, then, I hold that no discipline is more calculated than this to excite and foster seditions and civil wars. For every man is commanded by nature to do every thing that he can for the preservation of himself and his own life: and on account of this law alone civil societies were and ought to be founded. Wherefore wicked and flagitious men will act most justly and agreeably to the prescript of reason and of the law of nature, if when they see themselves threatened with capital

authority and sovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleasure.

punishment by the sovereign, they throw the whole state into confusion and anarchy for the sake of insuring their own safety. Theirs also will be a right and justifiable course, who kill or banish a tyrant, in order to render themselves safe and free from his arbitrary power. The ancient Christians also, whom the emperors commanded to be put to death by the most exquisite tortures, would have done nobly and excellently if they had taken up arms, and fought for the preservation of their fortunes and lives: for "the aid of war is to be resorted to, if peace cannot be had and life preserved." Nay, if the men we have been speaking of were to act otherwise, and to neglect their own preservation, they would sin against God and the law of nature. But these men, Hobbes perhaps will here tell us, renounced their own right, and having entered in a compact with civil rulers, confided to them all their own natural power: but no one is allowed to violate a compact: therefore they ought to endure every thing even to loss of life rather than offer resistance. I will grant all this to be the case, and still it will avail him nothing. The only cause that led men to form civil communities, and to subject their desires to the will of one man, was this, that they might obey as far as possible that first law of nature respecting self-preservation. For when they saw that while they exercised all their own right it would be difficult for them to preserve their life and safety, which nature nevertheless requires, they determined to give up a portion of this right rather than be involved in perpetual dangers. Consequently, in conferring their own right upon the civil sovereign, they did not renounce that first natural law of self-preservation: neither could they have done so if they had wished, for no one can free himself from an obligation imposed upon him by right reason: but on the contrary they submitted themselves to the dominion of other men in order to satisfy that primary law. From which it is manifest that agreeably to this discipline a man is bound to pay obedience to a magistrate only so far as can be done consistently with that eternal precept of nature respecting self-preservation. No one in his senses will deny that a primary law ought always to be preferred to all the secondary ones that have been made on account of it; and indeed a man would be a fool and a simpleton to say, that for the sake of these secondary laws the principal and primary one from which they all flowed ought to be violated. Now according to Hobbes, the primary law of nature is as follows: "Do all that thou canst for thy own preservation." This primary law required another secondary one: "Since thou canst not preserve thyself, as long as thou remittest nothing of thy own natural right, transfer that right to others and obey them." Of necessity, therefore, this secondary law must be sacred so long as it supports and upholds the primary law. But should it oppose the primary law, and destroy its force, and should obedience to the civil ruler be incompatible with the conservation of the people, what sane man, I ask, would assert that the minor and subordinate law notwithstanding is to be observed, and the primary one, which is the parent and cause of it, is to be disregarded? Most assuredly he would determine just as wisely as if he were to say that in order to preserve the force and authority of a certain corollary, the principle from which it flowed is to be abrogated and divested of all truth. Every body knows that if you take away the end, you take away the thing itself. If therefore the sole end and object for which any one has subjected himself to the dominion of others is the preservation of his own life and fortunes, it is evident that as soon as he perceive this end to be done away with, he is at once discharged of the obligation.

In the next place, I affirm it to be a manifest consequence from this discipline of Hobbes, that all rulers of the present day rule unjustly, and are bound by the law of nature to relinquish the power they possess, and submit themselves to the power of one man. All kings and princes that have the right of giving laws to others, according to Hobbes' doctrine are yet in a state of nature, and every state and commonwealth ought to be looked upon no otherwise than as one artificial man, who has been deprived of none of those rights which all men enjoy in so far as they are men. He has openly avowed this in several places, nor could he arrive at any other conclusion: see Leviath. chap. 1. p. 1. &c. chap. 13. p. 65. &c. Therefore every king and people possesses that right to all things, which our philosopher tells us nature has bestowed upon every one, and which every one ought to renounce for the preservation of himself, his life, and

Neither indeed are these atheistic politicians themselves altogether unaware hereof, that this their artificial justice and obligation can be no firm vinculum of a body politic, to consociate those together, and unite them into one, who are naturally dissociated and divided from one another; they acknowledging that "covenants without the sword, being but words and breath, are of no strength to hold the members of their Leviathan, or body politic together." Wherefore, they plainly betake themselves at length from art to force and power, and make their civil sovereign really to reign only in fear.[8]

felicity. But as individuals, according to the dictates of right reason and of the law of nature, ought to make it their chief care to secure their own life and preservation; so also beyond all question it is the duty of kings and princes, on whom the entire community has conferred its own rights from motives of self-preservation, to obey the law of nature by doing all in their power to protect and preserve the body of which they are the head, and to secure the state from all evils. Hobbes, De Cive, chap. 13. sect. 2. p. 91. "Now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence, 'The safety of the people is the supreme law:' for although they who among men obtain the chiefest dominion cannot be subject to laws properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief and subject are contradictious; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as possibly they can, to yield obedience unto right reason, which is the natural, moral, and divine law. But because dominions were constituted for peace's sake, and peace was sought after for safety's sake, he who being placed in authority shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the laws of nature," sect. 4. "But by safety must be understood not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever, but in order to its happiness. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves, and institute a government, that they might, as much as their human condition would afford, live delightfully." Add Leviathan, chap. 3. p. 157. But nothing is more fatal to public tranquillity and to the conservation both of individuals and of states, which according to Hobbes ought to be regarded as one man, than that right possessed by supreme rulers to all things; neither will there ever be a firm and stable peace among nations, or an end put to war, so long as they exercise that right. For example, the kings of France, England, Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, being in a state of nature, have the right of doing as they please; and, according to this writer, while this right is retained, it must of necessity give rise to endless wars and the most violent animosities, altogether subversive of the welfare and happiness of the nations of which those kings are protectors and guardians. Consequently, the law of nature, agreeably to the doctrine of Hobbes, requires that all kings for the preservation and safety of themselves and their people, should renounce the right which they hold, and transfer it to one man. For while the empire of the world is divided even between two, contentions and wars will never cease, and the welfare and happiness of the people will always be subject to risk and peril. It will be necessary therefore for the entire world to become one state, and for the several kings to transfer their rights to one man, who shall rule over the whole human race; and till they do so, they are offending most gravely against reason, and resisting Hobbes' law of nature, which commands every one to give up his own right for the conservation of all. Now let the advocates of the rights of the civil power consider whether it is to the advantage of supreme rulers that this philosophy should be universally introduced and instilled into the minds of men.

[8] Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 17. p. 83. "The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we see them live in commonwealths), is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby: that is to say of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants and observation of those laws of nature. For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to) of themselves,

And this must needs be their meaning, when they so constantly declare all obligation, just and unjust, to be derived only from law; they by law there understanding "a command directed to such as by reason of their imbecility are not able to resist:[9] so that the will and command of the more powerful obliges by the fear of punishment threatened.[10] Now, if the only real obligation to obey civil laws be from the fear of punishment, then could no man be obliged to hazard his life for the safety of his prince and country; and they, who could reasonably promise themselves impunity, would be altogether disobliged, and consequently might justly break any laws, for their own advantage. An assertion so extravagant, that these confounded politicians themselves are ashamed plainly to own it, and therefore disguise it, what they can, by equivocation; themselves sometimes also

without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions; that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept when he hath not the will to break them, though he can do it safely), if there be no power erected or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men."

[9] This definition of law is not put forth by Hobbes in these identical words, but is elicited from his other tenets and principles. The way in which he himself defines law will be evident from the following passages. De Cive, chap. 14. sect. 1. p. 100. "Law is the command of that person (whether man or court) whose precept contains in it the reason of obedience." Obscure enough certainly; but he immediately adds what renders his meaning more intelligible: "as the precepts of God in regard of men, of magistrates in respect of their subjects, and universally of all the powerful in respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their laws." I suspect Dr. Cudworth had these words in his mind, when he attributed the definition of law which is here given to Hobbes. A little otherwise respecting law, Leviathan, chap. 26. p. 129. "Which considered, I define civil law in this manner: civil law is to every subject those rules which the commonwealth hath commanded him by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will, to make use of for the distinction of right and wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule."

[10] Read and attentively examine the following words of this man, De Cive, chap. 15. sect. 5. p. 113. "Now if any man had so far exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joint forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that right which nature had given him; the right, therefore, of domination over all the rest, would have remained with him by reason of that excess of power whereby he could have preserved both himself and them. They, therefore, whose power cannot be resisted, and by consequence God Almighty derives his right of sovereignty from the power itself." He therefore rules rightfully who has power sufficient to compel the subjection of others. This doctrine is admirably convenient to turbulent and aggressive tyrants, who are always striving to extend the limits of their empire, and to reduce all nations, if possible, under their own sway. For according to it, if they only possess the power, they have the most unquestionable right to invade neighbouring nations, nor will it be proper to resist them, since they hold the title to dominion, and the mandates of those who cannot be resisted are laws. Let those who feel even a slight interest in human affairs be judges how much peace and tranquillity mankind could expect from this decree: whoever is more powerful than others is justified in attacking the weaker, and having vanquished, has a right to rule them. I pass over what is here said about the right of God being derived solely from his power: which opinion will be adopted by none but those who suppose the supreme Deity to be like Hobbes' kings, to whom nothing is just except what they themselves will to be so. Add what he has left on record, De Cive, chap. 6. sect. 4. p. 41. "We must therefore provide for our security not by compacts but by punishments."

confessing so much of truth, that Pœna non obligat, sed obligatum tenet,[1] "punishment does not oblige, but only hold those to their duty who were before obliged." Furthermore, what is made by power and force only, may be unmade by power and force again. If civil sovereigns reign only in the fear of their own sword, then is that right of theirs so much talked of, indeed nothing else but might, and their authority, force; and consequently successful and prosperous rebellion, and whatsoever can be done by power, will be ipso facto thereby justified. Lastly, were civil sovereigns, and bodies politic, mere violent and contra-natural things, then would they all quickly vanish into nothing, because nature will prevail against force and violence; whereas men constantly every where fall into political order, and the corruption of one form of government is but the generation of another.

Wherefore, since it is plain that sovereignty and bodies politic can neither be merely artificial nor yet violent things, there must of necessity be some natural bond or vinculum to hold them together, such as may both really oblige subjects to obey the lawful commands of sovereigns, and sovereigns in commanding to seek the good and welfare of their subjects; whom these atheistic politicians, (by their infinite and belluine right) quite discharge from any such thing. Which bond or vinculum can be no other than natural justice; and something of a common and public, of a cementing and conglutinating nature, in all rational beings; the original of both which is from the Deity. The right and authority of God himself is founded in justice; and of this is the civil sovereignty also a certain participation.[2]

[1] Hobbes, De Cive, chap. 14. sect. 2. p. 101. after saying that "Contracts oblige us; laws tie us fast, being obliged;" adds the following annotation: "*To be obliged*, and *to be tied being obliged*, seem to some men to be one and the same thing, and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words but none in deed. More clearly therefore I say thus, That a man is obliged by his contracts, that is, that he ought to perform for his promise sake; but that the law ties him, being obliged, that is to say, it compels him to make good his promise, for fear of the punishment appointed by the law."

[2] But this very thing is altogether denied by Hobbes, who maintains that all the right and authority possessed by God himself over men and animals, is founded upon his power alone, and not upon his justice or wisdom. I have adduced a passage a little above, in which this is openly professed, and to remove all ground for doubt I shall now add others, De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 5. p. 112. "God, in his natural kingdom hath a right to rule and to punish those who break his laws, from his sole irresistible power," sect. 7. p. 114. "Now, if God have the right of sovereignty from his power, it is manifest that the obligation of yielding him obedience, lies on men by reason of their weakness; for that obligation which rises from contract, of which we have spoken in the second chapter, can have no place here. From this second kind of obligation, that is to say, from fear, or the consciousness of one's own weakness, (in respect to the divine power) it arises that in the natural kingdom of God, we are bound to obey him; reason declaring to all who acknowledge the power and providence of God, that we ought not to kick against the pricks." To illustrate these words, he adds the following comment: "Should this seem hard to any one, I ask him to consider in his silent thoughts, if there were two omnipotents, which would be obliged to obey the other.

It is not the mere creature of the people, and of men's wills, and therefore annihilable again by their wills at pleasure; but hath a stamp of divinity upon it, as may partly appear from

He will confess, I imagine, that neither would be bound to the other. If this be true, that is also true which I have laid down, that men are subject to God, because they are not omnipotent. For our Saviour, admonishing Paul, (who at that time was an enemy to the church) not to kick against the pricks, seems to have exacted obedience from him on the ground that he had not power enough to resist." Leviathan, cap. 31: p. 167. "The right of nature whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his laws, is to be derived, not from his creating them, as if he required obedience, as of gratitude for his benefits, but from his irresistible power." Every one imbued even with the first elements of the Christian religion, must be aware of the futility of all this, and of its being most clearly at variance with sacred writ, which so often declares that God is holy, just, wise, and as a parent to the human race, and that his kingdom is founded upon goodness and justice. His interpretation of our Saviour's words to St. Paul, Acts ix. 5. "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks," is especially ridiculous, and unworthy of so acute a philosopher. He supposes their meaning to be as follows: "Thou wilt gain nothing by opposition: therefore give way to a greater power." For my part, if by this warning our Saviour meant to induce St. Paul to embrace the Christian religion, I should not at all wonder why men like Hobbes entertained a mean opinion of his wisdom and holiness. But even a child may see that our blessed Lord meant this: "Thou wilt incur the most grievous punishments both here and hereafter, if thou dost not abandon the course thou hast entered upon." But the crafty man whose object it was to subvert every thing just and virtuous, in order to strengthen the power and authority of the supreme rulers, clearly foresaw that if any justice and holiness were left, sensible men would begin to say that the power of potentates also was restrained and circumscribed by a certain right, and that it is not lawful for them to imitate any other than God, whose representatives they are. He therefore eagerly adopted the severer doctrines of absolute decrees, which were at that time maintained by certain reformers in England, and having divested God of all justice and holiness, converted him into an absolute Lord, who governs all things by the irresistible force of fate. This has already been observed by the most erudite and discreet Bishop Burnet, in his History of his own Times, An. 1661. p. 187. who says: "Hobbes' main principles were, that all men acted under an absolute necessity, in which he seemed protected by the received doctrine of absolute decrees." And this is the reason why Dr. Cudworth every where inveighs so bitterly against those who suppose that God decrees all things absolutely, and that his whole nature is comprised in power: and his example was afterwards imitated by all the most learned English writers, who from the time of Hobbes became much more inveterate in their hostility to the above-mentioned doctrine of certain Reformers. I know not whether Spinoza ever read Hobbes, but he certainly follows most closely in his footsteps, so that they appear to re-echo each other's opinions: see the Tractatus Theol. Politicus, cap. 16. p. 176. where he writes thus: "Among men as long as they are considered to be living under the empire of nature alone, both he who knows nothing yet of reason, or who does not yet possess the habit of virtue, and he who regulates his life according to the laws of reason, are perfectly justified in living solely according to the laws of the appetite.———The natural right of each man is determined not by sound reason, but by desire and power." A little afterwards he declares that all divine right arises out of the compact which God entered into with mankind. "Wherefore, it must be simply taken for granted that divine right commenced from that time, when men by an express compact promised to obey God in all things, by which they, as it were, surrendered their natural liberty, and transferred their own right to God." This seems to be at variance with the precepts of Hobbes; but that it was said merely to save appearances is evident from his Tractatus Politicus, extant among his posthumous works, in which, cap. 2. p. 270. he transgresses all bounds of modesty. For after having asserted, sect. 2. that "the power of physical things, as far as they exist, and consequently as far as they operate, can be nothing else than the eternal power of God himself," which manifestly flows out of his infamous doctrine respecting the divine nature, he thus proceeds, sect. 3. "Since God has a right to all things, and

hence, because that jus vitæ et necis, that "power of life and death," which civil sovereigns have, was never lodged in singulars, before civil society; and therefore could not be conferred by them. Had not God and nature made a city, were there not a natural conciliation of all rational creatures, and subjection of them to the Deity, as their head (which is Cicero's,[3] Una civitas deorum atque hominum, "one city of gods and men,") had not God made ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, "ruling and being ruled," superiority and subjection, with their respective duty and obligation; men could neither by art, or political enchantment, nor yet by force, have made any firm cities or polities. The civil sovereign is no Leviathan, no beast, but a God, ("I have said ye are gods:"[4]) he reigns not in mere brutish force and fear, but in natural justice and conscience, and in the right and authority of God himself. Nevertheless, we deny not but that there is need of force and fear too, to constrain those to obedience to whom the conscience of duty proveth ineffectual. Nor is the fear of the civil sovereign's own sword alone sufficient for this neither, unassisted by religion, and the fear of an invisible Being omnipotent, who seeth all things, and can punish secret, as well as open transgressors, both in this life, and after death; which is a thing so confessedly true, that Atheists have therefore pretended religion to have been at first a mere political figment. We conclude therefore, that the civil sovereign reigneth not merely in the fear of his own power and sword; but first in the justice and authority, and then in the power and fear also of God Almighty. And thus much for the first Atheistic pretence, from the interests of civil sovereigns.

To their second, that sovereignty is essentially infinite, and therefore altogether inconsistent with religion, that would limit and confine it, we reply, that the right and authority of civil sovereigns is not, as these our atheistic politicians ignorantly suppose, a mere belluine liberty, but it is a right essentially founded in the being of natural justice, as hath been declared. For authority of commanding is such a right, as supposes obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but mere will and force. But none can be obliged in duty to obey but by natural justice; commands, as such, not creating obligation, but presupposing it. For, if persons were not before obliged to obey, no commands would signify any thing to them.

the right of God is nothing more than the power of God, in so far as this is considered absolutely free, it follows that every physical thing has so much right by nature, as it has power to exist and operate."

[3] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 62. p. 3043. tom. 9. opp. according to the opinion of the Stoics: "For the world is a common house or city, as it were, of gods and men."

[4] Psalm lxxxii. 6. on which passage consult the remarks of J. Le Clerc, Comm. in Psalmos, p. 408. 409.

Wherefore, the first original obligation is not from will, but nature. Did obligation to the things of natural justice, as many suppose, arise from the will and positive command of God, only by reason of punishments threatened, and rewards promised; the consequence of this would be, that no man was good and just, but only by accident, and for the sake of something else; whereas the goodness of justice or righteousness is intrinsical to the thing itself, and this is that which obligeth, (and not any thing foreign to it) it being a different species of good from that of appetite and private utility, which every man may dispense withal. Now, there can be no more infinite justice than there can be an infinite rule, or an infinite measure. Justice is essentially a determinate thing; and therefore can there not be an infinite jus, "right or authority." If there be any thing in its own nature just and obliging, or such as ought to be done; then must there of necessity be something unjust or unlawful, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded by any authority whatsoever. Neither ought this to be thought any impeachment of civil authority, it extending universally to all, even to that of the Deity itself. The right and authority of God himself, who is the supreme sovereign of the universe, is also in like manner bounded and circumscribed by justice. God's will is ruled by his justice, and not his justice ruled by his will; and therefore, God himself cannot command what is in its own nature unjust. And thus have we made it evident, that infinite right and authority of doing and commanding any thing without exception, so that the arbitrary will of the commander should be the very rule of justice itself to others, and consequently might oblige to any thing, is an absolute contradiction, and a non-entity; it supposing nothing to be in its own nature just or unjust; which, if there were not, there could be no obligation nor authority at all. Wherefore, the Atheists, who would flatter civil sovereigns with this infinite right, as if their will ought to be the very rule of justice and conscience, and, upon that pretence, prejudice them against religion, do as ill deserve of them, as of religion hereby; they indeed, absolutely divesting them of all right and authority, and leaving them nothing but mere brutish force and belluine liberty. And could civil sovereigns utterly demolish and destroy conscience and religion in the minds of men, (which yet is an absolute impossibility) they thinking thereby to make elbow-room for themselves, they would certainly bury themselves also in the ruins of them. Nevertheless, thus much is true; That they in whom the sovereign legislative power of every polity is lodged, (whether single persons or assemblies;) they who make civil laws, and can reverse them at pleasure, though they may unquestionably sin against God, in making unjust laws, yet can they not sin politically or civilly, as violators or transgressors of

those laws cancelled and reversed by them, they being superior to them. Nor is this all; but these sovereign legislative powers may be said to be absolute also in another sense, as being ἀνυπεύθυνοι, "unjudicable," or uncensurable by any human court; because, if they were so obnoxious, then would that court or power which had a right to judge and censure them, be superior to them; which is contrary to the hypothesis. And then, if this power were again judicable by some other, there must either be an infinite progress, or endless circulation, (a thing not only absurd, but also utterly inconsistent with government and property; because, there being no ultimate judgment unappealable from, there could never be any final determination of controversies;) or else at last, all must be devolved to the multitude of singulars, which would be a dissolution of the body politic, and a state of anarchy. And thus have we fully confuted the second atheistic pretence also, for the "inconsistency of religion with civil sovereignty."

Their third and last follows: "That private judgment of good and evil is contradictious to civil sovereignty, and a body politic, this being one artificial man, that must be all governed by one reason and will." But conscience is private judgment of good and evil, lawful and unlawful, &c.[5] To which we reply that it is not religion, but, on the contrary, the principles of these atheistic politicians, that unavoidably introduce private judgment of good and evil, such as is absolutely inconsistent with civil sovereignty, there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a public or common good, nothing of duty or obligation, but all private appetite and utility, of which also every man is judge for himself. For if this were so, then, whenever any man judged it most for his private utility to disobey laws, rebel against sovereigns, nay, to poison or stab them, he would be unquestionably bound by nature and the reason of his own good, as the highest law, to do the same. Neither can these atheistic politicians be ever able to bring men out of this state of private good, judgment and will, which is natural to them, by any artificial tricks and devices, or mere enchantments of words, as "artificial justice," and an "artificial man," and a "common person" and "will," and a "public conscience," and the like. Nay, it is observable, that themselves are necessitated by the terror of these their principles, casuistically to allow such private judgment and will as is altogether inconsistent with civil sovereignty; as, that any man may lawfully resist in defence of his own life; and that they, who have once rebelled, may afterwards justly defend themselves by force. Nor indeed can this

[5] The passages of Hobbes in which this doctrine is professed, have already been brought forward by us.

private judgment of men, according to their appetite and utility, be possibly otherwise taken away, than by natural justice, which is a thing not of a private, but of a public and common nature; and by conscience, that obligeth to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, though contrary to men's appetites and private interest. Wherefore conscience also is, in itself, not of a private and partial, but of a public and common nature; it respecting divine laws, impartial justice and equity, and the good of the whole, when clashing with our own selfish, good, and private utility. This is the only thing that can naturally consociate mankind together, lay a foundation for bodies politic, and take away that private will and judgment, according to men's appetite and utility, which is inconsistent with the same; agreeably to that of Plato's:[6] Τὸ κοινὸν συνδεῖ, τὸ ἴδιον διασπᾷ, That "which is of a common and public nature, unites; but that, which is of a private, segregates and dissociates." It is true, indeed, that particular persons must make a judgment in conscience for themselves, (a public conscience being nonsense and ridiculous,) and that they may also err therein; yet is not the rule neither by which conscience judgeth, private; nor itself unaccountable, unless in such mistaken fanatics as professedly follow private impulses; but either the natural and eternal laws of God, or else his revealed will, things more public than the civil laws of any country, and of which others also may judge. Nevertheless, we deny not but that evil persons may and do sometimes make a pretence of conscience and religion, in order to sedition and rebellion, as the best things may be abused: but this is not the fault of religion, but only of the men; conscience obliging, though first to obey God, yet, in subordination to him, the laws of civil sovereigns also. To conclude, conscience and religion oblige subjects actively to obey all the lawful commands of civil sovereigns, or legislative powers, though contrary to their own private appetite, interest, and utility; but, when these same sovereign legislative powers command unlawful things, conscience, though it here obliges to "obey God, rather than man," yet does it, notwithstanding, oblige not to resist. Rom. xiii. "Whosoever resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation." And Matthew xxvi. "All they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword." Here is "the patience and the faith of the saints." And thus does religion "give unto Cæsar, the things that are Cæsar's, as well as unto God the things that are God's.[7]

[6] De Legibus, lib. 9. p. 660.

[7] In recommending this dogma of the abrogation of men's private judgments respecting their own actions, Hobbes was influenced no doubt by the civil wars and seditions which at that time miserably harassed Great Britain. For those who had resisted

And now, having fully confuted all the atheistic grounds, we confidently conclude, That the first original of all things was neither stupid and senseless matter fortuitously moved, nor a blind and nescient, but orderly and methodical plastic nature; nor a living matter, having perception or understanding natural, without animal sense or consciousness; nor yet did every thing exist of itself necessarily from eternity, without a cause. But

Charles I. and brought this unfortunate monarch to the scaffold, justified their conduct upon the plea of conscience, and asserted that the king had issued certain behests which the inward monitor residing in their own breasts forbade them to obey. While on the other hand, the parties who were favourable to the restoration of the royal power, in their turn declared that they were impelled by conscience again to commit the destinies of the commonwealth to the care of the offspring of the murdered monarch. Hence this philosopher, whose only object was to conciliate the favour of those in power, by his profane doctrines, was the foe of all conscience. This dogma of his, however, is altogether foul and deformed, and clearly shows that none can be citizens in Hobbes' Commonwealth, unless they are changed into beasts, and deprived of all reason. In the first place, it takes away all dignity and authority from the sacred volumes, they being the rule by which the judgment of the conscience is formed. For what necessity can there be for any rule of the kind in a state, if no one is allowed to pay attention to it, or to regulate his life by its precepts. Indeed, Hobbes has left some place for religion in his commonwealth, merely for the sake of escaping popular odium: but in reality he scouts and despises it. For if the supreme magistrate, as he undisguisedly avows, is its only interpreter, and if it has not the force of law, except the magistrate wills—in short, if nothing is to be believed except what he commands to be believed, and nothing to be regarded as good, or just, or right, except he declares it to be such, it would be better I imagine to banish it altogether, than to give it a place in a community where no one can be benefited by it. The same precept requires citizens to renounce the use of their own reason, and to cease to be men. For conscience is nothing but right reason judging of our actions by the guidance of the law of nature and of scripture. Wherefore, if all conscience is to be banished from a state, to prevent disturbance, it behoves all citizens to confine the whole of their care, like flocks and herds, to their food, and in all other matters to do as they are commanded. Undoubtedly, reason is a great evil, and ought by all means to be got rid of, if its use is pernicious to the welfare of the commonwealth, in which that of all the citizens is comprised. Lastly, if this doctrine is admitted, human life will be a compound of injustice wickedness, and iniquity. For if no one in any undertaking is allowed to consult his own conscience, in order to learn what is conformable and what is repugnant to right, he will be at liberty to follow his own inclinations, and to do whatever he conceives to make for his own interests, provided he commits no act that is interdicted by the civil laws. Supposing that those who are engaged in commerce, or who enter into compact with others, pay no heed to conscience, nay, are commanded to disregard it, an infinity of wrongs will take place, and will admit of taking place with impunity. In short the whole of this doctrine of Hobbes' is childish and nugatory. Let the man argue as he likes, it is clearly impossible for any state to subsist, unless each individual exercises a private judgment upon his own actions. Let us imagine to ourselves a community such as this philosopher had in view, in which the chief magistrate has all the power, and no law but the civil is in force, all the laws of nature and revelation being disregarded. Still, I suppose, in this commonwealth every man ought to decide whether or not anything he wishes to perform is conformable to the laws laid down by the sovereign. A supporter of Hobbes would be insane were he to deny this. For if it be incumbent upon citizens to obey the laws, and to live according to their rule, the very necessity of the thing requires also that they should compare their own actions with these laws, and see whether they are in accordance or at variance with them. Consequently, wherever law is, there of necessity must be the private judgment of the citizens, or conscience; and those who, to prevent any evil to a commonwealth, advocate the abrogation of conscience, at the same time advocate the abolition of law and the commonwealth.

there is one only necessary existent, the cause of all other things; and this an absolutely perfect Being, infinitely good, wise, and powerful; who hath made all that was fit to be made, and according to the best wisdom, and exerciseth an exact providence over all: whose name ought to be hallowed, and separated from all other things: "To whom be all honour, and glory, and worship, for ever and ever. Amen."

A TREATISE

CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BY RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

With a Preface,

BY THE

RIGHT REV. FATHER IN GOD, EDWARD, LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

PREFACE.

The Author of the following treatise was the very learned Dr. Ralph Cudworth, whose name is so well known to them that are acquainted with the best authors, as to render it needless to say more in behalf of this piece, than that it was composed by the same person that wrote the "True Intellectual System of the Universe." This Author, being early prepared with a nice skill in most of the learned languages, and having joined to a clear and solid judgment an indefatigable application to study, began soon to form vast designs for the service of religion: and in subserviency thereto to reduce his large treasure of learning to proper heads or subjects, which he purposed one time or other to improve into complete discourses.

He lived in an age when the disputes concerning liberty and necessity, mingling with the political schemes of the leaders of opposite parties, helped to cause strong convulsions in the state, and to spread no less fatal an influence upon the principles and manners of the generality of people. For debauchery, scepticism, and infidelity, as he complains,* flourished in his time, and grew up, in his opinion, from the doctrine of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, as from its proper root.† Such a belief, upon whatsoever grounds or principles maintained, as he conceived, did serve the design of atheism and undermine Christianity and all religion; as taking away all guilt and blame, punishments and rewards: and plainly rendered a day of judgment ridiculous. And he thought it evident, that some in those days pursued those notions in order to that end.

These sentiments disposed him to bend much of his study this way, and to read over all the ancient philosophers and moralists, which he did with great accuracy. He then set himself to gather and answer all the ancient and modern arguments, for the necessity of all actions, which had been maintained by several persons, upon very different grounds.

* Epistle Dedicatory before his Intellectual System.

† Preface to the Intellectual System.

And many of his collections of this kind still remain, as so many monuments of his copious reading, judgment, and industry.

He accordingly distinguished three sorts of fatality, that he might treat of each apart. First, natural or material, which excluding God out of the scheme, and supposing senseless matter necessarily moved, to be the first principle and cause of all things, is truly and properly the atheistical fate. This he found defended by Epicurus of old, and to refute him and the other assertors of the atomic material necessity, he published his learned and unanswerable book, which he entitled "The Intellectual System of the Universe."

Secondly, theologic or divine fate, which indeed allows in words the existence of that perfect Intellectual Being, distinct from matter, whom we call God: yet affirming that God irrespectively decrees and determines all things, evil as well as good, doth in effect make all actions alike necessary to us. In consequence whereof, God's will is not regulated by his essential and immutable goodness and justice: God is a mere arbitrary will omnipotent: and in respect to us, moral good and evil are positive things, and not so in their own nature, that is, things are good or bad because they are commanded or forbidden, and that which is now good might have been bad, and bad good, if the pure will of God at first had not determined them to be what they are at present.

Thirdly, the Stoical Fate, which constrains also the natural and moral actions of the Universe, and makes necessity to be so intrinsical to the nature of every thing, as that no being or action could possibly be otherwise than it is. For all things, according to this notion, depend in a chain of causes, all in themselves necessary, from the first principle of Being, who pre-ordered every event before it fell out, so as to leave no room to liberty or contingency any where in the world.

These two last hypotheses of fatalism were but lightly touched in his "Intellectual System," because he intended to give them a more particular and more ample consideration: however, ill health, a short life, or other reasons we know not, hindered him from finishing what the world earnestly expected, and no one that survived him was able to supply.

It is probable, that foreseeing the length of the work, and some of the hindrances that afterwards fell out to retard and defeat it, he thought it best to contract his undertaking, and to treat in smaller volumes of those points that he judged to be most material and principal in this controversy.

In this view he drew up the book with which the world is now presented, wherein he proves the falseness of the consequences with respect to natural justice and morality in God, which are deducible from the principles of those that maintain the second sort of fate, denominated

by him theologic. And thus it may be reckoned to be a sequel in part of his first book against material fate. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had served for a proper antidote to the poison in some of Mr. Hobbes' and other writings, who revived in that age the exploded opinions of Protagoras and other ancient Greeks, and took away the essential and eternal discrimination of moral good and evil, of just and unjust, and made them all arbitrary productions of divine or human will.

Against the ancient and modern patrons of this doctrine no one hath written better than Dr. Cudworth. His book is indeed a demonstration of the truth of the contrary opinion; and is drawn up with that beauty, clearness and strength, as must delight as well as convince the reader, if I may judge of the affection of others, from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a just idea of the writer's good sense, as well as vast learning.

We are not certain that this treatise is quite so perfect as the author designed it: but it appears from the MS. that he transcribed the best part of it with his own hand, as if it was speedily to have been sent to the press.

His death following not long after, this, with several other manuscripts, was locked up from the sight of the world for many years, and at last came into the hands of his grandson Francis Cudworth Masham, Esq., one of the masters in Chancery, whose temper is too beneficent and communicative to deprive the public any longer of a work that promises much benefit to it.

It is well known, that the loose principles, with regard to morality, that are opposed in this book, are defended by too many in our time. It is hoped also that the new controversies springing up, that have some relation to this subject, may be cleared and shortened by the reasons herein proposed. However that be, a book of sound sense and true learning is at all times in fashion: and if any the least good shall follow, as there may much good from the publication of it; or if even the memory of so great a man in all parts of learning, divine and human, who was an honour to Emanuel College, where he was educated, and to Christ's College, where he afterwards presided, and indeed to the whole University of Cambridge, which he adorned, shall by these means be revived and perpetuated, it cannot be said to be published unseasonably.

E. Duresme.

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A TREATISE

CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BOOK I.—CHAPTER I.

As the vulgar generally look no higher for the original of moral good and evil, just and unjust, than the codes and pandects, the tables and laws of their country and religion, so there have not wanted pretended philosophers in all ages who have asserted nothing to be good and evil, just and unjust, *φύσει καὶ ἀκινήτως*, "naturally and immutably;" but that all these things were *θετικὰ, νομιμὰ, ψηφισματώδη*, "positive, arbitrary, and factitious only." Such Plato mentions in his tenth book de Legibus, who maintained, *Τὰ δίκαια οὐδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἀμφισβητοῦντας διατελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ' ἂν μετάθωνται καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' οὐ δή τινι φύσει*, "That nothing at all was naturally just, but men changing their opinions concerning them perpetually, sometimes made one thing just, sometimes another; but whatsoever is decreed and constituted, that for the time is valid, being made so by arts and laws, but not by any nature of its own." And again in his Theætetus, *Ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις, καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον· καὶ ὅσοι δὲ μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν ὧδε πῶς τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι*, "As to things just and unjust, holy and unholy, not only the Protagoreans (of whom we shall treat afterward), but many other philosophers also confidently affirm, that none of these things have in nature any essence of their own, but whatsoever is decreed by the authority of the city, that is truly such when it is so decreed, and for so

long time, viz. just or unjust, holy or unholy." And Aristotle more than once takes notice of this opinion in his Ethics: *Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια περὶ ὧν ἡ Πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή,** "Things honest and just, which politics are conversant about, have so great a variety and uncertainty in them, that they seem to be only by law, and not by nature." And afterwards, lib. 5. cap. 10. after he had divided *τὸ δίκαιον πολιτικὸν*, "that which is politically just," into *φυσικὸν*, i. e. "natural," *τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν*, "which has every where the same force," and *νομιμὸν*, i. e. "legal," *ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως· ὅταν δὲ ϑῶνται, διαφέρει*, "which before there be a law made, is indifferent, but when once the law is made, is determined to be just or unjust:" which legal just and unjust (as he afterward expresses it) are *ὅμοια τοῖς μέτροις οἰνηροῖς καὶ σιτηροῖς*, "like to wine and wheat measures, as pints and bushels," which are not every where of an equal bigness, being commonly lesser with those that sell and greater with those that buy: then he adds, *Δοκεῖ δὲ ἐνίοις πάντα εἶναι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνϑάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει. Τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσι*, "Some there are that think that there is no other just or unjust, but what is made by law and men, because that which is natural is immutable, and hath every where the same force, as fire burns alike here and in Persia; but they see that jura and justa, rights and just things are every where different."

2. The philosophers particularly noted for this opinion in Plato, are Protagoras in his Theætetus, Polus and Callicles in his Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Glauco in his Politics; but Diogenes Laërtius† tells us of some others, as of Archelaus, Socrates' master, that held *τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ*, "that just and dishonest are not so by nature but by law;" and (as I conceive)‡ Democritus; for after he had set down his opinion concerning happiness, or the chief end, he adds this as part of the Democritical philosophy, *ποιητὰ νομιμὰ εἶναι*, which I understand thus, that things accounted just or unjust, are all factitious or artificial things, not natural; nothing being real or natural but atoms and vacuum, as the following words are, *φύσει δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν*. The same is noted by Diogenes§ also concerning Aristippus, Plato's contemporary, that he asserted *μηδὲν εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔϑει*, "that nothing was good or evil otherwise than by law or custom." And Plutarch, in the Life of Alexander, tells us of Anaxarchus, that was Aristotle's equal, that when Alexander repenting, sadly lamented the death of Clitus, whom

* Arist. Eth. Nicom. lib. 1. cap. 1.
† Lib. 2. segm. 16.
‡ Lib. 9. segm. 45.
§ Lib. 2. sect. 193.

he had rashly slain, he read this lecture of philosophy to him to comfort him, *πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος, δίκαιον εἶναι,** "that whatsoever is done by the supreme power, is ipso facto just." And Pyrrho, the Eliensic philosopher, and father of the Sceptics, that was Anaxarchus' scholar, seems to have been dogmatical in nothing else but this, *οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν, οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν,*† "that there is nothing good or shameful, just or unjust, and so likewise as to all things, that there is nothing so in truth, but that men do all things according to law and custom."

3. After these succeeded Epicurus, the reviver of the Democritical philosophy, the frame of whose principles must needs lead him to deny justice and injustice to be natural things; and therefore he determines that they arise wholly from mutual pacts and covenants of men made for their own convenience and utility, and laws resulting from thence. *Ὅσα τῶν ζώων μὴ ἠδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθέν ἐστι οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἠδύνατο ἢ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι· οὐκ ἦν τὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλὰ ἐν ταῖς μετὰ ἀλλήλων συντροφαῖς, καθ' ὁπηλίκους δήποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι,*‡ "Those living creatures that could not make mutual covenants together not to hurt, nor to be hurt by one another, could not for this cause have any such thing as just or unjust amongst them. And there is the same reason for those nations that either will not, or cannot make such mutual compacts not to hurt one another. For there is no such thing as justice by itself, but only in the mutual congresses of men, wheresoever they have entered together into covenant not to hurt one another." The late compiler of the Epicurean system expresses this philosopher's meaning after this manner: Sunt quidam qui existimant ea quæ justa sunt, esse secundum propriam invariatamque naturam justa, et leges non ista justa facere, sed duntaxat præscribere juxta eam quam habent naturam; verum res non ita se habet,§ "There are some that think that those things that are just, are just according to their proper, unvaried nature, and that the laws do not make them just, but only prescribe according to that nature which they have. But the thing is not so."

After Epicurus, Carneades the author of the New Academy, as Lactantius‖ testifieth, was also a zealous assertor of the same doctrine.

* Page 695. tom. 1. opp. † Diog. Luërtius, lib. 9. segm. 61.
‡ The words of Epicurus in his *Κυρίαι Δόξαι*, sect. 35. 36. in Laërt. lib. 10. sect. 150.
§ Gassendus Syntagm. par. 3. cap. 25. ‖ Instit. Divin. lib. 5. cap. 14.

4. And since in this latter age the physiological hypotheses of Democritus and Epicurus have been revived, and successfully applied to the solving of some of the phenomena of the visible world, there have not wanted those that have endeavoured to vent also those other paradoxes of the same philosophers, viz. "That there is no incorporeal substance, nor any natural difference of good and evil, just and unjust;" and to recommend the same under a show of wisdom, as the deep and profound mysteries of the atomical or corpuscular philosophy. As if senseless matter and atoms were the original of all things, according to that song of old Silenus in the poet:

> Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta
> Semina terrarumque animæque marisque fuissent,
> Et liquidi simul ignis; ut his exordia primis
> Omnia, et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.*

> "He sung the secret seeds of nature's frame;
> How seas, and earth, and air, and active flame,
> Fell through the mighty void, and in their fall
> Were blindly gathered in this goodly ball."

Of this sort is that late writer of ethics and politics, who asserts, doctrinas de justo et injusto, bono et malo, præter leges in unaquaque civitate constitutas, authenticas esse nullas; et utrum aliqua actio justa vel injusta, bona vel mala futura sit, a nemine inquirendum esse, præterquam ab iis, ad quos legum suarum interpretationem civitas demandaverit, "that there are no authentic doctrines concerning just and unjust, good and evil, except the laws which are established in every city: and that it concerns none to inquire whether an action shall be reputed just or unjust, good or evil, except such only whom the community have appointed to be the interpreters of their laws."

And again: Ad civitatem pertinet etiam Christianam, quid sit justitia, quid injustitia, sive peccatum contra justitiam, determinare,† "Even a Christian government hath power to determine what is righteous, and what is the transgression of it."

And he gives us the same over again in English: "In the state of nature nothing can be unjust; the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place; where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no transgression."‡ "No law can be unjust."§ Nay, temperance is no more φύσει, "naturally" according to this civil (or rather uncivil) philosopher, than justice. "Sensuality in that sense in which it is condemned, hath no place till there be laws."‖

5. But whatsoever was the true meaning of these philosophers, that affirm justice and injustice to be only by law, and not by

* Virg. Eclog. 6. † Hobbes, De Cive, p. 343.
‡ Leviathan, p. 63. § Ib. p. 182. ‖ Ib. p. 25.

nature (of which I shall discourse afterwards), certain it is that divers modern theologers do not only seriously, but zealously contend in like manner, that there is nothing absolutely, intrinsically, and naturally good and evil, just and unjust, antecedently to any positive command or prohibition of God; but that the arbitrary will and pleasure of God (that is, an omnipotent Being devoid of all essential and natural justice), by its commands and prohibitions, is the first and only rule and measure thereof. Whence it follows unavoidably, that nothing can be imagined so grossly wicked, or so foully unjust or dishonest, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this omnipotent Deity, must needs upon that hypothesis forthwith become holy, just, and righteous. For though the ancient fathers of the Christian church were very abhorrent from this doctrine (as shall be showed hereafter), yet it crept up afterward in the scholastic age, Ockham being among the first that maintained nullum actum malum esse nisi quatenus a Deo prohibitum, et qui non possit fieri bonus si a Deo præcipiatur; et e converso, "that there is no act evil but as it is prohibited by God, and which cannot be made good if it be commanded by God. And so on the other hand as to good." And herein Petrus Alliacus and Andreas de Novo Castro, with others, quickly followed him.

But this doctrine hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think nothing so essential to the Deity as uncontrollable power and arbitrary will, and therefore that God could not be God if there should be any thing evil in its own nature which he could not do; and who impute such dark counsels and dismal actions unto God, as cannot be justified otherwise than by saying that whatsoever God can be supposed to do or will, will be for that reason good or just, because he wills it.

Now the necessary and unavoidable consequences of this opinion are such as these: Amare Deum φύσει esse ἀδιάφορον, et moraliter bonum solummodo, quia a Deo jubetur: prohibere Dei amorem vel præcipere Dei odium, non pugnare cum Dei naturâ, sed tantum cum voluntate liberâ. Non repugnare juri divino naturali præcipere peccata. Deum posse imperare blasphemiam, perjurium, mendacium, &c. Deum posse præcipere contrarium, ut omnibus præceptis decalogi, ita potissimum primo, secundo, tertio. Sanctitatem non esse conformitatem cum natura Dei; Deum posse hominem obligare ad impossibile; Deum nullam habere naturalem inclinationem in bonum creaturarum; Deum jure posse creaturam insontem æternis cruciatibus damnare, "That to love God is by nature an indifferent thing, and is morally good only, because it is commanded by God; that to prohibit the love of God, or command the hatred of God, is not inconsistent with the nature of God, but only with his free will;

that it is not inconsistent with the natural equity of God to command blasphemy, perjury, lying, &c. That God may command what is contrary, as to all the precepts of the Decalogue, so especially to the first, second, third; that holiness is not a conformity with the nature of God; that God may oblige man to what is impossible; that God hath no natural inclination to the good of the creatures; that God can justly doom an innocent creature to eternal torment." All which propositions, with others of like kind, are word for word asserted by some late authors. Though I think not fit to mention the name of any of them in this place, excepting only one, Joannes Szydlovius,* who in a book published at Franeker, hath professedly avowed and maintained the grossest of them. And yet neither he, nor the rest, are to be thought any more blameworthy herein than many others, that holding the same premises have either dissembled or disowned those conclusions which unavoidably follow therefrom: but rather to be commended for their openness, simplicity, and ingenuity, in representing their opinion nakedly to the world, such as indeed it is, without any veil or mask.

Wherefore since there are so many, both philosophers and theologers, that seemingly and verbally acknowledge such things as moral good and evil, just and unjust, that contend notwithstanding that these are not φύσει "by nature," but θέσει, "institution," and that there is nothing naturally or immutably just or unjust; I shall from hence fetch the rise of this ethical discourse or inquiry περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, "concerning things good and evil, just and unjust, laudable and shameful (for so I find these words frequently used as synonymous in Plato and other ancient authors): demonstrating in the first place, that if there be any thing at all good or evil, just or unjust, there must of necessity be δίκαιον φυσικὸν καὶ ἀκίνητον, "something naturally and immutably good and just." And from thence I shall proceed afterward to show what this δίκαιον φυσικὸν, ἀκίνητον, καὶ ἀιώνιον, "natural, immutable, and eternal justice is," with the branches and species of it.

CHAPTER II.

1. Wherefore in the first place, it is a thing which we shall very easily demonstrate, That moral good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest (if they be not mere names without any signification, or names for nothing else, but willed and commanded, but have a reality in respect of the persons obliged to

* Vindiciæ quæstionum aliquot difficilium.

do and avoid them), cannot possibly be arbitrary things, made by will without nature; because it is universally true, that things are what they are, not by will but by nature. As for example, things are white by whiteness, and black by blackness, triangular by triangularity, and round by rotundity, like by likeness, and equal by equality, that is, by such certain natures of their own. Neither can Omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) by mere will make a thing white or black without whiteness or blackness; that is, without such certain natures, whether we consider them as qualities in the objects without us according to the Peripatetical philosophy, or as certain dispositions of parts in respect of magnitude, figure, site, and motion, which beget those sensations or phantasms of white and black in us. Or, to instance in geometrical figures, Omnipotence itself cannot by mere will make a body triangular, without having the nature and properties of a triangle in it; that is, without having three angles equal to two right ones, nor circular without the nature of a circle; that is, without having a circumference equidistant every where from the centre or middle point. Or lastly, to instance in things relative only; omnipotent will cannot make things like or equal one to another, without the natures of likeness and equality. The reason whereof is plain, because all these things imply a manifest contradiction; that things should be what they are not. And this is a truth fundamentally necessary to all knowledge, that contradictories cannot be true; for otherwise, nothing would be certainly true or false. Now things may as well be made white or black by mere will, without whiteness or blackness, equal and unequal, without equality and inequality, as morally good and evil, just and unjust, honest and dishonest, debita and illicita, by mere will, without any nature of goodness, justice, honesty. For though the will of God be the supreme efficient cause of all things, and can produce into being or existence, or reduce into nothing what it pleaseth, yet it is not the formal cause of any thing besides itself, as the schoolmen have determined, in these words, Deum ipsum non posse supplere locum causæ formalis, "That God himself cannot supply the place of a formal cause;" and therefore it cannot supply the formal cause, or nature of justice or injustice, honesty or dishonesty. Now all that we have hitherto said amounts to no more than this, that it is impossible any thing should be by will only, that is, without a nature or entity, or that the nature and essence of any thing should be arbitrary.

2. And since a thing cannot be made any thing by mere will without a being or nature, every thing must be necessarily and immutably determined by its own nature, and the nature of things be that which it is, and nothing else. For though the will and power of God have an absolute, infinite and unlimited

command upon the existences of all created things to make them to be, or not to be at pleasure; yet when things exist, they are what they are, this or that, absolutely or relatively, not by will or arbitrary command, but by the necessity of their own nature. There is no such thing as an arbitrarious essence, mode or relation, that may be made indifferently any thing at pleasure; for an arbitrarious essence is a being without a nature, a contradiction, and therefore a nonentity. Wherefore the natures of justice and injustice cannot be arbitrarious things, that may be applicable by will indifferently to any actions or dispositions whatsoever. For the modes of all subsistent beings, and the relations of things to one another, are immutably and necessarily what they are, and not arbitrary, being not by will but by nature.

3. Now the necessary consequence of that which we have hitherto said is this, That it is so far from being true, that all moral good and evil, just and unjust are mere arbitrary and factitious things, that are created wholly by will; that (if we would speak properly) we must needs say that nothing is morally good or evil, just or unjust by mere will without nature, because every thing is what it is by nature, and not by will. For though it will be objected here, that when God, or civil powers command a thing to be done, that was not before debitum or illicitum, "obligatory or unlawful," the thing willed or commanded doth forthwith become Δέον or debitum, "obligatory," that which ought to be done by creatures and subjects respectively; in which the nature of moral good or evil is commonly conceived to consist. And therefore if all good and evil, just and unjust be not the creatures of mere will (as many assert) yet at least positive things must needs owe all their morality, their good and evil to mere will without nature; yet notwithstanding, if we well consider it, we shall find that even in positive commands themselves, mere will doth not make the thing commanded just or debitum, "obligatory," or beget and create any obligation to obedience; but that it is natural justice or equity, which gives to one the right or authority of commanding, and begets in another duty and obligation to obedience. Therefore it is observable, that laws and commands do not run thus, to will that this or that thing shall become justum or injustum, debitum or illicitum, "just or unjust, obligatory or unlawful;" or that men shall be obliged or bound to obey; but only to require that something be done or not done, or otherwise to menace punishment to the transgressors thereof. For it was never heard of, that any one founded all his authority of commanding others, and others obligation or duty to obey his commands, in a law of his own making, that men should be required, obliged, or bound to obey him. Wherefore since the thing willed in all laws is not that men should be bound or

obliged to obey; this thing cannot be the product of the mere will of the commander, but it must proceed from something else; namely, the right or authority of the commander, which is founded in natural justice and equity, and an antecedent obligation to obedience in the subjects; which things are not made by laws, but presupposed before all laws to make them valid. And if it should be imagined, that any one should make a positive law to require that others should be obliged, or bound to obey him, every one would think such a law ridiculous and absurd; for if they were obliged before, then this law would be in vain, and to no purpose; and if they were not before obliged, then they could not be obliged by any positive law, because they were not previously bound to obey such a person's commands; so that obligation to obey all positive laws is older than all laws, and previous or antecedent to them. 'Neither is it a thing that is arbitrarily made by will, or can be the object of command, but that which either is or is not by nature. And if this were not morally good and just in its own nature before any positive command of God, that God should be obeyed by his creatures, the bare will of God himself could not beget an obligation upon any to do what he willed and commanded, because the nature of things do not depend upon will, being not γιγνόμενα but ὄντα, "things that are arbitrarily made," but "things that are." To conclude therefore, even in positive laws and commands it is not mere will that obligeth, but the natures of good and evil, just and unjust, really existing in the world.

4. Wherefore that common distinction betwixt things, φύσει and θέσει, "things naturally and positively good and evil," or (as others express it) betwixt things that are therefore commanded because they are good and just, and things that are therefore good and just, because they are commanded, stands in need of a right explication, that we be not led into a mistake thereby, as if the obligation to do those thetical and positive things did arise wholly from will without nature; whereas it is not the mere will and pleasure of him that commandeth, that obligeth to do positive things commanded, but the intellectual nature of him that is commanded. Wherefore the difference of these things lies wholly in this, That there are some things which the intellectual nature obligeth to per se, "of itself," and directly, absolutely and perpetually, and these things are called φύσει. "naturally good and evil;" other things there are which the same intellectual nature obligeth to by accident only, and hypothetically, upon condition of some voluntary action either of our own or some other person's, by means whereof those things which were in their own nature indifferent, falling under something that is absolutely good or evil, and thereby acquiring a new relation to the intellectual nature, do for the time become debita

or illicita, "such things as ought to be done or omitted," being made such not by will but by nature. As for example, to keep faith and perform covenants, is that which natural justice obligeth to absolutely; therefore, ex hypothesi, "upon the supposition" that any one maketh a promise, which is a voluntary act of his own, to do something which he was not before obliged to by natural justice, upon the intervention of this voluntary act of his own, that indifferent thing promised falling now under something absolutely good, and becoming the matter of promise and covenant, standeth for the present in a new relation to the rational nature of the promiser, and becometh for the time a thing which ought to be done by him, or which he is obliged to do. Not as if the mere will or words and breath of him that covenanteth had any power to change the moral natures of things, or any ethical virtue of obliging; but because natural justice and equity obligeth to keep faith and perform covenants. In like manner natural justice, that is, the rational or intellectual nature, obligeth not only to obey God, but also civil powers, that have lawful authority of commanding, and to observe political order amongst men; and therefore if God or civil powers command any thing to be done that is not unlawful in itself, upon the intervention of this voluntary act of theirs, those things that were before indifferent, become by accident for the time debita, "obligatory," such things as ought to be done by us, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of that which natural justice absolutely obligeth to.

And these are the things that are commonly called θέσει, "positively" good and evil, just or unjust, such as though they are adiaphorous or indifferent in themselves, yet natural justice obligeth to accidentally, ex hypothesi, "on supposition" of the voluntary action of some other person rightly qualified in commanding, whereby they fall into something absolutely good. Which things are not made good or debita, "due" by the mere will or pleasure of the commander, but by that natural justice which gives him right and authority of commanding, and obligeth others to obey him; without which natural justice, neither covenants nor commands could possibly oblige any one. For the will of another doth no more oblige in commands than our own will in promises and covenants. To conclude therefore, things called naturally good and debita, "due," are such things as the intellectual nature obliges to immediately, absolutely, and perpetually, and upon no condition of any voluntary action that may be done or omitted intervening; but those things that are called positively good and debita, "due," are such as natural justice or the intellectual nature obligeth to accidentally and hypothetically, upon condition of some voluntary act of another person invested with lawful authority in commanding.

And that it is not the mere will of the commander that makes these positive things to oblige or become debita "due," but the nature of things; appears evidently from hence, because it is not the volition of every one that obligeth, but of a person rightly qualified and invested with lawful authority; and because the liberty of commanding is circumscribed within certain bounds and limits, so that if any commander go beyond the sphere and bounds that nature sets him, which are indifferent things, his commands will not at all oblige.

5. But if we would speak yet more accurately and precisely, we might rather say, that no positive commands whatsoever do make any thing morally good and evil, just and unjust, which nature had not made such before. For indifferent things commanded, considered materially in themselves, remain still what they were before in their own nature, that is, indifferent, because, as Aristotle speaks, τὸ φύσει ἀκίνητον, "will cannot change nature." And those things that are φύσει ἀδιάφορα, "by nature indifferent," must needs be as immutably so, as those things that are φύσει δίκαια or ἄδικα, καλὰ or αἰσχρὰ, "by nature just or unjust, honest or shameful." But all the moral goodness, justice, and virtue, that is exercised in obeying positive commands, and doing such things as are θέσει, "positive" only, and to be done for no other cause but because they are commanded, or in respect to political order, consisteth not in the materiality of the actions themselves, but in that formality of yielding obedience to the commands of lawful authority in them. Just as when a man covenanteth or promiseth to do an indifferent thing which by natural justice he was not bound to do, the virtue of doing it consisteth not in the materiality of the action promised, but in the formality of keeping faith and performing covenants. Wherefore, in positive commands, the will of the commander doth not create any new moral entity, but only diversely modifies and determines that general duty or obligation of natural justice to obey lawful authority and keep oaths and covenants, as our own will in promising doth but produce several modifications of keeping faith. And therefore there are no new δίκαια, justa or debita, "things just or due" made by either of them, besides what was alway φύσει, "by nature" such, to keep our own promises, and obey the lawful commands of others.

6. We see then that it is so far from being true, that all moral good and evil, just and unjust (if they be any thing) are made by mere will and arbitrary commands (as many conceive) that it is not possible that any command of God or man should oblige otherwise than by virtue of that which is φύσει δίκαιον, "naturally just." And though particular promises and commands be made by will, yet it is not will but nature that obligeth to the doing of things promised and commanded, or makes them

debita, "such things as ought to be done." For mere will cannot change the moral nature of actions, nor the nature of intellectual beings. And therefore, if there were no natural justice, that is, if the rational or intellectual nature in itself were indetermined and unobliged to any thing, and so, destitute of all morality, it were not possible that any thing should be made morally good or evil, debitum or illicitum, "obligatory or unlawful," or that any moral obligation should be begotten by any will or command whatsoever.

CHAPTER III.

1. But some there are that will still contend, that though it should be granted that moral good and evil, just and unjust, do not depend upon any created will, yet notwithstanding they must needs depend upon the arbitrary will of God, because the nature and essences of all things, and consequently all verities and falsities depend upon the same. For if the natures and essences of things should not depend upon the will of God, it would follow from hence that something that was not God was independent upon God.

2. And this is plainly asserted by that ingenious philosopher, Renatus Des Cartes, who in his answer to the Sixth Objector against his Metaphysical Meditations, writes thus: Repugnat Dei voluntatem non fuisse ab æterno indifferentem ad omnia, quæ facta sunt aut unquam fient, quia nullum bonum vel malum, nullum credendum vel faciendum vel omittendum fingi potest, cujus idea in intellectu divino prius fuerit, quam ejus voluntas se determinarit ad efficiendum, ut id tale esset. Neque id loquor de prioritate temporis, sed ne quidem prius fuit ordine, vel natura, vel ratione ratiocinata, ut vocant, ita scilicet ut ista boni idea impulerit Deum ad unum potius quam aliud eligendum. Nempe exempli causa, non ideo voluit creare mundum in tempore, quia vidit sic melius fore, quam si creasset ab æterno, nec voluit tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non posse, &c. Sed contra, quia voluit mundum creare in tempore, ideo sic melius est, quam si creatus fuisset ab æterno; et quia voluit tres angulos trianguli necessario æquales esse duobus rectis, idcirco jam hoc verum est, et fieri aliter non potest; atque ita de reliquis. Et ita summa indifferentia in Deo summum est ejus omnipotentiæ argumentum. "It is a contradiction to say that the will of God was not from eternity indifferent to all things which are or ever shall be done; because no good or evil, nothing to be believed, or done, or

omitted, can be fixed upon, the idea whereof was in the divine intellect before that his will determined itself to effect that such a thing should be. Neither do I speak this concerning priority of time, but even there was nothing prior in order or by nature, or reason as they call it, so as that that idea of good inclined God to choose one thing rather than another. As for example sake, he would therefore create the world in time, because that he saw that it would be better so than if he had created it from eternity; neither willed he that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles, because he knew that it could not be otherwise. But on the contrary, because he would create the world in time, therefore it is better than if he had created it from eternity; and because he would that the three angles of a triangle should necessarily be equal to two right angles, therefore this is true and can be no otherwise; and so of other things. And thus the greatest indifference in God is the greatest argument of his omnipotence."

And again afterward, p. 162, "Attendenti ad Dei immensitatem manifestum est, nihil omnino esse posse, quod ab ipso non pendeat, non modo nihil subsistens, sed etiam nullum ordinem, nullam legem, nullamve rationem veri et boni, "To him that considers the immensity of God it is manifest that there can be nothing at all which doth not depend upon him, not only nothing subsisting, but also no order, no law, no reason of truth and goodness."

And when he was again urged by the Sixth Objector, Nunquid Deus potuerit efficere, ut natura trianguli non fuerit? et qua ratione, amabo, potuisset ab æterno facere, ut non fuisset verum bis quatuor esse octo? "Could not God cause that the nature of a triangle should not be such? and how, I pray thee, could he from eternity cause that it should not be true, that twice four are eight?" He confesseth ingenuously that those things were not intelligible to us; but yet notwithstanding they must be so, because, Nihil in ullo genere entis esse potest, quod a Deo non pendeat, "Nothing in any sort of being can be, which doth not depend upon God." Which doctrine of Cartesius is greedily swallowed down by some servile followers of his that have lately written de prima philosophia, "of the old philosophy."

3. Perhaps some may make a question for all this, whether Cartesius were any more in earnest in this, than when he elsewhere goes about to defend the doctrine of transubstantiation by the principles of his new philosophy, because, in his meditations upon the old philosophy (where it is probable he would set down the genuine sense of his own mind more undisguisedly, before he was assaulted by these objectors, and thereby forced to turn himself into several shapes) he affirmeth that the essences of things were eternal and immutable; but being afterward urged

by Gassendus with this inconvenience, that then something would be eternal and immutable besides God, and so independent upon God, he doth in a manner unsay it again, and betakes himself to this pitiful evasion, "Quemadmodum poetæ fingunt a Jove quidem fata fuisse condita, sed postquam condita fuere, ipsum se iis servandis obstrinxisse; ita ego non puto essentias rerum, mathematicasque ullas veritates, quæ de ipsis cognosci possunt, esse independentes a Deo; sed puto nihilominus, quia Deus sic voluit, quia sic disposuit, ipsas esse immutabiles et æternas, "As the poets feign that the fates were indeed fixed by Jupiter, but that when they were fixed, he had obliged himself to the preserving of them; so I do not think that the essences of things, and those mathematical truths which can be known of them, are independent on God; but I think nevertheless, that because God so willed and so ordered, therefore they are immutable and eternal;" which is plainly to make them in their own nature mutable. But whether Cartesius were in jest or earnest in this business, it matters not, for his bare authority ought to be no more valued by us than the authority of Aristotle and other ancient philosophers was by him, whom he so freely dissents from.

4. For though the names of things may be changed by any one at pleasure, as that a square may be called a circle, or a cube a sphere; yet that the nature of a square should not be necessarily what it is, but be arbitrarily convertible into the nature of a circle, and so the essence of a circle into the essence of a sphere, or that the self same body, which is perfectly cubical, without any physical alteration made in it, should by this metaphysical way of transformation of essences, by mere will and command be made spherical or cylindrical; this doth most plainly imply a contradiction, and the compossibility of contradictions destroys all knowledge and the definite natures, rationes, or "notions" of things. Nay, that which implies a contradiction is a nonentity, and therefore cannot be the object of divine power. And the reason is the same for all other things, as just and unjust; for every thing is what it is immutably by the necessity of its own nature; neither is it any derogation at all from the power of God to say, that he cannot make a thing to be that which it is not. Then there might be no such thing as knowledge in God himself. God might will that there should be no such thing as knowledge.

5. And as to the being or not being of particular essences, as that God might, if he pleased, have willed that there should be no such thing as a triangle or circle, and therefore nothing demonstrable or knowable of either of them; which is likewise asserted by Cartesius, and those that make the essences of things dependent upon an arbitrary will in God: this is all one as if one should

say that God could have willed, if he had pleased, that neither his own power nor knowledge should be infinite.

6. Now it is certain, that if the natures and essences of all things, as to their being such or such, do depend upon a will of God that is essentially arbitrary, there can be no such thing as science or demonstration, nor the truth of any mathematical or metaphysical proposition be known any otherwise, than by some revelation of the will of God concerning it, and by a certain enthusiastic or fanatic faith and persuasion thereupon, that God would have such a thing to be true or false at such a time, or for so long. And so nothing would be true or false φύσει but θέσει, "naturally" but "positively" only, all truth and science being mere arbitrarious things. Truth and falsehood would be only names. Neither would there be any more certainty in the knowledge of God himself, since it must wholly depend upon the mutability of a will in him essentially indifferent and undetermined; and if we would speak properly according to this hypothesis, God himself would not know or be wise by knowledge or by wisdom, but by will.

7. Wherefore as for that argument, that unless the essences of things and all verities and falsities depend upon the arbitrary will of God, there would be something that was not God, independent upon God; if it be well considered, it will prove a mere mormo, "bugbear," and nothing so terrible and formidable as Cartesius seemed to think it. For there is no other genuine consequence deducible from this assertion, that the essences and veritics of things are independent upon the will of God, but that there is an eternal and immutable wisdom in the mind of God, and thence participated by created beings independent upon the will of God. Now the wisdom of God is as much God as the will of God; and whether of these two things in God, that is, will or wisdom, should depend upon the other, will be best determined from the several natures of them. For wisdom in itself hath the nature of a rule and measure, it being a most determinate and inflexible thing; but will being not only a blind and dark thing, as considered in itself, but also indefinite and indeterminate, hath therefore the nature of a thing regulable and measurable. Wherefore it is the perfection of will, as such, to be guided and determined by wisdom and truth; but to make wisdom, knowledge, and truth, to be arbitrarily determined by will, and to be regulated by such a κανὼν μολύβδινος, "plumbean and flexible rule" as that is, is quite to destroy the nature of it; for science or knowledge is κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος, "the comprehension of that which necessarily is," and there can be nothing more contradictious than truth and falsehood arbitrary. Now all the knowledge and wisdom that is in creatures, whether angels or men, is nothing else but a participation of that one eternal, immutable, and

increated wisdom of God, or several signatures of that one archetypal seal, or like so many multiplied reflections of one and the same face, made in several glasses, whereof some are clearer, some obscurer, some standing nearer, some further off.

8. Moreover, it was the opinion of the wisest of the philosophers (as we shall show afterward), that there is also in the scale of being a nature of goodness superior to wisdom, which therefore measures and determines the wisdom of God, as his wisdom measures and determines his will, and which the ancient cabalists were wont to call כתר, a "crown," as being the top or crown of the Deity, of which more afterward. Wherefore although some novelists make a contracted idea of God, consisting of nothing else but will and power, yet his nature is better expressed by some in this mystical or enigmatical representation of an infinite circle, whose inmost centre is simple goodness, the radii, "rays" and expanded area, "plat" thereof, all comprehending and immutable wisdom, the exterior periphery or interminate circumference, omnipotent will or activity, by which every thing without God is brought forth into existence. Wherefore the will and power of God have no imperium ad intra, "command inwardly" either upon the wisdom and knowledge of God, or upon the ethical and moral disposition of his nature, which is his essential goodness; but the sphere of its activity is extra Deum, "without God," where it hath an absolute command upon the existences of things; and is always free, though not always indifferent, since it is its greatest perfection to be determined by infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. But this is to anticipate what according to the laws of method should follow afterward in another place.

BOOK II.—CHAPTER I.

1. Now the demonstrative strength of our cause lying plainly in this, that it is not possible that any thing should be without a nature, and the natures or essences of all things being immutable, therefore upon supposition that there is any thing really just or unjust, debitum or illicitum, "due or unlawful," there must of necessity be something so both naturally and immutably, which no law, decree, will, nor custom can alter. There have not wanted some among the old philosophers, that rather than they would acknowledge any thing immutably just or unjust, would not stick to shake the very foundations of all things, and to deny that there was any immutable nature or essence of any thing, and by consequence any absolute certainty of truth or knowledge;

maintaining this strange paradox, that both all being and knowledge was fantastical and relative only, and therefore that nothing was good or evil, just or unjust, true or false, white or black, absolutely and immutably, but relatively to every private person's humour or opinion.

2. The principal assertor of this extravagant opinion was Protagoras the Abderite, who, as Plato instructs us in his Theætetus,* held οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τινὶ ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι· τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, "that nothing was any thing in itself absolutely, but was always made so to something else, and essence or being was to be removed from every thing." In which position of his there seems to be these two things asserted: first, that all things were in perpetual motion, and nothing had any esse, but fieri, "being, but a possibility to be," which the said Protagoras thus expressed: Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται, ἃ δὴ φαμὲν εἶναι οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορέυοντες,† "All things are made by motion and mixture of things together, and therefore are not rightly said to be; for nothing is, but every thing is always made." Secondly, that nothing is made absolutely, but only relatively to something else. Εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ τινὸς, ἢ πρός τι, ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον, οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, "If any one say that any thing either is or is made, he must say that it is so to something, or in respect of some body, for we cannot affirm that any thing either is or is made absolutely in itself, but relatively to something else."

Now from hence proceeded those known aphorisms of his, recorded both in Plato and Aristotle, τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ τᾶυτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φάινεται, "that those things which appear to every one, are to him to whom they appear." And again, πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς, "that every fancy or opinion of every body was true." And again, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, "that man is the measure of all things whether existing or not existing." Which sentence seemed so pretty and argute to him, that he placed it in the very front of his book, as Plato tells us; and indeed it comprises in it all the singularity of his philosophy, the true meaning thereof being this; not only that man taken generally is the measure of all things (which in some sense might be affirmed that our own humane faculties are the measure of all things unto us), but also that πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, "every individual man is the measure of all being and truth" respectively to himself; for so the following words in Plato explain it: Οὐκοῦν οὕτως πῶς λέγεις, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοί· οἷα δὲ σοὶ, τοιαῦτα ἂν σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ,

* Page 116. † Ibid.

"Your meaning (saith Socrates) is this, that as every thing appears to me, such it is to me; and as it appears to you, such it is to you, both of us being alike men." Wherefore it is elsewhere expressed after this manner, *μέτρον ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή*, "that every man is the measure of what is and is not, that is, to himself," and *μέτρον εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ σοφίας*, "that every one is the measure of his own wisdom to himself." Sextus Empiricus gives a short account of this Protagorean philosophy in a few words thus:* *Τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρὸς τί*, "He asserts that, which seems, to every one to be, and so makes all things relative." Now this was an higher strain of madness than the Pyrrhonian scepticism, which was not so extravagant as to affirm that all things were fantastical and relative only; but that we could not affirm what things absolutely were in their own nature, but only what they seemed to us.

3. But that all this was chiefly intended as a battery or assault against morality, and principally levelled by Protagoras against the absolute and immutable natures of good and evil, just and unjust, appeareth also from sundry passages of that learned dialogue called Theætetus. *Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν, εἰ σοὶ ἀρέσκει τὸ μήτι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν*,† "Tell me therefore, dost thou in good earnest think that nothing is good or honest, but is always made so?" And afterwards Protagoras affirms, *οἷά γ' ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ*,‡ "that whatsoever things seem to be good and just to every city or commonwealth, the same are so to that city or commonwealth so long as they seem so." Again: *Καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ, δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα, καὶ ὅσια καὶ μὴ, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου, οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι*,§ "Whatsoever things any city thinking doth decree to be honest or dishonest, just or unjust, holy or unholy, those things are really or truly such to that city; and in such things as these no one private person or city is wiser than another, because *οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν, οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον*, "none of these things have any nature or essence of their own, being merely fantastical and relative." Lastly, to name no more places, *Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν δὴ διϊσχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τιθεμένῃ ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται*,‖ "The thing that we were about to show was this, that they which made the natures

* Pyrrhon. Hypotypos. lib. 1. cap. 32. p. 55. † Ed. Serrani, p. 157.
‡ P. 167. § P. 177. ‖ P. 172.

and essences of all things, flowing and mutable, and which held that what seemed to every body, was that to whom it so seemed, as they do maintain this concerning all other things, so concerning nothing more than just and unjust, as being unquestionably true of these, that whatsoever any city thinks to be good and just, and decrees them such, these things are so to that city, so long as they are so decreed."

CHAPTER II.

1. WHEREFORE, since in order to the taking away of the immutable natures of good and evil, just and unjust, and the moral differences of humane actions, there was so strange an attempt made by these philosophers to overthrow the absolute essences and truths of all things; let us in the next place consider what pretences or grounds they could possibly have for maintaining so wild a paradox as this is.

First, therefore, it is evident from Plato's writings that Protagoras laid his foundation in the Heraclitical philosophy, at that time in great vogue and request in the world, which did φερομένην οὐσίαν εἰσάγειν,* as that philosopher writes, "bring in a floating and moveable essence," and maintained οὐδὲν ἑστάναι, πάντα δὲ κινεῖσθαι, "that nothing stood, but all things moved and flowed." An opinion which most of the ancients were inclining to, as appears from the poets, who made πάντα ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως,† "all things to be the offspring of flux and motion:" insomuch that Homer himself (as Plato observes) deriving the pedigree of the gods, made the ocean their father, and Tethys their mother. Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τήθυν.

And there were not any philosophers of note, besides Parmenides and Melissus, that opposed it, who also ran into another extreme: and therefore the former of these Plato facetiously calls τοὺς ῥέοντας, "the flowing philosophers," the latter στασιώτας, the "standers." Now the true meaning of this Heraclitical philosophy was plainly this, that there is no other being in the world besides individual body or matter, and no such thing as εἴδη, "standing intelligible forms," that is, no intellectual being; which matter or corporeal being as it is liable to motion and mutation because of its divisibility, every part of it being separable from another; so by the mutation that we find in all corporeal things, we may reasonably conclude that it is throughout perpetually moved and agitated by streams and subtle matter

* In Theæteto, p. 118. † Ibid.

passing the pores of all bodies; whence it was that they affirmed οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, "that all things flowed like a stream;" and that there was no stability either of essence or knowledge any where to be found. For that Cratylus and Heraclitus endeavoured to destroy the certainty of all science from this principle, is evident in that they maintained that contradictories might be true concerning the same thing, and at the same time. And indeed if there were no other being in the world but individual matter, and all knowledge proceeded from the impresses of that matter, that being always agitated, it is not conceivable how there could be any stability of knowledge any more than of essence found in this rapid whirlpool of corporeal things; nay, nor how there should be any such thing as knowledge at all. Wherefore according to this Heraclitical philosophy, Protagoras in the first place concluded ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις, "that knowledge is nothing else but sense;" for as Plato writes, εἰς ταυτὸν συμπέπτωκε οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, καὶ αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι, "these two assertions come all to one, that all things flow like a stream, and that knowledge and sense are one and the selfsame thing."

2. But Protagoras went further, and made a superstructure upon this Heraclitical philosophy out of the old atomical or Phenician philosophy, which clearly asserted, that all those sensible qualities, as they are called, of heat and cold, light and colours, sounds, odours and sapours, formally considered, are not things really and absolutely existing without us, but only passions, sensations and phantasms in us, occasioned by certain local motions made upon the organs of sense from the objects without us, and so indeed but relative and phantastical things. And thus Protagoras made up his business complete from this mixture of the heraclitical and atomical philosophy together; for taking it for granted according to Heraclitus' doctrine, that knowledge is nothing else but sense, and according to the Phenician or atomical philosophy, that the sensible qualities are not things really and absolutely existing without us, but appearances or sensations in us, he concluded πάντα τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά, "all sensible and intelligible things" not to be absolute essences, but things merely relative, fantastical and imaginary.

CHAPTER III.

1. Now that this atomical, corpuscular or mechanical philosophy, that solves all the phenomena of the corporeal world by those intelligible principles of magnitude, figure, site and motion, and thereby makes sensible things intelligible, banishing away

those unintelligible corporeal forms and sensible qualities, was known to Protagoras, who lived not only before Plato and Aristotle, but also before Democritus himself, as Plutarch testifies (though he abused it in grounding so strange a paradox upon it), I shall make it undeniably evident from several testimonies out of Plato's Theætetus; for besides that passage aforementioned, p. 152; Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα, "That all things are made by local motion and mixture with one another," and what follows after: Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, "That motion is that which makes every thing to seem to be, or to be generated," p. 153, he plainly describes the nature of colours according to this very hypothesis: ΣΩ. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὑτωσὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον· ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι· μηδέ τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν μένοι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ γενέσει γίγνοιτο. Θέαιτ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς; Σω. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες, καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαντε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγεννημένον. καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμὲν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον, οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός,* the sense whereof is this, "Let us begin first with the eyes or sight: That which is called a white colour, is not any real quality existing either without the eyes or in the eyes; for then it would not consist only in motion and generation: but taking it for granted that no sensible thing is such absolutely in itself, we must say that a white and black colour, and every other colour is generated by certain motions made and impressed upon the eye, and every colour is neither that which makes the impression, nor that which receiveth it (that is, neither any thing in the eye nor in the object absolutely), but a certain middle thing between them both," which can be nothing else but a passion or sensation in us. Elsewhere in that dialogue he proves this assertion, that colours and the like sensible things are no real and absolute qualities either in the sentient or in the object, because the same object seems to have different qualities to different persons, as Πνέοντος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγῶ, ὁ δ' οὔ· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα, "The same wind blowing seems cold to one and warm to another; and the same wine which to one in health seems sweet, will to the same person appear bitter and distasteful if he be sick."† Whence he concluded that heat and cold, sweet and bitter, were not things really and absolutely existing in the objects without, but relative things, being passions or sensations

* Page 153. † Page 118, 121.

that may be diversified by the different tempers and complexions of the body.

2. Afterward, p. 156, we have the sum of this atomical or mechanical philosophy, more copiously and fully set down after this manner: Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν. Ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν. Ἐστὶ δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα, γίγνεται ἔκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ. τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις, καὶ ψυξεις τε καὶ καύσεις, καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λυπαὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι. Καὶ ἄλλαι ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμαι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὠνομασμέναι. Τὸ δὲ αὖ αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἑκάσταις ὁμόγονον. Ὄψεσι μὲν παντοδαπαῖς χρώματα παντοδαπά· ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναὶ, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ γιγνόμενα. . . . ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλό τι τῶν τούτῳ συμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐγένετο, ἑκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων [τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα] ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε, καὶ ἐγένετο οὔτι ὄψις, ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν. τὸ δὲ συγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα, λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη, καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὖ, ἀλλὰ λευκὸν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιοῦν συνέβη χρῶμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. Καὶ τἄλλα δὴ οὕτω σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν, καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑπολητέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, "The beginning upon which all things depend is this; that the whole world is motion, and nothing else besides. Now of motion there are two kinds, each of which containeth innumerable branches under it; but the power of one is action, of the other passion. From the mutual congress and contrition of both which together, are begotten innumerable offsprings, which may all be reduced to these two general heads, whereof the one the sensible, the other sense, which is always joined together with the sensible. The senses have such names as these, sight, hearing, tasting, touching, pleasures, pains, desires, fears, and others innumerable without names, but many that have names. The sensible kind doth answer and correspond to every one of these; to the sight all manner of colours, to the hearing sounds, and to the other senses other sensibles, that are of kin to them. . . . . When therefore the eye, and some other thing analogous to it, meet together, they beget whiteness, and a certain sense proportionable there-

unto, neither of which would have been made, if either of these had not met with the other. Then these things being carried respectively, sight to the eyes, and whiteness to the object, which did actively beget it, the eye becomes full of sight, and sees, and is not made sight in the abstract, but an eye seeing; and that which did congenerate the colour, is fitted with whiteness, and is made, not whiteness in the abstract, but a thing white, whether wood or stone. The same is to be conceived of all other sensible things, as hard and hot, and the like, that nothing is by itself absolutely any of these things, but they are all made from a mutual congress of the outward object and the sense, by means of motion."

3. Here we see it plainly asserted, that the whole world is made by nothing else but the motion of particles, by means of which all things are generated and corrupted; neither did Protagoras acknowledge any other motion but local, as is plainly intimated; and that all these sensible qualities which we take notice of by the several senses, as colours, sounds, sapors, odours, and the like, are not things really existing without us, but passions or sensations in us, caused by several local motions upon the organs of sense. Which, if that be not sufficient that I have already alleged, is yet more plainly expressed after this manner, p. 182: *Μέμνησαι γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἓν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὐτὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντων, τὰ μὲν ποῖα ἅττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα,* "Nothing is absolutely any one thing by itself, neither the agent nor the patient, but from both of these meeting together, are generated at once both the senses and the sensible things."

4. These passages which I have cited are so clear and evident, that they cannot possibly be capable of any other sense than what I have expressed; and therefore those two Latin interpreters Ficinus and Serranus, that lived before the restitution of this mechanical philosophy, and therefore understood it not, yet expound them after the same manner. The first thus: Color neque oculorum aspectus est, neque corporum motus, sed ex aspectu motuque medium quiddam resultans: id est, talis circa oculos passio, "Colour is neither the sight of the eyes, nor the motion of bodies, but a certain middle thing resulting from the sight and motion, that is, such a passion about the eyes." The other in this manner: Ex varia aspicientis *διαθέσει*, variaque adeo intermedii sensilis schesi, colores varios et videri et fieri, ita tamen ut omnia sint *φανταστικὰ*, nec nisi in animo subsistant, vario autem motus congressu varientur; quod de omnibus sensibus constituendum est, "That from the different disposition of the beholder, and so the different affection of the intermediate sensible organ, the various colours are both made

and seen, but so as that they are all fantastical, nor have any subsistence but in the mind, are varied by the different congress of motion, which is to be concluded concerning all the senses." Only Protagoras, in order to his sceptical design, made these sensible things not only relative to animals in general, but also to individuals, because it is impossible to demonstrate, as he urges, that all brute beasts, nay, that any two men have the very same phantasms or ideas of red or green, these being idiopathies, and because experience shows, that not only the gratefulness and ungratefulness of tastes and smells, but also that heat and cold are relative to individuals.

CHAPTER IV.

1. Wherefore we have made it evident, that that very mechanical or atomical philosophy, that hath been lately restored by Cartesius and Gassendus, as to the main substance of it, was not only elder than Epicurus, but also than Plato and Aristotle, nay, than Democritus and Leucippus also, the commonly reputed fathers of it. And therefore we have no reason to discredit the report of Posidonius the Stoic, who, as Strabo tells us, affirmed this atomical philosophy to have been ancienter than the times of the Trojan war, and first to have been brought into Greece out of Phœnicia: Εἰ δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων δόγμα παλαιὸν ἐστὶν, ἀνδρὸς Σιδονίου Μόσχου πρὸ τῶν Τροϊκῶν χρόνων γεγονότος,* "If we may believe Posidonius the Stoic, the doctrine of atoms is ancienter than the times of the Trojan war, and was first invented and delivered by one Moschus a Sidonian," or rather a Phœnician, as Sextus Empiricus cites the testimony of Posidonius: "Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, εἰ μήτι ἀρχαιοτέραν ταύτην ζητέον τὴν δόξαν, καὶ ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Στωϊκὸς Ποσειδώνιος, ἀπὸ Μόσχου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς Φοίνικος καταγομένην,† "Democritus and Epicurus invented the doctrine of atoms, unless we make that physiology to be ancienter, and derive it, as Posidonius the Stoic doth, from one Moschus, a Phœnician." And since it is certain from what we have shown, that neither Epicurus nor yet Democritus were the first inventors of this physiology, this testimony of Posidonius the Stoic ought in reason to be admitted by us.

2. Now what can be more probable than that this Moschus the Phœnician, that Posidonius speaks of, is the very same person with that Moschus the physiologer, that Jamblichus men-

* Lib. 16. edit. Casaub. p. 757. † Advers. Mathemat. p. 367.

tions in the Life of Pythagoras,* where he affirms, that Pythagoras, living some time at Sidon in Phœnicia, conversed with the prophets that were the successors of Mochus the physiologer, and was instructed by them: Τοῖς τε Μώχου τοῦ φυσιολόγου προφήταις ἀπογόνοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ Φοινικικοῖς ἱεροφάνταις, "He conversed with the prophets that were the successors of Mochus and other Phœnician priests. And what can be more certain than that both Mochus and Moschus, the Phœnician and philosopher, was no other than Moses, the Jewish lawgiver, as Arverius rightly guesses: Μόσχου legendum videtur, nisi quis Μώχου vel Μωσέως legere malit, "It seems that it ought to be read Moschus, unless any had rather read it Mochus or Moses." Wherefore according to the ancient tradition, Moschus or Moses the Phœnician being the first author of the atomical philosophy, it ought to be called neither Epicurean nor Democritical, but Moschical or Mosaical.

3. It must be acknowledged, that neither of these two famous and renowned philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, had the good hap to be rightly and thoroughly instructed in this ancient Phœnician and Moschical or Mosaical philosophy; Protagoras so much abusing it to scepticism, and the taking away of the natural discrimination of good and evil, might probably beget a prejudice in Plato against it, though he doth not confute the physiological part of it in all his Theætetus, where good occasion was offered him; and yet in his Timæus he hath a little smattering of it, where he endeavours to resolve the differences of the four elements, fire, air, water, earth, into the different geometrical figures of their insensible parts, making the small particles of the earth to be cubical, by reason of their solidity and immobility, but of the fire, pyramidal:† Τὸ ἔχον ὀλιγίστας βάσεις εὐκινητότατον ἀνάγκη πεφυκέναι, τμητικώτατόν τε ὀξύτατον ὂν πάντῃ πάντων, "It is reasonable that that figure which hath the smallest basis, should be attributed to that body which is most moving, cutting, and piercing." And that he doth not mean mystically in this, but physically, appears from his own explication of it concerning the insensible parts, p. 56: Πάντα οὖν δεῖ ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ οὕτως ὡς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον μὲν τοῦ γένους ἑκάστου διὰ σμικρότητα οὐδὲν ὁρώμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι, "These cubes and pyramids in the earth and the fire can only be perceived by the mind and understanding, since the single particles alone are not sensible, but only the aggregation of many of them together.

4. But Aristotle plainly rejects it. Jacobus Carpentarius, in his notes upon Alcinous, treating of the nature of universals, writes thus: Quidam universalia non omnino quidem tollunt,

* Cap. 3. p. 10. † Page 55. Ser. edit.

sed ea tantum esse volunt, quando intelliguntur, nihil vero haberi in natura quod mentis notioni respondeat: quod mihi sane perinde est, ac si dicerent colores nihil actu esse, sed tales effici, quando reipsa videntur. Quæ etiam opinio suos habuit assertores, sed ab Aristotele est damnata, "Some do not altogether deny universals, but will have it that they only are when they are understood, but that there is nothing in nature which answers to the notion of the mind. Which to me indeed is the same thing as if they should say that colours are not in their nature actually any thing, but are made such when they are in very deed seen. Which opinion also hath had its assertors, but is condemned by Aristotle. This opinion, that colours are not actually existent according to those very ideas that we have of them before vision, is the arcanum, "mystery," of the old atomical or Mosaical philosophy, which Carpentarius understood not; which makes them not qualities absolutely existing without us, but passions and sensations in us. And indeed this philosophy is condemned by Aristotle, in his third book De Anima, "Of the Soul," cap. 2. and that as the received doctrine of the ancient Physiologists before his time: Οἱ πρότεροι φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὔδε χυμὸν ἄνευ γέυσεως, "The former Physiologists," saith he, "were (generally) mistaken in this, in that they thought blackness and whiteness were no absolute qualities without the sight, nor sweet and sour without the taste." Again, he endeavours to confute the same philosophy which resolves those sensible qualities into figures, site, and motion of particles; not only attributing it to Democritus, but also making it the most generally received physiology before his time: Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσι. Καίτοι εἰ καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστη ἁφή τίς ἐστι· τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἔστι ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν· Ἔτι δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πασῶν χρῶνται ὡς ἰδίοις. Μέγεθος γὰρ καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐστὶ, εἰ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλὰ ὄψεώς γε καὶ ἁφῆς. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἴδια ἐνταῦθα ἀνάγουσιν ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος. Τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, τὸ μὲν τραχὺ φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λεῖον. Εἰς δὲ τὰ σχήματα ἀνάγει τοὺς χυμοὺς, καίτοι ἢ οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ὄψεως τὰ κοινὰ γνωρίζειν, "Democritus and most of the Physiologers commit a great absurdity in this, in that they make all sense to be touch; which is a thing at first sight plainly impossible. Moreover, they do not distinguish betwixt the objects common to all the senses, and those which are proper and peculiar to the several senses apart. For magnitude and figure, roughness and smoothness, sharpness and bluntness, which belong to bulk, are common to all the senses; or if not to all, yet

to sight and touch. Whereas our sense is deceived concerning these common objects, but it is never deceived concerning the proper objects of the several senses, as the sight is not deceived about colours, nor the hearing about sounds. But most of the ancient physiologists refer these proper objects to the common sensilia; as Democritus, who, as for white and black, makes one of them to consist in scabrities, 'roughness' and 'ruggedness,' the other in smoothness and evenness of parts. He also reduceth sapors to figures, though it belong chiefly to sight to take cognizance of figures and magnitude, and the like; whereas according to this philosophy, the sense of touch would be the most critical of them." Aristotle there concludes this discourse, with two general arguments against that philosophy (that made the sensible qualities to be properly sensations in us, and nothing else in the objects without us but magnitude, figure, site of parts and motion) in this manner: Ἔτι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τῷ μέλανι τὸ λευκὸν, καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὸ γλυκὺ τῷ πικρῷ, σχῆμα δὲ σχήματι οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐναντίον. τίνι γὰρ τῶν πολυγώνων τὸ περιφερὲς ἐναντίον; Ἔτι ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν σχημάτων, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς εἶναι ἀπείρους, "That there is contrariety in qualities, but not in figures; and that the variety of figures being infinite, tastes, colours, and the rest would be so likewise." Which arguments, though they be handsome and ingenious (that is, Aristotelical) to prove that there are such entities as qualities visible, tangible, tasteable, and the like, really existing in the objects without us; yet as they will not counterbalance the weight of those other arguments that militate on the contrary side, so they will without any difficulty be answered by the assertors of this Novantique philosophy.

5. But after Plato's and Aristotle's time, this old physiology was again revived by Epicurus, but so blended with immorality and impiety, as that it soon sunk again, there being nothing left of all those voluminous treatises of Epicurus concerning it, saving what is preserved in Diogenes Laërtius, nor no other system thereof transmitted to posterity but what is comprised in the poem of Lucretius Carus. So that the world was generally seized with a deep and profound oblivion of this physiology, there being only some obscure footsteps and dark intimations of it now and then found in the writings of some learned authors. As when Sextus tells us that some of the Stoics held τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι πρός τι, "that sensitive things were relative to animals, and depended upon our sensation;" and τὰ πάθη μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι, "that not the things themselves were comprehended by sense, but only our passions from them: and when the Pyrrhonian Sceptics themselves affirmed, πάντα εἶναι πρός τι, τουτέστι πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον, ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ ζῶον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον,

καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φαίνεται, "that all things are relative, that is, to that which judges of them, and every thing appears to be according to sense."

And when Plotinus makes a doubt whether sensible things did really exist in the objects without us, or were only passions within us: Ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἃ δὲ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχῃ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανόιας τῶν κρινόντων,* "It may be well doubted concerning sensible things themselves, that we seem to have the greatest assurance of, whether they really exist in the objects without us, or whether they be passions in us."

6. But in this last age it hath been so successfully restored by the writings of some learned authors, and the truth thereof so convincingly evidenced by many other experiments besides that of the glassy prisme and rainbow, that there is little doubt left concerning it. And indeed unless this philosophy be acknowledged to be true, we must of necessity affirm, that the sensible and corporeal world is altogether unintelligible. For as Timæus Locrus long ago observed, that τὰ αἰσθητά, sensible things could not be apprehended any otherwise than αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ, "by sense and a certain kind of spurious reason," so it is most certainly true that we cannot possibly have any clear and intelligible ideas of heat and cold, light and colours," as such qualities really existing in the objects of sense without us, but as passions and sensations in ourselves we may. Wherefore unless we will assert that these lower sensible things are ἀκατάληπτα, utterly "incomprehensible" to our understanding, whilst it is able clearly to comprehend things of a higher nature, we must conclude this old atomical, Moschical or Mosaical philosophy to be true.

CHAPTER V.

1. But though this old atomical philosophy be most solidly and substantially true, the paradoxes that Protagoras and others endeavoured to ground upon it, are not only ridiculously absurd and contradictious in themselves, but also altogether inconsequent from the same.

For as for those assertions, that whatever seems is, and that every fancy is true; though they seem ridiculously absurd, yet those two learned philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, vouchsafe them a serious confutation. Plato from hence, in his Theætetus,

* Enn. 5. lib. 5.

because that the fancies of them that dream would be as true and real as the sensations of those that are awake; and that all men would be alike wise, and the opinions of the most illiterate idiots in geometry as true as any geometrical theorems, and all predictions of future things alike true: and that in the actions of human life, it would be indifferent what any man did in order to any end, and so all deliberation and consultation cease.

But Aristotle, in his metaphysics, with some mixture of facetiousness also writes after this manner:* Τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑποβάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο εἶναι διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι ταῦτα, καὶ πάλιν ἓν· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινοῦσι τὴν ὄψιν ἓν φαίνεται τὸ ἕν, "To those that put their finger under their sight or between their eyes, it will be both two and one." But Sextus Empiricus bestows more subtlety upon it than either of them:† Εἰ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον ἔσται ἀληθές· καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος, "If every fancy be true, then when one fancies that every fancy is not true, that must be true also, and so then this proposition that every fancy is true, will be false."

2. Whereas the meaning of these assertions, that whatever seems is, and every fancy is true, was no other than this, that nothing was absolutely true at all, but that all truth and knowledge were but seeming, fantastical and relative things. And because one seeming or appearance is as true as another, therefore they were all equally true, that is to say, none of them true at all. This Aristotle elsewhere rightly apprehended:‡ Ὁ λέγων ἅπαντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἅπαντα ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα πρός τι, "He that saith that all things that appear are true, makes all beings to be relative."

But if nothing be absolutely true, but only relatively to him that thinks so, then this very opinion of Protagoras, that nothing was absolutely true, and that man was the measure of all things, was not itself absolutely true, but only seemingly and relatively to Protagoras; whereas this is asserted for an absolute truth by him, that nothing is absolutely true.

And what a ridiculous folly was this in one that would be accounted a philosopher, to take a great deal of pains in writing a large volume, and to endeavour industriously to convince the world, that nothing was absolutely, but only relatively and fantastically true; since it must needs follow from thence, that this very thing itself was not absolutely true, but only relatively to those that thought so; and the contrary altogether as true to those that thought otherwise. For it would no more concern the world to know that this was relatively and fantastically true to Protagoras that nothing was absolutely true, than to know

* Metaphys. lib. 13. cap. 6. † Advers. Logicos, lib. 1. sect. 390.
‡ Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 6.

what Protagoras dreamt of the last night. For since according to him, αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνα δοξάζει, "that every man does but think" his own truths, it cannot concern any man to know another's opinions any more than his dreams. And therefore Protagoras had done more wisely if he had spared his pains, and kept those private relative truths of his own, that is, his dream or imagination wholly to himself.

But by his industrious endeavouring to convince the world of this, that nothing was absolutely true, but only relatively, he plainly confuted his own doctrine, in asserting that this was absolutely true, that nothing was absolutely true, which is a manifest contradiction. There need be the less pains taken in confuting scepticism and fantasticism, since it always so easily confutes itself.

3. For if nothing be absolutely true, then not so much as this could be absolutely true, that it seemed to Protagoras that nothing was absolutely true. And it could only seem to seem to be true. Nay, it could not be absolutely true, that Protagoras, to whom all truth seemed to be relative, had any real existence, much less that there are any objects without, from whence the impressions or motions are made upon our senses; or that there is any such thing as magnitude, motion, figure and site of parts, or τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκεῖσθαι, "that matter is floating, and that the reasons of all appearances are founded therein;" which things, as Plato and Sextus tell us, were dogmatically affirmed by Protagoras.

CHAPTER VI.

1. Again, as this scepticism or fantasticism of Protagoras is most absurd and contradictious in itself, so there is not any foundation for it at all in the old atomical philosophy, but contrariwise, nothing doth more effectually and demonstratively overthrow both these assertions, that knowledge is sense, and that all truth and knowledge is but fantastical and relative, than this atomical philosophy doth.

For first, since no sense can judge of itself, or its own appearances, much less make any judgment of the appearances belonging to another sense for ἃ δι' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνῃ, ἀδύνατον δι' ἄλλης τούτων αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως· ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς,* "those things which are perceived by one of our powers, it is impossible to perceive them by another, as the objects of hearing by sight, or the objects of sight by hearing, and the like."

* Plato in Theætet. p. 132.

The sight cannot judge of sounds which belong to the hearing, nor the hearing of light and colours; wherefore that which judges of all the senses and their several objects, cannot be itself any sense, but something of a superior nature.

2. Moreover, that which judges that the appearances of all the senses have something fantastical in them, cannot possibly be itself fantastical, but it must be something which hath a power of judging what really and absolutely is or is not. This being not a relative, but an absolute truth, that sensible appearances have something fantastical in them. Neither could Protagoras ever have arrived to the knowledge of this truth, if he had not had some faculty in him superior to sense, that judgeth of what is and is not absolutely.

Now this same rational faculty, that discovers, according to the atomical philosophy, that there is something in our sensations that is merely fantastical and relative, doth assure us also not only that there are absolutely and really such passions, affections and seemings in us, but that they that do sentire, "perceive," have an absolute and real entity. For though it should be supposed that our senses did deceive us in all their representations, and that there were no sun, no moon, no earth, that we had no hands, no feet, no body, as by sense we seem to have, yet reason tells us that of necessity that must be something, to whom these things seem to be, because nothing can seem to that that is not; this being an absolute and immutable truth, nihili nullam esse neque actionem neque passionem, "that of nothing there is not any either action or passion whatsoever;" but also that when we are awake and use our senses, there are corporeal objects really existing without us, which make those sensible impressions upon us, and that those corporeal objects have absolutely and really as many correspondent varieties in them in respect of magnitude, figure, site and motion, as there are varieties of sensible ideas and phantasms that we take notice of by them. For Protagoras himself, according to the old atomical philosophy, acknowledges that local motion, magnitude, figure, and site of parts, absolutely are in corporeal things themselves; only that colour and such other things are relative. Therefore all being and truth, according to Protagoras himself, is not fantastical and relative, but there is some absolute.

3. Wherefore, the proper and genuine result of this old atomical philosophy, which is the triumph of reason over sense, is nothing else but this, that sense alone is not the criterion or judge of what does really and absolutely exist without us, but that there is a higher and superior intellectual faculty in us that judges of our senses, which discovers what is fallacious and fantastical in them, and pronounces what absolutely is and is not. And Democritus, who did more thoroughly and perfectly under-

stand this atomical philosophy than Protagoras, makes this to be the proper result and consequence of it, the invalidating the judgment of sense concerning bodies themselves, and the asserting a higher faculty of reason in us to determine what is absolutely true and false; which is worth the noting. For so Sextus, the philosopher, writes concerning Democritus:* Δημόκριτος δὲ ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ δόξαν· ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν, "Democritus doth discredit sense, attributing not truth to it, but only appearance, and that really nothing exists in the corporeal world but atoms and vacuum." And Democritus's own words concerning it are these: Νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν καὶ νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ χροιή· ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν, "Sweet and bitter, hot and cold, colours and the like, are by law and opinion, atoms and vacuum really: That which is supposed and fancied to be are sensibles; but these are not according to truth, only atoms and vacuum." Sextus Empiricus likewise in another place writes thus concerning Democritus:† Ἐν δὲ τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας, ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνῶσιν κατάγει προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλανές· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν. Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν Ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη. Καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τὰ δὲ σύμπαντα Ὄψις, Ἀκοὴ, Ὀδμὴ, Γεῦσις, Ψαῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταῦτης, "Democritus in his canons saith, that there are two kinds of knowledge, the one by the senses, the other by the mind; of which that by the mind he calls knowledge, accounting it that which may be trusted for the judgment of truth; that by the senses he calleth dark and obscure, denying it to have any certainty as to the knowledge of truth. His own words are these: Of knowledge there are two kinds, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure; to the dark kind of knowledge are referred seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching; but the genuine knowledge is more hidden and recondite than this."

Now, this concerning Democritus I note the rather more carefully, because Epicurus afterward dotingly fumbling about the same philosophy, made sense to be the only criterion of truth and falsehood, and consequently abused this old atomical philosophy to atheism and immorality; whereas, if rightly understood, it is the most impregnable bulwark against both; for this philosophy discovering that the ideas of sense are fantastical, must needs suppose another principle in us superior to sense, which judges what is absolutely and not fantastically or relatively only true or false.

* Advers. Logicos, lib. 1. sect. 135. † Ibid. sect. 138.

BOOK III.—CHAPTER I.

1. Now, although what I have already said may possibly seem a sufficient confutation of Protagoras' objection against the immutable and absolute natures or essences of all things, from that very atomical physiology which he appeals to, which, if rightly understood, is the most compliable with true metaphysics, and the most subservient to it of any; yet notwithstanding, I think it very proper to the business which I have in hand, to launch out farther into this argument, to show the different natures of sense and intellection, or knowledge, not only that I may thereby the more fully confute this scepticism, or rather fantasticism of Protagoras, and also assert the immutable natures or essences of things, but also for other purposes, which I shall give an account of in the close of this discourse, and I hope then to make it appear that this was no impertinent digression.

2. I shall begin with sense, to show what it is, and that it is not knowledge.

First, therefore it is acknowledged by all, that sense is passion. And there is in all sensation, without dispute, first, a passion in the body of the sentient, which bodily passion is nothing else but local motion impressed upon the nerves from the objects without, and thence propagated and communicated to the brain, where all sensation is made. For there is no other action of one body upon another, nor other change or mutation of bodies conceivable or intelligible besides local motion; which motion in that body which moves another, is called action, in that which is moved by another, passion. And therefore, when a corporeal object very remotely distant is perceived by us, since it is by some passion made upon our body, there must of necessity be a continued propagation of some local motion or pressure from thence unto the organs of our sense, or nerves, and so unto the brain. As when we see many fixed stars sparkling in a clear night, though they be all of them so many thousand semidiameters of the earth distant from us, yet it must of necessity be granted, that there are local motions or pressures from them, which we call the light of them, propagated continuedly or uninterruptedly through the fluid heavens unto our optic nerves, or else we could not see them. And that motion or pressure by which we see all other opaque bodies, is nothing but the Ἀντέρεισμα, "pushing against each other of the etherial globula, "globulous particles," striving to move outward from the centre of the vortex resisted or rejected from the solid superficies of them; in the same manner as we feel things at a distance in the

dark, by the resistancy which they make upon the further end of the staff that we hold in our hands. And when we hear the sound of a bell or cannon a great way off, the tremulous vibrations of the air, like the circlings of the water when a stone is flung into it, are from thence continually propagated to our ears or acoustic nerves, the undulations still growing the wider and weaker, the further they go.

3. But, forasmuch as sense is not mere local motion impressed from one body upon another, or a body's bare reaction or resistance to that motion of another body, as some have fondly conceited, but a cogitation, recognition, or vital perception and consciousness of these motions or passions of the body, therefore, there must of necessity be another kind of passion also in the soul or principle of life, which is vitally united to the body, to make up sensation. Which passion notwithstanding is of a different kind or species from the former; for the soul, that is a cogitative being, is supposed to be such a thing as can penetrate a body, and therefore cannot be conceived to be locally moved by the local motion of the body. For we see that light which pervades the air, though it be a corporeal motion, yet it is not moved or shaken by the agitations of the air, because it is in a body far more subtle than the air, that runs through the spongy pores of it. Wherefore the soul, though it be conceived to be an extended substance, yet being penetrative of body, not by filling up the pores of it, but by coexisting in the same space with it, cannot be locally moved by the motions of it.

Neither is this passion of the soul in sensation a mere naked passion or suffering; because it is a cogitation or perception which hath something of active vigour in it. For those ideas of heat, light, and colours, and other sensible things, being not qualities really existing in the bodies without us, as the atomical philosophy instructs us, and therefore not passively stamped or imprinted upon the soul from without in the same manner that a signature is upon a piece of wax, must needs arise partly from some inward vital energy of the soul itself, being phantasms of the soul, or several modes of cogitation or perception in it. For which cause some of the Platonists would not allow sensations to be passions in the soul, but only Παθῶν γνώσεις, "active knowledges of the passions of the body."

4. But, as I said before, sense is a passion in the soul also, viz., such a passion as a vital and cogitative being is capable of, because we find by experience that it is not elicited from the soul itself, but obtruded upon it from without; so that the soul cannot choose but have such sensations, cogitations, or affections in it, when such or such external objects are presented to the outward senses. The soul receiving its information from without by sympathizing with the passions of its own body concerning what

individual bodies exist round about it, and the general modes of them; which no innate reason of its own could possibly discover to it. And therefore the soul being necessarily determined to exert such cogitations within itself, when such local motions are impressed upon the body which she is vitally united to, these sensations are certain kinds of passive energies of the soul. For the soul and body by reason of that vital union which is betwixt them, making up one compositum, "compound" or "animal," do of necessity mutually suffer from each other, the body being variously moved by the soul, and the soul again variously affected from the body; or the motions which are made upon it. Neither doth the soul suffer indifferently from any body, but all sense arises from that natural sympathy or compassion which the soul hath with that individual body with which it is vitally united. And had not the soul such a passive principle in it, it could not possibly be vitally united to any body, neither could there be any such thing as an animal or living creature.

Moreover, these sensitive cogitations, as we shall show afterward, do plainly differ, in the mode of them, from those pure cogitations that are the actions of the soul itself; there being a vast difference between the senses of hunger and thirst, and mere volitions in the soul to eat and drink, as likewise betwixt that grief and sadness that arises from some ill tidings told and understood by the mind (though there be something of corporeal passion consequent or concomitant here also) and betwixt a sense of pain when the body is hurt. And in like manner in those other sensations of light and colours, heat and cold, the soul doth not merely know or understand the figure and motions of those corporeal particles, but hath certain confused affections and phantasms within itself by reason of them. From whence it is evident, that these sensitive cogitations are not pure actions springing from the soul itself, but compassions with the body. And therefore that opinion of the Platonists is no way to be admitted, that "sensations are not passions," but παθῶν γνώσεις, "knowledges of the passions," as if they were free and sincere actions of the soul, or released and unpassionate knowledges in it of the passions of the body.

5. Wherefore sensations formally considered are certain passions or affections in the soul fatally connected with some local motions in the body, whereby the soul perceiveth something else besides those immediate corporeal motions in the nerves, spirits, or brain. For though the soul do only sympathize with the motions of its own body, yet by sense it doth not take immediate cognizance of those very motions themselves, in the brain, spirits, and nerves, perceiving them as they are in themselves, but it is secretly instructed by nature to take notice of some other things thereby that may concern the body.

For, first, the soul is sometimes so affected by reason of those local motions of the blood and heart communicated by the nerves unto the brain, as that it perceives something within itself, viz., certain pathemata, "passions," of joy or pleasantness, dulness and sadness, or contristation, irascible and concupiscible inclinations, when we know no rational cause for them within ourselves, and therefore they could not spring from the soul itself.

Again, the soul is sometimes so affected by motions communicated from the nerves that belong to the stomach and œsophagus, "windpipe," as that it perceives or takes notice of hunger or thirst in those parts of the body, and the like may be said of the other pains or pleasures, pruriences and titillations of the body, which the soul perceives as things existing in some certain parts of the body itself; when the nerves are in a certain way moved.

Lastly, the soul is frequently so affected by the motions of those five other conjugations of nerves, as that by natural instinct it takes notice of some corporeal things existing without our bodies, whence that motion upon the nerves comes, as light, colours, sounds, heat and cold, hardness, softness, gravity, levity, odours, sapors. The objects being many times remotely distant from us; though it does not perceive them in the same manner as they absolutely exist without us.

Now though all these three kinds mentioned be equally passions and sensations in the soul, yet the use of speech hath appropriated the denomination of passions only to the former, and styled the two latter by the name of sensations, the first of them being commonly called internal corporeal senses, the second external. Wherefore corporeal senses in general may be thus defined, to be "affections in the soul caused by certain local motions made upon some parts of the body, by reason of the vital sympathy betwixt the soul and body, whereby the soul seems to perceive corporeal things existing without itself, either in its own body, or else at a distance from it."

CHAPTER II.

1. Wherefore, sense being a passion in the soul, or a compassion with its own body, which it is vitally united to, that is, diversified according to the difference both of local motions and of bodily organs through which those motions are conveyed; there being a necessary and fatal connexion between certain motions in some parts of the enlivened body, and certain affections or sympathies in the soul, which Democritus seems to intimate in those words: Νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, "By law a thing is cold, or by law hot," that hot and cold, and the like,

were passions or phantasms fatally connected with certain local motions in the body. Sense is a kind of dull, confused, and stupid perception obtruded upon the soul from without, whereby it perceives the alterations and motions within its own body, and takes cognizance of individual bodies existing round about it, but doth not clearly comprehend what they are, nor penetrate into the nature of them, it being intended by nature, πρὸς χρείαν, οὐ πρὸς γνῶσιν, as Plotinus speaks, not so properly "for knowledge," as for the "use of the body." For the soul suffering under that which it perceives by way of passion, cannot master or conquer it, that is to say, know or understand it. For so Anaxagoras in Aristotle very fitly expresses the nature of knowledge and intellection under the notion of κρατεῖν, "conquering:" Ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστιν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ,* "Wherefore it is necessary, since the mind understands all things, that it should be free from mixture and passion, for this end, as Anaxagoras speaks, that it may be able to master and conquer its objects, that is to say, to know or understand them." In like manner Plotinus, in his book of Sense and Memory,† makes πάσχειν, "to suffer," and κρατεῖσθαι, "to be conquered," all one, as also γινώσκειν καὶ κρατεῖν, "to know and to conquer;" for which cause he concludes that that which suffers doth not know: Πάσχειν ἀλλ' οὐ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς ποιοῦμεν, ὅτι κρατεῖν δέδοται, ἀλλ' οὐ κρατεῖσθαι, "That which we make to suffer," eo nomine, "in saying so," "we make it not to know, because to know is to conquer, and not to be mastered or conquered." Sense, that suffers from external objects, lies as it were prostrate under them, and is overcome by them: wherefore no sense judges either of its own passion, or of the passion of any other sense, but judgment or knowledge is the active energy of an unpassionate power in the soul.

2. And for this cause Aristotle himself tells us, that the soul is a heterogeneous thing, and hath μόρια, several "parts," in it of a very different nature from one another. First, a higher and active part, which he calls τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ ἀπαθὲς, that which acts separately from the matter, and is impassible, and this is τὸ νοητικὸν, "that which knows and understands;" the other a lower, passive, or sympathetical part which suffers from without, and acts in conjunction with the body, and this is τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, "that to which sensation belongs." So that knowledge and intellection are the clear, serene, and unpassionate perceptions of that higher part of the soul which acts alone, by and from itself. Sensations are the energies of that lower, passive, and sympathetical part, whereby the soul is vitally united to the body, and

* Arist. de Anima, lib. 3. cap. 4.
† Plotinus de Sensu et Memoria, cap. 2.

cleaving to it, makes up one animal with it. Or else they may be said to be the cogitations of the whole compositum "compound," or "animal," which is the reason that they are so cloudy and confounded, because they arise from the very crasis, "mixture" and confusion of the soul and body as it were blended together.

3. For though the soul be a distinct substance, and of a different nature from the body, yet notwithstanding in every animal it is intimately conjoined with the body, and cleaves to it in such a manner, as that both together compound and make up one thing. And therefore it is not present with it only as a mariner with a ship, that is, merely locally, or knowingly and unpassionately present, they still continuing two distinct things; but it is vitally united to it, and passionately present with it. And therefore when the body is hurt, the soul doth not unpassionately know or understand it, as when a mariner knows that a ship hath sprung a leak, or when a man is informed that his neighbour's house is set on fire; but it feels a strong and vehement pain, and hath a dolorous sense or perception of it, as being one thing with it. So in like manner when the body wants either meat or drink, the soul doth not unpassionately know this as an indifferent by-stander, and therefore rationally only will or desire meat and drink for it, but it feels a passionate sense of hunger and thirst in itself, as being intimately concerned in the business. Now the same is true also in those other sensations in which the animal seems to be less concerned, as of light and colour, heat and cold, sounds and odours, that they are not simple knowledges or intellections of that part of the soul which acts alone by itself, but they are the perceptions of that which is vitally united with the body, and sympathizing with the motions and passions of it, makes up compositum, one "compound" with it. Wherefore though all cogitations be formally in the soul, and not in the body, yet these sensitive cogitations being in the soul no otherwise than as vitally united to the body, they are not so properly the cogitations of the soul, as of τὸ μικτὸν, "the mixed," or συναμφότερον, "both together," as Plotinus calls it, the compound of soul and body, or, as that philosopher will have it, of the "body and a certain vivificating light, imparted from the soul to it." And therefore, as he observeth out of Aristotle, Ὥσπερ ἄτοπον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν, "As it is absurd to say the soul weaves," (or indeed the body either, weaving being a mixed action of the man and weaving instruments) so it is absurd to say that the soul alone doth concupiscere, dolere, or sentire, "covet," "grieve," or "perceive:" these things proceeding from the "compound," or the coalescence of soul and body together; being not pure mental, but corporeal cogitations of the soul, as it vitally informs the body, and is passionately united to it.

4. Sense therefore is a certain kind of drowsy and somnolent perception of that passive part of the soul, which is as it were asleep in the body, and acts concretely with it. So Plotinus expresses it: Τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ψυχῆς ἐστιν εὐδούσης· ὅσον γὰρ ἐνσώματι ψυχῆς, τοῦτο εὕδει,* "Sense is of that part of the soul that sleeps, for that of the soul that is immersed into the body, is as it were asleep." It is an energy arising from the body, and a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended together with it. The perceptions of which, compositum, or animæ semisomnis, "compound," or "of the soul as it were half asleep and half awake," are confused, indistinct, turbid and encumbered cogitations, very different from the energies of the "noetical" part, that acts alone, without sympathy with the body, which are free, clear, serene, satisfactory and awakened cogitations, that is to say, knowledges.

And that these cogitations of the passive part of the soul called sensations, are not knowledges or intellections, is evident by experience also, not only in the senses of hunger and thirst, pain and corporeal titillation, but also in all those other perceptions of light and colours, heat and cold, sounds, odours and sapors. For if they were knowledges or intellections, then all men would rest satisfied in the sensible ideas or phantasms of them, and never inquire any further, at least when the stroke or impression made upon sense were strong and vigorous, as when we see the clear light of the meridian sun, or hear the loud noise of thunder, whereas the one doth but dazzle our eyes, the other deafens our ears, but neither enlighten nor inform our understandings. Whereas, on the contrary, the minds of men are restlessly inquisitive after some further intellectual comprehension of all these things that we perceive by our several senses. Neither is this true of the vulgar only, but it is very observable, that the most acute philosophers in all ages have complained of their ignorance of these things; and indeed have confessed themselves more puzzled and at a loss about these sensible things, than those abstract immaterial things which are remote from bodily sense. Luminis et colorum essentiæ sunt intellectui tam obscuræ, quam sunt ipsa visui manifesta, "The essences of light and colours (saith Scaliger) are as dark to the understanding, as they themselves are open to the sight." Nay, undoubtedly so long as we consider these things no otherwise than sense represents them, that is, as really existing in the objects without us, they are and must needs be eternally unintelligible. Now when all men naturally inquire what these things are, what is light, and what are colours, the meaning hereof is nothing else but this, that men would fain know or comprehend them by something of their own which is native and domestic,

* Enn. 3. lib. 6.

not foreign to them, some active exertion or anticipation of their own minds, as I shall show afterwards.

Wherefore though sense be adequate and sufficient for that end which nature hath designed it to, viz. to give advertisement of corporeal things existing without us, and their motions for the use and concernment of the body, and such general intimations of the modes of them, as may give the understanding sufficient hints by its own sagacity to find out their natures, and invent intelligible hypotheses to solve those appearances by, (for otherwise reason alone without sense could not acquaint us with individual existent things without us, or assure us of the existence of any thing besides God, who is the only necessarily existent being); yet notwithstanding sense, as sense, is not knowledge or intellection; which I shall still make further appear by these following more particular considerations.

CHAPTER III.

1. For, first, sense only suffering and receiving from without, and having no active principle of its own, to take acquaintance with what it receives, it must needs be a stranger to that which is altogether adventitious to it, and therefore cannot know or understand it. For to know or understand a thing, is nothing else but by some inward anticipation of the mind, that is native and domestic, and so familiar to it, to take acquaintance with it; of which I shall speak more afterward.

2. Sense is but the offering or presenting of some object to the mind, to give it an occasion to exercise its own inward activity upon. Which two things being many times nearly conjoined together in time, though they be very different in nature from one another, yet they are vulgarly mistaken for one and the same thing, as if it were all nothing but mere sensation or passion from the body. Whereas sense itself is but the passive perception of some individual material forms, but to know or understand, is actively to comprehend a thing by some abstract, free and universal ratios, "reasonings," from whence the mind quasi desuper spectans concepta forma quæ subsunt dijudicat, "as it were looking down (as Boethius expresseth it) upon the individuals below it, views and understands them." But sense which lies flat and grovelling in the individuals, and is stupidly fixed in the material form, is not able to rise up or ascend to an abstract universal notion; for which cause it never affirms or denies any thing of its object, because (as Aristotle observes) in all affirmation, and negation at least, the predicate is always universal. The eye which is placed in a level with the

sea, and touches the surface of it, cannot take any large prospect upon the sea, much less see the whole amplitude of it. But an eye elevated to a higher station, and from thence looking down, may comprehensively view the whole sea at once, or at least so much of it as is within our horizon. The abstract universal rationes, "reasons," are that higher station of the mind, from whence looking down upon individual things, it hath a commanding view of them, and as it were a priori comprehends or knows them.

But sense, which either lies in the same level with that particular material object which it perceives, or rather under it and beneath it, cannot emerge to any knowledge or truth concerning it.

3. Sense is but a slight and superficial perception of the outside and accidentals of a corporeal substance, it doth not penetrate into the profundity or inward essence of it. For a body may be changed as to all the several senses, and remain really the same that it was before. Wherefore, though men are commonly said to know things when they see and feel them, yet in truth by their bodily senses they perceive nothing but their outsides and external induments. Just as when a man looking down out of a window into the streets, is said to see men walking in the streets, when indeed he perceives nothing but hats and clothes, under which, for aught he knows, there may be Dædalean statues moving up and down. Neither is this spoken only in respect of that defect of sight (to omit the other senses) which is a little relieved by microscopical glasses, yet it cannot perceive the figures and contextures of those minute particles out of which bodies are compounded, nor penetrate beyond the superficies into their corporeal profundity; for though our sight were so much more than Lyncean, that it could discover the very pores in glass through which the light passes, as Aristotle complains it cannot; nay, though it could discern the particular globuli, "globulous particles," in the motion of which light consisteth, and the triangular spaces between them through which the smallest and most subtle striated matter passes; yet notwithstanding it would not reach to the essential profundity either of body or sphericalness, or triangularity, which nothing but the subtle acies, "sharpness," of the mind can penetrate into; so as to comprehend the immutable ratio, "reason" of any of them. And therefore it is rightly pronounced by that excellent restorer of the old atomical and Moschical philosophy, Ipsamet corpora non propriè à sensibus vel ab imaginandi facultate, sed solo intellectu percipi, nec ex eo percipi, quòd tangantur aut videantur, sed tantùm ex eo, quòd intelligantur, "That even bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses, or by the imagination, but by the understanding alone; nor are

therefore perceived because they are touched or seen, but only because they are understood.

4. The essence of nothing is reached unto by the senses looking outward, but by the mind's looking inward into itself. That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its object, is not one with that which it perceives, but is at a distance from it, and therefore cannot know and comprehend it; but knowledge and intellection doth not merely prospicere, look out upon a thing at a distance, but makes an inward reflection upon the thing it knows, and according to the etymon of the word, intellectus, "the intellect," doth in interioribus legere, "read inward characters written within itself," and intellectually comprehend its object within itself, and is the same with it. For though this may be conceived to be true of individual things known (although the mind understands them also under abstract notions of its own) yet, at least in Aristotle's sense, it is unquestionably true,* Ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, "In abstract things themselves," which are the primary objects of science, "the intellect and the thing known are really one and the same." For those ideas or objects of intellection are nothing else but modifications of the mind itself. But αἴσθησις τοῦ ἔξω, "sense is of that which is without," sense wholly gazes and gads abroad, and therefore doth not know and comprehend its object, because it is different from it. Αἴσθησις γραμμὴ, νοῦς κύκλος, "Sense is a line, the mind is a circle." Sense is like a line which is the flux of a point running out from itself, but intellect like a circle that keeps within itself.

5. Sense apprehends individual bodies without, by something derived from them, and so à posteriori, Ὕστεραι οὖσαι αἰσθήσεις εἰκόνες εἰσι, "The senses being last, are the images of the things." The sensible ideas of things are but umbratile and evanid images of the sensible things, like shadows projected from them; but knowledge is a comprehension of a thing proleptically, and as it were, a priori. But now, to lay aside metaphysics, and speak plainly, all that which comes from the individual object of sense from without, (as we have already declared) is nothing at all but local motion or pressure, when an enlivened body is jogged or thrust upon by some other body without. But to receive or feel a jog, knock, or thrust from without made upon the body which the soul is united to, this is not to know, no not so much as what local motion is, much less to know all other things. For knowledge is not a knock or thrust from without, but it consisteth in the awakening and exciting of the inward active powers of the mind.

6. This point which I have hitherto insisted upon concerning the shallowness, dullness, and bluntness of sense, in that it

* De Anima, lib. 2. cap. 50.

cannot penetrate to the essences of things, is very ingeniously and philosophically handled by Plato, in his Theætetus; where he demonstrates against Protagoras, that science is not sense, but that there is another power in the soul besides that of sense or passion, to which science, knowledge, and intellection is to be referred after this manner. First, Socrates obtains this from Theætetus, that sense is when the soul, by or through several organs of the body, takes cognizance of several corporeal things without. And secondly, that one sense or organical perception cannot take cognizance of the object of another; as sight cannotsee sounds, nor the hearing hear light and colours: And therefore, where we think of the objects of several senses comparing them together, and considering of some things common to them all, this cannot be sense or organical perception; because one sense cannot consider the object of another sense. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοῇ, οὐκ ἂν διά γε τοῦ ἑτέροῦ ὀργάνου αἰσθάνοι ἄν, "If any thing concerns both, it cannot perceive it by either organ." As when we consider sound and colour together at once, and attribute several things to them in common; as first of all essence; and then that in each of them is identity with itself, and diversity to the other, that both of them are two, and each of them one; That they are not like but unlike to one another; what sense or organ is there by which the soul perceives all these things, viz. essence and non-essence, identity, diversity, unity, duality, similitude, dissimilitude, things common both to sound and colour? Surely, it cannot be neither by the senses of sight or of hearing, because these cannot consider one another's objects. Neither can we find any other organ in the body by which the soul may passively take cognizance of all these things, and consider the objects of both those other senses of sight and hearing. Whereby he makes Theætetus confess that these things the soul doth not organically perceive by any sense, but by itself alone without any bodily organ. And therefore, Τὰ μὲν αὐτὴν δι' αὑτῆς ψυχὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων, "Some things the soul perceives by itself, or by its own active power," as essence, similitude, dissimilitude, identity, alterity, good and evil, honest and dishonest. Other things it perceives by and through the organs of the body: as for example, by the sense of touch the soul perceives nothing but the hardness of that which is hard, and the softness of that which is soft, and the like. But essence, and what hardness and softness is, and their contrariety to one another; and again, the essence of contrariety itself, the soul alone by itself discoursing endeavours to judge of. Wherefore, there is this difference between those things that come into the soul by the passions of the body, and those things that arise from the ratiocinative power of the soul itself: Τὰ μὲν εὐθὺ γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ

θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται, οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται, "That both men and beasts do naturally perceive as soon as they be born those things that come into the soul by the passions of the body. But ratiocinations concerning these things as to the natures and essences of them, and their utilities, are slowly by labour and help of institution attained unto." Now, that which doth not reach to the essence of any thing, cannot reach to truth or knowledge. Wherefore, he concludes, Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὡς ἔοικε δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον, "That there is no knowledge or science in passions, but in the discourse of the mind upon them; for in this latter way it is possible to reach to the essence and truth of things, but impossible in the former." And that we ought not, Ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα, "to seek knowledge any more in sense, but in that of the soul, whatsoever it be called, which doth alone by itself contemplate things that are.

CHAPTER IV.

1. But I have still something more to add concerning this argument before I dismiss it; wherefore, in the next place, I shall make it further appear, that sense is not science or intellection, because the soul by sense doth not perceive the things themselves, or the absolute natures of them, but only her own passions from them. This, Sextus the philosopher took notice of: Αἱ αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνουσι, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη, "The senses do not reach to the objects that are placed without, but to their own passions alone." And this is that which Protagoras so much insisted on, that τὰ αἰσθητὰ, all our "sensible ideas" of light and colours, sounds, odours, sapors, heat and cold, and the like, are not absolute but relative things. For neither is αἴσθησις, "sensation" any thing of the soul considered absolutely in itself, it being no pure and sincere cogitation of the soul alone, neither is τὸ αἰσθητὸν, "the sensible idea" any absolute quality of the object without, but both these (viz., αἴσθησις and αἰσθητὸν, "sense and sensible") are certain middle things begotten betwixt the agent and the patient, and resulting from the activity of the object without,

* Pyrr. Hyp. lib. 2. cap. 7.

and the passion of the mind within, and severally respecting each of them. Or, as he expressed it, Ἐκ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, "From the congress or collision of these two together are generated at once both sense and the sensible; for the sensible (formally considered, according to that idea that we have of it) hath no existence before sensation, but is begotten with it." And therefore, Ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμὲν χρῶμα οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι, "Colour and the rest is neither any thing really existing in the object without, nor yet any thing in the soul itself, but a middle thing betwixt both," that is, a passion. Which is the very same with that which Aristotle imputes to the ancient physiologers as a paradox, that black and white were not without the sight.

The truth of which is so evident in some instances, that none can possibly gainsay it. For when the body is either pricked with a needle or wounded with a sword, no man can imagine that those pains that result from thence were such real and absolute qualities existing in the needle or sword before our sensation, but that they are our own passions, and so relative things to us, or perceptions of the motions of the needle or sword relatively to the enlivened body, and as they are hurtful to it. And the same is vulgarly acknowledged in those colours that are therefore called fantastical, as in the iris "rainbow," and the prism, whereas in reality all colours are as fantastical as the colours o the rainbow, and the colours of the rainbow as real as any other. And it is likewise true of the other proper objects of the several senses. For as Sextus the philosopher observes, Οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαί με, καὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι, "Honey is not the same thing with my being sweetened, nor wormwood the same with my having sense of bitterness." That which we know by sense concerning honey and wormwood, is only that our taste is so affected from them; but what absolute mode or disposition of parts in them causes these different sensations in us, belongs to some other faculty of the soul to discover. And hence it comes to pass, that though the natures or essences of things be simple, yet one and the same thing perceived by our several senses begets several passions and phantasms in us. Flame, which is nothing but a violent agitation of the small particles of a body by the rapid subtle matter; the same motion communicated to the eye or optic nerves begets one kind of sensible idea or phantasm called light, but to the nerves of touch another quite different from it called heat; therefore neither light nor heat, according to those sensible ideas that we have of them, are really and absolutely in the flame without, which is but one kind of motion or agitation of matter, but only fantastically

and relatively, the one to our sight, the other to our touch. And hence it proceeds also that sensations are diversified from the same thing to several individuals of the same kind, and to the same individual at several times, by reason of some difference in the idiosyncrasy or proper temperament of the body, as (to omit the instance of those that are icterical) appears plainly in the degrees of heat and cold, the gratefulness or ungratefulness of several tastes and odours to several individuals, or to the same considered both in sickness and in health; which things could not be, if all sensible ideas were absolute qualities in the thing itself, and so taken notice of by sense. And it is worth the while to see how Protagoras philosophized about this latter instance, improving it to this purpose:* "Οταν οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδὺς μοὶ καὶ γλυκὺς. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. Καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειργάσατο. Ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώσσῃ καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι. "Οταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα ἀλλότι ἥ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ ἀληθείᾳ, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν, ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθε. Ἕτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὅ τε τοιοῦτος καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότατος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, "When I drink wine, being in health, it appears pleasant and sweet. For the agent and the patient betwixt them beget both sense and sweetness, severally respecting the agent and the patient. For sense respecting the patient, makes and denominates the tongue sentient, and sweetness respecting the agent (that is, the wine) makes and denominates that sweet, not absolutely but respectively to the tongue of one that is in health. But when the patient is altered by sickness, and becomes different from what it was, then it receives quite another taste than formerly, for it comes to a very different patient. Quite different things are produced by the person and the drinking of the wine; respecting the tongue a sense of bitterness, and as to the wine its being made and denominated bitter."

Wherefore since by sense the soul doth not perceive corporeal objects, as they are truly, really and absolutely in themselves, but under some fantastical representations and disguises, sense cannot be knowledge, which comprehends a thing as it is. And indeed if the soul had no other power in it but only this of passion or sensation (as Protagoras supposed), then there could be no such thing at all as any absolute truth or knowledge. But that hypothesis of his, as we have already showed, plainly contradicts and confutes itself. For that which pronounces that our sensible ideas of things are fantastical and relative, must needs be

* The words not of Protagoras but of Socrates in Plato's Theætet. p. 121.

something in us superior to sense, that is, not relative or fantastical, but that judges what really and absolutely is and is not.

2. But to strike this business home, I shall in the last place further observe, that sense cannot be knowledge, nor the certainty of all things ultimately resolvable into sense, as many men beside Protagoras conceive, for this reason, because the nature of sense consists in nothing else but mere seeming or appearance. This was intimated before in that definition that we gave of sense, that it is ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν, or ἐν τῷ φάινεσθαι, "a passion or affection in the soul, whereby it seems to perceive some corporeal things existing." That is, sense is when the soul is so affected, as if there were such a corporeal thing existing. So that all the reality that is necessarily required to sense, is only this, that there be really a passion in the soul, or that the soul be really so affected as if there were such a thing; that is, that it have really such a seeming or appearance, but not that the thing really be, as it appears. For as to a thing's being such or such, its having such a mode or quality, we have already demonstrated by reason, that in this respect most of our sensible ideas are fantastical things. And the same may be evinced and made evident also by sense itself; for it is as true and real a sensation, when a man looking upon a staff that is partly in the air, and partly in the water, sees it crooked (though it be really straight), as when he looks upon it all in the air, and sees it straight as really it is; for we are as really affected, and there is as much a seeming in one as in the other. And innumerable instances might be given in this kind, to prove that as to things being such or such, there is no other truth or reality necessarily required in sensation, but only that of appearance.

But this is not all, for I shall observe in the next place that there is not so much as the reality of being or existence of the object necessarily required to sensation; but there may be a true sensation, though there be no object at all really existing without the soul. A known and approved instance whereof we have in those that, after they had their arms and legs cut off, have been sensible, when they were awake, of a strong and violent pain in their fingers and toes, though really they had no such members. And we have all constant experience of the same in our dreams, which are as true sensations, as those which we have when we are awake, and when the objects are really existent without us. Because the soul is as really affected, and hath as lively images, ideas, and phantasms of sensible things as existent then, as when we are awake, and many times is really sensible of violent and exquisite pain, which is a real sense, though it be but a fantastical thing; and immediately vanishes away upon our awakening. Because there was nothing really in the body, that by the motions of the nerves could beget a real pain.

3. Now the reason of this, that the soul may be passively affected in this manner, when there is no object at all really existing without it, is from hence: because by sense the soul doth not suffer immediately from the objects themselves, but only from its own body, by reason of that natural and vital sympathy which it hath with it, neither doth it suffer from its own body in every part of it, or from the outward organs of sense immediately; as from the eye when we see, the tongue when we taste, or the exterior parts of the body when we feel, but only in the brain, or from the motions of the spirits there. But so as that it doth not take immediate cognizance of those very motions immediately as they are in themselves, but by the secret instinct of nature doth by means of them take cognizance of those corporeal things existing without us, from whence the original of the motion comes: as for example, of the stars that are so vastly distant when we look upon the heavens. Whence it comes to pass that if that body from which the soul immediately suffers, and that is the spirits in the brain, be so moved as it would be moved by the nerves when any outward objects present make their several impressions upon the organs of sense, the soul must needs have the same passions, affections, and sensations in it, as if the objects were really existing without. Now this may come to pass either by the fortuitous motions or agitations of the spirits themselves, casually falling into the same figurations, that the motions of the nerves would impress upon them from some outward objects; or else by the spirits rushing against certain prints, traces, or marks in the brain, made by former sensations when we were awake, whereby their motions are determined. Or, lastly, by the fantastical power of the soul itself, which as it suffers from the body, so it can likewise act upon it; and according to our customary actions, or inward affections, inclinations, or desires, may move the spirits variously, and beget divers phantasms in us.

And that dreams are many times thus begotten or excited by the fantastical power of the soul itself, is evident from the orderly connexion and coherence of imaginations, which many times are continued in a long chain or series; with the fiction of interlocutory discourses and dialogues, consisting of apt answers and replies made interchangeably to one another, and contain such things as never were before printed upon the brain in such a series or order; which therefore could not proceed either from the fortuitous dancings or subsultations of the spirits, or from the determination of their motion, by antecedent prints or traces made by former sensations in the substance of the brain.

4. And the dreams that we have in our sleep, are really the same kind of things with those imaginations that we have many times when we are awake, when the fancy, being not

commanded or determined by the will, roves, and wanders, and runs at random; and spins out a long thread or concatenated series of imaginations or phantasms of corporeal things, quite different from those things which our outward senses at the same time take notice of. And some persons there are to whom these waking dreams are very ordinary and familiar.

And there is little doubt to be made but if a man should suddenly fall asleep in the midst of one of these waking dreams, when his fancy is roving and spinning out such a long series of imaginations, those very imaginations and phantasms would ipso facto, "of course," become dreams, and run on, and appear not as phantasms or imaginations only of things feigned or non-existent, but as perceptions of things really existent, that is, as sensations.

Whereas these imaginations that we have of individual corporeal things when we are awake, and our outward senses employed upon their several objects, do not seem to be sensations of things really existing and present, as our dreams do, but to be certain faint, evanid, shadowy and umbratile things in comparison of those sensations which we have at the same time with them when we are awake, that is, not as things existent without us, but as our own cogitations. The reason whereof is, because though they be both of the same kind, yet those motions of the spirits which are caused by the nerves, from the objects without when we are awake, being more vigorous, durable, constant and prevalent, do naturally obscure or extinguish those other weaker phantasms or imaginations which we have at the same time; and reason interposing, brings in its verdict for those stronger phantasms also whose objects are durable and permanent, by means whereof the latter only seem to be real sensations, the former counterfeit and fictitious imaginations; or mere picture and landscape in the soul. And this Aristotle long ago observed in this manner:* Μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐκκρούονται, ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ἀφανίζονται ὥσπερ παρὰ πολὺ πῦρ ἔλαττον, καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἡδοναὶ μικραὶ παρὰ μεγάλας, παυσαμένων δὲ ἐπιπολάζει καὶ τὰ μικρά, "In the day they are shut out and disappear, the senses and understanding working, as the lesser fire is made to disappear by the greater; and small griefs and pleasures by great ones. But when we are at rest in our beds, the least phantasms make impressions upon us." In the day-time, and when we are awake, those more fleeting fancies and imaginations, which proceed not from the motions of the nerves, caused by the objects without, must needs yield and give place, as being baffled and confuted by those stronger, more durable and lasting motions that come from the nerves, caused by permanent objects, reason also carrying it clearly for the latter, by means

* Libro de Insomniis, cap. 4.

whereof the former cannot appear as real things or sensations. But when we are asleep, the same phantasms and imaginations are more strong, vivid and lively; because the nerves are relaxated, there are often no motions transmitted by them from the outward objects into the brain, to confound those motions of the spirits within, and distract the soul's attention to them; just as the same loudness of a voice in a still evening will be heard a great deal further and clearer, than in the day-time when the air is agitated with many contrary motions crossing and confounding one another. But now there are no other motions of the spirits, besides these which cause dreams to compare with them; and disgrace them, or put them out of countenance; and as it were, by their louder noise and clamours, so to possess the animadversive part of the soul, that the weaker murmurs of the other cannot obtain to be heard, as it is when we are awake, or in the day-time. And therefore in sleep the mind naturally admits these phantasms as sensations, there appearing none other to contradict that verdict.

5. Wherefore, phantasms and sensible ideas are really or materially the same thing, which Aristotle intimates, affirming that,* φαντασία is αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, "fancy is a weak kind of sense," and that† φαντάσματα are οἷον αἰσθήματα, "phantasms are as sensations;" for both phantasms and sensations are passions or sufferings in the soul from the body. And yet notwithstanding every phantasm doth not seem to be a corporeal thing really existing without the soul, as a αἴσθημα, "sensation" doth. Wherefore there are two cases in which a phantasm doth not seem to be αἴσθημα, "a sensation." First, when a phantasm is raised or excited purposely and voluntarily, by the mere imperium, command or empire of our own will; as by experience we find it often is. For it is in our power to fancy what corporeal thing or person (formerly known to us) we please, though it be absent from us. Nay, and to compound such things as we never saw before; as a golden mountain, a centaur, a chimera. Now in this case, when the soul is conscious to itself, that these phantasms are arbitrarily raised by it, or by its own activity, it cannot look upon them as sensations, or things really existing without itself, but only as evanid images, pictures and adumbrations of things within itself. And such phantasms as these do usually accompany most of our other cogitations. Wherefore phantasmata, "phantasms," do nôt seem to be αἰσθήματα, "sensations" or perceptions of things as really existing without the soul, when they are voluntary, or when the soul is inwardly conscious that they are raised up by its own activity.

Secondly, neither doth every involuntary phantasm, or such as the soul is not conscious to itself to have purposely excited or

* De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 4. † Ibid. cap. 9.

raised up within itself, seem to be αἴσθημα, "a sensation" or perception of a thing, as existing without us; for there may be straggling phantasms, which come into the mind we know not how; and bubble up of themselves, which yet the soul may distinguish from αἰσθήματα, "sensations" or perceptions of things, as existing really without it; because of some other phantasms at the same time in the soul, whose vigours and lustre do cloud and eclipse them. For when there are phantasms of several kinds at the same time in the soul, or such as arise from different motions of the spirits, the soul silently comparing both together, naturally looks upon the more vigorous, strong, and permanent of those phantasms only as real existences; but the more faint, flitting, and transitory, as imaginary things. Now there are two kinds of involuntary phantasms, as I have already intimated, in the soul, when we are awake. One that proceeds from such motions of the spirits as are caused by the nerves moved from the objects without: another that proceeds from the spirits of the brain, otherwise moved than by the nerves: and therefore in vigiliâ, "when we are awake," and have phantasms of both these kinds together in the soul, those phantasms that arise from the motions of the nerves caused by the objects without, appearing very different from those other phantasms that arise from the spirits otherwise moved than by the nerves, both in respect of their vigour and constancy, do therefore to all such persons, as are not distempered either in body or in mind, naturally seem to be real, or things existing without the soul, but the latter imaginary. Whereas in sleep, when the nerves being relaxated, communicate no motion to the spirits, the very same phantasms (there being now no other and stronger to compare with them and discredit or disgrace them) do naturally appear to the soul as sensations of things really existing without the soul.

6. Now the truth of this matter doth evidently appear from hence, in that by reason of some disease either of body or mind, men's spirits may be so furiously, violently, and strongly agitated, that those phantoms which do not arise from the motion of the nerves, being most prevalent and predominant, even when they are awake, may become αἰσθήματα, "sensations" and appearances of things as really existing without the soul; that men may confidently believe they hear, see, and feel those things that are not, and be imposed upon in all their senses. Which is a thing that frequently happens, not only in phrenetical, maniac, and hypochondriacal persons, of which there are many instances recorded, but also in others possessed with strong passions of fear, love, and the like. Wherefore as sense, that is, the phantasms that arise from the motion communicated to the spirits of the brain by the nerves, do ordinarily baffle and confute imaginations and fancy; that is, those phantasms that arise from the

spirits, otherwise moved than by the nerves, so likewise imaginations growing wild, rampant, and exorbitant, may in the same manner baffle and confute all our senses.

7. Which exorbitancy of fancy or imagination prevailing over sense, or those phantasms which arise from the motion communicated to the brain from the objects without by the nerves, may either proceed originally from some disease in the body, whereby the animal spirits being furiously heated and agitated, may be carried with so great a force and career, as that the motions caused from the objects by the nerves being weakened, may yield and give place to them, and their phantasms be in a manner silent, vanquished and obliterated by them; those stronger phantasms that arise from the agitation of the spirits themselves, possessing the place of them, the affection or animadversion of the soul being always won by those phantasms that make the loudest noise, or have the greatest vigour. Or else the same thing may proceed originally from some disease or distemper in the soul itself. When the lower, irrational, and passive part of the soul (in which the concupiscible and irascible affections are seated), and so by consequence, the fantastic power of the soul (the same power that begets in us those waking dreams before-mentioned) grows excessively and exorbitantly predominant, insomuch that it doth not only weaken and extinguish the noetical powers, which are always proportionably debilitated as this is invigorated, but also prevent the power of sense itself, the immoderate activity of the fancy not permitting the soul to suffer from, or be passive to, the action of the objects upon it, nor quietly to receive the impressions of them, without ruffling and confounding them. And this is that sad and lamentable condition that the soul of man is liable and obnoxious to, by its overmuch indulgence to that passive, and irrational, and corporeal part in which the affections, appetites, and desires are seated; a condition which, if it continue always, is worse than death itself, or perfect annihilation. To have not only reason degraded and dethroned, but even sense itself perverted or extinguished, and in the room thereof boisterous phantasms protruded from the irrational appetites, passions, and affections (now grown monstrous and enormous) to become the very sensations of it, by means whereof it is easy to conceive that the divine nemesis, "vengeance," may make the soul its own tormentor, though there were no other hell without it, not only by representing most loathsome and affrightful, dismal and tragical scenes of things to itself, but also by cruciating itself with exquisite and sensible pains. And the serious consideration hereof should make us very careful how we let the reins loose to that passive irrational part of our soul which knows no bounds nor measures, lest thereby we unawares precipitate and plunge our-

selves headlong into the most sad and deplorable condition that is imaginable.

8. I shall not discourse here, of that power also which evil genii, "spirits" may possibly have upon those that have either mancipated themselves unto them, or otherwise forfeited that ordinary protection which divine providence commonly affordeth to all, by acting immediately upon the spirits of the brain, and thereby endeavour to give an account of those phenomena of wizards and witches vulgarly talked of, their seeming transportations in the air, nocturnal conventicles and junkettings, and other such like things, as seem plainly contradictious and unreconcilable to philosophy: but we have already said enough to prove that sense is nothing but seeming and appearance. And therefore we can have no certainty by sense alone either concerning the absolute natures of individual corporeal things without us, nor indeed of their existence; but all the assurance that we have thereof arises from reason and intellect judging of the phantasms or appearances of sense, and determining in which of them there is an absolute reality, and which of them are but merely relative or fantastical.

BOOK IV.—CHAPTER I.

1. Having hitherto showed that sense or passion from corporeal things existent without the soul, is not intellection or knowledge, so that bodies themselves are not known or understood by sense; it must needs follow from hence, that knowledge is an inward and active energy of the mind itself, and the displaying of its own innate vigour from within, whereby it doth conquer, Κρατεῖν, master and command its objects, and so begets a clear, serene, victorious, and satisfactory sense within itself.

Wherefore though it be vulgarly conceived that knowledge arises from the force of the thing known, acting upon that which knows from without; yet contrariwise it is most certain, to use Boethius' expression,* Id quod scitur, non ex suâ vi, sed ex comprehendentis vi et facultate sciri vel cognosci, "That intellection and knowledge do not arise from the force and activity of the thing known from without, upon that which knows, but from the inward power, vigour and activity of the mind that knows actively, comprehending the object within itself, and subduing and prevailing over it." So that knowledge is not a passion from any thing without the mind, but an active exertion of the inward strength, vigour and power of the mind, displaying itself

* De Consolat. Philos. lib. 5. p. 131.

from within; and the intelligible forms by which things are understood or known, are not stamps or impressions passively printed upon the soul from without, but ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from within itself.

2. A thing which is merely passive from without, and doth only receive foreign and adventitious forms, cannot possibly know, understand or judge of that which it receives, but must needs be a stranger to it, having nothing within itself to know it by. The mind cannot know any thing, but by something of its own, that is native, domestic and familiar to it. When in a great throng or crowd of people, a man looking round about, meets with innumerable strange faces, that he never saw before in all his life, and at last chances to espy the face of one old friend or acquaintance, which he had not seen or thought of many years before; he would be said in this case to have known that one, and only that one face in all that company, because he had no inward, previous or anticipated form of any other face, that he looked upon, in his mind; but as soon as ever he beheld that one face, immediately there revived and started forth a former anticipated form or idea of it treasured up in his mind, that, as it were taking acquaintance with that newly received form, made him know it or remember it. So when foreign, strange and adventitious forms are exhibited to the mind by sense, the soul cannot otherwise know or understand them, but by something domestic of its own, some active anticipation or prolepsis within itself, that occasionally reviving and meeting with it, makes it know it, or take acquaintance with it. And this is the only true and allowable sense of that old assertion, that knowledge is reminiscence, not that it is the remembrance of something which the soul had sometime before actually known in a pre-existent state; but because it is the mind's comprehending of things by some inward anticipations of its own, something native and domestic to it, or something actively exerted from within itself.

And thus Plotinus argues, when he endeavours to prove that the immediate τὰ νοητά, objects of knowledge and intellection, are not things without the mind acting upon it at a distance, but contained and comprehended within the mind itself:* Πῶς δὲ καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι ἀντελάβετο ὄντως, πῶς δὲ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἢ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ δίκαιον; Ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ἄλλο αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ αἱ τῆς κρίσεως ἀρχαὶ αἷς πιστεύσει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐταὶ ἔξω καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐκεῖ, "Otherwise how should the mind know or judge when it had really apprehended any thing, that this is good, that honest or just, these things being all strangers to the mind, and coming into it from without. So that the mind could not have any principles of judgment within itself in this case, but these would be without it, and then the truth must needs be without it also."

* Enn. 5. lib. 5. cap. 1.

3. If intellection and knowledge were mere passion from without, or the bare reception of extraneous and adventitious forms, then no reason could be given at all why a mirror or looking-glass should not understand; whereas it cannot so much as sensibly perceive those images which it receives and reflects to us. And therefore sense of itself, as was before intimated, is not a mere passion, but a passive perception of the soul, which hath something of vital energy in it, because it is a cogitation; to which vital energy of the soul those sensible ideas of light, colours, heat, and the like, owe all their entity. Much less therefore can intellection be a pure passion. But if intellection and knowledge were a mere passive perception of the soul from without, and nothing but sense, or the result of it, then what reason could be given, why brute animals, that have all the same senses that men have, and some of them more acute, should not have intellection also, and be as capable of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics, and have the same notions of morality, of a Deity and religion that men have? Wherefore it must of necessity be granted, that besides passion from corporeal things, or the passive perception of sense, there is in the souls of men another more active principle or vis cognoscendarum rerum innata, an "innate cognoscitive power," whereby they are enabled to understand or judge of what is received from without by sense. And some, that would otherwise make the soul as naked a thing as is possible, are forced to acknowledge thus much. And hereby they grant all that we contend for and they deny, though considering not in the mean time what they say. For this innate cognoscitive power in the soul, can be nothing else but a power of raising intelligible ideas and conceptions of things from within itself. For it is not possible that any knowledge should be without an objective idea or conception of something known included in it, or that νόησις, "the intellection," should be in one faculty, and νόημα, "the conception," in another, one in the intellect, and the other in the fancy. That knowledge should be actively produced from within, and the conception or objective idea passively received from without, that the mind should exert an act of knowledge or intellection without an object, or upon an object without itself, and not comprehended by it, that the idea of the thing known should not be comprehended in the knowledge of it. Whereas, as Aristotle himself hath observed, Τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, "Actual knowledge is in reality the same with the thing known, or the idea of it," and therefore inseparable from it. It being nothing but the mind's being conscious of some intelligible idea within itself.

4. And therefore, whereas the only objects of sense are indi-

* De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 6.

vidual corporeal things existing without the mind, which the soul perceives by looking out from itself upon that from which it suffers, not actively comprehended within itself; the primary and immediate objects of intellection and knowledge, are not things existing without the mind, but the ideas of the mind itself actively exerted, that is, the intelligible rationes, "reasons," of things. Νόησις οὐ τοῦ ἔξω, ὥσπερ ἡ αἴσθησις, "The intellection is not of what is without, as sense is." And ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ, "the immediate objects of intellection are not without the mind that understands." They are assertions that Plotinus* at large demonstrates. And Aristotle frequently asserts the same:† Ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γαρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, "In abstracted things that which understands and that which is understood are the same; for the theoretical science and the scibile, 'knowable,'" or object of knowledge are all one. And ὅλως ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν, "the mind altogether is that which understands things." These being all but several modifications of intellect. For as hard and soft, hot and cold, and the like corporeal qualities, are but several modifications of matter, so the several objective ideas of the mind in scientifical speculation, are but several modifications of the mind knowing. Wherefore individual things existing without the soul, are but the secondary objects of knowledge and intellection, which the mind understands not by looking out from itself as sense doth, but by reflecting inwardly upon itself, and comprehending them under those intelligible ideas or rationes, "reasonings," of its own, which it protrudes from within itself; so that the mind or intellect may well be called (though in another sense than Protagoras meant it) τὸ μέτρον πάντων, "the measure of all things."

5. For the soul having an innate cognoscitive power universally (which is nothing else but a power of raising objective ideas within itself, and intelligible rationes, "reasons," of any thing), it must needs be granted that it hath a potential omniformity in it. Which is not only asserted by the Platonists, that the soul is πάντα νοιρῶς, "all things intellectually," but also by Aristotle himself, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πῶς πάντα, "that the soul is in a manner all things." The mind being a kind of notional or representative world, as it were a diaphanous and crystalline sphere, in which the ideas and images of all things existing in the real universe may be reflected or represented. For as the mind of God, which is the archetypal intellect, is that whereby he always actually comprehends himself, and his own fecundity, or the extent of his own infinite

* Enn. 5. lib. 5. cap. 1. 2.

† De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 6.

goodness and power; that is, the possibility of all things; so all created intellects being certain ectypal models, or derivative compendiums of the same; although they have not the actual ideas of all things, much less are the images or sculptures of all the several species of existent things fixed and engraven in a dead manner upon them; yet they have them all virtually and potentially comprehended in that one vis cognitrix, "cognoscitive power," of the soul, which is a potential omniformity, whereby it is enabled as occasion serves and outward objects invite, gradually and successively to unfold and display itself in a vital manner, by framing intelligible ideas or conceptions within itself of whatsoever hath any entity or cogitability. As the spermatic or plastic power doth virtually contain within itself the forms of all the several organical parts of animals, and displays them gradually and successively, framing an eye here and an ear there.

6. Now because intellection and knowledge are not passion from without, but an active exertion of the mind from within itself, hence it comes to pass, as Aristotle hath observed, that the mind by knowing that which is σφόδρα νοητὸν, "exceedingly intelligible," the most radiant and illustrious truths, is not debilitated thereby or overpowered, as sense is in perceiving that which is σφόδρα αἰσθητὸν, "exceedingly sensible," as the brightness of the sun; but contrariwise the more invigorated thereby, and the better enabled to comprehend lesser and smaller truths; because though sense is passive and organical, yet knowledge is inorganical and an active power and strength of the mind, which the more it is exerted, is the more thereby invigorated and enlarged.

From hence likewise it is, as the same Aristotle hath observed,* ἀκριβεστέραν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἐπιστήμης, τὴν μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴν τῆς ἁρμονικῆς, "that those knowledges which are more abstract and remote from matter, are more accurate," intelligible and demonstrable, than those which are conversant about concrete and material things, as arithmetic than harmonics, which are numbers concrete with sounds; and so likewise geometry than astronomy, or the mixed mathematics; whereas if all knowledge did arise from corporeal things by way of sense and passion, it must needs be contrariwise true, that the more concrete and sensible things were, the more knowable they would be. Moreover, from hence it is also, as experience tells us, that scientifical knowledge is best acquired by the soul's abstraction from the outward objects of sense, and retiring into itself, that so it may the better attend to its own inward notions and ideas. And therefore it is many times observed, that overmuch reading and hearing of other

* Analyt. Posterior. lib. 1. cap. 27.

men's discourses, though learned and elaborate, doth not only distract the mind, but also debilitates the intellectual powers, and makes the mind passive and sluggish, by calling it too much outwards. For which cause that wise philosopher Socrates altogether shunned that dictating and dogmatical way of teaching used by the sophisters of that age, and chose rather an aporetical and obstetricious method; because knowledge was not to be poured into the soul like liquor, but rather to be invited and gently drawn forth from it; nor the mind so much to be filled therewith from without, like a vessel, as to be kindled and awakened. Lastly, from hence is that strange parturiency that is often observed in the mind, when it is solicitously set upon the investigation of some truth, whereby it doth endeavour, by ruminating and revolving within itself as it were to conceive it within itself, parturire, "to bring it forth out of its own womb;" by which it is evident, that the mind is naturally conscious of its own active fecundity, and also that it hath a criterion within itself, which will enable it to know when it hath found that which it sought.

7. Wherefore it is evident from what we have declared, that there are two kinds of perceptive cogitations in the soul: the one passive, when the soul perceives by suffering from its body, and the objects without; the other active, when it perceives by exerting its own native vigour from within itself. The passive perceptions of the soul have two several names given unto them; for when the soul, by sympathizing with the body, seems to perceive corporeal things, as present and really existing without it, then they are called αἰσθήματα, "sensations." But when the passive affections of the soul are looked upon not as things really existing without the mind, but only as pictures of sensible things in the mind, or more crass or corporeal cogitations, then they are called φαντάσματα, "phantasms," or imaginations. But these φαντάσματα and αἰσθήματα, "phantasms" and "sensations," being really the same things, as we said before, both of them being passions or affections in the soul, caused by some local motions in the body, and the difference between them being only accidental, insomuch that φαντάσματα, "phantasms," may be changed into αἰσθήματα, "sensations," and sometimes also αἰσθήματα, "sensations," into φαντάσματα, "phantasms," therefore all these passive perceptions of the soul may be called in general φαντάσματα, "phantasms." But the active perceptions which rise from the mind itself without the body, are commonly called νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind;" and so we have the two species of perceptive cogitations; the one φαντάσματα, "phantasms," and the other νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind."

8. Now that all our perceptive cogitations are not φαντάσματα, "phantasms," as many contend, but that there is another species

of perceptive cogitations distinct from them, arising from the active vigour of the mind itself, which we therefore call νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind," is demonstrably evident from hence; because phantasms are nothing else but sensible ideas, images, or pictures of outward objects, such as are caused in the soul by sense; whence it follows, that nothing is φανταστὸν, "the object of fancy," but what is also αἰσθητὸν, "the object of sense," nothing can be fancied by the soul, but what is perceptible by sense. But there are many objects of our mind, which we can neither see, hear, feel, smell, nor taste, and which did never enter into it by any sense; and therefore we can have no sensible pictures or ideas of them, drawn by the pencil of that inward limner or painter which borrows all his colours from sense, which we call fancy; and if we reflect on our own cogitations of these things, we shall sensibly perceive that they are not fantastical, but noematical. As for example, justice, equity, duty and obligation, cogitation, opinion, intellection, volition, memory, verity, falsity, cause, effect, genus, species, nullity, contingency, possibility, impossibility, and innumerable more such there are that will occur to any one that shall turn over the vocabularies of any language, none of which can have any sensible picture drawn by the pencil of the fancy. And there are many whole propositions likewise, in which there is not any one word or notion that we can have any genuine phantasm of, much less can fancy reach to an apprehension of the necessity of the connexion of the terms. As for example: Nihil potest esse et non esse eodem tempore, "Nothing can be and not be at the same time." What proper and genuine phantasms can any perceive in his mind either of nihil, "nothing," or potest, "can," or esse, "be," or et, "and," or non esse, "not be," or eodem, "at the same," or tempore, "time."

9. Neither was it asserted by Aristotle, as some have taken for granted, that all our perceptive cogitations are phantasms, but contrariwise, that there are νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind" which are distinct things from φαντάσματα, "phantasms," only that the latter were always individual companions of the former. This appears from those words of his: Νοήματα τινὶ διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα φαντασμάτα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων,* "The conceptions of the mind somewhat differ from phantasms, they are not phantasms, but neither are they without phantasms. Where he inclines to this, that the νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind," are not φαντάσματα, "phantasms," but that they have phantasms always joined with them. So again afterwards he asks: Εἰ τὸ νοεῖν φαντασία, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, "Whether intellection be fancy, or rather a different thing from fancy, but such as never goes without it." Which indeed he

* De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 9.

affirms in other places, that the mind doth never νοεῖν, "conceive" without a phantasm. Now, this is true of sensible and corporeal things, that we never understand them, but we have also some confused phantasms or other of them in our mind, and yet besides the φαντάσματα, "phantasms," the mind exerts νοήματα, "conceptions" also upon them, or else it could not understand them, phantasms being but imperfect, incomplete, and superficial cogitations, which sometimes go before, and invite or call in the meanwhile the perceptions of the mind, and sometimes follow and attend upon the νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind," as the shadow upon the substance, but never comprehend the thing. And indeed, as we ourselves consist of soul and body naturally united together, so are the cogitations that we have of corporeal things usually both noematical and phantasmatical together, the one being as it were the soul, and the other the body of them. For when a geometrician considers a triangle, being about to demonstrate that it hath three angles equal to two right angles, no doubt but he will have the phatasmatical picture of some triangle in his mind; and yet notwithstanding he hath also a noematical perception or intellectual idea of it too, as appears from hence, because every express picture of a triangle must of necessity be either obtusangular or rectangular, or acutangular, but that which in his mind is the subject of this proposition thought on, is the ratio, "reason," of a triangle undetermined to any of these species. And the like might be observed also of the word angles in the same proposition. In like manner, whenever we think of a phantasmatical, universal, or universalized phantasm, or a thing which we have no clear intellection of; as for example, of the nature of a rose in general, there is a complication of something noematical, and something phantasmatical together; for φαντάσματα, "phantasms," in themselves alone, as well as αἰσθήματα, "sensations," are always individual things. And by a rose considered thus universally and phantasmatically, we mean a thing which so affects our sense in respect of figure and colour.

10. But as for those other objects of cogitation, which we affirmed before to be in themselves neither αἰσθητὰ, "the objects of sense," nor φανταστὰ, "the objects of fancy," but only νοητὰ, "things understood," and therefore can have no natural and genuine phantasms properly belonging to them; yet it is true, notwithstanding that the fantastic power of the soul, which would never willingly be altogether idle or quite excluded, will busily intend itself here also. And therefore many times, when the intellect or mind above is exercised in abstracted intellections and contemplations, the fancy will at the same time busily employ itself below, in making some kind of apish imitations, counterfeit iconisms, symbolical adumbrations and resemblances

of those intellectual cogitations of sensible and corporeal things. And hence it comes to pass, that in speech, metaphors and allegories do so exceedingly please, because they highly gratify this fantastical power of passive and corporeal cogitation in the soul, and seem thereby also something to raise and refresh the mind itself, otherwise lazy and ready to faint and be tired by overlong abstracted cogitations, by taking its old companion the body to go along with it, as it were to rest upon, and by affording to it certain crass, palpable, and corporeal images, to incorporate those abstracted cogitations in, that it may be able thereby to see those still more silent and subtle notions of its own, sensibly reflected to itself from the corporeal glass of the fancy.

Sometimes also there are other spurious phantasms that do little or nothing symbolize with the noetical cogitations, that yet are arbitrarily or customarily annected to them, merely because the fantastic power would not stand wholly idle and unemployed; so that when the mind thinks of such an intelligible idea, the fancy will presently hold forth such a customary phantasm before it, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες, "as those that use artificial memory, make certain phantasms at pleasure" to signify certain cogitations.

But lastly, rather than the fancy shall quite stand out and do just nothing at all, it will sometimes exercise itself (especially in speech) in raising phantasms of the very sounds and names, by which the notions of the mind are signified respectively. So that it is very true both that there are active νοήματα, "cogitations of the mind" distinct from φαντάσματα, "phantasms;" and such of which there can be no natural and genuine phantasms or sensible pictures; and yet according to Aristotle's opinion, that frequently those νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind" (at least in the vulgar, that are little accustomed to abstracted cogitation) have some kind of spurious and counterfeit, or verbal and nominal phantasms joined with and accompanying of them.

11. As for that opinion, that the νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind," and intelligible ideas or rationes, "reasons," of the mind should be raised out of the φαντάσματα, "phantasms," by the strange chemistry of intellectus agens, "an agent intelligence;" this as it is founded on a mistake of Aristotle's meaning, who never dreamed of any such a chimerical intellectus agens, "agent intelligence," as appears from the Greek interpreters that best understood him; so it is very like to that other opinion called Peripatetical, that asserts the eduction of immaterial forms out of the power of matter; and as both of them arise from the same sottishness of mind that would make stupid and senseless matter the original source of all things; so there is the same impossibility in both, that perfection should be raised out

of imperfection, and that vigour, activity and awakened energy, should ascend and emerge out of dull, sluggish and drowsy passion. But indeed this opinion attributes as much activity to the mind, if at least the agent intelligence be a part of it, as ours doth; as he would attribute as much activity to the sun, that should say the sun had a power of educing light out of night or the dark air, as he that should say the sun had a power of exerting light out of his own body. The former being but an improper way of expressing the same thing, which is properly signified in the latter way.

But that other opinion, that asserts that the abstract and universal rationes, "reasons," of things, as distinct from phantasms, are nothing else but mere names without any signification, is so ridiculously false, that it deserves no confutation at all.

CHAPTER II.

1. That there are some ideas of the mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from the sensible objects without, and therefore must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself, is evident, in that there are, first, ideas of such things as neither are affections of bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any local motions, nor can be pictured at all by the fancy in any sensible colours; such as are the ideas of wisdom, folly, prudence, imprudence, knowledge, ignorance, verity, falsity, virtue, vice, honesty, dishonesty, justice, injustice, volition, cogitation, nay, of sense itself, which is a species of cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any sense; and many other suchlike notions as include something of cogitation in them, or refer to cogitative beings only; which ideas must needs spring from the active power and innate fecundity of the mind itself, because the corporeal objects of sense can imprint no such things upon it. Secondly, in that there are many relative notions and ideas, attributed as well to corporeal as incorporeal things that proceed wholly from the activity of the mind comparing one thing with another. Such as are cause, effect, means, end, order, proportion, similitude, dissimilitude, equality, inequality, aptitude, inaptitude, symmetry, asymmetry, whole and part, genus and species, and the like.

2. But that which imposes upon men's judgments here, so as to make them think, that these are all passive impressions made upon the soul by the objects of sense, is nothing else but this; because the notions both of those relative ideas, and also of those other immaterial things (as virtue, wisdom, the soul, God) are

most commonly excited and awakened occasionally from the appulse of outward objects knocking at the doors of our senses. And these men not distinguishing betwixt the outward occasion or invitation of those cogitations, and the immediate active or productive cause of them, impute them therefore all alike, as well these intelligible, as the other sensible ideas, or phantasms, to the efficiency or activity of the outward objects upon us. Wherefore that we may the better understand how far the passion of sense reaches, and where the activity of the mind begins, we will compare these three things together: First, a mirror, looking-glass or crystal globe; secondly, a living eye, that is, a seeing or perceptive mirror or looking-glass; thirdly, a mind or intellect superadded to this living eye or seeing mirror.

3. First, therefore, when the same objects are equally exposed or held before a crystal globe or looking-glass, and a living eye; there are all the same impressions made upon the crystal globe that there are upon the living eye; which appears from hence, because the eye looking upon the crystal globe or mirror, will see all the same images reflected to itself from thence, that it perceived before immediately from the objects themselves. The motion and pressure of the ethereal globuli, "globulous particles," in which the nature of light is conceived to consist, from every opaque object, bearing alike every way upon that which resists, and therefore as much upon the mirror as the eye; so that there is every jot as much corporeal passion in the mirror or crystal globe, as in the glassy part of the living eye; for, as we said before, the corporeal part of the eye is indeed nothing else but a mirror or looking-glass. And yet notwithstanding, the mirror or crystal globe doth not see or perceive any thing as the eye doth; from whence we learn, first, that things are never perceived merely by their own force and activity upon the percipient, but by the innate force, power and ability of that which perceives. And therefore, secondly, that sense itself is not a mere corporeal passion, but a perception of the bodily passions proceeding from some power and ability supposed to reside in a sensitive soul, vitally united to that respective body. Which perception, though it have something of energy in it, as being a cogitation; yet it is rightly called a passion of the soul, because it is not a clear intellective or cognoscitive perception of the motions of the body, but a passive or sympathetical perception only. Whereby, according to nature's instinct, it hath several seemings or appearances begotten in it of those resisting objects without it at a distance, in respect of colour, magnitude, figure and local motion; by reason of the difference of those rectilinear motions communicated from them by the intermediate globuli, "globulous particles," and impressed upon the optic nerves.

Wherefore the living eye immediately perceives nothing but

these corporeal passions which are made equally upon it, and the mirror or crystal globe alike, by the motion of that intermediate or subtle body which causeth light; which corporeal passions being also passively perceived by that vital principle called the sensitive power residing in the eye, all passion from the outward object there ceaseth, and goes no further; but that power of the soul that next followeth, which is the third thing that we mentioned before, the intellect, begins immediately to exert and display its activity upon the object passively perceived by sense.

4. But the better to illustrate the business in hand, let us again suppose some ingenious piece of mechanism, or artificial automaton; as for example, an horologe or watch, at once held before the mirror or crystal globe, and also exposed to the particular view of the living or sentient eye, both in the outside and interior fabric of it; so that as every part in it is reflected from the mirror, so it may be consciously perceived also by the sentient eye, in a particular successive view. Now the sentient eye will be conscious or perceptive of nothing in all this, but only its being variously affected, from different colours, figures, protuberancies, cavities, sculptures, local motions, one after another, all the same things which were impressed on the crystal globe or mirror, and reflected from it, there being no difference at all betwixt the one and the other, but that the eye was conscious or perceptive of what it suffered, but the mirror not. But now the mind or intellect being superadded to this sentient eye, and exerting its active and more comprehensive power upon all that which was reflected from the mirror, and passively perceived by the sentient eye, as it doth actually and intellectually comprehend the same things over again, which sense had perceived before in another manner (of which we must speak afterward), so it proceeds further, and compares all the several parts of this ingenious machine or self-mover one with another, taking notice first, of the spring, as the original and cause of all the motion in it; of the chain or string, by the mediation of which that motion is communicated to the fusee; of the balance that reciprocating moderates the motion of the several wheels, some greater, some lesser, propagating the motion from one to another; of the horary circle divided into equal parts; and, lastly, of the index, moving round about the circle, through equal space in equal time, all these in their several scheses, "relations" to one another and the whole. Whereupon the intellect, besides figure, colour, magnitude and motions, raises and excites within itself the intelligible ideas of cause, effect, means, end, priority and posteriority, equality and inequality, order and proportion, symmetry and asymmetry, aptitude and inaptitude, sign and thing signified, whole and part, in a manner, all the logical and relative notions that are. Whereas the sentient eye, by which this whole me-

chanism was represented to the intellect, perceived none of all these things; neither cause nor effect, nor equality nor irregularity, nor order nor proportions, nor symmetry nor asymmetry, nor sign nor thing signified, nor whole nor part; since there is no colour nor figure in any of these things. And if the sentient eye could dispute with the mind or intellect, it would confidently avow and maintain, that there were no such entities as those in this automaton "self-moving machine," and that the understanding was abused and deceived in those apprehensions; since all that was impressed from the object was, by the sentient eye, faithfully transmitted to it, and the intellect received all its intelligence or information from it. And to make its cause good, sense would appeal to the mirror or crystal globe standing by, in which there were no images of any of those invisible ideas or logical notions reflected. Wherefore since sense doth freely conceive and ingenuously own, that none of these ideas are passively and phantasmatically stamped upon it from the objects without; be they what they will, real or not real, certain it is that they are the objects of the intellect, and they must of necessity be raised in it by its own innate vigour and activity.

5. Indeed though it should be granted, that the scheses, "relations," of cause and effect, whole and parts, and the like, were mere notions of the mind and modes of conceiving in us, that only signify what things are relatively to intellect; yet it would not follow from hence, that they had no reality at all, but were absolute nonentities; because intellect being a real thing, and that which indeed hath more of entity in it than matter or body, the modifications of intellect must needs be as real things as the modifications of matter; and therefore cause and effect, whole and part, symmetry and asymmetry, and all the other logical notions would have as much reality in them as hard and soft, moist and dry, hot and cold, which, though but modifications of matter, are looked upon as very real things; and such intellectuals as were relative to intellect be as real, as those sensible phantasms which are relative to sense. But this must not be granted, that the modes of conception in the understanding (where all truth is), are disagreeable to the reality of the things conceived by them; and so being unconformable, are therefore false. Wherefore that these scheses, "relations," are not (though sense doth not perceive them) mere notions or figments of the mind, without any fundamental reality in the things themselves without us, corresponding to them, appears from hence, because art and wisdom are most real things, which beget real effects of the greatest moment and consequence in nature and human life of any thing; and yet are conversant about nothing else but only the relations, proportions, aptitudes of things to one another, and to certain ends. Now if these were all mere figments, and

nothing but logical notions or entia rationis, "beings of reason," then there could be no such realities produced out of them. Nay, then art and wisdom themselves must needs be figments and fancies, and likewise it would be indifferent whatever a man did in order to any end or effect; and all men (as Protagoras held) would be really alike wise and skilful. Then there would be no other extrinsical causality of any effect but that of efficiency, force, or power; which, in corporeal things, is nothing else but local motion. And no such thing as the causality of skill and art (that is commonly called the exemplary cause), distinct from force, power, and blind impetuosity. Nay, then virtue, justice, honesty, must of necessity be figments also, because moral good and evil are schetical and relative things; and which is more yet, external convenience and inconvenience, utility and inutility themselves, be nothing else but fancies also.

6. But though the verdict and testimony of sense ought to be admitted as authentic in this particular, as to what is or is not passively impressed upon us from without, because it is not possible that any thing should be impressed upon the intellect from sensible things, but it must needs pass through the medium of sense, and so be transmitted thereby unto the understanding, which cannot be, unless sense be conscious thereof; yet notwithstanding, sense is not at all to be heard, as to the reality or nonreality of these relative ideas, it being no competent judge in that controversy. Because since the knowledge of things doth not arise from the activity, energy, and radiation of the objects without upon us, passively received by sense, but from the active and comprehensive energy or activity of the mind itself, as we have already observed: In cognoscendo cuncta, suâ potiùs facultate quàm rerum quæ cognoscuntur uti. Cum enim omne judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est, ut suam quisque operam non ex alienâ, sed ex propriâ facultate perficiat, "That in knowing all things, it rather useth its own power than that of the things which are known. For since all judgment is the act of him that judgeth, it must needs be that every one perform his own work, not by the power of another, but by his own faculty," as the afore-commended Boethius expresseth it.* We ought not to conclude that those relative ideas are therefore mere figments or modes of conceiving in us, because sense is not conscious of any such things passively impressed upon it from without, and because that lower and narrow faculty comprehends them not; but rather acquiesce in the sentiment of that larger and more comprehensive faculty the intellect, that judges of things by exerting its own active power upon them.

7. Wherefore, if we well consider it, we shall find that not only the beauty and pulchritude, but also the strength and ability

* De Consolat. Philos. lib. 5. p. 132.

of natural and corporeal things themselves, depend upon these relations and proportions of one thing to another. For what is pulchritude in visible objects, or harmony in sounds, but the proportion, symmetry, and commensuration of figures and sounds to one another, whereby infinity is measured and determined, and multiplicity and variety vanquished and triumphed over by unity, and by that means they become grateful and pleasing objects to the ear and eye of intellectual auditors and spectators, there being as it were certain ludicrous irritations and symbolical resemblances of art and wisdom, nay, and virtue too (as we shall show afterward), that is, of intellectuality in general appearing in them, whereby the mind beholds as it were its own face and image reflected to itself from a corporeal glass.

But because many will be ready to say here, that beauty is nothing but a fancy neither, and therefore cannot argue any reality in these schetical things; I add that even the strength and ability of corporeal things themselves depends upon the mutual scheses, "relations" and proportions of one thing to another. And this all men will be sensible of as something. And the truth hereof evidently appears from the mechanical powers. Nay, the health and strength of the body of animals arises from the configuration of the organical parts, and the fit contemperation of humours and the insensible parts with one another; so that if this harmonical crasis, "temperature" of the whole body be disturbed and put out of tune, weakness and languor, "languishing" will immediately seize upon it. Nay, doth not all the strength, as well as the comeliness and beauty of an army, consist in order? And therefore, if we should suppose some subtle sophister, and popular orator, sent from the quarters of an enemy, into a vast, numerous, and puissant army, that should insinuate into the common soldiers so far, as generally to persuade them, that order was nothing but a mere fancy or logical notion; a thing craftily devised by their commanders, merely to keep them in subjection, that they might the better tyrannize over them, and rule them as they please; insomuch that they should all at length altogether neglect their ranks and files, and put themselves wholly into disorder and confusion, and in this fashion prepare themselves to encounter their approaching enemy, would they not hereby be betrayed to certain ruin, though the enemy should be but a small handful of men, but well ordered and well commanded? For order is that which makes things, junctis viribus "with united forces," to conspire all to one end, whereby the whole hath the force and ability of all the several particular strengths conjoined and united into one.

8. Therefore I say, in the next place, returning to our former instance of an automaton or horologe, that though those several

relative ideas of cause, effect, symmetry, proportion, order, whole, and part, and the like, considered formally as νοήματα, "conceptions of the mind," be only in the intellect itself (as the ideas and conceptions of all other things likewise are;) yet notwithstanding the intellect doth not forge or falsify any thing in apprehending of them, in that material automaton "self-mover," represented to it by sense, because all the several scheses, "relations" are fundamentally and really in the same, though they could not be stamped upon sense materially, and received passively from it. And therefore, that the true nature, formal ratio "reason," essence and idea of this automaton, "self-mover," watch or horologe, is really compounded and made up of those several scheses, "relations," as ingredients into it, so that it cannot possibly be understood without them; though sense could not reach to the comprehension of any one of them, much less of this whole logical system or compages, "collection" of them. It being impossible that the nature of automaton, "a self-mover," horologe, or watch, should be otherwise understood than by the comprehension of these relative ideas; and by such a logical, unitive, comprehensive power and activity, as can frame out of them one idea of the whole. For an horologe or watch is not mere silver or gold, brass and steel, any way jumbled, mingled, or confounded together, but it is such an apt and proportionable disposition of certain quantities of those several materials into several parts of such certain figures, contemperated together, as may harmoniously conspire to make up one equal and uniform motion, which running as it were parallel with the motion of time, and passing round the horary circle, and being measured in that horary circle, may also measure out and distinguish the quantity of that silent and successive flux, which, like a still and deep river, carries down all things along with it indiscernibly, and without any noise; and which, in its progressive motion, treads so lightly and softly, that it leaves no traces, prints, or footsteps at all behind it.

9. Wherefore the eye of sense, though it be fixed never so much upon the material outside of this automaton, "self-mover," yet it never comprehends the formal nature of it within itself, as it is, totum, "a whole" made up of several parts, united not so much by corporeal contact or continuity, as by their relative conspiration to one certain end. Sense being like one of those narrow telescopes, by which the eye looking upon the moon, can never view it all at once, and see the site and configuration of all the several mountains and valleys, and seas in it, and have one comprehensive idea of the whole; but taking it in the piecemeal, part after part, leaves the intelligent spectator afterwards to compile and make up one entire draught or map of stenography out of all those several particular or partial views.

So that if we will speak properly, we cannot say that the eye sees any machina, "machine" or automaton, "self-mover," for it is but variously affected from the material part of it, perceiving several passions in itself from the several colours and figures of it, it being so far from comprehending the formal ratio, "reason" of it, as it is a totum, "whole" made up of several parts, according to several scheses, "relations" and proportions contributing thereto, that it cannot reach to any one relative idea, neither doth bare fancy go any further than sense. Or else the difference between intellect and sense may be resembled by the difference betwixt the sense of sight and touch. For touch groping, perceives but as it were a point at once, the eye comprehends the whole superficies. Sense sees particular things absolutely, intellect compares them according to those relations they have to one another, has a comprehensive idea of a totum, "whole" made up of several parts as one thing. And therefore the form, ratio, "reason," or intelligible idea of an automaton, "self-mover" or horologe, was never stamped or impressed upon the soul from without, but upon occasion of the sensible idea excited and exerted from the inward active and comprehensive power of the intellect itself.

10. There are many other such ideas of the mind, of certain totums, "wholes" made up of several corporeal parts, which, though sometimes locally discontinued, yet are joined together by scheses, "relations," and habitudes to one another (founded in some actions of them, as they are cogitative beings) and by order all conspiring into one thing: which, though they are altogether imperceptible by sense, and therefore were never stamped or impressed upon the mind from the objects without; yet, notwithstanding, are not mere figments or entia rationis, "beings of reason," but things of the greatest reality, founded in certain actions of thinking and cogitative beings; which are altogether imperceptible by sense, and therefore could not possibly be outwardly stamped upon the mind; as for example, a polity or commonwealth, called an artificial man, which is a company of many united together by consent or contract under one government, to be regulated by some certain laws as it were by one will for the good of the whole; where, though the eye may see the particular persons, (or at least their outsides) that are the respective members thereof, yet it can neither see the bond which unites them together, which is nothing but relation, nor comprehend the totum, "whole" that is made up of them, that is, a polity or commonwealth, according to the formal nature of it, which is an idea that proceeds merely from the unitive power and activity of the mind itself.

In a word, all the ideas of things called artificial or mechanical, contain something in them that never came from sense, nor was

ever stamped upon the soul from the objects without, which, though it be not merely notional or imaginary, but really belongs to the nature of that thing, yet is no otherwise than intellectually comprehended. As for example, a house or palace is not only stone, brick, mortar, timber, iron, glass, heaped together; but the very essence and formal ratio, "reason" of it is made up of relative or schetical notions, it being a certain disposition of those several materials into a totum, "whole" or compages, "collection," consisting of several parts, rooms, stairs, passages, doors, chimneys, windows, convenient for habitation, and fit for the several uses of men; in which there is the logic of whole and parts, order, proportion, symmetry, aptitude, concinnity, all complicated with wood, stone, iron, and glass, as it were informing and adorning the rude and confused mass of matter, and making it both beautiful and serviceable. And therefore for this cause, no man that is in his wits will say, that a stately and royal palace hath therefore less reality, entity, and substantiality in it, than a heap of rubbish confusedly cast together; because, forsooth, the idea of it partly consists of logical notions, which are thought to be mere imaginary things; whereas the totum, "whole" is all solid matter without this notional form. For this logical form which is the passive stamp or print of intellectuality in it, the first archetypes contained in the idea or skill of the architect, and thence introduced into the rude matter, successively with much pains and labour, is the only thing that distinguishes it from mere dirt and rubbish, and gives it the essence of a house or palace. And it hath therefore the more of entity in it, because it partakes of art or intellectuality. But the eye or sense of a brute, though it have as much passively impressed upon it from without, as the soul of a man hath, when it looks upon the most royal and magnificent palace, if it should see all the inside also as well as the outside, could not comprehend from thence the formal idea and nature of a house or palace, which nothing but an active intellectual principle can reach unto.

II. Neither is this true of such things only as are commonly called artificial, but also of natural compounded things, such as plants and animals are. And indeed, if we consider things philosophically, we shall not find any such essential difference as is commonly supposed, betwixt things called artificial and natural. For there is a nature in all artificial things, and again, an artifice in all compounded natural things. Plants and animals being nothing else but artificial mechanisms, the latter of which especially are contrived with infinitely more wit, variety, and curiosity than any mechanisms or automata, "self-movers" that were ever yet produced by human art. Wherefore the true form of an animal, if we attend only to the mechanism of the body

(for we must acknowledge something else not only in men but also in brutes, if they have any cogitation besides mechanism, which is a substance of another nature, or a cogitative being united to the body) is an idea that includes many relative and logical notions in it, and therefore could never be stamped upon the soul by sense; for sense only takes notice of several colours and figures either in the outside or the inside of any animals, but doth not sum them up into one totum, "whole." But the idea of it, as collected into one mechanical automaton, "self-mover," consisting of many organical parts fitly proportioned together, and all harmoniously conspiring to one end, to make it every way a fit habitation for a cogitative substance to reside in, in respect of nutrition, local motion, sense, and all other functions of life; such an idea, I say, that hath something of logic in it, is only conceivable by the unitive, active and comprehensive power of the intellect.

The same is to be affirmed of that huge and vast automaton, which some will have to be an animal likewise, the visible world or material universe, commonly called Κόσμος or mundus, cosmos or mundus, "the world," from the beauty of it: whether we mean thereby that one single vortex, to which our planetary earth belongs, or a system of as many vortices as we see fixed stars in the heavens, their central sunsand circumferential planets moving round about them respectively. Now sense looking round about, and making many particular views, sees now one fixed star, and then another; now the moon, then the sun; here a mountain, there a valley; at one time a river, at another a sea, particular vegetables and animals one after another. But it cannot sum up or unite all together, nor rise to any comprehensive idea of the whole at once, as it is one or many mechanical automatons, "self-movers," most curiously and artificially framed of innumerable parts; in which there are all manner of logical scheses, "relations," possible offered to the mind, but all so fitly proportioned with such admirable symmetries and correspondencies in respect of one another and the whole, that they perfectly conspire into one most orderly and harmonious form.

Hitherto therefore we have seen, that the relative ideas that we have in our mind, are not passions impressed upon the soul from the objects without, but arise from the innate activity of the mind itself; and therefore because the essences or ideas of all compounded corporeal things themselves, whether artificial or natural; that is, whether made by the artifice of men or nature, always necessarily include these logical scheses, "relations," in them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that no corporeal compounded thing whatsoever is understood by sense, nor the idea of it passively stamped upon the mind, from the objects

without, but comprehended only by the large unitive power of the intellect, and exerted from the innate activity thereof.

12. But the case is still clearer concerning those other ideas before-mentioned, of the several modes of cogitative beings, or such as involve or include some relation to them; that these are not by the passive impresses from the outward objects by sense; although they are often occasionally invited and drawn forth by them. Which we shall illustrate by the former instance of an artificial automaton, "self-mover," exhibited first to the view of sense, and afterward actively comprehended by the understanding. After the mind hath framed a clear idea of this automaton, "self-mover," within itself, the end or design whereof is to measure the equal motion either of the sun and heavens, or earth (according to different astronomical hypotheses) by the equal motion of this automaton, "self-mover," and so to distinguish or mark out to us the quantities of that silent and undiscerned flux of time; and when it hath considered how aptly conducible every part of this mechanism is to that design, and how there is neither the least redundancy nor deficiency in any thing in order thereunto, and of the beauty and elegancy of the fabric, making a further and a more inward reflection upon the same, it plainly perceives this accurate contrivance to be but a passive print or stamp of some active and living art or skill upon it: wherefore the ideas of art and skill are upon this occasion naturally exerted from it; neither doth it rest in considering of art and skill abstractedly, but because these are modes of an existent cogitative being, it thinks presently of some particular intelligent being, the artificer or author of this curious fabric, and looking further into it finds his name also engraven in legible characters upon the same, whereupon he forthwith pronounces the sound of it. Whereas the living eye, that is, sense alone in its antecedent view, as it could not espy any logical scheses, "relations," or notions there, so neither can it perceive any ideas of art or skill in it, they having neither figure nor colour in them, nor of author and artificer, any more than it could see the sound of the artificer's name in the engraven sculptures or characters of it; for the eye could see no more than was represented in or reflected from the crystal globe or mirror. Wherefore the ideas of art and skill, author and artificer were not passively imprinted upon the intellect from the material automaton, "self-mover," but only occasionally invited from the mind itself, as the figures of the engraven letters did not passively impress the sound of the artificer's name upon him, but only occasion him to exert it from his own activity.

13. Just in the same manner it happens many times in the contemplation of that great automaton, "self-mover," of the material universe, which is the Θεοῦ τέχνασμα, "artifice of God,"

the artifice of the best mechanist, though there be no more passively impressed upon us from it, than there is upon the diaphanous air, or liquid ether contiguous to all solid bodies by local motion, of which only sensitive beings have a conscious perception; yet there is a wonderful scene of various thoughts and motions raised in the mind thereupon, which are only occasionally invited by those stamps and impressions made from the material fabric, and its various furniture without, but owe their true original and efficiency to nothing else but the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself. Some of which we have already instanced in the ideas of those relative scheses, "considerations," of corporeal things themselves and their parts to one another; by means of which the intellect rises up to that comprehensive view of the natures of particular corporeal things, and the universal mundane system within itself all at once; which sense perceiving only by little and little, and taking in as it were point after point, cannot sum up its partial perceptions into the entire idea of any one totum "whole." But the intellect doth not rest here, but upon occasion of those corporeal things thus comprehended in themselves, naturally rises higher to the framing and exciting of certain ideas from within itself, of other things not existing in those sensible objects, but absolutely incorporeal. For being ravished with the contemplation of this admirable mechanism and artificial contrivance of the material universe, forthwith it naturally conceives it to be nothing else but the passive stamp, print and signature of some living art and wisdom; as the pattern, archetype and seal of it, and so excites from within itself an idea of that divine art and wisdom. Nay, considering further, how all things in this great mundane machine or animal (as the ancients would have it) are contrived, not only for the beauty of the whole, but also for the good of every part in it, that is endued with life and sense, it exerts another idea, viz. of goodness and benignity from within itself, besides that of art and wisdom, as the queen regent and empress of art, whereby art is employed, regulated and determined; now both these things, whereof the first is art, wisdom and knowledge; the second, goodness, benignity and morality, being looked upon as modes of some intellectual being or mind in which they exist, it from hence presently makes up an idea of God, as the author or architect of this great and boundless machine; a mind infinitely good and wise; and so as it were resounds and re-echoes back the great Creator's name, which from those visible characters impressed upon the material universe, had pierced loudly into its ears, but in such an indiscernible manner, that sense listening never so attentively, could not perceive the least murmur or whisper of it. And this is the most natural scale by which the intellectual mind in the con-

templation of corporeal things ascends to God; from the passive prints and signatures of that one art and wisdom that appears in the universe, by taking notice from thence of the exemplary or archetypal cause, one infinite and eternal mind setting his seal upon all. For as he that hears a consort of musicians playing a lesson, consisting of six or eight several parts, all conspiring to make up one harmony; will immediately conclude, that there was some other cause of that harmony besides those several particular efficients, that struck the several instruments; for every one of them could be but a cause of his own part which he played; but the unity of the whole harmony, into which all the several parts conspire, must needs proceed from the art and musical skill of some one mind, the exemplary and archetypal cause of that vocal harmony, which was but a passive print or stamp of it; so though the Atheist might possibly persuade himself, that every particular creature was the first author or efficient of that part which it played in the universe, by a certain innate power of its own; yet all the parts of the mundane system conspiring into one perfect harmony, there must of necessity be some one universal mind, the archetypal and exemplary cause thereof, containing the plot of the whole mundane music, as one entire thing made up of so many several parts within himself.

14. But that oftentimes there is more taken notice of and perceived by the mind, both in the sensible objects themselves, and by occasion of them, than was impressed from them, or passively received by sense; which therefore must needs proceed from some inward active principle in that which perceives, I shall make it further appear by some other instances.

For, first, let a brute and a man at the same time be made spectators of one and the same artificial statue, picture, or landscape; here the brute will passively receive all that is impressed from the outward object upon sense by local motion, as well as the man, all the several colours and figures of it; and yet the man will presently perceive something in this statue or picture, which the brute takes no notice of at all, viz. beauty and pulchritude, and symmetry, besides the liveliness of the effigies and portraiture. The eye of the brute being every jot as good a glass or mirror, and perhaps endued with a more perspicacious sense or power of passive perception, than that of a man.

Or again, let both a man and a brute at the same time hear the same musical airs, the brute will only be sensible of noise and sounds, but the man will also perceive harmony in them, and be very much delighted with it; nay, even enthusiastically transported by it. Wherefore the brute perceiving all the sounds, as well as the man, but nothing of the harmony, the

difference must needs arise from some inward active principle or anticipation in the man, which the brute hath not.

And indeed the reason is the same both in visibles and audibles; for the sense of a man, by reason of its vicinity and neighbourhood to reason and intellectuality, lodged in the same soul with it, must needs be coloured with some tincture of it; or have some passive impresses of the same upon it; and therefore when it finds or meets with insensible objects any footsteps or resemblances thereof, any thing that hath cognation with intellectuality; as proportion, symmetry and order have, being the passive stamps and impresses of art and skill (which are intellectual things) upon matter, it must needs be highly gratified with the same. But the soul of a brute having no intellectual anticipations in it, but barely suffering from the corporeal objects without, can have no sense of any thing but what their activity impresseth upon it.

Nay further, the man will also espy some symbolical resemblances of morality, of virtue and vice in the variously proportioned sounds and airs; for there are ἠθικαὶ, "ethical" (as Aristotle hath observed) as well as ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ ἁρμονίαι, "enthusiastical harmonies," as the physiognomists in like manner observe signatures of morality in the countenances of men and their pictures, which it is yet less possible that a brute should be sensible of; these differences arising, not from the absolute nature of the objects without, or their bare impression which they make; but the different analogy which they have to some inward and active anticipations which they meet withal in the percipient. For the man hath certain moral anticipations and signatures stamped inwardly upon his soul, which makes him presently take notice of whatsoever symbolizes with it in corporeal things; but the brute hath none.

15. And this will still further appear, if we again compare the judgment of some excellent artists in painting and music with that of an ordinary vulgar person, that hath not any acquired skill in either faculty. For the skilful and expert limner will observe many elegancies and curiosities of art, and be highly pleased with several strokes and shadows in a picture, where a common eye can discern nothing at all; and a musical artist hearing a concert of exact musicians playing some excellent composure of many parts, will be exceedingly ravished with many harmonical airs and touches, that a vulgar ear will be utterly insensible of. Nay, such an one perhaps would be more pleased with the streperous noise of a single fiddle, or the rustical music of the country bagpipes, or the dull humming of a Jew's trump, than the fullest and most exquisitely composed harmony.

And the reason is the same with what was before suggested, because the artists of either kind have many inward anticipations

of skill and art in their minds; which being awakened by those passive impressions of the same skill or art in the outward objects that strike upon their senses, there arises immediately an inward grateful sense and sympathy from the correspondence and analogy that is betwixt them; art and skill in the mind of the musical hearer, finding συγγενές τι, "something akin," to itself in those harmonious airs, some footsteps and resemblances of itself gratefully closing with them. Of which vital sympathy, there is vulgarly thought to be some resemblance in nature; when, upon the striking of a string in one viol, another string, that is an unison to it in a distant viol, will dance and leap; and that not from any mechanical cause (as some conceive) passively only, but from a vital and active principle in nature, which is affected with concord and harmony. Now there is yet a pulchritude of another kind; a more interior symmetry and harmony in the relations, proportions, aptitudes and correspondencies of things to one another in the great mundane system, or vital machine of the universe, which is all musically and harmonically composed; for which cause the ancients made Pan, that is, nature to play upon an harp; but sense, which only passively perceives particular outward objects, doth here, like the brute, hear nothing but mere noise and sound and clatter, but no music or harmony at all; having no active principle and anticipation within itself to comprehend it by, and correspond or vitally sympathize with it; whereas the mind of a rational and intellectual being will be ravished and enthusiastically transported in the contemplation of it; and, of its own accord, dance to this pipe of Pan, nature's intellectual music and harmony.

16. But I shall yet further illustrate this business, that the mind may actively comprehend more in the outward objects of sense, and by occasion of them, than is passively received and impressed from them, by another instance. Suppose a learned written or printed volume, held before the eye of a brute creature or illiterate person; either of them will passively receive all that is impressed upon sense from those delineations; to whom there will be nothing but several scrawls or lines of ink drawn upon white paper. But if a man that hath inward anticipations of learning in him, look upon them, he will immediately have another comprehension of them than that of sense, and a strange scene of thoughts presently represented to his mind from them; he will see heaven, earth, sun, moon and stars, comets, meteors, elements, in those inky delineations; he will read profound theorems of philosophy, geometry, astronomy in them; learn a great deal of new knowledge from them that he never understood before, and thereby justly admire the wisdom of the composer of them. Not that all this was passively stamped upon his soul by sense from those characters; for sense,

as I said before, can perceive nothing here but inky scrawls, and the intelligent reader will many times correct his copy, finding erratas in it; but because his mind was before furnished with certain inward anticipations, that such characters signify the elements of certain sounds, those sounds, certain notions or cogitations of the mind; and because he hath an active power of exciting any such cogitations within himself, he reads in those sensible delineations, the passive stamps or prints of another man's wisdom or knowledge upon them, and also learns knowledge and instruction from them, not as infused into his mind from those sensible characters, but by reason of those hints and significations thereby proposed to it, accidentally kindled, awakened and excited in it. For all but the phantasms of black inky strokes and figures, arises from the inward activity of his own mind. Wherefore this instance in itself shows how the activity of the mind may comprehend more in and from sensible objects, than is passively imprinted by them upon sense.

But now, in the room of this artificial book in volumes, let us substitute the book of nature, the whole visible and material universe, printed all over with the passive characters and impressions of divine wisdom and goodness, but legible only to an intellectual eye; for to the sense both of man and brute, there appears nothing else in it but as in the other, so many inky scrawls, i. e. nothing but figures and colours; but the mind or intellect, which hath an inward and active participation of the same divine wisdom that made it; and being printed all over with the same archetypal seal, upon occasion of those sensible delineations represented to it, and taking notice of whatsoever is cognate to it, exerting its own inward activity from thence, will not have only a wonderful scene and large prospect of other thoughts laid open before it, and variety of knowledge, logical, mathematical, metaphysical, moral displayed; but also clearly read the divine wisdom and goodness, in every page of this great volume, as it were written in large and legible characters.

CHAPTER III.

1. We have hitherto showed, that there are many ideas of the mind, which, though the cogitations of them be often occasionally invited from the motion or appulse of sensible objects without made upon our bodies; yet notwithstanding the ideas themselves could not possibly be stamped or impressed upon the soul from them, because sense takes no cognizance at all of any such things in those corporeal objects, and therefore they must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind

itself. Such as are, first, the relative ideas of the several scheses or respects which are betwixt corporeal things themselves compared with one another. Which relative ideas being not comprehended by sense, and yet notwithstanding, the natures of all compounded corporeal things, whether artificial or natural, that is, whether made by the artifice of men or nature, consisting of them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that the natures of no compounded corporeal things can possibly be known or comprehended by sense. And again, the ideas of cogitative beings, and the several modes of them, together with all such notions as involve some respect or relation to them. For although these also be often occasionally invited and elicited by the objects of sense, when the mind, in the contemplation of them by its own active strength, perceives the signatures of art, counsels, contrivance, wisdom, nay, and goodness also (all which are modes of cogitative beings) printed upon them; yet they cannot owe their being or efficiency to the activity of those outward objects, but merely to the activity of the mind itself.

I should now proceed to show, that even those simple corporeal things themselves, which by sense we have a passive perception of, in individual bodies without us, are also known and understood by the active power of the mind exerting its own intelligible ideas upon them.

2. That sensation is not knowledge of those corporeal things that we sensibly perceive, we have before largely showed; and indeed it sufficiently appears from hence, because upon the seeing of light and colours, though never so clearly, the feeling of heat and cold smartly, the hearing of loud sounds and noises, we naturally inquire further, what this light and colours, heat and cold, and sounds are, which is an undoubted acknowledgment that we have not a clear and satisfactory comprehension of those things which make so strong a stroke and impression upon our senses; and therefore the mind desires to master and conquer them by its own active strength and power, and to comprehend them by some ideas of its own, which are not foreign, but native, domestic, and intrinsical to it.

Now if sense itself be not knowledge, much less can any secondary or derivative result from sense be knowledge; for this would be a more obscure, shadowy and evanid thing than sense itself is. As when the image of a man's face, received in a mirror or looking-glass, is reflected from thence into a second mirror, and so forward into a third; still the further it goes, the more obscure, confused and imperfect it grows, till at last it becomes altogether imperceptible. Or as in the circlings and undulations of water, caused by the falling of a stone into it, that are successively propagated from one to another; the further and wider they go, the waves are still the less, slower and

weaker, till at length they become quite undiscernible. Or as a secondary echo, that is, the echo of an echo, falls as much short of the primary echo in proportion, as that doth of the original voice. Or, lastly, if we could suppose a shadow to cast a shadow, this secondary shadow, or projection of a shadow, would fall as much short of the primary shadow as that did of the substance itself. So if the knowledge of corporeal things were but a secondary and derivative result from sense (though it cannot be conceived that the passion of sense should ray upon the intellect, so as to beget a secondary passion there, any more than one shadow should cast another) then knowledge would be much a weaker perception of them than sense itself is, and nothing but as it were the secondary reflection of an image, or the remote circlings and undulations of the fluid water, or the mere echo of the echo of an original voice. Or, lastly, nothing but the shadow of the shadow of a substance. Whereas it is a far more real, substantial and satisfactory, more penetrative and comprehensive perception than sense is, reaching to the very inward essence of the things perceived. And therefore it must of necessity proceed from the active power of the mind itself, exerting its own intelligible ideas upon that which is passively perceived, and so comprehending it by something of its own that is native and domestic to it. So that besides the *αἰσθήματα*, "sensations," or *φαντάσματα*, "phantasms," the sensible ideas of corporeal things passively impressed upon us from without, there must be also *νοήματα*, "conceptions," or intelligible ideas of them actively exerted from the mind itself, or otherwise they could never be understood.

3. Wherefore, that we may the better illustrate this business, let us suppose some individual body; as for example, a white or black triangular superficies, or a solid tetrahedrum, "four-square" included all within a triangular superficies, exposed first to the view of sense or a living eye; and then afterward considered by the intellect, that we may see the difference betwixt the passive perception of it by sense, and the active comprehension of it by the understanding. Now sense, that is a living eye or mirror, as soon as ever it is converted toward this object, will here passively perceive an appearance of an individual thing, as existing without it, white and triangular, without any distinction concretely and confusedly together; and it will perceive no more than this, though it dwell never so long upon this object; for it perceives no more than is impressed upon it; and here the passion of sense ends and goes no further. But the mind or intellect residing in the same soul that hath a power of sensation also, then beginning to make a judgment upon that which is thus passively perceived, exerts its own innate vigour and activity, and displays itself gradually after this manner.

For, first, with its subtle divisive power, it will analyze and resolve this concrete phantasmatical totum, "whole," and take notice of several distinct intellectual objects in it. For considering that every white or black thing is not necessarily triangular, nor every triangular thing white or black, it finds here two distinct intellectual objects; the one white, the other triangular. And then again, because that which is nothing can have no affections, it concludes, that here is something as a common substratum, "subject," to both these affections or modifications, which it calls a corporeal substance; which being one and the same thing, is here both white and triangular. Wherefore it finds at least three distinct objects of intellectual cogitation, corporeal substance, white, and triangular, all individual. But then reflecting again upon these several objects, and that it may further inquire into the natures and essences of them, it now bids adieu to sense and singularity; and taking a higher flight, considers them all universally and abstractly from individuating circumstances and matter. That is, it no more seeks the knowledge and comprehension of these things without itself, from whence it hath already passively perceived them by sense; but revolving within itself upon its own inward notions and active anticipations (which must needs be universal) it looks for some domestic ideas of its own to understand these general natures by, that so from thence with a descending view it may comprehend under them those individuals that now affect the sense.

4. First therefore, for corporeal substance in general, which is the substratum, "subject," both of colour and figure, not to pursue any long and tedious processes, it quickly concludes the essence of it to be this; a thing extended impenetrably, or which hath impenetrable longitude, latitude and profundity. And because it is not here considered merely as a notion or objective cogitation, but as a thing actually existing without the mind, therefore it exerts another ratio "notion," of existence or singularity also; which added to the former, makes it up a thing that hath impenetrable extension existing. Now none of these ideas, neither of essence nor existence, nor thing, nor substance, nor something, nor nothing; nor impenetrability, nor extension, nor longitude, latitude and profundity, were impressed or stamped upon the mind, either from this individual, or any other sensible object; for they can be neither seen nor perceived by any corporeal sense; but are merely excited from the innate activity of the mind itself, that same power by which the mind is enabled to conceive of nihil, "nothing," as well as aliquid, "something;" and certain it is that the idea of nothing was never impressed from any thing. And if the essence of body, or corporeal substance itself, be only comprehended and understood by the active ideas of the mind (for sense here perceived no such thing, but

only was affected from the exterior induments thereof, colour and figure), then the several modes of it, such as whiteness and triangularity, which are but certain modes of an extended substance, must needs be understood in like manner, not by passive ideas and phantasms, but the noematical or intelligible ideas of the mind.

5. Wherefore in the next place, as for white colour or whiteness, here is a plain and palpable difference betwixt sense and intellection; betwixt the φάντασμα, "phantasm," and νόημα, "conception," betwixt a sensible and intelligible idea; for the sense or phantasm of white, that we have from the individual object, is no clear comprehension of any essence or intelligible ratio, "notion;" but only a passion or affection in the soul, caused by some local motions communicated to the brain from the object without, that is, a drowsy, confused and imperfect perceptive cogitation; but now the awakened mind or intellect revolving its own inward ideas, and being not able to comprehend any such mode or quality in extended substance, as this sensible idea of white is, formally considered; for this very reason, boldly and confidently concludes that this is no real quality in that body itself absolutely considered, because no such thing is intelligible by it; in which opinion, it is confirmed by sense itself, in that the lower ends of the rainbow that reach to the earth do not stain or dye any thing with the several colours of it; and that the same drops of dew or rain to eyes at several distances, have all those several colours of the rainbow in them, and none at all. And by other experiments it appears that these things are only passions or affections in the sentient itself, caused by some peculiar modification of the superficies of that material object in respect of the figure, site and disposition of its insensible parts, whereby the light or intermediate globuli, "globulous particles," are in a peculiar manner reflected upon the eye, and that probably the difference betwixt a white and a black object consists in this, that in one the small particles are polite and solid, and therefore vividly reflect the lighter globuli, "globulous particles;" but in the other being differently disposed, the light, as a ball flung against a heap of sand, is not so smartly reflected from it, but as it were sinks into it, and its motion is stifled and smothered in the caverns of it. Wherefore the intelligible idea of a white colour is this, that it is a certain passion or sense in the soul, caused by a peculiar modification of the object without, in respect of the disposition of its insensible parts, whereby the light or globuli, "globulous particles," are more smartly and vividly reflected upon the eye; which is another kind of comprehension of it, than the sensible idea or phantasm of white is, which is no intelligible idea, but a cogitative passion; that is, another species of cogitation, or an half-

awakened perception. Neither are these intelligible ideas of passion and sense impressed upon the soul from the sensible objects without; for the eye sees neither passion nor sense, but they are actively exerted from the mind itself, and therefore mastered and conquered, and comprehended by it.

6. I now proceed to the last intellectual object comprehended in this individual body, which is triangularity, or some one particular species of a triangle; as for example, an equilateral, or a rectangular triangle; for there can be no individual triangle but must be of one determinate species or another.

Now because the phantasm of such a triangle doth not only bear a resemblance of the outward material object, which the phantasms of colours and the like do not, but also of the true intelligible idea of a triangle itself; and because when men think never so abstractedly and mathematically of a triangle, they have commonly some rude phantasm or picture of it before them in their imagination, therefore many confidently persuade themselves that there is no other idea of a triangle or other figure, beside the bare phantasm or sensible idea impressed upon the soul from some individual object without; that is, no active noematical idea inwardly exerted from the mind itself. Which indeed is all one as to say, that there is no intellection or knowledge of a triangle at all; forasmuch as neither sense nor fancy, which are but superficial, imperfect, and incomplete perceptive cogitations, reach to the comprehension of the ratio, "notion" or essence of any thing. Wherefore now to make the contrary appear, we will again view this material triangle, or tetrahedrum, or "four-square" before our eyes, making a nearer approach to it, and upon this second contemplation of it we plainly observe much inequality in the superficies, unevenness and inequality in the lines, and bluntness in the angles. From whence it evidently appears that that idea that we had in our minds of a perfect triangle, as a plain superficies terminated by three straight lines joined together in three angles, ending in so many points, was not impressed upon our soul from this individual object, it being different from it, and far more exact and perfect than that is. And therefore it must needs be granted that it was but occasionally or accidentally invited and drawn forth from the mind, upon the sight of it, just in the same manner as when a man looks upon certain lines drawn with ink upon a piece of paper something resembling the face of a man, his mind doth not fix and stay itself in the consideration of those inky lines; but presently upon this occasion excites within itself the idea of a man's face. Or when a man walking in a gallery where there are divers pictures hung upon the wall, chances amongst them to espy the picture of a friend or acquaintance of his, which, though perhaps far from an exact resemblance, yet

notwithstanding makes him presently to excite the idea of his friend in his imagination. Neither of which things could possibly be, if there had not been a previous and pre-existent idea of a man's face, or such a certain friend in his mind before; for otherwise a man in this case could think of nothing but just that that was impressed upon him by sense, the figures of those inky delineations, and those several strokes and shadows of the pictures. In like manner, when we look upon the rude, imperfect, and irregular figures of some corporeal things, the mind upon this occasion excites from within itself the ideas of a perfect triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, and the like, whose essences are so indivisible that they are not capable of the least additions, detraction, or variation without the destruction of them, because there was some rude and bungling resemblance of these regular figures in those material objects that we look upon, of which probably the maker had the ideas in his mind. And the mind naturally delights more to think of simple and regular, than of compounded and irregular figures.

7. But if any one should here object and say, that it doth not follow from hence, that that more perfect idea which now I have of a triangle in my mind, the accuracy whereof this present visible idea before my eyes doth not reach unto, was actively excited from the mind itself; because it might be some time formerly impressed, from some other individual triangle which I had elsewhere seen; just in the same manner as when I looked upon a picture, that idea of a man's face in general, or of that particular friend, that was occasionally excited thereby, was not any innate idea, or an idea that sprung wholly from the activity of the mind, but was formerly impressed upon the soul, from individual sensible objects now remembered or called to mind: I say, that this cannot possibly be true, because there never was any material or sensible straight line, triangle, circle, that we saw in all our lives, that was mathematically exact, but even sense itself, at least by the help of microscopes, might plainly discover much unevenness, ruggedness, flexuosity, angulosity, irregularity, and deformity in them, as will appear to any one that shall make a triangle upon the most accurate lines that the wit or art of man can make; and therefore no material line could stamp or impress upon the soul in a mere passive way those exact ideas that we now have of a triangle or of a straight line, which is the shortest possible between two points, or a circle that is every where equidistant from an individual centre, &c. And if it should be again replied, that notwithstanding there being many such lines and circles as common sense cannot discern the least irregularity in them, howsoever they would be in the mean time really irregular to a perfect and lyncean sight; yet, according to their appearance, might impress those ideas

that we have of a straight line or circle; I answer, that this cannot be neither, there being a vast difference betwixt the confused indistinction of sense and fancy, by reason of their bluntness and imperfection, and the express accuracy, preciseness, and indivisibility of those intelligible ideas that we have of a straight line, circle, triangle, tetrahedrum, "four-square," and other geometrical figures; and therefore that imperfect, confused indistinction of sense could never impress any such accurate ideas upon the mind, but only occasion the mind actively to exert them from within itself.

8. Nay, though it should be granted that there were material lines mathematically exact, perfect triangles, squares, pyramids, cubes, spheres, and the like, such as geometry supposes, as no doubt but the divine power can make such in fitting matter; yet sense could not at all reach to the discerning of the mathematical accuracy of these things, no more than it doth to the absolute equality of any quantities; as of lines, superficies, bodies, angles, which is found and determined only by the understanding, in that materia intelligibilis, "intelligible matter" which geometry is conversant about. So that sense could not be able to determine what triangle and what tetrahedrum, "four-square" was mathematically exact, and what not. From whence it is demonstrably evident that neither the ratio, "notion" of perfect equality, nor the perfect mathematical ideas of figures, triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, &c., were impressed upon the soul from without by sense; sense not at all reaching to the discernment of them.

9. But, lastly, if there were material lines, triangles, pyramids, perfectly and mechanically exact; yet that which made them such, and thereby to differ from other irregular lines, imperfect triangles and cubes, could be nothing else but a conformity to an antecedent intellectual idea in the mind, as the rule and exemplar of them; for otherwise an irregular line and an imperfect triangle, pyramid, cube, are as perfectly that that they are, as the other is; only they are not agreeable to those anticipated and pre-conceived ideas of regular lines and figures actively exerted in the mind or intellect, which the mind naturally formeth to itself, and delighteth to exercise itself upon them, as the proper object of art and science, which the other irregular figures are not. Wherefore whenever a man looking upon material objects judges of the figures of them, and says this is a straight line, this is a perfect triangle, that a perfect circle, but those are neither perfect triangles nor circles; it is plain that here are two several ideas of these lines and figures; the one outwardly impressed from those individual material objects from without upon the sense of the beholder; the other actively exerted from his inward mind or intellect. Which latter busy

anticipation of it is the rule, pattern, and exemplar whereby he judges of those sensible ideas or phantasms. For otherwise, if there were no inward anticipations or mental ideas, the spectator would not judge at all, but only suffer; and every irregular and imperfect triangle being as perfectly that which it is, as the most perfect triangle, the mind now having no inward pattern of its own before it, to distinguish and put a difference, would not say one of them was more imperfect than another; but only comparing them with one another, would say that this individual figure was not perfectly like to that; upon which account the perfect triangle would be as imperfectly the imperfect triangle, as the imperfect was the perfect.

10. Wherefore, as I said before, this is just in the same manner as when a man looks upon the picture of an absent friend or familiar acquaintance, and presently judges of it, he hath plainly two several ideas in his mind at the same time; one outwardly impressed from the present picture, the other pre-existent in his mind before; by one of which, as the pattern or exemplar, he makes a judgment upon the other, and finds many faults in it; saying, that here both the ideas were foreign and adventitious, the pre-existent idea having been some time formerly impressed from an outward material object, and thence retained in the memory or fancy; but in the other case, when a man looking upon a material triangle, square, circle, cube, sphere, in which there are some palpable irregularities; which he judges of by comparing them with some inward pre-existent ideas that he hath in his mind of a perfect individual triangle, square, circle, cube; and also conceives some dislike and displeasure at the disconformity of the one to the other: the pre-existent ideas here were no foreign or adventitious things, but native and domestic to him, nor at any time formerly passively received from any material objects without, but actively exerted from the mind itself. And I think there is no doubt to be made but if a perfect adult man, that was immediately framed out of the earth, having a newly created soul infused, as the protoplast had, should look upon two several kinds of objects at the same time, whereof one was a perfect circle or sphere, equilateral triangle, tetrahedrum, "four-square," square, or cube; the other having some resemblances of the same, had notwithstanding apparent irregularity in some parts of them; but that at first sight, he would be more pleased with the one than with the other; which could not be, unless he had some native or active idea of his own within himself, to compare them both with, to which one was more conformable than the other. For there could be no such thing as pulchritude and deformity in material objects, if there were no active power in the soul of framing ideas of regular, proportionate, and symmetrical figures

within itself, by which it might put a difference between outward objects, and make a judgment of them; but that it only received stamps and impressions from without, for then it must needs be equally or indifferently affected with all alike, and not more pleased or displeased with one than with another. Now the judgment that men have of pulchritude and deformity in sensible things, is not merely artificial, from institution or instruction, or of taught things, but such as springs originally from nature itself.

11. But that there is an intelligible idea of a triangle inwardly exerted from the mind itself, distinct from the phantasm or sensible idea that is outwardly impressed from the material object, will yet further appear from that which follows; for the mind reflecting further upon that idea which it hath of a triangle, considers first the generical nature of it, that it is a plain figure, and that a plain figure is the termination of a plain superficies; which superficies is nothing else but mere latitude without profundity: for plain figures are no otherwise conceived by geometricians. Now, it is certain that this idea of a superficies, which geometricians have, was never imprinted upon their minds by sense from any material objects; there being no such thing any where existing without the mind, as latitude without profundity. And therefore it must needs arise from the activity of the mind itself. And the idea of a plain superficies, that is, such a superficies as to all whose parts a straight line may be accommodated, as well as the idea of a straight line, must needs be actively excited from the mind also. Again, it considers the difference betwixt a triangle and other plain figures, that it is included in and terminated by three straight lines joined together in three points; which straight lines being the extremities of a superficies, are mere longitude without either profundity or latitude; and which points being the extremities of those lines, have neither longitude, latitude, nor profundity in them. Which mathematical ideas, in like manner, of a line without latitude and profundity, and a point without longitude, latitude, and profundity, were never impressed upon Euclid, or any other geometrician from without, as is evident without further proof. Moreover, this intelligible idea of a triangle, as it includes some numerical considerations in it, which sense hath no idea of, perceiving only one and one and one; so therein sides and angles are relatively considered also to one another; nay, the very notion of an angle, and the quantity thereof, is a relative thing, as Proclus hath observed, and therefore not impressed by sense.

Again, the mind considering the idea of its own, as it can find out the several properties of a triangle by mere cogitation, without any thing of sense; as that the greater side always subtends the greater angle, nay, and that the three angles are

always equal to two right angles (as we shall show afterwards) so it also, by its own strength, is able to find out all the species that are possible in a plain triangle, in respect of the differences both of sides and angles. As in respect of the sides, that it is either equilateral or isosceles, "even-legged," or scalenum, "having unequal sides;" of the angles, that it is a rectangulum, "straight cornered," or amblygonium, "blunt cornered," or Ὀξυγώνιον, "sharp-cornered" triangle, and that there can be no individual triangle but must of necessity belong to one of the three species of either sort. So that this is not gathered from sense, but exerted from the active power of the mind.

12. The mind can clearly understand a triangle in general, without determining its thought to any particular species, and yet there can be no distinct phantasm of any such thing; for every distinct phantasm or sensible picture of a triangle must of necessity be either equilateral or equicrural or inequilateral, scalenum, "uneven-legged." And so as we can in like manner clearly understand in our minds, chiliogonum, "a thing with a thousand corners," or myriogonum, "one with ten thousand corners," though we cannot possibly have a distinct phantasm of either of them. But for those particular species of triangles which we may have distinct phantasms of, this doth not at all hinder but that we have, notwithstanding, intelligible ideas of the same besides, actively exerted from the mind itself. And so there is a φάντασμα, "phantasm," and a νόημα, "conception" at the same time concurring together, an active and a passive cogitation. The νοήμα, "conception," or intelligible idea being as it were embodied in the phantasm, which alone in itself is but an incomplete perceptive cogitation of the soul, half awakened, and doth not comprehend the indivisible and immutable ratio "notion" or essence of any thing.

Which thing to those that cannot better understand it by what we have already declared, might be illustrated in this manner: when an astronomer, thinking of the sun, demonstrates that it is a hundred and sixty times bigger than the globe of the earth, he hath all the while a phantasm or imagination of the sun in his mind, but as ὥσπερ πεδιαίου, "a circle of a foot diameter;" nay, he cannot for his life have a true phantasm of any such magnitude which contains the bigness of the earth so many times, nor indeed fancy the earth a hundredth part so big as it is. Now, as the astronomer hath an intelligible idea of the magnitude of the sun very different from the phantasm of the same, so in like manner have we intelligible ideas of corporeal things, when we understand them, besides the phantasms of them. The phantasm being as it were involucrum, "the crasser indument," or corporeal vehicle of the νόημα, "intelligible idea," of the mind.

13. Hitherto, by the instance of an individual and material

triangle, we have shown how the soul, in understanding corporeal things, doth not merely suffer from without from the body, but actively exert intelligible ideas of its own, and from within itself. Now, I observe that it is so far from being true, that all our objective cogitations or ideas are corporeal effluxes or radiations from corporeal things without, or impressed upon the soul from them in a gross corporeal manner, as a signature or stamp is imprinted by a seal upon a piece of wax or clay; that (as I have before hinted) this is not true sometimes of the sensible ideas themselves. For all perception whatsoever is a vital energy, and not a mere dead passion; and as the atomical philosophy instructs us, there is nothing communicated in sensation from the material objects without, but only certain local motions, that are propagated from them by the nerves into the brain; which motions cannot propagate themselves corporeally upon the soul also, because it penetrates and runs through all the parts of its own body. But the soul, by reason of that vital and magical union which is between it and the body, sympathizing with the several motions of it in the brain, doth thereupon exert sensible ideas or phantasms within itself, whereby it perceives or takes notice of objects distant from the brain, either within or without the body. Many of which sentiments and phantasms have no similitude at all, either with those local motions made in the brain, or with the objects without; such as are the sentiments of pain, pleasure, and titillation, hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, sweet and bitter, light and colours, &c. Wherefore the truth is, that sense, if we well consider it, is but a kind of loquela, "speech," (if I may so call it) nature as it were talking to us in the sensible objects without, by certain motions as signs from thence communicated to the brain. For, as in speech, when men talk to one another, they do but make certain motions upon the air, which cannot impress their thoughts upon one another in a passive manner; but it being first consented to and agreed upon, that such certain sounds shall signify such ideas and cogitations, he that hears those sounds in discourse, doth not fix his thoughts upon the sounds themselves, but presently exerts from within himself such ideas and cogitations as those sounds by consent signify, though there be no similitude at all betwixt those sounds and thoughts. Just in the same manner nature doth as it were talk to us in the outward objects of sense, and import various sentiments, ideas, phantasms, and cogitations, not by stamping or impressing them passively upon the soul from without, but only by certain local motions from them, as it were dumb signs made in the brain; it having been first constituted and appointed by nature's law, that such local motions shall signify such sensible ideas and phantasms, though there be no similitude at all betwixt them; for what similitude can there

be betwixt any local motions and the senses of pain or hunger, and the like, as there is no similitude betwixt many words and sounds, and the thoughts which they signify. But the soul, as by a certain secret instinct, et tanquam ex compacto, "and as it were by compact," understanding nature's language, as soon as these local motions are made in the brain, doth not fix its attention immediately upon those motions themselves, as we do not use to do in discourse upon mere sounds, but presently exerts such sensible ideas, phantasms, and cogitations as nature hath made them to be signs of, whereby it perceives and takes cognizance of many other things both in its own body, and without it, at a distance from it, in order to the good and conservation of it. Wherefore there are two kinds of perceptive powers in the soul, one below another; the first is that which belongs to the inferior part of the soul, whereby it sympathizes with the body, which is determined by the several motions and pressures that are made upon that from corporeal things without to several sensitive and fantastical energies, whereby it hath a slight and superficial perception of individual corporeal things, and as it were of the outsides of them, but doth not reach to the comprehension of the essence or indivisible and immutable ratio, "notion" of any thing. The second perceptive power is that of the soul itself, or that superior, interior noetical part of it which is ἀπαθὴς, ἀσυμπαθὴς, "free from passion or sympathy," free and disentangled from all that magical sympathy with the body. Which acting alone by itself, exerts from within the intelligible ideas of things, virtually contained in its own cognoscitive power, that are universal and abstract rationes, "notions," from which tanquam desuper spectans, "as it were looking downward" it comprehends individual things. Now, because these latter, which are pure active energies of the soul, are many times exerted upon occasion of those other passive or sympathetical perceptions of individual things anteceding; it is therefore conceived by many that they are nothing else but thin and evanid images of those sensible ideas, and therefore that all intellection and knowledge ascends from sense, and intellection is nothing but the improvement or result of sense. Yet, notwithstanding it is most certainly true, that they proceed from a quite different power of the soul, whereby it actively protrudes its own immediate objects from within itself, and comprehends individuals without it, not passively or consequentially, but as it were proleptically, and not with an ascending, but with a descending perception; whereby the mind first reflecting upon itself, and its own ideas, virtually contained in its own omniform cognoscitive power, and thence descending downward, comprehends individual things under them. So that knowledge doth not begin in individuals, but end in them. And therefore they are but the

secondary objects of intellection, the soul taking its first rise from within itself, and so by its own inward cognoscitive power comprehending things without it. Else how should God have knowledge? And if we know as God knows, then do we know or gain knowledge by universals. In which sense, (though not in that other of Protagoras) the soul may be truly said to be the measure of all things.

Now I say, if the very sensible ideas and phantasms themselves, be not mere stamps or impressions from individual things without in a corporeal manner impressed upon the soul, but active, though sympathetical energies of the soul itself: it is much more impossible that the universal and abstract intelligible ideas of the mind, or essences of things, should be mere stamps or signatures impressed upon the soul, as upon a dead thing in a gross corporeal manner.

14. Wherefore here is a double error committed by vulgar philosophers; first, that they make the sensible ideas and phantasms to be totally impressed from without in a gross corporeal manner upon the soul, as it were upon a dead thing; and, secondly, that then they suppose the intelligible ideas, the abstract and universal notions of the mind, to be made out of these sensible ideas and phantasms thus impressed from without in a corporeal manner likewise by abstraction or separation of the individuating circumstances, as it were by the hewing off certain chips from them, or by hammering, beating or anvelling of them out into thin intelligible ideas; as if solid and massy gold should be beaten out into thin leaf-gold. To which purpose they have ingeniously contrived and set up an intellectus agens, "active understanding," like a smith or carpenter, with his shop or forge in the brain, furnished with all necessary tools and instruments for such a work. Where I would only demand of these philosophers, whether this their so expert faber, "smith," or architect, intellectus agens, "the active understanding," when he goes about his work, doth know what he is to do with these phantasms beforehand, what he is to make of them, and unto what shape to bring them? If he do not, he must needs be a bungling workman; but if he do, he is prevented in his design and undertaking, his work being done already to his hand; for he must needs have the intelligible idea of that which he knows or understands already within himself; and therefore now to what purpose should he use his tools, and go about to hew and hammer and anvil out these phantasms into thin and subtle intelligible ideas, merely to make that which he hath already, and which was native and domestic to him?

But this opinion is founded in no less a mistake of Aristotle's text concerning the intellectus agens, "active understanding," who never dreamed of any such as these men imagine, if we

may believe the Greek scholiasts, that best understood him; than it is of the text of nature; as if not only those phantasms, but also the intelligible ideas themselves, were gross and corporeal things impressed from matter; whereas even the first of these are passive energies of the soul itself, fatally united to some local motions in the body, and concurrently produced with them, by reason of that magical union betwixt the soul and body; but the other are the pure active energies of the mind itself, as free from corporeal sympathy. Neither can these latter be made out of the former by any abstraction or separation, no nor by any depinxation or chymical distillation or sublimation neither; for it is a thing utterly impossible that vigour, activity and awakened energy, as intellections are, should be raised out of dull, sluggish and drowsy passion or sympathy. And this opinion is but like that other of the same philosopher's, concerning the eduction or raising of substantial and immaterial forms out of the passive matter, both of them proceeding from one and the same sottishness of mind that induces them to think that dull, stupid and senseless matter, is the first original source of all activity and perfection, all form and pulchritude, all wisdom and knowledge in the world.

And things being rightly considered, this opinion doth in truth and reality, attribute as much activity to the soul, that saith it hath a power of raising or educing of intelligible ideas or universal and abstract rationes, "notions," out of phantasms, as that other that affirms it hath a power of exerting them from itself; as it would attribute as much activity to the sun to say that he had a power of raising or educing light or the day out of night and darkness, as to say that he had a power of exerting it out of his own body.

15. Wherefore others of this kind of philosophers, that will not acknowledge any immaterial substance, that hath any active power of its own in it, or any thing in the soul besides impression from corporeal objects without, have found out another device, and that is this, plainly to deny that there are any universal notions, ideas or rationes, "reasons," in the mind at all; but that those things which are called universal, are nothing else but names applied to several individuals. Which opinion, as it was formerly held by those that were therefore called nominales, "nominalists;" so it hath been lately revived and taken up by some of these strenuous impugners of immaterial and incorporeal substances. There is nothing in the world (saith a late author) universal, but names; for the things named are every one of them individual and singular. Now indeed this is true, and nobody denies it, of things existing without the mind; but this author's meaning herein is to deny all universal conceptus, "conceptions," and rationes, "reasonings," of the mind, as

appears by his larger explication of the same opinion elsewhere. Est nomen hoc universale non rei alicujus existentis in rerum naturâ, neque ideæ sive phantasmatis alicujus in animo formati, sed alicujus semper vocis sive nominis nomen, ita ut cum dicatur animal, vel saxum, vel spectrum, vel aliud quicquam esse universale, intelligendum sit tantum voces eas animal, saxum, esse nomina universalia, id est nomina pluribus rebus communia, et respondentes ipsis in animo conceptus sunt singularium animalium vel aliarum rerum imagines et phantasmata. Ideoque non est opus ad vim universalis intelligendam aliâ facultate quàm imaginativâ, quâ recordamur voces ejusmodi modo unam rem, modo aliam in animo excitâsse,* " This universal is the name, not of any thing existing in the nature of things, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name; so that when an animal or a stone, or a spectre, or any thing else is said to be universal, it is to be understood only that those words animal, stone, are universal names, that is, names common to more things; and the conceptions answering to them in the mind, are the images and phantasms of singular animals or other things. And therefore to understand the meaning of an universal, there is no need of any other faculty than that of the imagination, whereby we are minded that words of that sort have sometimes excited one thing sometimes another in our mind." That is, there are no other ideas in the mind but only phantasms of individual corporeal things; only there are universal names, which are applied in common to more individuals than one; but there is no other object of the mind or cogitation but only singular and individual things existing without the soul. Wherefore this author consentaneously hereunto defines understanding to be nothing else but conception caused by speech; and therefore if speech be peculiar to man, then is understanding peculiar to him also. This mysterious notion is insisted upon and explained likewise by the third objector against Cartesius's metaphysics, after this manner: Quid jam dicimus, si forte ratiocinatio nihil aliud sit, quam copulatio et concatenatio nominum sive appellationum per verbum hoc, Est. Unde colligimus ratione nihil omnino de naturâ rerum, sed de eorum appellationibus, nimirum utrum copulemus rerum nomina secundum pacta, vel non. Si hoc sit, sicut esse potest, ratiocinatio dependebit à nominibus, nomina ab imaginatione, et imaginatio ab organorum corporeorum motu, et sic mens nihil aliud erit, præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici. " Now what do we say, if perhaps reasoning be nothing else but the coupling and chaining together of names or appellations, by these words, it is. Whence we gather

* Elect. Philos.

nothing at all by reason concerning the nature of things, but concerning their appellations; to wit, whether we join the names of things according to agreements or not. If this be so, as it may be, reasoning will depend upon names, names upon the imagination, and the imagination upon the motion of the bodily organs; and so the mind will be nothing else but a motion in some parts of the body." According to which philosophy, reason and science do not superadd any thing to sense, or reach any further in the knowledge of the nature of things, but only in making use of common names to express several individuals by at once.

16. Wherefore, although there be already enough said to prove, that in the understanding of individual corporeal things, beside sense and the sensible phantasms from them, there are also intelligible ideas and universal rationes, "notions," exerted from the mind itself, by which alone they are comprehended; yet still to make this business clearer, and also to demonstrate, that the knowledge of universal axiomatical truth, and scientifical theorems is a thing which doth not passively result from sense, but from the actual strength and vigour of the intellect itself comprehending its own intelligible ideas, we will here propose that one geometrical theorem concerning a triangle; that it hath three angles equal to two right angles; and consider what the subject of it is, ἐπιστημονικῶς, "scientifically," comprehended.

First therefore, if there be no other object of the mind in knowledge but sensible individuals existing without us, then the subject of this theorem, when Euclid wrought it, was only some individual bodies by him compared together. Nay, Euclid himself did not carry this knowledge about with him in his mind, neither was he master of it any longer than he held those individual bodies in his hands, or looked upon them with his eyes; and if so, it could not signify any thing at all, to any other person which either then or now had not the same individual bodies to compare, that Euclid had. Whereas it is plain that the subject of this theorem, whatsoever it be, is such a thing as every geometrician, though in never such distant places and times, hath the very same always ready at his hand, without the least imaginable difference. And they all pronounce concerning the same thing. Which could not possibly otherwise be, unless it were some universal ratio, "notion," and intelligible idea of the mind.

17. Again, secondly, no individual or material thing is the subject of this theorem, as sense takes cognizance of it, that is, the matter, and colour, and figure, and magnitude, all concretely together. For the same individual matter may presently be made quadrangular or circular, but only precisely in respect of

the figure; and of that also no otherwise than as it is conformable to the indivisible and immutable ratio, "notion" or idea of a triangle, comprehended in the mind as the exemplar of it. Now as we have showed already, there is no material triangle any where to be found that is mathematically exact and accurate, neither is the individual form of a material triangle immutable. And if there were any mathematically exact, our sense could be no κριτήριον, "criterion" or "rule to judge," of it, nor discern when any thing were indivisibly such, nor judge of the absolute and mathematical equality of the three material angles of it, with two other angular superficies. Wherefore the subjects of this geometrical theorem are no sensible individual bodies, but the rationes, "notions," and ideæ, "ideas," of the mind itself, in which alone mathematical accuracy is to be found, and the exact equality of one thing, to another certainly and infallibly known.

18. Nay, if we should suppose that there were some individual material triangles and angles, absolutely and mathematically exact; and that our sense did infallibly perceive the indivisible points of them; or that we had an infallible pair of compasses, whose cuspides, "tops," were mathematical points, whereby we could measure the several angles of the triangle and right angle in a perfect circle, accurately divided into infinite parts; or else cutting off those several angles of the triangle, and laying them together upon an absolute plane, we should thus mechanically find them equal to the two material right angles; this would not amount to the knowledge of this truth, that a triangle, as such, hath of necessity three angles equal to two right angles; we thus considering them only as material individuals, and things existing without the mind by corporeal sense. For though we had now found that these individual material triangles were equal to those two individual material right angles; yet looking no further than sense determined to individuals, we could not tell certainly that it was so with all individual triangles, much less understand any necessity of its being so, or attain to any thing of the διότι, "reason," of it, in which alone true science consisteth. And this Aristotle hath observed very pertinently to our purpose, Post. Anal. lib. 1. cap. 31, Οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαί γε ἀναγκαῖον· τὸ δὲ τί καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν· τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ τόδε, οὐδε νῦν, οὐ γὰρ ἦν καθόλου. Τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φαμὲν εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ μὲν ἀποδείξεις καθόλου, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ οὐχ (ὡς φασί τινες) ἠπιστάμεθα. Αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὰ τοῦ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστί, "Neither is it necessary to understand

by sense, but to perceive; but this regards a particular thing and manner, and the present time. But it is impossible to perceive by sense what relates to every thing, and in all respects: for this and now relate not to an universal; for of an universal we say, that it is always and every where. Since then demonstrations are of an universal, it is plain that there is no knowledge of the universal theorems of geometry by sense. For it is manifest, that if we could perceive by sense that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles, yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient knowledge of it (as some say), but would seek further after a demonstration hereof: sense reaching only to singulars, but knowledge to universals." The mind would not be satisfied herewith, but would still further require a demonstration of it; which demonstrations are not of individuals perceived by sense, but only of the universal rationes, "notions," comprehended in the mind; knowledge, as I said before, being a descending comprehension of a thing from the universal ideas of the mind, and not an ascending perception of them from individuals by sense.

19. Wherefore the apodictical knowledge of this truth is no otherwise to be attained than by the mind's ascending above sense, and elevating itself from individuals to the comprehension of the universal rationes, "notions," and ideas of things within itself, making the object of its inquiry and contemplation, not this nor that material individual triangle without itself, but the indivisible and immutable notion of a triangle. And thus it finds several ways that a triangle, as such, must of necessity have its three angles equal to two right angles.

For, first, if one will consider any triangle, as made out of a parallelogram (though this be the more compounded figure) divided by a diagonal line into two equal triangles, it is plain in every parallelogram there are four angles equal to four right angles, because when a straight line cuts two parallel lines, the two interior angles must of necessity be equivalent to two right angles, one of them being the complement of the other to a semicircle. But when the parallelogram is divided into two equal triangles by a diagonal line, the quantity of the three angles in each must of necessity be half the quantity of the four angles in the parallelogram.



Or, if a man will consider the genesis, "formation," of a plain triangle in this manner; first, by a straight line cutting two parallel lines, and then one of these parallels moving upon its centre in the straight line out of its parallelism, and inclining towards the other line, if it move never so little out of its



parallelism towards the other parallel, the continuation of it must needs cut the other line, and make a triangle. And so much as the interior angle, which with the other opposite, made up two right angles, so much is the third angle; and therefore all three make up two right angles.

20. Now here is a gross error of the vulgar to imagine, because geometricians demonstrating such theorems, commonly make use of such sensible schemes or diagrams, that therefore the knowledge of this truth doth result from sense, or that the geometricians themselves have no other ideas in their minds of straight lines, parallels, right, acute, and obtuse angles, triangles, equality of angles, than what are impressed upon their fancy from these schemes. Whereas these are only made use of to entertain the fancy in the mean time, whilst the mind being intent upon the demonstration, actively exerts other intelligible ideas of these things from within itself, and from thence comprehends the apodictical necessity of the theorem. Neither is the true and proper knowledge of one theorem or universal and necessary truth, either in geometry or metaphysics, passively impressed upon the soul from individuals existing without, or the result of mere sense, but it proceeds from the active strength and vigour of the mind, comprehending the intelligible ideas and universal rationes, "notions," of things within itself.

21. Wherefore we conclude, that the immediate objects of geometrical science, properly so called, are not individual bodies or superficies, but the intelligible and universal ideas of a triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, actively exerted from the mind, and comprehended in it. For the mind doth not seek its objects of knowledge abroad without itself, but must needs actively comprehend them within itself: which also, as we shall show in the following chapter, are immutable things, and always the same.

CHAPTER IV.

1. No individual material thing is always necessarily the same with itself, but mutable and changeable. And our sensible perceptions of them are nothing but passions or affections in the soul from some local motions in our body caused by them; which passions also are a kind of motions in the soul, whereby we do not comprehend the immutable ratio or essence of any thing.

But intellection and knowledge are the active comprehension of something that is mixed and immutable, and hath always a necessary identity with itself. For that which is not one steady and immutable thing, cannot as such, be an object of intellection or knowledge, neither can the mind fix itself upon it; for it must needs mock and delude the understanding, perpetually gliding and rolling away from it, when it endeavours to grasp or comprehend it. Neither can it be the basis or subject of any scientifical theorem or proposition; for how can any thing be certainly, constantly, and immutably affirmed of that which is no one certain thing, nor always immutably the same with itself. Whence it plainly follows, that the immediate objects of intellection and knowledge, cannot be these individual material things as such, which our senses are passively affected from, but must of necessity be something else.

2. For which cause those flowing philosophers before mentioned, Heraclitus, Cratylus, and Protagoras, that maintained that there were no other beings that could be the objects of cogitation besides these individual material things, which they supposed always to flow, and never to stand still; did consentaneously to this hypothesis of theirs assert; that there was no knowledge but sense, and no certain or immutable comprehension of any thing. For that this assertion of theirs was grounded merely upon this hypothesis, that there was no other being or object of the mind, besides individual material things, as such; which they signified after this manner, by saying that all things flowed, for these material things do so; Aristotle plainly instructs us in his Metaphysics: Αἴτιον τῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν· τὰ δ' ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον· ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει. . . . Ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περίγε τὸ πάντος πάντη μεταβάλλον, οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν. Ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθησεν ἡ ἀκροτάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων ἡ τῶν φασκόντων Ἡρακλειτίζειν, καὶ οἵαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐδὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἐμβῆναι. αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἅπαξ,* "The ground of this opinion, which denied all certain and immutable knowledge, was from hence; because truth and knowledge refer to beings or entities, and they supposed that there were no other beings besides these individual sensibles only. In which there is very much of undeterminateness . . . And which they perceived to be liable to perpetual motion or mutation. Now concerning that which always changes, nothing can be affirmed as constantly and immutably true. And from this supposition sprung the highest

* Arist. Metaph. lib. 4. cap. 5.

sect of those which are called Heraclitical philosophers, and those that follow Cratylus, who at last came to this, that he only moved his finger, but thought that nothing at all ought to be affirmed; and reprehended Heraclitus for saying that one cannot twice enter into the same river, because he thought that one could not so much as once do it;" that is, that no material thing remained one moment the same.

3. Wherefore if there be any such thing as intellection, science, and knowledge, distinct from external sense, and any immutable truths, then there must of necessity be some other kind of beings or entities, besides these individual material things, as the immediate objects or subjects of them, such things as do not flow, but ἀεὶ ταῦτα καί ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, "always remain immutably the same," or μόνιμα καὶ μίαν ἀεὶ φύσιν ἔχοντα, "permanent, and having always the same nature," as Plato expresseth these immediate objects of knowledge; or else, in Aristotle's language, ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "an immutable essence." Who therefore confutes both these sects of philosophers, whereof one was extremely metaphysical, that made all things to stand still; whom, I confess, I understand not; the other too grossly material, and addicted to sense, that made nothing to stand still, but all things to flow, after this manner:* Φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' οἱ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, οὐδ' οἱ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ ἔσται· φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο μεταβάλλον· ὁ γὰρ λέγων πότε αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀληθές, πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ, "It is manifest, that neither they speak truly who affirm all things to rest, nor they that affirm all things to move. For if all things rest, then the same things would always be true and false; which is not so, because he that affirms this, once was not, and again will not be. But if all things move, then nothing can be true, and therefore all things will be false." And both he and Plato compounded that controversy thus; by acknowledging two sorts of entities, the one mutable, or subject to flux and motion, such as are especially individual corporeal things; the other immutable, that always rest or stand still, which are the proper objects of certain, constant, and immutable knowledge, that therefore cannot be mere nothings, non-entities.

Which latter kind of being, that is, the ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "immutable essence," as a distinct thing from individual sensibles, Aristotle plainly asserts against Heraclitus, and those other flowing philosophers, in these words:† Ἔτι δὲ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἣ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει, οὔτε φθορὰ, οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν, "We would have these philosophers to know, that besides sensible things," that are always mutable, "there is another kind of being or entity of

* Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 8. † Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 5.

such things as are neither subject to motion, corruption, nor generation." And elsewhere he tells us, that this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "immoveable essence," is the object of theoretical knowledge, of the first philosophy, and of the pure mathematics.

4. Now these immutable entities are the universal rationes, or intelligible natures and essences of all things, which some compare to unities, but Aristotle to numbers; which formally considered, are indivisible: saith he, εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι, "the essences of things are like to numbers;" because if but the least thing be added to any number, or subtracted from it, the number is destroyed.

And these are the objects of all certain knowledge. As, for example, the objects of geometry are not any individual material triangles, squares, circles, pyramids, cubes, spheres, and the like; which because they are always mutable, nothing can be immutably affirmed of them; but they are those indivisible and unchangeable rationes of a triangle, square, circle; which are ever the same to all geometricians, in all ages and places, of which such immutable theorems as these are demonstrated, as that a triangle has necessarily three angles equal to two right angles.

But if any one demand here, where this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, these immutable entities do exist? I answer, first, that as they are considered formally, they do not properly exist in the individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted upon the understanding, which some have taken to be Aristotle's opinion; because no individual material thing is either universal or immutable. And if these things were only lodged in the individual sensibles, then they would be unavoidably obnoxious to the fluctuating waves of the same reciprocating Euripus, in which all individual material things are perpetually whirled. But because they perish not together with them, it is a certain argument that they exist independently upon them. Neither, in the next place, do they exist somewhere else apart from the individual sensibles, and without the mind, which is that opinion that Aristotle justly condemns, but either unjustly or unskilfully attributes to Plato. For if the mind looked abroad for its objects wholly without itself, then all its knowledge would be nothing but sense and passion. For to know a thing is nothing else but to comprehend it by some inward ideas that are domestic to the mind, and actively exerted from it. Wherefore these intelligible ideas or essences of things, those forms by which we understand all things, exist nowhere but in the mind itself; for it was very well determined long ago by Socrates, in Plato's Parmenides, that these things are nothing else but noemata: Τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκει ἐγγίνεσθαι ἄλλοτι ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, "These species or ideas are all of them nothing but noemata, or notions that exist nowhere but in

the soul itself." Wherefore to say that there are immutable natures and essences, and rationes of things, distinct from the individuals that exist without us, is all one as if one should say, that there is in the universe above the orb of matter and body, another superior orb of intellectual being, that comprehends its own immediate objects, that is, the immutable rationes and ideas of things within itself, by which it understands and knows all things without itself.

And yet, notwithstanding, though these things exist only in the mind, they are not therefore mere figments of the understanding: for if the subjects of all scientifical theorems were nothing but figments, then all truth and knowledge that is built upon them would be a mere fictitious thing; and if truth itself and the intellectual nature be fictitious things, then what can be real or solid in the world? But it is evident, that though the mind thinks of these things at pleasure, yet they are not arbitrarily framed by the mind, but have certain, determinate, and immutable natures of their own, which are independent upon the mind, and which are blown away into nothing at the pleasure of the same Being that arbitrarily made them.

But we all naturally conceive that those things have not only an eternal, but also a necessary existence, so that they could not ever but be, such, and so many as they are, and can never possibly perish or cease to be, but are absolutely undestroyable.

6. Which is a thing frequently acknowledged in the writings of both those famous philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. The former of them calling those things:* Τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' αἰὶ ὄντα, "Things that were never made, but always are," and μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, "things that were never made, nor can be destroyed." Τὰ ἀγέννητα καὶ ἀνώλεθρα, "things ingenerable and unperishable;" quæ Plato negat gigni, sed semper esse (as Tully expresseth it†) et ratione et intelligentia contineri. And Philo, the Platonical Jew, calls the τὰ νοητὰ, which are the same things we speak of, ἀναγκαιότατα οὐσίαι, "the most necessary essences," that is, such things as could not but be, and cannot possibly not be. And Aristotle himself calls the rationes of things in his metaphysics, not only χωριστὰ and ἀκίνητα, "things separate from matter and immutable," but also ἀΐδια, or "eternal; and in his ethics likewise, he calls geometrical truths ἀΐδια, eternal things, lib. 3. cap. 5: Περὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλέυεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι, "where he makes the geometrical truth concerning the incommensurability betwixt the diameter and the side of a square, to be an eternal thing." Elsewhere he tells us, that, οὐ τῶν φθαρτῶν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, "science, properly so called, is not of things corruptible and contingent," but of things necessary, incorruptible,

* In Theæteto et Parmenide. † Oratore, cap. 3.

and eternal. Which immutable and eternal objects of science, in the place before quoted, he described thus: Οὐσίαν τῶν ὄντων ἣ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει, οὔτε φθορὰ, οὔτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν, "Such a kind of entity of things as has neither motion, nor generation, nor corruption," that is, such things as were never made, and can never be destroyed. To which, he saith, the mind is necessarily determined. For science or knowledge has nothing either of fiction or of arbitrariness in it, but is κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος, "the comprehension of that which immutably *is*."

5. Moreover, these things have a constant being, when our particular created minds do not actually think of them, and therefore they are immutable in another sense likewise, not only because they are indivisibly the same when we think of them, but also because they have a constant and never-failing entity; and always are, whether our particular minds think of them or not. For the intelligible natures and essences of a triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cube, sphere, &c., and all the necessary geometrical verities belonging to these several figures, were not the creatures of Archimedes, Euclid, or Pythagoras, or any other inventors of geometry; nor did then first begin to be; but all these rationes and verities had a real and actual entity before, and would continue still, though all the geometricians in the world were quite extinct, and no man knew them or thought of them. Nay, though all the material world were quite swept away, and also all particular created minds annihilated together with it; yet there is no doubt but the intelligible natures or essences of all geometrical figures, and the necessary verities belonging to them, would notwithstanding remain safe and sound. Wherefore these things had a being also before the material world and all particular intellects were created. For it is not at all conceivable, that ever there was a time when there was no intelligible nature of a triangle, nor any such thing cogitable at all, and when it was not yet actually true that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, but that these things were afterward arbitrarily made and brought into being out of an antecedent nothing or non-entity; so that the being of them bore some certain date, and had a youngness in them, and so by the same reason might wax old, and decay again; which notion he often harps upon, when he speaks of the εἴδη, or forms of things, as when he says: Τοῦ σφαῖραν εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, "There is no generation of the essence of a sphere," that is, it is a thing that is not made; but always is. And elsewhere he pronounces universally of the εἴδη: Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ὅλως εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, "The forms of material things are without generation and corruption," and: Τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ γεννᾶται, "That none makes the form of any thing, for it is never generated." Divers have censured Aristotle in some

of such passages too much to confound physics and metaphysics together; for indeed these things are not true in a physical, but only in a metaphysical sense. That is, τὰ νοητὰ, the immediate objects of intellection and science, are eternal, necessarily existent, and incorruptible.

7. Now the plain meaning of all this is nothing else, but that there is an eternal wisdom and knowledge in the world, necessarily existing, which was never made, and can never cease to be or be destroyed; or, which is all one, that there is an infinite eternal mind necessarily existing, that actually comprehends himself, the possibility of all things, and the verities clinging to them. In a word, that there is a God, or an omnipotent and omniscient Being, necessarily existing, who therefore cannot destroy his own being or nature, that is, his infinite power and wisdom.

For since the rationes, "intelligible essences," and verities of things, as we observed before out of Plato, are nothing but noemata, that is, objective notions or knowledges, which are things that cannot exist alone, but together with that actual knowledge in which they are comprehended, they are the modifications of some mind or intellect. It is all one to affirm, that there are eternal rationes, essences of things, and verities necessarily existing, and to say that there is an infinite, omnipotent, and eternal Mind, necessarily existing, that always actually comprehendeth himself, the essences of all things, and their verities; or, rather, which is the rationes, essences, and verities of all things; for the rationes and essences of things are not dead things, like so many statues, images, or pictures hung up somewhere by themselves alone in a world: neither are truths mere sentences and propositions written down with ink upon a book, but they are living things, and nothing but modifications of mind or intellect; and therefore the first intellect is essentially and archetypally all rationes and verities, and all particular created intellects are but derivative participations of it, that are printed by it with the same ectypal signatures upon them.

And we may undoubtedly conclude, that it is a thing altogether as certain, that there is an infinite and eternal Mind (that is, a God) necessarily existing in the world, as that there ever was the ratio or intelligible essence of a triangle, or circle, of unity and duality; and that it was ever actually true, that a triangle hath three angles equal to two right angles; or that æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt æqualia: or the like.

8. Neither does this hinder or contradict the truth of this assertion, that many that doubt concerning the existence of a God, yet notwithstanding confidently believe the necessary eternity of these things; and persuade themselves, that though there were no mind nor intellect, and so no God in the world;

nay, though there was no matter neither, and no substantial entity at all, yet, notwithstanding, these rationes and verities of things would necessarily beas they are.

9. For there is an absolute impossibility in this assertion, that these essences of things and verities should be, though there were no substantial entity or no mind existing. For these things themselves must of necessity be either substances, or modifications of substance: for what is neither substance nor modification of a substance, is a pure non-entity; and, if they be modifications of substance, they cannot possibly exist without that substance whose modifications they are; which must either be matter or mind; but they are not the modifications of matter as such, because they are universal and immutable; therefore they are the modifications of some mind or intellect; so that these cannot be eternal without an eternal Mind.

And these men do but deceive themselves in the hypothetical assertion, that there would have been these rationes and universal verities, though there had never been a God or intellect; neither considering what the nature of God is, whose existence they would question or doubt of, nor what those rationes and verities are, which they would make so necessarily existent, by means whereof they do at once assert and question the same thing. For that which begets so strong a persuasion in their minds, that the rationes of things and universal verities are so necessarily eternal, though they do not perceive it, is nothing else but an inward invincible prepossession of the necessary existence of God, or an infinite eternal omnipotent and omniscient mind (that always actually comprehends himself, and the extent of his own power, or the ideas of all possible things), so deeply radicated and infixed in their minds, as that they cannot possibly quit themselves of it, though they endeavour it never so much, but it will unawares adhere to them, even when they force themselves to suppose the non-existence of God as a person, whose idea they do not clearly comprehend: that is, the force of nature is so strong in them as to make them acknowledge the thing when they deny the word. So that the true meaning of this phenomenon is nothing else but this, that God is a being so necessarily existent, that though men will suppose the non-existence of him, and deny the name, yet notwithstanding they cannot but confute themselves, and confess the thing.

10. Nay, it is clearly and mathematically demonstrable from what we have already proved, that there is some eternal mind; for as it is unquestionably certain, that something in the world was eternal, merely from hence, because there is being, which could not spring out of nothing; and therefore if there were no God, matter of necessity must be eternal. So because there is mind and understanding, and actual knowledge in the world,

and these things could not spring out of matter, wisdom and knowledge must needs be eternal things, and there must be of necessity some eternal mind.

For, ex hypothesi, that once there had been no knowledge, no intelligible rationes or essences of things, no mind or intellect in the world, it would have been absolutely impossible that ever there should have been any such thing, because it could neither spring out of nothing, nor, which is all one, out of senseless and unknowing matter.

11. Now because every thing that is imperfect must needs depend upon something that is perfect in the same kind, our particular imperfect understandings, which do not always actually contain the rationes of things and their verities in them, which are many times ignorant, doubting, erring, and slowly proceed by discourse and ratiocination from one thing to another, must needs be derivative participations of a perfect, infinite and eternal intellect, in which is the rationes of all things, and all universal verities are always actually comprehended. Which consideration is so obvious and unavoidable, that Aristotle himself could not miss of it; for he tells us, that since our understandings are but δυνάμει πάντα, "potentially all things," that is, have not an actual but potential omniformity only, there must of necessity be in rerum natura, another intellect that is actually all knowledge, and is the same to our understandings, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, "that active art is to passive matter," and οἷον τὸ φῶς, "that the light is to our eyes," and which does not ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν, "sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand,"* but is always eternal, Κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη, "actual knowledge." A sun that never sets, an eye that never winks. Wherefore though all our knowledges be not stamped or impressed upon our souls from the matter; they are all, as it were, ἐσφραγίσματα, "ectypal prints," and ἐκμάγματα, "derivative signatures," from one archetypal intellect, that is essentially the rationes of all things and all verities.

12. And from hence it comes to pass, that all understandings are not only constantly furnished with forms and ideas to conceive all things by, and thereby enabled to understand all the clear conceptions of one another, being printed all over at once with the seeds of universal knowledge, but also have exactly the same ideas of the same things; whereas if these things were impressed upon our souls from the matter without, all men would not be readily furnished with ideas to conceive all things by at every time, it being merely casual and contingent what things occur to men's several senses; neither could their ideas be exactly alike to one another, because no individual objects are

* As it were sometimes awake and sometimes asleep.

so; and therefore when one spoke of one thing, another would mean another. Much less could men so promptly and expeditely exert them upon all occasions, if they were dead forms passively received only, and not all virtually contained in some one active and vital principle that had a potential omniformity in it.

Wherefore, as Themistius observes, men could not possibly confer and discourse together in that manner as they do, presently perceiving one another's meaning, and having the very same conceptions of things in their minds, εἰ μή τις ἦν εἷς νοῦς οὗ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν, "if all did not partake of one and the same intellect." Neither could one so readily teach, and another learn, εἰ μὴ ταυτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος, "if there were not the same ectypal stamps of things in the mind both of the teacher and the learner."

13. Moreover, from hence also it comes to pass that truths, though they be in never so many several and distant minds apprehending them, yet they are not broken, multiplied, or diversified thereby; but they are one and the same individual truths in them all. So that it is but one truth and knowledge that is in all the understandings in the world. Just as when a thousand eyes look upon the sun at once, they all see the same individual object. Or as when a great crowd or throng of people hear one and the same orator speaking to them all, it is one and the same voice that is in the several ears of all those several auditors; so in like manner, when innumerable created understandings direct themselves to the contemplation of the same universal and immutable truths, they do all of them but as it were listen to one and the same original voice of the eternal wisdom that is never silent; and the several conceptions of those truths in their minds, are but like several echos of the same verba mentis of the divine intellect resounding in them.

14. From what we have already declared, it is evident, that wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, are eternal and self-subsistent things, superior to matter and all sensible beings, and independent upon them. Which mystery is thus acknowledged both in Christianity and Platonism, in that wisdom and intellect are made the eternal and first-begotten offspring of the first original goodness, the fountain of all things. "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was," &c. Prov. viii. 22, 23.

And indeed that opinion, that knowledge, wisdom and understanding, is in its own nature posterior to sensible and material things, and doth result out of them, or proceed only from the radiation and activity of the matter on that which understands, is nothing else but downright atheism. For if this were true,

that wisdom, knowledge, and intellection were in its own nature posterior to sensible and corporeal things, as being nothing but the stamp or impress of them, then it must needs follow that this corporeal world was not made or framed by any antecedent wisdom or knowledge, but that it sprang up of itself from the blind, fortuitous, and giddy motions of eternal atoms; from whence all that knowledge that is in the world did afterward result. Which is all one as to say that there is no God at all.

But if any will here pretend, that there is indeed a knowledge in God antecedent to all corporeal being, and therefore no passion but a thing independent upon matter and self-originated; but yet, notwithstanding, the knowledge of all created understandings is not a thing immediately derived from thence, but only taken up at the rebound or second-hand from sensible and corporeal things. This is just as if one should say, that there is indeed a brightness or lucidity in the sun, but yet notwithstanding the light which is in the air, is not derived from that light which is in the body of the sun, but springs immediately out of the power of the dark air; which being a thing apparently absurd, it may be presumed that this assertion is nothing but a verbal and pretended acknowledgment of a God, that has an antecedent and an independent knowledge, made by such as really deny the same; for otherwise, to what purpose should they so violently and distortedly pervert the natural order and dependency of things in the universe, and cut off that cognation and connexion which is betwixt things imperfect and things perfect of the same kind, betwixt created minds and the increated mind, which is the intellectual scale or ladder by which we climb up to God, if they did really believe and acknowledge any such thing. But he that can believe that all human knowledge, wisdom, and prudence, has no other source and original than the radiations and impresses of the dark matter, and the fortuitous and tumultuous jumblings thereof; it is justly to be suspected, that he is too near akin to those ancient theologues that Aristotle speaks of, οἱ ἐν νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες, "that fetched the original of God and all things out of night," or the dark chaos of matter; that held there is no God at all, or that blind and senseless matter and chance are the only original of all things.

CHAPTER V.

1. We formerly showed that the perception of external sense, as such, is a mere relative and fantastical thing: there being nothing absolutely true and real in it, but only this, that the soul hath such a passion, affection, phantasm, appearance, or

seeming in it. But sense being but an idiopathy, we cannot be absolutely certain by it, that every other person or animal has the same passion or affection or phantasm in it from the same corporeal object that we ourselves have. Ἦ σὺ διϊσχυρίσαιο ἄν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ; Θεαιτ. μὰ Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε· Σωκ· τί δ' ἄλλῳ ανθρώπῳ ἆρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι οὖν ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδέ σοι αὐτῷ ταυτὸν, διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν, "Are you certain that every other animal has the same sense or phantasm of every colour that you have (saith Socrates, according to Protagoras' sense) nay, that every other man has the same. Or, lastly, can you be so much as sure that yourself shall always have the same phantasm from the same object, when you are not always the same with yourself?" and passions are diversified by the ἰδιοσυγκρασία of the patient ——. Wherefore we cannot be sure merely by the passions of sense, what the absolute nature of a corporeal object is without us, our perception being only relative to ourselves, and our several organs and bodily crasis.

Nay, we cannot be sure that there is any object at all before us, when we have a phantasm of sensation of something. Forasmuch as not only in our dreams, but also when we are awake, we have phantasms and sensations in us of things that have no reality.

The reason of all which is, because by external sense we do but suffer from corporeal things existing without, and so do not comprehend the nature of the thing as it is absolutely in itself, but only our own passion from it. Neither is our sense a passion immediately from the thing itself that is perceived, for then it would not be altogether so uncertain as it is, but only from certain local motions in that body which the soul is vitally united to, by the mediation whereof it perceives other things at a distance, which local motions and passions may be produced when there are no such objects.

So that if there were no other perceptive power or faculty distinct from external sense, all our perceptions would be merely relative, seeming, and fantastical, and not reach to the absolute and certain truth of any thing; and every one would but, as Protagoras expounds it, τὰ ἴδια μόνον δοξάζειν, "think his own private and relative thoughts truths," and all our cogitations being nothing but appearances, would be indifferently alike true phantasms and one as another.

2. But we have since also demonstrated that there is another perceptive power in the soul superior to outward sense, and of a distinct nature from it, which is the power of knowing or understanding, that is, an active exertion from the mind itself. And therefore has this grand pre-eminence above sense, that it is no idiopathy, not a mere private, a relative, seeming, and

fantastical thing; but the comprehension of that which absolutely IS and IS NOT.

For whereas the τὰ αἰσθητὰ, "objects of external sense," are nothing but individual corporeal things existing without us, from which by sense we receive only idols, images, and passions; by reason of which, as Plotinus observes, τὸ γίγνωσκόμενον δι' αἰσθησεως, τοῦ πράγματος εἴδωλόν ἐστι, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἡ αἴσθησις λαμβάνει· μένει γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἔξω, "that which is known by sense, is but an image of that individual body existing without, which sense suffers from; but the object of sense is a being not inwardly comprehended, but remaining without:" and διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἀλλὰ δόξα, ὅτι παραδεχομένη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δόξα οὖσα ἄλλο παραδέχεται, ἄλλου ὄντος ἐκείνου ἐξ οὗ τοῦτο ὃ παραδέχεται ἔχει, "for this cause, the truth of the thing is not in sense, but only opinion."

Yet the τὰ νοητὰ, the proper and immediate objects of science, rightly so called, and intellection, being the intelligible essences of things and their necessary verities, that exist nowhere but in the mind itself; the understanding by its active power is fully master of them; and comprehends αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐκ εἴδωλα μόνον, "not idols or images of them, but the very things themselves," within itself; ὁ νοῦς τὰ νοητὰ γινώσκων οὐκ ἕτερα ὄντα γινώσκει, "knowledge is not the perception of things abroad without the mind," but is the mind's comprehending itself. Otherwise, as the same philosopher adds: Θεωρήσει αὐτὰ οὐκ ἔχων αὐτὰ, εἴδωλα δι' αὐτῶν . . . τὸ τοίνυν ἀληθινὸν οὐκ ἔχων, εἴδωλα δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς παρ' αὐτῷ λαβὼν, τὰ ψευδῆ ἕξει, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθές, "the mind, in considering things, will not apprehend the things themselves, but only their images," &c.

Wherefore it is most true, as Aristotle often observeth, ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν, "that the knowledge of any scientifical theorem is one and the self-same thing with the thing known; τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον, "that which knows, and that which is known, are really the same thing." Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, "The knowledge of any metaphysical or mathematical truth is the very thing," τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι, "or truth itself known," and not any passion from it, or image and picture of it. And though the same philosopher writes elsewhere, that αἴσθησις is τὰ αἰσθητὰ, and νόησις τὰ νοητὰ, sense is the same with sensible things, and understanding the same with the things understood; yet the difference betwixt those two is very great, for the τὰ αἰσθητὰ, "sensible things," really exist without, and sense has only a passive and phantasmatical representation of them; but the τὰ νοητὰ, "intellectual conceptions," properly so called, the primary objects of science and intellection, that is, the τὰ χωριστὰ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα, "sepa-

rate eternal and immutable rationes of things," exist nowhere but in the mind itself, being its own ideas: for the soul is, as Aristotle speaks, τόπος εἰδῶν, "the place of forms and ideas," and they have no other entity at all but only in being known or understood. And by and through these inward ideas of the mind itself, which are its primary objects, does it know and understand all external individual things, which are the secondary objects of knowledge only.

3. Moreover, that the intellection and knowing perception of the soul is not relative and fantastical as the sensitive, is evident from hence, because it is liable to falsehood, which it could not be, if it had not a power of comprehending absolute truth.

For external sense, for this very reason, is not capable of falsehood, because as such it does not comprehend the absolute truth of any thing; being only φαντασία, "a phantasm," or appearance, and all appearances as such are alike true.

So in like manner, if the noetical perceptions of the soul were only fantastical, and did not extend to the comprehension of the absolute truth of things, then every opinion would of necessity be alike true, neither could there be any absolute falsehood in any, because πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, "every fancy is true," that is, every fancy is a fancy or an appearance, and nothing more is required to it; for absolute truth belongs not to the nature of it. But it is evident to all that are not sunk and degenerated below men into brutish sottishness, that there are false opinions: whence it follows undeniably, that the noetical knowing and intellective power extends to the absolute truth of things. So that whatever theoretical universal proposition in geometry or metaphysics is true to one mind, the same is absolutely true in itself, and therefore true to all minds whatsoever throughout the whole world, that clearly understand it.

4. Wherefore, though the immediate objects of knowledge, which are the intelligible essences of things, and their relations to one another or verities, exist nowhere but in minds; yet notwithstanding they are not figments of the mind, because then every opinion or cogitation would be alike true, that is, a true figment, having no other truth but relative to that particular mind whose figment it is. But these things have an absolute and immutable nature in themselves, and their mutual respects to one another are alike immutable. And therefore those opinions and cogitations of the mind, which are not conformable to the immutable reality of those objective ideas, have an absolute falsehood in them. As for example, the nature of a triangle is an immutable thing, and this is demonstrable of it, as immutably and necessarily true, that it hath three angles equal to two right ones: neither can any man's opinion or thinking make it otherwise: for it is a false opinion, unless it be agreeable to the

immutable nature of a triangle. So likewise the plain regular geometrical solids, as such, have an immutable nature or essence: and it is demonstrable of them, that there are five such bodies, and that there can be no more: and any opinion to the contrary will be an absolute falsehood. Wherefore every opinion or thinking is not knowledge, but only a right opinion: and therefore knowledge is not relative, πρὸς τὸ κρίνον, as sense is. Truth is the most unbending and uncompliable, the most necessary, firm, immutable, and adamantine thing in the world.

4. Moreover, because these intelligible essences of things, as before was observed, are like unities indivisible; so that if the least be added to them, or detracted from them, they are not the same, but something else; whenever the same things are rightly understood by any minds, they must of necessity have all the same truths belonging to them every where. Nay, these truths are not at all multiplied, as we observed before, by the multiplicity of minds that apprehend them; but are one and the same individual truths in those several minds: forasmuch as wisdom, truth, and knowledge, are but one and the same eternal original light shining in all created understandings.

To conclude therefore, whenever any theoretical proposition is rightly understood by any one particular mind whatsoever, and wheresoever it be, the truth of it is no private thing, nor relative to that particular mind only, but it is ἀληθὲς καθολικὸν, "a catholic and universal truth," as the Stoics speak, throughout the whole world; nay, it would not fail to be a truth throughout infinite worlds, if there were so many, to all such minds as should rightly understand it.

5. But probably it may be here demanded, how a man shall know when his conceptions are conformed to the absolute and immutable natures or essences of things, and their unchangeable relations to one another? Since the immediate objects of intellection exist in the mind itself, we must not go about to look for the criterion of truth without ourselves, by consulting individual sensibles, as the exemplars of our ideas, and measuring our conceptions by them. And how is it possible to know by measuring of sensible squares, that the diameter of every square is incommensurable with the sides? Nay, as was observed before, the necessary truth of no geometrical theorem can ever be examined, proved, or determined by sensible things mechanically. And though the eternal divine intellect be the archetypal rule of truth, we cannot consult that neither, to see whether our conceptions be commensurate with it. I answer therefore, that the criterion of true knowledge is not to be looked for any where abroad without our own minds, neither in the height above, nor in the depth beneath, but only in our knowledge and conceptions themselves. For the entity of all theoretical truth is nothing

else but clear intelligibility, and whatever is clearly conceived is an entity and a truth; but that which is false, divine power itself cannot make it to be clearly and distinctly understood, because falsehood is a nonentity, and a clear conception is an entity: and omnipotence itself cannot make a nonentity to be an entity.

Wherefore no man ever was or can be deceived in taking that for an epistemonical truth which he clearly and distinctly apprehends, but only in assenting to things not clearly apprehended by him, which is the only true original of all error.

6. But there is another opinion that seems to have gained the countenance of some very learned philosophers, which differs but a little from the Protagorean doctrine; though for my part I conceive it not to be an opinion, but only a certain scheme of modesty and humility, which they thought decorous to take upon themselves, that they might not seem to arrogate too much either to themselves, or to their excellent performances, by not so much as pretending to demonstrate any thing to be absolutely true, but only hypothetically, or upon supposition that our faculties are rightly made.

For if we cannot otherwise possibly be certain of the truth of any thing, but only ex hypothesi, that our faculties are rightly made, of which none can have any certain assurance but only he that made them, then all created minds whatsoever must of necessity be condemned to an eternal scepsis. Neither ought they ever to assent to any thing as certainly true, since all their truth and knowledge as such, is but relative to their faculties arbitrarily made, that may possibly be false, and their clearest constant apprehensions nothing but perpetual delusions.

Wherefore according to this doctrine, we having no absolute certainty of the first principles of all our knowledge, as that, Quod cogitat, est. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt æqualia. Omnis numerus est vel par vel impar. We can neither be sure of any mathematical or metaphysical truth, nor of the existence of God, nor of ourselves.

For whereas some would endeavour to prove the truth of their intellectual faculties from hence, because there is a God, whose nature also is such, as that he cannot deceive: it is plain that this is nothing but a circle, and makes no progress at all, forasmuch as all the certainty which they have of the existence of God, and of his nature, depends wholly upon the arbitrary make of their faculties; which, for aught they know, may be false. Nay, according to this doctrine, no man can certainly know that there is any absolute truth in the world at all; because it is nothing but his faculties which makes him think there is, which possibly may be false. Wherefore upon this supposition, all created knowledge, as such, is a mere fantastical thing.

Now, this is very strange to assert, that God cannot make a creature which shall be able certainly to know either the existence of God, or of himself; or whether there be any absolute truth or no.

7. It is evident that this opinion plainly supposes that intellectual faculties may be so made, as clearly and distinctly to understand that to be true which is absolutely false and impossible (for unless they did acknowledge that we do clearly understand some things, they could not undertake so much as hypothetically to demonstrate any thing) as for example, that the whole is not greater than one of its parts, or that the three angles of a triangle are never equal to two right angles.

Now, we have already demonstrated, that a falsehood can never be clearly conceived or apprehended to be true, because a falsehood is a mere non-entity; and whatsoever is clearly conceived or understood, is an entity; but a non-entity can never become an entity. Nay, the true knowledge or science which exists nowhere but in the mind itself, has no other entity at all besides intelligibility; and therefore, whatsoever is clearly intelligible, is absolutely true. Hence, it comes to pass that both philosophers and divines have without scruple measured the divine omnipotence itself, and the possibility of things, by their own clear intellections concerning them; and so pronounce that God himself cannot make contradictions to be true at the same time; whereas it were a high and unpardonable presumption thus to venture to measure the divine omnipotence, if there were not an absolute certainty of the truth of clear intellections, as being nothing else but the immutable wisdom of God participated and imparted to us. And if it be absolutely impossible even to omnipotence, that contradictories should be true together, then omnipotence itself cannot make any such faculties as shall clearly understand that which is false to be true, since the essence of falsehood consists in nothing else but non-intelligibility.

But if they will say that it is not impossible that contradictions should be true, because our faculties, which make us think so, may be false and deceive us in every thing, the necessary consequence from hence will be, that it is possible that there may be no certain knowledge at all, because if contradictories may be true, then nothing can be certainly affirmed or denied of any thing.

8. Wherefore, be our faculties what they will, and let them be supposed to be made how you will, yet notwithstanding whatsoever is clearly understood and conceived, has an objective entity in it, and must of necessity be true. For a clear conception cannot be nothing. And though intellectual faculties may be made obscure more or less, yet it is not possible that

they should ever be made false, so as clearly to apprehend whatsoever is true to be false, and what is false to be true.

So that if there were a world of men created either in the moon or elsewhere, that should affirm the contradictories to all the theorems in geometry; forasmuch as we certainly know that we clearly understand them to be true, and that falsehood can never be clearly understood, we ought not in the least to question from hence whether our faculties or theirs were made true, or to suspect that truth and knowledge were such whiffling things, as that they merely depended upon an arbitrary make of faculties; but conclude without any controversy that this was but a bedlam world of mad, frantic, and distracted souls, that had no clear apprehensions of any thing, and either by mere chance or humour happened to assent to every thing that was false as true.

9. But yet if any one will still pertinaciously urge, that it is nothing but our faculties which instruct us thus, that every clear conception is an entity, and that the entity of truth is nothing but clear intelligibility; that contradictions cannot be true, or if they could, then there were no possibility of any certain knowledge; that all this is from our faculties, but that still our faculties themselves may be false; nay, it is not reasonable to think that the intellectual faculties of any creatures should be absolutely infallible in any thing, because this seems to be the peculiar privilege and sole prerogative of the Deity.

I answer, that this is the thing we contend for, that the ultimate resolution of theoretical truth, and the only Κριτήριον, "criterion" of it, is in the clearness of the apprehensions themselves, and not in any supposed blind and unaccountable make of faculties. So that the certainty of clear apprehensions is not to be derived from the contingent truth of faculties, but the goodness of faculties is only to be tried by the clearness and distinctness of apprehensions. For be these faculties what they will, clear intellectual conceptions must of necessity be truths, because they are real entities. And to suppose that faculties may be so made, as to beget clear apprehensions of things that are not, as if knowledge were an arbitrary fictitious thing, is much like that opinion of some, that all the new celestial phenomena, as of the jovial planets, and the mountains in the moon, and the like, are no real things; but that the clear diaphanous crystal of the telescopes may be so artificially cut, ground, and polished, as to make all those, and any other phenomena, clearly to appear to sense, when there is no such thing: nay, it is more absurd and ridiculous to imagine, that that more than crystalline pellucid intellectual faculty, by which we perceive the truth of things, can be arbitrarily so made

or polished, as to represent any non-entities whatsoever, as clear and real objects of intellection.

10. Nay, to make the certainty of all truth and knowledge, not to be determined by the clearness of apprehensions themselves, but a supposed unaccountable truth and rectitude of faculties, and so by the uncertainty thereof, quite to baffle all our clearest intellections, is quite to pervert the nature of knowledge, which is κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος, "the comprehension of that which absolutely is;" which is not terminated in the τὸ φαινόμενον, appearance only, as sense is, but in that τὸ ὄν, "which is," "and whose evidence and certainty is no extrinsical, adventitious, and borrowed thing, but native and intrinsical to itself."

For if knowledge have no inward κριτήριον of its own, but the certainty of all truth and knowledge depend upon an arbitrary peculiar make of faculties, which is not a thing knowable in itself, neither can there be any assurance of it given but what is extrinsical by testimony and revelation, (inartificial arguments), there will be no such thing as knowledge, but all will be mere credulity and belief.

11. It is a fond imagination for any to suppose that it is derogatory to the glory of God to bestow or import any such gift upon his creatures as knowledge is, which hath an intrinsical evidence within itself, or that creatures should have a certainty of the first principles which all men are conscious that they do so clearly understand, that they cannot doubt of them, as that nihili nulla est affectio. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficient æqualia; without which they can know nothing at all; though they be notwithstanding ignorant, doubting, and erring in many things, and slowly proceed in their ratiocinations from one thing to another; whereas, on the contrary, it is plainly derogatory to it to suppose that God cannot make any creature that can possibly have any certain knowledge of God's own existence, or any thing more than a bare credulity of the same.

12. Wherefore since it cannot be denied but every clear apprehension is an entity, and the essence of truth is nothing but clear intelligibility, those philosophers must lay the stress of their cause here, that intellectual faculties may be so made, as that men can never certainly tell when they have clear apprehensions, but may think they have them, when they have not.

And it cannot be denied but that men are oftentimes deceived, and think they clearly comprehend what they do not: but it does not follow from hence, because men sometimes think that they clearly comprehend what they do not, that therefore they can never be certain that they do clearly comprehend any thing; which is just as if we should argue, that because in our dreams

we think we have clear sensations, we cannot therefore be ever sure, when we are awake, that we see things that really are.

I shall conclude this discourse with that of Origen against Celsus: Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπίστημα, "Science and knowledge is the only firm thing in the world," without a participation of which communicated to them from God, all creatures would be mere ludibria and vanity.

CHAPTER VI.

1. We have now abundantly confuted the Protagorean philosophy, which, that it might be sure to destroy the immutable natures of just and unjust, would destroy all science or knowledge, and make t relative and fantastical. Having shown that this tenet is not only most absurd and contradictious in itself, but also manifestly repugnant to that very atomical physiology on which Protagoras endeavoured to found it, and, than which nothing can more effectually confute and destroy it: and also largely demonstrated, that though sense be indeed a mere relative and fantastical perception, as Protagoras thus far rightly supposed; yet notwithstanding there is a superior power of intellection and knowledge of a different nature from sense, which is not terminated ἐν τῷ φαινομένῳ, "in mere seeming and appearance only," but ἐν τῷ ὄντι, "in the truth and reality of things," and reaches to the comprehension of that which really and absolutely is, whose objects are the eternal and immutable essences and natures of things, and their unchangeable relations to one another.

2. To prevent all mistake, I shall again remember what I have before intimated, that where it is affirmed that the essences of all things are eternal and immutable; which doctrine the theological schools have constantly avouched, this is only to be understood of the intelligible essences and rationes of things, as they are the objects of the mind: And that there neither is nor can be any other meaning of it, than this, that there is an eternal knowledge and wisdom, or an eternal mind or intellect, which comprehends within itself the steady and immutable rationes of all things and their verities, from which all particular intellects are derived, and on which they do depend. But not that the constitutive essences of all individual created things were eternal and uncreated, as if God in creating of the world, did nothing else, but as some sarcastically express it, Sartoris instar rerum essentias vestire existentia, only clothed the eternal, increated, and antecedent essences of things with a new outside garment of existence, and not created the whole of them: and as if the

constitutive essences of things could exist apart separately from the things themselves, which absurd conceit Aristotle frequently, and no less deservedly chastises.

3. Wherefore the result of all that we have hitherto said is this, that the intelligible natures and essences of things are neither arbitrary nor fantastical, that is, neither alterable by any will whatsoever, nor changeable by opinion; and therefore every thing is necessarily and immutably to science and knowledge what it is, whether absolutely or relatively, to all minds and intellects in the world. So that if moral good and evil, just and unjust, signify any reality, either absolute or relative, in the things so denominated, as they must have some certain natures, which are the actions or souls of men, they are neither alterable by mere will nor opinion.

Upon which ground that wise philosopher Plato, in his Minos, determines that νόμος, "a law," is not δόγμα πόλεως, "any arbitrary decree of a city or supreme governors;" because there may be unjust decrees, which therefore are no laws, but τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις, "the invention of that which IS," or what is absolutely or immutably just, in its own nature. Though it be very true also, that the arbitrary constitutions of those that have lawful authority of commanding, when they are not materially unjust, are laws also in a secondary sense, by virtue of that natural and immutable justice or law that requires political order to be observed.

4. But I have not taken all this pains only to confute scepticism or fantasticism, or merely to defend and corroborate our argument for the immutable natures of just and unjust; but also for some other weighty purposes that are very much conducing to the business that we have in hand. And first of all, that the soul is not a mere rasa tabula, a naked and passive thing, which has no innate furniture or activity of its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it without; for if it were so, then there could not possibly be any such thing as moral good and evil, just and unjust; forasmuch as these differences do not arise merely from the outward objects, or from the impresses which they make upon us by sense, there being no such thing in them; in which sense it is truly affirmed by the author of the Leviathan, page 24, "That there is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves," that is, either considered absolutely in themselves, or relatively to external sense only, but according to some other interior analogy which things have to a certain inward determination in the soul itself, from whence the foundation of all this difference must needs arise, as I shall show afterwards; not that the anticipations of morality spring merely from intellectual forms and notional ideas of the mind, or from certain rules or propositions, arbitrarily printed upon the soul as upon a book,

but from some other more inward and vital principle, in intellectual beings, as such, whereby they have a natural determination in them to do some things, and to avoid others, which could not be, if they were mere naked passive things. Wherefore since the nature of morality cannot be understood, without some knowledge of the nature of the soul, I thought it seasonable and requisite here to take this occasion offered, and to prepare the way to our following discourse, by showing in general, that the soul is not a mere passive and receptive thing, which hath no innate active principle of its own, because upon this hypothesis there could be no such thing as morality.

5. Again, I have the rather insisted upon this argument also, because that which makes men so inclinable to think that justice, honesty and morality are but thin, airy and fantastical things, that have little or no entity or reality in them besides sensuality, is a certain opinion in philosophy which doth usually accompany it, that matter and body are the first original and source of all things; that there is no incorporeal substance superior to matter, and independent upon it; and therefore that sensible things are the only real and substantial things in nature; but souls and minds springing secondarily out of body, that intellectuality and morality which belong unto them, are but thin and evanid shadows of sensible and corporeal things, and not natural, but artificial and factitious things that do as it were border upon the confines of nonentity.

6. This is a thing excellently well observed by Plato, and therefore I shall set down his words at large concerning it: *Λέγουσί που τινὲς ὡς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ διὰ τύχην. Ἔοικε δὲ φασὶ, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην· ἣν δὲ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων καὶ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεσθαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. Ὧδ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασὶ, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων· καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. Τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ ξυμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πῶς θερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ πρὸς ὑγρὰ, καὶ μαλακὰ πρὸς σκληρά· καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράσει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη. Ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανόν· καὶ ζῶα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐν τούτων γενομένων· οὐ διὰ νοῦν φασὶν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν, οὐδὲ δια τέχνην, ἀλλὰ ὃ λέγομεν φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. Τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην αὐτὴν θνητὴν ἐκ θνητῶν, ὕστερα γεγεννηκέναι παιδείας τινὰς, ἀληθείας οὐ σφόδρα μετεχούσας, ἀλλ' εἴδωλα ἄττα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν· οἷα ἡ γραφὴ γεννᾷ, καὶ Μουσικὴ, καὶ*

ὅσαι ταύταις εἰσὶ συνέριθοι τέχναι· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν πᾶσαν οὐ φύσει, τέχνῃ δὲ, ἧς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς· εἶναι τὰς θέσεις, "These men making this distribution of things, that all things that are, are either by nature, or art, or chance, they imagine that the greatest and most excellent things that are in the world, are to be attributed to nature and chance; which working upon those greater things which are made by nature, does form and fabricate certain smaller things afterward, which we commonly call artificial things. To speak more plainly, fire, water, air and earth, they attribute wholly to nature and chance, but not to any art or wisdom; in like manner those bodies of the earth, the sun, moon and stars, they will have to be made out of them fortuitously agitated; and so by chance causing both divers systems and compages of things; thus they would have the whole heavens made, and all the earth and animals, and all the seasons of the year, not by any mind, intellect, or God, not by any art or wisdom, but all by blind nature and chance. But art and mind afterwards springing up out of these, to have begotten certain ludicrous things, which have little truth and reality in them, but are like images in a glass, such as picture and music produces. Wherefore these men attribute all ethics, politics, morality and laws, not to nature, but to art, whose productions are not real and substantial."

7. Now this philosopher, that he may evince that ethics, politics and morality are as real and substantial things, and as truly natural as those things which belong to matter, he endeavours to show that souls and minds do not spring secondarily out of matter and body, but that they are real things in nature, superior and antecedent to body and matter. His words are these: Ψυχὴν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ὀλίγου ξύμπαντες, οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει καὶ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι, καὶ δὴ καὶ γενέσεως ὡς ἐν πρώτοις ἐστὶ σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, καὶ μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν καὶ μετακοσμήσεως ἁπάσης ἄρχη παντὸς μᾶλλον, "These men are all ignorant concerning the nature of mind and soul, as in other regards, so especially in respect of its original, as it is in order of nature before matter and body, and does not result out of it; but does command it, govern it, and rule it."

And I have in like manner in this antecedent discourse, endeavoured to show that wisdom, knowledge, mind and intellect, are no thin shadows or images of corporeal and sensible things, nor do result secondarily out of matter and body, and from the activity and impressions thereof; but have an independent and self-subsistent being, which in order of nature is before body; all particular created minds being but derivative participations of one infinite eternal mind, which is antecedent to all corporeal things.

8. Now from hence it naturally follows, that those things

which belong to mind and intellect, such as morality, ethics, politics and laws are, which Plato calls, *νοῦ γεννήματα οὐχ ἧττον φύσει εἶναι ἢ φύσεως*, "The offspring and productions of mind, are no less to be accounted natural things, or real and substantial, than those things which belong to stupid and senseless matter;" for since mind and intellect are first in order of nature before matter and body, those things which belong to the mind must needs be in order of nature before those things which belong to the body. *Ἆρα οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, οὔσης ταύτης πρεσβυτέρας ἢ σώματος, νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος καὶ τρόπος καὶ ἤθη σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν, βαρέων καὶ κούφων, μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους πρότερα*, "Wherefore mind and intellect, art and law, ethics and morality are first in order of nature, before hard and soft, light and heavy, long and broad, which belong to body;" and therefore more real and substantial things. For since mind and intellect are a higher, more real and substantial thing than senseless body and matter, and what hath far the more vigour, activity and entity in it, modifications of mind and intellect, such as justice and morality, must of necessity be more real and substantial things, than the modifications of mere senseless matter, such as hard and soft, thick and thin, hot and cold, and the like are. And therefore that grave philosopher excellently well concludes: *Τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις (ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν) αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης εἴη καὶ νοῦ*, that "the greatest and first works and actions are of art or of mind, which were before body; but those things which are said to be by nature (in which they abuse the word nature, appropriating it only to senseless and inanimate matter) are afterwards, being governed by mind and art."

9. Wherefore I thought our former discourse seasonable to confute the dulness and grossness of those philosophasters that make corporeal things existing without the soul, to be the only solid and substantial things, and make their grossest external senses the only judges of reality of things, *οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἅπριξ ταῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι*, "and so conclude nothing is or has any reality but what they can grasp in their hands, or have some gross or palpable sense of."

Whereas notwithstanding it is most true that those corporeal qualities, which they think to be such real things existing in bodies without them, are for the most part fantastic and imaginary things, and have no more reality than the colours of the rainbow; and, as Plotinus expresseth it, *καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν*, "have no reality at all in the objects without us, but only a seeming kind of entity in our own fancies;" and therefore are not absolutely any thing in

themselves, but only relative to animals. So that they do in a manner mock us, when we conceive of them as things really existing without us, being nothing but our own shadows, and the vital passive energies of our own souls.

Though it was not the intention of God or nature to abuse us herein, but a most wise contrivance thus to beautify and adorn the visible and material world, to add lustre or embellishment to it, that it might have charms, relishes, and allurements in it, to gratify our appetites; whereas otherwise really in itself, the whole corporeal world in its naked hue, is nothing else but a heap of dust or atoms, of several figures and magnitudes, variously agitated up and down; so that these things, which we look upon as such real things without us, are not properly the modifications of bodies themselves, but several modifications, passions, and affections of our own souls.

10. Neither are these passive and sympathetical energies of the soul, when it acts confusedly with the body and the pleasures resulting from them, such real and substantial things as those that arise from the pure noetical energies of the soul itself intellectually and morally; for since the mind and intellect is in itself a more real and substantial thing, and fuller of entity than matter and body, those things which are *νοῦ γεννήματα*, "the pure offspring of the mind," and sprout from the soul itself, must needs be more real and substantial than those things which blossom from the body, or from the soul enfeebled by it, and slumbering in it.

11. Wherefore that philosopher professing and understanding to confute Atheists, and to show, *τοὺς λόγων ἁπτομένους ἀσεβῶν μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρᾶσθαι*, "that all Atheists, though they pretend to wit never so much, are but bunglers at reason, and sorry philosophers," he, not without cause, fetches his discourse from hence, that *ὅτι ὃ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο οὐ πρῶτον ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντό εἶναι γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι, ὃ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον, ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τῆς ὄντως οὐσίας*, "They that thus infect men's minds with impiety and atheism, make that which is the first cause of all generation and corruption, to be the last thing in the universe, and that which is the last to be the first: from hence proceeds their error concerning the being of God;" that is, they make mind and soul to be the last thing, and body and matter to be the first.

This therefore is the only course and method which this philosopher proceeds in to confute the Atheists; to show, *ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν*, "that mind and soul, in the order of the universe, are before body, and not posterior to it; mind and soul being that which rules in the universe, and body that which is ruled and ordered by it." And there is no

phenomenon in the world but may be solved from this hypothesis.

Now this he demonstrates, even from local motion, because body and matter has no self-moving power, and therefore it is moved and determined in its motion by a higher principle, a soul or mind; which argument is further improved by the author of that excellent philosophical treatise, book ii. chap. 2.

12. Now, for the self-same cause, I have endeavoured to demonstrate in the foregoing discourse, that knowledge and intellection cannot possibly spring from sense, nor the radiation or impresses of matter and body upon that which knows, but from an active power of the mind, as a thing antecedent to matter, and independent upon it, whereby it is enabled from within itself to exert intelligible ideas of all things.

13. Lastly, I have insisted the rather so largely upon this argument, for this further reason also, because it is not possible that there should be any such thing as morality, unless there be a God, that is, an infinite eternal mind that is the first original and source of all things, whose nature is the first rule and exemplar of morality; for otherwise it is not conceivable, whence any such thing should be derived to particular intellectual beings. Now there can be no such thing as God, if stupid and senseless matter be the first original of all things; and if all being and perfection that is found in the world, may spring up and arise out of the dark womb of unthinking matter; but if knowledge and understanding, if soul, mind, and wisdom may result and emerge out of it, then doubtless every thing that appears in the world may; and so night, matter, and chaos, must needs be the first and only original of all things.

14. Wherefore Plato, as I have already intimated, taking notice of the opinion of divers pretenders to philosophy, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον, "that fire, water, air, and earth, are the first beings of all, to which senseless and inanimate things they appropriate the title of nature: but that soul did spring up afterward out of these as a secondary thing," and as a mere shadow of them, he immediately adds concerning it: Οἷον πήγην τινὰ ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσοι πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφήψαντο ζητημάτων, "We have here found and discovered the true fountain of all that atheistical madness that possesses most of those that deal in physiology or questions of natural philosophy," viz. that they are all possessed with this sottishness, that matter and body is the first original of all things; and therefore it is observed by the same author, that the same persons that held all things were derived from body, blind nature, and chance, did both deny the existence of God, and which is consentaneous thereunto, asserted that justice and morality have no nature or entity at all, saying,

they were nothing but passion from corporeal things, without the sentient or the renitence, or the reaction made upon local motion in a body duly mixed and tempered: that is, if soul and mind, knowledge and wisdom may thus arise from the contemplation of mere senseless matter, and radiation or impression that is the mere local motion of corporeal objects without, then, as we said before, there cannot possibly be the least shadow of argument left to prove a Deity by; since not only the souls of men, but also all that wisdom, counsel, and contrivance that appears in the frame of the whole visible world, might first arise in like manner from the mere casual concourse and contemperation of the whole matter; either in those particular bodies of the sun and stars, or else in the whole system and compages of the material world itself.

15. Wherefore we have not only showed that all intellection and knowledge does not emerge or emane out of sense, but also that sense itself is not a mere passion or reception of corporeal impresses without, but that it is an active energy and vigour, though sympathetical in the sentient. And it is no more possible that this should arise out of senseless matter and atoms, by reason of any peculiar contemperation or contexture of them in respect of figure, site, and motion, than that which all Atheists stoutly deny, that something should arise out of nothing.

And here we can never sufficiently applaud that ancient atomical philosophy, so successfully revived of late by Cartesius, in that it shows distinctly what matter is, and what it can amount unto, namely, nothing else but what may be produced from mere magnitude, figure, site, local motion, and rest; from whence it is demonstrably evident and mathematically certain, that no cogitation can possibly arise out of the power of matter; whereas that other philosophy which brings in a dark unintelligible matter that is nothing and every thing, out of whose potentiality not only innumerable qualities, but also substantial forms and sensitive souls (and therefore why not rational also, since all reason emerges out of sense) may be educed, must of necessity perpetually brood and hatch Atheism. Whereas we cannot but extremely admire that monstrous dotage and sottishness of Epicurus, and some other spurious pretenders to this atomical philosophy, that notwithstanding they acknowledge nothing else in matter besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion, yet would make not only the power of sensation, but also of intellection and ratiocination, and therefore all human souls, to arise from the mere contexture of corporeal atoms, and utterly explode all incorporeal substances; than which two assertions nothing can be more contradictious. And this is far more absurd, to make reason and intellection to arise from magnitude, figure and motion, than to attribute those unintelligible qualities to matter which they explode.

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